


25 -1407



No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child/(ren)
of: C.R. and J.R., Parents I, II

Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child,
Petitioner, v. Charles Webber, Respondent

*On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joseph Daryll Rued; Scott
Rued; Leah Rued
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Pro Se Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

In three actions related to the same factual circumstances, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has taken action fundamentally based upon the Minnesota Judiciary's demonstrable fraud asserting the admitted perjury and fraud of Minnesota County CPS agency conclusions and determinations have been litigated when the Minnesota Judiciary has systematically prevented the litigation of such to deny access to state child maltreatment laws, deprive numerous protected parental/individual rights, and impose fines upon a citizen for seeking to address such undetermined frauds causing irreparable harms.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:

Do these Appellate Court applications of Minn. Stat. §260C.141 to inhibit enforcement and access to child maltreatment laws violate Constitutional requirements, including equal protections through invidiously discriminating against persons with a non-abusive parent or subject to custody determinations?

Are Fourteenth Amendment requirements binding upon state appellate court actions in non-criminal proceedings that sustain or further deprivations of citizens', including children's, protected rights and interests necessitating fulfillment of fundamental fairness and process due?

Does the Supremacy Clause require state appellate courts to construct and apply the law and effect factual determinations in concert with Fourteenth Amendment requirements, including within constraints of equal protections?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Joseph Rued (also J.R., a person and father), also o/b/o W.O.R., a person, minor child, and son, is a Petitioner in *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child, v. Charles Webber* (A25-0362), and *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child/(ren) of: C.R. and J.R. I* (A25-0935) and *II* (A25-1150), and S.D.R., who is Scott Rued, and L.J.R., who is Leah Rued, persons and grandparents, are Petitioners in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child/(ren) of: C.R. and J.R., I* (A25-0935) and *II* (A25-1150).

Respondent in *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child, v. Charles Webber* (A25-0362) is Charles Webber, a person that is also a state judicial officer. Respondent in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C.R. and J.R. (I)* (A25-0935) is C.M.R., who is Catrina Rued, a person and mother. Respondents in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: C.R. and J.R. (II)* (A25-1150) are C.M.R., who is Catrina Rued, also C.R., a person and mother, and Scott County Human Services, an executive department of Scott County overseen by the State Agency Minnesota Department of Children, Youth, and Families.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

- *Joseph D. Rued v. Catrina M. Rued*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 22-702
- *In Re the Marriage of Catrina Rued and Joseph Rued*, Minnesota Court of Appeals Nos. A21-0798; A21-1064; A22-0812; A23-0715
- *Joseph Daryll Rued and on Behalf of minor child W.O.R and Catrina Marie Rued, et al*, Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A22-0593
- *Joseph Daryll Rued and on Behalf of minor child W.O.R and Catrina Marie Rued, et al*, Hennepin County Court No. 70-FA-21-13336
- *In Re the Marriage of Catrina Rued and Joseph Rued*, Minnesota Court No. 27-FA-16-6330
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al* Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-24-4238
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber* Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-24-7810
- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 23-CV-02685
- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 23-CV-03092

- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 23-986
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al*, Hennepin County District Court No. 27-CV-24-5845; Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-3662 (JWB/DJF)
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A24-1740; A25-0057
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber*, Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court Nos. A24-1706; A24-2035
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al*, Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court Nos. A24-1705; A24-1905
- *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1620
- *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al I*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-2437 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1623
- *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al II*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-3409 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1651

- Rued, et al, v. Judge Charlene Hatcher, et al, Minnesota District Court No. 25-CV-0468 (JRT/ECW) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1614
- *In re Rued, et al I*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1593
- *In re Rued, et al II*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1594
- *In re Rued, et al III*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1597
- *In re Rued, et al IV*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1598
- *Rued, et al, v. Jayswal, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 25-CV-3333 (PJS/DLM)
- *Rued, et al, v. Jayswal, et al*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 25A571
- *Rued, et al v. Harris, et al*, Middle District of Florida District Court No. 2:26-cv-01060 JES-NPM
- *Rued, et al v. Harris, et al*, District of Columbia District Court No. 1:26-cv-01258

Related Cases

- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*. Supreme Court of the United States No. 23A829

- *Joseph Rued v. Commissioner of Human Services*, Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A22-1420; Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A25-0831
- *Joseph Rued v. Commissioner of Human Services*, Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-22-7318
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner* Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A23-0044; A23-1754; A24-0759; A24-0982
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner* Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-1754; A23-1755; A23-1936; A24-0719 A24-0759; A24-0982
- *In Re Petitioners Scott Rued and Joseph Rued, In Re Complaint Against 041423, A Minnesota Attorney*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-1004
- *In Re Complaint Against 041423, A Minnesota Attorney*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-0614
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*, Hennepin County District Court No. 27-JV-18-5395
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*,

Hennepin County District Court No. 27-JV-25-1195

- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C.M.R. and J.D.R.*, Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A25-1175
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*, Scott County District Court No. 70-JV-25-7699
- *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 25-420

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Orders below are of the Minnesota Court of Appeals ("MCOA") in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child[/ (ren)] of: C.R. and J.R., Parents I* (A25-0935) (App.-10-), *Joseph Daryll Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber* (A25-0362) (App.-16-), *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: C.R. and J.R., Parents II* (A25-1150) (App.-23-), which were all Petitioned for Further Review ("PFR") at the Minnesota Supreme Court ("MSC") and denied.

JURISDICTION

Petitioners timely PFR with MSC (App.-25-; -83-; -152-) for review of MCOA Orders issued October 8, 2025 in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child[/ (ren)] of: C.R. and J.R., Parents I* (A25-0935) (App.-10-), which was denied November 14, 2025 (App.-7-) and Judgement entered on November 20, 2025 (App.-1-), September 18, 2025 in *Joseph Daryll Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber* (A25-0362) (App.-16-), which was denied November 26, 2025 (App.-8-) and Judgement entered December 19, 2025 (App.-3-), and November 12, 2025 in *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: C.R. and J.R., Parents II* (A25-1150) (App.-152-), which was denied December 19, 2025 (App.-9-) and Judgement entered December 26, 2025 (App.-5-). Petitioners timely filed Petition for Writ of Certiorari within 90 days denial of further review by the highest court and the Clerk returned Petitioners' Petition with directives and requiring Petitioners to refile within 60 days of March 11, 2026, which Petitioners have fulfilled. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a). U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 12.4 is invoked for review of multiple orders from the same court. 28 U.S.C.

§2403(b) may apply. Petitioners have made notifications required under Rule 29.4(c).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Art. VI §2, 3

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.

U.S. Const. Amend. I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §1

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Minnesota Constitution Art. III

Section 1. Division of powers. The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution.

Minnesota Statute §260C.141, subdivision 1(b)

A petition for a child in need of protection filed by an individual who is not a county attorney or an agent of the commissioner of children, youth, and families shall be filed on a form developed by the state court administrator and provided to court administrators. Copies of the form may be obtained from the court administrator in each county. The court administrator shall review the petition before it is filed to determine that it is completed. The court administrator may reject the petition if it does not indicate that the petitioner has contacted the responsible social services agency.

An individual may file a petition under this subdivision without seeking internal review of the responsible social services agency's decision. The court shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a need for protection or services exists before the matter is set for hearing. If the matter is set for hearing, the court administrator shall notify the responsible social services agency by sending notice to the county attorney.

The petition must contain:

- (1) a statement of facts that would establish, if proven, that there is a need for protection or services for the child named in the petition;
- (2) a statement that petitioner has reported the circumstances underlying the petition to the responsible social services agency, and protection or services were not provided to the child;
- (3) a statement whether there are existing juvenile or family court custody orders or pending proceedings in juvenile or family court concerning the child;
- (4) a statement of the relationship of the petitioner to the child and any other parties; and
- (5) a statement whether the petitioner has inquired of the parent or parents of the child, the child, and relatives about the child's heritage, including the child's Tribal lineage pursuant to section 260.761 and the child's race, culture, and ethnicity pursuant to section 260.63, subdivision 10.

The court may not allow a petition to proceed under this paragraph if it appears that the sole purpose of the petition is to modify custody between the parents.

Minn. Stat. §260E.01

The legislature hereby declares that the public policy of this state is to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through maltreatment. While it is recognized that most parents want to keep their children safe, sometimes circumstances or conditions interfere with their ability to do so. When this occurs, the health and safety of the children must be of paramount concern. Intervention and

prevention efforts must address immediate concerns for child safety and the ongoing risk of maltreatment and should engage the protective capacities of families. In furtherance of this public policy, it is the intent of the legislature under this chapter to:

- (1) protect children and promote child safety;
- (2) strengthen the family;
- (3) make the home, school, and community safe for children by promoting responsible child care in all settings, including through the reporting of child maltreatment;
- (4) provide protective, family support, and family preservation services when appropriate; and
- (5) provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or permanent home environment for maltreated children.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Underlying factual circumstances of these three cases are, materially, the same, known to this Court (e.g., 25-420), and well known by the Minnesota Judiciary ("TMJ") and the Minnesota Attorney General ("TMAG"), along with Defendants/Respondents. A25-0362 is an appellate proceedings in which Joseph Rued ("Rued"/"Petitioner"), also on behalf of W.O.R., a minor child ("Petitioner"), sought enforcement of protected rights unlawfully deprived and infringed through reliance upon admitted fraud and perjury of Hennepin County Child Protective Services ("HCCPS") child welfare investigations. A25-0935/A25-1150 are appellate proceedings regarding Child In Need of Protection or Services ("CHIPS") Petitions filed by

Scott ("Scott") and Leah ("Leah") Rued ("Petitioners"), which were joined and supported by Rued and W.O.R., that were dismissed—Minnesota's Public Policy regarding child maltreatment is Minn. Stat. §260E.01.

I. ESSENTIAL UNDERLYING FACTUAL ISSUES

**[HC]CPS...FILED AN ADMITTEDLY
PERJURIOUS AND FRAUDULENT
CHIPS PETITION REGARDING W.O.R.
TO REMOVE W.O.R. FROM HIS
FATHER'S CARE AND ISOLATE HIM
WITH HIS ABUSERS, DESPITE W.O.R.'S
REPORTS AND EVIDENCES OF ABUSE
AND NEGLECT, WHICH THE FALSIFIED
CHIPS PETITION ASSERTED DID NOT
EXIST[]**

[]Jaykumar Jayswal [{"Jayswal"}], of [HC]CPS, filed a CHIPS Petition regarding W.O.R., which...was granted, resulting in W.O.R. being placed in Catrina Rued's [{"Catrina"}] sole care and...Rued's custody and other rights being removed....[The] Petition was dismissed in August 2019 with...Rued's rights being reinstated...[Jayswal's]...CHIPS Petition's [{"JCP's"}] material allegations against...Rued...follow[s], all of which...[Jayswal] has admitted under oath are untrue[]:

- Rued made allegations of abuse and maltreatment of W.O.R. while in the care of Catrina...that were false;

- There was no evidence to support...Rued's allegations of abuse of W.O.R.[];
- There was no evidence of medical diagnosis to support...Rued's allegations of medical neglect of W.O.R.[];
- As a result of these allegations against...Rued, [JCP] alleged that W.O.R. was without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care for his physical or mental health or morals because...Rued was unable or unwilling to provide that care, W.O.R. was without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of...Rued, and W.O.R. is a child whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to W.O.R. or others...and juvenile court agreed such allegations were sufficient to grant [JCP], remove W.O.R. from...Rued's care and custody, and to place W.O.R. solely in Catrina[]'s care.

[]Rued deposed...Jayswal...[who]...admitted:

- [A]llegations that...Rued made allegations of abuse and maltreatment of W.O.R. in Catrina[]'s care that were false...are not true and totally incorrect...[and]...there is evidence...supporting...Rued's allegations...W.O.R. was abused,

maltreated, and neglected in Catrina[]'s care, contrary to the material allegations in [JCP], as follows with Answers ("A")...from Jayswal[]:

Q: [JCP] states, "There have been false allegations made against...[Catrina]...and her other children, Child 2 and Child 3 over the last two years which has been investigated and never founded." Is there a difference between a false and an unfounded allegation?

A: Can you clarify the question?

Q: []You've stated that these accusations made by...Rued were false[,]...[y]et we've talked multiple times here about numerous allegations [W.O.R.] made, not just to...Rued[,] [Scott, Leah, and others], but also to you; is that right?

A: Yes.[]

Q: On page 5 of your...[CHIPS Petition] it states..."This behavior [(Rued reporting and documenting W.O.R.'s maltreatment)] has been ongoing despite professionals concluding that there is no evidence of any such abuse or medical diagnosis of dietary restrictions." Do you see that?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it true that there was no evidence of any abuse?

A: I don't believe there was.

Q: Any evidence of abuse? Hadn't [W.O.R.] made multiple reports to you?

A: Yes.[]

Q: And he made those disclosures multiple times to you, right?

A: Correct.

Q: He also made them to CornerHouse, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And then you'd gotten multiple reports from reporters that there had been sexual abuse, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: So to say that there was no evidence of any such abuse is just totally incorrect, isn't it?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, following along there, [JCP] also indicates there was no evidence of a medical diagnosis of dietary restrictions [to dairy]. But there had been hadn't there?

A: Yes.

Q: So to again say that there was no evidence of a medical diagnosis is just not true, is it?

A: Yes.[]

- [JCP]'s allegations...that...Rued's reports of W.O.R.'s abuse and maltreatment in Catrina[]'s care have caused W.O.R. to not be able to love or be around his half-siblings are not true:

Q: Now, you allege in this petition...[Rued's]...allegations "have caused the reporter to be extremely concerned that [W.O.R.] is now harboring ill feelings towards...[Catrina] and [half-siblings]; and that [W.O.R.] feels [W.O.R.] is not able to love them or be around them."...did [W.O.R.] say that to you?

A: I don't believe he did.[]

Q: And what did you observe about [W.O.R.'s] interactions with [half-siblings]?

A: They were playful. They got along.
They were nice to each other.[]

[JCP] allegations that...Rued's reports that W.O.R. was maltreated in Catrina Rued's care are false...are necessary for his...Petition to [facially] comport with state law given civil and criminal immunity for reporters of child maltreatment, as...Rued, W.O.R., and Petitioners here all are (Minn. Stat. §[260E.34). All material allegations against...Rued in [JCP] are admitted by Jayswal, under oath, to be untrue, which renders this...Petition definitional perjury under state law (Minn. Stat. §[609.48 subd. 1 and subd. 3).

[JCP] also makes numerous other assertions that are demonstrably untrue with respect to the evidence in Jayswal's investigation[.]...identif[ying] assertions from Anne Gearity that she is concerned W.O.R. may be "brainwashed" [to report abuse]..., but...Gearity provided Jayswal a letter admitting Gearity had no support or basis to believe W.O.R. was "brainwashed" and the information she did have could not support such assertions[]—[]Jayswal did not amend his...Petition so that it did not contain false allegations intentioned to be used against...Rued to deprive Constitutionally protected rights, including custody, which is also a crime under state law given Jayswal's...Petition is...affecting child-custody rights and definitionally informs another

person of numerous allegations against...Rued that Jayswal is aware are untrue (Minn. Stat. § 609.507).

[JCP] also asserted that Ryan Kuffel, an Eden Prairie Police Officer[], asserted CornerHouse had reason to believe W.O.R. was coached to disclose abuse....However,...the evidence...from CornerHouse's [October 3, 2018 records] provided affirmative evidence that W.O.R. could not have been coached to report abuse because W.O.R. refused to name his private parts..., which Kuffel, CPS, CornerHouse, and the Hennepin County Attorney were aware of....The investigators were also in possession of...a...multi-year...evaluation that determined the evidence supported that W.O.R. was *not* coached to disclose abuse, relying upon CornerHouse's...records[].

[JCP] also omits significant information regarding the evidence in Jayswal's [investigations]—Jayswal...admitted...W.O.R. reported sexual abuse to him on multiple occasions, in addition to having reported abuse at CornerHouse... Had Jayswal included this most essential evidence from his investigations..., the...Petition would be self-defeating...[given]...assertions...there is no evidence *whatsoever* supporting...Rued's reports of W.O.R.'s maltreatment and abuse[, which] CPS and law enforcement...directed...Rued...to report...under threat of being charged...for not doing so:

Q: Did [W.O.R.] ever disclose to you that he was sexually abused?

A: I **believe** he did.[]

Q: []If we look at the bottom there, I believe this is the interview at CornerHouse on October 26 of 2018; is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: And that was the same disclosure he had made to you, wasn't it?

A: Yes.[]

Q: []And what did [W.O.R.] disclose to CPI Higgins on November 24th, 2018?

A: Are you referring to the contact of 11/24/2018[]?

Q: Yeah....Didn't [W.O.R.] disclose...[abuse occurring in Catrina's care]]?

A: Yeah.[]

[F]orensic psychologists have reviewed W.O.R.'s interview[s, including] from October 26, 2018 as a part of their determinations that there is no evidence to support that W.O.R. was ever coached to disclose abuse[], although there are expert determinations that *there is evidence*

that W.O.R. was coached by Catrina Rued to not disclose abuse]. Reviewing [CornerHouse's] interview of W.O.R...is deeply disturbing. As an interviewer of a young sexual abuse victim, [CornerHouse's interviewer,]Weigman[,] demonstrated neither interest in understanding nor ability to reasonably try to understand W.O.R.—[CornerHouse] interrupted W.O.R. in the middle of disclosures of abuse, told W.O.R. she does not believe him regarding abuse W.O.R. reported to her, and tried, very unsuccessfully, to frame...Rued for coaching W.O.R., through repeated leading questions..., which only produced affirmative evidence contrary to [CornerHouse]'s obvious intent.

[CornerHouse]'s actual transcript demonstrates...representations...regarding W.O.R.'s CornerHouse interview, made...two-weeks after the interview, were falsified and fraudulent. Additionally, every expert that has reviewed the actual evidence...has determined that W.O.R. does not suffer source monitoring issues and there is no evidence that he ever has..., and assertions...[otherwise]...are unreasonable given his age and level of intellect[.].

**SCOTT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
[("SCCPS")], [HCFC] AND [TMJ]
HAVE...FUNDAMENTALLY...RELIED
UPON...ADMITTED PERJURY AND
FRAUD IN [HCCPS]' INVESTIGATIONS
AND [JCP] TO ISOLATE W.O.R. WITH
HIS ABUSERS AND DEPRIVE W.O.R.'S**

RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FATHER AND
 PATERNAL FAMILY...ABSENT
 ALLOWING FOR OR PROVIDING
 REQUISITE DUE PROCESS AND
 WITHOUT [WITNESS] TESTIMONY OR
 EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT, OR IS NOT
 BASED UPON, ADMITTED FRAUD...
 RESULTING IN MALTREATMENT,
 NEGLECT, ENDANGERMENT, AND
 EMOTIONAL TERRORISM OF W.O.R.,
 INCLUDING ON THE SAME BASES
 ALLEGED IN JCP]

In...[HCFC]...custody trial,...Rued
 submitted Jayswal's and Kuffel's
 depositions[]—[HCFC] reviewed such
 depositions and excluded them from evidence.
 Rued subpoenaed Kuffel and Jayswal to testify.
 Kuffel contacted...Rued's attorney asking to not
 testify, which is understandable because Kuffel
 ha[d] made [unsupportable and] false
 allegations of child maltreatment against
 Rued...[Shortly thereafter, HCFC] issued an
 order dictating...witnesses...Rued was allowed
 to call and the order in which...Rued could call
 his witnesses, claiming Kuffel and Jayswal
 were not essential[]. [HCFC] did this outside of
 the record[], knowing what [investigator's]
 deposition
 admissions...demonstrated,...[and]...did not
 explicitly rely on [JCP]. Accordingly, such
 perjury admissions were not generally available
 to be addressed within initial direct
 review...[and since have not been]...considered
 due to assertions...of relitigating which are
 definitionally and fraudulently based on

presumptions that such admissions were included in [HCFC]'s initial proceedings[, absent any, much less full or fair, opportunity to litigate].[]

While the initial appeal of [HCFC's] custody order was pending, W.O.R. continued suffering, reporting, and exhibiting abuse in Catrina[]'s care, which W.O.R. began writing down in August 2021 so what he was reporting could not be lied about[, including]:

- [XXXX,] touches [XXXX] many times[—he XXXX.] After he says don't tell anyone. [He] does this in many rooms at mom's white house[.] I hate it.[]
- My mom makes me eat foods that makes me sick[.] She knows food she makes me eat makes...me sick. I tell her it makes me sick and she makes me [eat it.]
- When I eat dairy I get a stuffy nose and stomach ache[, scratchy throat[, and] hives[.] My mom lies.[]
- Mom and [XXXX] hurt my nails. They each do it to me alone[—]mom...clips my nails[, holds me down[, and] shoves my nails she cut off under my toe nails[.] I say stop and she does not. I cry a lot because it hurts[.] My mom has done this to me in the white house in Shakapee...many times[.]

- Catrina threatens me about talking about the bad stuff that happens at my mom['s house by telling me that I [will] never see my dad again[if I do.] This is very scary and the scariest thing in my life[.] By [W.O.R.].[]
- [XXXX] does bad touches to me[—XXXX] are where he does bad touches with fingers, both clothes on and off[.] This has happened at mom['s house[]

Rued sought an OFP based upon W.O.R.'s disclosures, which was granted and proceeded to trial, overseen by Judge...Webber[]— []Barbosa submitted an affidavit, herself, as Catrina[]'s and her non-joint [child]'s attorney in the proceeding, and presented [JCP] that Barbosa knew was admitted perjury and untrue, claiming the falsified CHIPS Petition was true and reliable...Webber stated he would not rely upon an affidavit from an attorney in the proceeding and would only rely upon testimony in the hearing unless something was admitted another way under...Rules[]. Webber never admitted [JCP]...and neither Jayswal nor Barbosa [testified].

W.O.R. testified...to the abuse he suffered...consistent with his writings of the abuse perpetrated upon him, specifically testifying: (1) to the sexual abuse by his half-sibling, physical abuse by Catrina[]'s...first ex-husband...and to medical neglect by Catrina Rued[]; (2) that he came up with his writings on his own and wrote what he did because it is the

truth;...(3) that he needs to stay with his father because of all of the abuse he has told [Webber] about[; (4)]...that his abusers threaten him that if he tells anyone about the abuse that he will not be able to see his father, and such is the scariest thing in W.O.R.'s life. [Despite lack of notice, Webber dismissed the proceeding prior to receiving rebuttal evidence with the only evidence relied upon being Jayswal's admitted perjury.] Rued...informed...Webber that his order relied upon admitted perjury, but...Webber declined to consider [such], so the issue was not available to be addressed on direct appeal. Subsequently, [MCOA] affirmed [HCFC]'s orders in explicit reliance upon [Jayswal's] admittedly perjurious...[Petition] and affirmed Webber's order in reliance upon...affirmance of HCFC's orders...[and], again, explicitly relying upon [Jayswal's] admittedly perjurious [Petition]. -297-332-.

See App.-294-375- for complete information regarding the Minnesota Government's, especially TMJ's, horrific maltreatment of W.O.R. due to flagrant and willful violations of Constitutional requirements.

a. A25-0362

After dismissing Plaintiffs' claims seeking relief from fraud and enforcement of Constitutional requirements, Judge Castro ("Castro"), under Chief Justice Hudson's appointment, ordered Rued to show cause for why he should not be sanctioned for seeking to address irreparable harms unlawful acts of relying upon JCP absent due process causes Rued and W.O.R. Rued appeared, providing the following:

[RUED: [I object to the proceeding on numerous grounds....I...filed for more definition regarding where exactly this Court and...[TMAG]...believed...Plaintiffs[] claims had been reached, which also plays into an objection I have for lack of notice. Because...I don't know where these claims purportedly have been reached or where the admissions of...Jayswal regarding [JCP] and [HCCPS] investigations have ever been reached[—]that's the basis of the claims...and if those issues have never been reached, I have a hard time understanding under general due process principles and general state law principles for preclusion..., however...it may be applied[—]the issues haven't been litigated, allowed to be litigated appropriately, or reached by any Court and that includes not just state...but...federal court[s—]the Court has concluded that federal and state courts...reached these issues, and I asked the Court to for clarification prior to this hearing[—w]here the Court...and...[TMAG]...believed...these issues have been reached, which I still don't have...[M]y argument is...simple[—]if these issues haven't been reached, I have a very difficult time understanding how these issues could be presented frivolously....[O]rders...appear to relate, but fundamentally they all are based upon initial trial orders in...[HCFC] which did not allow the evidence into the record...And...all...orders that follow and rely on...[HCFC]...sustain...[and further]...those due process violations...I did call [and

subpoenaed]...Jayswal as a witness...[HCFC]
 forbid me from calling him...and from litigating
 the issue which is...known...by all parties here.
 App.-385-387-/-392-393-[XXXX]

Castro determined the above "provided no reasonable explanation" for litigation—Rued appealed and MCOA affirmed on the basis that "our state and federal courts have determined that the issues [related to Jayswal's perjury admissions] have no merit" (App.-20-). These quotations are to Castro's declaration in an order. Rued still has no awareness where anything related to Jayswal's perjury admissions have even been mentioned by any court, much less litigated and determined—no court has even attempted to provide a citation to where Jayswal's perjury admissions were allowed to be litigated and determined, as such does not exist, which is why Rued cannot be provided adequate notice regarding where exactly such issues have been litigated, assertions of which are based upon demonstrable fraud by TMJ.

In A25-0362, MCOA misrepresented Rued's jurisdiction argument, citing the wrong order and appeal, considered the determinations at issue independent of the determinations at issue, claimed Rued's defense "that [these] fraud claims had not previously been litigated" is contrary to Castro's determinations that Rued "provided no reasonable explanation or excuse for [bringing such claims]" that are "supported by the record," when all that matters is whether such issues have been litigated, and that the Constitution, itself, is an inadequate legal authority to require addressment (App.-19-21-). MCOA claimed being informed of the hearing and responding in the hearing is all that is required to levy fines against

citizens and deprive First Amendment rights, ignoring that such conclusions supporting deprivations require that these claims regarding JCP have been litigated and determined, which has not occurred and is supported solely by TMJ's demonstrably fraudulent declarations in orders, absent any citation to where such issues have been litigated (App-18-). Castro also purported to rule upon pending records in which he is a Defendant in personal capacity along with TMAG—in doing so, Castro acknowledged facts regarding W.O.R.'s medical evidence, history, and recommendations HCFC claims is non-existent to fit TMJ's statutorily prohibited diagnoses. Such incoherence is what will occur whenever any meaningful fact is acknowledged when virtually every meaningful fact asserted by HCFC is based upon demonstrable fraud.

b. A25-0935

Scott and Leah Rued filed a CHIPS Petition to protect W.O.R. through enforcement of child maltreatment laws in Hennepin County Juvenile Court ("HCJC"). HCJC dismissed the Petition, asserting the sole purpose was to modify custody between the parents and venue was improper—given allegations, venue exists, and if unpreferred, transfer, not dismissal, is supported (App.-32-33-). On appeal, Petitioners identified HCJC's determinations that the sole purpose of Petitioners' CHIPS Petition is to change custody between parents requires that the Petition present no basis to protect W.O.R., which is untrue and supported only by HCJC's fraudulent assertions regarding the Petition and all record evidence, unlawfully depriving Petitioners' protected rights, among other issues, including equal protections

through unreasonable and invidious application of Minn. Stat. 260C.141 resulting in discrimination against certain maltreated children and parents seeking to care for their children through availing themselves of Minnesota's child maltreatment statutes, absent adequate rationale (App.-45-62;-64-67-).

Despite acknowledging Petitioners' CHIPS Petition's claims (App.-10-11-) and TMJ's conspiracy in such maltreatment and endangerment (App.-14-), MCOA affirmed dismissal on grounds that the "sole purpose of the petition is to modify custody," which was purportedly supported by Petitioners providing support for TMJ's conspiracy in W.O.R.'s maltreatment, having sought custody elsewhere, and not preemptively seeking reunification with Catrina when there was nothing to reunify and such requirement is only upon CPS and/or courts, not Petitioners (App.-12-13-). MCOA also asserted HCJC did not abuse discretion because Petitioners' CHIPS Petition has already been resolved by TMJ (App.-13-), citing to a proceeding explicitly determined/affirmed in reliance upon Jayswal's admitted perjury and those relying upon the same, for which due process has still not been provided in four years (see A25-0831), in which Rued was not allowed to present any claims, as HCFC determined all that would be at issue was Catrina's claims, refusing to allow Rued to present necessary evidence or reach issues related to CPS fraud and abuse, relying upon the initial custody proceeding (22-702) and Jayswal's fraud absent considering his deposition admissions. No proceeding purportedly relied upon for assertions that the issues in Petitioners' CHIPS Petition have been determined has ever even mentioned Jayswal's deposition

admissions, the essential basis of Petitioners' CHIPS Petition, much less allowed such issues to be litigated and actually determined such. MCOA's assertions otherwise are fraudulent.

c. A25-1150

Petitioners filed a CHIPS Petition in Scott County District Court ("SCDC") that similarly did not mention custody (App.-252-253-). SCDC dismissed Petitioners' CHIPS Petition on grounds that the allegations had already been determined to be unfounded, the Petition sought to change custody, and the prospective action was a prohibited collateral attack. On appeal, Petitioners raised numerous issues, including unreasonable and invidious application of Minn. Stat. 260C.141, subd. 1(b), unsupportable assertions that Petitioners' CHIPS Petition allegations had been held to be unfounded, and that inhibiting prospective statutorily prescribed proceedings as purported collateral attacks due to existence of custody determinations that did not consider the evidence supporting Petitioners' CHIPS Petition or apply child maltreatment laws and refusing to address demonstrable fraud upon the court violates Constitutional requirements (App.-169-227-). The entirety of support and analysis provided by MCOA in affirmance is:

[S]eeing no[abuse of discretion], we affirm [SCDC's] decision to dismiss the petition. App.-24-.

II. COMMONALITIES BETWEEN PROCEEDINGS.

Customs and practices of MCOA refusing to reach or address Constitutional issues is established

here—equal protections was not even mentioned in A25-0935 or A25-1150 affirmances, A25-0209's affirmance did not even consider irreparable harms through flagrant violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, and A25-0361/A25-0362 construed Fourteenth Amendment requirements to allow depriving citizens' property and rights based upon demonstrably fraudulent assertions for which support of allegations in State initiated proceedings, necessary for defense to be constructed, does not need to be provided. When Appellants have a Constitutional right to relief sought on direct appeal, failure for such to be provided, irrespective of means employed to sustain Constitutional violations, results in Constitutionally prohibited action by appellate courts—state action of any kind must conform with the Constitution's dictates. Post-incorporation of appeals as a right, flagrant Constitutional violations in courts should be few and far between—these circumstances demonstrate reality to be the opposite with MCOA refusing to even consider, much less enforce, the Constitution's requirements. MCOA has replaced Constitution and law with its will to protect the Minnesota Government through abusing citizens and children.

As is common with clear violations of Constitution, MCOA transgressions result in violations of multiple aspects of the Constitution's requirements—reliance upon demonstrable fraud prevented from being litigated to deprive protected rights/property offends fundamental fairness and procedural due process requirements, applicable in all 5 proceedings. Constructions of law subordinating Constitutional requirements to any thing in state law and violations of separations of powers by judges to

deprive protected rights here necessarily result in violations of equal protections, as prohibited denials of rights usually necessitate (e.g., 10 U.S.C. §253). Petitioners raised 31 legal issues to MSC (App.-26-28-; -84-87-; -153-154-), which may broadly be separated into violations of due process, including process due and fundamental fairness, and violations of equal protections, including construction and applications of law in violation of Supremacy Clause requirements or prejudicial alterations of law in application by judges through transgressions of separations of powers principles, presented here, not under federal doctrine, but as alterations of law in application necessarily resulting in violation of federal equal protections requirements. Due to the significance of a state construing and applying its child maltreatment statutes as inaccessible for American parents and children, invidiously and unreasonably discriminating against broad categories of children and parents, absent adequate rationale, contrary to clear federal imposition upon state duties beyond just equal protections (*Palmore...U.S....*(1984)) as is occurring here, Minn. Stat. §260C.141, subd. 1(b)'s application is presented separately.

Petitioners challenge the Constitutionality of Minn. Stat. §481.02, subd. 1 inhibiting Rued's right to care for W.O.R., including when judges conspire to violate law against a child due to the lack of separations of powers judges wield over attorneys, this Court's third-party standing holdings, and Rued's right to represent himself (e.g., App.-369-370-), which is unopposed below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

While all state action is subject to the Constitution's requirements, and it has long been specifically established that such requirements are not limited to criminal proceedings, applying whenever protected rights are at issue, these circumstances demonstrate the degree of Constitutional crisis in Minnesota, even when rights far more precious than property rights are at issue (App.-346-) and regarding child welfare, which is so unambiguous Natural Law, apart from legislative enactments on behalf of State Peoples and federal requirements upon States to provide for the welfare of the children, establishes TMJ's actions are abusive and objectively constitute a danger to Petitioners and the public, in addition to clearly being unconstitutional. This Court is ultimately responsible for judicial compliance with the Constitution's requirements, both in the states and federally—if this Court is not going to adequately regulate the lower judiciaries, the Minnesota Government's abuse and fraud will not simply be swept under the rug. If this Court does not address the open war by lower judiciaries against the Constitution, the result will be that someone else will have to fulfill this Court's duties—separations of powers exist as a limit to tyranny (*Loving...U.S....*(1996)), not to checks and balances, which do not flow only one way from the judicial to other branches. What these circumstances demonstrate is occurring in America is indicting to the American Justice System and damning to judicial credibility.

I. [MCOA] HAS UNREASONABLY CONSTRUED MINN. STAT. §260C.141, SUBD. 1(B) TO INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST PETITIONERS AND LARGE CLASSES OF AMERICAN PARENTS AND CHILDREN ABSENT RATIONALE, IMPEDING MINNESOTA'S PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE DUTIES OF THE HIGHEST ORDER, AND APPLIED SUCH LAW IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENTS.

In A25-0935/A25-1150 MCOA affirmed dismissals of CHIPS Petitions on the basis that the *sole* purpose is to change custody between parents. 'Sole' is a strong word and means 'only,' or that 'there is not any other,' in this case, *purpose* beyond changing custody (App.-180-186-). Care is not custody (App.-155-; -186-; -287-)—parents without custody *care* for their children all of the time. Custody is not much broader than making decisions regarding health care and education—possessing "custody" does not mean one has authority to make decisions or take actions in violation of child maltreatment or any other laws. HCFC has no authority to deprive a parent's right to care for their child under state law—such can only occur through termination of parental rights, unactionable in HCFC. Custody authorizes neither harming or not properly caring for one's child nor refusing to provide medically recommended care causing obvious harm to children, plainly violative of Minnesota's child maltreatment laws here and addressable under such, which is Constitutionally protected as a parent exercising right to care for their child, not custody. Custody, care, and companionship of one's natural child, while all equally Constitutionally protected, are all separate rights—a

parent without custody, even when not directly exercising companionship, always exercises care for their child during parenting time and is responsible for environment, even if not physically present.

Alterations to custody is neither sought nor mentioned in either CHIPS Petition—the statutory language allows for consideration of appearances of petitions but does not provision dismissal of petitions on such basis unless there appears to be *no other purpose* than to change custody, which ‘sole’s qualification necessitates. To dismiss a petition on the grounds affirmed here, courts must necessarily determine that there is no purpose to *protect* the child in the petition, which is an objectively fraudulent determination when there is *any* purpose to protect the child—in these cases, the Petitions self-evidently contain multitudes of purposes to protect W.O.R. (App.-294-375-). Given this, even if the Petitions did mention custody, there are no grounds for dismissal on such basis given the plain language and meaning of the word ‘sole.’ There is nothing discriminatory in the plain language of the statute, nor mystery as to purpose and intent of the statute, which is to ensure children have access to child maltreatment laws, consistent with the state’s established public policy. Equal protections requirements are not limited to the legislature and apply to laws *and their application* (*Martin v. Walton*, 368 U.S. 25, 28 (1961)).

Because TMJ cannot allow for due process on issues presented in the CHIPS Petitions that will expose flagrant criminality, corruption, violations of state and federal law, including Constitutions, and child endangerment and maltreatment by Minnesota’s Government, especially TMJ and HCCPS/SCCPS, MCOA inhibits these statutorily prescribed

proceedings enacted to protect children, resulting in multidimensional equal protections violations. The statutory language and use of the word 'sole' ensures that juvenile court is not accessible for mere custody disputes and reserved solely for enforcement of child maltreatment laws—this is the plain meaning and intent of the last sentence in Minn. Stat. §260C.141, subd. 1(b), ensuring only petitions seeking enforcement of child maltreatment laws proceed, not actions under other standards or bases, like best interests, which any court is subject to. If the legislative purposes with the statute's language was to inhibit private persons from protecting children the statute would not exist, and the legislature's overriding concern and intent is codified (Minn. Stat. §260E.01).

Certainly, claims could be precluded if determined with full and fair opportunity to litigate based upon child maltreatment law, but determinations based upon fraud do not preclude claims under state law, which is necessary for state preclusion law to comply with Constitutional requirements—MCOA knows it is sustaining fraud absent full and fair opportunity to litigate so it does not even get into preclusion law, but anything else in state law that sustains deprivations of protected rights, such as W.O.R.'s to bodily integrity, Rued's to care for W.O.R., and Scott and Leah Rued to petition the government, based upon demonstrable fraud absent full and fair opportunity and through refusing to reach Petitions as pled, is unconstitutional for the same reasons preclusion law would be if it allowed for sustaining fraudulent determinations in such circumstances as these. Certainly, if a CHIPS petition did not appear to seek to protect a child in accordance

with child maltreatment laws, it must be dismissed, but dismissing Petitions plainly seeking to protect a child, as these do, under this statute applies a statute that does not exist by altering the language to change the word 'sole' to 'a,' to dismiss any petition that would apparently *affect* custody, which is what TMJ has done here in violation of Minn. Const. Art. III, changing the law, which is definitionally legislative, through application—such precludes petitions involving custodian whenever there is also a non-abusive parent. The statute is not under review—nothing is unconstitutional regarding the statute, but the statute as applied by TMJ is flagrantly unconstitutional, invidiously discriminating against Petitioners to impede public policy, absent rationale or legitimate government interest, resulting in law that unconstitutionally discriminates against broad swaths of American citizens and children in the state, including children subject to custody judgements, which would mean that prospective enforcement of child maltreatment laws is inaccessible even when, as here, custody determinations have not even considered the basis of the endangerment and maltreatment, which is HCCPS' admissions of fraud and perjury in investigations, when a child has only one, not two parents involved in maltreatment, which are invidious and arbitrary criterion entirely foreign to the statute and its purpose, and child maltreatment laws are inaccessible to parents in caring for their own children if a parent with custody is involved in the maltreatment. That the facts might also indicate changes in custody would be appropriate do not cut against the child's need or parent's right to access maltreatment laws, and, certainly, judges being involved in the conspiracy to violate child

maltreatment laws does not affect/nullify the statutes or provision judicial violations of statutes.

These prejudicial violations of Minn.Const.Art.III altering statutory language in application, alone, are equal protections violations and the resulting alteration of the statute in application that clearly arbitrarily discriminates absent any reasonable or legitimate basis results in iterations of equal protections violations. Transgressions or alterations of statute by judges in application of law *necessarily* violates separations of power (*Ex Parte United States*, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916)) and such violations of separations of power, prejudicial to established rights, as here, *definitionally* results in unequal application of law prohibited by equal protections, resulting in construction and application of law also violating the Supremacy Clause—if TMJ's *goal* were to violate the Constitution one would be hard pressed to make suggested improvements here. The whole point of equal protections is that law must be equal and the application of Minn. Stat. §260C.141, subd. 1(b) here is not the words of this statute, but rather a statute that does not exist and contravenes public policy, simply because TMJ will not allow for due process that will expose TMJ's and other actors under color of state law's abuse and wanton violations of law and Constitution, which is not a legitimate basis to deny Petitioners access to the law and is unconstitutional. The same mechanics governing federal separations of powers and statutory construction (*Sorrells...U.S....(1932)*), mirrored, as applicable here, under state law (*Litterer...(Minn.2018)*; *Minnesota Higher...([Minn.]1975)*), when prejudicially transgressed by state courts against citizens' rights

violates equal protections in a number of ways, and, here, forecloses access to child maltreatment laws and impedes public policy, through unreasonable interpretation imputing invidious and unconstitutional effect to statute. Absent federal child maltreatment laws for American children, broadly, adherence to Constitutional requirements in construction and application of state law effecting protection for children is of national import, essential to the welfare of American children and for efficacy of parental and children's rights, especially where, as here, CPS and the State is involved in the violations of Constitution causing child endangerment and maltreatment.

II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS ARE BINDING UPON ALL STATE APPELLATE COURT ACTIONS AND ANY 'THING' IN STATE LAW, WHICH MUST RESULT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS, INCLUDING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS REQUIREMENTS.

Due process, including process due and fundamental fairness, is required whenever protected rights and interests of citizens are deprived or infringed—the Fourteenth Amendment establishes this, which is a paramount provision supreme to any 'Thing' in state law (Supremacy Clause (eg, App.-32; -159-)), also necessitating not only that laws must be equal, but *application* of law must not invidiously or arbitrarily discriminate (App.-154-), all of which remains unlawfully unprovided by MCOA in all cases here.

a. A25-0362

Due process is not fulfilled by providing notification of hearing and a hearing in which citizens are not presented with any evidence supporting allegations of wrong-doing resulting in levying fines—due process requires notice of *the basis of the claims* brought against a person so that the person can respond, not just notice of the hearing regarding claims of violation of statute or rules, consisting only of unevicenced assertions of transgression and nothing supporting the basis or to concretely identify that such was transgressed, as opportunity to present defenses is absent (*Bliek...*(8th...1997), discussing *Mullane*[],...U.S....(1950) and *Memphis Light*[],...U.S....(1978)), or by providing an unfair hearing determined by fraud. Despite repeatedly requesting more definition to understand how Castro or anyone else could possibly support the issues related to Jayswal's perjury admissions have been previously litigated or determined (App.-124-125-), to this day Rued has no cognizance what Castro's allegations are based upon or where or how these issues were ever litigated. Absent existence of an order making determinations regarding Jayswal's deposition *admissions*, assertions such have been litigated are unsupportable and, resultingly, cannot be effectively noticed in accordance with due process.

Not only does the transcript of the hearing demonstrate Castro could provide no support for his own purported conclusions in his initiation of this proceeding by the state (the mechanics of which, in concluding prior to the hearing, definitionally violate due process), but TMAG's entire contribution purportedly supporting Castro's assertions is acknowledgement that Jayswal's perjury admissions have been kept out of evidence and, thus, could not

even hypothetically have been litigated or determined (App.-389-). Another attorney in the same hearing related to the same issues, Barbosa, provided nothing more than acknowledgement Jayswal's perjury admissions had *not* been litigated (App.-389-390), claiming Rued *could have* litigated such, which Barbosa also knows is untrue and fraudulent because she is also the HCFC attorney (App.-393-), and claimed other issues unrelated to Jayswal's perjury admissions result in Jayswal's perjury admissions having been litigated "over and over and over" (App.-390-), which is also objectively untrue and fraudulent.

What is at issue regarding sanctions is if Jayswal's perjury admissions have been litigated and determined—to lawfully fine Rued regarding such, it must be the case that it is not even *arguable* that such issues have not been litigated and determined, and the only arguments presented are based upon the relevant evidence having been *excluded* from record TMAG and Castro assert such evidence was litigated and finally determined in, which is self-defeating. It is not even arguable that such issues *have been* litigated, reached, or ever acknowledged by any court. This is the evidence upon which MCOA asserts state and federal (purportedly applying jurisdictional bars) courts have determined Jayswal's admissions of perjury "have no merit" when such has never even been mentioned by courts. Rued is fined based upon Castro's demonstrable fraud, which is unconstitutional.

In reality, Castro and MCOA believe they can lie with impunity to cover up crimes of the government *because* they are judges—in reality, *because they are judges*, these blatant lies used as falsified evidence to unlawfully take tens of thousands of dollars from a citizen *are* unconstitutional and illegal. Fining citizens

based upon fraud of judges acting as investigators, witnesses, prosecutors, and judges, committing fraud at every step, plainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. While any financial deprivations pale in comparison to the harms to W.O.R. here, citizens presenting issues this obvious based on actions this unjustifiable by state judges demonstrates the severity of the Constitution's crisis in Minnesota. States cannot abuse their citizens for exposing the criminality of the Minnesota Government and refusing to forfeit federal rights by fining citizens and depriving petition rights based upon the State's own demonstrable fraud. MCOA had a Constitutional duty to ensure the result of its orders complied with the Constitutional requirements encapsulated at *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (App.-97-99-), unfulfilled here (App.-83-91-; -93-148-).

Rued and W.O.R. have been denied access to statutory law providing for redress of fraud and protection of one's child, causing irreparable harms to Rued and W.O.R., as no one can return this time unlawfully deprived or take back the endangerment, abuse, and maltreatment wrought upon W.O.R., that has inhibited Petitioners' day in court (*Johnson v. Johnson*, 243 Minn. 403, 405 (Minn.1955)), which denies equal protections based upon government fraud in asserting that these issues have been litigated—equal protections are further denied through depriving statutory and state rule rights to relief from *the fraud in these proceedings* through deprivations of the right to petition the government for redress, despite every effort, which, a year later, is still un-responded to (App.-149-151-). Additionally, fines and deprivations of petition rights are imposed upon Rued on the basis that common law judicial immunity so obviously

inhibited collateral equitable relief against Webber Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous (App.-18-)-no legal support or analysis was provided beyond declarations of judges denying the existence of controlling law from this Court and the only thing provided on appeal was the following apparently attempted testimony from TMAG:

Accordingly, even if there were legal authority for the type of injunction Rued asked for, which there is not, Judge Webber did not have jurisdiction to provide the relief Rued sought. Additionally, judicial immunity precludes a lawsuit against a judge based only on a legal ruling ([t]hese...problems are so glaring...even a pro se litigant should have known not to file this lawsuit). App.-376-.

Webber is the Defendant, *not judge*, in this case. This Court's decision in *Pulliam*...(1984) is controlling with respect to judicial immunity in this case where equitable relief is sought to cause ongoing Constitutional deprivations to cease (App.-136-147-)-while this case was not brought under §1983, it was brought for violations of federal law, which must be addressable directly under the Fourteenth Amendment absent statutory provision, mirrored, in Minnesota, under self-executing Constitutional provisions, providing jurisdiction for such equitable claims (*General Oil*...(1908); *Willis*...([Minn.]1892)).

Reading Wikipedia, or perspectives of similar sophistication, regarding 1996 additions to §1983, one might think *Pulliam* was abrogated by 1996 additions to §1983, but such statutory additions are *statutory* limitations, not Congressional constructions of common law derived judicial immunity, which is

squarely in the purview of this Court and *Pulliam*, holdings contrary to which would unconstitutionally subordinate Constitution to judges, remains controlling regarding. While Congress' 1996 additions to §1983 violate the Tenth Amendment (*C.R. Cases...*(1883)) and lack enumerated power (*City...Boerne...*(1997)), such was not challenged here, generating jurisdiction also directly under Constitution(s). At best, Petitioners rights and property are deprived, as pro se citizens, based upon judicial immunity due to understanding these legal issues better than TMJ and TMAG—Constitutional incompetence is an insufficient basis to deprive equal protections and protected rights and interests. Contrary to TMAG's declarations, this Court's controlling rulings *are* effective legal authorities, even if state courts do not like them and TMAG still has not figured out what occurred in *Ex Parte Young...*(1908).

Purporting to rule upon claims already dismissed as *incognizable*, through *pending federal records* in which Castro/TMAG are personal defendants, deploying principles ensuring uniformity, A25-0362 now contradicts HCFC regarding W.O.R.'s medical facts, which will occur whenever actual facts are acknowledged with HCFC relying upon demonstrable fraud—Castro's/TMAG's motivations generating such absurdities are clear, as they knew they had no basis for Rooker-Feldman assertion in 25-420, though this provides no basis for Rooker-Feldman invocation in actions (25-CV-3333) prior to state court completion given bad-faith fraud and preclusion law (App.-116-132-). This behavior elucidates Constitutional necessity in constructing and applying Rooker-Feldman coherently—federal courts misrepresenting relief targeting cessation of

Constitutionally prohibited *actions* as “appellate” review unlawfully provisions state judicial alterations of federal jurisdiction.

b. A25-0935/A25-1150

The Court of Appeals affirmances that Petitioners’ CHIPS Petitions’ allegations have been previously determined or held to be unfounded violate due process because such has never been allowed to be litigated *and* are *admitted* fraud and perjury—court orders claiming something has been fully *and* fairly litigated and determined directly contrary to the only relevant evidence is simply fraud upon the court, which cannot be furthered with Constitutional compliance, nor can any *thing*, including orders, denying that Jayswal has admitted his allegations against Rued are untrue, given Jayswal’s admissions. Orders asserting reliance upon Jayswal’s perjury to effect W.O.R.’s circumstances here does not violate child maltreatment laws and endanger and harm W.O.R. results in fraud, as it is uncontested and already controlling law false allegations of maltreatment, which are also prohibited by statute, harm children—such is harmful to a child’s relationship with that parent, in this case Rued.

If preclusion law or doctrines provisioned reliance upon admitted fraud to deprive rights, such would be unconstitutional—since preclusion law *does* constitutionally comport (App.-197-198-) equal protections are necessarily violated through application of preclusion to reach any such result. The same framework (i.e., the Constitution) applies to other judicial doctrines under state law. Knowing preclusion law explicitly prohibits application to the frauds and abuse at issue in these CHIPS Petitions,

TMJ has attempted to invoke another judicial doctrine, collateral attack, to inhibit provision of access to child maltreatment laws, resulting, yet again, in multidimensional Fourteenth Amendment violations. The collateral attack affirmance is based upon *Greer*... (Minn.App.2011) (App.-166-, via App.-23-), a case in which a litigant asserted lack of ability to bring claims in prior proceeding due to statutory prohibition, but there was no statutory prohibition to bringing such claims in the previous proceedings as such was explicitly provisioned under statute (*Ibid.* at 127-28)—*Greer's* application of collateral attack doctrine was evaluated to ensure opportunity was provisioned and that opportunity was found to have existed and been forfeited.

Rued attempted to litigate Jayswal's admissions of fraud and perjury in his investigations and was explicitly prevented from doing so, appealed all available due process issues through this Court (22-702), and thereafter has been prevented from litigating such issues on grounds that they were litigated when such litigation was always explicitly prevented—there is nothing in any prior custody or any other judgement related to Jayswal's perjury admissions, which is the essential basis of Petitioners' CHIPS Petitions' claims, resulting in nothing for Petitioners' CHIPS Petition to attack. State law precedent of collateral attacks does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements, and applying collateral attack here clearly violates due process and equal protections (App.-203-223-). If state courts had made determinations related to violations of child maltreatment laws and allegations in Petitioners' CHIPS Petitions, application of such doctrine would not be unconstitutional, but applying the doctrine to

inhibit claims that have never been allowed to be litigated or determined cannot be inhibited by preclusion, collateral attack, or any other judicial doctrines in concert with due process requirements, and doing so here plainly violates equal protections requirements because Plaintiffs do not have access to the same law as others through Minnesota Statutes, with respect to judicial doctrines, or Constitutions. Nothing in Petitioners' CHIPS Petition "attempt[s] to annul, amend, reverse, or vacate a judgment or to declare it void" (*Aaron Carlson...*(Minn.2019)). Prior custody determinations based upon best interest law that explicitly did not consider the evidence supporting Petitioners' CHIPS Petition are absolutely unaffected by this proceeding that has no nexus altering any custody judgement—this statutorily prescribed proceeding is purely prospective.

SCDC claims that because the fraud upon the court, committed by *Judge Vraa of SCDC* ("Vraa"), for which Petitioners sought relief (App.-258-259-), was a result of Vraa's determinations Petitioners merely "disagreed" with (App.-168-) such necessarily constitutes impermissible reconsideration requests—of course when a judge commits fraud upon the court prejudiced litigants will "disagree," but such frauds partake in the nature of objectivity, as something determinatively relied upon that is demonstrably untrue. This is not about ice-cream preferences—if there is basis supporting that the relief targeted is not fraud, such is exceptionally easy to provide, as it is simply the unimpeached evidence originally relied upon. Petitioners' disagreement with demonstrable fraud upon the court provides no possible support that what Petitioners seek to address is somehow not fraud upon the court because Petitioners do not agree with

Vraa's fraud. Vraa committed fraud upon the court and has no support, other than her fraud, and somehow thinks such objective elements can be relativized allowing Vraa to lie about relief sought, and sustain flagrant Fourteenth Amendment violations—this is what TMJ does in **CHILD MALTREATMENT CASES**, involving protected rights of citizens, parents, and, most importantly, children.

The Minnesota Government's and TMJ's actions in these cases are a danger to the public (App.-146-147-; -160-; -292-) and American citizens and children subject to this State which believes it a law and world unto itself that can abuse American citizens and children in violation of Constitution with impunity to try to cover up its own crimes—this is unbridled tyranny and open war against the Constitution. Judges are supposed to prevent tyranny, uphold the Constitution, and protect children, not be tyrants, violate the Constitution and law, abuse children, and think they can get away with it because they are judges—this is lawlessness. On appeal, the Scott County Attorney, knowing these issues have never been litigated, perpetrated fraud and urged sustaining of the same (App.-397-)—typical for judges in Minnesota (e.g., 25-420/25-CV-3333: Tunheim/Loken/Schiltz), MCOA preferred to *perpetrate* the illegal actions of the government, *themselves*, thinking such actions become cloaked in *their* immunity (App.-24-). Ethically, this is disgusting—legally, this is incredibly naïve and illegal.

CONCLUSION

If citizens possess a Constitutional right to the relief sought on appeal, appellate courts must provide such relief as Constitution dictates. These circumstances demonstrate MCOA does not believe the Constitution has any effect or imposition upon their actions, resulting is the open defiance of law and reason exhibited in these cases, causing devastating impact to Petitioners' rights and welfare. This Court should grant certiorari to address these serious government abuses and further clarify that the judiciary is subject to the law and Constitution and may not alter either in applying law bent to their will to protect the government and themselves attempting to obfuscate their own abuses and conspiracy against the Constitution and a child—such plain dangers to the public as exhibited by TMJ's actions here are unacceptable within any lawful or civilized society.

Petitioners believe and will ensure that the federal executive understands the significance of these circumstances and resulting opportunity, along with corresponding duties, such overt criminality and debauchery that MCOA's illegal actions here generate to reinstitute Constitutionality and address the most prolific abusers of American children and citizens and greatest impediment to reinstitution of Constitutionality and rule of law in America: judges. Plaintiffs have also taken actions to address the unauthorized actions of the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court purporting to apply rules that do not exist to Petitioners to alter and abrogate rights, which this Court has not authorized the Clerk to do and, even if the Court had authorized such actions, such would be violative of Separations of Powers requirements and invalid.

Respectfully Submitted,

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April 26, 2026

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