

APPENDIX

to the Petitioner's Reply to the Brief-in-Opposition

(This appendix pagination is consecutive to Petitioner's Appendix to the Petition)

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

VALERIE NDJE NLEND,

Respondent,

and

RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,

Appellant.

No. 86331-2-1 (consolidated with
Nos. 87482-9-1, 87158-7-1)

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BIRK, J. — After more than two years of litigating this dissolution matter in four counties in two states, Rodrigue Ndje Nlend did not appear for or participate in the trial. Several months after the trial court entered final orders that dissolved his marriage to Valerie Ndje Nlend and provided for the care and support of the parties' children, Rodrigue¹ filed a series of motions primarily seeking to vacate the final dissolution orders. The trial court entered nine orders denying the postjudgment motions. The court later granted a motion to correct clerical errors, and entered an amended decree of dissolution.

In three consolidated appeals, Rodrigue challenges 25 orders entered in this proceeding. Rodrigue's challenges are largely precluded by his failure to preserve his claims of error, present evidence, or challenge Valerie's evidence at trial. His claims otherwise lack merit and are simply a continuation of his

¹ We use the parties' first names for clarity and intend no disrespect by doing so.

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established pattern of using the legal system to harass and distract from his repeated failures to comply with orders enforcing his court-ordered obligations over the life of this case. We affirm.

I

The parties were married in 2006, had two children, and lived in Washington for about 15 months before they separated in September 2020. In a November 2020 proceeding, the King County Superior Court entered a Domestic Violence Protection Order (DVPO) protecting Valerie and the children and imposing restrictions on Rodrigue. In May 2021, Valerie filed a petition in King County to dissolve the parties' marriage. A few months thereafter, she moved to North Carolina with the children.² The trial court entered temporary provisions requiring that Rodrigue pay spousal and child support, and a temporary parenting plan.

In April 2022, following a contempt hearing to enforce Rodrigue's past due support obligations, Rodrigue filed an action seeking dissolution in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. In July 2022, Rodrigue filed in King County Superior Court a judgment for "Absolute Divorce" entered by the Mecklenburg County court and sought dismissal of Valerie's Washington petition. The superior court dismissed the petition without prejudice. Valerie sought reconsideration, asserting that the North Carolina order did not address many significant issues she sought to resolve in her Washington petition, such as child support, parenting provisions, and the

² Although Valerie moved without providing advance notice, the trial court later concluded the relocation was not in bad faith and it was in the children's best interest to remain in North Carolina with Valerie pending resolution of the case.

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distribution of assets. In August 2022, the superior court granted reconsideration and vacated the dismissal order, concluding that it was “inappropriate” for Rodrigue to obtain the North Carolina order while the matter was pending in Washington. The trial court reset the matter for trial and Rodrigue appealed the August 2022 order.

Meanwhile, the King County Superior Court entered an order confirming jurisdiction in Washington, after conferral as authorized by statute, RCW 26.27.101 (a Washington court may communicate with another state court about a family law proceeding). The North Carolina court vacated the judgment of divorce. This court affirmed the trial court’s ruling reinstating Valerie’s petition and resetting the matter for trial. See In re Marriage of Nlend, No. 84442-3-I, slip op. at 1, 10-11 (Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 2023) (unpublished), <https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/844423.pdf>.

With both Washington and North Carolina courts unambiguously confirming Washington’s jurisdiction over the dissolution matter, Rodrigue filed additional competing and duplicative actions in Mecklenburg County and two other North Carolina counties, seeking the same relief. And he again unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the Washington case. In a 2023 order resolving approximately twenty motions Rodrigue filed in that court, a Mecklenburg County trial court found that Rodrigue had engaged in “forum shopping” to avoid the enforcement of Washington’s support orders; exhibited “gamesmanship and acted in bad faith” by filing excessive pleadings, inexcusably failing to appear for hearings, and ignoring

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this court's rulings; interposed pleadings for the "improper purpose of harassing [Valerie], causing unnecessary delay, and needlessly increasing the costs of litigation;" and used the courts in both states in a "weaponized manner for the purpose of continuing his abuse and harassment."

Four times between June 2022 and April 2023, the King County court found Rodrigue in contempt for failing to comply with support and other court-ordered obligations. The court imposed numerous conditions on Rodrigue to purge the contempt, such as, payment of outstanding support amounts due, disclosure of his residential address with proof of residency, and the return of funds withdrawn from the parties' accounts following the parties' 2020 separation. Rodrigue did not respond to the allegations of contempt, appear at any of the contempt hearings, or comply with any purge conditions. In addition to the conditions included in the initial temporary orders, the court entered orders imposing specific financial restraints on Rodrigue, freezing certain accounts, and prohibiting withdrawal or transfer of financial assets.

In April 2023, the King County court renewed the DVPO. A few days later, the trial court denied another of Rodrigue's "multiple motions" to dismiss, noting that courts in Washington and North Carolina had ruled that "Washington Court has jurisdiction in this matter," Rodrigue had previously raised a "inconvenient forum" argument, and he had not shown that any relevant circumstance had changed.

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Rodrigue did not participate in a pretrial status conference held on October 26, 2023 or respond to Valerie's ER 904 submissions. In November 2023, Valerie filed a motion to require Rodrigue to appear in person for trial. Valerie pointed to Rodrigue's history of noncompliance with court orders and explained that, following the April 2023 renewal of the DVPO and denial of his motion to dismiss, Rodrigue had ceased participating in the case. The court granted the motion and ordered Rodrigue to appear in person.

Valerie appeared at the December 14, 2023 trial by Zoom.³ The court considered her testimony and more than 70 exhibits she filed. Rodrigue did not appear. The trial court memorialized Rodrigue's nonappearance and noted that the court had communicated with him about the start of trial using the e-mail address he had used throughout the case:

All right, so I want to just state on the record that the respondent is not here. Since being assigned this case, I forget when it was, last week that came to me on brokerage, on reassignment, I have not heard—we have not heard anything from the father. He has not communicated in any way with my bailiff. The email address that we are using has not been returned. Nothing's been returned from that address, and it appears to be the same address that has been used throughout these proceedings. We haven't heard anything. We haven't received anything. He was ordered to appear in person. My courtroom door is open, we're down here at the King County Courthouse, and although the petitioner is appearing on Zoom, the respondent was ordered, for many reasons, to come in in person and he has failed to do so.

³ "Zoom" is a cloud-based, peer-to-peer videoconferencing software platform that is used for teleconferencing, telecommuting, distance education, and social relations.

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On January 22, 2024, the trial court entered a Decree of Dissolution, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a Parenting Plan, and a Child Support order. Shortly after, the court entered a one year restraining order protecting Valerie and the children. On February 20, 2024, Rodrigue filed a notice of appeal designating for review the final dissolution orders and several underlying orders.⁴

About five months after entry of the orders that finalized the dissolution, Rodrigue filed a slew of postjudgment motions, including motions to vacate and for an order to show cause, a motion to serve by mail, a motion to disqualify the judge, a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, and a motion to allow remote appearance. Rodrigue filed declarations and hundreds of pages of exhibits in support of his motions. He primarily urged the trial court to vacate the orders because he claimed he was unaware of the December 14 trial date until sometime in February 2024, when Valerie's North Carolina counsel alerted him to the entry of final orders in Washington. He claimed at that point, he "created a new profile," accessed the King County Superior Court dockets, and discovered that trial had occurred in his absence. The trial court entered seven separate orders denying Rodrigue's motions and Rodrigue appealed.

In October 2024, Rodrigue filed a motion to modify or terminate support, a motion for trial by affidavit, and another motion to vacate. Valerie filed a motion to correct non-substantive clerical errors in the decree. On October 25, 2024 the trial court entered an amended decree, and a "status order," indicating that, apart from

⁴ Rodrigue later filed an amended notice of appeal designating additional orders.

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entering an amended decree to correct scrivener's errors, it would not adjudicate the additional motions because of pending appellate review. Rodrigue filed a third notice of appeal. This court consolidated Rodrigue's appeals.

II

Many of the arguments in each of Rodrigue's appeals turn on his claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by entering final dissolution orders without ensuring proper notification of trial date.

Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. State v. Ralph Williams' Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 327, 335, 553 P.2d 442 (1976). For notice to meet these constitutional requirements, it must be " 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " In re Marriage of Himes, 136 Wn.2d 707, 736-37, 965 P.2d 1087 (1998) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)). Such notice must give a party " 'sufficient notice to make an intelligent decision to appear or default.' " In re Marriage of Johnson, 107 Wn. App. 500, 504, 27 P.3d 654 (2001) (quoting Conner v. Universal Util., 105 Wn.2d 168, 172, 712 P.2d 849 (1986)).

A judgment entered without notice and an opportunity to be heard is void. State ex. rel. Adams v. Super. Ct., 36 Wn.2d 868, 872, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950). Courts are required to vacate void judgments. See In re Marriage of Chai, 122 Wn. App. 247, 254, 93 P.3d 936 (2004). But a judgment entered by a court with

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both jurisdiction and inherent power is not void, even if there was some procedural irregularity in the process. Id.

Rodrigue does not dispute that he was notified by e-mail of the date, time, and location of the trial. In the months leading up to trial, Rodrigue received numerous documents by e-mail, including ER 904 exhibits, supplemental exhibits, Valerie's trial memorandum, a proposed parenting plan, and a motion to order his in-person attendance at trial. On November 28, 2023, following a hearing at which Rodrigue failed to appear, the court sent him by e-mail an "Order Adjusting Trial Date" that continued the trial "to the week of December 11, 2023." (Some capitalization omitted.) On the morning of December 11, 2023, the court's bailiff informed Valerie's counsel and Rodrigue by e-mail that the trial was not yet assigned. At the end of the day, the bailiff sent another e-mail to both parties, stating that Judge Suzanne Parisien would preside over the trial, which would begin at 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 2023. The next day, the parties received further instructions by e-mail from Judge Parisien's bailiff, and on December 13, 2023, the day before trial, they were provided with a Zoom link by e-mail. The record also indicates that the court sent final orders to both parties by e-mail on the date they were entered.

Rodrigue contends that notice of the trial date by e-mail was "ineffective and constitutionally defective" because (1) notice by mail is the "standard method allowed by law[]," (2) his current mailing address was in the court file; (3) unless affirmatively agreed to, service of pleadings by e-mail is not authorized by CR 5;

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and (4) the significant interests at stake in dissolution proceedings warrant more formal notice. Days after Valerie filed her petition, the trial court authorized original service of process of the petition by mail (to a post office box in Indiana) and e-mail because Rodrigue's physical location was unknown. Rodrigue does not challenge the sufficiency of that original service. His right to due process was protected. See 14A DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 50:1 (3d ed. 2018) (service of process requirements are both strictly construed and enforced to protect a defendant's due process rights, but once an action is commenced, requirements are "far less rigorous").

CR 5 provides rules for service of pleadings subsequent to the initial complaint, but does not govern the manner in which the court communicates with parties. Here, Rodrigue appeared in the case and litigated extensively for approximately two years. The record shows that he frequently and consistently used the same e-mail address to correspond with opposing counsel, his own former counsel, and the court between 2021 and 2023. Rodrigue cites no authority prescribing the manner in which a court presiding over trial may direct the parties when and how to appear for trial proceedings, in the absence of which we decline to opine on the nature of such a standard. For, in any event, disseminating trial information using the e-mail address that Rodrigue used throughout the case was reasonably calculated to apprise him of that information.⁵ Rodrigue fails to

⁵ Rodrigue argues that the court should have surmised that his e-mail was not working properly because he had not responded to recent e-mail correspondence sent by the court or opposing counsel or initiated contact with the court for several months before trial. But, as the trial court noted, none of

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establish constitutionally insufficient notice and therefore provides no justification for appellate relief from the trial court's rulings entered after trial.

III

In addition to his procedural argument, Rodrigue's first appeal raises claims as to substantive aspects of the final orders. In particular, Rodrigue challenges the (1) findings of contempt; (2) authority to enter a final child support order; (3) the calculation of his income; (4) the determination of ownership and distribution of real property; (5) the identification and assignment of value to the parties' assets; (6) the award of spousal support; (7) the judgment for past due support; and (8) the finding of intransigence and award of fees and costs to Valerie. But, as he acknowledges, Rodrigue did not participate in the trial and undisputedly presented no evidence, proposed no alternative findings or provisions, and did not challenge the evidence Valerie presented.

With limited exceptions, a party must raise an issue at trial in order to preserve it for appeal. RAP 2.5(a). The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error that was not raised in the trial court. Fireside Bank v. Askins, 195 Wn.2d 365, 374, 460 P.3d 157 (2020). As explained, we discern no error—let alone manifest constitutional error—as to notice. See RAP 2.5(a)(3) (manifest error affecting a constitutional right may be raised for the first time on appeal).

Rodrigue's e-mails were returned to sender. And, given Rodrigue's extensive history of "gamesmanship" in the litigation, the trial court drew the equally reasonable inference that Rodrigue's silence was strategic and his claim that e-mail correspondence was not received at the time of delivery was "not credible."

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Rodrigue's substantive claims are waived as a result of his failure to raise them in the trial court.

Similarly, although he did not appear at any hearings or submit evidence to demonstrate compliance with support obligations imposed in the court's temporary orders, Rodrigue challenges the contempt orders for the first time on appeal. Rodrigue claims the orders are void because Valerie did not comply with the applicable statute requiring personal service of a show cause order. RCW 26.18.050(1) authorizes a trial court to issue a show cause order to address a motion for contempt for a party's failure to comply with a support order. According to RCW 26.18.050(2), "[s]ervice of the order to show cause shall be by personal service, or in the manner provided in the civil rules of superior court or applicable statute."

It appears from the record that, at least twice, the trial court authorized service by mail or e-mail of contempt documents. Rodrigue evaded personal service throughout the case, because although ordered to do so, he consistently refused to disclose his residential address. He provided numerous mailing addresses in three different states during the litigation, but the addresses were either places of business where he was renting a mailbox or other places where he did not reside. Rodrigue does not challenge any order authorizing service by mail or e-mail. His claim of insufficient service does not suggest that he did not receive copies of contempt orders by mail or e-mail. Nor does he attempt to show that, at any point between June 2022 and April 2023, he asserted that any

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contempt order was invalid because of insufficient of service of a show cause order. To the contrary, in disputing Washington's jurisdiction to proceed during the last appeal litigated in this court, which we decided by opinion issued on July 31, 2023, and by his efforts to preempt the Washington court's rulings in his North Carolina filings later deemed by that state's courts to be improper forum shopping, Rodrigue manifested awareness and receipt of the court's orders and findings of contempt. Rodrigue fails to establish manifest constitutional error or any other basis that warrants review of unpreserved errors related to the contempt orders.

Rodrigue challenges the April 2023 denial of his motion to dismiss Valerie's petition under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It is transparent from the extreme facts of this case that Rodrigue's efforts to litigate in North Carolina were an exercise in improper forum shopping as that state's courts have also noted. In addition, Rodrigue fails to explain why his claim asserting a more convenient forum for trial is not moot now that the matter has been resolved. See e.g. Herrera v. Villaneda, 3 Wn. App. 2d 483, 491, 416 P.3d 733 (2018) (appeal of the trial court's determination that county was an inconvenient forum for action to establish parenting plan was moot after Oregon court resolved all parenting plan issues).

And finally, Rodrigue challenges the trial court's order assigning the case to Judge Parisien days before trial. However, he demonstrates no basis to review that administrative order given the trial court's inherent authority to control and manage its calendars, proceedings, and parties. See State v. Gassman, 175 Wn.2d 208, 211, 283 P.3d 1113 (2012).

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IV

Rodrigue's second appeal arises from the multiple orders denying his postjudgment motions.⁶ Again, because we reject Rodrigue's arguments that he was deprived of constitutionally sufficient notice, we reject his claim that the trial court was required to vacate the orders under CR 60(b) on this basis.

Rodrigue's contention that the trial court was required to vacate the orders on the basis of fraud likewise fails. To obtain relief under CR 60(b)(4), the party challenging the judgment must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct prevented the party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. Coogan v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec Inc., 197 Wn.2d 790, 821, 490 P.3d 200 (2021). Rodrigue contends that Valerie failed to disclose, or accurately report, certain assets. But the appropriate means to present evidence contrary to Valerie's contentions was by participating in good faith at trial on the merits. Apart from the fact Rodrigue's claims of fraud are inadequately supported, he cannot voluntarily absent himself from the adversarial proceeding to determine disputed facts, and then obtain a second chance at a trial simply by arguing his opponent's evidence was not correct. Rodrigue does not show that he was unable to present his case due to fraud.

⁶ In addition to the July 2024 orders, Rodrigue's second notice of appeal designates for review the trial court's 2022 order confirming Washington state jurisdiction and a 2023 order renewing the DVPO. It does not appear that either order is appealable in this matter, and in any event, Rodrigue's briefing in this appeal does not assign error to these orders.

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As to the denial of his motion to disqualify the judge, Rodrigue claims the court erred by treating the motion as one under RCW 4.12.050 (any party appearing in superior court may disqualify a judge if notice is filed before the judge has made any discretionary ruling in the matter). Rodrigue's motion, however, expressly sought disqualification and RCW 4.14.040 and .050 provide the only mechanism to disqualify a judicial officer. And, nothing in the record suggests that the court failed to appreciate that Rodrigue's motion referenced the "appearance of fairness doctrine" and thus, also implicitly invoked a request for recusal on due process grounds. Rodrigue speculatively asserted that the court exhibited bias by, for instance, allowing Valerie to testify via Zoom at trial while denying his postjudgment motion to appear remotely, "enthusiastically" agreeing to attempt to expedite the entry of final orders, and engaging in a "strategy to delay" decisions on his postjudgment motions. Because these allegations did not constitute "[e]vidence of a judge's actual or potential bias," the court acted within its discretion in denying the motion. State v. Dominguez, 81 Wn. App. 325, 329, 914 P.2d 141 (1996); see Tatham v. Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 87, 283 P.3d 583 (2012) (this court reviews a trial court's recusal decision for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, the trial transcript, including the court's statements about not recently being on a "family law rotation," provides no support for Rodrigue's assertion that he had no opportunity to present his case before a "competent tribunal." Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wn. App. 722, 728, 649 P.2d 181 (opportunity to present one's position before a competent tribunal is a component of due process).

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Rodrigue also contends that the court erred in denying his CR 60(b) motions without first issuing a mandatory show cause order under CR 60(e)(2). But Rodrigue mistakes the significance of CR 60(e)(2). The purpose of the notice requirement and the order directing parties to appear is to facilitate notice of the motion to the nonmoving parties. Here, the trial court denied Rodrigue's motion. It rejected his claims that he had "meritorious defenses" by pointing to allegedly undisclosed financial assets and claiming that Valerie knowingly proposed inflated income for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of support—all of which Rodrigue could have argued had he participated in trial. Rodrigue simply points to evidence that could have supported arguments in favor of different calculations or a different distribution of property. These arguments are not "defenses" to Valerie's petition, which sought to dissolve the marriage, distribute property, and establish parenting provisions. Rodrigue had notice of his own CR 60 motion, and the court reached and considered the merits of his motion. Rodrigue fails to show that he is aggrieved by any failure by the court to additionally issue an order giving notice to Valerie under CR 60(e)(2). Rodrigue fails to establish error.

Rodrigue claims that in denying his motion to allow remote appearances for "all proceedings" under the dissolution case, the court denied his right to meaningfully access the court. But Rodrigue fails to explain how he was prejudiced since the court considered his postjudgment motions without oral argument and he demonstrates no right to an oral presentation as to any of his

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motions. See State v. Bandura, 85 Wn. App. 87, 92-93, 931 P.2d 174 (1997) (“[O]ral argument is a matter of discretion, so long as the movant is given the opportunity to argue in writing his or her version of the facts and law.”).

And finally, Rodrigue claims that after denying the motion to appear remotely, the court was required to grant his postjudgment motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. But again, Rodrigue does not explain why that request, seeking a more convenient forum to adjudicate the matter, was not moot after the trial court entered orders resolving all outstanding issues.

v

Although Rodrigue’s third appeal challenges the October 2024 amended decree, he makes no specific arguments related to its amended provisions. Instead, he reiterates his claim that the January 2024 decree was void because it was entered after a trial without notice, and as a result, the amended decree is “equally null & void ab initio.” Having already considered this argument, we need not address it further.

As to the “Status order re Motions Filed Post Notice of Court of Appeals Review,” Rodrigue claims that RAP 7.2 did not prevent the trial court from ruling on his pending motions. He therefore requests that we (1) reverse the status order and (2) “use [our] powers under RAP 12.2 to reach the merits” of his pending motion to vacate. Contrary to his apparent belief, RAP 12.2 does not grant authority to act outside of our appellate capacity. RAP 12.2 governs “Disposition on Review,” and provides that “the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify

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the decision being reviewed and take any other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require." The "other action[s]" contemplated are specifically with reference to the "decision being reviewed"—in this case, the status order. Nothing in RAP 12.2 allows us to set aside that order and rule on Rodrigue's motions in the first instance. And, as appellate review is now no longer pending, we need not reach any claim of error with respect to the interpretation of RAP 7.2.⁷

Affirmed.

Birk, J.

WE CONCUR:

Cohen, J.

HSG

⁷ Rodrigue has filed numerous motions, petitions, and documents in conjunction with his appeals. Several of those motions have been passed to this panel, including multiple motions for sanctions, motions and emergency motions to stay the enforcement of trial court orders, petitions for writs of mandamus, and an objection and request for sanctions related to Valerie's supplemental designation of clerk's papers. Rodrigue has also filed a motion to modify a commissioner's June 18, 2025 ruling passing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the panel under RAP 17.7. All of Rodrigue's outstanding motions are hereby denied.



NDJE NLEND NORTH CAROLINA COURTS NDJE NLEND <north.carolina.court.ndjenlend@gmail.com>

Status of Rodrigue's Pending Motions under No. 21-3-02434-3 SEA after WA Court of Appeals 01-Dec-2025 Opinion

3 messages

Rodrigue Alain NDJE NLEND - North Carolina Courts <north.carolina.court.ndjenlend@gmail.com>
To: "Parisien, Suzanne" <Suzanne.parisien@kingcounty.gov>, "Court, Parisien" <Parisien.Court@kingcounty.gov>
Cc: Rich Cassidy <rich@cassadyfamilylaw.com>

Wed, Mar 11, 2026 at 9:14 AM

Honorable Suzanne Parisien,

I trust that you received the WA Court of Appeals 01-Dec-2025 Opinion under Case No. 863312 and related to KCSC case No. 21-3-02434-3 SEA.

More than three (03) months after the WA Court of Appeals 01-Dec-2025 opinion under Case No. 863312, I still haven't received the Court's rulings on my pending motions (see below and attached for my motions which have been pending before the Court, with most of these motions pending for more than one year before the Court).

Could your Honor please provide her ruling(s) on Rodrigue's pending motions?







| Sub No. | Filing Date | Filed Document Name | Filed Document Additional Information | Appendix No. | Clerk's Papers Page No. | RCW 2.08.240 Overdue? |
|----------------|-------------|------------------------|--|--------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 894 | 10/7/2024 | Motion | FOR MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE | 81 | CP 1798 - 1803 | Yes |
| 895 | 10/7/2024 | Notice of Hearing | MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE | | CP 1804 - 1806 | |
| 899 | 10/7/2024 | Motion and Declaration | VACATE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS | 9 | CP 1892 - 2081 | Yes |
| 900 | 10/7/2024 | Notice of Hearing | VACATE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS | | CP 2082 - 2084 | |
| 920 | 10/29/2024 | Motion and Declaration | VACATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS | 91 | | Yes |
| 921 | 10/29/2024 | Notice of Hearing | VACATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS | | | |
| 946 | 12/2/2024 | Motion and Declaration | CIVIL RULE 60(b) MOTION TO VACATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS (AMENDED) | 12 | CP 2136 - 2166 | Yes |
| 944 | 12/2/2024 | Notice of Hearing | CIVIL RULE 60(b) MOTION TO VACATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS (AMENDED) | | CP 2133 - 2135 | |
| 989 | 3/7/2025 | Motion | FOR JUDGE DISQUALIFICATION | 89 | | No |
| 987 | 3/7/2025 | Motion | TO VACATE VOID ORDERS | 90 | | No |
| 991 | 3/7/2025 | Notice of Hearing | TO VACATE VOID ORDERS and JUDGE DISQUALIFICATION | | | |

Respectfully,

Rodrigue Alain ~~Ndje~~ Nlend, **Pro Se**

7 attachments

 2025-03-18_WPL_Respondent's CR 60(b) Motion and MFJD_FILED.pdf
367K

-  2025-03-07_NoH_Motion-to-vacate-Void-Orders_MfJD.pdf
606K
-  2025-04-07_NoH_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf
607K
-  2025-03-07_Motion for Judge Disqualification.pdf
1540K
-  2025-03-07_DCLR_Motion-to-vacate-Void-Orders_MfJD.pdf
908K
-  2025-04-07_WPL_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf
968K
-  2025-04-07_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf
1597K

Rodrigue Alain NDJE NLEND - North Carolina Courts <north.carolina.court.ndjenlend@gmail.com>
 To: "Parisien, Suzanne" <Suzanne.parisien@kingcounty.gov>, "Court, Parisien" <Parisien.Court@kingcounty.gov>
 Cc: Rich Cassidy <rich@cassadyfamilylaw.com>

Thu, Mar 12, 2026 at 12:31 PM

Honorable Suzanne Parisien,

This is a follow up to the above matter.
 Could your Honor please provide her ruling(s) on Rodrigue's pending motions or the status of Rodrigue's pending motions?

Best Regards,

Rodrigue Alain Ndjé Nlend, Pro Se

[Quoted text hidden]

Rodrigue Alain NDJE NLEND - North Carolina Courts <north.carolina.court.ndjenlend@gmail.com>
 To: "Parisien, Suzanne" <Suzanne.parisien@kingcounty.gov>, "Court, Parisien" <Parisien.Court@kingcounty.gov>
 Cc: Rich Cassidy <rich@cassadyfamilylaw.com>

Fri, Mar 13, 2026 at 1:45 PM

Honorable Suzanne Parisien,

This is a follow up on my 11-Mar-2026 email on the above matter.
 Could your Honor please provide her ruling(s) on Rodrigue's pending motions or the status of Rodrigue's pending motions?

Best Regards,

Rodrigue Alain Ndjé Nlend, Pro Se

[Quoted text hidden]

7 attachments

-  **2025-03-18_WPL_Respondent's CR 60(b) Motion and MFJD_FILED.pdf**
367K
-  **2025-03-07_NoH_Motion-to-vacate-Void-Orders_MfJD.pdf**
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-  **2025-04-07_NoH_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf**
607K
-  **2025-03-07_Motion for Judge Disqualification.pdf**
1540K
-  **2025-03-07_DCLR_Motion-to-vacate-Void-Orders_MfJD.pdf**
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-  **2025-04-07_WPL_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf**
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-  **2025-04-07_Respondent's DCLR & Motion for Sanctions_FILED.pdf**
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RAP 7.2
AUTHORITY OF TRIAL COURT AFTER REVIEW ACCEPTED

(a) Generally. After review is accepted by the appellate court, the trial court has authority to act in a case only to the extent provided in this rule, unless the appellate court limits or expands that authority as provided in rule 8.3.

(b) Settlement of Record. The trial court has authority to settle the record as provided in Title 9 of these rules.

(c) Enforcement of Trial Court Decision in Civil Cases. In a civil case, except to the extent enforcement of a judgment or decision has been stayed as provided in rules 8.1 or 8.3, the trial court has authority to enforce any decision of the trial court and a party may execute on any judgment of the trial court. Any person may take action premised on the validity of a trial court judgment or decision until enforcement of the judgment or decision is stayed as provided in rules 8.1 or 8.3.

(d) Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses On Appeal. The trial court has authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses for an appeal in a marriage dissolution, a legal separation, a declaration of invalidity proceeding, or an action to modify a decree in any of these proceedings, and in any other action in which applicable law gives the trial court authority to do so.

(e) Postjudgment Motions and Actions To Modify Decision. The trial court has authority to hear and determine

(1) postjudgment motions authorized by the civil rules, the criminal rules, or statutes, and

(2) actions to change or modify a decision that is subject to modification by the court that initially made the decision. The postjudgment motion or action shall first be heard by the trial court, which shall decide the matter. If the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained prior to the formal entry of the trial court decision. A party should seek the required permission by motion. The decision granting or denying a postjudgment motion may be subject to review. Except as provided in rule 2.4, a party may only obtain review of the decision on the postjudgment motion by initiating a separate review in the manner and within the time provided by these rules. If review of a postjudgment motion is accepted while the appellate court is reviewing another decision in the same case, the appellate court may on its own initiative or on motion of a party consolidate the separate reviews as provided in rule 3.3(b).

(f) Release of Defendant in Criminal Case. In a criminal case, the trial court has authority, subject to RCW 9A.06.022 and .064, to fix conditions of release of a defendant and to revoke a suspended or deferred sentence.

(g) Questions Relating to Indigency. The trial court has authority to decide questions relating to indigency as provided in Title 15 of these rules.

(h) Supersedeas, Stay, and Bond. The trial court has authority to act on matters of supersedeas, stays, and bonds as provided in rules 8.1 and 8.4, CR 62(a), (b), and (h), and RCW 6.17.040.

(i) Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses. The trial court has authority to act on claims for attorney fees, costs and litigation expenses. A party may obtain review of a trial court decision on attorney fees, costs and litigation expenses in the same review proceeding as that challenging the judgment without filing a separate notice of appeal or notice for discretionary review.

(j) Juvenile Court Decision. The trial court has authority to enter findings and conclusions in a juvenile offense proceeding pursuant to JuCR 7.11. The trial court has authority to act on matters of supersedeas, stays, bonds, the release of a person, and extension of jurisdiction pending review of a juvenile court proceeding.

(k) Perpetuation of Testimony. The trial court has authority to supervise discovery proceedings pursuant to CR 27.

(l) Multiple Parties, Claims, or Counts. If the trial court has entered a judgment that may be appealed under rule 2.2(d) in a case involving multiple parties, claims, or counts, the trial court retains full authority to act in the portion of the case that is not being reviewed by the appellate court.

References

Rule 5.1, Review Initiated by Filing Notice of Appeal or Notice for Discretionary Review, (f) Order entered after review accepted; Rule 8.1, Supersedeas in the Trial Court; Rule 8.3, Appellate Court Orders Needed for Effective Review; Rule 8.4, Bond With Individual Sureties--Justification--Objection; CR 62, Stay of Proceedings To Enforce Judgment, (a) Automatic stays, (b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment, (d) Multiple claims or multiple parties; RCW 6.08, Stay of Execution.

[Adopted effective July 1, 1976; Amended effective July 2, 1976; September 1, 1985; September 1, 1987; September 1, 1990; September 1, 1994; September 1, 1998; December 24, 2002.]

RAP 1.2
INTERPRETATION AND WAIVER OF RULES BY COURT

(a) Interpretation. These rules will be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate the decision of cases on the merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling circumstances where justice demands, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b).

(b) Words of Command. Unless the context of the rule indicates otherwise: "Should" is used when referring to an act a party or counsel for a party is under an obligation to perform. The court will ordinarily impose sanctions if the act is not done within the time or in the manner specified. The word "must" is used in place of "should" if extending the time within which the act must be done is subject to the severe test under rule 18.8(b) or to emphasize failure to perform the act in a timely way may result in more severe than usual sanctions. The word "will" or "may" is used when referring to an act of the appellate court. The word "shall" is used when referring to an act that is to be done by an entity other than the appellate court, a party, or counsel for a party.

(c) Waiver. The appellate court may waive or alter the provisions of any of these rules in order to serve the ends of justice, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b) and (c).

References

Rule 18.8, Waiver of Rules and Extension and Reduction of Time, (b) Restriction on extension of time, (c) Restriction on changing decision; Rule 18.9, Violation of Rules.

[Adopted effective July 1, 1976.]

RCW 4.44.020 Notice of trial—Note of issue. At any time after the issues of fact are completed in any case by the service of complaint and answer or reply when necessary, as herein provided, either party may cause the issues of fact to be brought on for trial, by serving upon the opposite party a notice of trial at least three days before any day provided by rules of court for setting causes for trial, which notice shall give the title of the cause as in the pleadings, and notify the opposite party that the issues in such action will be brought on for trial at the time set by the court; and the party giving such notice of trial shall, at least five days before the day of setting such causes for trial file with the clerk of the court a note of issue containing the title of the action, the names of the attorneys and the date when the last pleading was served; and the clerk shall thereupon enter the cause upon the trial docket according to the date of the issue.

In case an issue of law raised upon the pleadings is desired to be brought on for argument, either party shall, at least five days before the day set apart by the court under its rules for hearing issues of law, serve upon the opposite party a like notice of trial and furnish the clerk of the court with a note of issue as above provided, which note of issue shall specify that the issue to be tried is an issue of law; and the clerk of the court shall thereupon enter such action upon the motion docket of the court.

When a cause has once been placed upon either docket of the court, if not tried or argued at the time for which notice was given, it need not be noticed for a subsequent session or day, but shall remain upon the docket from session to session or from law day to law day until final disposition or stricken off by the court. The party upon whom notice of trial is served may file the note of issue and cause the action to be placed upon the calendar without further notice. [2003 c 406 s 1; 1893 c 127 s 35; RRS s 319.]

Rules of court: Cf. CR 40(a).

CR 40
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES

(a) Notice of Trial—Note of Issue.

(1) *Of Fact.* At any time after the issues of fact are completed in any case by the service of complaint and answer or reply when necessary, as herein provided, either party may cause the issues of fact to be brought on for trial, by serving upon the opposite party a notice of trial at least 3 days before any day provided by rules of court for setting causes for trial, which notice shall give the title of the cause as in the pleadings, and notify the opposite party that the issues in such action will be brought on for trial at the time set by the court; and the party giving such notice of trial shall, at least 5 days before the day of setting such causes for trial, file with the clerk of the court a note of issue containing the title of the action, the names of the attorneys and the date when the last pleading was served; and the clerk shall thereupon enter the cause upon the trial docket according to the date of the issue.

(2) *Of Law.* In case an issue of law raised upon the pleadings is desired to be brought on for argument, either party shall, at least 5 days before the day set apart by the court under its rules for hearing issues of law, serve upon the opposite party a like notice of trial and furnish the clerk of the court with a note of issue as above provided, which note of issue shall specify that the issue to be tried is an issue of law; and the clerk of the court shall thereupon enter such action upon the motion docket of the court.

(3) *Adjournments.* When a cause has once been placed upon either docket of the court, if not tried or argued at the time for which notice was given, it need not be noticed for a subsequent session or day, but shall remain upon the docket from session to session or from law day to law day until final disposition or stricken off by the court.

(4) *Filing Note by Opposite Party.* The party upon whom notice of trial is served may file the note of issue and cause the action to be placed upon the calendar without further notice by the served party.

(5) *Issue May Be Brought to Trial by Either Party.* Either party, after the notice of trial, whether given by either party, may bring the issue to trial, and in the absence of the adverse party, unless the court for good cause otherwise directs, may proceed with the case, and take a dismissal of the action, or a verdict or judgment, as the case may require.

(b) Methods. Each superior court may provide by local rule for placing of actions upon the trial calendar

- (1) without request of the parties, or
- (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties, or
- (3) in such other manner as the court deems expedient.

(c) Preferences. In setting cases for trial, unless otherwise provided by statute, preference shall be given to criminal over civil cases, and cases where the defendant or a witness is in confinement shall have preference over other cases.

(d) Trials. When a cause is set and called for trial, it shall be tried or dismissed, unless good cause is shown for a continuance. The court may in a proper case, and upon terms, reset the same.

(e) Continuances. A motion to continue a trial on the ground of the absence of evidence shall only be made upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it, and also the name and address of the

witness or witnesses. The court may also require the moving party to state upon affidavit the evidence which he expects to obtain; and if the opposing party admits that such evidence would be given, and that it be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and overruled as improper, the trial shall not be continued. The court, upon its allowance of the motion, may impose terms or conditions upon the moving party.

(f) Change of Judge. Any right under RCW 4.12.050 to seek disqualification of a judge will be deemed waived unless, in addition to the limitations in the statute, the motion and affidavit is filed with the court no later than thirty days prior to trial before a preassigned judge. For purposes of this rule, "trial" includes any review or appeal from an administrative body. If a case is reassigned to a different judge less than forty days prior to trial, a party may then move for a change of judge within ten days of such reassignment, unless the moving party has previously made such a motion.

[Adopted effective July 1, 1967; Amended effective October 19, 1999; April 28, 2015.]

- A mandatory pleading remains to be filed.
- Other explanation:

DATED: _____ SIGNED: _____

Plaintiff/Petitioner/Attorney (If attorney, WSBA #: _____)

Typed Name: _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____

Attorney(s) For: _____

(2) Cases Subject to Mandatory Arbitration. If a statement of arbitrability pursuant to LMAR 2.1(a) is filed on or before the deadline for filing the Confirmation of Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Defenses, the Confirmation of Joinder need not be filed and no show cause hearing will be held. See LFLR 4(c).

(b) Family Law Dissolution and Modification Cases; Confirmation of Issues; Referral to Mediation; Form. See LFLR 4(c).

(c) Paternity Cases; Confirmation of Completion of Genetic Testing; Form. See LFLR 4(d).

[Adopted effective September 1, 1996; amended effective April 14, 1997; September 1, 1997; September 1, 1999; September 1, 2001; September 1, 2002; September 1, 2003; September 1, 2004; September 1, 2008; September 1, 2015.]

LCR 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS

(d) Filing. No motion for any order shall be heard unless the original documents pertaining to it have been filed with the clerk.

(k) Copies of Cases Not to be Filed. Working copies of cases shall be provided to a judge pursuant to LCR 7(b), but shall not be filed with the clerk. The copies provided to the judge and all parties should be in the same form, including but not limited to markings, highlights, and color copies.

[Amended effective September 1, 1994; September 1, 1999; September 1, 2002; June 1, 2009; September 2, 2013.]

III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS (Rules 7-16)

LCR 7. CIVIL MOTIONS

For "Respective Chief Judge" see LGR 29(h).

(b) Motions and Other Documents.

(1) Scope of Rules. Except when specifically provided in another rule, this rule governs all motions in civil cases. See, for example, LCR 12, LCR 26, LCR 40, LCR 56, and the LFLR's.

(2) Hearing Times and Places. Hearing times and places will also be available from the Clerk's Office/Department of Judicial Administration by telephone at (206) 296-9300 or by accessing <https://kingcounty.gov/courts/clerk.aspx>. Schedules for all regular calendars (family law motions, ex parte, chief civil, etc.) will be available at the information desk in the King County Courthouse and the Court Administration Office in Room 2D of the Regional Justice Center.

(3) Argument. All nondispositive motions, motions for orders of default, and motions for default judgment shall be ruled on without oral argument, except for the following:

(A) Motions for revisions of commissioners' rulings:

(i) Motions for revisions of commissioners' rulings regarding involuntary commitment act proceedings, Title 13 proceedings, and proceedings where the underlying motion did not include oral argument shall be ruled on without oral argument.

(ii) All other motions for revision shall be noted with oral argument. The judge may strike oral argument. If the judge strikes oral argument, the court will notify the parties.

(B) Motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions;

(C) Family Law motions under LFLR 5;

(D) Motions to be presented in person to the Ex Parte and Probate Department pursuant to the Ex Parte and Probate Department Presentation of Motions and Hearings Manual ("Motions and Hearings Manual") issued by the clerk;

(E) Motions for which the Court allows oral argument.

(4) Dates of Filing, Hearing, and Consideration.

(A) Filing and Scheduling of Motions. The moving party shall serve and file all motion documents no later than 4:30 p.m. nine judicial days before the date the party wishes the motion to be considered. A motion must be scheduled by a party for hearing on a judicial day. For cases assigned to a judge, if the motion is set for oral argument on a nonjudicial day, the moving party must reschedule it with the judge's staff; for motions without oral argument, the assigned judge will consider the motion on the next judicial day.

(B) Scheduling Oral Argument on Dispositive Motions. The time and date for hearing shall be scheduled in advance by contacting the staff of the hearing judge.

(C) Oral Argument Requested on All Other Motions. Any party may request oral argument by placing "ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED" prominently on the first page of the motion or opposition.

(D) Opposing Documents. Any party opposing a motion shall file and serve the original responsive papers in opposition to a motion, serve copies on parties, and deliver working copies to the hearing judge no later than 4:30 p.m. four judicial days before the date the motion is to be considered. Working copies shall be submitted pursuant to the requirements in this rule.

(E) Reply. Any documents in strict reply shall be similarly filed and served no later than 4:30 p.m. two judicial days before the hearing.

(F) Working Copies. Working copies of the motion and all documents in support or opposition shall be delivered to the hearing judge, commissioner, or appropriate judicial department no later than on the day they are to be served on all parties. The copies provided to

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SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, COUNTY OF KING

In re Marriage of:

VALERIE NDJE NLEND,
Petitioner,
&
RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,
Respondent.

NO. 21-3-02434-3 SEA
ORDER ADJUSTING TRIAL DATE
Clerk's Action Required:
Trial: December 11, 2023

I. BASIS

The Court having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, that it is basically ready for trial and just needs a new, adjusted trial date; the Court finding good cause for the entry of this order; and the Court noting that despite receiving proper notice, the Respondent failed to appear for today's hearing and the Court waited until 1:42 p.m. to start the hearing to see if the Respondent would appear, which he did not and did not contact the Court either, the Court hereby issues the following order:

II. ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

The trial date in this matter shall be adjusted from November 27, 2023, to the week of December 11, 2023.

Dated this 28th day of November 2023



JUDGE SUSAN H. AMINI

Presented by:

Richard B. Cassady, Jr.

Richard B. Cassady, WSBA No. 23655
Attorney for Petitioner

failed to appear

Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend
Respondent Pro Se

FILED
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SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
E-FILED
CASE #: 21-3-02434-3 SEA

Superior Court of Washington, County of King

In re Marriage of:

Petitioner:

VALERIE NDJE NLEND

And Respondent:

RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND

No. 21-3-02434-3 SEA

Order to Allow Service by Mail
(ORRSR)

Order to Allow Service by Mail

1. The court has considered the *Motion to Serve by Mail* filed by the Petitioner. The *Motion* shows a valid reason to serve by mail.
2. The requesting party may serve the *Summons* and *Petition* in this case by mail to the Respondent, Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend, as follows:

to his/her last known mailing address:
P.O. Box 3923, South Bend, Indiana 48619, and

To the email address the Respondent stated may be used for service:
rodnlend@gmail.com

3. To Serve by Mail:

- The requesting party may use the *Summons by Mail* form (FL All Family 106).
- The server must be someone age 18 or older who is not a party to this case.
- The server must mail two copies of the court papers to each address listed above.
 - Mail one copy of the court papers by regular, prepaid first class mail.
 - Mail the other copy by certified mail, with return receipt requested.
- Each envelope must show the requesting party's (not the server's) return address. The return address may be the requesting party's lawyer's address or any other address where the requesting party agrees to receive legal papers.
- Fill out and file a *Proof of Service by Mail* (form FL All Family 107).

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CASE #: 21-3-02434-3 SEA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

In re the Marriage of:

VALERIE NDJE NLEND,

Petitioner,

and

RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,

Respondent.

NO. 21-3-02434-3 SEA

DECLARATION OF MAILING


I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to the laws of the state of Washington, that on August 2nd, 2021, I personally,

Sent a Copy of the (1) Summons and (2) Petition for Divorce, via First Class Mail and Certified mail, to Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend, P.O. Box 3923 South Bend, IN 46619 on August 2nd, 2021.

Sent the list below, via email, to Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend, rodnlend@gmail.com, on August 2nd, 2021.

| | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Petition for Divorce | Summons |
| Financial Declaration | Allow Service by Mail |
| Sealed Financial Source | Notice of Absence |
| Notice of Court Date | Notice of Appearance |
| Sealed Financial Source | Child Support Worksheets |
| Order Setting Deadlines | Declaration of Petitioner re Motion for Temp. |
| Motion for Temporary Orders | |

Dated: August 11th, 2021



Kathleen Parker

Legal Assistant to the Attorney's

LAW OFFICES OF
Cassady • Filer, L.L.P.
The Colman Building — Suite 100
811 First Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 613-5133 Fax (206) 623-3933

DECLARATION OF MAILING -

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FILED
2022 NOV 22 09:00 AM
KING COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
E-FILED
CASE #: 20-2-14116-0 SEA

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SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, COUNTY OF KING

VALERIE NDJE NLEND,
Petitioner,
&
RODRIGUE ALAIN NDJE NLEND,
Respondent.

No. 20-2-14116-0 SEA
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS
SCOMIS CODE: NT
(CLERK ACTION REQUIRED)

NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS

PLEASE BE ADVISED that the Respondent's address of **9805 Statesville Road, Unit 6440, Charlotte, NC 28269** (or any other address you may have on file) has changed. The new address is:

125 Remount Rd
Suite C-1 #706
Charlotte, NC 28203


All further correspondence should be mailed to this address.

Submitted this 22nd day of November 2022 by:



Respondent
Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend,
125 Remount Rd
Suite C-1 #706
Charlotte, NC 28203

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13588653 1.51-562

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SUSAN H. AMINI
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
KING COUNTY COURTHOUSE
515 THIRD AVENUE C-203
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104-2361
MS/KCC-SC-0203


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
RODRIGUE NDIJE NLEND
125 REMAINT Road, Suite C-1, #706
CHARLOTTE, NC 28203

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RETURN IN 3 DAYS TO
Office of the Clerk
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
PO BOX 2779
Raleigh, N.C. 27602

Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend
Suite C-1 #706
125 Remount Road
Charlotte, NC 28203-6458

Office of the Clerk
Court of Appeals of North Carolina



P.O. BOX 2779

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Eugene Soar
Clerk

Telephone
Area Code (919) 831-3500

12 December 2022

Rodrigue Alain Ndje Nlend
Suite C-1 #706
125 Remount Road
Charlotte, NC 28203-6458

RE: Notice of Appeal

The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently received your "Notice of Appeal" from a matter disposed of in a trial court or administrative tribunal.

Under the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal is to be filed with the clerk of superior court in the county where the judgment or order was entered that the party is seeking to appeal or the clerk of the administrative tribunal. See N.C.R. App. P. 3, 3.1, 4, and 18.

Please consult an attorney and/or the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure for guidance in filing for relief with this Court. This Court does not provide legal advice to parties as to what should be in their filings. Nor can court personnel provide legal advice to an individual pursuant to guidelines adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

No action will be taken on the notice of appeal or other documents you have sent to this Court. In my discretion, I am returning your documents to you.

Sincerely,

DeLena McEssy
Appellate Clerk
N.C. Court of Appeals

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CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
MECKLENBURG COUNTY
PO BOX 37971
CHARLOTTE, NC 28237-9971


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Rodrigue Alan Noy Mend
185 Lumbert Rd. Ste C-1 #104
Charlotte, NC 28203

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
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SODOMA
LAW

217 NORTH GRAHAM STREET
CHARLOTTE, NC 28202

Rodrigue Alain Ndjé Nfend
125 Remount Road, Suite C-1, #706
Charlotte, NC 28203



SODOMA
LAW

277 NORTH GRAHAM STREET
CHARLOTTE, NC 28207

Rodrigue Alain Nole Nined
125 Remount Road, Suite C-1, #706
Charlotte, NC 28203