

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois – CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)
Eastern Division**

Ashley Black

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 1:25-cv-09324

Honorable April M. Perry

Victoria Olson, et al.

Defendant.

New file

same judge

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, August 7, 2025:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable April M. Perry: Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [4] is granted. However, summons shall not issue. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may at any time dismiss an action brought in forma pauperis that the Court deems to be frivolous or malicious or which fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint in this matter alleges a claim for "fraud on the court (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3))." Doc. 1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d), a party may move for relief from a judgment or to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not give rise to independent causes of action. See *Taylor v. City of Chicago*, 2005 WL 1692635, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2005) (collecting cases). To the extent that Plaintiff wanted to seek relief from a judgment, the proper place to do it would be in a motion filed under the docket number for the case that Plaintiff complains of, not in an entirely new civil case. That said, any such motion would be baseless. The case of which Plaintiff complains 25 cv 1112 was dismissed for frivolousness. The dismissal did not in any way depend upon representations made or actions taken by Defendants Victoria Olson or Ayiende Love; the sole basis for the dismissal was the nature of the allegations made by Plaintiff in the complaint. See Case No. 25 cv 1112, Doc. 79. Thus, even if it had been filed under the proper case number, Plaintiff's motion under Rule 60(d) would be denied as meritless. The remaining 35 pages of Plaintiff's complaint do no better at stating a plausible claim for relief. For example, Plaintiff purports to bring criminal charges against Defendants under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1503, 1513, 1505, 1512, 371, 1343. None of these statutes creates a private right of action. Plaintiff's attempts to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fail because Defendants were not acting under color of law. Finally, Plaintiff's attempts to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fail because she does not plausibly allege any facts which could support such a claim (including, but not limited to, alleging race-based or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus). All of the allegations in this complaint arise from the Defendants' extremely limited actions in 25 cv 1112, none of which had any basis on the outcome of the case. Moreover, the factual allegations pled in the complaint lack basic plausibility. As one example, Plaintiff is fixated on the idea that Defendant Love responded to the complaint before she was served. That is untrue. See Doc. 25 cv 1112, Doc. 21 (certificate of service for Defendant Love on 2/11/2025); Doc. 39 (Love's Answer filed on 3/4/2025); Doc. 40 (Love's Motion to Dismiss filed on 3/4/2025). Even if

it were true, Defendants are allowed to waive service of summons and respond to publicly-filed complaints of which they are aware. The Court therefore finds that this case is frivolous, brought to harass Defendants, and fails to state any plausible claim for relief. Because no amendment would cure these core problems, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Mailed notice. (jcc,)

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Activity in Case 1:25-cv-09485 Black v. Emerson-Heery order on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

From: usdc_ecf_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov (usdc_ecf_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov)

To: ecfmail_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov

Date: Friday, August 22, 2025, 09:35 AM CDT

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United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 8/22/2025 at 9:34 AM CDT and filed on 8/22/2025

Case Name: Black v. Emerson-Heery

Case Number: 1:25-cv-09485

Filer:

Document Number: 7

Docket Text:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Georgia N. Alexakis: Plaintiff applied to file this lawsuit without prepaying the filing fee. Plaintiff also initiated a similar case, docketed as case number 25-cv-7171. In that case, plaintiff seems to be trying to sue BPM LLP, among other defendants, under a theory of racketeering. See 25-cv-7171, Dkt. No. 24 at page 2 ("Defendants include individuals and entities operating as an enterprise linked to the Northern District of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court, BPM LLP, CPA board members, and private actors"). In this case, plaintiff is trying to sue defendant William Emerson-Heery, who she alleges is affiliated with BPM LLP. E.g., [1] at 7]. Both cases appear to include allegations of misconduct in another litigation. Related claims, arising out of the same series of transactions, should be brought in one case. That avoids

inconsistent rulings, claim splitting, and potential claim or issue preclusion. Under the court's local rules, the first-filed case is treated as the primary case. See e.g., Local Rule 40.4. Plaintiff's complaint in case number 25-cv-7171 was dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), after plaintiff was given the opportunity to amend her complaint, as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. See 25-cv-7171, Dkt. No. 57. The Court adopts the reasoning of the district court in 25-cv-7171. The Court further notes that the pleading deficiencies apparent in case number 25-cv-7171 are also apparent here. For example, although plaintiff has filed a single document as her complaint (unlike the multiple documents plaintiff filed in cases like 25-cv-7171 and 25-cv-8086 as her complaint), that single document is still confusing, internally inconsistent (e.g., on different pages it identifies different parties to this action), and devoid of allegations that notify the Court and defendants as to the basis of plaintiff's claims for relief. [1]. Because plaintiff already has had the opportunity to amend her complaint in 25-cv-7171, this case is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [4] is dismissed as moot. Civil case terminated. (ca,)

1:25-cv-09485 Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ashley Black justiceforharmony@yahoo.com

1:25-cv-09485 Notice has been delivered by other means to:

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois – CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)
Eastern Division**

Ashley Black

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 1:25-cv-09485

Honorable Georgia N. Alexakis

William Emerson–Heery

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Friday, August 22, 2025:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Georgia N. Alexakis: Plaintiff applied to file this lawsuit without prepaying the filing fee. Plaintiff also initiated a similar case, docketed as case number 25-cv-7171. In that case, plaintiff seems to be trying to sue BPM LLP, among other defendants, under a theory of racketeering. See 25-cv-7171, Dkt. No. 24 at page 2 ("Defendants include individuals and entities operating as an enterprise linked to the Northern District of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court, BPM LLP, CPA board members, and private actors"). In this case, plaintiff is trying to sue defendant William Emerson–Heery, who she alleges is affiliated with BPM LLP. E.g., [1] at 7]. Both cases appear to include allegations of misconduct in another litigation. Related claims, arising out of the same series of transactions, should be brought in one case. That avoids inconsistent rulings, claim splitting, and potential claim or issue preclusion. Under the court's local rules, the first-filed case is treated as the primary case. See e.g., Local Rule 40.4. Plaintiff's complaint in case number 25-cv-7171 was dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), after plaintiff was given the opportunity to amend her complaint, as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. See 25-cv-7171, Dkt. No. 57. The Court adopts the reasoning of the district court in 25-cv-7171. The Court further notes that the pleading deficiencies apparent in case number 25-cv-7171 are also apparent here. For example, although plaintiff has filed a single document as her complaint (unlike the multiple documents plaintiff filed in cases like 25-cv-7171 and 25-cv-8086 as her complaint), that single document is still confusing, internally inconsistent (e.g., on different pages it identifies different parties to this action), and devoid of allegations that notify the Court and defendants as to the basis of plaintiff's claims for relief. [1]. Because plaintiff already has had the opportunity to amend her complaint in 25-cv-7171, this case is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis [4] is dismissed as moot. Civil case terminated. (ca,) *appeal*

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

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Activity in Case 1:25-cv-08564 Black et al v. Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP order on motion for miscellaneous relief

From: usdc_ecf_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov (usdc_ecf_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov)

To: ecfmail_ilnd@ilnd.uscourts.gov

Date: Thursday, August 21, 2025, 03:54 PM CDT

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United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 8/21/2025 at 3:53 PM CDT and filed on 8/21/2025

Case Name: Black et al v. Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP

Case Number: 1:25-cv-08564


Filer:

Document Number: 12

Docket Text:

ORDER Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 8/21/2025: The plaintiff's motion to accept her IFP application [11] is denied. The submission indicates only that the plaintiff was granted IFP status in a separate, earlier case, and argues that it should therefore be granted in this case. But the plaintiff must still submit an IFP application that is complete and provides this Court with all information needed to determine the plaintiff's financial status. The plaintiff having failed, after two opportunities, to provide that information, the application is denied. Further, this case is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which allows the Court to dismiss any action that "is frivolous [or]... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." The complaint alleges that after the plaintiff filed a civil rights lawsuit (separate from this

one), the defendant law firm conspired with government actors to unlawfully suppress her claim. The plaintiff's only factual basis for that claim is that the law firm filed a motion to dismiss and appearances before she had formally served the summons and complaint on them. She alleges that this indicates "PACER manipulation" and "fraud." She then broadly claims that the defendant acted in conspiracy with government actors to effect that fraud, and that their actions constitute, somehow, a violation of her 5th and 14th Amendment due process rights, a violation of her privacy in violation of the 4th Amendment, and an interference with her "familial rights" because it resulted in separation from her child. But the fact that a lawyer is aware of lawsuit prior to formal service and elects to respond to it is in no way indicative of fraud or collusion. The plaintiff does not say who the alleged government actors are that the defendant conspired with, or how filing a response to a lawsuit "suppress[es]" the claim or "interfere[s]" with litigation. Nor is it clear how those actions constitute an invasion of privacy or would lead to separation from family. The plaintiff has simply not pleaded enough facts to support her allegation of conspiracy, fraud, or constitutional violations. Moreover, the court concludes that amendment would be futile, and dismisses the complaint with prejudice. Mailed notice(air,)



1:25-cv-08564 Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ashley Black justiceforharmony@yahoo.com

1:25-cv-08564 Notice has been delivered by other means to:

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:

Document description:Main Document

Original filename:n/a

Electronic document Stamp:

[STAMP dcecfStamp_ID=1040059490 [Date=8/21/2025] [FileNumber=29983531-0] [2cbb596b5fcd7bfd2e974356928e3df08006883870c580029d268e916369e4d78b bbf8e0fde46ec8df8a26b5f537fc455fa909e3bd35d5bbe80903b9f8475178]]

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

BLACK, et al,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP.,

Defendant(s).

Case No. 1:25-cv-08564
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

ORDER

The plaintiff's motion to accept her IFP application [11] is denied. The submission indicates only that the plaintiff was granted IFP status in a separate, earlier case, and argues that it should therefore be granted in this case. But the plaintiff must still submit an IFP application that is complete and provides this Court with all information needed to determine the plaintiff's financial status. The plaintiff having failed, after two opportunities, to provide that information, the application is denied. Further, this case is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which allows the Court to dismiss any action that "is frivolous [or] . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." The complaint alleges that after the plaintiff filed a civil rights lawsuit (separate from this one), the defendant law firm conspired with government actors to unlawfully suppress her claim. The plaintiff's only factual basis for that claim is that the law firm filed a motion to dismiss and appearances before she had formally served the summons and complaint on them. She alleges that this indicates "PACER manipulation" and "fraud." She then broadly claims that the defendant acted in conspiracy with government actors to effect that fraud, and that their actions constitute, somehow, a violation of her 5th and 14th Amendment due process rights, a violation of her privacy in violation of the 4th Amendment, and an interference with her "familial rights" because it resulted in separation from her child. But the fact that a lawyer is aware of lawsuit prior to formal service and elects to respond to it is in no way indicative of fraud or collusion. The plaintiff does not say who the alleged government actors are that the defendant conspired with, or how filing a response to a lawsuit "suppress[es]" the claim or "interfere[s]" with litigation. Nor is it clear how those actions constitute an invasion of privacy or would lead to separation from family. The plaintiff has simply not pleaded enough facts to support her allegation of conspiracy, fraud, or constitutional violations. Moreover, the court concludes that amendment would be futile, and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

Date: 8/21/2025

/s/ John J. Tharp, Jr.

John J. Tharp, Jr.

United States District Judge

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois – CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)
Eastern Division**

Ashley Black

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 1:25-cv-07926
Honorable Jorge L.
Alonso

Mayweather Boxing and Fitness Franchising, LLC,
et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, September 3, 2025:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso: Plaintiff's applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] [6] are denied without prejudice. Applicants are required to answer every question on the application, even if the answer is zero or none. Plaintiff's applications are missing information regarding her dates of last employment, last take-home pay, and other information concerning sources of income and money over the past 12 months. Accordingly, by 9/18/25, the plaintiff is directed to either pay the full statutory filing fee of \$405.00 or file a second application to proceed without prepaying fees that supplies all required information. In addition, she must provide information about how she supported herself and obtained the basic necessities of life (e.g., employment, assistance from family, public assistance, or other support) with the very limited income disclosed. Failure to comply by the deadline will result in dismissal of this case. The Court denies the motion to consolidate [8] without prejudice to reinstatement if the complaint proceeds past the screening process. Notice mailed by Judge's staff (lf,)

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

ASHLEY BLACK,
Plaintiff(s),

v.

MAYWEATHER BOXING AND
FITNESS FRANCHISING LLC, et al.,
Defendant(s).

Case No.
2:25-cv-08438-MWC-MBK

**STANDING ORDER REGARDING
NEWLY ASSIGNED CASES**

READ THIS ORDER CAREFULLY. IT CONTROLS THIS CASE

This action has been assigned to the calendar of Judge Michelle Williams Court. The responsibility for the progress of litigation in the Federal Courts falls not only upon the attorneys in the action, but upon the Court as well. "To secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 1, all parties or their counsel are hereby ordered to familiarize themselves with the Fed. R. Civ. P., particularly Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, the Local Rules of the Central District of California, and this Court's Orders.

1 **UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED ^{#19} BY THE COURT, THE FOLLOWING**
2 **RULES SHALL APPLY:**

3 1. **Service of the Complaint.** The Plaintiff(s) shall promptly serve the
4 Complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 and file the proofs of service
5 *pursuant to the Local Rules. Any Defendant(s) not timely served shall be dismissed*
6 *from the action without prejudice. Any "DOE" or fictitiously-named Defendant(s)*
7 *who is not identified and served within 90 days after the case is filed shall be*
8 *dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).*

9 2. **Removed Actions.** Any answers filed in state court must be refiled in
10 this Court as a supplement to the petition. Any pending motions must be re-noticed
11 in accordance with the Local Rules. If an action is removed to this Court that
12 contains a form pleading (i.e., a pleading in which boxes are checked), the party or
13 parties utilizing the form pleading must file an appropriate pleading with this Court
14 within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Notice of Removal. The appropriate
15 *pleading referred to must comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 7.1, 8,*
16 *9, 10 and 11.*

17 3. **Presence of Lead Counsel.** The attorney attending any proceeding
18 before this Court, including all status and settlement conferences, must be the lead
19 trial counsel.

20 4. **Filing.** The Court's CM/ECF system is available 24/7 for electronic
21 filing of documents. Parties may register for access to PACER. For more
22 information, please visit the Court's website.

23 Unrepresented litigants who cannot electronically file their documents in the
24 CM/ECF system may mail their filings to the Clerk of Court at 255 E. Temple
25 *Street, Suite TS-134, Los Angeles, CA 90012-3332 or submit documents for filing*
26 *through the Court's Electronic Document Submission System (EDSS). For*
27 *additional filing information, please visit the Court's website, scroll down to the*
28 *box labeled "People without Lawyers," and click "Questions and Answers."*

1 Attorneys who are required to manually file documents pursuant to the Local
2 Rules must mail their filings to the Clerk of Court at the above address.

3 Non-paper physical exhibits exempted from electronic filing shall be sent via
4 U.S. Mail or other commercial delivery to the Clerk of Court at the above address.

5 **5. Discovery.** All discovery matters have been referred to a United States
6 Magistrate Judge to hear all discovery disputes. (The Magistrate Judge's initials
7 follow the Judge's initials next to the case number.) All documents must include
8 the words "DISCOVERY MATTER" in the caption to ensure proper routing.
9 Counsel are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge's Courtroom Deputy Clerk to
10 schedule matters for hearing.

11 The decision of the Magistrate Judge shall be final, subject to modification by
12 the District Court Judge only where it has been shown that the Magistrate Judge's
13 order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Any party may file and serve a motion
14 for review and reconsideration before this Court. The moving party must file and
15 serve the motion within fourteen (14) days of service of a written ruling or within
16 fourteen (14) days of an oral ruling that the Magistrate Judge states will not be
17 followed by a written ruling. The motion must specify which portions of the text are
18 clearly erroneous or contrary to law, and the claim must be supported by points and
19 authorities. Counsel shall provide the Magistrate Judge with chambers copies of the
20 moving papers and responses consistent with the corresponding judge's procedures.

21 **6. Motions – General Requirements.**

22 a. **Time for Filing and Hearing Motions:** Motions shall be filed in
23 accordance with Local Rules 6 and 7. This Court hears motions on Fridays,
24 beginning at 1:30 p.m. If the motion date selected is not available, the Court will
25 issue a minute order striking the motion. (Counsel are advised to check the
26 availability of a selected date immediately prior to filing the motion.) Opposition
27 or reply papers due on a holiday must be filed the preceding business day
28 (i.e., Thursday)—not the following business day (i.e., Monday)—and must be

1 hand-delivered or emailed to opposing^{#21} counsel on the preceding business day.

2 Professional courtesy dictates that moving parties should, whenever possible, avoid
3 filing motions for which opposition papers will be due the Thursday preceding a
4 holiday. Such a filing is likely to cause a requested continuance to be granted.

5 *Adherence to the timing requirements is mandatory for chambers'*
6 *preparation of motion matters.*

7 b. Pre-filing Requirement: Counsel must comply with Local Rule 7-
8 3, which requires counsel to engage in a pre-filing conference "to discuss
9 thoroughly . . . the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential
10 resolution." Counsel should discuss the issues to a sufficient degree that if a motion
11 is still necessary, the briefing may be directed to those substantive issues requiring
12 resolution by the Court. Counsel should resolve minor procedural or other
13 non-substantive matters during the conference. The *pro per* status of one or more
14 parties does not negate this requirement.

15 c. Length and Format of Motion Papers: Memoranda of points and
16 authorities in support of or in opposition to motions shall not exceed 25 pages.
17 Replies shall not exceed 12 pages. Only in rare instances and for good cause shown
18 will the Court grant an application to extend these page limitations. Pursuant to the
19 Local Rules, either a proportionally spaced or monospaced font may be used. A
20 proportionally spaced face must be 14-point or larger, or as the Court may
21 otherwise order. A monospaced face may not contain more than 10½ characters per
22 inch. These typeface requirements apply to footnoted material. Counsel shall
23 adhere to Local Rule 5-4.3 with respect to the conversion of all documents to PDF
24 format so when a document is electronically filed, it is in proper size and is text-
25 searchable. Further, all documents shall be filed in a format so that text can be
26 selected, copied, and pasted directly from the document. See Local Rule 5-4.3.1.

27 d. Documents with Declarations, Exhibits, and Other Attachments: If
28 a filed or lodged document has declarations, exhibits, or other attachments, each of

1 these must be filed as a separately docketed attachment to the main docket entry
2 with a description of the attachment (e.g., Dkt. 29-1 Smith Declaration).

3 e. Citations to Case Law: Citations to case law must identify not
4 only the case cited, but the specific page referenced. Citations to cases must be in
5 *Bluebook format. Counsel may omit parallel citations. For unreported cases, the*
6 Court prefers Westlaw citations.

7 f. Citations to Other Sources: Statutory references should identify
8 with specificity the sections and subsections referenced (e.g., Jurisdiction over this
9 cause of action may appropriately be found in 47 U.S.C. § 33, which grants the
10 district court jurisdiction over all offenses of the Submarine Cable Act, whether
11 the infraction occurred within the territorial waters of the United States or on
12 board a vessel of the United States outside said waters). Statutory references that
13 do not specifically indicate the appropriate section and subsection (e.g., Plaintiffs
14 allege conduct in violation of the Federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act,
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, *et seq.*) are to be avoided. Citations to treatises, manuals, and
16 other materials should include the volume, section, and pages being referenced.

17 g. Oral Argument: The Court strongly prefers counsel to appear in
18 person for motion hearings and pretrial and settlement conferences. Requests for a
19 remote appearance will only be considered upon a written application filed at least
20 seven (7) days before the hearing and supported by an appropriate declaration
21 establishing good cause.

22 If the Court deems a matter appropriate for decision without oral
23 argument, the Court will notify the parties in advance.

24 The Court encourages parties to permit less experienced lawyers,
25 including lawyers from historically under-represented groups, to actively
26 participate in the proceedings by presenting argument at motion hearings or
27 examining witnesses at trial. The Court is more likely to hear oral argument if any
28 party files a notice at least seven (7) days before a scheduled hearing stating that

1 junior counsel, including lawyers ^{#23} from historically under-represented groups, will
2 conduct the argument, or most of it.

3 **7. Specific Motion Requirements.**

4 a. **Motions Pursuant to Rule 12:** Many motions to dismiss or to strike
5 *can be avoided if the parties confer in good faith (as required under Local Rule 7-3),*
6 *especially for perceived defects in a complaint, answer, or counterclaim that could*
7 *be corrected by amendment. See Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.*
8 *1996) (where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should provide leave to*
9 *amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment).*
10 *Moreover, a party has the right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course*
11 *within twenty-one (21) days of serving it or “if the pleading is one to which a*
12 *responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21*
13 *days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is greater.”*
14 *Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Even after a complaint has been amended or the time for*
15 *amending it as a matter of course has run, the Federal Rules provide that leave to*
16 *amend should be “freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).*
17 *The Ninth Circuit requires that this policy favoring amendment be applied with*
18 *“extreme liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074,*
19 *1079 (9th Cir. 1990). These principles require that plaintiff’s counsel carefully*
20 *evaluate defendant’s contentions as to the deficiencies in the complaint. In most*
21 *instances the moving party should agree to any amendment that would cure the*
22 *defect.*

23 b. **Motions to Amend:** In addition to the requirements of Local Rule
24 15-1, all motions to amend pleadings shall: (1) state the effect of the amendment;
25 (2) *be serially numbered to differentiate the amendment from previous*
26 *amendments; (3) state the page and line number(s) and wording of any proposed*
27 *change or addition of material; and (4) include as an attachment a “redlined”*
28 *version of the proposed amended pleading indicating all additions and deletions*

1 of material.

2 c. Summary Judgment Motions: Parties need not wait until the
3 motion cutoff to bring motions for summary judgment or partial summary
4 judgment. Moreover, the court expects that the party moving for summary
5 judgment will strictly observe the timing requirements of the Local Rules and this
6 Standing Order. A motion under Rule 56 must be filed at least forty-nine (49) days
7 prior to the date on which the motion is noticed for hearing. The opposition is due
8 not later than twenty-one (21) days before the date designated for the hearing of
9 the motion, and the reply not later than fourteen (14) days before the date
10 *designated for the hearing of the motion. Because summary judgment motions are*
11 *fact-dependent, parties should prepare papers in a fashion that will assist the court*
12 *in absorbing the mass of facts (e.g., generous use of tabs, tables of contents,*
13 *headings, indices). The parties are to comply precisely with Local Rule 56-1*
14 *through 56-4. No party may file more than one motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.*
15 *56, regardless of whether such motion is denominated as a motion for summary*
16 *judgment or summary adjudication, without leave from the Court.*

17 i. Statement of Undisputed Facts and Statement of Genuine Issues:
18 The separate statement of undisputed facts shall be prepared in a two-column
19 format. The left-hand column sets forth the allegedly undisputed fact. The right-
20 *hand column sets forth the evidence that supports the factual statement. The factual*
21 *statements should be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs. Each*
22 *paragraph should contain a narrowly focused statement of fact. Each numbered*
23 *paragraph should address a single subject as concisely as possible.*

24 The opposing party's statement of genuine issues must be in two columns
25 and track the movant's separate statement exactly as prepared. The left-hand
26 column must restate the allegedly undisputed fact, and the right-hand column
27 must state either that it is undisputed or disputed. The opposing party may dispute
28 all or only a portion of the statement, but if disputing only a portion, it must clearly

1 notice to the parties. Proposed stipulations^{#28} extending scheduling dates do not
2 become effective unless and until this Court so orders. Counsel wishing to know
3 whether a stipulation has been signed shall comply with the applicable Local Rule.

4 **14. Communications with Chambers.** Counsel shall not attempt to
5 *contact the Court or its staff by telephone or by any other ex parte means unless*
6 *contact has been first initiated by chambers staff. Counsel must not contact the*
7 *Courtroom Deputy Clerk regarding the status of any matter before the Court.*
8 *Counsel may contact the Courtroom Deputy Clerk with appropriate inquiries only.*
9 *The preferred method of communication with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk is*
10 *email. To facilitate communication with the Courtroom Deputy Clerk, counsel*
11 *should list their email addresses along with their telephone numbers on all papers.*

12 **15. Order Setting Scheduling Conference.** Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
13 16(b), the Court will issue an Order setting a Scheduling Conference as required by
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and the Local Rules of this Court. Strict compliance with Fed. R.
15 Civ. P. 16 and 26 is required.

16 **16. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).** This Court participates in the
17 Court-Directed ADR Program. If counsel have received a Notice to Parties of
18 Court-Directed ADR Program (ADR-08), the case will be presumptively referred
19 to the Court Mediation Panel or to private mediation at the time of the initial
20 scheduling conference. *See General Order 11-10, § 5.1. Counsel should include*
21 *their shared or separate views regarding a preference for the Court Mediation Panel*
22 *or private mediation, and when the mediation should occur, in the written report*
23 *required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and Local Rule 26-1. This Court generally does*
24 *not refer settlement conferences to magistrate judges. For information about the*
25 *Court's ADR Program, the Mediation Panel, and mediator profiles, visit the "ADR"*
26 *page of the Court website.*

27 **Notice of this Order.** Counsel for plaintiff or plaintiff (if appearing on his or
28 her behalf) shall immediately serve this Order on all parties, including any new

1 parties to the action. If this case came ^{#29} to the Court by a Petition for Removal, the
2 removing defendant(s) shall serve this Order on all other parties.
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6 Dated: September 10, 2025
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HON. MICHELLE WILLIAMS COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

Ashley Black,

Plaintiff,

v.

Craig Hamm,

Defendant.

Case No. 25-cv-09474

Judge Mary M. Rowland

ORDER

Plaintiff Ashley Black brings this *pro se* lawsuit against Defendant Craig Hamm. [1]. Before the Court is Plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* ("IFP") [4] and Plaintiff's complaint for initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP [4] is granted, and Plaintiff's complaint [1] is dismissed with prejudice.

STATEMENT

The federal IFP statute allows a litigant to pursue a case in federal court without paying fees provided that the litigant submits an affidavit which asserts an inability to pay, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and as long as the action is not frivolous or malicious, states a claim upon which relief may be granted, and does not seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. IFP Application

"To qualify for IFP status, a plaintiff must fully disclose her financial condition, and she must do so truthfully under penalty of perjury." *Effinger v. Monterrey Sec. Consultants*, 546 F. Supp. 3d 715, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). "In order to proceed in forma pauperis, 'a plaintiff's income must be at or near the poverty level.'" *Barnes v. Reynolds*, No. 20-CV-5796, 2021 WL 4945191, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2021) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff states in her IFP application that she is unemployed and that she receives only \$2,100 in income in a 12-month period. [4] at 1. She states that she is not working consistently and has a dependent. The Court finds that Plaintiff is indigent and that she qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

B. Complaint Review

After finding a person qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss the action if it is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Courts reviewing complaints under § 1915(e)(2) apply the same standard used for dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.*, 860 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2017), *cert. denied*, 138 S. Ct. 739 (2018). The complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 602, 678 (2009). The statement must give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago*, 811 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Although *pro se* complaints are held to a less stringent standard, they are not excused from meeting the basic requirements of the federal rules. *Killebrew v. St. Vincent Health*, 295 Fed. App’x 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff’s complaint contains at least one count against Defendant Craig Hamm stemming from Defendant’s alleged “constitutional violations and due process denials . . . through the filing and use of false, fraudulent, or procedurally improper legal documents.” [1] ¶ 4. Specifically, Hamm is alleged to have filed a motion to dismiss a previous lawsuit that Plaintiff filed before Plaintiff filed a certificate of service. [1] at 11.¹ The case was ultimately dismissed. [1] at 28.

The complaint contains several near-duplicate versions of itself and it is not clear to the Court what exact claims Plaintiff intends to pursue. Across the different versions of the complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for a violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, [1] at 3, counts for obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, fraud on the court, civil rights conspiracy, [1] at 7, intentional infliction of emotional distress, [1] at 12, abuse of process, and defamation. [1] at 27. The different versions of the complaint seek between \$1 and \$4 billion in damages. [1] at 7, 27.

¹ Plaintiff alleges that because Hamm had not been served, he could not have known the case existed, and that “[f]iling a motion in a case you shouldn’t know exists is textbook fraud on the court.” [1] at 29. In support, Plaintiff cites to *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238 (1944). *Hazel-Atlas* discusses a complicated and “sordid story” wherein a party induced an appellate court to rely on evidence obtained by fraud. *Id.* at 243. It is thus inapposite to Plaintiff’s allegations here.

The complaint does not identify in which case Defendant allegedly filed the motion to dismiss, so it cannot be said that it gives Defendant “fair notice” of Plaintiff’s claim, nor the grounds upon which that claim rests. *Bonstetter*, 811 F.3d at 973.² But even if it did, a district court “has no appellate authority to review the decisions of another federal district court judge.” *Lewis v. Ludwig*, No. 24-CV-1013-PP, 2024 WL 3887660, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2024). “This Court lacks power over another Court’s docket.” *Johnston v. United States Attorney’s Off. for N. Dist. of Illinois*, No. 21-CV-1057, 2021 WL 860356, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2021) Any errors made by the judge in that case must be addressed through the appellate process. *Dawson v. Newman*, 419 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s claims here are premised on a motion to dismiss that Defendant allegedly filed in a separate case that Plaintiff brought before a separate district court judge. See [1] at 28. Plaintiff “cannot use a new lawsuit to contend that the disposition of the first was mistaken.” *Hudson v. Hedge*, 27 F.3d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1994).

That aside, as to the causes of action identified in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff either fails to state a claim, fails to identify a valid cause of action, or both. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant obstructed justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, [1] at 7, but that statute resides in the United States Criminal Code and does not confer a private right of action to private plaintiffs. See *Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.*, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994). For the same reason, Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to obstruct justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 fails. [1] at 7.

Plaintiff’s claims for violations of her due process, *e.g.* [1] at 7, 26, also fail. While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a private plaintiff to bring a civil action for the deprivation of civil rights, such a claim can only be brought against a government actor or a person acting under the color of state law. See *London v. RBS Citizens, N.A.*, 600 F.3d 742, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant is a government actor or that he was acting under the color of state law; to the contrary, she alleges that he “is a private citizen” who is “affiliated with private law firms.” [1] at 7, 20. Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 thus fail. Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, *e.g.* [1] at 20, fail for the same reason. *Briscoe v. LaHue*, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981), *aff’d*, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (affirming dismissal of *pro se* plaintiff’s

² Although the case giving rise to Plaintiff’s allegations here was not identified in the complaint, from reviewing Plaintiff’s allegations and searching the docket, the Court believes that Plaintiff is referring to the proceedings in *Black v. BPM LLP et al*, 25-cv-01112. The Court notes that in that action, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice because the district court found that Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous and/or malicious. *Id.*, ECF No. 79. Further, Defendant Hamm in that case was served in that case prior to filing a motion to dismiss, see *id.*, ECF No. 22, and Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. But because the Court is confined to the facts alleged in the complaint when reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint, see *Coleman*, 850 F.3d at 468, the Court does not rely on filings and docket entries in another case in its analysis here.

Section 1985 claim where the complaint failed to allege specific facts suggesting a conspiracy between state officials and private defendants).

Further, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for “fraud on the court” because there is no stand-alone cause of action for fraud on the court. *Torrence v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for N. Dist. of Illinois, E. Div.*, No. 17 C 3120, 2017 WL 3593116, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2017) (citing *Moore v. Burge*, 771 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2014)). Rather, if Plaintiff believes that Defendant defrauded the court in a separate action, “the proper course of action is to file a motion in that case asserting fraud” rather than file a new civil action. *Ratkovich v. Chandiramani*, No. 14 C 6484, 2014 WL 5784970, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2014).

And while Illinois law recognizes “abuse of process” as a cause of action, to state an abuse of process claim a plaintiff must “plead facts that show that the defendant instituted proceedings against him for an improper purpose, such as extortion, intimidation, or embarrassment.” *Kumar v. Bornstein*, 820 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Here, Defendant allegedly filed a motion to dismiss prior to receiving service. Such conduct falls well short of the conduct necessary to state a claim for abuse of process. *See id.* (tort of abuse of process “is not favored” and the elements “must be strictly construed”). For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails. *See Shamim v. Siemens Indus., Inc.*, 854 F. Supp. 2d 496, 511 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “a defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency” and must be “regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim for defamation also fails. “To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must allege facts that show: (1) the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff; (2) the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) the publication caused her damages. *Dobias v. Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. 200*, 57 N.E.3d 551, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). At a minimum, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second element of a defamation claim because, to the extent that Defendant’s motion to dismiss could be considered a publication, it is protected by Illinois’s litigation privilege. *See O’Callaghan v. Satherlie*, 36 N.E.3d 999, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). Plaintiff also fails to identify with any specificity what statements in the publication were actually false.

Normally, a court dismisses an original complaint without prejudice to allow a plaintiff an opportunity to cure deficiencies in the original pleading. *See Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department*, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996) (district courts are to allow a pro se plaintiff ample opportunity to amend the complaint when it appears the plaintiff can state a meritorious claim). However, the Court may dismiss the complaint with prejudice when it finds that any amendment would be futile. *Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West*, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (“District courts,

nevertheless, 'have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.'" (quoting *Arreola v. Godinez*, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)). Here, the Court believes that Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous and that any amendment would be futile. The complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's complaint [1] is dismissed with prejudice and the motion for IFP [4] is granted. Civil case terminated. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff.

E N T E R:

Dated: September 9, 2025

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mary M Rowland". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois – CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)
Eastern Division**

Ashley Black

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 1:25-cv-07935

Honorable Manish S. Shah

BPM LLP

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, July 21, 2025:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Plaintiff applied to file this lawsuit without prepaying the filing fee. Plaintiff also initiated a similar case, docketed as case number 25-cv-7171. In that case, plaintiff seems to be trying to sue BPM LLP, among other defendants, under a theory of racketeering. See 25-cv-7171, Dkt. No. 24 at page 2 ("Defendants include individuals and entities operating as an enterprise linked to the Northern District of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court, BPM LLP, CPA board members, and private actors"). In this case, plaintiff is trying to sue BPM, LLP for racketeering activity. Both cases appear to include allegations of manipulated docket entries. Related claims, arising out of the same series of transactions, should be brought in one case. That avoids inconsistent rulings, claim splitting, and potential claim or issue preclusion. Under the court's local rules, the first-filed case is treated as the primary case. See e.g. Local Rule 40.4. This case is dismissed without prejudice because it is duplicative of the claims plaintiff is trying to assert in Case No. 25-cv-7171. This case number is closed, and plaintiff should follow the instructions in Case No. 25-cv-7171 to submit an amended complaint in that case that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Terminate civil case. The applications to proceed in forma pauperis [4][6] are terminated as moot. Notices mailed. (psm,)

*Case
file
Northern
District
of
Illinois*

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please refer to it for additional information.

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION**

ASHLEY BLACK,

Plaintiff,

vs.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,**

Defendant.

Case No. 25 C 7171

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Ashley Black has filed a *pro se* lawsuit, along with an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, that is, without prepaying the usual filing fee. The Court grants the motion (dkt. 4 & dkt. 49) but has reviewed Ms. Black's amended complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

*No laws
How many
claims
can be
filed*

Ms. Black's original "complaint" was scattered over thirty-six separate filings. The Court struck those filings because they did not comply with federal pleading rules and gave Ms. Black to file a revised version of her complaint. Ms. Black did so.

There is a threshold issue. Ms. Black's amended complaint names the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois as the defendant. The undersigned judge is a judge of that Court. But this does not require the undersigned judge's recusal (nor would it require the recusal of any other judge of the Court). The reason is the common law "rule of necessity," under which judges on a court are not required to recuse, and in fact must not do so, if the upshot would be that the case otherwise could not be heard by the court. See, e.g., *Stewart v. S. Dist. of Ill.*, No. 20-

CV-01090, 2020 WL 6203250, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2020) (citing, among other authorities, *United States v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200, 215 (1980); *Matter of Skupniewitz*, 73 F.3d 702, 705 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996)). That is the situation here. Thus the Court proceeds ahead.

Ms. Black's amended complaint (dkt. 54) alleges misconduct, leading to wrongful dismissal, in an earlier case or cases that Ms. Black filed in this district. Ms. Black does not identify the docket number of the earlier case or cases, but from one of her earlier filings in the present case, the principal case that Ms. Black is referencing appears to have been assigned to Judge April Perry.

Ms. Black says that some of her filings in the earlier matter were suppressed and were not filed on the docket. The remedy for this, however, would have been, first, to bring this to the attention of the judge assigned to the earlier case, and second, if that judge did not remedy the alleged problem and dismissed the earlier case, to raise these issues on appeal. It is possible that Ms. Black has done that; the undersigned judge does not know. But it is not appropriate to collaterally challenge the wrongful handling and dismissal of one lawsuit by filing another, separate lawsuit. See, e.g., *Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) ("A collateral attack on a final judgment is not a permissible substitute for appealing the judgment . . ."). Ms. Black's complaint fails on this basis, and because there is no reasonable basis to believe this fundamental defect could be cured by further amendment, the Court dismisses the case with prejudice.

Conclusion

As stated above, the Court grants plaintiff's applications to proceed *in forma*

pauperis [4] [49] but dismisses the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim and denies her motion to reinstate [55]. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment stating: This case is dismissed with prejudice.

Date: August 18, 2025



MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE Northern District of Illinois – CM/ECF NextGen 1.8 (rev. 1.8.3)
Eastern Division**

Ashley Black

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 1:25-cv-07171
Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly

United States District Court Northern
District

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Wednesday, July 9, 2025:

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: The plaintiff is this case has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (i.e. without prepaying the usual filing fee). For this reason the Court intends to review plaintiff's complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 USC 1915(e)(2). However plaintiff has not filed a single "complaint." Rather she has filed thirty-six separate documents (docket entries 6 through 41) all of which appear to include claims for relief. This is inappropriate. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Thirty-six separate documents do not constitute "a" statement of the plaintiff's claim or claims; nor does the filing of these multiple documents constitute a "short" statement of the claim or claims (the Court leaves for later determination whether there is a "plain" statement of the claim or claims). The Court therefore strikes docket entries 6 through 41 without prejudice to plaintiff filing a single complaint that includes a short and plain statement of all of her claims for relief. The Court will address plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and will conduct the 28 USC 1915(e)(2) review once plaintiff files a single complaint. Plaintiff is given two weeks (to July 23 2025) to file a revised version of her complaint consistent with this order. Mailed notice. (mma,)

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please refer to it for additional information.

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In the United States Court of Federal Claims

ASHLEY BLACK,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

No. 25-cv-1295

No. 25-cv-1296

No. 25-cv-1299

No. 25-cv-1301

(Filed: August 18, 2025)

ORDER

On August 8, 2025, Plaintiff, Ashley Black (“Ms. Black”), filed a Motion to Consolidate All Pending Claims into One New Case. *Black III v. United States*, 25-cv-1296, ECF No. 7. Ms. Black requests a consolidation of “all pending claims previously filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims into a single new case pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC).” *Id.* at 1. Ms. Black claims that “[t]he claims share common questions of law and fact” and “[c]onsolidation is necessary for the efficient administration of justice.” *Id.* at 2.

After reviewing and comparing the operative complaints, the Court agrees that the cases involve common questions of law and fact such that consolidation would be in the interest of judicial economy. Consolidation will not interfere with pending or future motions, including the resolution of Ms. Black’s Motion for Leave to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. See *Black III v. United States*, 25-cv-1296, ECF No. 5.

Accordingly, pursuant to RCFC 42(a), this Court hereby **ORDERS** that the four above-captioned cases be consolidated and **DESIGNATES** No. 25-cv-1296 as the lead case. The Court **DIRECTS** the Clerk of Court to **CONSOLIDATE** the above-captioned cases. All future filings shall be made only in the lead case, *Black III v. United States*, No. 25-1296.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER
Judge

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

ASHLEY BLACK,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

No. 25-cv-1505

(Filed: September 26, 2025)

ORDER

On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff Ashley Black (“Ms. Black”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint with this Court. See ECF No. 1. Ms. Black simultaneously filed an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, ECF No. 2, requesting a waiver of the \$405 in filing fees, *i.e.*, \$350 filing fee plus a \$55 general administration fee. As detailed below, the Court denies Ms. Black’s application to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

The Court has discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to grant *in forma pauperis* status if the plaintiff shows she is unable to pay the relevant fees. The Court has a “duty to deny *in forma pauperis* status to those individuals who have abused the system.” *In re Sindram*, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991); *see also Santini v. United States*, 173 Fed. Cl. 724, 727 (2024). This case is largely duplicative of Ms. Black’s prior cases which were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *See Black v. United States*, 25-cv-1296 (“*Black III*”), Order of Dismissal, ECF No. 9. This case—along with two others—was filed shortly after the Court issued a Show Cause Order requesting that Ms. Black show cause as to why the Court should not impose an anti-filing injunction restricting further filings in the Court, *Black v. United States*, 25-cv-0827 (“*Black I*”), Show Cause Order, ECF No. 20. *See Black v. United States*, 25-cv-1506 (“*Black VII*”), *Black v. United States*, 25-cv-1507 (“*Black VIII*”). Ms. Black has demonstrated a history of frivolous and vexatious filings prompting the Court to issue an Anti-Filing Order, ECF No. 7, sanctioning Ms. Black and enjoining her “from filing any new documents with the Court without first obtaining leave from the Chief Judge.” Anti-Filing Order at 3. “It is vital that the right to file *in forma pauperis* not be incumbered by those who would abuse the integrity of our process by frivolous filings.” *Colida v. Panasonic Corp. of N. Am.*, 374 F. App’x 37, 40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing *Zatko v. California*, 502 U.S. 16, 18 (1991)) (cleaned up).

A case may be dismissed as malicious if it “duplicates claims that the same plaintiff has raised in previous or pending litigation.” *Greene v. United States*, 169 Fed. Cl. 334, 340 (2024), *appeal dismissed*, No. 2024-cv-1475, 2024 WL 2239024 (Fed. Cir. May 17, 2024) (citing *Pittman v. Moore*, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993); *Wilson v. Lynaugh*, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1989)). “Duplicative cases repeat the ‘same series of events’ and allege ‘many of the same facts as an earlier suit.’” *Santini*, 173 Fed. Cl. at 728 (quoting *Bailey v. Johnson*, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Complaint in this case relates to the same events alleged in Ms.

Black's prior cases which were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, *Black III*, Order of Dismissal. See Anti-Filing Order at 2–3 (noting the duplicative nature of Ms. Black's suits). Compare *Black v. United States*, Case No. 25-cv-1295, Compl., ECF No. 1 ("*Black II*"); *Black III*, Compl., ECF No. 1; *Black v. United States*, Case No. 25-cv-1299, Compl., ECF No. 1 ("*Black IV*"); *Black v. United States*, Case No. 25-cv-1301, Compl., ECF No. 1 ("*Black V*"); *Black v. United States*, Case No. 25-cv-1505, Compl., ECF No. 1 ("*Black VI*"); *Black VII*, Compl., ECF No. 1; and *Black VIII*, Compl., ECF No. 1. At the heart of Ms. Black's suits is her disagreement with the management of her cases before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See *Black VI*, Compl. at 1, 2; *Black VII*, Compl. at 2, 3 1; *Black VIII*, Compl. at 1. Thus Ms. Black's Complaint is duplicative of prior complaints and subject to dismissal.

Accordingly, the Court **DENIES** Ms. Black's application for *in forma pauperis* status. The Court hereby **DISMISSES** Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 1, without prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter **JUDGMENT** accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER
Judge

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

ASHLEY BLACK,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

No. 25-cv-0827

(Filed: July 3, 2025)

ORDER

Docket 13

The Court has become aware that Ashley Black (“Ms. Black”), a pro se plaintiff, has filed or attempted to file over 100 motions and miscellaneous documents in this case. Given the volume of the filings and the procedural stage of this case, the submission and review of responses to those filings would not be an efficient use of the Court’s resources.

Accordingly, the Court hereby **STAYS** the United States’ obligation to respond to any filings from Ms. Black with which it has been served, pending further Order of the Court. Specifically, the deadline for the United States to file a response to any of Plaintiff’s submissions is hereby **STAYED**, with one exception; briefing on the pending Motion to Dismiss shall continue in accordance with the Court’s rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER

Judge

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**