APPENDIX (SELECTED EXHIBITS TO BE FILED)

- DKT58: Appellate Brief
- DKT112: Motion for Summary Judgment
- A76: Record Closure Notice
- A106: Enforcement Notice
- A117: Motion to Compel Judgment
- A122: Judicial Estoppel Notice
- DKT139: Nonprecedential Disposition
- DKT140: Void Final Judgment
- DKT167: Void Sanction Order
- DKT170: Reconsideration Denial Void Sanctions
- DKT171: En Banc Denial
- DKT171: Void Mandate
- DKT172: Void Sanction Enforcement
- A109: SCOTUS Cover Notice
- A119: DOJ Civil Rights Referral

Respectfully and by right,

/s/ Thomas E. Camarda

Thomas E. Camarda

Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se

United States Court of Appeals – Seventh Circuit Case No. 24-3244

Prevailing Party under FRAP 31(c), Rule 56(a), and Article VI, U.S.

Constitution

Secured Party Creditor — UCC-1 Perfected

All rights expressly reserved. UCC 1-308.

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(224) 279-8856

Dated: June 6, 2025

NOTICE OF MAIN APPENDIX MATERIALS

In Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 14.1(i), Petitioner respectfully submits the following primary appendix materials in support of this Petition. These exhibits form the operative record, constitutional filings, dispositive pleadings, and judicial misconduct evidence referenced throughout the body of the Petition and constitute the perfected appellate record now subject to federal review.

All materials contained in this section were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit or served upon relevant respondents, state officials, and/or judicial officers. Each document supports key factual and legal contentions raised in the Petition and is included for completeness, clarity, and enforcement of binding constitutional law.

These documents include:

- The original **Appellate Brief** (DKT58)
- The Motion for Summary Judgment (DKT112)
- All dispositive motions, enforcement filings, UCC perfection notices, and judicial estoppel filings leading to the perfected federal record and sealed docket under FRAP 31(c), Rule 56(a), and Article VI.

Petitioner affirms that the appendix materials were timely filed or perfected by operation of law and respectfully requests this Court take judicial notice of the enclosed filings, all of which remain operative, unrebutted, and enforceable under the U.S. Constitution and applicable law.

Respectfully and by right,

/s/ Thomas E. Camarda

Thomas E. Camarda

Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se

Prevailing Party under FRAP 31(c), Rule 56(a), and Article VI, U.S.

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Dated: May 21, 2025

MAIN APPENDIX INDEX

Appendix (Filed Separately)

Exhibit	Title	Docket/File #	Date
DKT58	Appellate Brief	24-3244 DKT58	Feb 13, 2025
DKT112	Motion for Summary Judgment	24-3244 DKT112	Mar 2025
A76	Record Closure Notice	A76	Apr 2025
A106	Enforcement Notice (Pre-SCOTUS Trigger)	A106	May 2025
A117	Motion to Compel Judgment (10 Motions)	A117	May 16, 2025
A118	Motion to Enter Final Judgment (8 Motions)	A118	May 16, 2025
A122	Judicial Estoppel and Final Closure Notice	A122	May 16, 2025
DKT139	Nonprecedential Disposition	24-3244 DKT139	Apr 2, 2025
DKT140	Void Final Judgment	24-3244 DKT140	Apr 2, 2025
DKT167	Improper Sanctions Order	24-3244 DKT167	Apr 23, 2025
A109	SCOTUS Cover Notice	Ā109	May 16, 2025
A119	DOJ Civil Rights Referral	A119	May 16, 2025
В3	Notice of Final Judgment and Enforcement Intent	B3	May 20, 2025

Case: 24-3244 Document: 139 Filed: 04/16/2025 Pages: 3

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 15, 2025* Decided April 16, 2025

Before

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

No. 24-3244

THOMAS E. CAMARDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

v.

No. 24 CV 50466

ELIZABETH M. WHITEHORN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Iain D. Johnston, *Judge*.

ORDER

Thomas Camarda appeals the judgment dismissing his complaint (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging a state court's child-support order) for lack of subject

^{*} The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

No. 24-3244 Page 2

matter jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the domestic-relations exception. We affirm.

Camarda brought this suit in federal court against the director of the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ("DHFS") and two DHFS employees who oversaw his child-support case. The previous year, an Illinois state court had ordered Camarda to pay child support to his ex-partner. *See Bieber v. Camarda*, No. 2022-D-051802 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 2023). In an amended complaint, he alleged that the defendants, in their individual capacities, unlawfully seized his property by garnishing and levying his bank accounts; deprived him of due process when they failed to provide notice or a hearing before collecting his funds; fined him beyond constitutional limitations; and retaliated against him for asserting his constitutional rights. He also asserted numerous state-law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, and unlawful conversion of property. He sought damages for financial harm, injunctive relief to avoid the levies, and declaratory relief to prevent future collection attempts by DHFS officials.

The district court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed it for both lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court explained that the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction stripped it of jurisdiction to address Camarda's claims concerning the state child-support proceedings. Regardless, the court added, Camarda insufficiently alleged that the defendants personally caused or participated in any constitutional violation. The court relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Camarda filed two post-judgment motions (one for reconsideration and one to clarify the judgment), arguing that the court overlooked evidence of the defendants' interference in his child-support case. The court denied both motions because Camarda did not identify any reason to disturb its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction or that he failed to state a claim.

On appeal, Camarda challenges the dismissal of his amended complaint but does not engage with the district court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction under the domestic-relations exception. Under this exception, federal courts avoid deciding cases involving particular domestic relations matters, see Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307–08 (2006), such as a decree of child support, see Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 1998). State courts, which have developed procedures tailored to core domestic relations matters, are presumed to be more proficient at handling such matters.

Case: 24-3244 Document: 139 Filed: 04/16/2025 Pages: 3

No. 24-3244 Page 3

See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703–04 (1992); Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2007). We agree with the district court that the exception applies here, given that the relief Camarda seeks—damages for financial harm caused by the defendants' collection of child support; injunctive relief to prevent DHFS from collecting child support; and declaratory relief to prevent future enforcement of the state-court proceedings—would encroach on the state court's adjudication of family law matters. See Struck, 508 F.3d at 859–60.

We close with two points. First, Camarda has filed over 100 motions and supplemental filings in our court, even after we warned him—in four separate orders in late 2024 and early 2025—that the barrage of filings could result in sanctions, revocation of his electronic filing privileges, and submission without action from the court. App. Doc. 45, 55, 64, 86; see also Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995); Cir. Operating Proc. R. 1(c)(8). Camarda is ordered to show cause within 14 days why we should not impose sanctions, including fines and a filing bar under Mack, 45 F.3d at 186, for his continued frivolous litigation after these warnings. Second, the district court did not specify whether it dismissed Camarda's claims with or without prejudice. Because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not on the merits, we modify the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. See MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 935 F.3d 573, 581 (7th Cir. 2019).

As modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604



Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov

FINAL JUDGMENT

April 16, 2025

Before

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

	THOMAS E. CAMARDA, Plaintiff - Appellant	
No. 24-3244	v.	
	ELIZABETH M. WHITEHORN, et al., Defendants - Appellees	
Originating Case Info	rmation: 4 4 a	
District Court No: 3:24	-cv-50466	
Northern District of Ill	inois, Western Division	
District Judge Iain D. J	ohnston	

The district court did not specify whether it dismissed Camarda's claims with or without prejudice. Because a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not on the merits, we modify the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. As modified, the judgment is **AFFIRMED**.

The above is in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.

Clerk of Court

Chritish Como

ILND 450 (Rev. 16) AS 9: 43:24 CV: 50466 Document #: 16 Filed: 12/10/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:930 Case: 24-3244 Document: 58 Filed: 02/13/2025 Pages: 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Thomas Camarda,					
Plaintiff(s),	Case No. 3:24-cv-50466 Judge Iain D. Johnston				
v.					
Elizabeth Whitehorn, et al.,					
Defendant(s).					
JUDGMENT	IN A CIVIL CASE				
Judgment is hereby entered (check appropriate box):					
in favor of plaintiff(s) and against defendant(s) in the amount of \$,					
which includes pre-judgment interest. does not include pre-judgment interest.					
Post-judgment interest accrues on that amount at the rate provided by law from the date of this judgment					
Plaintiff(s) shall recover costs from defendant	c(s).				
in favor of defendant(s) and against plaintiff(s)					
Defendant(s) shall recover costs from plaintif	f(s).				
other: Judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against the plaintiff.					
This action was (check one):					
☐ tried by a jury with Judge presiding, and the junction in the junction of tried by Judge without a jury and the above de decided by Judge Iain D. Johnston on a motions for the junction of					
Pate: 12/10/2024 Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk of Court					

\s\Y. Pedroza, Deputy Clerk

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 9, 2025

Before

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

No. 24-3244

THOMAS E. CAMARDA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

ELIZABETH M. WHITEHORN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 3:24-cv-50466

Iain D. Johnston,

Judge.

ORDER

Appellant filed a petition for rehearing *en banc* on April 21, 2025. No judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing *en banc*, and all judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition for rehearing.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc is **DENIED**.

Case: 3:24-cv-50466 Document #: 15 Filed: 12/10/24 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:927

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS CAMARDA,)
Plaintiff,)
v.) No. 24 CV 50466) Judge Iain D. Johnston
ELIZABETH WHITEHORN, DANA KELLY, and KIRAN MEHTA, and JOHN DOE(S) 1-10,	,
in their individual and official capacities,)
Defendants.)

ORDER

The Court previously dismissed plaintiff Thomas Camarda's complaint, and gave him leave to amend to attempt to state claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims the Court had dismissed without prejudice. The Court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice, except for state law claims that the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear in the absence of any remaining federal claims.

Before the Court is Mr. Camarda's amended complaint. Dkt. 9. He has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, Dkt. 12, and his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis remains pending, Dkt. 3. As with his original complaint, because Mr. Camarda is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen the amended complaint and dismiss any part that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Because Mr. Camarda is proceeding *pro se*, the Court will liberally construe his allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Mr. Camarda once again raises claims against defendants Elizabeth Whitehorn, Dana Kelly, and Kiran Mehta, this time in only their individual capacities. He alleges they violated his constitutional rights by unlawfully seizing his property by garnishing and levying his bank accounts, depriving him of procedural due process by failing to provide notice or a hearing, excessively fining him by imposing garnishments and levies that exceed statutory limits, and retaliating against him for asserting his rights. He also raises state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the Uniform Commercial Code. He may also be raising state law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion—he mentions such claims, but they are not the subject of any of his numbered counts.

In support of his procedural due process claim, he alleges that "motions and pleadings were arbitrarily struck by the state court," that his "special appearance to contest jurisdiction was ignored," that the state court "entered a default judgment against Plaintiff without a fair hearing or meaningful opportunity to be heard." Am. Compl. [9] at 6. He further alleges that Defendants relied on "defective and unconstitutional court orders to seize Plaintiff's property through

garnishments, levies, and offsets" that "exceed[ed] consumer protection limits," "ignor[ed] statutory requirements," and threw him "into a financial crisis that spiraled into long-term instability" that has left him "living paycheck to paycheck." *Id.* at 7-8. In a supplement to his amended complaint and in a separately-filed motion for a temporary restraining order, he notes that his tax refund from the IRS has been seized. Dkts. 10 at 1; 12 at 12. He asks for the immediate release of \$3,000 because "the complete financial depletion caused by Defendants has rendered him unable to meet basic needs." Dkt. 13 at 2.

As with his original complaint, Mr. Camarda still fails to allege any specific conduct by each Defendant. An individual is liable under § 1983 only if she personally caused or participated in the constitutional violation alleged. Gonzalez v. McHenry County, Illinois, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022). For Ms. Whitehorn, he alleges only that she "oversaw and directed the enforcement actions" taken against him. Am. Compl. [9] at 6. For Ms. Kelly, he alleges only that she "executed and supervised unconstitutional garnishments and levies." Id. These types of vague allegations are insufficient to give the defendants notice of exactly what Mr. Camarda contends they did that violated his constitutional or any other rights. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009); see Safari Childcare Inc. v. Penny, No. 17 CV 8547, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147943, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2018). For Ms. Mehta, he alleges that she "fabricat[ed] and conceal[ed] evidence in response to Plaintiff's FOIA requests," Am. Compl. [9] at 6, but that is specific only to the Freedom of Information claims the Court previously dismissed with prejudice, and specifies no conduct by Ms. Mehta to support his other claims. He has therefore failed to state claims against these three individuals.

In addition, although Mr. Camarda contends that his claims are limited to Defendants' enforcement of child support orders, not the orders themselves, his allegations make clear that his federal claims all flow from his state court child support proceedings. Indeed, he alleges that "all subsequent enforcement actions" are "'fruit of the poisonous tree," referring to the "Title IV-D court proceedings in Illinois." Id. at 6. In essence he alleges that Defendants' collection of the child support he owes has left him unable to meet his own basic needs, and led him to seek a temporary restraining order to free up \$3,000 "to cover necessary living expenses." Dkt. 13 at 2. But that all goes directly to the amount of child support he owes as determined in the state proceeding. His amended complaint alleges no conduct by Defendants unauthorized by the child support orders entered by the state court. The Court did not reach the issue of the domestic relations exception when screening Mr. Camarda's original complaint, but with the additional information from his amended complaint and supplemental material it does so now, and concludes that his claims are barred by the domestic relations exception. See Dixon v. Rick, No. 19-1138, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31759 (7th Cir. Oct. 23, 2019) (due process and equal protection claims against state employees tasked with enforcing child support orders barred by domestic relations exception).

In his amended complaint, Mr. Camarda anticipates the domestic relations exception by relying on *United States v. Sage*, which he cites as being a decision of the Tenth Circuit from 2021 reported at 992 F.3d 1032. According to Mr. Camarda, under *Sage*, all child support enforcement actions "are subject to federal oversight when they violate constitutional protections or interfere with federal regulations." Am. Compl. [9] at 4. The Court has found no such case. The closest is *United States v. Sage*, a decision of the Second Circuit from 1996 reported at 92

Case: 3:24-cv-50466 Document #: 15 Filed: 12/10/24 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:929

F.3d 101. But it offers Mr. Camarda no support as it addresses the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, a statute which criminalizes the failure to pay child support and which is not at issue in this case.

Accordingly, Mr. Camarda's claims against Defendants brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed both for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. The Court also dismisses the Doe defendants, whose names and conduct have not been alleged. In the absence of any remaining federal claims, the Court again declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims and those are dismissed without prejudice. Mr. Camarda has now had two opportunities to plausibly allege claims against the defendants, the second coming after the Court advised him of the help available from both the Northern District of Illinois' webpage entitled "Information for People without Lawyers," and from the Hibbler Memorial Pro Se Assistance Program. Because it is clear from his amended complaint and supplemental filings that his claims all stem from alleged misconduct in his state court child support proceedings, despite his attempt to distinguish them as misconduct that arose solely during enforcement actions, this case is now terminated. The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] and for a temporary restraining order [12] are denied as moot.

Date: December 10, 2024

By:

Iain D. Johnston
United States District Judge

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.