

In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re ALLEN WATKINS,

Petitioner,

v.

CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
ARIZONA, AND THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA,

Respondents.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

(Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, § 9, 43 Stat. 883-884; the Rules
Enabling Act, Act of June 19, 1934, as amended by Pub. L. 100-702, Title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19,
1988, 102 Stat. 4648; and **Rules 15.8**, 20, 33, 34, and 39 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
the United States)

CONFERENCE DATE: APRIL 2, 2026

Allen Watkins, Petitioner Pro Se

3308 W. Saint Kateri Dr.

Phoenix, AZ 85041

623.633.2623

Maclayar@gmail.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED SUPPLEMENTED:

Whether the Clerk's Office of this Court, acting without judicial order, authority, or procedural basis, may extend the conference date of an emergency petition for writ of mandamus beyond its mathematically compliant date under Rule 15.5, while cases of identical procedural posture bearing sequential docket numbers are processed and disposed of on schedule, thereby compounding ongoing irreparable harm to Petitioner including absolute indigency, imminent homelessness, and displacement of a minor child.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Allen Watkins respectfully presents this Supplemental Brief pursuant to Rule 15.8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States to call the Court's attention to three intervening matters that have arisen since the original Petition was filed on October 24, 2025 each of which is independently material to the proper adjudication of this writ of mandamus and each of which is fully documented on the public docket or in Petitioner's records.

This Court should be clearly advised at the outset: this is a petition for COMPULSION, not a petition for REVIEW. The writ of mandamus sought herein is directed at compelling a ministerial duty mandated by Congress. It is not a vehicle for this Court to review the merits of any underlying decision. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, § 9, 43 Stat. 883, 884, employs the word "must" — not "may," not "should," not "may in its discretion." The ninety-day statutory window for challenge under sections 10 and 11 of the Act closed without any challenge being filed. No judicial discretion remains at the lower court level. The only function before this Court is to issue the compulsion that Congress mandated.

STATEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MATTERS

I. THE CONFERENCE DATE WAS EXTENDED WITHOUT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY.

On October 24, 2025, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Respondents were ordered to respond by March 6, 2026. No response was filed. No waiver was filed. No extension of time was requested by any Respondent.

Under Rule 15.5, distribution to the Court for conference consideration follows automatically upon expiration of the response period. The mathematically compliant conference date following proper distribution was March 20, 2026.

On March 18, 2026 — two days before that conference — the docket was updated reflecting a new conference date of April 2, 2026: a thirteen-day extension beyond the Rule 15.5 minimum. The docket reflects no judicial order authorizing this extension. No Justice's signature appears. No filing by any Respondent appears that would create a procedural basis for this change. Petitioner was not notified and did not consent.

The Clerk's Office of this Court has no published code of conduct and no published operational procedures governing how petitions are routed, scheduled, or delayed. Petitioner has confirmed this directly. The absence of any accountability mechanism governing this administrative action — which materially affected Petitioner's substantive right to timely disposition — is itself a matter of public record that this Court should be aware of as it enters conference.

Petitioner is suffering ongoing, escalating, and irreparable harm including loss of livelihood, imminent homelessness, and the displacement of a minor child, all directly caused by

two years of documented judicial obstruction of a congressional mandate. Every day of unauthorized delay compounds that harm.

II. RESPONDENTS' DOUBLE DEFAULT IS COMPLETE AND DOCUMENTED ON THE PUBLIC DOCKET.

Respondents — the Honorable United States District Judge and Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona — stand in double default before this Court:

First Default: The two arbitration awards at issue, each individually exceeding one million dollars and together exceeding two million dollars, were issued on February 5, 2024. The Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, §§ 10–11, provides a statutory window within which any party may seek vacatur, modification, or correction. That window closed without any challenge being filed by any party. The awards are final, binding, and unreviewable on the merits as a matter of federal law.

Second Default: This Court ordered Respondents to file a response by March 6, 2026. No response was filed. No waiver was filed. No letter was sent to the Clerk as permitted under Rule 20.3(b). No copy of any waiver was served on Petitioner as required by the express service instruction on this Court's own waiver form, which states: "A copy of this form must be sent to Petitioner." Petitioner received nothing. The docket confirms nothing was filed.

Silence in the face of a direct order of this Court is not a neutral act. It is a concession that no legal basis exists to oppose the writ. Respondents have been afforded every procedural opportunity to articulate a defense to issuance of this writ and have, by their silence, confirmed that none exists.

III. THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROHIBITS APPLICATION OF ANY DISCRETIONARY FRAMEWORK TO THIS COMPULSION WRIT.

The Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, Pub. L. 100-702, Title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4648 (28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)), provides in mandatory terms that rules of procedure *"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."*

The Federal Arbitration Act's mandatory confirmation provision — the word "must" in section 9 of the original 1925 enactment — is a substantive right conferred by Congress. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, binds every court officer to that congressional mandate. The Ninth Circuit's conversion of Petitioner's writ of mandamus into a standard discretionary appeal without Petitioner's knowledge or consent was precisely the substitution of a discretionary procedural standard for a non-discretionary congressional mandate that the Rules Enabling Act prohibits.

Any framing of this petition as a discretionary review question — whether by this Court's administrative processes or otherwise — would itself constitute an application of a procedural framework to abridge a substantive congressional right, in direct violation of The Rules Enabling Act. The only available disposition consistent with federal law is the issuance of the writ to compel confirmation of the awards as Congress directed.

IV. THE CLERK'S OFFICE EXTENSION OF PETITIONER'S CONFERENCE DATE — BYPASSING TWO AVAILABLE MARCH CONFERENCE DATES WITHOUT JUDICIAL ORDER — IS DOCUMENTED BY THIS COURT'S OWN PUBLIC

RECORDS AND CONSTITUTES AN ADDITIONAL ACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTRUCTION OF A CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE.

Petitioner respectfully brings to the direct attention of the Justices — not the Clerk's Office — the following documented administrative irregularity that has further compounded the deprivation of rights already inflicted upon Petitioner by the lower courts.

On March 18, 2026, the docket in Case No. 25-6708 was updated to reflect a conference date of April 2, 2026. No judicial order authorized this change. No Justice's signature appears on the docket. No filing by any Respondent created a procedural basis for any extension. Petitioner was not notified and did not consent. The mathematically compliant conference date under Rule 15.5 — following the expiration of the court-ordered response deadline of March 6, 2026 with no filing by any Respondent — was March 20, 2026. A second available conference date, March 27, 2026, was also bypassed without explanation.

This Court's own published March 23, 2026 Order List — a public document available at supremecourt.gov — confirms that cases bearing docket numbers both immediately below and immediately above Case No. 25-6708, including cases docketed after Petitioner's case, were distributed, conferenced on March 20, 2026, and disposed of on the March 23, 2026 Order List. Petitioner's case was specifically and selectively bypassed while sequentially numbered cases of identical procedural posture were processed on schedule.

The sequential docket numbering on this Court's own public documents eliminates any scheduling or calendar-based justification for this extension. Cases filed after Petitioner's case were processed and disposed of before Petitioner's case. No neutral administrative explanation is consistent with this documented sequencing.

Petitioner respectfully directs this Court's attention to the fact that this administrative action was taken by the Clerk's Office — which operates without a published code of conduct, without published operational procedures governing petition routing and scheduling, and without any accountability mechanism available to pro se litigants. Petitioner confirmed this directly. The Clerk's Office of the highest court in the land functions as an unreviewable administrative agency with no published rulebook, and Case No. 25-6708 is a documented example of what that unreviewable authority produces when applied to an emergency compulsion writ brought by an indigent pro se petitioner against a court whose institutional relationships with the real party of interest are already documented in this record.

This administrative extension — imposed without judicial authority, without procedural basis, without notice, and without consent — on a petition where Petitioner is suffering absolute indigency, exhaustion of all unemployment insurance benefits, suspension of professional licenses, inability to obtain necessary medical care, imminent homelessness, and displacement of a minor child, all directly caused by two years of judicial obstruction of a congressional mandate — is not a neutral act.

The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 144–145, and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, collectively establish that the systematic deprivation of a federally mandated right — whether by a district court, a circuit court, or an administrative action of this Court's own Clerk's Office — is not a matter that can be deferred, delayed, or administratively managed without compounding the constitutional injury already inflicted.

Petitioner respectfully presents that only the Justices of this Court — not the Clerk's Office — have the authority to adjudicate the obstruction documented in this record. It is to the Justices and to them alone, that this presentment is respectfully directed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the original Petition, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue the writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to confirm the arbitration awards issued on February 5, 2024, as mandated by the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, § 9, 43 Stat. 883, 884.

Respectfully Presented,



Allen Watkins, Pro Se

3308 W. Saint Kateri Dr.

Phoenix, AZ 85041

(623) 633-2623

Dated: 3.25.26