

No. _____

**In the
Supreme Court of the United States**

EUGENE N. BOLIN, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

KEYSTONE RV COMPANY,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does a person's 14th Amendment right to procedural due process include the right to see the evidence that a court uses against them if the opposing party who submitted that evidence claims it is secret under the attorney-client privilege?

Different courts answer this constitutional question differently. Some federal Circuits hold that due process requires the person to see *all* that evidence. Other Circuits hold the person can see *most* of that evidence. And in this case, the Washington state courts held the person can see *none* of that evidence – limiting the person to a blacked-out version of the evidence upon which the court based its ruling. (Image of the blacked-out versions is in the body of this petition.)

To end the *all, most, none* split in our nation's courts, this Petition asks this Court to establish a uniform due process right for all Americans regardless of which Circuit or State they live in.

PARTIES

Petitioner: The party filing this Petition is Eugene Bolin, Jr. (“Mr. Bolin”).

Respondent: The Respondent is Keystone RV Company (“Keystone”).

Other parties in the lawsuit below: Although this Petition’s procedural due process question solely concerns Keystone’s attorney fees motion against Mr. Bolin and trial judge’s corresponding \$376,626.83 judgment against Mr. Bolin, that judgment was entered in a lawsuit to which the following were also parties: defendants Tacoma RV Center, Inc., Ladonna Meadows and John Doe Meadows, American Guardian Warranty Services, Inc., Contractors Bonding, Dexter Axle Company, and Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc.; plaintiffs Aubrey N. Rinehart and Ryan M. Day; and plaintiff’s counsel Law Offices of Eugene N. Bolin Jr. PS. These parties are not participating in the proceedings before this Court.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., No. 104774-6,
Washington State Supreme Court.

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., Nos. 59095-6–
II, 59788-8–II, Washington State Court of Appeals,
Division Two.

Rinehart v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc. et al., No.
21-2–06008-2, Superior Court for the State of
Washington in and for Pierce County.

Day v. Tacoma RV Center, Inc., No. 23-2–
05117-9, Superior Court for the State of Washington
in and for Pierce County.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Eugene N. Bolin, Jr. respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington to review the the Washington courts' holding that his 14th Amendment right to procedural due process does not include the right to see attorney fee evidence that the trial court used against him because the opposing party who submitted that evidence against Mr. Bolin asserted that that evidence was privileged attorney-client information that the opposing party wanted kept secret from Mr. Bolin.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Washington Supreme Court's March 4, 2026 Order denying Mr. Bolin's Petition for Review is at 584 P.3d 402 (Wash. 2026), 2026 WL 613166 (App. 121).

The Washington Court of Appeal's October 14, 2025 Opinion is available at 2025 WL 2910726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2025) (App. 1). That Opinion's rejection of Mr. Bolin's due process claim is at 2025 WL 2910726, at *27-29.

The trial court's April 8, 2024 Order that Mr. Bolin "pay restitution" to Respondent in the amount of \$376,626.83 of the attorney fees detailed in the attorney fee bills Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see is at App. 80-120 (App. 119, ORDER ¶¶ 1 & 3).

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

The final judgment rendered by the highest court of the State of Washington was entered March 4, 2026. (App. 121).

The Petitioner (Mr. Bolin) claims a right to procedural due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. He accordingly invokes this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257(a) (Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where any right is claimed under the Constitution of the United States).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part: "...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, §1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The Trial Court Ruling that Petitioner Asserts Violated His Constitutionally Protected Right to Procedural Due Process

Respondent Keystone RV Company ("Keystone") was one of five corporate defendants in a product defect case where Petitioner Eugene Bolin represented the plaintiff. (App. 3-4). After that case

was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice (App. 21), one of those five corporate defendants (Respondent Keystone RV Company) filed a Motion To Recover Attorneys' Fees And Costs against Mr. Bolin. (App. 37-38).

To evidence the amount, reasonableness, and necessity of the attorney fees it sought to recover from Mr. Bolin, Keystone gave the judge the detailed attorney fee billing statements that it said it had paid. (App. 38).

But Keystone gave the judge those detailed attorney fee billing statements *ex parte* for the judge to review *in camera* (App. 38-39) – thereby preventing Mr. Bolin from being able to see, confront, question, challenge, or dispute the reasonableness, necessity, (or even applicability) of the hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fees Keystone's motion asked the judge to order Mr. Bolin to reimburse.

(App. 124-125 [above is the actual image of one of the redacted billing statements in the court file, but Appendix printing rules prohibited the actual image being reproduced in this Petition's Appendix]).

Mr. Bolin objected to his being denied access to the *unredacted* billing statement evidence that Keystone had submitted to the judge *ex parte* for use against him. (App. 39, 70-73).

Mr. Bolin objected that unlike the *unredacted* attorney fee evidence that Keystone had given to the judge *ex parte*, approximately 75% of the attorney fee evidence Keystone provided to him did not even show what the \$502,169.11 Keystone claimed it had paid was for. (App. 70).¹

Mr. Bolin objected that the redacted invoices deprived him of due process and were fundamentally unfair. (App. 39).

The judge rejected Mr. Bolin's objections, and ruled that Keystone "has provided unredacted fee and costs statements *in camera* substantiating all of their costs of defense in this case.... Having reviewed these detailed invoice statements, the Court finds that all of these expenses were incurred in defense of the above-captioned lawsuit, and all were reasonable, and unfortunately necessary expenditures". (App. 106).

Based on that *in camera* review of the *ex parte* billing statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see, the judge ordered Mr. Bolin to "pay restitution" to Keystone in the amount of \$376,626.83 of the attorney fees detailed in the evidence Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see (App. 119, ORDER ¶¶ 1 & 3).

¹ The following equation is the math for that approximately 75% calculation: $(\$502,169.11 - \$130,688.50) \div \$502,169.11 = 0.73975$, or 74%.

The *unredacted* billing statements upon which the judge based that \$376,626.83 attorney fee restitution order, however, are not in the court record because Keystone gave its attorney fee evidence to the judge *ex parte*. Only the redacted billing statements are in the court record for appeal. (App. 70).

2. The Washington Appellate Courts' Ruling on Petitioner's Due Process Claim

The Washington Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Bolin's claim that ordering him to reimburse \$376,626.83 of the attorney fees detailed in evidence Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see, confront, question, challenge, or dispute the reasonableness, necessity, and applicability of violated his constitutional right to due process. 2025 WL 2910726, at *27-29 (App. 70-75).

The Washington Court of Appeals did so by ruling that Mr. Bolin had no 14th Amendment due process right to see the evidence that the judge used against him to find that \$376,626.83 was the restitution amount he had to pay to Keystone – explaining that Keystone asserted the evidence it had submitted to the judge *ex parte* for use as a sword against Mr. Bolin was shielded by the attorney-client privilege, and that “there is no due process right for an opposing party to see materials protected by attorney-client privilege.” 2025 WL 2910726, at *27 (App. 71).

The Washington Supreme Court denied Mr. Bolin's Petition for Review of that Court of

Appeals decision. 584 P.3d 402 (Wash. 2026), 2026 WL 613166 (App. 121-122).

3. The 14th Amendment Procedural Due Process Question Presented in this Petition

Keystone's Motion To Recover Attorneys' Fees And Costs presented two issues:

Step 1. The *legal* liability issue: should Mr. Bolin be held liable to reimburse any attorney fees and costs? (App. 80-120).

Step 2. The *factual* amount issue: if Mr. Bolin should be held liable to reimburse any attorney fees and costs, which of the fees and costs claimed by Keystone were reasonable, necessary, and applicable to that liability? (App. 80-120).

For the reasons explained in the Washington state court proceedings below, Mr. Bolin believes the state court erred in the Step 1 liability part of its ruling on Keystone's Motion To Recover Attorneys' Fees And Costs. (App. 78, 119).

But since the state court's Step 1 legal liability ruling is governed by Washington *state* law instead of federal law, Mr. Bolin's Petition to this Court cannot (and thus does not) concern the Step 1 *legal* question of whether Mr. Bolin should be liable to reimburse any attorney fees and costs.

On the other hand, the state court's Step 2 *factual* determination of which fees and costs claimed by Keystone are in fact reasonable,

necessary, and applicable to Mr. Bolin's liability triggers ***federal*** law – specifically, Mr. Bolin's federally protected 14th Amendment right to procedural due process when the state court made its \$376,626.83 factual determination.

Put bluntly, the question presented by Mr. Bolin's Petition to this Court is straightforward and simple: Does a person's 14th Amendment right to procedural due process include the right to see the evidence used against that person when the opposing party submitting that evidence to the court claims that that evidence is a secret under the attorney-client privilege? The Washington State courts' answer is "no". Mr. Bolin respectfully submits that the United States Constitution's answer is "yes".

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

The facts material to the constitutional question presented by this Petition are not complicated.

This Petition concerns solely the Washington courts' Step 2 *factual* determination that \$376,626.83 is the amount of attorney fees and costs that Mr. Bolin must pay as restitution to reimburse attorney fees and costs detailed in the billing statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see. (It is important to remember that while the findings concerning the Washington courts' Step 1 *legal* determination that Mr. Bolin's conduct created legal liability to Keystone can be long and contentious, this Petition only concerns the Washington courts' Step 2 *factual* determination that \$376,626.83 is the

dollar amount of reasonable, necessary, and applicable attorney fees and costs that Mr. Bolin must pay as restitution to reimburse the Keystone attorney fees and costs detailed in the billing statements that Mr. Bolin was not allowed to see.)

1. The 14th Amendment’s Due Process Guaranty: Washington’s Courts Shall Not Deprive Mr. Bolin of Property Without Due Process of Law

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

2. Money is “Property” Protected under the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Guaranty

Money is “property” protected under the 14th Amendment’s due process guaranty. *See Nelson v. Colorado*, 581 U.S. 128, 135 (2017) (analyzing the withholding of petitioner’s money paid to the court as fees, court costs, and restitution as property in procedural due process claim); *Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972) (“This Court has also made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money”).

This Court has accordingly made it clear that “The action of state courts in imposing penalties ... without providing adequate notice and opportunity

to defend, has, of course, long been regarded as a denial of due process of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” *Shelly v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948); *accord*, *Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg*, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994) (“A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); *In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.*, 982 F.2d 603, 614 (1st Cir. 1992) (“when a judge constructs a process for setting fees, the process must contain at least the procedural minima that the Due Process Clause requires”).

3. The Procedural Due Process that the 14th Amendment Requires

“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a ***meaningful time*** and in a ***meaningful manner***.’” *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (bold italics added) (quoting *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

“Never” is not a ***meaningful time*** to be shown the evidence used against you.

And allowing you to be heard on the content of evidence that you are not allowed to see does not provide a ***meaningful manner*** to respond to that evidence’s hidden content.

Mr. Bolin’s constitutional right to procedural due process accordingly required disclosure of the evidence that the judge used to make the

previously-noted factual finding against him that \$376,626.83 of the expenses detailed in the attorney fee bills Keystone gave the judge *ex parte* were all reasonable and necessary. See *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) (when reasonableness depends of factual findings, the evidence used must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue); *TikTok Inc. v. Garland*, 604 U.S. 56, 82 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing *Greene* and stating that “Efforts to inject secret evidence into judicial proceedings present obvious constitutional concerns”); *Gross v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (“Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.”); *Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); *cf.*, *Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank*, 288 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner J.) (disapproving of permitting the submission of class action fee applications *in camera* because it “paralyzes objectors”).

Federal case law accordingly makes it clear that when important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires the court to provide the opponent an opportunity to confront and cross-examine with respect to the evidence being used against that opponent. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (adverse witnesses); *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (documents as well as witnesses because disclosure of both witness testimony and documentary evidence are important to protect one’s Due Process rights); *see also Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno*, 70 F.3d

1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that procedural due process’s notice and hearing requirements have ancient roots in the rights to confrontation and cross-examination).

4. Employing Secret, *Ex Parte* Evidence Does Not Provide the Procedural Due Process that the 14th Amendment Requires

Federal courts have accordingly recognized that the use of secret evidence, reviewed *in camera*, is a violation of due process.

For example, *Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 656 F.2d 1337, (9th Cir. 1981) involved a university assistant professor who was denied merit salary increases based on content in the professor’s tenure review file. 656 F.2d at 1339–1340. The university refused to disclose the professor’s tenure file to the professor – but submitted the file to the trial court where the judge reviewed it *in camera*. *Id.* at 1345. The Ninth Circuit held that that violated due process – explaining that our adversarial system “functions properly and leads to fair and accurate resolutions, only when vigorous and informed argument is possible. Such argument is not possible, however, without disclosure to the parties of the evidence submitted to the court.” *Id.* at 1346.

Another example is *Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995). Applying the *Matthews* balancing test, the Ninth Circuit held that when secret evidence is used, “One would be hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in erroneous

deprivations” – explaining that “the very foundation of the adversary process assumes that the use of undisclosed information will violate due process because of the risk of error.” 70 F.3d at 1069.

The 14th Amendment’s procedural due process guaranty requires disclosure even in highly sensitive national security contexts. *See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (citizen detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker, because “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’”) (quoting *Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill*, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).

In short, federal case law makes it clear that employing secret, *ex parte* evidence against a person does not provide the procedural due process that the 14th Amendment requires.

5. Lack of Consistency Among the Circuits When Attorney-Client Privilege is Asserted

The same 14th Amendment right to procedural due process should apply in every American courtroom. But when it comes to one’s right to see the evidence a judge is using against you if your opponent asserts that that evidence is privileged attorney-client information, your 14th Amendment constitutional right turns not on

our Constitution but on that courtroom's federal Circuit or state.

For example, in some Circuits your 14th Amendment right to procedural due process allows you to see ***all*** of that evidence being used against you with no redactions. See, e.g., *Ideal Elec. Sec. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co.*, 120 F.3d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding party against whom fees were sought was “entitled to discover the information it requires to appraise the reasonableness of the amount of fees requested,” including the “nature and extent of the work done” so it would “present to the court any legitimate challenges” to the fees sought); *Am. C.L. Union of Ga. v. Barnes*, 168 F.3d 423, 428 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding fee opponents have an obligation to make “specific and reasonably precise” objections to fee petitions that indicate “a lack of proper billing judgment” and defendants carried their burden by “carefully analyz[ing] the billing records . . . to calculate the number of hours billed for completing each of various litigation tasks”).

In other Circuits your 14th Amendment right to procedural due process allows you to see ***most*** of that evidence being used against you, with limited redactions or through summaries of the work performed. See, e.g., *Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG*, 825 F.3d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 2016) (“On remand, the district court must allow Defendants access to the timesheets, appropriately redacted to remove privileged information, so they can inspect them and present whatever objections they might have concerning the fairness and reasonableness of

Plaintiffs’ fee request.”); *Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 770 F.3d 1300, 1308 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel itemized time records, reviewing records in camera, allowing each side to depose someone familiar with adversary’s billing, and ordering disclosure of billing rates and time incurred); *Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo*, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (holding legal bills were protected from disclosure to the extent the bills revealed the identity of the federal statutes researched implicating opinion work product not subject to disclosure).

But in Washington state, your 14th Amendment right to procedural due process allows you to see ***none*** of that evidence being used against you. Washington allows total reductions in that evidence being used against you. As explained earlier, the Washington court ruled that Mr. Bolin had no 14th Amendment due process right to see the evidence that the judge used against him to find that he had to pay restitution to Keystone in the amount of \$376,626.83, because Keystone asserted that the evidence it had submitted to the judge *ex parte* for use as a sword against Mr. Bolin was shielded by the attorney-client privilege – and “there is no due process right for an opposing party to see materials protected by attorney-client privilege.” 2025 WL 2910726, at *27 (App. 71).

**6. This Court Can (and Should) Easily
Resolve the Lower Courts' Inconsistent
Interpretation of 14th Amendment
Procedural Due Process Rights**

This Court can (and should) easily end the current inconsistency among the Circuits and states as to whether employing secret, *ex parte* evidence against a person provides the procedural due process required by the 14th Amendment when the party submitting that evidence ***against*** their opponent to prove the reasonableness and necessity of their fees simultaneously refuses to disclose that evidence ***to*** their opponent.

This Court's *Matthews* balancing test evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest at stake. *Nelson v. Colorado*, 581 U.S. 128 (2017) (citing *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

(A) Private Interest Affected. With respect to the private interest, the private interest affected in fee requests is the amount of money the court orders to be paid – with, as noted earlier, money being “property” protected under the 14th Amendment’s due process guaranty.

(C) Governmental Interest at Stake. With respect to the government interest in private fee requests like this, the government interest at stake is *de minimis* at best – because requiring the fee applicant to disclose its evidence to the opposing

party imposes little (if any) burden on the court system or government.

(B) Risk of Erroneous Deprivation through the Procedures Used. With respect to the risk of erroneous deprivation, the discussion in the above Sections 3 and 4 of this Petition confirms this Court's own recognition that the risk of erroneous deprivation is high when the fee applicant is allowed to use secret, *ex parte* evidence to "prove" to the court the value and reasonableness of the applicant's fee request – for as Justice Gorsuch accurately explained last year in his *TikTok Inc. v. Garland* concurrence, "Efforts to inject secret evidence into judicial proceedings present obvious constitutional concerns". 604 U.S. at 82 (2025); *accord*, *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) (when reasonableness depends of factual findings, the evidence used must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue); *Gross v. Lopez*, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) ("Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights."); *Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); *cf.*, *Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank*, 288 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner J.) (disapproving of permitting the submission of class action fee applications *in camera* because it "paralyzes objectors").

This serious risk of erroneous deprivation is why, as noted earlier, federal case law makes it clear that when important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires the court to provide the

opponent an opportunity to confront and cross-examine with respect to the evidence being used against that opponent. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (adverse witnesses); *Greene v. McElroy*, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (documents as well as witnesses); *see also Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno*, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due process have ancient roots in the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and that “One would be hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in erroneous deprivations” – explaining that “the very foundation of the adversary process assumes that the use of undisclosed information will violate due process because of the risk of error.”).

Employing secret, *ex parte* evidence in the trial court then further exacerbates this well recognized risk of erroneous deprivation by preventing appellate review of the evidence upon which the trial court based its decision. *Cf., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg*, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994) (procedural due process requires “the availability of both ‘meaningful and adequate review by the trial court’ and subsequent appellate review.”) (quoting *Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip*, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991)).

But since the attorney fee evidence used against Mr. Bolin was given by Keystone to the trial judge *ex parte*, that evidence is not in the court record for any appellate court to review. Instead, the appellate courts – like Mr. Bolin himself – have to determine if \$376,626.83 of fees were reasonable,

(App. 124-125 [above is the actual image of one of the redacted billing statements in the court file, but Appendix printing rules prohibited the actual image being reproduced in this Petition's Appendix]).

The resulting impossibility of appellate review further confirms the risk of unchecked and erroneous deprivation.

The state trial judge, state Court of Appeals, and state Supreme Court in this case read this Court's procedural due process decisions to say something that the Petitioner believes this Court's

decisions did not say. The Washington courts read this Court's decisions to hold that a person's 14th Amendment right to procedural due process does not include the right to see, confront, or question evidence used against that person if the opposing party submitting that evidence as a sword to be used ***against*** that person claims that that evidence is shielded from disclosure ***to*** that person under the attorney-client privilege.

If the Petitioner is correct in believing that that is not what this Court's decisions said, then this Court should grant this Petition to resolve the current lack of consistency among our nation's courts with respect to evidence that can Constitutionally be given to the judge *ex parte* but hidden from the person who will be penalized by that evidence.

To end the previously noted ***all, most, none*** split in our nation's courts, Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to grant this Petition so it can establish a uniform due process right for Americans regardless of which Circuit or State they live in, and under that uniform due process right, review and reverse the Washington courts' decision below.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

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