

No. 25-6712

In the supreme court of the United States

WILLIAM LOUIS ARMSTRONG, petitioner

Vs

**BOYLAND AUTO BGMC LLC, GENERAL MOTORS, KUNES BUICK GMC, AUTOMOTIVE
EXPERTS LLC, NATIONAL BUSINESS BROKERS, DORIAN BOYLAND, and KAUFMAN
DOLOWICH, respondents**

**On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh
Circuit**

**PETITION FOR THE REHEARING OF AN ORDER DENYING A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI**

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“Let not any one pacify his conscience by the delusion that he can do no harm if he takes no part, and forms no opinion. Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing.”

— John Stuart Mill, *Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews*

Here is William Armstrong, asking this court to reconsider denial of my petition for Certiorari. I ask for reconsideration by way of grant, GVR, or relisting. Please at least relist me. On account of *Trump V. Casa*, this is effectively the first time since the Holocaust that universal injunctions aren't available as a tool to turn off genocide chambers and people are scared. My representational arguments are arguments of last resort also for more serious cases. You don't need to wait for a genocide to ask, “what about a pro se in the Holocaust?” Your code of conduct from Nov. 2023 says that 97% of petitions are denied without joint discussion by the justices. I must not have even been discussed, but even if I was, a little more would be good.

In *National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association* 606 U. S. ____ (2025), Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh said that “Lower court judges may sometimes disagree with this Court's decisions, but they are never free to defy them”. but that's worthless if you're content to do nothing when they do. Of course they are, and they operate accordingly. Like Justice Roberts comment about courts doing their best to do equal rights by litigants, this too seems to be a privilege for the few, and lip service from the privileged for the rest of us. I wanted to buy a bicycle that now I can't afford and may not be able to afford for years. Whether or not you say they're free to do so, they do freely defy SCOTUS precedent and other laws, and at a real cost for the rest of us, especially when we try and fail to get you to do anything about it.

“The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.” — Judges 5:20 (KJV)

I have several shining star cases that the 7th circuit opinion conflicts with that were not mentioned in my petition. My case is squarely controlled by the existing construction of the screening statute **28 U.S.C. 1915** as not permitting dismissal but on the specified grounds, such construction was provided by this court in ***Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)*** which reads;

“We think that the PLRA’s screening requirement does not—explicitly or implicitly—justify deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself. Before the PLRA, the in forma pauperis provision of §1915, applicable to most prisoner litigation, permitted sua sponte dismissal only if an action was frivolous or malicious. 28 U. S. C. §1915(d) (1994 ed.); see also Neitzke, 490 U. S., at 320 (concluding that a complaint that fails to state a claim was not frivolous under §1915(d) and thus could not be dismissed sua sponte). In the PLRA, Congress added failure to state a claim and seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief as grounds for sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis cases, §1915(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.)”

My appeal argued that I was denied equality of consideration with non-indigent litigants, and while I thought it was enough that it was prejudicial legal error, ***Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992)***, and ***Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)***, have each recognized and affirmed the “congressional goal” in passing the screening statute to assure “equality of consideration for all litigants”. My questions about inherent power sua sponte dismissals and rules based FRCP 41

dismissals and my questions about equal process for indigents are controlled by these precedents, and important for ensuring equality of consideration for all litigants.

That's three heavy hitting SCOTUS cases that weren't in my original petition which control my appeal. Dismissal at screening is only permitted on the grounds specified in the statute. The statute's purpose is to assure equality of consideration. The error was plain. These cases justify per curiam reversal. You can GVR all day everyday on this without controversy. In the absence of action, silence by this court speaks volumes. Without intervention I have been denied equality of consideration most egregiously, despite my case crossing at least 20 appellate judges each having sworn to do equal right by rich and poor. What the seventh circuit did was outrageous.

After filing in this court, during screening in another case *Armstrong et al v. Alter Trading Corporation et al*, 2:25-cv-01702, in Wisconsin Eastern District, I was threatened with sua sponte inherent power dismissal for other reasons that the statute has been construed as not permitting. I was told I would be dismissed if an amended complaint included more than ten defendants or was more than fifteen pages. That's despite my civil RICO complaint being the product of four years of investigation and alleging several hundred felonies, while explicitly describing at least eighteen defendants directly involved in predicate acts. The order didn't filter specific defendants, it imposed an arbitrary limit of ten. My experience informs my view on the value in distinguishing sua sponte inherent power and rules based dismissals. Despite contrary precedent, indigent litigants have been denied equality of consideration which the statute is meant to ensure for decades with impunity, by abusive sua sponte inherent power dismissals during screening.

“[T]he Sun, without changing place, is situate in the Centre of the Conversion of the Celestial Orbes; and that the Earth, convertible about its own Axis, moveth it self about the Sun” — Galileo Galilei, *Epistle to the Dutchesse of Tuscany*

“There is no federal general common law” (*Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)), “Instead, only limited areas exist in which federal judges may appropriately craft the rule of decision.” (*Rodriguez v. FDIC* (589 U.S. ____ (2020))), Such instances are “few and restricted” (*Wheeldin v. Wheeler*, 373 U. S. 647, 373 U. S. 651 (1963)), falling into essentially two categories: those where a federal rule of decision is “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests” (*Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U. S. 398, 376 U. S. 426 (1964)), and those where Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, (*Wheeldin v. Wheeler, supra, at 373 U. S. 652.*) “Of course, the federal interest guarded in all these cases is one the ultimate statement of which is derived from a federal statute. “ (*Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)), see generally (*Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.*, 451 U.S. 630 (1981)) (Middle of sequence is Texas edit to avoid long quote)

This court should do more than just assume a conclusion on representational issues in passing while deciding other things and using progressively more restrictive language in dicta. A national customary law on representation of others applied in federal courts, if not codified by enactment with force of statute, and if not a universal injunction, is federal common law, and therefore subject to laws governing the same. Except insofar as applicable statutes are preempted by enactments passed pursuant to the rules enabling acts, congressional authorization has only ever been given “to such courts, respectively” to formulate substantive law on the subject. If issues

are controlled by federal common law, it must honor the scope of authorization, and the ultimate statement of relevant interests must be derived from the statutes. The same applies to the “need not order service” rule that was invented in my case for denying me justice.

It wasn't always the case that federal courts recognized any authority to supply a rule of decision themselves. *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) was fully controlling law, until *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) limited its effect. *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) provided that “In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.” That expresses a Blackstonian view of the common law, where common law is discerned and expounded by judges rather than created by judicial decree. Whether or not that view prevails now, *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) was relatively contemporaneous with statutes governing relevant issues. Of most importance, *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) was clearly established controlling precedent when the rules enabling act of 1934 was enacted, four years prior to the decision in *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)..

When the rules enabling act of 1934 was enacted, *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) as controlling authority made it impossible for appellate supplied rules of decision to divest district courts of statutory discretion recognized in *Wayman v. Southard*, 23 U.S. 1 (1825). “In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect is entitled to very great respect.” (*Edwards' Lessee v. Darby*, 25 U.S. 206 (1827)), “The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no

room for construction.” (*United States v. Wiltberger*, 18 U.S. 76 (1820)), “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.” (*United States v. Fisher*, 6 U.S. 358 (1805))

Controlling SCOTUS authority further said “There is no common law of the United States in the sense of a national customary law” (*Smith v. Alabama*, 124 U.S. 465 (1888)) “There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” *Id.* The statement that there is no national customary law, with defining an exception as involving simply interpreting the constitution, weighs against reading statutes of 1793 and 1934 in general course as impliedly adopting the strictures of English law.

The defining feature of America is that we are not England. There may have even been a war. It's unamerican to assume away our liberty on account of English customs. In light of the historical statutes and precedents, what else could the countercase have? That you were told that in law school? Isn't that precious. That's a serious separation of powers and equal rights for rich and poor problem, that a country's worth of federal courts are operating on a fatally flawed assumption for little more reason than it was ingrained in them by a private monopoly.

My first petition showed the construction from *Wayman v. Southard*, 23 U.S. 1 (1825) of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. 83) and the additional act 1793 (1 Stat. 335) recognizing a “full power over all matters of practice” for “courts respectively”, this petition goes further, distinctly showing that prevailing assumptions on representational issues are patently frivolous under the general system of laws. For a long time there simply was no federal common law that even could divest the district courts of discretion, and even now “only limited areas exist in which federal judges may appropriately craft the rule of decision.” (*Rodriguez v. FDIC* (589 U.S. ____ (2020)). *Wheaton v. Peters*, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) is clear on the issue of federal common law;

“It is clear there can be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent states, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the union and has the authority of law that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption.”

The federal common law precedents are also decisions of this court that status quo opinions conflict with. The historical absence of federal common law, and the quoted statement from *Rodriguez v. FDIC* (589 U.S. ____ (2020) with other authorities, justifies this court's review of the summary treatment given by lower courts to representational issues, and this court's judgement regarding the correct source for the rule of decision. It was impossible for the historic law to have divested statutory discretion from district courts.

Consider that **28 U.S.C. 1654** traces to The Judiciary Act of 1789 (**1 Stat. 92**), and never distinguished between cases in law and cases in equity. It must have allowed courts at least as much discretion in law as they had in equity. Courts of equity have always had the power of original admission of solicitors unless derogated by legislation, and such a derogation in the courts of the United States requires federal legislation.

In speaking of The Process Act of 1792 (**1 stat. 276**) Chief Justice John Marshall writing for the majority stated “This act has been generally understood to adopt the principles, rules, and usages of the Court of Chancery of England.” in *Vattier v. Hinde*, **32 U.S. 252 (1833)**, and another case provides that “The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses, is subject to neither limitation or restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the different states of the Union.” (*Payne v. Hook*, **74 U.S. 425 (1868)**). See also *Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company*, **54 U.S. 518 , 564 (1851)** (reconciling quirks of equity jurisprudence with *Wheaton v. Peters*, **33 U.S. 591 (1834)**)

The statute text of **1 Stat. 276** confers discretion to “courts respectively”, it specifies discretion in altering and adding to the principles, rules, and usages of equity or state law, and subjects that discretion to supreme court rules. Where **1 Stat. 83** and *Wayman v. Southard* dictate the result of discretion in law, the present authorities dictate the result of discretion in equity absent derogating legislation. The history of equity is vital for considering **1 Stat. 92** and its successor **28 U.S.C. 1654**. In historical context it's clear that **28 U.S.C 1654** permits as much discretion in civil actions as courts had in equity unless lawfully derogated.

The Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, **1 Stat. 93**, and **1 Stat. 275** respectively, said that the forms of writs and other process except their style, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits at common law shall be the same as those in the supreme courts of various states, and said the same for courts of equity regarding courts of equity. **1 Stat. 93** and **1 Stat. 275** were relatively undisturbed until **17 Stat. 197** in 1872. The conformity laws began with static conformity (**1 stat. 93**) then progressed to dynamic conformity (**17 Stat. 197**), until arriving with the rules enabling act of 1934 (**48 Stat. 1064**) at uniformity or elective conformity.

While **17 Stat. 197** excluded equity from its reach, with respect to cases in law **17 Stat. 197** with its omission of prior “alterations” and “additions” language may be read as an uncertain middle ground on the road from **1 Stat. 93** and *Wayman v. Southard* to **28 U.S.C. 1654** with **28 U.S.C. 2072** in cases at law. Therefore I offer *Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company v. Horst*, **93 U.S. 291 (1876)**; which in construing **17 Stat. 197** states

“The conformity is required to be ‘as near as may be’ -- not as near as may be possible, or as near as may be practicable. This indefiniteness may have been suggested by a purpose: it devolved upon the judges to be affected the duty of construing and deciding, and gave them the power to reject, as Congress doubtless expected they would do, any subordinate provision in such state statutes which in their judgment would unwisely encumber the administration of the law or tend to defeat the ends of justice, in their tribunals.”

The discretion recognized in *Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company v. Horst*, **93 U.S. 291 (1876)**; shows that when the act of 1872 was law precedent still allowed discretion in

appropriate cases. The district courts were not divested of discretion to moot representational defects by ordering admission while keeping claims alive. That has no significant bearing on the issues which **17 Stat. 197** intended to resolve, and is squarely within the domains that exercising discretion was expected. Diverse statutes and cases recognized and protected discretion.

Space doesn't allow briefing everything, so I'll succinctly pass over additional points that would be briefed. I would brief more limited jurisdiction of early appellate courts prior to the Evarts act in the vein of separation of law and equity briefing, the historical treatment of absent class members as privies by representation and its relevance to local rules, law students permitted to practical train and their status under current law, additional background on local rules and the history of the rules enabling act, delegation of federal judicial power to the states and completeness of federal judicial power on its own, the word attorney meaning attorney in fact in early corporation cases, colonial era disfavour of lawyers as applied to the argument for discretion, etc.

On representational issues every one of you probably assumed the same thing as the lower courts. That doesn't make it right, it speaks to the scale of the problem. I haven't had the benefit of a response or merits briefing, but if I did I would show unequivocally that on the basis of current statutes and cases federal courts absolutely have discretion unless derogated by local rules, if I hadn't already. Representational issues get the most briefing, but I lead with *Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), and *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) for a reason. This court should reverse the seventh circuit on the grounds of those cases, so as to provide me with equality of consideration for the other issues in my case.

My first petition argued that a district court discretion divestiture rule created by appellate court decision is supervisory power that conflicts with statutes which appropriately supply the rule of decision. This petition shows that those principles also apply to other issues in my case and other cases. This court's attention on the responsible exercise of supervisory power and properly sourcing rules of decision would result in broadly relevant and useful guidance, controlling the most invidious and wrongful practices of the lower courts.

The rules of civil procedure were held to have “the force of a federal statute” in *Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.*, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). The seventh circuit created a “need not order service” exception to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), despite obligatory language and preemption of conflicting laws under 28 U.S.C. 2072. They based this rule on the practice of courts screening pauperis complaints at the outset of cases. Such timing may itself be a supervisory power rule conflicting with “any time” language in the statute. The “need not order service” rule they invented was also an exercise of supervisory power that conflicts with statutes, including 28 U.S.C. 2072, and involved a judicially created rule of decision without deference to legislative text that must supply the ultimate statement of federal interest. My first petition only offered the rule text, but this aspect of my case also conflicts with and is controlled by supervisory power precedents.

Space doesn't permit showing application of this framework to other cases, but I'll point to *Martin v. United States*, 605 U.S. 395 (2025), *Rico v. United States*, 607 U.S. ____ (2026), *Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services*, 605 U.S. 303 (2025), *Hewitt v. United States*, 606 U.S. 419 (2025), *Gutierrez v. Saenz*, 606 U.S. 305 (2025), and *Glossip v. Oklahoma*, 604 U.S. 226 (2025), as recent cases where application of a framework that considers rules sourcing and the

nature and limits of power can provide useful and informative insights. I want to show you a thorough application of that framework to recent and historical cases but I simply don't have space to do it all, if relisted I would ask for additional time to refile my petition for Certiorari with an increased page limit. I'm able to argue justification by extraordinary circumstances.

Moving on. I want this court to consider question 8 with special care. It could cut your docket in half, and is good for the future. It's a statement of law that AI would do well with. This court should hold it to be a per se abuse of discretion when appeals courts commit errors of law, allowing you to then audit for harm and when harmful reverse, in cases of preserved or plain errors. You should primarily not be an error correcting court because you reverse at the first harmful error unless developing law, and not because you turn a blind eye to 97% of cases being the wild west. That's not justice. This court should put the days of appeals court impunity behind us. Every one of you has a failed dissent relating to harmful errors. Instead of dissenting tragic denials, you should dissent or concur in summary reversals. If you correct the lower courts they'll correct themselves and your docket will clear. There's no other way to ensure equal justice under the law other than by refining your approach instead of doing nothing for so many when justice is denied. You say they're not free to defy this court's orders, don't just talk about it, be about it.

With my requested statement of law and simply auditing for preservation or plainness and harm from any such errors, it may be next year that AI can effectively facilitate meaningful review of tens of thousands of petitions with a fraction of the work for people that it currently requires. Question 8 is not controversial, but it's a great statement of law for the future, that is ideal for expedited review of appellate opinions, which is essential for ensuring equal justice for all.

This court last granted Certiorari independently to a pro se over ten years ago in *Bobby Chen v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. 13-10400*. Every pro se grant since then has followed from a decision of this court in the case of a represented party. That's despite pro se cases being a big part of this court's docket. Bobby Chen's status as a pro se petitioner through petition for Certiorari and grant is confirmed in the second paragraph of his petition for rehearing.

My question is similar to the one from *Bobby Chen*. Bobby Chen asked if district courts have discretion to extend the time to serve defendants under **Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)** absent good cause. The Fourth Circuit was holding that it did not allow the courts to extend the time for service without good cause. Consider that despite *Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)* the Fourth Circuit did not abandon their practice of disallowing extension of time until eight years after *Bobby Chen* in *Edward Gelin v. Kyle Shuman, No. 21-1498 (4th Cir. 2022)*. Justice delayed while waiting for attorney special interests to take our cases for this court to finally exercise its supervisory power is justice denied.

This court should consider *Bobby Chen* and the eight year delay until *Edward Gellin*, when weighing the importance of my case with a view to my *Jones V. Bock* argument and my experiences in *Armstrong V. Alter* and this case. *Jones v. Bock* has been this court's precedent for twenty years, and despite this, even today forma pauperis plaintiffs face dismissal at screening on various grounds not permitted by **28 U.S.C 1915**. What I experienced in *Armstrong v. Alter* and this case is happening everywhere, and it's happening to people who don't know better in order to cite *Jones v. Bock*. My case presents an opportunity to affirm that current law, regardless of which question is granted, and it's important for this court to do so. Reset the clock.

Due process is not fixed or inflexible. It calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands. In my case due process required more. The case of *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) citing various cases applied the due process holding of *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U. S. 545, (1965) to a civil plaintiff in a statutory rights context while also writing that;

“These decisions underscore the truism that “[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” *Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy*, 367 U. S. 886, 367 U. S. 895 (1961).

“[D]ue process is flexible, and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U. S. 471, 408 U. S. 481 (1972).

Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. *Arnett v. Kennedy*, *supra* at 416 U. S. 167-168 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); *Goldberg v. Kelly*, *supra* at 397 U. S. 263-266; *Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy*, *supra* at 367 U. S. 895.”

Due process demands more than taking for granted a conclusion on the representational issues while misconstruing argument, and violating basically every other principle of law. The seventh circuit had actual topical bias that also violated my right to an impartial tribunal. The great weight of controlling SCOTUS authority and history opposes prevailing assumptions. Roughly half of all cases are filed pro se, vital questions affecting the freedom to petition should not simply be taken for granted without proper roots in the law. Please consider that due process may demand more and discuss my case.

Where the outcome of particular situations is determinative of interests in liberty or property, the court is not without grounds for considering the demands of due process in particular situations. I'm not keen to advocate for new and niche requirements of due process in particular situations, but my specific case doesn't require a new rule, it only requires that I be afforded the equality of consideration that I was already entitled to by controlling SCOTUS authority and statute, and that the plain language of the governing rules, statutes, and precedents be faithfully applied.

All I'm asking for is equality of consideration. That's what I've fought for. It never should have been denied in any aspect of my case except as far as the screening statute itself provides. The error was plain. The harm was severe. My state law claims are lost because I chose to seek justice in a federal forum and to fight for equal dignity with non-indigents in federal courts.

Injury to due process of such nature as was done in my case is deleterious to society.

I myself have considered prostitution and suicide, thinking throughout, that if I had known that I would be denied equal rights with non-indigents. I would have sooner licked ass for filing fees rather than suffer unequal justice under the law, because it's less of an indignity. If there were to be a next time I just might. I also have been thinking about writing the text of rule 4(c)(3) on the pavement and throwing myself off of a building next to it.

Justice Schmustice.

William Louis Armstrong

No. 25-6712

In the supreme court of the United States

WILLIAM LOUIS ARMSTRONG, petitioner

Vs

BOYLAND AUTO BGMC LLC, GENERAL MOTORS, KUNES BUICK GMC,
AUTOMOTIVE EXPERTS LLC, NATIONAL BUSINESS BROKERS, DORIAN

BOYLAND, and KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, respondents

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The 7th
Circuit


RULE 44 CERTIFICATION FOR PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

William Louis Armstrong, pro se

2580 S 34th St Milwaukee WI 53215, 414-248-1487

Here is William Armstrong certifying that the grounds of my petition for reconsideration are restricted to substantial intervening circumstances and other substantial grounds not previously presented, and that the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. That refers to my grounds to grant reconsideration, not the whole of the petition's contents. I refer to my petition for Certiorari a few times, but to establish context and relate new grounds to the whole. Some grounds are similar to previous arguments but are distinguished. Some are broader propositions supported by newly shown SCOTUS authorities using language from those authorities, distinguished from narrower propositions previously put forth without newly shown authorities.

William Louis Armstrong



No. 25-6712

In the supreme court of the United States

WILLIAM LOUIS ARMSTRONG, petitioner


Vs

BOYLAND AUTO BGMC LLC, GENERAL MOTORS, KUNES BUICK GMC,
AUTOMOTIVE EXPERTS LLC, NATIONAL BUSINESS BROKERS, DORIAN

BOYLAND, and KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, respondents

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The 7th
Circuit

PROOF OF SERVICE FOR PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION



William Louis Armstrong, pro se

2580 S 34th St Milwaukee WI 53215, 414-248-1487

Service made on April 27 2026 by US mail first class or better; on National Business Brokers at 100 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 900, Irvine, CA 92618; on Kunes Buick GMC at 7020 S 27th St Suite A, Oak Creek, WI 53154; on Kaufman Dolowich at 30 N La Salle St Suite 1700, Chicago, IL 60602; on General Motors at 1240 Woodward Avenue, Detroit, MI 48226; on Automotive Experts LLC at 5500 PRYTANIA ST #534 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70115; on Boyland Auto BGMC, LLC at COGENCY GLOBAL INC, 100 WILBURN RD, SUITE 100 SUN PRAIRIE , WI 53590; on Dorian Boyland at 6219 LOUISE COVE DRIVE, WINDERMERE, FL 34786.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 27, 2026

State of Wisconsin, County of Milwaukee
This document was signed before me on
William Armstrong by
04-27-2026

William Armstrong
Armstrong

