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APPENDIX A

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 24-12505
Non-Argument Calendar

JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY,

Father

L.M.,

a minor, by and through her father, Jean Dominique
Morancy,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SABRINA ALEX SALOMON,

GERALD FRANCIS ZNOSKO,

ANGELA LYNN LAMBIASE,

CARLOS A. OTERO,

KEITH FRANKLIN WHITE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00714-CEM-RMN

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and WILSON, Circuit
Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Jean Dominique Morancy, proceeding
pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his request for
a preliminary injunction in his civil suit.¹ On appeal, he
argues, in part, that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a preliminary
injunction because it failed to support its decision with

¹ We give "liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants,
[but] we nevertheless [require] them to conform to procedural rules."
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

specific factual findings. Because the district court did not apply the wrong law, follow incorrect procedures, or make clearly erroneous factual findings, and because under *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Morancy's case was unlikely to succeed on the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morancy's request for a preliminary injunction. As a result, we affirm.

I.

Morancy filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against many people and institutions involved with his underlying state court dependency proceedings.² He alleged that the various defendants had conspired to commit offenses including fraud, abuse of power, attempted murder, perjury, defamation, legal

² Morancy petitioned in state court in late 2019 to resolve timesharing and child support issues between him and the mother of his minor child.

malpractice, obstruction of justice, and racketeering, in relation to the state court case. The district court dismissed the case under the *Younger* abstention doctrine. Morancy appealed. This court reversed the dismissal for reasons not relevant on appeal but declined to address whether *Younger* abstention applied, instead leaving that question for the district court to address on remand. Morancy amended his complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of mandamus.

The district court denied Morancy's request for a preliminary injunction. The court stated that review of Morancy's second amended complaint and motions raised the issue of whether the district court should abstain under *Younger* because Morancy sought relief from state court decisions. The court noted that all of Morancy's claims related to civil state proceedings and involved

issues of child custody, child support, and paternity. The court concluded that all three Middlesex³ factors for determining abstention were met: (1) that the proceedings constituted an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) that the proceedings implicated an important state interest, and (3) that there was adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. So the court determined that Morancy failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The court denied Morancy's motion and ordered him to show cause as to why his claims seeking injunctive relief should not be dismissed and his claims seeking damages stayed under *Younger*. Morancy filed this interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of his request for a preliminary injunction.

³ *Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n*, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

II.

We review a district court's ruling on a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. *Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc.*, 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004). Similarly, a district court's decision to abstain under *Younger* is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *31 Foster Child. v. Bush*, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). A district court abuses its discretion when "it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making [a] determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." *Klay*, 376 F.3d at 1096.

III.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that

(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs

whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts need not address the other requirements if the movant cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. *Bloedorn v. Grube*, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011).

The *Younger* doctrine “derives from the vital consideration of comity between the state and national governments.” 31 *Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under *Younger* and its progeny, “federal district courts must refrain from enjoining pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” *Old Republic Union Ins. v. Tillis Trucking Co.*, 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997). *Younger* abstention applies to three categories of cases:

(1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,” (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” *Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, whether the case warrants *Younger* abstention is then threefold: (1) do the proceedings constitute “an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) “do the proceedings implicate important state interests,” and (3) “is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” *Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n*, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

The first factor is met when the relief sought by the plaintiff would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. *31 Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1275–76. The

plaintiff's requested relief interferes with the state proceeding if it would disrupt the normal course of action in the state proceeding. *Id.* at 1276.

As to the second factor, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that states "have important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial systems." *Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.*, 481 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1987). Proceedings implicate important state interests when they are necessary for the vindication of vital state policies. *31 Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1274. Domestic relations issues are historically considered important state issues left to the discretion of state courts. *See Moore v. Sims*, 442 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1979) (family relations are an "important" and "traditional area of state concern").

For the third factor, "plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an

adequate remedy for their federal claims.” 31 *Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1279. “A federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant question is “not whether the state courts can do all that Plaintiffs wish they could” but whether the available remedies are adequate. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

IV.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morancy’s request for a preliminary injunction.⁴ The district court here provided both a

⁴ Morancy also requested an evidentiary hearing, and the district court denied the request as moot. While a district court may hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on a preliminary injunction, we have determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), which provides that a preliminary injunction shall only issue after notice to the adverse party, “does not expressly require a

factual background and caselaw and noted that the requirements of the foundational caselaw were met. It properly applied our test for when a preliminary injunction is appropriate and determined that Morancy failed to meet the first prong—a substantial likelihood of success on the merits—because it was barred from considering his claims under *Younger*. Though the district court’s order was brief, it did specifically find that the *Middlesex* factors were met and that *Younger* abstention was warranted.

The district court’s analysis was not clearly erroneous because the instant case directly involves civil state court proceedings in a dependency and child custody case, see *Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.*, 571 U.S. at 78, and it

hearing on every motion for injunctive relief.” *Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.*, 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988). Therefore, to the extent that Morancy argues that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion, he is incorrect.

satisfies all three *Middlesex* factors. *See 31 Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1275–79. The first *Middlesex* factor, requiring ongoing state judicial proceedings in which federal litigation would interfere, is satisfied because Morancy requests the transfer of his state court case to a different state court. *See id.* at 1275. Morancy’s request indicates not only that the state case is ongoing, but also that Morancy explicitly requested intervention in the state proceedings. *See id.* And *Younger* does not, as Morancy appears to argue, apply only where there are pending criminal proceedings. *See id.* At 1274.

The second factor, requiring that the state proceeding implicate important state interests, is satisfied because domestic relations issues have been historically considered a state interest. *See Middlesex*, 457 U.S. at 432; *Moore*, 442 U.S. at 434–35. While Morancy’s second amended complaint arguably raises

federal issues, the underlying state proceedings he seeks to challenge fall squarely within the realm of state interests, and the district court therefore properly concluded that this factor was met. *See Moore*, 442 U.S. at 434–35; *Klay*, 376 F.3d at 1096.

The third factor, requiring adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, is also satisfied because the court may presume that the state proceedings will afford an adequate remedy, and Morancy did not provide any unambiguous authority to the contrary. *See 31 Foster Children*, 329 F.3d at 1279. Morancy's claims about the bias and corruption of various state court actors are irrelevant to the third factor because the third factor is not concerned with questions of substance or equity, but is procedural, and Morancy could raise his due process claims in the state

proceedings. *Johnson v. Florida*, 32 F.4th 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In sum, the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, follow incorrect procedures, or make clearly erroneous factual findings when it found that the three *Middlesex* factors were met and that *Younger* abstention was likely warranted. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morancy's request for a preliminary injunction because he was unlikely to succeed on the merits. *See Forsyth Cnty.*, 633 F.3d at 1039; *Klay*, 376 F.3d at 1096. Because the district court did not err in finding that Morancy failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not consider the other prongs of the preliminary injunction inquiry. *See Bloedorn*, 631 F.3d at 1229. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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APPENDIX B

**In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit**

No. 24-12505

JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY,

Father

L.M.,

**a minor, by and through her father, Jean Dominique
Morancy,**

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SABRINA ALEX SALOMON,

GERALD FRANCIS ZNOSKO,

ANGELA LYNN LAMBIASE,

CARLOS A. OTERO,

KEITH FRANKLIN WHITE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida Calendar
D.C Docket No. 6:23-cv-00714-CEM-RMN

ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND
PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before Rosenbaum, Abudu, and Wilson, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED,
no judge in regular service on the Court having requested
that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc. FRAP 40.
The Petition for Panel Rehearing also is denied. FRAP 40.

APPENDIX C

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION**

JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY

and L.M.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Case No. 6:23-cv-714-CEM-RMN

**SABRINA ALEX SALOMON, GERALD FRANCIS
ZNOSKO, ANGELA LYNN LAMBIASE, CARLOS A.
OTERO, KEITH FRANKLIN WHITE, JOHN DAVID
WILLIAM BEAMER, ELAINE AGNES BARBOUR,
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA,
FLORIDA SIXTH COURT OF APPEAL, ZNOSKO &
REAS, P.A., FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
ANNA ARCENEUX, ALBERT & DONNELLY LLC,
JOHN JOSEPH ALBERT, WANDA MARIE REAS,
OTERO FAMILY LAW P.A., JAY PAUL COHEN,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CHILD
SUPPORT PROGRAM, IRENA MONICO, JUDY
NICHOLSON, DAVID MUGUERCIA, MICHAEL T**

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**DONNELLY, II , TIFFANY MOORE RUSSELL,
REVIVAL PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS
CORPORATION, CHARLES SCHREIBER,
NICHOLAS SHANNIN, SHANNIN LAW FIRM P.A.,
CAROL BRADSHAW SHANNIN, DANIEL E.
TRAVER, and CARRIE ANN WOZNIAK,**

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs¹
Motion for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order and Issuance of Necessary Writs
("Motion," Doc. 138), to which Defendants Elaine Agnes
Barbour, John David William Beamer, Jay Paul Cohen,
Florida Attorney General, Florida Sixth District Court of
Appeal, Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, Charles
Schreiber, Daniel E. Traver, Keith Franklin White, and
Carrie Ann Wozniak filed a response, (Doc. 148), and

¹ For convenience, Plaintiffs Jean Dominique Morancy and L.M. will be collectively referred to as "Plaintiff."

Defendant Florida Department of Revenue - Child Support Program filed a response, (Doc. 161). Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing Related to the Motion for the Preliminary Injunction/TRO ("Request for Hearing," Doc. 159). As set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion will be denied and the Request for Hearing will be denied as moot.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must sufficiently establish that "(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest." *Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Siegel v. LePore*, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). "A preliminary injunction,

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moreover, ‘is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.’” *Llovera v. Florida*, 576 F. App’x 894, 896 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting *Forsyth Cnty.*, 633 F.3d at 1039).

Plaintiff seeks relief from state court decisions. Plaintiff requests this Court enjoin Florida Department of Revenue - Child Support Program from garnishing Plaintiff’s wages; grant child custody in his favor; and transfer the paternity case from the Ninth Judicial Circuit to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, among other forms of relief. (See Doc. 138 at 14–15; see also Doc. 117 at 94–99). Review of the Motion and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 117), thus raised concerns whether this Court should abstain pursuant to *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

The *Younger* abstention doctrine “requires a federal court to abstain where a plaintiff’s federal claims

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could be adjudicated in a pending state judicial proceeding.” *Deakins v. Monaghan*, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). “The Supreme Court has recognized only three types of state proceedings where abstention is warranted: (1) criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ . . . judicial functions.” *Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy*, 61 F.4th 902, 907–08 (11th Cir. 2023). All Plaintiff’s claims relate to civil state proceedings, with at least one count directly referencing the actions of legal counsel at the state level and state court judges. (Doc. 117 at 26–51). Furthermore, the proceedings involve issues of child custody, child support, and paternity, which fall under the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. *Marshall v. Marshall*, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (“[O]nly ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’ remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds.”).

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“[F]ederal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation rights, establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.” *Ingram v. Hayes*, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988). Therefore, this state proceeding is covered by the third category discussed in *Leonard*.

The Court must then ask three questions before determining abstention is warranted: “first, do the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do [the proceedings] implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” 31 *Foster Children v. Bush*, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc.*, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). If the answer to those inquiries is “yes,” then federal courts must abstain from intervention in the

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ongoing, state court proceedings. It appears that all three of these factors are met here. Therefore, Plaintiff has also not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

Accordingly, it is **ORDERED** and **ADJUDGED** as follows:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order and Issuance of Necessary Writs (Doc. 138) is **DENIED**.

2. Plaintiff's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing Related to the Motion for the Preliminary Injunction/TRO (Doc. 159) is **DENIED as moot**.

3. On or before August 19, 2024, 2024, Plaintiff shall **SHOW CAUSE** in writing as to why the claims requesting injunctive relief should not be dismissed and the claims seeking damages stayed pursuant to the *Younger* abstention doctrine. **Failure to do so will**

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**result in the dismissal and stay of the claims
without further notice.**

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on
July 31, 2024.

/S/ CARLOS E. MENDOZA

**CARLOS E. MENDOZA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

APPENDIX D

← Back



...



RE: TRIAL RESET - 2019DR16766 MORANCY V SALOMON

Yahoo!/Inbox ☆



Bratek-Cohen, Christine

From: ctjacbz@ocnjcc.org

To: Angela Lambiase, Jennie Morrison, Gerald Znosko, Morancy, Jean Dominique



Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 2:58 PM

▲ This message contains blocked images. Show images or Always show images

The trial has been reset via order. An order will be efiled shortly.

ATTENTION: DIVISION 29 IS NO LONGER USING IACS. WE HAVE FULLY TRANSITIONED TO USING AI CALENDAR. Please be sure to use the AI Calendar to look for available hearing time, which can be found on Judge Barbour's page online. For your convenience, I have provided links below for AI Calendar and a User Guide.

AI Calendar Division 29: <https://aicalendar.ocnjcc.net/Calendar/Orange/1513>

AI User Guide: <https://ninthcircuit.org/sites/default/files/2023-05/aiCALENDAR-User%20Guide-Attorney.pdf>

Any Emergency Matters from the Clerk should include a Copy of the Motion as well as indicate "Emergency" in the Subject Line of your email to include case number and style.

Please remember that the Judge's office cannot receive EX-PARTE communications from anyone. You MUST always copy ALL parties on ANY and ALL emails, correspondence and or communications with this office.

Thank you and have a wonderful day!
Christine T. Bratek-Cohen
Judicial Assistant to Judge Elaine A. Barbour
Domestic Relations Division 29
Orange County Courthouse
425 N Orange Avenue, Orlando, FL 32801
Courtroom 19C
Office: 407-836-2342
ctjacb2@ocnjcc.org
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Facebook, Instagram, Twitter: @NinthCircuitFL

Judge Elaine A. Barbour's webpage:
[Elaine A. Barbour | Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida \(ninthcircuit.org\)](http://Elaine.A.Barbour.NinthJudicialCircuitCourtofFlorida.ninthcircuit.org)

Please refer to **Orange County Division 29 Procedures** here:
[Div-29-Procedures.pdf \(ninthcircuit.org\)](http://Div-29-Procedures.pdf(ninthcircuit.org))

Please refer to **Administrative Order No. 2014-19 when setting hearings:**
<https://www.ninthcircuit.org/sites/default/files/AO-2014-19.pdf>

Hearing times for Orange County Domestic Relations Division 29:
Please refer to ACalendar for available dates and times.


From: Angela Lambiase <ALambiase@znoskoreas.com>
Sent: Monday, July 31, 2023 2:14 PM

To: Bratek-Cohen, Christine <cjbac2@ocnjcc.org>; Jennie Morrison <JMorrison@znoskoreas.com>; Gerald Znosko <GZnosko@znoskoreas.com>; Morancy, Jean Dominique <ubmojedo@yahoo.com>
Subject: RE: TRIAL RESET - 2019DR16766 MORANCY V SALOMON

Received. We are good with August 14th at 9:00 a.m.

Kind Regards,

Angela Lambiase, Esq.



NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY & DISCLAIMER: This e-mail and any attachments are covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510-2521, is CONFIDENTIAL, may be ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED and/or ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT and exempt from disclosure under applicable law, and is intended only for the use of the addressee. Any unauthorized use, disclosure, distribution, dissemination, or copying is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not the intended recipient, you are prohibited from any further viewing of the e-mail or any attachments or from making any use of the e-mail or attachments. If you believe you have received this e-mail in error, notify us immediately and permanently delete the e-mail, any attachments, and all copies thereof from any drives or storage media and destroy any printouts of the e-mail or attachments and any copies of such printouts.

From: Bratek-Cohen, Christine <cjbac2@ocnjcc.org>
 Sent: Monday, July 31, 2023 1:21 PM
 To: Jennie Morrison <JMorrison@znoskoreas.com>; Gerald Znosko <GZnosko@znoskoreas.com>; Angela Lambiasi <ALambiasi@znoskoreas.com>; Morancy, Jean Dominique <ubmojedo@yahoo.com>
 Subject: TRIAL RESET - 2019DR16766 MORANCY V SALOMON
 Importance: High

Good afternoon,

The trial set for August 4th at 9 am will need to be reset to August 14th at 9 am. Please confirm receipt of this email and your availability.

ATTENTION: DIVISION 29 IS NO LONGER USING JACS. WE HAVE FULLY TRANSITIONED TO USING AI CALENDAR. Please be sure to use the AI Calendar to look for available hearing time, which can be found on Judge Barbour's page online. For your convenience, I have provided links below for AI Calendar and a User Guide.

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Please remember that the Judge's office cannot receive EX-PARTE communications from anyone. You **MUST** always copy ALL parties on ANY and ALL emails, correspondence and or communications with this office.

Thank you and have a wonderful day!

Christine T. Bratek-Cohen

Judicial Assistant to Judge Elaine A. Barbour

Domestic Relations Division 29

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Filed By:	Charles Schreiber
Phone #:	(850) 414-3300
On Behalf of:	Defendants

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Office of the Attorney General
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Notice of Appeal.pdf

186 kB

APPENDIX F

6th District Court of Appeal SERVICE OF COURT DOCUMENT Case Number 6D2023-3456
 JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY VS SABRINA ALEX SALOMON

Yahoo/Inbox ☆



From: court-service-noreply@flcourts.gov
 To: ubmojado@yahoo.com



Fri, Aug 2, 2024 at 12:48 PM ☆

C-Track CMS

Notice of Service of Court Documents

Filing Information: 6th District Court of Appeal

Case Number: 6D2023-3456

Case Style: JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY VS SABRINA ALEX SALOMON

Clerk of Court

**IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
 SIXTH DISTRICT**

August 2, 2024

JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY
 APPELLANT(S)

CASE NO.: 6D2023-3456
L.T. NO.: 2019-DR-016766

V.

SABRINA ALEX SALOMON
 APPELLEE(S)

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Appellee's motion to relinquish jurisdiction, dated November 2, 2023, and renewed on February 6, 2024, is granted. This matter is relinquished to the trial court for forty-five days for the trial court to vacate its final judgment dated September 14, 2023, and enter any necessary and appropriate relief. The Court notes the final disposition of the writ petitions filed in 6D23-1323 and 6D23-1677, which were pending at the time the trial court entered its final judgment. Counsel for Appellee shall file a status report within thirty days of this order to apprise this Court of the trial court proceedings. In the interim, this matter is abated.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original court order.

6D2023-3456 August 2, 2024

 Stacey Pectol
 Clerk



cc:

ANGELA L. LAMBIASE, ESQ.
 JEAN DOMINIQUE MORANCY
 TIFFANY RUSSELL, CLERK

NICHOLAS A. SHANNIN, ESQ.
 GERALD F. ZNOSKO, ESQ.

