

No. 25-581

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH,
LITTLETON, COLORADO, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

LISA ROY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF EARLY CHILDHOOD, *et al.*,

Respondents.

ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

**BRIEF OF *AMICUS CURIAE* THOMAS MORE
SOCIETY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS**

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE¹

Amicus Curiae the Thomas More Society (“TMS”) is a not-for-profit, national public interest law firm based in Chicago, Illinois, dedicated to restoring respect in law for human life, family, and religious liberty. TMS regularly advocates for the rights of religious schools to operate according to their Gospel missions and to fully participate in school choice programs, consistent with parents’ right to direct the religious education and upbringing of their children. TMS thus has a distinct interest in the protection of these rights pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause’s text, history, and jurisprudence.

**INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

The decision below turned in part on a familiar canard. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit opined that if the First Amendment requires accommodating the religious petitioners here, it would effectively protect “beliefs that are commonly described as secular” under a modern understanding of “religion.” *St. Mary Catholic Parish in Littleton v. Roy*, 154 F.4th 752, 764 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing *Welsh v. United States*, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970), and *United States v. Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). Thus, the Court contended, it would mean that states are prevented “from placing almost any condition on school funds.” *Id.*

1. No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or part; no party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund the brief; and no person other than *Amicus Curiae*, their members, or their counsel contributed money intended to fund the brief.

That is fundamentally false. Even under *Welsh* and *Seeger*, courts can (and must) determine whether the exercise at issue is actually religious rather than purely secular, given this Court’s recognition that “philosophical and personal rather than religious” beliefs are not cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). Though the meaning of “religion” is still broad and “delicate,” it is not unlimited. *See infra*. Courts have consistently shown the ability to weed out sincerely held alleged religious beliefs that are not in fact religious, even under modern standards, including, *e.g.*, beliefs in the “Church of Marijuana,” the Flying Spaghetti Monster, and the Ku Klux Klan. *See infra*.

Further, this Court would do well to restore the original, historic meaning of the free exercise of religion, which was consistently defined in the Founding era to mean one’s duty to, and reverence for, God. *See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States*, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (citing Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments”). The modern shift away from that definition stems largely from this Court’s decisions in *Welsh* and *Seeger*. But those decisions turned on this Court’s statutory interpretation of particular text in the Universal Military Training and Service Act (*i.e.*, the phrase “in a relation to a Supreme Being”) that is found nowhere in the First Amendment. *See infra*. Return to the historic, original understanding of religion would provide more stability and predictability to free exercise jurisprudence going forward.

Alternatively, this Court should at minimum reverse the decision below in light of this Court’s decision in *Mahmoud v. Taylor*, 606 U.S. 522 (2025). *Mahmoud*

recognized that if “a law” substantially interferes with or threatens to undermine the religious development and upbringing of parents’ children, it must undergo strict scrutiny. *See id.* at 565 (emphasis added). Here, petitioners include two religious parents seeking to ensure their children can attend St. Mary’s preschool in accord with their Catholic beliefs. *See Cert. Pet.* at 8. Because Colorado law substantially interferes with and undermines the parent petitioners’ ability to do so, *see, e.g., id.* at 12, it must face strict scrutiny pursuant to *Mahmoud*—contrary to the decision below. Thus, at minimum, this Court should reverse in light of *Mahmoud*. *Accord Miller v. McDonald*, 146 S. Ct. 879 (2025).

ARGUMENT

I. The Free Exercise Clause protects only religious exercise.

Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s concern that accommodating the indisputably religious petitioners here would effectively protect an unlimited number of “secular” beliefs, *St. Mary*, 145 F.4th at 764 n.9, this Court has made clear “the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” *Yoder*, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (emphasis added). Thus, a belief that is “philosophical and personal rather than religious . . . does not rise to the demands of the [First Amendment’s] Religion Clauses.” *Id.* at 216 (emphasis added).

To be sure, current Free Exercise doctrine protects a wide swath of sincerely held beliefs. But, as noted, courts

have recognized the Amendment has important limits that prevent extending protection to a wide range of “secular” beliefs. Further, this Court should restore the historical understanding of cognizable “religious” exercise, which, until the modern era, was limited only to acts arising from one’s understanding of his or her “duties to God.”

A. Courts can (and must) determine whether the relevant exercise is religious.

Because the Free Exercise Clause forbids governments from prohibiting the free exercise of “religion,” courts are obliged to determine whether the claimant’s relevant conduct is in fact “religious.” Specifically, the task of the judiciary in free exercise cases “is to decide whether the beliefs avowed are: (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature, in the claimant’s scheme of things.” *Africa v. Pennsylvania*, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1981); *accord Moore-King v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va.*, 708 F.3d 560, 570-71 (4th Cir. 2013).

While a claimant’s “sincerity” is a “question of fact,” whether a person’s belief is “religious” is “essentially an objective” inquiry. *United States v. Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965); *see also Yoder*, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (protecting religious exercise does not “allow[] every person to make his own standards” of religion).

The objective inquiry is a “delicate” one, *Yoder*, 406 U.S. at 215, because “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds,” *Hernandez v. Commissioner*, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The inquiry is thus individualistic: “Men

may believe what they cannot prove,” and thus “[t]hey may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines and beliefs.” *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); accord *Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div.*, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).

But, as others have noted, “[t]here is a distinct difference . . . between questioning the veracity or reasonableness of a claim and questioning whether the belief is objectively ‘religious.’” *Watts v. Fla. Intern. Univ.*, 495 F.3d 1289, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). “The latter is a foundational component of determining whether a plaintiff has pleaded a First Amendment free exercise claim.” *Id.*

This Court recognized the same in *Yoder*. There, it noted that had the Amish claimants’ objection to regular public education been more akin to “Thoreau’s . . . philosophical and personal” objections to “the social values of his time,” “rather than religious,” they would have lacked First Amendment protection. *Yoder*, 406 U.S. at 216; accord *Africa*, 662 F.2d at 1033-34 (where motivating belief is “far more the product of a secular philosophy than of a religious orientation,” there is no cognizable “religious” exercise). Accordingly, courts must determine whether the beliefs at issue are religious, rather than secular, to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause applies.

Lower courts often rely on the Third Circuit’s decision in *Africa v. Pennsylvania* as describing three “useful indicia” of “religion”: (1) it “addresses fundamental and

ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters”; (2) it “is comprehensive in nature” rather than an “isolated teaching”; and (3) it has “the presence of certain formal and external signs.” *Cavanaugh v. Bartelt*, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 829 (D. Neb. 2016) (citing *Africa*, 662 F.3d at 1032); accord *Love v. Reed*, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Meyers*, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996). “Although these ‘indicia’ certainly do not represent an exhaustive list of features defining a religious belief, it is important to have some objective guidelines in order to avoid ad hoc justice.” *Watts*, 495 F.3d at 1304 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (internal quotes omitted); accord *Cavanaugh*, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 829 (“[T]hat is not a rigid test for defining a religion, and flexibility and careful consideration of each belief system is needed.”).

In short, the Free Exercise Clause protects only *religious* exercise. Purely self-referential secular beliefs are not protected, contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s intimation below.

B. Courts have rightly declined First Amendment protection for numerous secular beliefs.

While it is true that courts have broadly construed the meaning of “religion” in recent decades, they have nonetheless rejected First Amendment protection for a variety of purely secular beliefs that claimants sincerely alleged were “religious.”

This Court’s decisions in *Seeger* and *Welsh* set forth exceedingly broad definitions of “religion.” They provided that “religion” means “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel

to that filled by . . . God.” *Seeger*, 380 U.S. at 176; *Welsh*, 398 U.S. at 340 (“If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by * * * God’ in traditionally religious persons.”).² Lower courts have applied that definition to “belief systems [that], although not theistic, still deal with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ and take a position ‘on religion, the existence and importance of a supreme being, and a code of ethics.’” *Cavanaugh*, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 829 (quoting *Kaufman v. McCaughtry*, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005)); accord *Fields v. Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives*, 936 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating this Court’s “understanding of ‘religion’ now includes nontheistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic ones”).

But courts have nonetheless denied protection for numerous sincerely held—but purely personal and secular—beliefs. These include sincere, *allegedly* religious beliefs in:

- The Church of Marijuana. *U.S. v. Meyers*, 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995);
- The Flying Spaghetti Monster. *Cavanaugh*, 178 F. 3d at 823-25;

2. Notably, *Seeger* and *Welsh* interpreted only the scope of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, not the First Amendment. *See infra*. Many courts have nonetheless adopted these statutory definitions in construing the First Amendment.

- Kozy Kitten Cat Food’s contribution to well-being. *Brown v. Pena*, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
- The Ku Klux Klan. *Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc.*, 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1973);
- Secular humanism. *Pelozo v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.*, 37 F.3d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1994); *Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Com’rs of Mobile Cnty.*, 827 F.2d 684, 690-95 (11th Cir. 1987);
- Evolutionism. *Pelozo*, 37 F.3d at 521-22; and
- Scientism. *Daniel Chapter One v. F.T.C.*, 405 F. App’x 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

All of this accords with *Yoder*’s recognition that a generally secular “way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation.” 406 U.S. at 215. Or, as another court put it, “*Yoder* teaches that [one] must offer some organizing principle or authority other than herself that prescribes her religious convictions.” *Moore-King*, 708 F.3d at 571 (4th Cir. 2013). Even then, “an asserted belief might be so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.” *Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp’t Sec.*, 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989) (internal quotes omitted); accord *Cavanaugh*, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 829-30 (finding belief in Flying Spaghetti Monster, or “FSMism,” to be “a satirical rejoinder” to religious belief in intelligent design and thus a mere “secular argument”).

Notably, the foregoing principles squarely contradict a key underlying premise in the decision below—*i.e.*, that if the First Amendment’s protections extend to the petitioners here, it would effectively “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” *St. Mary*, 154 F. 4th at 765 (quoting *Emp’t Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)); *see id.* at 764 n.9. On the contrary, this Court’s precedents (and myriad lower court decisions) show that, if a person acts according to purely personal, internal directives, it is not a cognizable “religious” exercise under the First Amendment. That’s because (at minimum) the action lacks any external reference point lifting it to the realm of the “spiritual or other-worldly” and pursuant to the authority of a higher power outside oneself. *See Africa*, 662 F.2d at 1032-33.

True, current doctrine requires asking whether one’s actions are religious in his or her “own scheme of things.” *Seeger*, 380 U.S. at 185. But Professor McConnell has rightly observed “that the definition and enforcement of the boundary is entrusted to the arm of the government most likely to perform the function dispassionately and best equipped to consider the specifics of the case. The individual believer is not judge in his own case.” McConnell, *Free Exercise Revisionism*, at 1150 (emphasis added).

Thus, discerning non-religious from religious exercise—and protecting only the latter—is consonant with, not contrary to, the rule of law. The Free Exercise Clause recognizes that “[t]he individual is not free from law; he is subject to two potentially conflicting sources of law, spiritual and temporal.” McConnell, *Free Exercise Revisionism*, at 1151 n.182 (emphasis added). And “the

established tenets of a religious tradition have their own dynamic safeguards of order and good sense, superior to individual will.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Accordingly, this Court’s broad definition of “religion” is not without limits, and courts have shown their ability to discern and enforce those limits in recent decades. The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary was no less erroneous as it was dangerous, given the Free Exercise Clause’s essential role in preserving the true rule of law.

C. Restoring the original meaning of “religion” would add yet more stability to Free Exercise jurisprudence.

Though modern precedent extends Free Exercise protection even to non-theistic beliefs, this was not always so. Founding-era definitions of “religion” were limited to actions motivated by duty to God, as this Court’s early decisions recognized. Free Exercise jurisprudence, however, later strayed from a strictly theistic view of religion, especially following this Court’s decisions in *Seeger* and *Welsh*, which, in turn, merely interpreted statutory language found nowhere in the First Amendment. Given the Tenth Circuit’s (misguided) slippery slope concerns below, this Court would do well to restore the historical, original understanding of “religion” and thus better ensure common sense and predictable applications of the Free Exercise Clause—both in this case and beyond.

1. The original theistic meaning of “religion”

Beginning with dictionary definitions, Samuel Johnson’s *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755),

defined religion as: “1. Virtue, as founded upon reverence of God, and expectation of future awards and punishments. 2. A system of divine faith and worship as opposite to others.” DeVito, *The Original Meaning of Religion*, No. 65 (Winter 2025).³ The same dictionary defined “divine” as “1. Partaking of the nature of God. 2. Proceeding from God; not natural; not human.” *Id.* The 18th century Universal Etymological English Dictionary, by Nathan Bailey, defined religion as “the worship of a Deity, Piety, Godliness,” and as “a general Habit of Reverence towards the divine nature, by which we are both enabled and inclined to worship and serve God[.]” *Id.*

Writers at the time of the Founding believed the same. In Memorial and Remonstrance, for example, Madison equated “religion” with “the duty we owe the Creator.” *Reynolds*, 98 U.S. at 163 (quoting Semple’s Virginia Baptists, Appendix); *see also Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Rev. Comm’n*, 605 U.S. 238, 258 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“According to Madison, man’s ‘duty towards the Creator ... is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.’”) (quoting Memorial and Remonstrance (1785)). Blackstone similarly defined “religion” as “the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.” St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1:App. 296-97, 2:App. 3-11, Doc. 59 (1803).⁴ Jefferson, too, construed “religion” in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom as a reference

3. <https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-original-meaning-of-religion>.

4. https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions59.html.

to “Almighty God” and the “Holy author of our religion, who [is] Lord of both body and mind.” Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, Virginia Museum of History & Culture.⁵

Early state charters reflected similar views. For example, like Madison and Blackstone, the influential Virginia Declaration of Rights based its protection for religious exercise on “religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.” See DeVito, *The Original Meaning of Religion*. And the New Hampshire and Pennsylvania constitutions likewise predicated the “freedom of conscience” on man’s “natural and unalienable right to worship God.” *Id.*

In short, Founding-era dictionaries, legal commentaries, and state declarations and constitutions all recognized that protected “religious” beliefs were inherently theistic.

2. Early precedent on the meaning of “religion”

Previous opinions from this Court have unsurprisingly recognized the same understanding of religion. In *Davis v. Beason*, this Court observed that “[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for [H]is being and character, and of obedience to [H]is will.” 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). Relying on *Davis*, Justices Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone later observed that “[o]ne cannot

5. <https://virginiahistory.org/learn/thomas-jefferson-and-virginia-statute-religious-freedom> (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).

speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its essential and historical significance, without assuming the existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God.” *United States v. Macintosh*, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), *overruled by Girouard v. United States*, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).

3. The judicial shift away from the original meaning of religion

This Court began to veer from its theistic view of religion in *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). There, this Court held the Constitution’s bar on religious tests, including via the Establishment Clause, prohibited Maryland from requiring a notary public to profess a belief in God. *Id.* at 492-96. The Court observed in a footnote that “[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.” *Id.* at 495 n.11. Yet, by 1972, this Court reaffirmed that merely “philosophical and personal” “choice[s]” are not cognizable exercises of religion. *Yoder*, 406 U.S. at 216. And in more recent times, courts from coast-to-coast have recognized that “secular humanism” is not a protected “religion.” *See Pelozo*, 37 F.3d at 521; *Smith*, 827 F.2d at 690-95. Even today, courts instinctively understand the meaning of “religious” exercise in reference to God. *See, e.g., Pelozo*, 37 F.3d at 521 (concluding “evolutionism . . . has nothing to do with how the universe was created; it has nothing to do with whether or not there is a divine Creator”).

As noted, though, courts today also generally construe the Free Exercise Clause as protecting even non-theistic

beliefs in light of *Seeger* and *Welsh*. But those decisions hinged only on the statutory interpretation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act—and particularly whether its textual allowance for conscientious objection to military service extended to non-theistic beliefs. See *Seeger*, 380 U.S. at 164-65; *Welsh*, 398 U.S. at 335. The Act included an exemption for those conscientiously opposed to war “by reason of their religious training and belief.” *Seeger*, 380 U.S. at 165. And it specifically defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but (not including) essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” *Id.* (emphasis added) (quoting 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958)). In *Seeger*, this Court avoided answering whether the statute violated the First Amendment and instead held as a matter of statutory interpretation that the phrase “in a relation to a Supreme Being” covered beliefs that, “in the life of [their] possessor,” are merely “parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.” 380 U.S. at 165-66 (holding the statutory exemption covered “a religious faith in a purely ethical creed” based on the philosophies of “Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza”). This Court held similarly in *Welsh*. See 398 U.S. at 340-43.

However, aside from the fact *Seeger* and *Welsh* seemed to contradict the very statute they interpreted—see § 456(j) (1958) (stating exemption did not apply to “essentially . . . philosophical views”)—they both studiously avoided construing the Free Exercise Clause itself. Instead, they relied on a single statutory phrase (“in a relation to a Supreme Being”) that appears nowhere in the First Amendment. And, indeed, it can perhaps

fairly be said that belief merely in “relation to a Supreme Being” very well includes opposition to such a Being. *See, e.g.*, Fulton Sheen, Passion Week, “Seven Last Words – 4th Word, Did Christ Think of Atheists?” at 08:22-08:42 (“How can you be an atheist unless there is something to atheate?”).⁶ Or as the Seventh Circuit has put it, “[i]f we think of religion as taking a position on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.” *Reed v. Great Lakes Cos.*, 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). But the Free Exercise Clause protects only religion—not beliefs that are merely “in relation to” (whether for or against) God or an amorphous “Supreme Being.”

Similarly, cases holding that atheism is protected by the Establishment Clause do not support extending *Seeger* and *Welsh* to the free exercise context. *Cf. Kaufman*, 419 F.3d at 682. This Court has recognized the Establishment Clause prohibits government from forcing atheists to adopt a religious creed. *See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree*, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985). But the very basis for that principle is the mutual exclusivity of religion and non-religion—that is, government may not establish a religion by forcing the non-religious (including atheists) to adopt religious beliefs. *See id.* It does not follow that atheism is therefore transformed into a “religion” for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause (which would render that Clause both superfluous and absurd, given the Establishment Clause’s protection of the same beliefs precisely because they are not religious). The Establishment Clause does all the work—and reinforces the real distinction between religion and non-religion (including atheism).

6. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pzjOwYhGbg>.

Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause’s protection for religious exercise extends only to beliefs and actions motivated by religion. And the original, historical understanding of “religion” is unquestionably one’s duty to, and reverence for, God. *See also, e.g., Pelozo*, 37 F.3d at 521 n.4 (“According to Webster’s, religion is the ‘belief in and reverence for a supernatural power accepted as the creator and governor of the universe.’”) (quoting Webster’s II *New Riverside University Dictionary* 993 (1988)). This Court should clarify that *Seeger* and *Welsh* are not authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment—and thereby further stabilize free exercise jurisprudence going forward by restoring the historical, original meaning of the free exercise of “religion.”

II. At minimum, this Court should reverse in light of *Mahmoud*.

Notably, two of the petitioners in this case are religious parents seeking to send or keep their children in St. Mary’s preschool. Cert. Pet. at 8. Yet, Colorado’s refusal to exempt St. Mary’s from its sexual orientation and gender identity requirements threatens the school’s ability to keep its doors open and robs the petitioner parents of “thousands of dollars of state funding solely because they chose a Catholic preschool for their children.” *Id.* at 12.

But this Court’s decision in *Mahmoud* makes clear that “when a law imposes a burden of the same character as that in *Yoder*, strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable.” 606 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). And a burden is of the “same character” as in *Yoder* when it “substantially interfere[s] with the religious development of the parents’ children”

or “poses a very real threat of undermining the religious beliefs and practices the parents wish to instill in their children.” *Id.* (internal quotes omitted).

Here, Colorado’s refusal to accommodate St. Mary’s and the Archdiocese of Denver’s other Catholic preschools threatens their very existence—and thus the petitioner “parents’ ability to direct the religious upbringing of their children.” *Id.* at 554 (internal quotes omitted). Accordingly, strict scrutiny must apply, contrary to the decision below. This Court should thus, at minimum, reverse the decision below in light of *Mahmoud*.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the decision of the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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