

No. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

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**STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD,  
Petitioner,**

**v.**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Respondent.**

**APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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**UNPUBLISHED**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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**No. 24-4243**

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD,

Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at  
Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cr-00017-TSK-MJA-1)

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Submitted: August 1, 2025

Decided: August 14, 2025

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Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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**ON BRIEF:** Douglas Sughrue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Brandon S. Flower, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Stephen C. Crawford of voluntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 1112(a), (b); assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 113(a)(3); and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 113(a)(6). The convictions arose out of an altercation in March 2015 at the United States Penitentiary in Hazelton, West Virginia, where Crawford is incarcerated. During the altercation, Crawford stabbed Arvel Crawford (“Arvel”) in the neck and torso, resulting in Arvel’s death. The video of the fight, but not the audio, was captured on the prison’s video surveillance system. The district court sentenced Crawford to 188 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Crawford contends that the district court erred in excluding witness testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and in denying his supplemental jury instruction defining reasonable doubt. Crawford also asserts that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2014), and in denying Crawford’s motion for a downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.10, p.s. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Crawford first argues that the district court erroneously found that Rule 404(b) required him to provide notice of his intent to use other crimes evidence through the testimony of Davon Easton. However, in its ruling excluding the testimony, the district court also found that Easton’s testimony was impermissible character evidence because defense counsel sought to introduce the evidence to prove Arvel’s propensity for violence, because neither the Government nor the court had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of

Easton's proposed testimony, and because the testimony was tenuously related to the crime or Crawford's self-defense claim. "Failure of a party in its opening brief to challenge an alternate ground for a district court's ruling waives that challenge." *Brown v. Nucor Corp.*, 785 F.3d 895, 918 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Because Crawford does not challenge the district court's independent, alternate grounds for excluding Easton's testimony, and because Easton's testimony was impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b), we conclude that Crawford has waived appellate review of this issue. *See id.*; *see also United States v. Queen*, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (creating four-step test to determine admissibility of prior act evidence which is admissible if relevant to an issue other than defendant's character, necessary to prove an element of the charged offense, reliable, and not unduly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403).

Next, Crawford argues that the district court abused its discretion in holding that Fourth Circuit precedent prohibited the court from adopting Crawford's supplemental jury instruction. We review a challenge to a district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Simmons*, 11 F.4th 239, 264 (4th Cir. 2021). Thus, we will reverse a district court:

for declining to give a proposed jury instruction only when the requested instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court's charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired that party's ability to make its case.

*United States v. Kivanc*, 714 F.3d 782, 794 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In reviewing the adequacy of jury instructions, we determine whether the instructions construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, adequately informed

the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). We will find an error in instructing the jury harmless “if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” *United States v. Ramos-Cruz*, 667 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the supplemental instruction defining reasonable doubt that Crawford requested here, while a district court “*may* define reasonable doubt to a jury,” *United States v. Frazer*, 98 F.4th 102, 115 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified), the district court is not required to define reasonable doubt as long as “the jury is instructed that a defendant’s guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” *United States v. Watkins*, 111 F.4th 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing *United States v. Williams*, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998) (expressing disdain for further definitions of reasonable doubt)). This is so because “efforts to define reasonable doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept.” *Williams*, 152 F.3d at 298.

Here, the district court faithfully adhered to our strong admonition in declining to instruct the jury on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” beyond stating that “reasonable doubt” is “doubt based upon reason and common sense” and that its meaning is “self-evident.” (J.A. 1074).\* Any further instruction by the district court would have risked confusing the jury. *Williams*, 152 F.3d at 298. Accordingly, we conclude that the district

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\* “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by parties in this appeal.

court did not err in refusing to adopt Crawford's supplemental jury instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.

Crawford also argues that the district court improperly enhanced his Sentencing Guidelines offense level for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1. Specifically, Crawford asserts that the district court did not find that he procured Roger Biel's false testimony, that Crawford did not have prior knowledge that Biel's testimony was false, and that the record supports the finding that Biel's testimony was the result of Biel's faulty memory, not of a willful attempt to obstruct justice.

We review a defendant's sentence for procedural reasonableness, applying a deferential "abuse-of-discretion standard." *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing whether a district court properly calculated a defendant's Guidelines range, including its application of a sentencing enhancement, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. *United States v. Fluker*, 891 F.3d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2018); *see also United States v. Andrews*, 808 F.3d 964, 966 (4th Cir. 2015) (reviewing application of obstruction of justice enhancement). Under the clear error standard, we will not reverse a district court's findings simply because we would have reached a different result; instead, we will only reverse if "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." *United States v. Charboneau*, 914 F.3d 906, 912 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A sentencing court is authorized to increase a defendant's Guidelines offense level two levels "[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of the instant offense of conviction; and (2) the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction.” USSG § 3C1.1. Obstructive conduct within the meaning of USSG § 3C1.1 includes suborning or attempting to suborn perjury at trial, “if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction.” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B); *see United States v. Jones*, 308 F.3d 425, 427-29 (4th Cir. 2002).

Perjury occurs when a witness under oath “(1) [gives] false testimony; (2) concerning a material matter; (3) with the willful intent to deceive.” *Id.* at 428 n.2 (citing *United States v. Dunnigan*, 507 U.S. 87, 92-98 (1993)). Subornation of perjury consists of three elements: (1) “the suborner should have known or believed or have had good reason to believe that the testimony given would be false”; (2) “should have known or believed that the witness would testify willfully and corruptly, and with knowledge of the falsity”; and (3) have “knowingly and willfully induced or procured the witness to give such false testimony.” *Petite v. United States*, 262 F.2d 788, 794 (4th Cir. 1959), *vacated on other grounds*, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); *see also United States v. Heater*, 63 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Subornation of perjury consists of procuring or instigating another to commit the crime of perjury.”).

Here, the district court explicitly found that Biel committed perjury. The court found that the video evidence proved that Biel’s testimony was patently false, that the perjured testimony was material because it bolstered Crawford’s self-defense claim and could have sparked “an honest intellectual debate” among the jury about the evidentiary record, and that Biel demonstrated a willful intent to deceive by creating his testimony out

of “whole cloth.” (J.A. 1179). A review of the video evidence proves that Biel’s testimony was false and that Crawford did not act in self-defense, but that Crawford was the first aggressor. Further, during cross-examination, Biel admitted that he did not observe what happened between Crawford and Arvel.

Although the district court found that Biel committed perjury, Crawford correctly asserts that the court did not explicitly find that Crawford procured Biel’s false testimony, “a finding that would have been necessary to support each element of perjury.” *Andrews*, 808 F.3d at 969. However, the court strongly implied that Crawford suborned Biel’s perjured testimony when it observed that Crawford was “rightfully . . . engaged throughout” the weeklong trial and that defense counsel and Crawford “delayed [the trial’s] start each day so that they had a chance . . . to meet and confer to prepare for each day.” (J.A. 1181). Further, the court rejected the notion that Biel’s testimony was simply the result of defense counsel’s “tactical or strategic decision at trial” and found it “ludicrous to suggest” that Crawford “had clean hands” with respect to Biel’s perjured testimony. (J.A. 1180-81).

As in *Andrews*, the obstruction of justice enhancement applied in this case was warranted because the district court “made a proper finding of obstruction even if it did not specifically find subornation of perjury.” *Andrews*, 808 F.3d at 968-70 (upholding USSG § 3C1.1 enhancement where defendant knew in advance, and likely arranged, his witnesses’ false testimony). During his allocution, Crawford admitted that he knew Biel had not seen the murder. Crawford stated that before Biel testified, Crawford asked defense counsel “not to ask [Biel] about the incident that happened. Because we done

watched that tape a thousand times, and we know [Biel] ain't on there." (J.A. 1217).

Because Crawford admitted that he knew Biel had not seen the stabbing and Biel's perjured testimony is conduct for which Crawford is expressly held responsible, the enhancement may rest "upon the very essence of § 3C1.1—the willful obstruction of justice." *Andrews*, 808 F.3d at 969-70. Accordingly, we conclude that the imposition of the obstruction enhancement was not clearly erroneous.

Last, Crawford contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward departure based on the victim's wrongful conduct pursuant to USSG § 5K2.10, p.s. However, we "cannot review a district court's decision not to depart, unless the district court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to do so." *United States v. Torres-Reyes*, 952 F.3d 147, 151 n.2 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). Here, the district court understood its authority to grant a downward departure but declined to exercise that authority because the court found that the evidence presented at trial, especially the video evidence, did not support a downward departure under USSG § 5K2.10, p.s. Accordingly, the district court's discretionary denial of Crawford's motion for a downward departure is not reviewable.

We therefore affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) **JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE**  
 v. )  
 STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD ) Case Number: 1:20CR17  
 ) USM Number: 12363-007  
 ) Douglas Sughrue  
 ) Defendant's Attorney

**THE DEFENDANT:**

- pleaded guilty to count(s) \_\_\_\_\_
- pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ which was accepted by the court.
- was found guilty on count(s) One, Two, and Three after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

<b>Title &amp; Section</b>	<b>Nature of Offense</b>	<b>Offense Ended</b>	<b>Count</b>
18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 1112(a), and 1112(b)	Voluntary Manslaughter	03/06/2015	1
18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3) & 113(a)(3)	Assault with a Dangerous Weapon with Intent to Do Bodily Harm	03/06/2015	2
18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3) and 113(a)(6)	Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury	03/06/2015	3

See additional count(s) on page 2

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Count(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

April 22, 2024

Date of Imposition of Judgment



Signature of Judge

Honorable Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief U.S. District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

April 30, 2024  
Date

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD  
CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17**IMPRISONMENT**

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: 188 months, consisting of 158 months on Count 1, and terms of 15 months on each of Counts 2 and 3, to be served consecutively with each other and consecutive to any sentence the defendant is currently serving.

- The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
- That the defendant be incarcerated at an FCI or a facility as close to \_\_\_\_\_ as possible;  
 and at a facility where the defendant can participate in substance abuse treatment, as determined by the Bureau of Prisons;  
 including the 500-Hour Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program.
- That the defendant be incarcerated at USP Victorville \_\_\_\_\_.  
 and at a facility where the defendant can participate in substance abuse treatment, as determined by the Bureau of Prisons;  
 including the 500-Hour Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program.
- That the defendant be allowed to participate in a mental health evaluation and treatment program as determined appropriate by the Bureau of Prisons.
- That the defendant be allowed to participate in any educational or vocational opportunities while incarcerated, as determined by the Bureau of Prisons.
- Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14135A, the defendant shall submit to DNA collection while incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons, or at the direction of the Probation Officer.
- The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
- The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:  
 at \_\_\_\_\_  a.m.  p.m. on \_\_\_\_\_.  
 as notified by the United States Marshal.
- The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:  
 before 12:00 pm (noon) on \_\_\_\_\_.  
 as notified by the United States Marshal.  
 as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.  
 on \_\_\_\_\_, as directed by the United States Marshals Service.

**RETURN**

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_  
 at \_\_\_\_\_, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By \_\_\_\_\_  
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD  
CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17**SUPERVISED RELEASE**

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of: 3 years on each of Counts 1, 2, and 3, with such terms to run concurrently.

**MANDATORY CONDITIONS**

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.  
 The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse. *(check if applicable)*
4.  You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution. *(check if applicable)*
5.  You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(check if applicable)*
6.  You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. *(check if applicable)*
7.  You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(check if applicable)*

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court in its November 29, 2016, Standing Order, as well as with any other conditions on the attached page (if applicable).

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD  
CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17Judgment—Page 4 of 7**STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION**

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.
4. You shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. You shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the probation officer.
5. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
6. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
7. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
9. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
10. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
11. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
12. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
13. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
14. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
15. You shall not purchase, possess or consume any organic or synthetic intoxicants, including bath salts, synthetic cannabinoids or other designer stimulants.
16. You shall not frequent places that sell or distribute synthetic cannabinoids or other designer stimulants.
17. Upon reasonable suspicion by the probation officer, you shall submit your person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, or other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. You shall warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.
18. You are prohibited from possessing a potentially vicious or dangerous animal or residing with anyone who possesses a potentially vicious or dangerous animal. The probation officer has sole authority to determine what animals are considered to be potentially vicious or dangerous.
19. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

**U.S. Probation Office Use Only**

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: [www.uscourts.gov](http://www.uscourts.gov).

Defendant's Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD

CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17

### **SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION**

1. You must not use or possess any controlled substances without a valid prescription. If you do have a valid prescription, you must disclose that prescription information immediately to your supervising probation officer. You must also very carefully follow any and all instructions that come with any prescription medication dispensed to you. That would include the dosage that you take and how frequently or often you take that dosage.
2. You must submit to substance abuse testing to determine if you have used a prohibited substance. You must not attempt to obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.
3. You must provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information and authorize the release of any financial information. The probation officer may share financial information with the U.S. Attorney's Office.
4. You must not incur new credit charges, or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer.
5. If the judgment imposes a financial penalty, you must pay the financial penalty in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment. You must also notify the court of any changes in economic circumstances that might affect the ability to pay this financial penalty.
6. You must immediately begin making fine and/or restitution payments of \$10 per month, due on the first of each month. These payments shall be made during incarceration, and if necessary, while on supervised release.
7. You must not communicate, or otherwise interact, with the victim's family, either directly or through someone else, without first obtaining the permission of the probation officer.

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD

CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17

**CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES**

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Restitution</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>AVAA Assessment*</u>	<u>JVTA Assessment**</u>
<b>TOTALS</b>	\$ 300.00	\$ 1,519.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00

The determination of restitution is deferred until \_\_\_\_\_. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

The victim's recovery is limited to the amount of their loss and the defendant's liability for restitution ceases if and when the victim receives full restitution.

Name of Payee	Total Loss**	Restitution Ordered	Priority or Percentage
Kimberly Crawford	\$1,519	\$1,519	100%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$ 1,519</b>	<b>\$ 1,519</b>	

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> See Statement of Reasons for Victim Information			
<input type="checkbox"/> Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> the interest requirement is waived for the <input type="checkbox"/> fine <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> restitution.			
<input type="checkbox"/> the interest requirement for the <input type="checkbox"/> fine <input type="checkbox"/> restitution is modified as follows:			

\*Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

\*\* Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

\*\*\* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: STEPHEN C. CRAWFORD  
CASE NUMBER: 1:20CR17

## SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

- A  Lump sum payment of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ due immediately, balance due  
 not later than \_\_\_\_\_, or  
 in accordance with  C  D,  E,  F, or  G below; or
- B  Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with  C,  D,  F, or  G below); or
- C  Payment in equal monthly (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ 10.00 over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence 90 (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
- D  Payment in equal \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ over a period of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., months or years), to commence \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
- E  Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
- F  Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:  
Financial obligations ordered are to be paid while the defendant is incarcerated, and if payment is not completed during incarceration, it is to be completed by the end of the term of supervised release; or
- G  Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:  
The defendant shall immediately begin making restitution and/or fine payments of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ per month, due on the first of each month. These payments shall be made during incarceration, and if necessary, during supervised release.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to Clerk, U. S. District Court, Northern District of West Virginia, P.O. Box 1518, Elkins, WV 26241.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

- Joint and Several

Case Number Defendant and Co-Defendant Names (including defendant number)	Total Amount	Joint and Several Amount	Corresponding Payee, if appropriate
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- The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.  
 The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):  
 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.