

NO. 25-7131



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSÉ YEYILLE

Petitioner,


v.

THE FLORIDA BAR

Respondent.

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT**

José Yeyille, PRO·SE
Citizen José
5505 SW 135th Court
Miami, Florida 33175
joseyeyille25@outlook.com



QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. **Right to Counsel**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent, The Florida Bar, deprived me, an **indigent man**, of my right to be **represented by counsel** protected by the **Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment** and the **Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution** *before, during, and after* disciplinary proceedings against me—**who had at all relevant times proceeded as a common citizen**—for alleged violations of Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (**RRTFB**) which are indistinguishable from **criminal statutes punishing libel against the government (judiciary)**.
2. **VLTRA·VIREs**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent, The Florida Bar, acted beyond their jurisdiction—**VLTRA·VIREs**—by harassing and prosecuting me, a **layperson** (Citizen José) who at all relevant times proceeded **only** in his **personal capacity**, for libel against the government (judiciary), and then extorting and suspending *attorney José Yeyille* for ninety-one days for alleged violations of **RRTFB** indistinguishable from **criminal statutes punishing libel against the government (judiciary)**, violated my rights to **Free Speech and Free Association, and to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances** protected by the **First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution**.
3. **Anti-SLAPP**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court's and its agent, The Florida Bar's complaint and prosecution against me for criticizing The judiciary of the state of Florida (**public issues in court filings**) and denying to me the right to challenge the Report of Referee, and to dismiss their inquisition under **Florida Anti-SLAPP Statute §768.295(4)** violated my **rights to Free Speech, Free Association, and to Access the Courts, to Petition the Government (judiciary) for a Redress of Grievances** protected by the **First Amendment, and my rights to a Fair Trial, Due Process, and Equal Protection** protected by the **First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution**.

4. **Absolute Litigation Privilege**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent, The Florida Bar, violated my right to **absolute litigation immunity** and my rights to **Free Speech and Due Process and Equal Protection protected by the U.S. Constitution** because, **in my capacity as common citizen**, I criticized the judiciary of the state of Florida and a law firm **in court filings**.

5. **First Amendment**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent The Florida Bar's prosecution against me for Rules Regulating The Florida Bar which are **indistinguishable from criminal statutes punishing libel against the government (judiciary)** deprived me of my rights to **Free Speech, Free Association, and to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution** for criticizing the judiciary of the state of Florida (**public issues**) exclusively in **court filings**.

5. **Vagueness and Overbreadth**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent The Florida Bar harassed, prosecuted, and extorted me for the alleged violation of Rules Regulating The Florida Bar which are so incurably vague and overbroad that they can be deceptively wielded as **criminal statutes** to punish conduct in a way which they cannot otherwise constitutionally achieve.

6. **Right to Jury Trial**: Whether the Florida Supreme Court and its agent, The Florida Bar's prosecution against me for Rules Regulating The Florida Bar which are **indistinguishable from criminal statutes punishing libel against the government (judiciary)** entitles me to the right to a **jury trial protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution**.

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

José Yeyille.

The Florida Bar.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Florida Bar v. Yeyille, SC2024-0235 (October 24, 2025)

Florida Bar v. Yeyille, 2024 WL 4903524, No. SC2024-0235
(Fla. Nov. 27, 2024)

Florida Bar v. Yeyille, SC2024-0235 (May 21, 2024)

José Yeyille v. Justin Speigel, 3D23-2147 (3rd DCA April 4, 2024).

José Yeyille v. Dinah Stein, et al., 3D24-418 (3rd DCA April 4, 2024)

José Yeyille v. Glenn Falk, et al., 3D23-0926 (3rd DCA Aug. 25, 2023)

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as moot my Emergency Petition(s) for Writs of MANDAMVS/
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Florida Bar v. Yeyille, 2024 WL 4903524, No. SC2024-0235

(Fla. Nov. 27, 2024)

Florida Bar v. Yeyille, SC2024-0235 (May 21, 2024)

José Yeyille v. Dinah Stein, et al., 3D24-418 (3rd DCA April 4, 2024)

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Yeyille v. Speigel, 373 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA June 14, 2023).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The final judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was issued on **October 24, 2025**.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under **28 U.S.C. §1257(a)**.

Petitioner kindly petitions this Court for a Writ of CERTIORARI to review the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

ARTICLE VI. This Constitution...and all treaties made...under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

AMENDMENT I: Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech...or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to an impartial jury...and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV: No state shall...deprive any person of...liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Article 27. Disciplinary Proceedings. “**Lawyers shall have the right to a fair hearing, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer of their choice.**”

Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. (**U.S. is signatory**).

Rule 18. Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. American Bar Association. Commentary: “...the license must not be arbitrarily taken away and the holder is entitled to procedural **due process** in any proceeding relating to such conduct. Such **due process** rights include... **right to counsel**.”

Rule 34. Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. American Bar Association. “Upon receipt of satisfactory proof of a respondent’s **indigency**, the board may request **a lawyer** to serve as counsel for the respondent.”

Florida Statute §768.295 (Anti-SLAPP).

§768.295(3):

A person or **governmental entity** in this state may not file or cause to be filed, through its employees or agents, any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim against another person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the constitutional right of **free speech** in connection with a **public issue**, or right to **peacefully assemble, to instruct representatives of government, or to petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental entities of this state, as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.**

§768.295(4):

A person or entity sued by a governmental entity or another person in violation of this section has a right to an expeditious resolution of a claim that the suit is in violation of this section. A person or entity

may move the court for an order dismissing the action or granting final judgment in favor of that person or entity....

The court may award, subject to the limitations in s. 768.28, the party sued by a governmental entity **actual damages** arising from a governmental entity's violation of this section. The court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed in violation of this section.

Rules Regulating the Florida Bar ("RRTFB")

3-7-4 GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE PROCEDURES.

3-7-4(h) Rights and Responsibilities of the Respondent. "The respondent may be accompanied by counsel."

10.7.2 PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.

10.7.2(b). Indigency of Respondent. "Any respondent who is determined to be indigent by the referee is entitled to the appointment of counsel."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 14, 2023, a panel of the third district court of appeal of Florida issued a written order referring me to disciplinary proceedings by The Florida Bar on account that my Motion for Rehearing pursuant to *Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill*, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (constitutional challenges to that court's order without opinion), impugned the qualifications or integrity of the judiciary of the state of Florida, because I accuse the law firm "Greenberg Traurig P.A. [of] own[ing] the judges of the Third District Court of Appeal", and

“that the judges of the judiciary of the state of Florida, from the district courts of appeals, especially the Third District Court of Appeal, to the justices of the Florida Supreme Court, are racists and elitists who deliberately issue PER CURIAM affirmances, in the vast majority of cases that they decide, to indigents, and indigent PRO SE Black and Hispanic parties which, in turn, preclude appeals and petitions for writs to the Florida Supreme Court.”
Jose Yeyille v. Justin Cole Spiegel, 373 So. 3d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA June 14 2023).[APPENDIX G].

Most significantly, the court forbade only Citizen José from filing “further pro se filings”—but not attorney José Yeyille—who resumed filing appeals regarding other cases. [APPENDICES D, E, F].

Two days later a distinguished national and international publication published a distinguished Ethics professor’s statement regarding my case:

“Third DCA Sanctions Miami Lawyer But Avoids Underpinning Issues.” Michael A. Mora. June 16, 2023, 01:34 PM. ALM/Law.com.

““All of these issues are central to the bar and bench in Florida, all are surfaced in Yeyille v. Spiegel, and all remain unresolved to the detriment of the rule of law””, said Anthony V. Alfieri of the University of Miami School of Law, who is not involved in the litigation.”
““[The Third DCA per curiam opinion issued on June 14, 2023] was noteworthy for its avoidance on vital issues underpinning them,”” said Anthony V. Alfieri of Miami School of Law. Alfieri, the founding director of the Center for Ethics and Public Service and a professor at Miami Law, who is not involved in the matter, said in an email that three issues stood out that ““remain unresolved to the detriment of the rule of law.””

““First, the increasing court use of per curiam affirmances on appeal. In fact, from 1983 to 1998, the number of PCAs increased by 92.7% in Florida District Courts of Appeal,”” Alfieri said. ““Second, the growing impact of law firm financing of increasingly costly judicial

election campaigns. And third, the rising state-wide controversy over the role of race in litigation and adjudication.””

September 29, 2023. I received a Notice of Grievance Committee Review signed by William Chung, Bar Counsel of the Florida Bar, (“Chung”) threatening to have a vote “as to whether probable cause is present” to prosecute me in my capacity as an attorney pursuant to the panel of judges of the third district court of appeal’s referral.

October 13, 2023, I sent a letter to Chung and the Grievance Committee informing them that The Florida Bar and its grievance committee does not have jurisdiction against citizens and nonlawyers, or any person representing himself in his individual capacity, and that at all relevant times in that court proceeding, in my capacity as common U.S. Citizen, I was exercising my rights to Free Speech on Public Issues, Free Association (not to be forced to associate with an organization that harasses attorneys and common citizens for exercising our First Amendment rights), and to Petition the Government (Judiciary) for a redress of grievances) protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

October 23, 2023. Chung sent the “Notice of Finding Probable Cause for Further Disciplinary Proceedings” informing me that they had found probable cause to prepare a formal complaint accusing me of violating Rules Regulating

the Florida Bar (“RRTFB”) which are undistinguishable from criminal libel statutes: RRTFB 3-4.3. Misconduct and Minor Misconduct. RRTFB 4-3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions. RRTFB 4-8.2(a) Impugning Qualifications and Integrity of Judges or Other Officers. RRTFB 4-8.4(d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

On February 15, 2024, Bar Counsel Chung and Bar Staff Counsel Patricia Ann Toro Savitz (“Toro”) filed a complaint against me on behalf of the Florida supreme court...in the Florida supreme court. *The Florida Bar v. Jose L Yeyille*, SC2024-0235.

February 16, 2024. I made the first of 10 requests to the Bar, Referee, and the Florida supreme court, repeatedly and consistently demanding to be represented by attorney(s) paid by The Florida Bar on account of my indigency.¹ October 24, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court denied my Motion for Rehearing closing the case (APPENDIX A). *See Florida Supreme*

.....

¹ February 16, 2024: Motion for Clarification Regarding Referee requesting that The Florida Bar and Florida supreme court hire an attorney to represent me in Bar disciplinary proceedings (Ignored by the Florida supreme court, The Bar and their Referee). April 13, 2024: Emergency Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or All Writs filed in Florida supreme court demanding to be represented by counsel (Denied May 21, 2024) [APPENDIX C]. May 27,

Court's official ACIS /Courts System www.flcourts.gov).

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2024: Response to Bar's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment...I am Entitled to Free Counsel, Transcripts, and Any and All Costs (Denied by the Bar and the Referee at trial of June 17, 2024). June 16, 2024: I made written demand to the Referee and the Bar that the Florida Supreme Court Appoint an Attorney for His Inquisition, and His Right to Jury Trial (Denied by the Bar and Referee at trial, June 17, 2024). June 17, 2024: Before the trial began, I repeatedly requested from the Referee and Bar counsel to be represented by counsel, and a jury trial. (Denied by Bar counsel and Referee). Whereupon I respectfully told the Referee that I was going to leave. Referee informed me that the trial will proceed IN·ABSENTIAM. Thereupon, I kindly bade farewell to Bar counsel and Referee ET·EXEI, and that same day filed Emergency Petition(s) for Writ of MANDAMVS and/or Prohibition and/or...All Writs to Command the Referee and The Florida Bar to Hire and Appoint Attorney(s) to Represent Indigent Respondent for His Inquisition for Libel against the Government—

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I timely, repeatedly, and “properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision[s]” all “federal claims” which I kindly ask this Court “to review.”

Gibson v. Berryl, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973); *Adams v. Robertson*, 520 U.S. 83, 86 (1997). The Florida supreme court’s deceptive evasions and refusals to rule on my constitutional challenges raised in my Motions to Dismiss the Report of

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the Judiciary of the State of Florida (Denied as moot, November 27, 2024). **October 8, 2024**: I timely filed Motion to Dismiss the Report of Referee with Prejudice and Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Florida Statute §768.295(4) Anti-SLAPP in the Florida supreme court. **November 27, 2024**: Florida supreme court’s order striking—and forging and erasing **my demand to be represented by counsel paid by the Florida supreme court and the Bar**—on account that my Motions did not “contest” (“[t]he uncontested report of the referee is approved”) suspending **attorney José Yeville** for 91 days, and extorting from him \$2,286.72 for “recovery costs”. [APPENDIX B]. **December 2, 2024**: I timely file Motion for Rehearing and Clarification. **October 24, 2025**: Florida supreme court’s order striking it and closing the case. [APPENDIX A. **Case Closed**]. See page 7, SVpra.

Referee/Anti-SLAPP Statute and Rehearing and Clarification² does not immunize it from review by this Court^{3,4,5}; nor does its denials of those same federal claims raised in emergency petitions for writs of MANDAMVS/

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² “The one belief the Majority, the Florida Supreme Court, and I appear to share about the Florida Supreme Court is that it has repeatedly acted deceptively... I believe the Florida Supreme Court acted deceptively...I also believe the Florida Supreme Court acted deceptively...” *Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 857 F.3d 1169, 1245 n.273 (11th Cir. 2017). (Judge Gerald Tjoflat, dissenting). In the Florida supreme court’s justices’ defense, you High Priests of the Potomac do not have a clue about what judicial integrity is either. “[Justices of the United States Supreme Court] do[] not even have a consistent theory about what it means by “judicial integrity.”” *Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar*, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1680 (2015)(Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting).

³ *Truax v. Corrigan*, 257 U.S. 312, 324 (1921):

In cases brought to this Court from state courts for review, on the ground that a federal right set up in the state court has been wrongly denied, and in which the state court has put its decision on a finding that the asserted federal right has no basis in point of fact, or has been waived or lost, this Court, as an incident of its **power to determine whether a federal right has been wrongly denied, may go behind the finding to see whether it is without substantial support. If the rule were otherwise, it almost always would be within the power of a state court practically to prevent a review here.** (Emphasis).

⁴ ““Whatever springs the state may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the state confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.”” *Brown and Western R. Co. of Alabama*, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949)(quoting *Davis v. Wechsler*, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923)(emphasis added).

Prohibition/All Writs immunize it from this Court's review.⁶

I. Indigent laypersons and/or attorneys have the right to be represented by attorney(s) hired and paid by state Bars and supreme courts at every stage of state Bars' disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Amendment XIV, International Law, and Amendment VI of the U.S. Constitution.

I am unaware of any binding case law that requires state Bars and supreme courts to afford attorneys to **indigent laypersons and attorneys** in disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, The Florida Bar's, the Referee, and the Florida supreme court's repeated indifference, and positive refusals **without opinions** or any reference to any binding legal authority to refuse counsel to me is telling that my case and this Petition are ones of enormous precedential value.

“The federal guaranty of **due process** [and **equal protection**] extends to **state action through its judicial** as well as through its legislative, executive or

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⁵ **United States Constitution, Article VI., Section 2. Supremacy Clause. *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).**

⁶ “[A] state appellate court’s refusal, on the ground of mootness, to consider a federal claim, did not preclude our independent determination of the question of mootness; that is itself a question of federal law which this Court must ultimately decide.” ***Henry v. Mississippi*, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965).** ““Even the availability of a ‘partial remedy’ is ‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.’”” ***Chaffin v. Chaffin*, 568 U.S. 165, 177 (2013)(quoting from *Calderon v. Moore*, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)(per curiam)(quoting *Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States*, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992).**

administrative branch of government.” *Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill*, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930)[**emphasis mine**] (**emphasis**).

“This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases...but also in all types of cases where administrative...actions were under scrutiny.”” *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (quoting *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1959)).

A. Due Process (Amendment XIV).

U.S. Constitution. Amendment XIV, Section 1 states in pertinent part:

“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of...**liberty**, or **property**, without **due process of law**; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the **equal protection of the laws**.” (**Emphasis**).

“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.” *Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.*, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). “At a minimum...deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication [must] be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).

My Liberty: “The attorney...being by the solemn judicial act of the court clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor. The

right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors and to argue cases is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court.” *Ex Parte Garland*, 71 U.S. 333, 379 (1867). An attorney has the liberty right to engage in his occupation free of arbitrary interference from the government (judiciary). *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923):

While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life.... The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts.

My Property: A license to practice law is property because “it may [be] terminated...only ““for cause,”” respondents assert a ““legitimate claim of entitlement”” within the protection of the Due Process Clause.” *Memphis Light, Gas Water Div. v. Craft*, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978). See also *Ex Parte Garland* (1867). SVPRA.

B. International Law: Article 27. Disciplinary Proceedings. “Lawyers shall have the right to a fair hearing, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer of their choice.” *Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers*. Adopted

by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. (Emphasis).←←The United States is a signatory to this Treaty. U.S. Constitution, ARTICLE VI: This Constitution...and all treaties made... under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990).

C. American Bar Association. Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary

Enforcement:

Rule 18. Commentary: "...the license must not be arbitrarily taken away and the holder is entitled to procedural due process in any proceeding relating to such conduct. Such due process rights include... right to counsel." (Emphasis).

Rule 34. "Upon receipt of satisfactory proof of a respondent's indigency, the board may request a lawyer to serve as counsel for the respondent." (Emphasis).

Rules Regulating The Florida Bar:

3-7-4(h) Rights and Responsibilities of the Respondent. "The respondent may be accompanied by counsel." (Emphasis).

10-7.2(b). Indigency of Respondent. "Any respondent who is determined to be indigent by the referee is entitled to the appointment of counsel." (Emphasis).

Therefore, these binding legal authorities guarantee an **indigent layperson or attorney** the constitutional and legal rights to be **represented by counsel paid by The Florida Bar Bar and the Florida supreme court** at every state of a disciplinary proceeding.

D. Equal Protection. (Amendment XIV).

“Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.” ‘Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.’” *Sweatt v. Painter*, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)(quoting *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U. S. 1, 22(1948).”

The Florida Bar (Florida supreme court) hires and pays attorney(s) to represent nonlawyers accused of practicing law without a license. **RRTFB 10-7.2(b).**

The Florida supreme court /The Bar **hires and pays Greenberg Traurig, P.A.** to represent them in lawsuits filed against the Florida supreme court/The Bar; therefore, the Florida supreme court/The Bar **must hire and pay attorney(s)** to represent me at **every stage** of their prosecution against me, too.

The Florida Bar and the Florida supreme court must treat me the same way

they treat their “Longtime” attorneys of the law firm Greenberg Traurig, P.A.⁷

E. Sixth Amendment.

At all stages in The Florida Bar (Florida supreme court)’s threats to prosecute me, and then prosecuting me, and suspending attorney José Yeyille’s license and extorting him for the cost of his prosecution for the alleged violation of RRTFB which are in fact criminal statutes proscribing libel against the government (judiciary) masquerading as RRTFB, I prominently and repeatedly demanded—and was prominently and repeatedly denied—from the Bar, Bar Counsel, the Referee, and the Florida supreme court my right to be represented by counsel(s) hired and paid by them.

Amendment VI applies to the states through Amendment XIV. *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

Florida Statute §836.01 Punishment for Libel.—Any person convicted of the publication of a libel shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree,

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⁷ “Greenberg Traurig P.A.’s Barry Richard Obtains Supreme Court Decision in Favor of Longtime Client The Florida Bar.” May 1, 2015. (Greenberg Traurig P.A.’s website). The case: *Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar*, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).

punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

“[A] definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year”, §775.082 (4)(a), and /or “1,000 fine”, §775.083(1)(d).”

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 indirect criminal contempt is punishable by a “fine...not [to] exceed \$500 nor the imprisonment 12 months.” Florida Statute §775.02.

“For good reason, ““no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for *libel on government* have any place in the American system of jurisprudence.”” (*emphasis*). *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 US 254, 291-292 (1964)(*Emphasis added*).

In *Baldwin v. New York*, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) this Court held that “administrative conveniences “can[not]...justify denying an accused the important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months’ imprisonment.” [Emphasis mine]. I kindly urge this Court to go further and adopt Justices Black’s and Douglas’ dissent:

“Not all official sanctions are imposed in criminal proceedings, but when, as in this case, **the sanction bears all the indicia of a criminal punishment**, a jury trial cannot be denied by labeling the punishment ““petty.”” (ID. at 76, n.2)

Disciplinary Proceedings are Judicial Proceedings. RRTFB 3—7.6(f)(1)

states that disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are “*Administrative in Character*.” A disciplinary proceeding is neither civil nor criminal but is a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding.” Yet, “[t]he Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply.” (IBID.)

Chief justice Carlos Muniz appointed **judge** Carlos Guzman to be “**referee**” in Citizen José’s Inquisition. RRTFB 3—7.6(a)(1). **Justice** and **referee** put the ***judicial*** in judicial proceedings. “A judicial proceeding is a proceeding over which a judge presides.” (*Legal Information Institute*. Cornell Law School).

The Florida supreme court explains that they are “adversary proceedings” RRTFB 3—7.6(b); in a **court** RRTFB 3—7.6(d); with a “pretrial conference” RRTFB 3—7.6(c). The “Style of Proceedings” are the same as those used in court filings in criminal cases RRTFB 3—7.6(e). Cases against attorneys (**and now also common citizens**) are **prosecuted** by Bar counsels RRTFB 3—7.6(g) chosen by Staff Counsels chosen by the Board of Governors all of them agents of the Florida supreme court RRTFB 3—3.3.

As in criminal trials, Respondents are found “**guilty**”. “**Guilty**” has always been a verdict reserved for criminal cases.⁸ See *The Fla. Bar v. Jacobs*, No. SC2020-1602, p. 2 (Fla. Jun. 8, 2023): “We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt.” All the procedures before the “referee”

are undistinguishable from procedures before a judge in a criminal trial except that there are no rules of evidence, no jury, and no right to confront witnesses is allowed.^{9,10} *The Fla. Bar v. Maynard*, 672 So. 2d 530 (1996). *Referee Manual* The Florida Bar. Revised February 2024, pgs. 5-13.

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⁸ “[T]he word used by a prisoner in pleading to an indictment when he confesses the crime of which he is charged, and by the jury in convicting.” *Black’s Law Dictionary*. Second Edition (1910).

⁹ “The respondent in the ‘Court of the Star Chamber’ probably had more rights than the respondent in the Florida Lawyer Discipline System.” Warren Adrian Rachels. *Lawyer Discipline*. The Florida Bar. Vol. 95, No.3. May/June 2021, pg. 6.

¹⁰ Established to combat heresy, the Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición, known elsewhere as the Spanish Inquisition, afforded more due process protections than the Florida supreme court through its ALTER·EGO The Florida Bar. Those tried by the Inquisición had the right to have a defense attorney appointed by the Santo Oficio and free transcripts of their trials. *Inquisitorial Inquiries: Brief Lives of Secret Jews and Other Heretics*, Edited and Translated by Richard Kagan and Abigail Dyer. (2d ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). *The trial of faith in the Spanish Inquisition: Between Law and Repentance*. Jean-Pierre Dedieu and Gundmar W. Knutsen. Cambridge University Press (2023). Blasphemy was a crime punished in the common law by the state. “*Blasphemy and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment*.” 135 Harv. L. Rev. 659 (2021). A significant percentage of the Inquisición’s trials ended with the accused being found innocent. (See *Inquisitorial Inquiries* and *The trial of faith*, IBID.). The Inquisición did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Jews and Muslims. The Florida supreme court’s disciplinary prosecutions against attorneys have never ended finding one attorney innocent; that is 100% prosecutorial success right there. They prosecuted me even though they do not jurisdiction to prosecute laypersons. See INFRA. I’d rather be a Muslim or a Jew in XVII Century Spain than a layperson in Florida today.

Therefore, in addition to hire and pay attorney[s] to represent me because it accused and prosecuted me of committing the crime of libel, The Florida Bar and the Florida supreme court must grant me the right to a **trial by jury**.

ATTENTION: If this Court decides to grant me this Petition on account that I, an indigent common citizen and/or attorney, was entitled to an attorney hired and paid by the Bar **at all stages of the Bar's disciplinary proceedings** against me, then, I reckon it would be unnecessary to get further into the weeds of this Petition. But, if this Court is not persuaded that I had the right to counsel, then I urge this Court to get further in the weeds of this Petition.

The Weeds

II. The Florida Supreme Court did not have Jurisdiction to subject a Layperson to Disciplinary Proceedings.

The Florida supreme court's jurisdiction¹¹ is limited "to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted." Art. V, §15, Florida Constitution. At all relevant times I was **not** practicing law—because I was not representing anyone inside or outside the court—, thus I was

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¹¹ "‘Jurisdiction,’ in the strict meaning of the term, as applied to judicial officers and tribunals, means no more than the power lawfully existing to hear and determine a cause... It does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff, in the particular case before the court." *Malone v. Meres*, 91 Fla. 709, 725 (Fla. 1926).

not an attorney admitted to practice law by The Florida Bar.^{12, 13, 14, 15}

“Justices”, “judges”, and “attorneys” are mere titles and trades. They are not

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¹² At all relevant times, I **did not proceed in the capacity of an attorney, not even as a PRO•SE attorney.** This fact has been acknowledged even by the court that banned Citizen José from filing further appeals in it, except if I proceeded in my capacity as an attorney. See *Yeyille v. Speigel*, 373 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA June 14 2023)(APPENDIX G). *José Yeyille v. Glenn Falk, Esq.*, 3D-2023-926 (August 2, 2023)(APPX. F). *José Yeyille v. Justin Cole Speigel, M.D.*, 3D-2023-2147 (April 3, 2024)(APPX. E). *José Yeyille v. Dinah Stein, Esq. et al.*, 3D24-418. (April 3, 2024)(APPX. D). It did not involve a **“situation[] involving the practice of law”**, *Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules*, 624 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1993). Rules Regulating The Florida Bar apply only to those **“engage[d] in conduct in connection with the practice of law.”** Rule 4—8.4(d) (July 8, 2024).

¹³ The United States Supreme Court and the Florida supreme court agree on what constitutes “the practice of law”. It defines it as the “preparation and prosecution” and “conduct inevitably requir[ing] the practitioner to consider and advise his clients.” *Sperry v. Florida*, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963)[emphasis]. Indeed, when laypersons and nonlawyers have been prosecuted and punished for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, the crucial issue is whether they had performed those services for money for the benefit and in representation of a third person: **clients**. *The Florida Bar v. Furman*, 451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984).

¹⁴ “The Florida Supreme Court has identified ““acts commonly understood to be the practice of law”” to include ““**holding himself out as an attorney in dealings with others**; attempting to argue and advocate the merits of cases, the applicability of the law, evidentiary issues, liability issues, discovery matters, and settlement matters with opposing counsel; and attempting to analyze statutory and case law and to discuss it with clients and opposing counsel.”” *Yormak v. Yormak (In re Yormak)*, 640 B.R. 491, 503 (M.D. Fla. 2022)(quoting from *The Florida Bar v. Nieman*, 816 So. 2d 587, 594 (Fla. 2002) (**emphasis added**).

always justices, judges, and attorneys. They are persons, too. They eat, defecate, copulate, and die. They also sue and are sued for torts and breach of contracts. They receive traffic tickets, fines, and criminal indictments, and defend themselves in court in their capacities as common citizens; and they file complaints and prosecute them for civil damages, and defend themselves against civil lawsuits in their individual capacities; that is, as citizens; private citizens, just like Citizen José.

““It would give public servants an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves.”” *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)(quoting from *New York Time, Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 282-283 (1964)). In my capacity as common citizen—I am that critic.

III. The Florida Bar does not have subject matter jurisdiction to harass and prosecute me—Citizen José.

“[T]he defense of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Fla.

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¹⁵ Recently, in *Warren v. DeSantis*, 90 F.4th 1115 (Cir. January 11, 2024), The U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that a state attorney (emphasis on attorney) “spoke as a private citizen” (ID. at 1132) (**emphasis**) because he “did not sign the statements under his official duties”. (ID. at 1131). What’s in a signature? **Everything**. The Florida supreme court is bound by this decision. U.S. Constitution, Article VI., Section 2. Supremacy Clause. *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).

R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(2).” *Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co.*, 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994). The Bar’s Complaint and the Report of “Referee” went sideways as soon as they claimed that “Respondent is, and at all times mentioned during this investigation was, a member of The Florida Bar, subject to the jurisdiction and Disciplinary Rules of the Florida Supreme Court.”

At all relevant times, Citizen José was not, and did not proceed, as a member of the Florida Bar.

IV. VLTRA·VIREs: The Florida Bar (Florida Supreme Court), Bar Counsels, Referee, and Justices harassed, prosecuted, and extorted me beyond their authority.

“[J]udicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers.” *Harmon v. Brucker*, 355 U.S. 579, 581-582 (1958) (citing *Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty*, 187 U.S. 94, 108 (1902)). “Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.” *Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.*, No. 22-451, June 28, 2024, 603 U.S. ____ (2024).

“[Q]uestions of law that determine the constitutionality of an agency’s decision fall ““outside the competence of administrative agencies” because “the power of constitutional construction is inherent in, and exclusive to, the

judiciary.”” *Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, et al.*, 692 S.W. 3d 184 (Tex. June 28, 2024), pgs. 27-28 (quoting from *City of Dallas v. Stewart*, 361 S.W. 562, 578-579 (Tex. 2012)).¹⁶

The Florida supreme court refers to The Florida Bar as its “creation”, *The Florida Bar re Schwarz*, 552 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1989); “an official arm of this court.” RRTFB. Chapter 1. It is, in fact, an “administrative agency”. (See

¹⁶ *Hensley* resembles my case. In *Hensley*, a judge “authorized by virtue of her judicial office to officiate at wedding ceremonies but not required to do so as part of her judicial duties...announced that because of her religious beliefs she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples.” (ID. at 3)(**Emphasis**). Although she had the right to appeal it, she instead decided to sue “the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA)”←Kindly, remark its identical counterpart in Florida Anti-SLAPP Statute)←”and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution (the Free Speech Clause)” IBID. The trial court dismissed her claims for want of jurisdiction, barred them on account of sovereign immunity, and held that the Commission’s officers (commissioners) did not act in excess of their jurisdiction—ultra vires. The court of appeals affirmed. The Texas supreme court reversed and held that although the Commission itself has sovereign immunity neither the Commission nor its officers were entitled to it under the Texas Religious Freedom Act. (See Florida Anti-SLAPP Statute). Regarding the **VLTRA·VIRES** issue, it ordered the lower court to decide the constitutionality of the Commission’s “investigation, Public Warning, and threat of future discipline” (ID. at page 8) to determine whether the Commission and its officers acted beyond its jurisdiction because “questions of law that determine the constitutionality of an agency’s decision fall ““outside the competence of administrative agencies”” because the power of constitutional construction is inherent in, and exclusive to, the judiciary.”” ID. at 27. SVPRA.

Florida supreme court website photo, p. 7 SVpra.). “As an **official agency** of the Supreme Court of Florida...” The Florida Bar’s Regulation of Lawyer Conduct’s website. In *Liberty Counsel v. Florida Bar Board of Governors*, 12 So. 3d 183 (2009), the Florida supreme court refers to the Bar as a “corporation...a municipality, county, or town” (ID. at 191) subject to **VLTRA·VIREs** review to determine whether The Florida Bar’s actions are ““unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.”” (ID. at 191)(quoting from *Black’s Law Dictionary* 1559 (8th ed. 2004), and whether “the Bar...act[ed] contrary to any of its rules or policies, or rules promulgated by this Court.” (ID. at 192)[emphasis added].

““An agency action that is **arbitrary stands outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency for purposes of review...**(allowing for remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion, among other things, was ““**[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law’ or [o]therwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision**””””.

Floridians Against Inflated Rates, Inc. v. Clark, No. SC2021-1761, p. 23 (Fla. Sep.28, 2023)(quoting from *Int’l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Cap. Truck, Inc.*, 872 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)(**Emphasis added**).

Therefore, because at all relevant times I was **not** practicing law, but

proceeding as a common Citizen, The Florida Bar and the Florida supreme court did not have jurisdiction to harass, prosecute, and extort common citizens and lay-persons.

V. Absolute Litigation Privilege.

“The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding extends not only to the parties in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well.” *Levin, Middle-brooks v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co*, 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994)(Emphasis).¹⁷

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¹⁷ Wielding *Levin*, the same Florida appellate court that referred me to the Bar for disciplinary proceedings for criticizing the judiciary of the state of Florida held that I could not sue two attorneys and their client for defamation PER·SE and ordinary defamation because they were entitled to immunity from liability for these statements:

“It is likewise not the Plaintiff’s first attempt to defraud the court into believing that he is an unknowledgeable pro se plaintiff as he is actually a barred attorney in the state of Florida parading under the guise of a prose plaintiff nor is it the Plaintiff’s first attempt to defraud the court by claiming indigency by asserting that his monthly bills total the exact amount as his monthly earnings in an effort to skirt the reasonable fees required for filing a complaint.”

And “Acting under his own proclamations of indigency”. *Yeyille v. Speigel*, 3D23-2147 and *Yeyille v. Stein, et al.*, 3D24-418. The Florida supreme court denied CERTIORARI for the first, *Yeyille v. Speigel*, SC2024-1672; and denied discretionary for the latter because it did not only include an “elaborate order”, but no order at all! *Yeyille v. Stein, at al.*, SC2024-1682.

Therefore, The Florida Bar and the Florida state supreme court violated the **universal principle** adopted by all jurisdictions in the United States—and all civilized nations—(Louise Lark Hill. *The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence*. Hofstra Law Review. Vol 44. Issue 2. (Dec. 1, 2015) by prosecuting me for defamation and libel on account of my statements on **public issues** made exclusively in **court filings**.

VI. Right to Free Speech, Free Association, and to Petition the Government (the Judiciary) for a Redress of Grievances. (Amendment I).

“Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment.” *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010). “[A] State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights.” *N.A.A.C.P. v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).

A. Free Speech: “[D]isciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment.” *Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada*, 501 U.S. 1030, 1054 (1991).^{18, 19} In *Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia*, 435 U.S. 829, 842 (1978), this Court held “that injury

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¹⁸ Florida Statute §454.11 “All attorneys shall be deemed officers of the court for the administration of justice, and amenable to the rules and discipline of the court in all matters of order or procedure **not in conflict with the constitution or laws of this state.**” (Emphasis).

to official reputation [of judges] is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free.’ (quoting *Sullivan* at 272-273)[Emphasis added],

.....

¹⁹ “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.’” *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)(quoting from *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. at 376 U.S. 270.” (Emphasis).

““[S]peech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.”” *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting from *Connick v. Myers*, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). “Judges should be foremost in their vigilance to protect the freedom of others to rebuke and castigate the bench and in their refusal to be influenced by unfair or misinformed censure. Otherwise freedom may rest upon the precarious base of judicial sensitiveness and caprice. And a chain reaction may be set up, resulting in countless restrictions and limitations upon liberty.” *Pennkamp v. Florida*, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946)(Emphasis). “Trial courts no doubt must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.” *Brown v. State*, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958)(Emphasis). (See *In re Little*, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972). “[L]itigation [is] a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.” *In re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978).

““[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”” *United States v. Trump*, 88 F.4th 990, 1002 (D. C. Cir. 2023)(quoting from *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). In both his individual and his official capacity as President, Donald Trump has called judges “fraud dressed up as a judge”, *United States v. Trump*, 88 F.4th at 998; and “activists”, “rogue”, “unhinged”, and “crooked” *U.S.A. v. Chief Judge George L. Russell*, 1:25-cv-02029 (Dist. Ct. Maryland June 24, 2025) (currently on appeal). Judge Thomas Cullen considered the Complaint “not ordinary” (euphemism for “frivolous”) and condemned Trump for “choos[ing] a different, and more confrontational path”, but still performed his duty and judicial labor to issue a 39-page Order of August 26, 2025.

and that “the institutional reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the constitutional scales.”

“The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. . . . [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.” *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941).

Therefore, The Florida Bar and the Florida supreme court) violated **my right to free speech on public issues.**

B. Free Association: Public sector unions which charge dues from non-members violate their First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. *Janus v. American Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31*, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). ““Freedom of association...plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate””, ID. at 2464 (quoting from *Roberts v. United States Jaycees*, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). ““[F]orced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible””. IBID. (quoting from *Pacific Gas & Elec., Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n*, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986). I kindly ask this Court to overturn *Keller v. State Bar of Cal.*, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).

The Florida Bar (the Florida supreme court) forced me, Citizen José, to associate with them. And Attorney José Yeyille contends that he cannot be compelled to **associate with them**, and forced to pay dues to be harassed, pro-

secuted, and extorted for exercising his right to Free Speech on public issues.

C. Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances and to Access the Courts²⁰: By denying to me the right afforded to all laypersons and all attorneys—even attorneys who are convicted criminals and attorneys who steal from their clients, to contest the reports of Referees (**A.P.P.S. C-D**), the Florida supreme court denied me my right to access the courts, to Petition the Government (Judiciary) for a Redress of Grievances, and the Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws.

VII. NEMO·IVDEX·IN·CAVSAM·SVAM.

The law firm Greenberg Traurig, P.A. promotes, chooses, and owns the judges of Florida third district court, justices of the Florida supreme court²¹, and SCOTUS' Justice Neil Gorsuch.²¹

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²⁰ “[T]he right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” *California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). “[T]he Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts...established by the government for resolution of legal disputes. “[T]he right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government.”” *Borough of Duryea v. Guarneri*, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011).

²² “Since 2014 Fred has served on and currently chairs the Florida Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Commission (JNC), where five

and SCOTUS' Justice Neil Gorsuch.²²

Greenberg Traurig, P.A.'s Fred Karlinsky publicly interviews the justices of the Florida supreme court chosen by him.

Therefore, The Florida Bar and Florida supreme court are acting as judges in their own case against me because they share an interest in muzzling and prosecuting laypersons and attorneys who criticize the justices of the Florida supreme court, and the judiciary of the state of Florida, and their benefactors²³

.....
of the seven current sitting Justices of the Florida Supreme Court have been appointed during Fred's tenure on the JNC." Greenberg Traurig, P.A. Website.

²² Greenberg Traurig, P.A.'s official Brian Duffy bought and owns Justice Neil Gorsuch. Gorsuch ruled in Greenberg Traurig, P.A.'s favor "in eight out of 12 cases" ("Gorsuch Reportedly Sold Property to Law Firm Executive After Joining Supreme Court" by Katherine Hamilton. *Forbes*. April 25, 2023). Heidi Przybyla. "Law Firm Head bought Gorsuch-owned property: The Supreme Court justice did not report the identity of the purchaser, whose firm has had numerous cases before the court". Politico (April 25, 2023).
Greenberg Traurig, P.A

²³ Justices of the Florida supreme court owe their positions, salary, and status to the law firm **Greenberg Traurig, P.A.** which openly and proudly broadcast the fact that they choose them. "[N]o judge ""can be a judge in his own case [or be] permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."" *Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie*, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)(quoting *In re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Florida supreme court justices' and The Florida Bar's pecuniary interest in harassing laypersons and attorneys who criticize the judiciary and the law firm who owns them certainly are not miniscule. *Tumey*

in violation of my Due Process right to a fair trial.

VIII. Florida Statute §768.295 (Anti-SLAPP).

Although §768.295 is a state statute, **it explicitly incorporates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.** “Whatever springs the state may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the state confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.” *Davis v. Wechsler*, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).

Therefore, the Florida supreme court deceptively **denied** and refused to rule on my Motion to Dismiss The Florida Bar’s case against me and the Report of Referee pursuant to Florida Statute §768.295 (Anti-SLAPP) (**APPENDIX B**) and **denied** my Motion for Rehearing and issued a **final judgment closing my case** (**APPENDIX A**).

IX. Vagueness and Overbreadth of RRTFB.

The Florida Supreme Court and its agent The Florida Bar harassed, prosecuted, and extorted me for the alleged violation of Rules Regulating The

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v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 36% of The Florida Bar’s approved general operating budget for the 2023-24 fiscal year came in part from **prosecution costs paid by disciplined lawyers.** (The Florida Bar. What we Do. Website).


Florida Bar which are so incurably vague²⁴ and overbroad²⁵ that they can be, and were indeed deceptively wielded as, **criminal statutes** to punish protected conduct—criticizing the judiciary of the state of Florida in court filings —**in my capacity as common citizen**—, and—speech on public issues in those court filings **in my capacity as common citizen**—in violation of my First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, respectively.

CONCLUSION

Kindly, grant my Petition for Writ of CERTIORARI.

March ~~18~~, 2026CE

25 J.Y.



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Citizen José
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²⁴ Their prohibitions are “not clearly defined” **even for attorneys** “and impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to...judges...for resolution on an *ad hoc* and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” *Grayned v. City of Rockford*, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).

²⁵ They “punish a ‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to’ [their] ‘plainly legitimate sweep,’” *Virginia v. Hicks*, 539 U.S. 113, 118-119 (2003). [Emphasis added].