25-5680

No. _____

ORIGINAL

FILED
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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

In The Supreme Court for the United States

David P. Petersen , Petitioner

vs.

United States of America, Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

David Petersen, Pro se
8109 South 194th Street
Gretna, NE 68028
402-983-6448

Cover

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the mens rea and actus reus requirements for aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 demand proof of specific intent and affirmative participation, as mandated by *Rosemond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), or whether mere association or general awareness suffices, as erroneously applied in this case, perpetuating a profound circuit split that fractures equal justice across the nation.
2. Whether a conviction under § 2, rooted in an indictment devoid of overt acts or specific intent, compounded by trial errors including constructive amendment, suppressed evidence, and ineffective counsel, violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, compelling coram nobis relief, especially where lower courts unjustly imposed procedural bars despite pro se challenges—such as financial devastation forcing self-representation after counsel's egregious failure to unearth exculpatory evidence or assert critical defenses, thus amplifying systemic disparities that deny the innocent their constitutional right to justice.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is David P. Petersen, who was the appellant below.

Respondent is the United States of America, which was the appellee below.

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  - Appendix Exhibit A
- Motion for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis
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Note: The Appendix is organized chronologically and by relevance to the petition. Certified copies of lower court documents have been obtained where required. If any document is not included, it is because it is not essential to the petition's

understanding or is incorporated by reference (Rule 14.1(i)). The petitioner, proceeding pro se, requests leniency under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), for any minor omissions.

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JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit entered judgment on August 6, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 2 provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."

The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."

INTRODUCTION

In the crucible of thousands of federal prosecutions each year, *18 U.S.C. § 2*'s aiding and abetting liability teeters on a fractured circuit split: does it demand "active participation" with unyielding specific intent (*Rosemond v. United States*, 572 U.S. 65 (2014)), or tolerate the frail shadow of mere passive association? In the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, a defendant charged with aiding securities fraud under *§ 2* would escape the ominous specter of trial and the indelible stain of conviction, as these circuits uphold *Rosemond*'s ironclad standards with ferocious resolve. Yet, in the Eleventh Circuit, Petitioner was mercilessly convicted on the gossamer threads of vague associations, imprisoned in a cage of injustice, and denied coram nobis relief, perpetuating a nine-circuit schism that shatters justice across over 10,000 annual *§ 2* prosecutions.[^1] The Eleventh Circuit's August 6, 2025, affirmance exposes a glaring unequal application of the law: it confines *Fischer v. United States*, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (2024), to a narrow textualist interpretation of *§ 1512(c)(2)*, while inexplicably abandoning that same rigor for *§ 2*, allowing a diluted standard that mirrors the multi-circuit split plaguing aiding and abetting liability. This selective application, dismissing claims as procedurally barred despite pro se obstacles, newly unearthed FOIA evidence, and the thunderous evolution of law, brands fundamental errors as inconsequential whispers. This petition demands review to forge a unified *§ 2* interpretation, enforce textualist consistency across statutes as *Fischer* mandates, and shield due process from the ruthless tyranny of forum-dependent and unequal justice.

This case exemplifies a profound and entrenched circuit split on the fundamental requirements for aiding and abetting liability under *18 U.S.C. § 2*—a statute invoked in thousands of federal prosecutions annually. Despite this Court's clarification in *Rosemond v. United States* that such liability demands "advance knowledge" and "active participation" with specific intent, lower courts remain divided on whether mere association or general awareness suffices in contexts beyond firearms offenses. The Eleventh Circuit's per curiam affirmance of the denial of Petitioner's second coram nobis petition (August 6, 2025) erred in deeming the claims procedurally barred without sound reasons for delay, inapposite to *Fischer v. United States*, and abandoned or relitigable, aligning with lenient circuits but conflicting with stricter ones and this Court's precedents, including the textualist principles in *Fischer*.

Compounded by constitutional violations—a deficient indictment, constructive amendment, *Brady* suppression, and ineffective counsel—this case presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the split, enforce uniform mens rea standards, and safeguard due process. Certiorari is warranted to prevent geographic disparities in criminal liability and restore fidelity to congressional intent, particularly where the lower courts misapplied coram nobis standards by ignoring evolving precedent and Petitioner's pro se challenges in accessing evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner David P. Petersen was ensnared in a 2012 conviction in the Southern District of Alabama for aiding and abetting securities fraud under *18 U.S.C. § 2*,

alongside conspiracy and wire fraud (*18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343*; *15 U.S.C. § 77q*). *United States v. Sencan*, 629 F. App'x 884 (11th Cir. 2015). The indictment, a hollow shell of accusation, alleged no specific overt acts or intent, leaning on the shadowy veil of vague associations. At trial, the government executed a treacherous pivot to a theory of passive involvement, a brazen constructive amendment defying *Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). Jury instructions silenced *Rosemond*'s sacred mandates of specific intent and active participation—standards forged post-trial yet undeniably applicable. The prosecution buried exculpatory evidence, including a prosecutor's pre-trial confession of Petitioner's lack of mens rea, a violation screaming *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Counsel, derelict in their sworn duty, failed to object, plummeting below *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

After enduring a 60-month sentence, Petitioner sought coram nobis relief, decrying an overbroad *§ 2* application clashing with *Rosemond* and *Fischer*. The district court dismissed the plea with cold indifference, labeling errors non-fundamental. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed per curiam on August 6, 2025, ruling the prosecutor's statement untimely without sound justification, *Fischer* irrelevant to *§ 2*, and other claims—indictment flaws, ineffective assistance—abandoned or relitigated. *United States v. Petersen*, No. 24-12435 (11th Cir. 2025).

After serving his sentence, Petitioner sought coram nobis relief, arguing his conviction rested on an overbroad *§ 2* application inconsistent with *Rosemond* and *Fischer*. The district court denied the motion, deeming the errors non-fundamental.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed per curiam on August 6, 2025, holding that Petitioner's claims based on a prosecutor's pre-trial statement (indicating lack of mens rea) were untimely without sound reasons for delay, that *Fischer* was inapposite as it concerns a different statute *(§ 1512),* and that other arguments (sufficiency of evidence, indictment defects, IAC) were abandoned or relitigable. The court rejected *Fischer*'s relevance to *§ 2*, overlooking its broader textualist directive against expansive criminal liability.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE PROFOUNDLY DIVIDED ON THE MENS REA AND ACTUS REUS REQUIREMENTS FOR AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER *18 U.S.C. § 2*, POST-*ROSEMOND.*

In *Rosemond* this Court decreed that *§ 2* liability demands "active participation" with "intent [that] goes to the specific and entire crime charged." 572 U.S. at 76-77. Yet, a nine-circuit chasm splits the nation's judicial conscience, debating whether this hallowed standard governs securities fraud. *Rosemond* resolved a pre-2014 split on advance knowledge for aiding *§ 924(c)* offenses, holding that liability requires "active participation" with "intent [that] goes to the specific and entire crime charged." 572 U.S. at 76-77. Yet, a mature split persists on whether this mens rea applies broadly to *§ 2*, including in securities fraud, felon-in-possession, and other cases. Five circuits demand strict proof of specific intent and affirmative acts, while four adopt lenient standards permitting conviction on association or awareness—creating unequal justice. The Eleventh Circuit's affirmance perpetuates this divide

by endorsing a lenient view without addressing the split, dismissing claims as untimely despite sound reasons (e.g., pro se barriers, evolving law like *Fischer*).

In the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, Petitioner's tenuous associations would have disintegrated under rigorous scrutiny, likely shielding him from prosecution or conviction, as these circuits enforce specific intent and affirmative acts with ironclad resolve. Envision the Third Circuit: under *United States v. Xavier*, 2 F.4th 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2021), the government's failure to prove intentional assistance would have crushed any case, halting trial at its inception; in the Second Circuit, *United States v. Valle*, 807 F.3d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 2015), would have overturned with righteous indignation for lack of deliberate aid; the First Circuit's *United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz*, 787 F.3d 581, 587 (1st Cir. 2015), would spurn passive roles with unyielding contempt; the Fifth Circuit mandates active facilitation (*United States v. Garth*, 773 F. App'x 678 (5th Cir. 2019)); and the Eighth Circuit venerates only knowingly intentional acts (*United States v. Gentry*, 925 F.3d 1021, 1027 (8th Cir. 2019); see also *United States v. High Hawk*, No. 23-3168 (8th Cir. May 13, 2024), affirming aiding second-degree murder under *§§ 1111(a), 2* with strict mens rea, rejecting mere association).

Conversely, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits embrace convictions on the fragile filament of mere association or awareness (*United States v. McCray*, 83 F.4th 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2023)), ensnaring Petitioner where stricter circuits would liberate him. This seismic rift, devastating over 10,000 *§ 2* cases annually,

unleashes a torrent of unequal justice. *U.S. Dept. of Justice, FY 2023 Criminal Statistics Report* (2024).[^2]

Certiorari is essential to enforce uniformity, especially as analogous splits persist in secondary liability contexts. For instance, the pending cert petition in *Doe v. Cisco Systems, Inc.* (cert. filed Feb. 2025) highlights a circuit divide on aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute, mirroring *§ 2* inconsistencies in mens rea requirements post-*Rosemond*.

Strict Circuits:

- First Circuit: Rejects passive roles, requiring "affirmative participation." *United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz*, 787 F.3d 581, 587 (1st Cir. 2015); *United States v. Ortiz-Melendez*, 2024 WL 383986, at *3 (1st Cir. Jan. 31, 2024); *United States v. Hernández-Carrasquillo*, No. 23-1823 (1st Cir. July 25, 2025) (refined test allowing circumstantial knowledge but emphasizing active participation in carjacking aiding).
- Second Circuit: Demands "specific intent to facilitate." *United States v. Valle*, 807 F.3d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 2015).
- Third Circuit: Requires "intentional assistance." *United States v. Xavier*, 2 F.4th 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2021).
- Fifth Circuit: Needs "active facilitation." *United States v. Garth*, 773 F. App'x 678 (5th Cir. 2019).

- Eighth Circuit: Upholds only "knowingly and intentionally aided" acts. *United States v. Gentry*, 925 F.3d 1021, 1027 (8th Cir. 2019); see also *United States v. High Hawk*, No. 23-3168 (8th Cir. May 13, 2024).

Lenient Circuits:

- Seventh Circuit: Allows "general awareness." *United States v. Morrison*, 983 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2020); *United States v. Haynes*, 2023 WL 6787123, at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2023) (dissent noting "unjust results").
- Ninth Circuit: Permits proximity-based liability. *United States v. Encinas-Rodriguez*, 944 F.3d 162, 167 (9th Cir. 2019); but see *United States v. Alfred*, 78 F.4th 1185 (9th Cir. 2023) (debating elements).
- Tenth Circuit: Upholds minimal aid. *United States v. Rosalez*, 711 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2013).
- Eleventh Circuit: Endorses indirect aid, but intra-circuit tension exists with *Steiner v. United States*, 940 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 2019). *United States v. McCray*, 83 F.4th 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2023).

This profound circuit divide, a festering wound in the fabric of federal law, demands this Court's urgent intervention. The Eleventh Circuit's refusal to acknowledge this schism, dismissing Petitioner's claims as mere repetition, betrays the constitutional mandate for uniform justice. This nine-circuit split affects diverse prosecutions, from fraud to firearms, leading to forum-dependent outcomes. The Eleventh Circuit's failure to engage this split, dismissing claims as relitigable, exacerbates

the disparity and warrants review. With over 10,000 *§ 2* cases annually hanging in the balance, the stark contrast between circuits—where Petitioner would walk free in the Third or Second but languishes in the Eleventh—cries out for resolution. This petition, forged in the crucible of pro se struggle, unveils a national crisis of unequal application, echoing the clarity that compelled review in *Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California*, 528 U.S. 152 (2000). The Supreme Court must seize this moment to mend this fractured legal landscape and restore the promise of equal justice under law.

Summary for Section I

This profound circuit divide, a festering wound in the fabric of federal law, demands this Court's urgent intervention. The Eleventh Circuit's refusal to acknowledge this schism, dismissing Petitioner's claims as mere repetition, betrays the constitutional mandate for uniform justice. With over 10,000 *§ 2* cases annually hanging in the balance, the stark contrast between circuits—where Petitioner would walk free in the Third or Second but languishes in the Eleventh—cries out for resolution. This petition, forged in the crucible of pro se struggle, unveils a national crisis of unequal application, echoing the clarity that compelled review in *Martinez v. Court of Appeal*, 528 U.S. 152 (2000). The Supreme Court must seize this moment to harmonize *§ 2*'s interpretation, ensuring that no citizen's fate hinges on the arbitrary lottery of jurisdiction. Grant certiorari to mend this fractured legal landscape and restore the promise of equal justice under law.

II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHATTERS THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS IN *ROSEMOND* AND *FISCHER*.

The Eleventh Circuit's grave error in deeming *Fischer* inapposite—confining it to *§ 1512(c)*—shatters its own logic and defies this Court's authority. *Fischer*'s textualist mandate, a beacon of restraint, narrowly construes criminal statutes to prevent overreach (144 S. Ct. at 2186), a principle that must illuminate *§ 2* with blinding clarity. As *Fischer* confined *§ 1512(c)(2)* to record-impairment, so too must *§ 2* be bound to "active participation" with specific intent (*Rosemond*), not the Eleventh Circuit's lax passive-association standard that distorts justice. This judicial overreach defies *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*, 598 U.S. 471 (2023), and *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S. 762 (2023), which crush passive secondary liability with unyielding force. The pending *Delligatti v. United States*, No. 23-825, amplifies *§ 2*'s actus reus crisis, compelling review to align circuits with *Fischer*'s unassailable rigor and restore harmony with this Court's precedents. This blatant departure from *Rosemond* and *Fischer* undermines the integrity of federal criminal law. The Eleventh Circuit's refusal to heed these binding precedents threatens a cascade of unjust convictions nationwide. This conflict, a clarion call for correction, aligns with the Court's duty to resolve precedent deviations, as seen in *Burgess v. United States*, 553 U.S. 124 (2008). The pending *Delligatti* case amplifies the urgency, but this petition stands as a beacon, illuminating the need to realign *§ 2* with constitutional intent. Grant certiorari to reaffirm this Court's authority, strike down this egregious misstep, and safeguard the rule of law for all.

The Eleventh Circuit erred in deeming *Fischer* inapposite, asserting it applies only to *§ 1512(c)* and not *§ 2*. This overlooks *Fischer*'s broader textualist principle: criminal statutes must be narrowly construed to avoid overreach beyond congressional intent. 144 S. Ct. at 2186. Just as *Fischer* limited *§ 1512(c)(2)* to record-impairment contexts, *§ 2* should be confined to "active participation" with specific intent under *Rosemond*, rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's lenient application allowing conviction without overt acts or intent. The decision below misapplies *Rosemond* by permitting vague associations to suffice, expanding *§ 2* judicially—precisely what *Fischer* prohibits.

This conflict defies the Court's recent guidance in *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*, 598 U.S. 471 (2023), rejecting passive aiding under the ATA, and *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S. 762 (2023), cabining encouragement liability to specific intent. *Fischer*'s emphasis on statutory context and history directly analogs to *§ 2*'s historical limits on secondary liability, rendering the Eleventh Circuit's narrow view erroneous. Certiorari is needed to clarify that *Fischer*'s textualism extends to *§ 2*, preventing forum-dependent expansions.

Summary for Section II

This Eleventh Circuit travesty, shattering *Rosemond* and *Fischer*, imperils the integrity of this Court's precedents and the uniformity of federal law. By clinging to a diluted standard of passive association, it defies the textualist rigor that *Fischer* demands and *Rosemond* enshrined, risking a cascade of unjust convictions nationwide. This conflict, a clarion call for correction, aligns with the Court's duty to

resolve precedent deviations, as seen in *Burgess v. United States*, 553 U.S. 124 (2008). The pending *Delligatti* case amplifies the urgency, but this petition stands as a beacon, illuminating the need to realign *§ 2* with constitutional intent. Grant certiorari to reaffirm this Court's authority, strike down this judicial overreach, and safeguard the rule of law for all. This constitutional crisis, ignited by the Eleventh Circuit's blind dismissal of pro se rights and suppressed evidence, strikes at the heart of due process and fair notice.

III. THIS CASE IGNITES FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND FAIR NOTICE, EXPOSING A CRISIS IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE.

The Eleventh Circuit's misapplication of *United States v. Mills*, 221 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000), is a travesty that mocks justice, dismissing claims as untimely or abandoned while blind to pro se barriers (*Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)) and FOIA evidence (June 2023) buried by suppression (*United States v. Moody*, 874 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1989)). The prosecutor's statement, a thunderbolt of exculpation newly resonant post-*Rosemond* and *Fischer*, and ineffective assistance crippling earlier appeals, forge a "fundamental error" (*United States v. Peter*, 310 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2002)) that cries out for redress. The FOIA odyssey—delayed through two appeals and a relentless lawsuit against the SEC, that finally settled for 150 boxes of evidence—unveiled a damning truth: no securities or investment contracts existed, a suppressed revelation under *Brady* that justifies delayed claims with irrefutable proof. Indictment defects (*Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)),

constructive amendment (*Stirone*), *Brady* violations, and *Strickland* ineffectiveness render the trial a grotesque mockery of justice, "presumptively unreliable." This injustice swells with systemic disparities: appointed counsel's catastrophic failure forced Petitioner into pro se representation due to financial ruin, a right enshrined in *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), yet trampled by lower courts. Pro se petitioners, shackled by a grant rate below 0.5% at this Court versus 4% for counseled cases—a disparity mirroring the rare triumphs of *Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California*, 528 U.S. 152 (2000), and *Burgess v. United States*, 553 U.S. 124 (2008)—face a towering resource gap that punishes the innocent when counsel falters, echoing a national crisis affecting thousands denied fair recourse.[^2] This access-to-justice catastrophe demands this Court's intervention to clarify Coram Nobis's vital role and dismantle barriers that silence the voiceless. The societal toll is staggering: the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers estimates wrongful incarcerations from such disparities cost taxpayers over $500 million annually, a burden exacerbated by inconsistent *§ 2* applications.

This constitutional crisis, ignited by the Eleventh Circuit's blind dismissal of pro se rights and suppressed evidence, strikes at the heart of due process and fair notice. The unmasking of the fact there were no securities present in this securities fraud case via the SEC FOIA, coupled with a pro se grant rate disparity (<0.5% vs. 4%), mirrors the injustices that propelled *Martinez v. Court of Appeal* and *Burgess v. United States* to review. Thousands of innocent accused, abandoned by ineffective counsel and financial ruin, face a justice system that punishes their poverty.

The Eleventh Circuit wrongly held Petitioner's claims procedurally barred for delay and abandonment, ignoring sound reasons under *United States v. Mills*, 221 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000). Pro se litigants face barriers to legal resources and evidence (*Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)), and Petitioner's claims rely on evolving precedent (*Rosemond, Fischer*) and newly obtained FOIA evidence confirming lack of mens rea—unavailable earlier due to suppression and investigative delays (*United States v. Moody*, 874 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1989)). The prosecutor's statement, while known, gained new relevance post-*Fischer*, constituting "fundamental error" not relitigable but newly viable.

The deficient indictment violated Sixth Amendment notice (*Russell*). Constructive amendment breached grand jury protections (*Stirone*). *Brady* suppression and *Strickland* IAC undermined due process, rendering the trial "presumptively unreliable" (*United States v. Peter*, 310 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2002)). The Eleventh Circuit's abandonment ruling errs: coram nobis addresses unraised fundamental errors, especially where IAC prevented earlier litigation. Certiorari is warranted to resolve whether such procedural bars preclude relief for constitutional violations in post-custody contexts.

Summary for Section III.

This Court, guardian of constitutional equality, must act to clarify Coram Nobis's power, dismantle these systemic barriers, and ensure that no citizen is denied redress due to counsel's failure or judicial indifference. Granting certiorari is a must to uphold the Sixth Amendment's promise.

IV. THIS CASE STANDS AS A PARAMOUNT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THESE NATIONAL IMPERATIVES.

The Petitioner's conviction in the Eleventh Circuit, where he would have escaped the gallows of trial or the brand of guilt in the First, Second, Third, or Fifth Circuits, exposes a split that corrodes equal justice across thousands of *§ 2* cases. The record stands pristine, issues preserved with unassailable clarity, and the Eleventh Circuit's blunders—misreading *Fischer*, dismissing pro se delays—mark this as a paramount vehicle for review. Unlike *United States v. Grant* (5th Cir. 2023), this case thunders with "fundamental error" (*United States v. Tinker-Smith*, W.D. Wash. 2025). *Ramdeo v. United States* (11th Cir. May 20, 2025) champions coram nobis for ongoing harms, shattering delay objections with righteous authority. *Delligatti v. United States* (No. 23-825) on secondary liability causation aligns with *§ 2*'s mens rea maelstrom, urging this Court to seize this moment and restore justice's sacred balance. The call for amicus support from civil rights organizations, as seen in *Burgess*'s post-grant counsel appointment, underscores the case's national resonance, inviting broader advocacy to amplify its stakes.

The record is clean, issues preserved, and the split squarely presented, with the Eleventh Circuit's errors exemplifying the need for review. *§ 2*'s ubiquity makes resolution urgent, impacting federal justice nationwide. Unlike denied coram nobis cases like *USA v. Grant* (5th Cir. 2023), this petition meets the "fundamental error" threshold, as in the recent grant in *United States v. Tinker-Smith* (W.D. Wash. 2025), where similar due process flaws justified relief. *Ramdeo v. United States*

(11th Cir. May 20, 2025) supports coram nobis for ongoing harms, countering the Eleventh Circuit's delay ruling. The pending *Delligatti v. United States* (No. 23-825) on secondary liability causation further aligns this case as a vehicle for clarifying *§ 2* mens rea.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. This case presents a vehicle to resolve a profound and entrenched circuit split on the mens rea and actus reus requirements for aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, as clarified in **Rosemond v. United States**, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), yet inconsistently applied across nine circuits in contexts like securities fraud. In stricter circuits such as the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth, Petitioner's mere associations would not sustain conviction, demanding proof of specific intent and affirmative acts; in lenient circuits like the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh, such tenuous links suffice, fostering geographic disparities that undermine equal justice in over 10,000 annuals of § 2 prosecutions. The Eleventh Circuit's affirmance perpetuates this divide, endorsing a diluted standard without engagement, while dismissing claims as procedurally barred despite evolving precedent.

Compounding this, the Eleventh Circuit's decision defies this Court's precedents in **Rosemond** and **Fischer v. United States**, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (2024), by confining

Fischer's textualist mandate—requiring narrow construction of criminal statutes to align with congressional intent—to § 1512(c)(2) alone. Yet *Fischer*'s principles of restraint against judicial overreach should extend to all criminal statutes, including § 2, demanding "active participation" with specific intent rather than passive association. By abandoning this rigor for § 2, the Eleventh Circuit expanded liability beyond congressional design, mirroring the overreach *Fischer* condemned and conflicting with decisions like *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*, 598 U.S. 471 (2023), and *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S. 762 (2023). This selective application not only misapplies binding precedent but renders the procedural bar on coram nobis relief erroneous: the fundamental error in Petitioner's conviction gains new viability post-*Fischer*, justifying delayed claims under Eleventh Circuit standards that require sound reasons for delay, such as evolving law and pro se barriers (*United States v. Mills*, 221 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000)). To bar relief ignores *Fischer*'s broader directive, perpetuating a miscarriage of justice where constitutional violations—a deficient indictment (*Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)), constructive amendment (*Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212 (1960)), *Brady* suppression (*Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), and ineffective assistance (*Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))—rendered the trial presumptively unreliable, exacerbated by systemic access-to-justice disparities for pro se petitioners (*Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).

With a clean record, preserved issues, and alignment with pending cases like **Delligatti v. United States**, No. 23-825, this petition is an ideal vehicle to enforce uniformity, reaffirm textualist consistency across statutes, and safeguard due process against forum-dependent outcomes. Grant certiorari to mend this fractured landscape, correct the Eleventh Circuit's travesty in **United States v. Petersen**, No. 24-12435 (11th Cir. 2025), and uphold the Constitution's promise of equal justice under law.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on September 6, 2025, by:



/s/ David P. Petersen, Pro Se
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[^1]: *U.S. Dept. of Justice, FY 2023 Criminal Statistics Report* (2024), reporting over 10,000 federal aiding and abetting charges under *§ 2*.

[^2]: *Supreme Court Statistics, 2023 Term, Office of the Clerk* (2024), showing pro se grant rate <0.5% vs. 4% for counseled petitions; see also *National Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Access to Justice Report* (2023), noting resource disparities amplify ineffective counsel outcomes.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that all parties required to be served have been served with copies of the **PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI** and **MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS** in the above-captioned case. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.5, on this 6th day of September 2025, I placed 3 copies of each document in the United States mail, properly addressed and first-class postage prepaid, to:

Solicitor General of the United States United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 6, 2025, by:

/s/ David P. Petersen, Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the accompanying **PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI** contains 4220 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d) (such as the cover, table of contents, table of authorities, questions presented, list of parties, corporate disclosure statement, opinions below, jurisdiction, constitutional and statutory provisions, and appendix). This document complies with the word limitation of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(g)(i) for a petition for a writ of certiorari (not exceeding 9,000 words).

In addition, this document complies with the typeface requirements of Supreme Court Rule 33.1(b), having been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using [Insert Word Processor Here, e.g., Microsoft Word] in Century Schoolbook (or a similar font) 12-point type for text and 10-point type for footnotes.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 6, 2025, by:



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