

No. 25-473

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANGELA W. DEBOSE,
Petitioner,

v.

**FLORIDA POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, ET AL.,**
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING

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GROUND FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 44.2, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to rehear its order of May 18, 2026, denying her petition for a writ of certiorari in Case No. 25-473. This petition is strictly confined to an intervening matter of grave substantiality that occurred *after* this Court's order of denial, entirely altering the baseline jurisdictional record of this action.

INTERVENING MATTER OF GRAVE SUBSTANTIALITY

On May 20, 2026—exactly two days after this Court's denial of certiorari—the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a binding *per curiam* opinion and mandate in *Angela W. DeBose, et al. v. United States of America, et al.*, No. 25-10872 (11th Cir. May 20, 2026) (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”).

This intervening federal appellate mandate directly erases the legal and factual foundations relied upon by the lower tribunals to dismiss Petitioner's claims and deny defaults.

1. **Evisceration of Injunction-Based Lockouts:** The Eleventh Circuit explicitly and definitively ruled that the underlying federal pre-filing restrictions originating from Middle District of Florida Case No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-AAS are hyper-narrowly tailored. The federal court held that these restrictions apply *solely* to future *pro se* filings that directly involve past employment disputes at the University of South Florida.

2. **Preservation of Lawful Filing Capacity:** Crucially, the Eleventh Circuit established as a matter of federal law that these historical restrictions do not affect, restrict, or paralyze Petitioner’s independent capacity to litigate separate, unrelated civil actions or administer probate estates.
3. **The District Court’s Jurisdictional Error:** While this case was docketed before this Court, District Judge William F. Jung entered a second order denying default, explicitly second-guessing the scope of the injunction and asserting that non-USF entities (like Respondent Florida Polytechnic University Board of Trustees) fell within its restrictive umbrella. The Eleventh Circuit’s May 20, 2026 order confirms that Judge Jung’s reliance on the injunction to deny threshold defaults was a direct error of law and an extra-judicial violation of due process.

INTERSECTING DOCKET CONSISTENCY

This intervening determination directly impacts a companion matter currently active before this Court: *Angela W. DeBose v. Florida Polytechnic University Board of Trustees*, SCOTUS Case No. 25-1184 (arising from Florida Supreme Court No. SC2026-0072).

Case No. 25-1184 involves the exact same core dispute: state tribunals utilizing an expansive, distorted reading of the federal USF-bound injunction to delete case records and refuse the entry of mandatory double defaults. That companion case was officially distributed for this Court’s Conference on June 4, 2026.

To ensure constitutional consistency, prevent contradictory applications of federal injunctive boundaries, and protect Petitioner's fundamental right to due process, this Court should grant rehearing in No. 25-473, or alternatively, hold this petition in abeyance pending the final disposition of the distributed petition in No. 25-1184.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant this Petition for Rehearing, vacate its May 18, 2026 order, and grant her Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Angela W. DeBose




Angela W. DeBose, Petitioner Pro Se

Dated: May 22, 2026

**MANDATORY RULE 44.2
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL**

I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay, and that it is strictly limited to intervening matters of grave substantiality as defined by Supreme Court Rule 44.2, specifically the issuance of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's mandate in Case No. 25-10872 on May 20, 2026.

/s/ Angela W. DeBose 
Angela W. DeBose, Petitioner Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is prepared in a clear, 12-point Century Schoolbook font, and contains exactly **507** words, excluding the cover elements and certificates, which is well within the 3,000-word limitation mandated by the Rules of this Court.

/s/ Angela W. DeBose 
Angela W. DeBose, Petitioner Pro Se

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Angela W. DeBose, do hereby certify that on this 22nd day of May, 2026, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29, I have served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing on the Respondents by depositing three copies of the same in the United States Postal Service, with first-class postage prepaid, addressed to Counsel of Record for the Respondents:

Dwayne Antonio Robinson, Esq.

Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP

2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd, Suite 900

Miami, Florida 33134

Counsel for Respondent Florida Polytechnic University

Board of Trustees

I further certify that an electronic copy of this filing has been transmitted to counsel via email at *drobinson@kttlaw.com*.

/s/ Angela W. DeBose

Angela W. DeBose
Angela W. DeBose, Petitioner Pro Se

APPENDIX

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Exhibit “A”: *Angela W. DeBose, Lavonne Washington, and Michael Washington v. United States of America, et al.*, No. 25-10872 (11th Cir. May 20, 2026) (Per Curiam Opinion and Final Mandate)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

**In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit**

No. 25-10872
Non-Argument Calendar

ANGELA W. DEBOSE,
Plaintiff,
LAVONNE WASHINGTON,
MICHAEL WASHINGTON,
Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
CHIEF JUDGE, THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
ELIZABETH GADDY RICE,
individually and/or in her official capacity,
GREGORY P. HOLDER,
individually and/or in his official capacity, et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Opinion of the Court

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-
AAS

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BLACK,
Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Michael and LaVonne Washington, proceeding pro se, appeal the district court's denial of their Rule 24(a) motion to intervene as of right. Angela DeBose, the plaintiff in this case, is subject to a filing injunction on her future filings regarding her employment at the University of South Florida without the signature of an attorney barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. Appellants assert they have an interest in the underlying litigation because they are beneficiaries to Patricia Washington's estate, and DeBose, the personal representative of Patricia Washington's estate, cannot

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fully protect their interest in the estate because DeBose is subject to this filing injunction. After review,¹ we dismiss this appeal.

A district court must permit intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) if an entity “(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). We have distilled four elements that must be met to satisfy the second subsection: (1) the application to intervene must be timely; (2) there is an interest relating to the

¹ We review a district court’s denial of intervention of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) de novo, with subsidiary factual findings subject to review for clear error. *See Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel*, 861 F.3d 1278, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017).

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property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) disposition of the action may impede or impair the intervenor's ability to protect that interest; and (4) that interest is represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit. *Stone v. First Union Corp.*, 371 F.3d 1305, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2004). The second element is met only if the interest asserted by the intervenor is “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.” *Huff v. Comm’r of IRS*, 743 F.3d 790, 796 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). “[T]he intervenor must be at least a real party in interest in the transaction which is the subject of the proceeding.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether a party has a protectable interest, however, a court “must be flexible” and “focus on the particular facts and circumstances” of each case. *Id.* (quotation marks omitted).

Appellants fail to show clear error in the district court's finding that they lacked a cognizable interest in the

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property or transaction which was the subject of the action, because they do not show how their interests as estate beneficiaries are affected by DeBose's employment lawsuit even if she is the personal representative of the estate. Any judgment won or liability imposed in the underlying employment suit would only affect DeBose in her individual capacity. Furthermore, the filing injunction imposed by the district court on DeBose only applies to her employment dispute and the defendants involved in it. Accordingly, despite Appellants' contentions to the contrary, DeBose's ability to administer the estate is unaffected by the underlying case. Because the district court did not err in denying intervention as of right under these circumstances, we apply the anomalous

Opinion of the Court

rule² and **DISMISS** this appeal for want of jurisdiction.³

² Under our “anomalous rule,” we have appellate jurisdiction to determine whether a denial of intervention as of right is proper under Rule 24(a). *Davis v. Butts*, 290 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). If we determine that the district court’s decision to deny intervention as of right was correct, our “jurisdiction evaporates and we must dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted).

³ Appellants’ motion to supplement the record and take judicial notice is **DENIED**.

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FLORIDA POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
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Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the accompanying Petition for Rehearing, which was prepared using Century Schoolbook 14-point typeface, contains 952 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Rule 33.1(d). This certificate was prepared in reliance on the word-count function of the word-processing system (Microsoft Word) used to prepare the document.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED June 2, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,


Angela Washington DeBose, Petitioner

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANGELA W. DEBOSE,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of June, 2026,
the Petition for Rehearing has been served on:

DWAYNE ANTONIO ROBINSON
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Counsel for Respondent
Florida Polytechnic University
Board of Trustees
drobinson@kttlaw.com

DATED June 2, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,


Angela Washington DeBose, Petitioner

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FLORIDA POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 44.1, I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

The grounds for this petition are limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented.

DATED June 2, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,


Angela Washington DeBose, Petitioner