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No. 25-1233

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

KARL LINARD MALLOY,
Petitioner,

v.

KRISTIN E. SCHELIN AND MARK A. WATSON,
Respondents.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT*

(Consolidated Appeals Nos. 25-1234 (L) and 25-1973)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

In *Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank*, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), this Court held that a bankruptcy order is final when it definitively resolves a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy case. In *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 589 U.S. 35 (2020), this Court applied that rule to automatic-stay litigation, holding that such litigation constitutes a discrete procedural unit whose resolution yields a final, immediately appealable order.

In the proceedings below, the bankruptcy court denied motions for protective relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), holding that its prior remand order permitted (i) entry and docketing of a state-court judgment affecting estate property and (ii) continuation of appellate proceedings against the debtor. The district court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court's orders were not final and, in one instance, that the appeal was moot after judgment was entered. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's orders did not "definitively dispose of discrete disputes."

The question presented is:

Whether a bankruptcy court order conclusively determining the scope of the automatic stay is a final order appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), or may be rendered effectively unreviewable through the combined application of non-finality and mootness doctrines.

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, Karl Linard Malloy, was the Defendant—Appellant below.

Respondents, Kristin E. Schelin and Mark A. Watson, were Plaintiffs—Appellees below.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioner is an individual and no Rule 29.6 disclosure statement is required.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner includes all proceedings known to him that are directly related to this case, including proceedings arising from Powhatan County Circuit Court Case No. CL22-242, the resulting bankruptcy case and adversary proceedings, and related contested bankruptcy and appellate proceedings. Proceedings listed below that form the direct appellate path to the judgment of the court of appeals under review are identified in bold italics.

Powhatan County Circuit Court

Schelin et al., v. Malloy, No. CL22-242, Powhatan County Circuit Court. Judgment entered October 20, 2024.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. CL22-242-01, Powhatan County Circuit Court. Judgment entered October 20, 2024.

Malloy v. Napier, No. CL23-226, Powhatan County Circuit Court. Pending.

Court of Appeals of Virginia

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 041723, Court of Appeals of Virginia. Judgment entered May 1, 2024.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 190324, Court of Appeals of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 191124, Court of Appeals of Virginia. Pending.

Supreme Court of Virginia

Writ of Mandamus, No. 230463, Supreme Court of Virginia. Judgment entered July 17, 2023.

Writ of Prohibition, No. 230464, Supreme Court of Virginia. Judgment entered July 17, 2023.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 240539, Supreme Court of Virginia. Judgment entered October 22, 2024.

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

In re Malloy, No. 3:2023-bk-33442, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 3:2023-ap-03043, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Napier, No. 3:2025-ap-03022, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00002, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered November 19, 2024.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00058, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered January 31, 2024.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00059, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00170, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered November 21, 2024.

Malloy v. Unknown, No. 3:2024-cv-00171, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered June 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Kane, No. 3:2024-cv-00200, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered March 11, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00477, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered February 6, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00727, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered April 3, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00728, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered January 30, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00729, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024. Judgment entered May 13, 2025.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00778, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00779, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 19, 2024. Corrected Judgment entered May 14, 2025.

Malloy v. Taylor, No. 3:2024-cv-00785, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00786, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00788, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 19, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00790, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 19, 2024.

Malloy v. Napier, No. 3:2024-cv-00791, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00792, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 19, 2024.

Malloy v. Napier, No. 3:2024-cv-00793, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Lafayette, No. 3:2024-cv-00794, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00795, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Davoli, No. 3:2024-cv-00796, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00797, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated December 18, 2024.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00828, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated January 13, 2025. Judgment entered January 30, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00832, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Cases consolidated January 13, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2024-cv-00890, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered July 18, 2025.

Malloy v. Huennekens, No. 3:2024-cv-00891, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered February 28, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00021, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered June 9, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00104, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered February 13, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00300, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered March 25, 2026.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00416, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered August 8, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00417, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Vogel et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00525, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered March 19, 2026.

Malloy v. Napier, No. 3:2025-cv-00534, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Judgment entered July 11, 2025.

Malloy v. Broscious, No. 3:2025-cv-00760, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Broscious, No. 3:2025-cv-00780, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Broscious, No. 3:2025-cv-00781, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Freeman, No. 3:2025-cv-00834, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2025-cv-00866, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Vogel Law Group PLC et al., No. 3:2026-cv-00021, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Freeman, No. 3:2026-cv-00022, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2026-cv-00082, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 3:2026-cv-00083, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pending.

**United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit**

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 24-1201, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered July 29, 2024.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 24-1451, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered July 30, 2024.

Malloy v. Unknown, No. 24-1664, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered July 28, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 24-2271, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 1, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 24-2272, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 1, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1067, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 1, 2025.

Malloy v. Schelin et al., No. 25-1208, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1234, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 1, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1275, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Kane v. Malloy, No. 25-1389, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Huennekens v. Malloy, No. 25-1695, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1700, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1793, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Napier v. Malloy, No. 25-1932, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1529, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 30, 2025.

Schelin et al. v. Malloy, No. 25-1973, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered December 1, 2025.

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INTRODUCTION

This case presents a structural defect in the administration of federal bankruptcy law: lower courts are conclusively determining the scope of the automatic stay while simultaneously insulating those determinations from appellate review.

In the proceedings below, the bankruptcy court denied motions for protective relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), holding that its prior remand order permitted (i) entry and docketing of a state-court judgment affecting estate property and (ii) continuation of appellate proceedings against the debtor. Those rulings resolved, definitively and finally, the scope of the automatic stay as applied to petitioner.

Yet the district court dismissed petitioner's appeals for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court's orders were not final. In one instance, the district court further held that the appeal became moot after the state court entered judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's orders did not "definitively dispose of discrete disputes."

The result is a procedural regime in which orders defining the scope of the automatic stay are never subject to appellate review: before enforcement, they are deemed non-final; after enforcement, they are deemed moot.

This "finality-or-mootness trap" ensures that a bankruptcy court's definitive interpretation of the automatic stay—one of the most consequential protections in federal law—can evade review entirely.

That regime cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions in *Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank*, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), and *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 589 U.S. 35 (2020). Those decisions establish that discrete disputes within bankruptcy—particularly those concerning the automatic stay—must be immediately appealable once resolved.

The decision below narrows that rule in a way that will affect bankruptcy proceedings nationwide. This Court's review is warranted.

OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the dismissal of petitioner's consolidated appeals, is reproduced in the appendix, App., *infra*, 3a.

The memorandum opinions and orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, dismissing petitioner's bankruptcy appeals for lack of jurisdiction and, in one instance, as moot, are reproduced in the appendix, App., *infra*, 8a, 10a, 28a, and 30a.

The orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denying petitioner's motions for protective relief are also reproduced in the appendix, App., *infra*, 24a and 40a.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered judgment on December 1,

2025, affirming the dismissal of petitioner's bankruptcy appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc on December 30, 2025.

This petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The following provisions are directly implicated by the question presented.

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—

- (1) the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor ...;
- (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
- (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate."

Section 158(a) of Title 28 provides, in relevant part: “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals— (1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees; ... of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title.”

Section 1254(1) of Title 28 provides, in relevant part: “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil ... case.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

This case arises from a dispute concerning petitioner’s primary residence in Powhatan County, Virginia. Respondents, Kristin E. Schelin and Mark A. Watson, initiated state-court litigation seeking relief related to a real estate transaction involving that property.

On October 5, 2023, petitioner filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The filing triggered the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which prohibits the commencement or continuation of judicial proceedings against the debtor and protects property of the estate from collection and enforcement activity.

Following the bankruptcy filing, the state-court litigation was removed to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court subsequently entered an order

remanding the matter to the Powhatan County Circuit Court, while modifying the automatic stay to permit respondents to "continue the State Court Litigation to a final judgment," subject to the condition that respondents seek further relief from the bankruptcy court before executing on any judgment.

After remand, respondents proceeded with the state-court litigation. As the litigation progressed, petitioner sought to preserve the protections of the automatic stay with respect to both the enforcement of any resulting judgment and the continuation of litigation beyond the scope authorized by the remand order.

First, after respondents sought entry and docketing of a state-court judgment that could operate as a lien against petitioner's property, petitioner filed an emergency motion for protective order requesting that the bankruptcy court prohibit such actions as violations of § 362(a). Petitioner argued that the automatic stay barred acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens against property of the estate.

Second, after entry of judgment, respondents initiated appellate proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Petitioner filed a second emergency motion for protective order, asserting that the automatic stay prohibits the "continuation" of judicial proceedings against the debtor and that this prohibition extends to appellate proceedings.

In both instances, the bankruptcy court denied relief. It interpreted its prior remand order as permitting not only continuation of the litigation to judgment, but also the subsequent steps necessary to effectuate that judgment and to continue the litigation through the appellate process. In doing so, the bankruptcy court definitively determined the scope of the automatic stay as applied to petitioner's case.

B. Procedural History

Petitioner timely appealed both protective-order denials to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

In the first appeal, arising from the denial of protective relief relating to the entry and docketing of judgment, the district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court's order was not a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

In the second appeal, arising from the denial of protective relief relating to the continuation of appellate proceedings, the district court likewise dismissed the appeal as non-final. In addition, the district court held, in the alternative, that the appeal was moot following the entry of judgment in the state court.

Petitioner appealed both dismissals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court of appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The

court held that the bankruptcy court's orders did not "definitively dispose of discrete disputes" within the bankruptcy case and therefore were not final under *Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 589 U.S. 35 (2020). The court further concluded that petitioner had not demonstrated grounds for interlocutory review.

Petitioner sought rehearing and rehearing en banc. The court of appeals denied rehearing on December 30, 2025.

This petition followed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Decision Below Creates a Structural Defect in Appellate Review

This case presents a structural defect in federal bankruptcy law: courts are conclusively determining the scope of the automatic stay while foreclosing appellate review of those determinations.

The bankruptcy court here resolved, definitively and finally, whether the automatic stay permitted respondents to proceed with litigation and appellate activity against petitioner. Those rulings immediately authorized respondents to continue litigation against the debtor notwithstanding the automatic stay.

Yet petitioner was denied appellate review at every stage. The district court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court's orders were not final and, in one

instance, that the appeal was moot after judgment was entered. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's orders were not final and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

The result is a regime in which determinations of the scope of the automatic stay evade appellate review entirely. Before enforcement occurs, such orders are deemed non-final. After enforcement occurs, they are deemed moot. This "finality-or-mootness trap" ensures that a bankruptcy court's definitive interpretation of the automatic stay can never be reviewed.

That outcome is incompatible with the structure of federal appellate jurisdiction.

II. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Framework Governing Bankruptcy Finality

This Court has repeatedly rejected rigid notions of finality in bankruptcy in favor of a functional approach that focuses on whether a discrete dispute has been conclusively resolved. *Bullard*, 575 U.S. at 501; *Ritzen*, 589 U.S. at 37.

In *Ritzen*, the Court held that litigation concerning the automatic stay constitutes a "procedural unit anterior to, and separate from, claim-resolution proceedings," and that an order resolving such litigation is immediately appealable. 589 U.S. at 40-41.

The orders at issue here fall squarely within that framework.

Each order resolved a discrete dispute: whether the automatic stay permitted litigation against the debtor to proceed, including entry of judgment and continuation of appellate proceedings. In the first order, the bankruptcy court held that its prior ruling authorized the entry and docketing of a state-court judgment affecting estate property. In the second, it held that the same ruling authorized continuation of appellate proceedings.

Those determinations were not preliminary, advisory, or contingent. They were definitive interpretations of the scope of the automatic stay, and they immediately altered the parties' legal rights.

Under *Ritzen*, that is the end of the analysis. The dispute was resolved; the order was final.

The Fourth Circuit nevertheless held that these orders did not "definitively dispose of discrete disputes." That conclusion cannot be reconciled with *Ritzen's* reasoning. If a bankruptcy court's definitive determination of whether litigation may proceed against the debtor is not a "discrete dispute," it is difficult to identify what would qualify.

The decision below thus narrows this Court's precedent by drawing an artificial distinction between different forms of stay-related rulings—treating some as final while excluding others that have identical functional consequences.

III. The Decision Below Creates An Appellate Review Void

The most serious problem with the decision below is not merely that it misapplies *Ritzen*, but that it creates a category of orders that are effectively immune from appellate review.

The interaction between non-finality and mootness produces a predictable and recurring result. When a bankruptcy court permits litigation to proceed, an appeal taken immediately is dismissed as interlocutory. If the appellant waits until the consequences of that ruling materialize—such as the entry of judgment or continuation of appellate proceedings—the appeal is dismissed as moot.

That is precisely what occurred here. The district court dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court's order was not final. It dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the same ground and, in the alternative, as moot. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's orders were not final and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

This sequence ensures that no court will ever review the merits of the stay determination.

This Court has repeatedly intervened where procedural doctrines operate to preclude meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., *Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter*, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (emphasizing the

importance of preserving avenues for review of significant legal questions). See also *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975) (recognizing review where issues would otherwise evade effective appellate review).

The automatic stay is not a peripheral procedural device. It is a central feature of federal bankruptcy law. Allowing definitive interpretations of its scope to evade appellate review undermines the uniformity and predictability of the bankruptcy system.

IV. The Decision Undermines the Automatic Stay

The automatic stay is a central feature of federal bankruptcy law. It preserves estate property, prevents piecemeal litigation, and ensures centralized resolution of claims.

The bankruptcy court's rulings permitted both the entry of judgment affecting estate property and the continuation of appellate proceedings against the debtor. These are precisely the types of actions the stay is designed to halt absent proper relief under § 362(d).

By insulating such determinations from appellate review, the decision below weakens the uniform application of the automatic stay and creates uncertainty in its enforcement.

V. The Question Presented Is Recurring and Important

Disputes concerning the scope of the automatic stay arise frequently in bankruptcy proceedings nationwide. Courts regularly determine whether particular actions—such as appeals, enforcement measures, or post-judgment proceedings—are permitted under § 362(a).

If such determinations are treated as non-final and later as moot, they will consistently evade appellate review. This problem is not limited to this case but is inherent in the interaction between finality and mootness doctrines.

This Court's intervention is necessary to ensure that its bankruptcy finality framework is applied consistently and that meaningful appellate review remains available. Absent review, this question will continue to arise while consistently evading appellate resolution.

VI. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle

This case presents a clean and purely legal issue: whether orders determining the scope of the automatic stay are final and whether they may be rendered unreviewable through procedural doctrines.

The issue was preserved at every stage and decided squarely by the court of appeals.

No jurisdictional obstacles or alternative grounds would prevent this Court from resolving the question presented.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ka' followed by a long, sweeping horizontal stroke.

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March 30, 2026