APPENDIX

A1. District Court Order imposing sanctions, Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 22-cv-3559 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2025).

A2. Nonprecedential Disposition of the Court of Appeals, Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 24-2352 (7th Cir. July 7, 2025).

A3. Order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing en banc, Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 24-2352 (7th Cir. July 24, 2025).

A4. Executive Committee Order restricting filings, In re Ruben Santoyo, No. 25-cv-04558 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2025).

A5. Published Opinion of the Court of Appeals (Scudder, J.), Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 24-2352 (7th Cir. July 7, 2025)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RUBEN SANTOYO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO ET AL,

Defendant.

Case No. 22-cv-3559

Judge Martha M. Pacold

ORDER

On August 15, 2024, after the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, [156]; [157], defendants submitted a bill of costs, [170]. For the following reasons, the court grants defendants costs in the amount of $3,700.84. Plaintiff's motion to withdraw an earlier version of his response, [177], is granted. Additionally, to the extent that plaintiff's response to defendants' bill of costs includes a motion to sanction defendants and to refer defense counsel to the state bar association for disciplinary action, *see* [179] at 3–9, the motion is denied. Instead, because plaintiff's request for sanctions is itself frivolous and is only the latest in a long chain of frivolous filings by plaintiff, the court will sanction plaintiff instead. In addition to the payment of defendants' costs, plaintiff is ordered to pay the court a monetary sanction of $1,500. Additionally, the court recommends to the Executive Committee that plaintiff be barred from any future filings in this district unless and until plaintiff pays the $1,500 sanction, the $3,700.84 in costs, and any other fees or costs due in any cases in this district.

STATEMENT

I. Bill of Costs

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) generally provides that "costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." *See Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth.*, 926 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)). This presumption that the court will award costs places the burden on the opposing party to demonstrate good reasons why the court should not make the award. *Lange v. City of Oconto*, 28 F.4th 825, 845 (7th Cir. 2022).

A. Costs Incurred

Defendants seek a total award of $3,700.84 for certain costs incurred in this action. [170]; [171].[1]

1. Videography and Transcription. Of this total, defendants seek to recover $3,610.84 related to the transcription of two witnesses' depositions and the videography and transcription of plaintiff's deposition. [170].

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), a judge may tax as costs "[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case." Additionally, "[t]he costs of both a stenographic transcript and videotape of a deposition may be taxed against a party." *Fletcher v. Doig*, No. 13-cv-3270, 2022 WL 18027446, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 2022) (quoting *Rogers v. City of Chicago*, No. 00 C 2227, 2022 WL 423723, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2022)); *see Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc.*, 514 F.3d 699, 701 (2008) (noting that § 1920 authorizes district courts to tax costs for video-recorded depositions). But these costs may only be taxed for the same deposition where it is "reasonably necessary for counsel to obtain both." *Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co.*, No. 17-cv-50144, 2020 WL 13032761, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2020) (citing *Little*, 514 F.3d at 702).

For the court to award costs, the prevailing party should provide "specific information about the depositions or their use." *LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., v. Whirlpool Corp.*, No. 08-cv-242, 2011 WL 5008425, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2011). However, "[t]he burden of demonstrating that costs should be denied falls on the parties opposing costs." *Kirk*, 2020 WL 13032761, at *1. Ultimately "[t]he decision whether to allow or deny costs is left to the discretion of the district court, though the discretion is 'narrowly confined' because of the strong presumption in favor of awarding costs." *Id.* (quoting *Contreras v. City of Chicago*, 119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Here, plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that any of the videography or transcription costs should be denied. Plaintiff presents no argument that these costs are not properly recoverable. Nor does plaintiff argue that costs should not be awarded for any other reason, such as indigence. Instead, plaintiff contends that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendants' bill of costs because plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal. [179] at 2. But plaintiff's only citation supporting his argument is Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, which governs costs *on appeal*. Defendants' bill of costs does not seek costs on appeal, however; it seeks the costs arising out of the litigation in this court—litigation in which defendants were the prevailing parties.

[1] Bracketed numbers refer to docket entries and are followed by page and / or paragraph number citations. Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF page number.

Moreover, defendants have provided sufficient information to demonstrate that all costs were reasonably necessary. All three depositions were of witnesses disclosed by both parties, and all three depositions were used at summary judgment. Additionally, because plaintiff was his own main witness as to liability, it was reasonable for defendants to also videotape plaintiff's deposition. In cases where the credibility of witnesses is "a key issue," it is reasonable for a party to obtain videos of witness depositions for future use at trial. *Fletcher*, 2022 WL 18027446, at *3. Although this case did not reach trial, it was nevertheless reasonable for defendants to obtain videos of plaintiff's deposition because plaintiff's credibility was likely to be a key issue at trial, if one had occurred. *See id.* Indeed, plaintiff's credibility would have been particularly important here because he was a party to the case. Defendants are therefore entitled to recover the costs related to the transcription of the witnesses' depositions and the videography and transcription of plaintiff's deposition.

2. Witness Fees. Defendants also seek $90.00 for witness fees: $45.00 each for the two witnesses, Marisela Vega and Grecia Poma. [170-1] at 5. Such costs are recoverable under § 1920. *See* 38 U.S.C. § 1920(3) (permitting the recovery of "[f]ees and disbursements for printing and witnesses"). Again, plaintiff fails to offer any objection to these costs beyond his argument regarding the court's jurisdiction to consider a bill of costs at this time. Defendants may therefore recover these costs as well.

B. Plaintiff's Request to Stay Costs Pending Appeal

In addition to his argument that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendants' bill of costs at this time, plaintiff's response includes a cursory argument that the court should stay the assessment or enforcement of the bill of costs until plaintiff's appeal is resolved. Plaintiff's argument here is closer to the mark, but it still is not persuasive. Plaintiff cites no authority that supports his request that the court stay enforcement of any award of costs pending appeal. Instead, he again points to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39, as well as *Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co.*, 481 F.3d 442, 447 (7th Cir. 2007). But neither authority requires the court to stay the enforcement of its award of costs here. *See Avanzalia Solar, S.L. v. Goldwind USA, Inc.*, No. 20 C 5035, 2023 WL 5804232, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2023) ("A district court is under no obligation to stay a bill of costs pending appeal." (quoting *Houde v. ISLA Dev. LLC*, No. 18-cv-7323, 2021 WL 7161195, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2021))); *see also id.* ("Apart from the fact that the Court's judgment may be reversed—which is a possibility almost any time a party appeals—Avanzalia provides no explanation for why a stay might be warranted. The Court denies the motion."). The court therefore declines to stay the enforcement of its award of costs to defendants.

II. Sanctions

The bulk of plaintiff's opposition to defendants' bill of costs is devoted to plaintiff's argument that defendants should be sanctioned for filing a frivolous bill of costs in a bad-faith attempt to harass plaintiff. [179] at 3–9. Plaintiff argues that the bill of costs is frivolous because he contends that defendants were required to wait until plaintiff's appeal was resolved before filing their bill of costs. *Id.*

But, as described above, defendants' filing was proper. In fact, under this court's local rules, defendants were required to file their bill of costs within 30 days of the court's judgment, or else they would lose the opportunity to pursue costs. *See* N.D. Ill. R. 54.1. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions, [179], is therefore denied.

Plaintiff's motion for sanctions was not just erroneous—it was frivolous. Plaintiff could easily have ascertained from a quick review of the court's local rules that defendants were required to promptly file their bill of costs. Plaintiff likewise could have ascertained through reasonable research that, although courts sometimes stay enforcement of an award of costs pending an appeal, there is no requirement that a court do so—nor is there any basis to plaintiff's argument that defendants' bill of costs was premature.

A motion for sanctions should not be filed lightly. Yet here, based on his misreading of authority that does not actually bear on the question at hand, plaintiff not only demands monetary sanctions from defendant but also asks this court to consider referring this matter to the state bar association for disciplinary action against defense counsel. This request cannot possibly be made in good faith. Throughout this litigation, defense counsel has exhibited competence and professionalism, and the court is not aware of any conduct by defense counsel that would warrant a referral for the consideration of professional discipline.

The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, but this does not excuse plaintiff from the consequences of his frivolous filings. While plaintiff's pro se status may warrant cutting plaintiff some slack when it comes to his familiarity with matters like defendants' bill of costs, this lack of familiarity should also have caused plaintiff to think twice before demanding sanctions and a referral for misconduct proceedings.

Unfortunately, plaintiff's incendiary allegations are unsurprising. Plaintiff's frivolous sanctions motion is just the latest in a chain of frivolous filings by plaintiff that has spanned almost the entire duration of this case. Plaintiff has been directly warned no fewer than seven times that he would be sanctioned if he continued to file frivolous submissions. *See* [82]; [84]; [90]; [117]; [151]; [163]; [174]; *see also* [151] (strongly cautioning plaintiff regarding his numerous frivolous filings).

What is more, it appears plaintiff has many other cases—in this court and in other courts—that have since been dismissed. *See* [171] (Defendants' Memorandum

in Support of Their Bill of Costs) at 3–6 (cataloging plaintiff's numerous other suits and arguing that they represent a pattern of frivolous and vexatious litigation). To be sure, the court does not here decide whether plaintiff's filings in any other cases were frivolous or sanctionable. But considering plaintiff's pattern of frivolous and vexatious litigation throughout this suit, the court is troubled by the number of other cases plaintiff has filed.

Given the sheer number of frivolous motions plaintiff has filed in this case, the the numerous warnings plaintiff has received, *see* [151] (minute entry cataloging many of the motions and warnings), the amount of the court's time that has been consumed by plaintiff's frivolous filings, and the costs that such filings have imposed on defendants, the court concludes that Santoyo should be sanctioned. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the court a monetary sanction of $1,500. Additionally, the Court recommends to the Executive Committee that plaintiff be barred from any future filings in this district unless and until plaintiff pays the $1,500 sanction, the $3,700.84 in costs, and any other fees or costs due in any cases in this district. *See Annamalai v. Paramasivam et al*, No. 16-06079, at [25] (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2016) (imposing a monetary sanction and recommending that the plaintiff "be barred from any future filings in this district until and unless Plaintiff pays the $500 fine and all outstanding filing fees"); *Miller v. Exec. Comm. of United States Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Illinois*, No. 23-2281, 2024 WL 1651669, at *1–2 (7th Cir. Apr. 17, 2024); *Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack*, 45 F.3d 185, 186–87 (7th Cir. 1995). The court notes that it specifically warned plaintiff about the possibility of filing restrictions no fewer than three times. *See* [84]; [90]; [151].

Dated: April 2, 2025 /s/ Martha M. Pacold

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 9, 2025*
Decided July 7, 2025

Before

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-2352

RUBEN SANTOYO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 22-cv-3559

Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.

ORDER

Ruben Santoyo appeals the denial of two post-judgment motions to reinstate his lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the two Chicago police officers who arrested him. Because Santoyo's motions were frivolous, as is this appeal, we affirm.

Santoyo was arrested for battery in July 2020 by officers Kevin Sodja and Isai Junes. Almost two years later, he brought this suit, alleging that the officers arrested

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, *see* 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. The defendants later moved for summary judgment. After oral argument, the district judge granted the motion, ruling that no reasonable jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Santoyo.

Two days later, Santoyo filed two motions to set aside the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In his first motion, Santoyo asserted that he had observed unspecified "irregularities suggesting judicial conflict of interest and misconduct," and that he had "substantial evidence suggesting that the presiding judge's impartiality may have been compromised." In his second motion, Santoyo contended that the judgment should be set aside because neither party was put under oath before arguing the summary judgment motion.

The judge denied both motions, concluding that they contained nothing more than vague assertions that failed to satisfy Rule 60(b)'s requirement of "exceptional circumstances." She further observed that Santoyo's accusations of judicial misconduct were "utterly baseless"—continuing a trend of baseless accusations by Santoyo throughout the litigation. The judge also noted that Santoyo had cited two non-existent cases, presumably generated by an artificial intelligence program that he had acknowledged using in past filings. The judge warned Santoyo that he could be sanctioned if he continued to make baseless accusations of judicial misconduct or if he submitted other fictitious authority.

Santoyo appealed and while that appeal was pending the district court sanctioned him for reasons unimportant to this order. We review that sanctions order in a precedential opinion also issued today.[1]

Santoyo challenges the denial of his Rule 60(b) motions,[2] but these challenges are frivolous. First, he reasserts that the judgment must be vacated because the parties were not under oath when arguing the summary judgment motion. But as the district judge correctly ruled, the parties did not need to be placed under oath before making legal

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[1] The sanctions order resulted in a filing bar being imposed against Santoyo in the district court, and he informs us that the Northern District of Illinois's Clerk's Office is now rejecting his submissions to the district court docket in this case. He correctly observes that the Executive Committee exempted from the filing bar any case that existed before the filing bar was imposed. The Clerk's Office is directed to accept Santoyo's filings on the district court docket in this case.

[2] Santoyo's original notice of appeal also challenged the underlying order granting summary judgment and the judgment itself, but he has since clarified in a "notice of correction" that he seeks to challenge only the denial of his Rule 60(b) motions.

arguments; the statements of attorneys are not evidence. *See Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 778 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2015). Second, Santoyo contends that he provided "detailed accounts" of judicial misconduct and conflicts of interest and that the judge did not sufficiently substantiate her ruling. But the judge rightly rejected Santoyo's allegations because he provided no evidence to support them, much less evidence sufficient to call into doubt the court's impartiality, *see United States v. Walsh*, 47 F.4th 491, 499–500 (7th Cir. 2022), or show the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b), *see Word Seed Church v. Village of Homewood*, 43 F.4th 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2022). To the extent Santoyo argues that the judge's threat of sanctions suggests bias, he is mistaken. Even a pro se litigant like himself must verify that the authority he submits is accurate, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), and a judge's threat to enforce that rule with sanctions does not hint of bias, *see In re City of Milwaukee*, 788 F.3d 717, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (threat of sanctions for "non-starter arguments" did not suggest bias).[3]

Our determination that Santoyo's appeal is frivolous does not automatically justify sanctions in our court, *Dolin v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC*, 951 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2020), but we are persuaded that they are warranted here. We recently warned Santoyo in a separate appeal, also frivolous, that future frivolous appeals may result in sanctions. *Santoyo v. Village of Oak Lawn*, No. 24-2051, 2024 WL 4930393, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). And a year before that warning, in a matter relating to this case, we denied as frivolous Santoyo's petition for a writ of "supervisory control" concerning recusal of the district judge and warned him that further frivolous petitions may result in sanctions. *In re Ruben Santoyo*, No. 23-3048 (7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2023). What's more, we denied Santoyo's request in this appeal to proceed in forma pauperis, concluding that he had not made any "potentially meritorious argument." *Santoyo v. City of Chicago*, No. 24-2352 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2024). And despite the district judge's warning that he could be sanctioned for submitting additional filings with irrelevant citations, the authorities he cites in his opening brief in our court do not at all support the propositions he advances.

In short, this appeal is frivolous. Santoyo is ordered to show cause within 14 days why he should not be subject to sanctions imposed by our court, including an order to pay the appellees' fees and costs. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 38.

AFFIRMED

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[3] In his reply brief, Santoyo for the first time raises other arguments concerning alleged procedural irregularities. But arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived, *Bradley v. Village of University Park*, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023), and so we do not address them.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

July 24, 2025

Before

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-2352

RUBEN SANTOYO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, *et al.*,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:22-cv-03559

Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.

ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on July 8, 2025. No judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

In the Matter of	)	
	)	Civil Action No. 25 CV 04558
Ruben Santoyo	)	

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER

Pro se litigant Ruben Santoyo has filed at least eight cases in this Court and has unpaid filing fees of $900, and was sanctioned $1500 in 22cv03559, *Santoyo v. City of Chicago*, by the presiding judge.

It is the judgment of the Executive Committee that reasonable and necessary restraints must be imposed upon Mr. Santoyo's ability to file new civil cases in this District *pro se* or otherwise until he pays $900 in unpaid fees and the $1500 sanction, for a total of $2400, to the Court. Cases in existence prior to the entry of this order are not affected by this order and shall proceed as usual.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE in its capacity as the supervisor of the assignment of cases, that the clerk is directed to return unfiled any documents or presentments submitted either directly or indirectly by or on behalf of Ruben Santoyo. A copy of this order shall be included with the returned documents, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any password issued to Ruben Santoyo for access to the electronic filing system shall be disabled, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that after making payment of $2400, Ruben Santoyo may submit to the Executive Committee a motion to modify or rescind this order, unless he demonstrates to the Executive Committee in writing that he is in imminent danger of great bodily harm, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that nothing in this order shall be construed -----

a) to affect Mr. Santoyo's ability to defend himself in any criminal action,

b) to deny Mr. Santoyo access to the federal courts through the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or other extraordinary writ, or

c) to deny Mr. Santoyo access to the United States Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That any new complaints filed by Mr. Santoyo and transferred to this Court from another jurisdiction shall be reviewed by the Executive Committee to determine whether they should be filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall cause to be created and maintained a miscellaneous file with the title In the Matter of Ruben Santoyo and the case number 25 CV 04558. The miscellaneous file shall serve as the repository of this order and any order or minute order entered pursuant to this order. The Clerk will also maintain a miscellaneous docket associated with the file. All orders retained in the file will be entered on that docket following standard docketing procedures. A brief entry will be made on the docket indicating the receipt of any materials from Mr. Santoyo, and .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall cause a copy of this order to be sent to Mr. Ruben Santoyo to the email address listed on his latest filing, ruben@sailphones.com, delivery receipt requested.

ENTER
FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, Chief Judge

Dated at Chicago, Illinois this 30th day of April 2025

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 24-2352

RUBEN SANTOYO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, *et al.*,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-03559 — **Martha M. Pacold**, *Judge.*

SUBMITTED MAY 9, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2025

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and KOLAR, *Circuit Judges.*

SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge.* In the course of litigation against the City of Chicago and two of its police officers, Ruben Santoyo filed many frivolous motions. The district judge warned him that another would bring sanctions. When Santoyo disregarded the admonition and filed yet another baseless and inflammatory motion, the district judge sanctioned him. On appeal Santoyo complains that the judge violated his right to due process by neither notifying him of the forthcoming

sanction nor giving him an opportunity to respond. We disagree and affirm.

I

Proceeding without counsel, Santoyo invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and challenged the constitutionality of an arrest. Throughout three years of litigation, he repeatedly filed frivolous motions. Many leveled unfounded attacks on the competence and integrity of the district judge handling his case. The judge repeatedly denied these motions and, exhibiting extraordinary patience, warned Santoyo no less than seven times that another frivolous filing would lead to sanctions.

In time the district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants and denied two motions to vacate the judgment. Santoyo appealed that denial. We address the denial of his post-judgment motions in a separate non-precedential order also issued today. Our opinion here focuses on the sanction that followed from Santoyo's failing to heed the district judge's warning that another baseless filing would have consequences.

As prevailing parties at summary judgment, the defendants moved to recover their costs while Santoyo's appeal was pending. Santoyo reacted not by engaging with the merits of the motion, but by accusing the defendants of acting in bad faith and insisting that the district judge refer defense counsel to the state bar for disciplinary action. By this point, the judge was out of patience. Alongside granting the defendants' motion for costs, the judge—on her own initiative—imposed a $1,500 sanction on Santoyo and referred him to the district's Executive Committee, which in turn barred future filings until he paid the sanction.

Santoyo challenges the sanction on appeal. Before considering the merits, however, we address his contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him while his appeal was pending. He is mistaken: a notice of appeal does not divest a district court of its authority to award costs and consider related matters of sanctions. See *Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co.*, 23 F.3d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor, by extension, does the pendency of an appeal. We need not say more on the point.

II

As a general matter, before a federal court sanctions a litigant, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. See *Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 767 & n.14 (1980). The amount of process due varies according to the facts of each case and the deprivation at stake. See generally *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.*, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

But Santoyo misses the mark in how considerations of fair process apply here. In insisting he had no notice, he ignores what transpired in the district court, entirely disregarding the judge's clear warnings that another frivolous filing would bring sanctions. When Santoyo crossed the line yet again, he could not have been surprised at the ensuing consequences. As the Supreme Court put the point in *Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.*, "the adequacy of notice and hearing respecting proceedings that may affect a party's rights turns, to a considerable extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such party may be taken to have of the consequences of his own conduct." 370 U.S. 628, 632 (1962); see also *Martin v. D.C. Ct.*

of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (sanctioning a petitioner for filing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court had previously warned him that "[f]uture similar filings" would "merit additional measures.").

Indeed, we have already rejected Santoyo's general contention that a district court must conduct a separate or formal hearing before imposing sanctions. See *Vega v. Chi. Bd. of Educ.*, 109 F.4th 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2024). Santoyo needed only notice of the district court's intent to impose sanctions sufficient to allow him a meaningful opportunity to respond or defend himself. See *id.*

He had it here. The district judge could not have been more transparent in warning Santoyo that another round of frivolous motions or baseless credibility attacks would earn sanctions. The record is unequivocal on this front. As just a small sampling—in an August 2023 order the judge informed Santoyo that it would impose sanctions if he continued to "file frivolous or repetitive motions." In a September 2023 order the judge informed Santoyo for the "final time" that it was considering assessing sanctions against him for his repetitive filings. And in a March 2024 order the judge, emphasizing his "extended pattern" of filing "frivolous motions seeking reconsideration and complaining of bias, impropriety, or misconduct when the court takes an action" he views as "adverse to his interests," gave Santoyo a final warning: "if plaintiff continues to file frivolous motions, the motions will be stricken and plaintiff will be sanctioned."

But instead of heeding that warning, Santoyo filed what was perhaps his most frivolous motion of all: he requested that the City of Chicago pay him attorney's fees for the time

spent responding to its motion for costs. He also wanted the City's counsel sanctioned and referred to the bar authorities. That was the final straw that drew the sanctions.

We see no error on these facts. To the contrary, we see a record replete with indications of fair notice to a party who had multiple opportunities to explain his perspective and avoid abusing the judicial process. Due process required no more, leaving us to AFFIRM.