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ORDER, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (JULY 16, 2025)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS*,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 25-1808
D.C. No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK
Central District of California, Los Angeles

Before: SILVERMAN, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The motion (Docket Entry No. 5) for summary disposition is granted. *See* 9th Cir. R. 3-6(a) (standard for summary disposition); *United States v. Hooton*, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1982).

The district court's judgment is affirmed.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

* Note: The Appellant filed the case under the name of the sole proprietorship BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS® but the court removed the registered mark symbol in its case caption.

ORDER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (FEBRUARY 27, 2025)

closed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS*

v.

UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Case No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK

Before: The Honorable R. Gary KLAUSNER, United States District Judge.

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Proceedings: **(IN CHAMBERS) Order Re: Plaintiff's Motions [DEs 27, 32]**

I. Introduction and Background

This is an action brought by Brandon Joe Williams ("Plaintiff")—a "natural person" who, despite being

* Note: The Appellant filed the case under the name of the sole proprietorship BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS® but the court removed the registered mark symbol in its case caption·

born in Indiana, identifies as a "foreign national of the Nation of the Amnesty Coalition" and not a citizen of any state or country, and therefore not subject to this Court's or any court's jurisdiction—on behalf of "BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS ®"—a "public corporation" in Plaintiff's name that was purportedly created at the time of Plaintiffs birth "as a buffer or flow-through for all commercial transactions" by Plaintiff (ECF No. 1-1.)

In May of 2020, the United States Small Business Administration ("Defendant") gave Plaintiff an Economic Injury Disaster Loan. On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter notifying Defendant that the loan was void and "ordering" Defendant to discharge the loan, according to incoherent interpretations of the Uniform Commercial Code. Unsurprisingly, Defendant did not heed Plaintiff's orders. Consequently, on September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in state court, asserting various contract and tort claims seeking recission of the loan and $2 million in damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) On November 5, 2024, Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(4 (ECF No. 1.)

On December 30, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, finding that Defendant's removal was proper because the action was filed against a United States agency, and that dismissal was warranted for failure to state a claim, noting that the Complaint relied on unintelligible arguments commonly brought by sovereign citizens, which courts have uniformly rejected. (ECF No. 23.) Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs "Motion for Leave to File a Response in

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and to Vacate Void Order" and "Motion to Void Order for the Original Remanding from State to Federal Court as well as the Judgment." (ECF Nos. 27, 32.) While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's order denying remand and granting dismissal. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motions.

II. Judicial Standard

While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 controls amending final judgments, Local Rule 7-18 controls reconsideration of court orders. *See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr.*, 869 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1989). A motion for reconsideration should only be granted in "highly unusual circumstances." *Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.*, 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold*, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). Local Rule 7-18 provides:

> A motion for reconsideration of an Order on any motion or application may be made only on the grounds of (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the time the Order was entered, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the Order was entered, or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before the Order was entered.

C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's Order denying remand and dismissing his claims with prejudice. He appears to argue that the Court erred by simply concluding that his pleadings and papers were unintelligible without affording him the opportunity to clarify, either at a hearing or through additional pleadings and papers. While there are multiple issues with this argument, the Court need only address one: Plaintiff does not even attempt to explain how this purported error fits into the limited grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiff does not cite Rule 59 or Local Rule 7-18. Plaintiff simply appears to demand an opportunity to relitigate the motions, which is not proper grounds for reconsideration. Indeed, Plaintiff does not appear to cite any relevant legal authority across either of his Motions.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES his Motions.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JRE/sf
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ORDER, U.S. DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (DECEMBER 30, 2024)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS*

v.

UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Case No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK

JS-6

Before: The Honorable R. Gary KLAUSNER, United States District Judge.

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [DEs 8, 12]

I. Introduction and Background

This is an action brought by Brandon Joe Williams ("Plaintiff")—a "natural person" who, despite being

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born in Indiana, identifies as a "foreign national of the Nation of the Amnesty Coalition" and not a citizen of any state or country, and therefore not subject to this Court's or any court's jurisdiction—on behalf of "BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS ®"—a "public corporation" in Plaintiff's name that was purportedly created at the time of Plaintiffs birth "as a buffer or flow-through for all commercial transactions" by Plaintiff. (Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1.)

In May of 2020, the United States Small Business Administration ("Defendant") gave Plaintiff an Economic Injury Disaster Loan. On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter notifying Defendant that the loan was void and "ordering" Defendant to discharge the loan, according to incoherent interpretations of the Uniform Commercial Code. Unsurprisingly, Defendant did not heed Plaintiff's orders. Consequently, on September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in state court, asserting various contract and tort claims seeking recission of the loan and $2 million in damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) On November 5, 2024, Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.)

Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8; Pl.'s Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion. Because Plaintiffs Motion to Remand challenges the Court's jurisdiction, the Court first addresses Plaintiffs Motion.

II. Motion to Remand

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a civil action filed in state court can be removed if the action is against "[t]he United States or any agency thereof . . . , for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To establish that removal is proper under § 1442(a)(1), the removing defendant must "demonstrate that (a) it is a person within the meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer's directions, and plaintiff's claims; and (c.) it can assert a colorable federal defense." *Stirling v. Minasian*, 955 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Unlike the federal question removal statute, § 1442(a)(1) "must be liberally construed in favor of removal." *Id.* (citations omitted).

Here, Defendant clearly meets each of these requirements. First, Defendant is a person within the meaning of the statute, as it is a United States agency. Second, there is a causal nexus between Defendant's agency actions and Plaintiff's claims, as Plaintiff's claims relate to Defendant's issuance and administration of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan. And finally, Defendant has a colorable federal defense. Namely, Defendant may assert that Plaintiff's contract claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and that his tort claims fail to meet the various jurisdictional requirements set forth by the Federal Tort Claims Act. *See Vacek v. US. Postal Serv.*, 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The United States, as sovereign, can only be sued to the extent it has waived its sovereign immunity."); *Jerves v. United States*, 966 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the False Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immu-

nity only if the plaintiff first exhausted his administrative remedies).

Plaintiff does not meaningfully dispute that these requirements are met. Instead, Plaintiff makes various arguments about the lack of federal claims, Defendant's status as a federal agency, Plaintiffs desire to have his claims be governed by the California Commercial Code, the distinctions between incorporated and unincorporated entities, principles of federalism, and Plaintiff's distaste for the term "sovereign citizen"—a term used to describe individuals who believe they are not under state or federal jurisdiction who commonly advance frivolous arguments in attempting to evade taxes, debts, and even criminal liability. These arguments are meritless and irrelevant.

Accordingly, the Court finds that removal under § 1442(a)(1) was proper and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

III. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss each of Plaintiff's claims, arguing that they are barred by sovereign immunity and inadequately pled. The Court agrees.

To put it bluntly, Plaintiffs Complaint is unintelligible. Plaintiff's claims rely on various strange, legally unsound arguments based on commercial codes, citizenship (or the purported lack thereof), and corporate statuses to conclude that he should be allowed to not just rescind his loan and have his debt cancelled, but also receive $2 million in unexplainable damages. These arguments are highly similar to those made by sovereign citizens, which courts have uniformly rejected. *See, e.g., Snead v. Chase Home Fin. LLC*, 2007 WL

1851674, at *3—4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) ("The complaint is largely unintelligible, consisting of unrecognizable citations and legal terminology . . . . [T]he Court hereby admonishes Plaintiff that [her] arguments are legally frivolous."). The Court sees no reason why Plaintiff's arguments in this case should fare better. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even oppose Defendant's Motion, thereby consenting to dismissal under Local Rule 7-12. C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 ("[F]ailure to file any required document . . . may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion.").

Accordingly. the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DISMISSES the action in its entirety.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES the action in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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