


NO:

25-6972

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL DONELL GLOVER  
Petitioner



v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS  
Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael Donell Glover  
Petitioner, Pro Se  
TDCJ# 02449975  
William P. Clements Unit  
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Amarillo, TX 79107

1. Is it a due process violation for a conviction to stand based on misleading and false evidence??

2. Did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apply an unreasonable application of the aggravating factor contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, during it's legal sufficiency of evidence review??

LIST OF PARTIES IN COURT BELOW

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THE STATE OF TEXAS

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Trial Judge:

The Honorable Casy Blair  
Presiding Judge  
86th Judicial District Court  
Kaufman County, Texas 75142

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OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas was reported at Glover v. State, 2024 Tex.App. Lexis 3766, WL 276365. at App.1

The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas was reported at Glover v. State, 710 S.W. 3d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). at App.2

JURISDICTION

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, entered its judgment on April 16, 2025.

This court has jurisdiction under, 28 USC, Section 1257(a).

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Constitution Provision Involved

The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent parts: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"

U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Procedure History:

On April 8, 2022, Petitioner was indicted for the first degree offense of Aggravated Robbery, Tex. Penal Code, Sec 29.03. Two enhancements paragraphs alleging that Petitioner had been convicted of two prior felony offenses were included in the indictment on October 7, 2022. Tex. Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(d).

On June 6, 2023, A jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offense. On the same day Petitioner elected to have the trial court assess punishment. After hearing closing arguments from both sides, the court sentenced Petitioner to LIFE in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.

On May 30, 2024, The Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Court of Appeals, Concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the aggravating element of Petitioner's conviction. No. 05-23-0057-CR. The court reversed the trial court's judgment convicting Petitioner of aggravated robbery, Vacated Petitioner's sentence, Modified the judgment to convict Petitioner of second-degree robbery, and Remand the cause for farther proceedings consistent with the court of appeals opinion including resentencing.

Procedural History(cont.)

On July 1, 2024, The State filed a Petition for Discretionary Review to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, NO 05-23-00571-GR.

On September 11, 2024, Petitioner's Petition For Discretionary Review was refused. In re Glover, 2024 Tex. Crim. App. Lexis 700 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2024).

On October 11, 2024, The State filed a Brief on the Merits to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. NO. PD-0514-24.

On November 14, 2024, Petitioner filed a Reply Brief to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. NO: PD-0514-24.

On April 16, 2025, The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, delivered their opinion. That the Fifth Court of Appeals erred to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove the aggravating element of Petitioner's conviction of aggravated robbery, and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals's judgment and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. NO: PD-0514-24.

**II. Relevant Facts Concerning the Conviction of Aggravated Robbery:**

On January 10, 2022, the Petitioner entered the Buc-ee's Store located in Terrell, Texas, around 6:00am, (RR7:7-8)(State's EX. 1)(Store;s Security Cameras). Petitioner walked around the store and got himself something to drink. Petitioner took a soft-sided cooler that had the Buc-ee's emblem on the side

cooler that had a Buc-ee's emblem on the side of it. (RR 7:19-20)(State's EX.No 4). Petitioner then went to go into an area of the store that was closed of.(RR 7:19-20).

The Petitioner was observed taking rolls of pennies and different brands of cigarettes and putting them in the Buc-ee's safe cooler. (RR 7:20-22). Petitioner then left the store without paying for the Buc-ee's safe cooler or the items. (RR 7:22). An employee "Delbert Parks(Parks), followed Petitioner. (7:22). As Parks followed Petitioner away from the store, he asked Petitioner to "give us our stuff back"(RR 7:34). Petitioner responded,"just let me go".(RR 7:35). When Petitioner stopped in an empty field across from the store, Parks grabbed the "duffel bag" and tried to get it from Petitioner. (RR 7:36). While the two were "tugging" for control of the bag, the Petitioner reached into his pocket and pulled out a pocketknife. (RR 7:36-37). Parks told Petitioner "don't do it Dude""I'll Fuck You Up".(RR 7:37). Petitioner started to cut the "Nylon Handle Strap" on the bag. (RR7:38). While Petitioner was cutting the bag he looked back at Parks and saw he nametag and said "Come on Dewayne, just let me go"(RR/7:38,43,46), (State's Brief on the Merits, pg.8). Parks heard his manager screaming his name and realized he was off property, and let go of the bag and returned to the store.(RR 7:39).

Petitioner was arrested a short time later and police found a pocketknife in his back pocket. (RR 7:66-67)(State's EX. 2). The knife was introduced at trial.(RR 8:31)(State's Ex. 10(knife). It;s blade was two to three inches long. (RR8:37;State's EX. 10)

### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion to reverse the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas judgment was based on misleading and false evidence presented during trial, in its legal sufficiency of evidence review.

The State presented misleading evidence when the "Front to Back" detachable shoulder strap from the Buc-ee's soft sided cooler bag was removed prior to taking the photos in State exhibits 3,4,5,6 and 8, and not mentioning it during trial. Also, through artful argument, by allowing the jury to believe the the cut strap was the only strap that Parks was holding, thereby giving the jury a false appearance of the facts of the case. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264; 3 L.Ed. 2d 1217; 79 S.Ct.1173 (1959).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it applied an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, to it's legal sufficiency of evidence review, when it changed the theory of the aggravating element of aggravated robbery, for the first time on direct review of Petitioner's use of the pocketknife as a deadly weapon. That "cutting the nylon cooler strap inches from Parks hands with the pocketknife was in the manner of it's use capable of causing serious bodily injury or death. To: "A rational jury could also conclude that Petitioner's used and /or exhibited the pocketknife with the additional intent to threaten Parks that if he did not let go of the cooler, Petitioner might use the pocketknife on him in a way that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death".

An appellate court may not support a conviction on a legal or factual theory that was not presented to the jury. United States V. Knox, 940 F. 2d 1536 (9th Cir.).

## ARGUMENTS

IS IT A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION FOR A CONVICTION TO STAND BASED ON MISLEADING AND FALSE EVIDENCE?

In United States ex rel. Munson v. McAdory, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6405, the prosecution is forbidden from knowingly presenting false and misleading evidence and from allowing false testimony to go uncorrected when it appears. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; also U.S. V. Saadeh, 61 F. 3d 510, 523 (7th Cir. 1995). A conviction obtained through the use of false or misleading evidence violates a defendant's due process rights, and often must be reversed. See Id. To warrant the reversal of the conviction, the misleading evidence must be material, meaning that there must be a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the results of the proceeding would have been different. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682; 87 L.Ed 2d 481; 105 S.ct. 3375 (1985). A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial's outcome.

During trial, as captured on the Buc-ee's store security cameras, when Petitioner exited the store he was carrying a black soft sided cooler bag, with a "front to back" shoulder strap over his right shoulder, later followed by Parks. (RR.7: 9, 22-23,32033; State's Ex. 1 at 5:58:00-59:33)( security cameras).

1. Black soft-sided cooler bag with front to back over the shoulder strap(detachable).

Petitioner first points out that the cooler bag was not physically presented at trial. The bag with the cut straps were shown in photos of State's Ex. 3,4,5, and 8. APP' 3-1

However, the front to back detachable shoulder strap that can be seen on the video in State's Ex. 1, when Petitioner exited the store was not shown in any of the State's Ex. 3,4,5 or 8. APP' 3-1. The strap had been removed prior to trial. The strap was also not mentioned during trial.

Petitioner feels that the strap which is vital to his defense was a material piece of evidence as to negate the prosecution's theory that "Petitioner swung the knife within inches of Park's hand, using the pocketknife in a manner capable of causing serious bodily injury or death". (State's Brief on the Merits, pg 12).

2. The Confrontation in the empty field.

Parks testified that when he and Petitioner stopped in the field, that Parks grabbed the "duffel Bag". At this point the record is somewhat confusing and silent as to where Petitioner and Parks were standing in reference to each other when Parks grabbed the bag; "face-to-face or Parks behind Petitioner"?

Looking at the photo, State's Ex. 3, of the two people (shoes) standing with the bag between them, looking bottom to top the cut nylon handle is on the left side, with the short part of the cut strap on the bottom, and the long part of the cut strap at top, tag is at the rear right on the bag. (State's Ex. 3 and 5).

If Petitioner and Parks were face-to-face while each had hold of the bag, this position would have put them extremely close to one another, nose to nose to point of touching. Highly unlikely. However, there was no testimony introduced that Parks stepped in front of Petitioner to stop his advancement or that Petitioner turned around to face Parks headon. Only testimony from Parks was that he followed Petitioner in the field and when Petitioner stopped Parks grabbed the Duffel bag. (RR.7:36).

\_\_\_Based on the above facts and testimony, it is more likely than not that Parks was standing behind Petitioner when he grabbed the bag and that Petitioner was facing forward. This would have put the bag with the cut strap against Petitioner's body on his right side.(Defense Illst. 1). It is also rational to believe that when Parks grabbed the bag, he grabbed the closest and most convenient thing to him, the missing detachable front to back shoulder strap, not the nylon handle strap that was against Petitioner's right side body. Defense Illst. 1).

### 3. Petitioner pull the pocketknife and cut the nylo handle strap.

Parks testified that when he grabbed the bag and begun to struggle for control, he asked Petitioner to release the cooler and Petitioner replied "let me have it". At this time Petitioner reached in his pocket(no testimony which pocket) and Parks said "don't do the dude". When Parks could tell that Petitioner had pulled a knife, Parks side"Dude, I'll fuck you up". Parks though Petitioner was going to cut him,but instead Petitioner opened the knife and began to cut the nylon side handle strap,

keeping the knife close to his (Petitioner's) body, as he cut, all the while Petitioner and Parks struggle for control of the cooler bag. Parks also testified that as Petitioner started to cut the bag strap, that Petitioner looked back and seeing Parks name tag said "Come on DeWayne, just let me go" (RR.7: 36-38).

On cross examination Parks could not describe the knife in any detail, but he had no doubt it was a knife. (TCCA opinion pg 3).

4.3. Existence of front to back detachable shoulder strap during the knife and cutting incident.

First, when Petitioner filled the bag with the stolen items from the store, this made the cooler bag extremely heavy. (State's Ex. 3,6,8).

Second, given the fact that Parks was standing behind Petitioner and they were struggling for control of the cooler. If Petitioner and Parks were holding the nylon side handle strap that was cut Petitioner would have only one hand free to reach into his pocket (front or back), retrieve the small folding pocketknife, open the blade and cut the nylon strap, although the strap is netted and very flimsy, lacking solidity of strength, giving the weight of the bag, all with one hand. This is highly unlikely if not impossible without losing control of the bag to Parks.

Once Petitioner retrieved the folding knife from his pocket, to facilitate opening the knife, Petitioner would need two(2) hands during the struggle. While holding the knife with one hand he would need the other hand to deploy the blade, by inserting

his fingernail in the groove on the back on the blade and pulling the blade out. (Defense Illst. 1). This holds true for cutting the nylon handle strap. Petitioner would need two hands to cut the flimsy strap. Petitioner would not be able to accomplish any of this without losing control of the bag during the struggle.

As such, it is reasonable to believe that there were additional support to allow Petitioner to let go of the cooler, giving the weight, open the blade of the pocketknife and cut the strap. It is also reasonable to believe that Parks was still holding onto the front to back shoulder strap during the confrontation. Looking at State's Ex. 5 and 8, you can see the front to back detachable shoulder strap "clamp" on the lower back of the cooler bag.

#### 5. Parks returned to the store

Parks testified that he heard his manager screaming his name and the realization of what was going on caused him to let go of the bag and return to the store. (RR. &: 39) That Petitioner was still trying to cut the strap when Parks backed away (RR.7:43). Parks also, testified that Petitioner never swung the knife at him nor pointed the knife at him. (RR.7: 43).

Whether that knife in this case was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death under the facts and all record evidence of this case. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W. 3d 763, 767-68(Tex. Crim. App. 2013): Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319).

The court has Said:

"We consider words and other threaten actions by the defendant, including the defendanr's proximity to the victim, the weapons ability to inflict serious bodily injury or death, including the size, shape and sharpness of the weapon; and the manner in which the defendant use the weapon. A factfinder should consider it's "intended use from the attitude" indicated by the perpetrator. Tisdal v. State, 686 S.W. 2d 117.

a. Words and other threatening actions by Petitioner

Parks testified that Petitioner never threatened him verbally or made any gestures that would indicate that Petitioner intended to harm him. The only words spoken by Petitioner in the field was "just let me go and come on DeWayne" (RR.7:35-38). Petitioner's words could be considered more of a "plea" then a challenge", considering Parks having advantage over Petitioner- Parks standing behind Petitioner and size. The record proves that Parks is two feet taller and approx. 40lbs heavier than Petitioner.

b. Petitioner's proximity to Parks in the field

As determined from the facts and exhibits in this case, when Petitioner and Parks stopped in the field, Parks was standing behind Petitioner. It can be determined by the testimony and evidence that Parks stayed behind Petitioner the entire time until he departed back to the store.

It can also be infered from the record evidence that when Parks grabbed the bag, he grabbed the

grabbed the bag, he grabbed the front to back shoulder strap. This would have put Parks approx. two(2) feet behind Petitioner, not within inches of Park's hand as the State claimed.(State's Brief of the merits, pg 12; Defense illst. 1.)

c. Pocketknife size and shape

Evidence at trial showed that Petitioner carried a common folding pocketknife with a blade that is approx. two to three inches long, with a handle approx. the same size. Total approx. 5½ inches long, pointed and sharp enough to saw through the nylon strap. (RR.8:37, State's Ex. 10)(Defense illst.1).

d. Sharpness of the pocketknife

The State in their "Brief on the merits, pg. 12, used words like, "slash and sliced" when describing the sharpness of the knife. Even going as far to say that the "the knife was sharp enough to slice through the cooler bag handle without sawing. This statement is very misleading, as it is highly unlikely that a small pocketknife is sold commercially that can slice through netted nylon without sawing

Looking at State's Exs: 4,5 and 6, the cut of the strap is "Frayed" more "Torn" than cut. The strap is not smooth sliced. It appeared that Petitioner took time to cut through the strap, indicating that the knife was not as sharp as the State claimed it to be.

e. Intended use of the pocketknife from the attitude of Petitioner

Parks testified that when Petitioner pulled the knife he never pointed it at him nor threaten him with it. (RR. 7: 37-46). The

record is clear that Petitioner never swung the knife at Parks nor did Parks use words like "swing or swung" to describe Petitioner's action. (RR 7: 31-47). After pulling the knife Petitioner began to cut the nylon handle, keeping the knife close to his body. (RR 7:38). Parks testimony indicates that Petitioner was still cutting the bag strap when Parks let go and walked away. (RR. 7: 43).

It can be reasonable inferred that when Petitioner pulled the knife, his only intention was to cut the front to back shoulder strap, that Parks was holding on to. However, it is reasonable to believe that in Petitioner's rush to cut the strap and looking back at Parks, pleading with him to "let me go", Petitioner mistakenly grabbed the nylon handle that was against the right side of his body and began to cut the strap, is the reason the strap is not cut close to the body of the bag, but inches away. (State's Ex. 5). Otherwise cutting the nylon handle strap serves no purpose at all. Parks never had hold of the Nylon Handle Strap that was cut during the confrontation in the field.

Therefore, Petitioner assert that the strap in question was removed at the Buc-ee's store prior to taking the photos in State's EXs. 3,4,5 and 8. It is reasonable to believe that the State knew about the strap during their pre-trial review of the store's security video. (State's EX. 1).

During trial and through artful arguments, the State misled the jury in believing that the nylon handle strap that was cut was the only strap Parks had to hold on to, giving the jury a false appearance of the facts of the case.

The front to back shoulder strap was "material" because it could have fundamentally altered the defense strategy to negate the State's theory that Petitioner cut the nylon strap inches from Parks hands and that Petitioner used the knife in a manner that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death. Additionally, the strap raises serious questions concerning the proximity of Petitioner to Parks.

If the front to back shoulder strap had been disclose during trial properly, the results of the proceeding would have been different, as to the aggravating elements of the offense. The jury would have had convincing evidence to convict Petitioner of only the second degree offense on "Robbery" and Petitioner's sentence would not have been so harsh.

DID THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS(TCCA) APPLY AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION TO THE AGGRAVATING FACTOR CONTRARY TO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AS SET FORTH IN JACKSON V. VIRGINIA, DURING IT'S LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE REVIEW?

Under Jackson, the Supreme Court has held " the relevent question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonabl doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Put another way, the dispostive question under Jackson is "whether the recored evidence could reasonable support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F. 3d 978-83(9th Cir. 2004).

Jackson cautions reviewing courts to consider the evidence " in the light most favorable to the prosecution". Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F. 3d 950,957 (9th Cir. 2004);(quating Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

— The court has said" However, although we must draw all reasonable infreances in favor of the prosecution, a reasonable inferance is one that is supported by a chain of logic, rather than... mere speculation dressed up in the guise of evidence". Juan H., 408 F. 3d at 1277.

The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause guarantees a criminal defendant may be convicted only upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364; 90 S.Ct. 1068; 25 L. Ed. 2nd 368 (1970).

### Argument

The TCCA in its review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, changed the theory for the "Aggravating Factor", for the first time on appeal. "That a jury can also conclude that Petitioner "used or exhibited the pocketknife for the purpose of convincing Parks that it was in his best interest to abandon the cooler and let Petitioner escape with it".(TCCA opinion ,pg.11)

The TCCA then found there were sufficient evidence that Petitioner ~~Threatened~~ of Placed Parks in fear of imminent bodily injury or death and he used or exhibited the pocketknife in a manner that was capable to cause death or serious bodily injury!"

Assuming Parks testimony could possibly be construed to support this new theory. An appellate court may not support a conviction on a legal or factual theory that was not presented to the jury. United States v. Knox, 940 F. 2d 1536 (9th Cir)(holding " while there may be sufficient evidence in the record to support a conviction on an aiding and abetting theory, this theory was not presented to the jury").

Thus, after the prosecutor exclusively argued that " Petitioner used the pocketknife within inches of Park's hand to slash the stolen bag handle and kept it out. (State's brief on the Merits, pg(s) 6,12,13,14).

"That view this in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found Petitioner "used or intended to use the pocketknife in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.(State's Brief on the Merits, pg. 14).

The TCCA can not now be permitted to rely on this new theory of causation raised for the first time on direct review. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 290; see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487; 78 S.ct. 1245; 2 L.Ed. 2d 1503(1958).(holding, respondent could not assert a new theory for the legalily of Petitioner's arrest for the first time on appeal, because to permit the government to inject it's new theory into the case at this stage would unfairly deprivePetitioner of an aquate opportunity to respond).

Moreover, if causation had been an issue, as it would have been here, if the prosecutor had argued the new theory was an additional and contributing cause of Petitioner's use or intended use of the pocketknife as a deadly weapon, the trial court would have been obligated to Sua Sponte instruct on causation with Tex. Penal Code, Sec. 29.03(a)(2). People v. Bernhardt, 222 CAL. Rptr. 401,416(1963).( finding prejudicial error in failure to instruct on proximate causation and noting a failure to instruct upon the element of proximate causation where that matter is in issue constitutes error)

Tex. Penal Code, Sec.29.03(a)(2), would have required the jury to find an act that Petitioner "used the pocketknife in a manner

that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, if the injury or death "is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act" and the injury or death would not have happened without the act.

However, causation was not in dispute, because the prosecutor did not argue that "Petitioner used and/or exhibited the pocketknife with the additional intent to persuade Parks that, if he did not let go of the cooler, Petitioner might use the pocketknife against him in a way that was capable of causing serious bodily injury if not death.

The jury was not further instructed on causation. Because the jury was not instructed, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's threat or imination of Parks was a direct, natural and probable consequence of Petitioner's use or intended use in a manner that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death and would not have happened without Petitioner's actions.

TCCA can not rely on this new theory of liability on appeal. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F. 3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004), amended, 413 F. 3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005). (finding there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conviction for vicarious liability under the theories on which the district court instructed the jury, and holding that because the jury was not instructed it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of co-schemer vicarious liability, on appeal the government may not rely on this new theory)

There were no evidence introduced at trial that Petitioner threaten Parks with words or action. Parks testified that when he and Petitioner were in the field and they were "tuggling" over the bag and Petitioner pulled the knife out of his pocket, that Petitioner never pointed at him nor threaten him with it. (RR7:37-38). Parks testified that Petitioner never threatened him verbally or made any gestures that would indicate that Petitioner intended to harm him. The only words spoken by Petitioner from when he let the store untill Parks left the field were "just let me go" and "come on, Dewayne". The only threatening words came from Parks when he told Petitioner "don't do it dude" and "I'll fuck you up".

Therefore, the TCCA's decision was an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is no evidence Petitioner did an act that threaten Parks that it was in his best interest to let go of the cooler or Petitioner would use the pocketknife on him that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is a unique departure from the decision from the United States Supreme Court that require that convictions based on misleading and false evidence as well as unreasonable application of federal law be set aside after conviction. As such, it represents a breach in the wall erected by the "Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the decision of the United States Supreme Court that was designed to protect a citizen from being convicted by the Government wrongfully.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Michael Donell Glover, respectfully requests that this court reverse the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas.

This petitione of writ of certiorari should therefore, by granted.

Date Sept. 16, 2025

Respectfully Submitted

*Michael Donnell Glover*  
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Petitioner, Pro Se *M.D.*

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