

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
NOV - 4 2025
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 25-1178

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re Rued, et al, Petitioners

*On Petition for Writ of Prohibition to the Eighth
Circuit*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

Joseph Daryll Rued;
Scott Daryll Rued;
Leah Jean Rued
Common Contact Point:
9007 Avila Cove
Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(239)276-4056
rued.joseph@yahoo.com
Pro Se Petitioners

RECEIVED
APR - 9 2026
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioners' actions seeking enforcement of federal rights and law were dismissed and denied based upon demonstrable fraud by the district court regarding Petitioners' Complaints and Petition. The essential determinations supporting dismissals and denial were explicitly based upon factual assertions purportedly derived solely from respective Petitioners' pleadings, namely that Petitioners' Complaint stated that a Petitioner "argued" the perjury of one Defendant-Respondent to another and that Habeas Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus sought relief from child-custody determinations. The face of the records demonstrates that Petitioners' Complaint(s) provide no possible support for assertions of the district court essential to dismissal and that Habeas Petitioner's Petition seeks relief only from unconstitutionally imposed physical confinement, necessitating that assertions otherwise are fully fabricated by the district court. Petitioners appealed and sought prohibition issuance at the Eighth Circuit, which summarily affirmed the district court and denied extraordinary relief, and sought certiorari here.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:

Should a writ of prohibition issue as a matter of right to the Eighth Circuit against sustaining actions that have no basis in any genuine case or controversy before the Eighth Circuit or district court below for failing to comply with U.S. Const. Art. III requirements for federal judicial action?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are Joseph Rued, a person and father, for all relief sought and Scott Rued, a person and grandfather, and Leah Rued, a person and grandmother, for all relief sought except for relief related to Habeas Corpus proceedings.

Direct Respondents to Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Prohibition are Judges of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: Judge Loken, Judge Gruender, and Judge Kobes. Indirect Respondents to Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Prohibition are Judge Bond, Judge Hatcher, Judge Hudson, Judge Klaphake, Judge Larson, Judge McKeig, Judge Worke, and Referee Stebbins, Jaykumar Jayswal, a person and Hennepin County CPS Investigator, Lesley Karnes, a person and Scott County CPS Investigator, Suzanne Arnston, a person and Deputy Director of Scott County CPS, Julie Swanson, a person and Scott County CPS Supervisor, Anne Gearity, a person and participant of Governor's CPS Task Force, Ryan Kuffel, a person and Eden Prairie Police Officer, Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department, a person and county department, Scott County Health and Human Services, a person and county department, Judy Weigman, a person and forensic interviewer with CornerHouse, Minnesota Department of Human Services, also known as Minnesota Department of Children, Youth, and Families, a state agency, Nancy Brasel, a person that is also a federal judicial officer, Leonard Steven Grasz,

a person that is also a federal judicial officer, Bobby Shepherd, a person that is also a federal judicial officer, David Stras, a person that is also a federal judicial officer, Mike Furnstahl, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Renee Worke, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Roger Klaphake, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Charles Webber, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Richard Stebbins, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Charlene Hatcher, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Jon Schmidt, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Nelson Peralta, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Christian Sande, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Carrie Lennon, a person that is also a state judicial officer, and Natalie Hudson, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Captain Pearson, a Shakopee Police Officer, Alec Sloan, a person that is also a Minnesota Attorney General Officer; Keith Ellison, a person that is also the Minnesota Attorney General, Charlie Alden, a person and attorney at Gilbert Alden Barbosa, PLLC, Beth Barbosa, a person and attorney at Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, a person and law firm, CornerHouse, a person and county and municipal forensic affiliate in CPS investigations, Leonardo Castro, a person that is also a state judicial officer, Hennepin County Clerk of Court, a state agency, and Catrina Rued, a person, mother, and client of Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

- *Joseph D. Rued v. Catrina M. Rued*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 22-702
- *In Re the Marriage of Catrina Rued and Joseph Rued*, Minnesota Court of Appeals Nos. A21-0798; A21-1064; A22-0812; A23-0715; A25-0209
- *Joseph Daryll Rued and on Behalf of minor child W.O.R and Catrina Marie Rued, et al*, Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A22-0593
- *Joseph Daryll Rued and on Behalf of minor child W.O.R and Catrina Marie Rued, et al*, Hennepin County Court No. 70-FA-21-13336
- *In Re the Marriage of Catrina Rued and Joseph Rued*, Minnesota Court No. 27-FA-16-6330
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al* Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-24-4238
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber* Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-24-7810
- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 23-CV-02685

- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 23-CV-03092
- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 23-986
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al*, Hennepin County District Court No. 27-CV-24-5845; Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-3662 (JWB/DJF)
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A24-1740; A25-0057
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Charles Webber*, Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court Nos. A24-1706; A24-2035
- *Joseph Rued, also o/b/o W.O.R., a minor child v. Catrina Rued, et al*, Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court Nos. A24-1705; A24-1905
- *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1620
- *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al I*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-2437 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1623

- *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al II*, Minnesota District Court No. 24-CV-3409 (JRT/TNL) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1651
- *Rued, et al, v. Judge Charlene Hatcher, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 25-CV-0468 (JRT/ECW) and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1614
- *In re Rued, et al I*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1593
- *In re Rued, et al II*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1594
- *In re Rued, et al III*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1597
- *In re Rued, et al IV*, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1598
- *Rued, et al, v. Jayswal, et al*, Minnesota District Court No. 25-CV-3333 (PJS/DLM)
- *Rued, et al, v. Jayswal, et al*, Supreme Court of the United States No. 25A571

Related Cases

- *Joseph Rued, et al v. Charlene Hatcher, et al*. Supreme Court of the United States No. 23A829

- *Joseph Rued v. Commissioner of Human Services*, Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A22-1420; Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A25-0831
- *Joseph Rued v. Commissioner of Human Services*, Scott County District Court No. 70-CV-22-7318
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner* Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A23-0044; A23-1754; A24-0759; A24-0982
- *In Re Joseph Rued, Petitioner* Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-1754; A23-1755; A23-1936; A24-0719 A24-0759; A24-0982
- *In Re Petitioners Scott Rued and Joseph Rued, In Re Complaint Against 041423, A Minnesota Attorney*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-1004
- *In Re Complaint Against 041423, A Minnesota Attorney*, Minnesota Supreme Court No. A23-0614
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*, Hennepin County District Court No. 27-JV-18-5395
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*,

Hennepin County District Court No. 27-JV-25-1195

- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C.M.R. and J.D.R.*, Minnesota Court of Appeals No. A25-0935; A25-1150; A25-1175
- *In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: Catrina M. Rued and Joseph D. Rued*, Scott County District Court No. 70-JV-25-7699

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED	i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING	ii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS	iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	xv
OPINIONS BELOW	1
JURISDICTION	1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	4
I. PROCEDURAL PREFACE REGARDING THIS PROCEEDING	4
II. THE CASE	7
III. REASONS THE LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIARY IS ACTING ABSENT ANY IDENTIFIABLE NEXUS TO CASES ACTUALLY BEFORE SUCH COURTS OR GENUINE CONTROVERSIES THEREIN AND RELEVANT CONTEXT	14

REASONS WRIT OF PROHIBITION SHOULD ISSUE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT	34
I. RELIEF SOUGHT	34
II. ISSUES PRESENTED	35
III. FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS PETITION	37
IV. REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE ...	38
CONCLUSION	41
APPENDIX	
Appendix A	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1620; 25-1623; and 25-1651 (April 9, 2025)	-1-
Appendix B	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1614 (April 9, 2025)	-5-
Appendix C	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1593 (March 31, 2025)	-7-
Appendix D	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1594 (March 31, 2025)	-8-
Appendix E	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1597 (March 31, 2025)	-9-
Appendix F	
Order and Judgement, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1598 (March 31, 2025)	-10-
Appendix G	
Order on Petition for Rehearing, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1620; 25-1623; and 25- 1651 (May 6, 2025)	-11-

Appendix H	
Order on Petition for Rehearing, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1614 (June 4, 2025)	-13-
Appendix I	
Order on Petition for Rehearing, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1593; 25-1594; 25-1597; 25-1598 (May 14, 2025)	-14-
Appendix J	
Mandate, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1620; 25-1623; and 25-1651 (May 14, 2025)	-16-
Appendix K	
Mandate, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1614 (June 12, 2025)	-18-
Appendix L	
Mandate, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1593; 25-1594; 25-1597; 25-1598 (March 31, 2025)	-19-
Appendix M	
Order, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-1763 (JRT/TNL) (March 11, 2025)	-21-
Appendix N	
Judgement, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-1763 (JRT/TNL) (March 13, 2025)	-30-
Appendix O	
Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-1763 (JRT/TNL) (November 6, 2024)	-32-
Appendix P	
Order, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-2437 (JRT/TNL) (March 11, 2025)	-55-
Appendix Q	
Judgement, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-2437 (JRT/TNL) (March 12, 2025)	-58-
Appendix R	

Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-2437 (JRT/TNL) (November 1, 2024)	-60-
Appendix S	
Order, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL) (March 11, 2025)	-73-
Appendix T	
Judgement, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL) (March 14, 2025)	-78-
Appendix U	
Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL) (November 22, 2024)	-80-
Appendix V	
Order, Minnesota District Court No. 25-cv-0468 (JRT/ECW) (March 11, 2025)	-102-
Appendix W	
Judgement, Minnesota District Court No. 25-cv-0468 (JRT/ECW) (March 12, 2025)	-105-
Appendix X	
Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-0468 (JRT/ECW) (February 7, 2025)	-107-
Appendix Y	
Petitioners' Petition for Rehearing, at the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 25-1593; 25-1594; 25-1597; 25-1598; 25-1614; 25-1620; 25-1623; 25-1651 (April 14, 2025)	-112-
Appendix Z	
Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Objections to Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-1763 (JRT/TNL) (November 18, 2025)	-137-
Appendix AA	
Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Objections to Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No.	

24-cv-2437 (JRT/TNL) (November 15, 2025)	-168-
Appendix BB Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Objections to Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL) (December 5, 2025)	-172-
Appendix CC Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Objections to Report and Recommendation, Minnesota District Court No. 24-cv-0468 (JRT/ECW) (February 10, 2025)	-187-
Appendix DD Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Memorandum Supporting Motion to Amend/Alter/For Additional Findings and/or Relief from Judgement for Fraud and Fraud Upon the Court and For Lack of Jurisdiction in 24-cv-1763, 24-cv-2437, and 24- cv-3409 (JRT/TNL) (undocketed by the district court and included in Eighth Circuit records as attachment to Petitioners' Petitions for Writs of Prohibition (25-1593; 25-1594; 25-1597) and as cited and included in appendix to Petition for Rehearing (25-1620; 25-1623; 25-1651)) (March 25, 2025)	-203-
Appendix EE Petitioners' Memorandum Supporting Motion to Amend/Alter/For Additional Findings and/or Relief from Judgement for Fraud and Fraud Upon the Court and For Lack of Jurisdiction in 24-cv-0468 (JRT/ECW) (undocketed by the district court and included in Eighth Circuit records as attachment to Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Prohibition (25- 1598) and as cited and included in appendix to	

Petition for Rehearing (25-1614) (March 25, 2025)	-252-
Appendix FF	
Segment of Petitioners' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Responsive Motion to Deny Persons that are also state judicial officer Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Emergency and Temporary Claims (24-2437 (JRT/TNL)) (July 30, 2024)	-282-
Appendix GG	
Segment of Petitioners' Memorandum of Law Supporting Plaintiffs' Responsive Motion to Deny CornerHouse's Motion to Dismiss (24-3409 (JRT/TNL)) (October 21, 2024)	-295-
Appendix HH	
Joseph Rued's October 22, 2025 Declaration Supporting Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Alternative Relief Sought (October 22, 2025)	-299-
Appendix II	
Psychological Opinion Pursuant to Defendants Stebbins' and Hatcher's Directives (24-CV-2437 (misfiled by Clerk—the record contains attempts to correct from Plaintiffs that were ignored) R.Doc.21 on 49-58) (January 20, 2023)	-303-
Appendix JJ	
Declaration of Psychological Expert Supporting Plaintiffs'/Petitioners' Motion for Emergency Restraining Order (24-CV-2437 (misfiled by Clerk—the record contains attempts to correct from Plaintiffs that were ignored) R.Doc.21 on 41-43) (June 23, 2024)	-314-

Appendix KK	
Transcript of Video Recording of W.O.R. Upon Discovery Defendant Webber Ordered W.O.R. Into Catrina Rued's Care After W.O.R. had Testified to Abuse Being Suffered Therein (November 1, 2021)	-318-
Appendix LL	
Declaration of Joseph Rued (December 22, 2025)	-323-
Appendix MM	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (February 7, 2024)	-328-
Appendix NN	
Declaration of Joseph Rued (December 22, 2025)	-330-
Appendix OO	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (December 5, 2025)	-332-
Appendix PP	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (January 23, 2026)	-334-
Appendix QQ	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (February 13, 2026)	-336-
Appendix RR	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (February 26, 2026)	-338-
Appendix SS	
Letter from Supreme Court of the United States Office of the Clerk of Court (February 26, 2026)	-340-

Appendix TT
 Petitioners' Motion to Direct the United States
 Supreme Court Clerk of Court to File Either or
 Both of Petitioners' Petitions for Extraordinary
 Writ (Re-)Submitted on January 7, 2026
 (citations to appendix therein relating to the
 appendix with the motion filing)
 (February 19, 2026) -342-

Appendix UU
 Letter from Supreme Court of the United States
 Office of the Clerk of Court
 (March 16, 2026) -387-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937) 38

Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover,
 359 U.S. 500, (1959) 26

Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,
 410 U.S. 484 (1973) 13

Caldwell v. DeWoskin,
 831 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 2016) 10

City of Boerne v. Flores,
 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) 16

Dennis v. Sparks,
 449 U.S. 24 (1980) 26

<i>Duncan v. Walker</i> , 533 U.S. 167, 176, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2126, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001)	13
<i>Ex parte Oklahoma</i> , 220 U.S. 191, 31 S. Ct. 426, 431, 55 L. Ed. 431 (1911)	36
<i>Ex Parte United States</i> , 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916)	40
<i>Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.</i> , 544 U.S. 280 (2005)	10
<i>Hageman v. Barton</i> , 817 F.3d 611, 615 (8th Cir. 2016)	10
<i>Halloran v. Blue and White Liberty Cab Co. Inc.</i> , 253 Minn. 436, 442 (Minn. 1958)	10
<i>Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, California</i> , 411 U.S. 345 (1973)	13
<i>Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.</i> , 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975)	10
<i>In re Rice, Petitioner</i> , 155 U.S. 396, 402-03, 15 S. Ct. 149, 152, 39 L. Ed. 198 (1894)	35
<i>In re State of S.D.</i> , 692 F.2d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 1982)	35
<i>Jones v. Cunningham</i> ,	

371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963)	13
<i>Kalina v. Fletcher</i> ,	
522 U.S. 118 (1997)	26
<i>Kimble v. Swackhamer</i> ,	
439 U.S. 1385, 1385, 99 S. Ct. 51, 53, 58 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1978)	40
<i>Lance v. Dennis</i> ,	
546 U.S. 459, 464, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1201, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1059 (2006)	12
<i>Larson v. Domestic Foreign Corp.</i> ,	
337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949)	26
<i>Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children's Servs. Agency</i> ,	
458 U.S. 502, 502-03, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3233, 73 L. Ed. 2d 928 (1982)	12
<i>Loving v. United States</i> ,	
517 U.S. 748 (1996)	40
<i>Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.</i> ,	
494 U.S. 545, 550 (1990)	26
<i>Mach v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co.</i> ,	
866 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. 2015)	10
<i>Marbury v. Madison</i> ,	
5 U.S. 137, 163, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)	40
<i>Marks v. United States</i> ,	
430 U.S. 188, 192, 97 S. Ct. 990, 993, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1977)	39

<i>Martin v. Walton</i> , 368 U.S. 25, 28 (1961)	41
<i>May v. Anderson</i> , 345 U.S. 528, 532 (1953)	13
<i>Merrel Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson</i> , 478 U.S. 804, 827 (1986)	15
<i>Morgan v. United States</i> , 304 U.S. 1, 19, 58 S. Ct. 773, 777, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938)	39
<i>Palmore v. Sidoti</i> , 466 U. S. 429, 432-434 (1984)	33
<i>Petition of U.S.</i> , 263 U.S. 389, 392-93, 44 S. Ct. 130, 131, 68 L. Ed. 351 (1923)	36
<i>Powers v. Ohio</i> , 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)	33
<i>Pulliam v. Allen</i> , 466 U.S. 522, 522-23, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)	26
<i>Santosky v. Kramer</i> , 455 U.S. 745 (1982)	33
<i>Simes v. Huckabee</i> , 354 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir.2004)	10
<i>Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment</i> , 523 U.S. 83, 101-102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)	38

United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
 594 U.S. 1, 28–29, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1988–89, 210 L.
 Ed. 2d 268 (2021) 41

U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall,
 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994) 38

*Washington-S. Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
 Steamboat Co.*,
 263 U.S. 629, 635–36, 44 S. Ct. 220, 222, 68 L. Ed.
 480 (1924) 36

Watson v. City of Memphis,
 373 U.S. 526, 535, 83 S. Ct. 1314, 1319–20, 10 L.
 Ed. 2d 529 (1963) 40

CONSTITUTIONS

U.S. Const. Art. III 2, 12, 14, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38,
 39

U.S. Const. Art. VI § 2, 3 2, 40, 41

U.S. Const. Amend. I 3, 6, 13, 33, 37, 39

U.S. Const. Amend. V 3, 6, 13, 33, 39, 41

U.S. Const. Amend. VII 7, 13, 15, 28, 32, 33

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII 27

U.S. Const. Amend. X 15

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1..... 7, 17, 21, 26

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 5..... 3, 15

STATUTES AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTS

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)..... 1, 36
28 U.S.C. § 1331 7
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) 1, 3
28 U.S.C. § 1651(b) 4
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)..... 3, 36
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)..... 7, 12
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) 2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 7
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 Additions to
§1983 ("FCIA") 13, 15
Minn. Stat. §147.081, subd. 1 and 3(3) 21
Minn. Stat §609.507 14

RULES

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5.1(a)(1)..... 2
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 44 2
U.S. Sup Ct. Rule 20.1 35

U.S. Sup Ct. Rule 29.4(b) 2

**AUTHORITIES INFORMING TRADITIONS OF
WESTERN CIVILIZATION**

Magna Carta (i.e., 'officers of sovereign are subject
to law') 40

Natural Law (i.e., 'do not intentionally harm children'
and 'parents must protect their children') 33

OPINIONS BELOW

Orders below at issue in 25-420 for which Petitioners seek Writ of Prohibition are from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ("EC") in *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al, Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al I and II* (App.-1-), *Rued, et al v. Judge Hatcher, et al* (App.-5-), and *In re Rued, et al I-IV* (App.-7-10-), which were all petitioned for rehearing (App.-112-) and denied (App.-11-14-).

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court for Petitioners' Petition is invoked under §1651(a). The relief sought herein is in support of this Court's appellate jurisdiction under §1254(1) in 25-420. Petitioners filed Petition for Writ of Prohibition related to the following cases at issue in 25-420 on November 4, 2025: *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al* (order and judgement entered April 9, 2025; rehearing denied May 6, 2025; mandate issued May 14, 2025), *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al I and II* (orders and judgements both entered on April 9, 2025; rehearing(s) were denied on May 6, 2025; mandates both issued May 14, 2025), all included in the Appendix ("App.") (App.-1-), *Rued, et al v. Judge Hatcher, et al* (order and judgement entered April 9, 2025; rehearing denied on June 4, 2025; mandate issued June 12, 2025) (App.-5-), and *In re Rued, et al I-IV* (orders, judgements, and mandates all entered March 31, 2025; rehearing(s) were denied on May 14, 2025) (App.-7-10-), which were all petitioned for rehearing (App.-112-) and denied (App.-11-14-). Such Petition was returned with directives to correct and refile within 60 days of December 5, 2026 (App.-333-), which Petitioners complied with regarding lawful directives and timely refiled, which was returned with

new, additional directives to change the jurisdiction section and refile within 60 days of February 13, 2026 (App.-337-). Petitioners timely refile this Petition prior to April 14, 2026 under protest. Petitioners have made notifications required under Rule 29.4(b). 28 U.S.C. §2403(a) may apply—while Petitioners filed necessary notifications under FRCP 5.1(a)(1) and FRAP 44 to initiate certification to the Attorney General, Petitioners have no reason to believe such has occurred in the lower courts.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. Art. III §2

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;

U.S. Const. Art. VI §2 and 3

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

U.S. Const. Amend. I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. Amend. V

nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §5

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

28 U.S.C. §2072(b)

Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

28 U.S.C. §1651

- (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

- (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. PROCEDURAL PREFACE REGARDING THIS PROCEEDING.

Petitioners filed this Petition on November 4, 2025 (App.-332-). The Clerk returned it, requesting changes (App.-332-)—Petitioners complied with requested changes possessing lawful basis and refiled along with a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus directing the Clerk to file this Petition that adequately complies with the Rules of this Court. The Clerk returned the Petition for Writ of Mandamus (*In re Rued, et al, Petitioners, I* (“*IRREAPP*”)) on January 23, 2026 on the basis that the Rules do not allow a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the Court itself (App.-334-), inaccurately reflecting relief petitioned for. The Clerk returned Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*In re Rued, et al, Petitioners, II* (“*IRREAPII*”)) on February 13, 2026, asserting relief also petitioned in the alternative cannot be petitioned in this Court and Rule 9.1 applies to non-attorneys, superseding substantive law and holdings of this Court regarding third-party standing, both of which are unreasonable and constitute violations of the Fifth Amendment, and, if not unreasonable, would impute statutorily prohibited action to this Court (App.-359-360-) and/or unlawful delegation by Congress (App.-383-384-), and requested a new change to the jurisdiction section to be provided within 60 days of the letter to preserve the initial filing date of November 4, 2025 (App.-336-337-).

Seeking to invoke this Court’s supervisory authority over its Clerk to require the Clerk to

construe and apply Rules in concert with Constitutional requirements, Petitioners filed a Motion to direct the Clerk to docket at least *IRREAPII* or *IRREAPI* (App.-342-), refiling such Petitions with the Motion—the Clerk returned Petitioners' Motion (App.-338-) and *IRREAPI* (App.-340-) February 26, 2026, asserting Rules do not provision the specific relief requested in motion or under mandamus (App.-338-; -340-) even though Rules do not provision specifics of any kind of substance for requested relief, under mandamus or motion—the Rules discuss requirements for extraordinary relief to be granted and makes no delineation of *all* actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction provisioning such relief to be requested or basis for the Clerk to reject filings, though Clerk actions are obviously essential to this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. If the Rules were the provisioning source of all requestable relief under mandamus/motion, such rules could not be lawfully promulgated or valid. The Clerk returned *IRREAPII* March 16, 2026 for the same reasons as previously returned.

Petitioners file this Petition, which complies with unlawful Clerk directives under protest—if the Clerk is going to construe and apply the Rules of this Court in concert with Constitutional requirements, which it must do given protected rights of Petitioners and W.O.R. at issue, the assertion of which is dependent upon Constitutionally comporting actions from the Clerk, then all of Petitioners' Petitions (this Petition and *IRREAPI & II*) and Motion must be docketed, but, due to the Clerk's repeated failures to comply with clear Constitutional requirements, Petitioners are filing this Petition, which seeks no relief not also sought in *IRREAPII* and does not

petition for relief also in the alternative or assert W.O.R.'s rights, to ensure some rights at issue are preserved while Petitioners seek the only relief available now that the Clerk has prevented this Court from exercising supervisory authority over its officers so that *IRREAPII* may be docketed and W.O.R.'s rights may be asserted as is proper and Joseph Rued and W.O.R. both possess a right to do and Petitioners may petition this Court for redress in accordance with means available to every other litigant before this Court. Given the Clerk's refusal to docket *IRREAPI & II* and Petitioners' Motion, equitable criterion allowing for redress of such actions by the Clerk violating Constitutional requirements that cannot be attributed to the United States is fulfilled, which Petitioners seek and will have to be granted in accordance with law because the Clerk has no possible defense that such actions as undertaken here could possibly comply with Constitutional requirements upon themselves, individually, or this Court and/or Congress, which will not be sought under supervisory authority or appellate jurisdiction but rather for enforcement of the United States Constitution against Scott Harris' and Pipa Fisher's actions, individually, as actors on behalf of the United States, along with addressing this Court's egregious failure to supervise/train its own Clerks in accordance with such clear duties. In addition to filing this Petition, Petitioners will re-submit *IRREAPI & II* and Petitioners' Motion in conjunction with the filing of such suit seeking prospective enforcement of the Fifth Amendment and other Constitutional requirements for the Clerk to simply docket Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*IRREAPII*) to the Eighth Circuit, including relief petitioned for also in the alternative and on behalf of W.O.R., which the filing of this Petition does not

constitute any waiver regarding. This Petition is filed to preserve some rights of Petitioners and should be replaced by *IRREAPII*, so all actionable rights are preserved.

II. THE CASE

Petitioners sought relief under §1983 for numerous violations of protected rights in *Rued, et al v. Jayswal, et al* (24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) in Minnesota District Court ("MDC"); 25-1620 at EC; and 25-1593 on Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*In re Rued, et al I*)), for an emergency and temporary injunction pending jury determinations on related issues in *Rued, et al v Hudson, et al I* (24-CV-2437 (JRT/TNL); 25-1623; and 25-1594 on Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*In re Rued, et al II*)), and for further violations of federally protected rights related to actions in ongoing state proceedings in *Rued, et al v. Hudson, et al II* (24-CV-3409 (JRT/TNL); 25-1651; and 25-1597 on Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*In re Rued, et al III*)). Petitioner Joseph Rued ("Rued") sought relief for unlawful imposition of physical confinement through habeas corpus in *Rued, et al v. Judge Charlene Hatcher, et al* (25-CV-0468 (JRT/ECW); 25-1614; and 25-1598 on Petition for Writ of Prohibition (*In re Rued, et al IV*)). Jurisdiction in the court of first instance is found through §1331 or, alternatively/additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment in EC cases 25-1620, 25-1623, and 25-1651 and §2254(a) for 25-1614.

MDC determined Petitioners' non-habeas related claims all lacked federal jurisdiction through application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the basis that Petitioners' Complaint(s) assert Rued had argued the fundamental basis of all of Petitioners' claims in initial state child custody proceedings in Hennepin

County ("HC") Family Court (App.-26-; App.-56-; App.-74-). A fundamental thrust of all of Petitioners' claims is that the Minnesota State Courts ("MSC") have systematically prevented the litigation of these federal issues, which fundamentally relate to falsified child abuse investigations by HC Child Protection Services ("CPS"), which the investigator, Indirect Respondent Jayswal ("Jayswal"), has admitted under oath were falsified through his Child in Need of Protection or Services Petition ("CHIPSP") against Rued in culmination of his investigations (App.-119-133-).

Initially, the Reports and Recommendations ("R&R"), which were adopted with additions by MDC, hypothesized Rued must have made arguments related to the fundamental basis of Petitioners' claims to the Minnesota Court of Appeals ("MCOA") (App.-52-). In objections, Petitioners demonstrated that such hypothesis, which was the basis for Rooker-Feldman application, was untrue (App.-143-148-), as Rued was not allowed to present the deposition admissions of Jayswal or to call Jayswal or any of those working with Jayswal as witnesses, despite submitting the deposition and subpoenaing the investigator as a witness in trial, because the state district court did not allow the litigation of such, including through dictating the witnesses and order in which Rued would call such in the order of importance according to the state court's purported view of the case, along with limiting trial time, which was facilitated outside of the record (24-CV-1763 R.Doc.4-5 on 211-212).

Judge Frisch of the MCOA is the first to issue opinion depriving Rued's rights explicitly relying upon Jayswal's admitted perjury—Frisch is not a defendant in any of these cases for which review is sought. None of the relief Petitioners seek targets anything that

Frisch has done, irrespective of legality, or the initial state judgement related to custody, which definitionally did not reach, consider, reject, determine, or do anything related to Jayswal's admitted perjury because such was prohibited from being litigated in MSC, despite Rued's attempts. Both R&R and Orders in the non-habeas related cases from the MDC assert that Judge Frisch's Judgement that did not consider Jayswal's admissions Petitioners' claims are based upon inhibits all of Petitioners' non-habeas claims under Rooker-Feldman.

After it was identified that the hypothesis put forth in the R&R was baseless, as Rued was prevented from raising anything related to Jayswal's admissions of perjury in his CHIPSP in the initial MCOA proceeding (App.-143-165-), the MDC issued Orders applying Rooker-Feldman on the basis that Petitioners' Complaint asserted that Rued had "argued" that Jayswal's CHIPSP was admitted perjury in the initial custody proceedings (App.-26-) to Defendant/Respondent Furnstahl ("Furnstahl"), who, accordingly, must have considered such arguments and such judgement, accordingly, reached such issues which were affirmed by MCOA and, thus, all claims with any relation to Jayswal's perjury admissions must constitute review of Judge Frisch's judgement prohibited under Rooker-Feldman.

However, Rued never "argued" anything related to Jayswal's perjury admissions in this initial trial—Petitioners' Complaint asserts that Rued was prevented from litigating such issues, *at all*, in initial trial or thereafter, despite repeatedly attempting to, including in ongoing proceedings (App.-119-122; App.-207-217-). MDC asserted Petitioners' Complaint in paragraphs 2 and 13 provided the factual basis that is

essential to MDC's dismissal determinations for Petitioners' non-habeas actions, which the face of the records demonstrates to be untrue and fabricated by MDC (App.-119-126-/App.-207-217-/App.-254-266-).

To apply Rooker-Feldman, MDC needed to support nexus from Petitioners' claims to a concluded state judgement—MDC could not cite to any support that Petitioners' claims had been considered, or even mentioned, by any MSC judgement, much less determined by a concluded one, could not support that Rued had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Petitioners' federal claims when he was prevented from calling Jayswal as a witness or submitting Jayswal's deposition admissions, could not support abstention regarding ongoing proceedings given flagrant violations of express Constitutional requirements in bad faith, and could not apply Rooker-Feldman through privity to non-Rued Petitioners' claims, as made clear in Petitioners' Objections to relevant R&R (App.-137-167-; App.-168-171-; App.-172-186-). So, absent any basis to justify application of Rooker-Feldman under the holdings of this Court (*Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 282 (2005)) or EC (*Hageman v. Barton*, 817 F.3d 611, 615 (8th...2016); *Caldwell v. DeWoskin*, 831 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th...2016); *Simes...[at]...829* (8th...2004)), or preclusion (*Halloran v. Blue and White...Cab...253 Minn. 436, 442* (Minn.1958); *Mach v. Wells...925* (Minn.2015)), or any abstention rationale (*Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.*, 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975)), MDC fabricated a fact attempting to justify Rooker-Feldman application, attributing such as asserted in Petitioners' Complaint, which is demonstrably and factually fraudulent.

As MDC dismissed Petitioners' actions based upon what is demonstrable fraud *by MDC*, Petitioners filed motions for relief from the judgements for fraud and fraud upon the court and to amend the orders to comport with Constitutional requirements and facts (App.-203-)-MDC refused to allow such motion(s) (App.-252-) to be filed through MDC's filing restrictions based upon MDC determining Petitioners' actions were frivolous *because* Rooker-Feldman so obviously inhibited such (App.-74-76-), based upon MDC's demonstrable fraud, as if Petitioners should have been aware MDC would commit such frauds prior to the actualization of such.

Rued's (Habeas Petitioner's ("HP")) Petition for relief under habeas corpus was similarly disposed. MDC asserted HP' Petition sought relief from child-custody judgements, not physical confinement, incorporating R&R which included assertions that "Rued is not subject to detention or any other physical restraint" (App.-108-), and claimed habeas relief only lies for those in the custody of wardens (App.-103-). HP are not seeking relief from child-custody judgements—Referee Furnstahl and Judge Frisch are not even named Respondents in HP' Petition, which seeks only relief from physical confinement and restraint imposed by other MSC judges. HP' Petition clearly specifies relief sought is *only* for physical confinement, including from the specific portions cited by MDC as seeking relief from child-custody determinations (App.-123-; App.-124-126-, citing to page 5, continued on page 16 of HP' Petition (App.-263-267-)). Simply reviewing HP' Petition demonstrates such claims by MDC to, again, be fabricated *by MDC* and determinative to the proceeding. There is nothing supporting what MDC cites as custody determinations

being “a form of ‘confinement’” in HP’ Petition or the portions cited by MDC as asserting such—MDC fabricated such facts, *itself*, to support applying *Lehman*...458 U.S. 502, 502-03...(1982), which is based upon §2254 providing relief for unconstitutional confinement/restraint *unshared by the general public*, as is imposed upon HP.

Upon receipt of MDC Orders, Petitioners promptly informed MDC of objections for lack of jurisdiction under Art. III genuine case and controversy requirements for such actions (App.-133-), as MDC had no basis in any genuine case or controversy before it for determinations that Rued “argued” Jayswal’s perjury admissions to Furnstahl or that HP’ Petition sought relief from child-custody determinations, not physical confinement, demonstrable on the face of the records, serving relevant Defendants. Petitioners appealed all of these issues to EC. Additionally, Petitioners sought writs of prohibition from EC to MDC on the basis that actions fabricating essential facts determinative to the proceedings and attributing such to HP’/Petitioners’ Petition/Complaints are not based upon any genuine case and controversy before MDC and, thus, such actions lack Constitutional jurisdictional requirements for federal judicial action.

EC denied all extraordinary writs and summarily affirmed all MDC actions (App.-1-10)—Petitioners Petitioned for Rehearing, raising all of these issues and other relevant issues related to MDC applying Rooker-Feldman to state proceedings that remain ongoing for which concurrent state-federal jurisdiction exists, to claims no state judgement has reached and through privity (*Lance v. Dennis*, 546 U.S. 459, 464...(2006)), along with MDC’s assertion that a

writ of habeas corpus does not lie unless Petitioners are in custody of a warden (*Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 176... (2001); *Jones v. Cunningham*, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963)) who must be the named party, contrary to controlling caselaw (*Hensley*...411 U.S. 345 (1973); *Braden*...410 U.S. 484 (1973)), along with all other issues raised here and denial of Petitioners' Motions for Injunction pending appeal (App.-112-136-).

Petitioners clearly identified the plain nature of the frauds by MDC resulting in actions that are based upon Complaints and a Petition that clearly do not actually exist, for which Constitutionally required jurisdictional requirements for federal judicial action cannot reasonably be fulfilled and for which Petitioners do not fulfill necessary standing requirements with respect to, arbitrary and invidious application of law absent rationale, violations of First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendment requirements, among other issues, including un-provisioned, Constitutionally prohibited Congressional action in passing FCIA relevant to injunction pending completion of proceedings here as well as lack of mootness related to Petitioners' prospective injunctive relief sought. EC denied Petitioners' Petition for Rehearing.

The admittedly perjurious allegations contained in Jayswal's CHIPSP are that Rued's reports regarding W.O.R.'s reports and exhibition of maltreatment, made under threat of neglect charges if reports were *not* made, are false and therefore harmful to W.O.R., and such admitted perjury is the basis penetrating Rued's statutory immunity as a child maltreatment reporter under state law (App.-120-122-) and federally protected parental rights (*May v. Anderson*, 345 U.S. 528, 532 (1953)). The purposes

effected by MSC in initial child custody proceedings were not a fair litigation of the issues related to W.O.R.'s best interests, but rather primarily to ensure that the illegal and fraudulent actions by actors under color of Minnesota law were not exposed (App.-166-), which is why Furnstahl did not explicitly rely on what he was personally aware, but could not legally consider, was admitted fraud and perjury, containing admittedly falsified allegations of child maltreatment (Minn.Stat. §609.507) against Rued, preventing such issues related to abuse and fraud of the government from generally being raised or exposed upon review, and MSC have, thereafter, uniformly declined to reach such issues (App.-118-).

III. REASONS THE LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIARY IS ACTING ABSENT ANY IDENTIFIABLE NEXUS TO CASES ACTUALLY BEFORE SUCH COURTS OR GENUINE CONTROVERSIES THEREIN AND RELEVANT CONTEXT

Judge Tunheim has professional history with the Minnesota government, specifically with the Minnesota Attorney General's Office ("TMAGO"), and no personal connection to Petitioners. Fabricating facts in conspiracy to violate Constitutional requirements and abuse Petitioners, including a child, is extraordinary—the only reasonable explanation for undertaking such indefensible and illegal actions is some involved interest and anticipation such abuses will not be exposed. Absent personal connection with Petitioners, ancillary interests are sourced from Respondents/Defendants, which include federal judicial persons against whom prospective declaratory relief is sought, and state judicial persons. Clearly, MDC motivations for these outrageous and unlawful actions is to help the government and its ilk—judges,

which the Seventh Amendment, trampled by MDC here, should protect against. With respect to the second motivational criterion, given historical lack of discernible executive enforcement against Constitutional abuses of citizens, MDC likely considered repercussions only under appellate review at EC—Judge Loken likely works out of the same building as Judge Tunheim, if not down the hall, and EC possesses the same motivations as MDC to protect fellow judicial persons, and likely considered only certiorari review in this Court wherein bandwidth could not come close to reaching all of the Constitutional abuses below (*Merrel...827* (1986) (dissent)).

MDC further mitigated likelihood of intervention under certiorari criterion by attempting to make it appear the cases turned upon fact, likely not anticipating such would yield jurisdictional addressment, which would be misapprehension fostered by the lack of separations of powers the judiciary wields over attorneys stunting natural development of law digressive from predominate judicial will. Attorneys apparently never even arguing FCIA violates the Tenth Amendment and lacks Enforcement Clause authorization (*City...Boerne v. Flores...507, 519* (1997)) amply demonstrates the chilling effect the judiciary's lack of separations of powers over attorneys has on citizens' rights. Such judicial control of attorneys virtually uniformly operates detrimentally upon citizens' rights, weakening impediment against Constitutional abuse unfound with the inverse—there is no dearth of attorneys challenging inhibitions upon government.

The reasons for the differences are simple—judicial will is not hostile to attorney actions

supporting government interests the way it is against attorney actions restraining judicial power, irrespective of however Constitutionally requisite such actions may be for citizens' and their children's rights. Given lack of separations of power and judicial hostility to erosions of judicial power, attorneys' personal-interest analysis constrains attorneys to practice in areas that judicial will and culture is unhostile to—what the law *is* or requires does not even factor in, inherently culturing systemic Constitutional abuses exhibited here that attorneys are disincentivized to address.

Effects of lifetime federal judicial appointment and judicial immunity are not preserving judicial independence to uphold the Constitution any more than facilitating judicial disregard of the same—the result is no longer fearless application of law, but fearlessness in willfully violating the law. Regarding MSC, there are not enough candidates to run against all of the willful criminals on the bench, and any attorney(s)' attempts to would almost certainly result in judicial blackballing. Additionally, restrictions upon public access to MCOA information, generally limited, until this year, to Courthouse terminals for access beyond orders, resulted in centuries of time being requisite for preponderance of Minnesota's population to educate themselves on what MCOA actually do given information before them for *an* election cycle—one would only be able to ascertain that judges willfully commit fraud and abuse children from the bench if the judges said so in orders, unless one was a party to the case(s), which remains the case for child welfare cases and in family court. The bench has been packed with people that lack the breadth of experience required, resulting in palpable immaturity—Governor

Walz's *attorney*, with as much experience teaching Egyptian band class as relevant legal experience, is on the Supreme Court.

Minnesota Legislature has been "overseeing" well known CPS issues in the state via "governor's/legislative task-forces" for decades—the issues, with devastating consequences to children and citizens, are exceptionally easy to address because virtually all of the problems unreasonably harming children arise from lack of provision of Constitutional due process from the judiciary (<https://rumble.com/v6y1deg-social-security-crisis-explained-child-custody-battles-are-fathers-set-up-t.html>). Apparently recognizing the judiciary's role, the legislature punted this oversight, which is now under the Children's Justice Initiative overseen by appellate courts—the fox now runs the hen house with the judges that violate Constitutional requirements to maltreat children and cover up abuse by CPS responsible for oversight of the well-known CPS issues in Minnesota.

Obviously, judges willfully abusing children and violating Constitutional requirements, as here, should be impeached, but, unless Petitioners forfeit federal rights, which will not happen, proceedings will remain ongoing—the state executive apparatus provides absolutely no oversight to ensure compliance with the law, with TMAGO repeatedly conspiring with its own judicial person clients to violate the Constitution and abuse W.O.R. The fraud issues in the state of Minnesota are hardly financially limited—the Minnesota Government's highest levels are directly involved in all of the demonstrable fraud and abuse here, which is almost to be expected given Defendant/Respondent Ellison's and Governor Walz's

plethora of publicly available information demonstrating open hostility to federal law. The abuse of citizens and children through demonstrable fraud here is perpetrated through all levels of the state judiciary and, in addition to TMAGO actors, actors from every relevant state, county, and municipal executive agency, attorney, and department. The sheer scope and depth of perversion here is so overwhelming and depraved, the Minnesota government and MDC will do anything to conceal it, and the fulcrum for doing so is the judiciary's ill-conceived bet that no one will enforce the law and Constitution against them.

Any lawful judicial action will expose the severe fraud, abuse, and criminality of the Minnesota government and lower federal judiciary, which has already been attested to in these cases by multiple highly qualified psychological experts—such is the motivation of MDC and EC, shared by the Minnesota Government, to commit these unjustifiable Constitutional abuses. The following is from a declaration supporting Petitioners'/Plaintiffs' emergency injunction sought from a doctor of psychology with greater knowledge of these facts and issues than judges:

[I...previously submitted a declaration in this Court and expert reports regarding this situation, which is attached...W.O.R. has not seen his Father since 2023[—]such deprivations, alone, are trauma inducing for all parties,...especially W.O.R. Nothing has changed from my prior reports and declaration except...these unreasonable deprivations have continued, causing further irreparable harms to

Plaintiffs, especially W.O.R. The relief Plaintiffs seek will cause these irreparable harms to cease and it is my professional opinion that absent prompt intervention severe, irreparable harms wi[ll] continue to be unreasonably and unjustifiably inflicted upon Plaintiffs, including upon W.O.R.[.]

[I have read, and continue to read, the majority of information submitted to the courts about this incredibly horrific situation. It is clear to me...Defendants are not doing the same. If the Defendants actually read what I have...there is no possible way they would be ruling the way they are...It is completely insane how the court and those associated with it continue to inaccurately villainize...Rued and his parents when they are...the only people who have done the right thing[—]ethically, morally, and legally for W.O.R. W.O.R. is the one who suffers the most from courts failing to read and incorporate the true facts, instead continuing to base their rulings and responses on wholly unsupported and fraudulent claims or, even worse, failing to reach the issues at hand. How the courts have missed...that there is no evidence or expert testimony against the veracity of what...Rued, Leah...,...Scott..., and W.O.R. have truthfully reported is a complete mystery.

[This Father and Son have been separated for absolutely no justifiable reason based upon evidence....W.O.R. reported he was being physically abused in the care of his Mother, Catrina Rued [("Catrina")], by her first ex-husband, Ted Reppas, and repeatedly sexually

and physically abused by his step-siblings, to his Father and Paternal Grandparents. They...took appropriate action reporting such issues to the authorities. Over time, the child reported the abuse to numerous people and professionals (at least 12 by my count). Furthermore, W.O.R. reported his mother would punish him by not letting him see his father if he reported the abuse. The child bravely reported it anyways and what happens[—]the courts take his father away from him just as the mother threatened!...The psychological trauma caused by the courts['] actions is enormous. The emotional terrorism brought on by the Defendants is mind boggling and needs to be stopped immediately.

[]W.O.R. has been very clear. The person he trusts the most in this world is his father,...Rued. He told his father[,]...grandparents,...nanny,...great-grandmother,...aunt, and uncle...[and Defendant/Respondent] Webber [“Webber”], Corner[H]ouse, and several CPS workers he was being abused. The court appointed...Psychological Assessment...indicated Leah...was the gold standard of credibility, closely followed by...Rued and Scott...The least credible was Catrina...Yet the courts fail to repeatedly listen to those found by the experts to be most credible...And, most importantly, none of the Defendants are listening to W.O.R.

[]The immense harm caused by Defendants[,]...reliance on fraudulent claims,

unsupported beliefs, uneducated opinions and inaccurate reporting needs to be stopped immediately[,]...[and]...unjustified separation of Father and Son and Grandparents and Grandson needs to be stopped immediately. There is absolutely no threat to W.O.R. by...Rued, Scott..., and Leah...as assessed by myself and all...the experts who have offered an opinion in the file. App.-312-315.

The Expert Opinion incorporated in the declaration above follows, which was generated at Defendants/Respondents Stebbins'/Hatcher's direction subjecting Rued to medical procedures of their own devising to control Rued's beliefs, more profound deprivations than of speech and so perverted it was likely inconceivable to our founders apart from through exertions of religious control, attempting to require Rued to believe Jayswal's admitted perjury is true, which would terrorize/maltreat his own son, solely to protect the government by forcing Rued to forfeit his and W.O.R.'s federal rights, via medical procedure (itself a criminal act—Minn.Stat.§147.081, subd. 1 and 3(3), which also proscribes MSC' personal diagnoses of W.O.R.'s allergies that are contrary to every controlling medical opinion and also necessarily violate equal protections given occurrence through *application* of law), under the guise that refusing to believe admitted government fraud is true constitutes child-endangerment, when only the opposite would:

I am a licensed psychologist working with...Rued...[and] owner and psychologist [of xx for the past ~20 years]. Pr[viously], I worked...as a forensic evaluator...[and]...contractor...[and] held

the...contract with Dakota County...Corrections for over 13 years to complete court ordered evaluations and forensic assessments...[and] did the same for...Ramsey County[].

[]Rued came to me with...directives in the Order filed April 14, 2022...to...address his beliefs...It was my understanding from the Therapy Order that...our work was to focus on helping...Rued change his narrative from that of a father attempting to protect his son by sharing with the proper authorities what his son reports and to...have his son stop being fed things that he potentially has an allergy or intolerance to[—]to a narrative of quietly accepting the reports from his son of being abused and illegally not report it and silently watch his son experience symptoms of allergic or intolerant food reactions and not try to stop it.

[]Rued...supplied me with a vast amount of information...outlining...atrocities his son has suffered over...several years and his attempts to...provide [W.O.R.] with a safe environment. After speaking to...Rued and reading all the information...it was clear to me...the task set forth by the courts was not in [W.O.R.]'s best interests. I could not in good conscience read numerous medical documents from physicians clearly recommending that [W.O.R.] have an allergy/intolerance/sensitivity evaluation completed by a qualified medical professional, while knowing that the child has been prescribed an Epi-[P]en, seeing pictures and videos of the child exhibiting symptoms of

reactivity (difficulty breathing, congestion, exhaustion, rashes, etc.), and hearing and seeing his father and his father's family report repeatedly that [W.O.R.] is showing symptoms and THEN order...father to stop saying [W.O.R.] has intolerances and allergies and...asking for his child to be properly and thoroughly evaluated by medical professionals.

No amount of therapy could shift a father's love and concern for his son being harmed (that is factually supported) to that of a silent bystander to actions and behaviors that are clearly hurting his son.

After reading the actual medical records from numerous medical professionals, it is quite clear to me that [W.O.R.]...needs to have an evaluation completed for food allergies, intolerances and/or sensitivities...To draw any other conclusion after reading all the medical records would be harmful to [W.O.R.]. [W.O.R.] experiencing an anaphylactic reaction corroborates how truly dangerous this is to [W.O.R.].

[Rued is doing what is right to help his son and does not need help to ignore these very serious issues. He is doing what a loving, caring parent should do. I would certainly deem it abusive if a child is showing signs of difficulty breathing, rashes, exhaustion, congestion, upset stomach and diarrhea and the parent did not try and investigate what was causing these issues. I would also recommend that since it is a medical issue, the parent should investigate this with

trained medical professionals and not the courts, home experiments, schools or daycare. As far as I can tell, this has been recommended numerous times by numerous evaluators and still has yet to be completed. This is blatantly abusive to [W.O.R.]. Given that sometimes allergic reactions can be deadly,...Rued is behaving completely appropriately and logically...When working with...Rued it is evident he loves his son very much and when [W.O.R.] reports being hurt by others, it breaks his heart. When [W.O.R.] cannot play basketball, which he loves, because he is exhausted and...unable to breathe normally,...[and w]hen [W.O.R.] repeatedly screams in terror after learning he is to return to [Catrina's] and leave his father, it breaks...Rued's heart.

[W.O.R.] has reportedly not perseverated on...actions he has reported others have done to him....[W.O.R.] did not need prompting when writing about the horrible events in his life, but rather a place...he felt safe to do so. [P]rompting is significantly different from source monitoring...[and] an expert on source monitoring...found that source monitoring and coaching have NOT occurred [(t]he parties' custody evaluator Mindy Mitnick also determined that coaching had not occurred and that...Rued was not reporting the abuse to gain advantage in the custody proceeding). There is NO evidence of coaching, interrogating, directing, or suggesting [W.O.R.] to make false allegations. Although [W.O.R.] has consistently reported abuse for years, it comes in the

disjointed, vague...manner often found in victimized children....It is unclear to me why supervision continues to be necessary as an expert has NEVER opined that...Rued...harmed his son. This seems abusive to [W.O.R.],...Rued and...Rued's family.

[T]here is no way to stop or change...Rued's narrative of what is happening to his son when you consider the facts...The facts support that [W.O.R.] needs his father and...nothing his father has done has harmed [W.O.R.] in any way, shape, or form. [E]xperts have weighed in and are united that [W.O.R.] does not suffer from source monitoring and there is no evidence that he has ever been coached, directed, or interrogated over claims of sexual abuse...[O]pinions on [W.O.R.]'s future should be based on facts...not prior rulings based on just prior rulings...grounded on baseless opinions, dropped proceedings, and on contrived conclusions that somehow...Rued is at fault for repeatedly trying to do what is best for his son. App.-303-311-.

Defendants/Respondents Stebbins/Hatcher responded to this expert input they ordered by subjecting Rued and W.O.R. to a "maximum-security supervision center," fundamentally and essentially based upon Jayswal's admittedly fraudulent allegations against Rued prevented from being litigated by Defendants/Indirect Respondents because allowing such would expose the Minnesota government's and CPS' criminality, including child maltreatment, claiming Jayswal's frauds were fully and fairly

litigated and, thus, precluded, knowing such has been prevented from ever being litigated, including by Stebbins/Hatcher, when there is no possible citation to provide that supports these issues even being allowed to be litigated, despite Rued's incessant attempts.

Most supervision centers are unable to comply with the specific extreme restrictions demanded by Stebbins/Hatcher on their face (which would subject centers, themselves, to Constitutional claims). Parenting time has been withheld from Rued and W.O.R. since January 2023 with the exception of a few hours in the fall of 2023—Rued has not been allowed to see W.O.R. for over two years, absent any due process provided for facts and issues essential to the determinations imposing deprivations based upon CPS' admitted fraud. Petitioners are abused because Petitioners have so much evidence that is so damning to the Minnesota government—Petitioners' claims are prevented from being litigated because litigation of Petitioners claims in accordance with law will expose the severe criminality of the Minnesota government. Petitioners are asserted frivolous because Petitioners' claims are so clear and meritorious that allowing the litigation of such in accordance with law and subject to a jury, as demanded, given intertwined issues involving shared issues of fact (*Lytle v. Household...* 494 U.S. 545, 550 (1990); *Beacon...v. Westover*, 359 U.S. 500, (1959)) between legal (*Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); *Kalina v. Fletcher*, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)) and equitable (*Pulliam...[at]...522-23...(1984)*; *Larson v. Domestic...690 (1949)*) claims that cannot be inhibited under immunities or otherwise lawfully precluded, barred, or abstained from in any way, will have devastating consequences for Minnesota's government and, now, also MDC and

EC judicial persons, who also cannot allow lawful litigation of Petitioners' claims to occur to also protect *themselves* (see 25-CV-3333), an incognizable government interest.

There is nothing remedial about what Petitioners are subjected to into perpetuity—Petitioners are punished, also in violation of Eighth Amendment requirements, because Petitioners can prove severe corruption and abuse throughout all levels of MSC and executive levels acting under color of state law. With one lawful judicial action here, Respondents know their extraordinary abuse will be laid bare, and that Petitioners can prove this all. The following transcript is from video recordings when W.O.R. learned he would return to Catrina's care when Webber dismissed W.O.R.'s OFP relying upon Jayswal's admitted perjury, which was submitted by attorney Defendant/Respondent Barbosa, though not then in the record and neither W.O.R.'s testimony transcript nor reliance upon Jayswal's perjury would be available/noticed for weeks. Webber later declined to reach the issue of his reliance upon admitted perjury or consider such evidence, inhibiting appellate review—W.O.R. never spent another day with Rued after this recording:

W.O.R.: Dada![].

[]Rued: Hey, [W.O.R.]—hey, you're going to have to go to Catrina's...

W.O.R.: No! [(W.O.R. is terrified and begins sobbing)].

[]Rued: You are going to have to go—I'm sorry.

W.O.R.: No, Dada! I love you!

[]Rued: I know.[]

W.O.R.: No...Dada.

[]Rued: I'm so sorry[]—...I tried and you did so good. I don't know what's going on—it's...

W.O.R.: Am I ever going to be able to see you again?

[]Rued: Yes, I'm—we're never going to quit—you just keep telling the truth, ok.

W.O.R.: No, I want to stay with you...Dada[]—why did the judge NOT LISTEN?! [(screaming and sobbing)]

[]Rued: He says...he really listened to...you and you didn't say it. I don't—something is going on and God will fix it. You are wonderful and it's not you[r] fault. You did great—I'm sure.

W.O.R.: Why? Dada—I don't want to...[sobbing]...

[]Rued: You did great—you are the bravest little boy in the world.

W.O.R.: [W]hen am I going to see you again? When?

[]Rued: You are going to see me on Thursday—ok. [(This did not occur because

Catrina...and...Barbosa sought an ex parte motion to remove parenting time from...Rued based upon...Rued having sought an OFP for W.O.R....and...Jayswal's admitted perjury...— W.O.R. would not see...[Rued]...again for months and, now, Catrina...and...Barbosa have willfully kept W.O.R. from...Rued for...[25+] months...Rued has sought to enforce [parenting time 4 times in the past 13 months and]...[MSC]...ha[ve denied relief every time, refusing even to *enforce their orders*, depriving Rued's and W.O.R.'s rights relying upon Jayswal's admitted perjury MSC systematically prevented from being litigated]).

W.O.R.: What day is it today?

[Rued:...Friday. I'm going to get a transcript of what you said to the judge—I know you are telling the truth. I love you].

W.O.R.: Why did they [(Webber)] not listen? [(sobbing)] Why?

[Rued: I don't know, [W.O.R.], but it's not your fault. I don't know and I believe you—that...[(Webber)] didn't listen to you.

W.O.R.: [(sobbing)]

[Rued: I believe you, [W.O.R.].

W.O.R.: [why did [Webber] not]...listen?

[Rued: [Webber] says he listened to you and...

W.O.R.: Then why did he NOT!?! [(screaming)].

[Rued: [Webber] says he listened to you and I'm going to get the transcript. [W.O.R.]—I know, I know that [Webber] didn't [(listen to you)]...[(W.O.R. sobbing)]...What didn't the judge listen to about?

W.O.R.: What do you mean?

[Rued: You are saying...[(Webber)] didn't listen—what...

W.O.R.: Why didn't...[(Webber)] listen...

[Rued: To who?

W.O.R.: To me and you, because [Webber] said I had to go...[(W.O.R. sobbing)]...with Katrina.

[Rued: Son, you just stay true—you just hold on. You just hold on—don't give up. Pray to God.

W.O.R.: [(sobbing)] Why [do] I have to go to Katrina's?

[Rued: [Webber] said so.

W.O.R.: What if you did not listen [Webber]?

[Rued: Someone would come take you—someone would come take you, ok, and I'm, we're going to fix it,...God is with you, ok.

W.O.R.: Ok.

[]Rued: Ok—hey, let's pray.

W.O.R.:... [A]m I going to see you when[?]

[]Rued:... Thursday.

W.O.R.: But how long am I going to see you on Thursday?

[]Rued: You will be with me for the weekend.

W.O.R.: Are you going to go back to Wy work? ['Wy work' is what W.O.R. calls... Rued working to get W.O.R. safe from all of abuse W.O.R. has reported to... Rued, Petitioners and many third-parties)].

[]Rued: Of course, of course—it's not over and [Webber] said... investigations have to proceed.

W.O.R.: Did [Webber] say he listened to me?

[]Rued: You know what, [Webber] said a couple different things.

W.O.R.: What did he say?

[]Rued: He said that no one told you what to say and what to say to him, and then today he said it seemed like you didn't really know. Is that true?

W.O.R.: No.

[]Rued: I know—and... [Webber] did that for some reason that has nothing to do with you... or

me, ok. You did great. You just keep going. Would you like to pray?

W.O.R.: I hope that Dada does good Wy work and when all the Wy work is done all the time in my life gets spent with my Dada. Amen.[]

This evidence of egregious harm and emotional terrorism perpetrated upon W.O.R. by [Defendants'/Respondents'] reliance upon Jayswal's admitted perjury in his CHIPS[P] and related frauds in conspiracy with Catrina...and...Barbosa, fulfilling the threat by Catrina...that if W.O.R. reported abuse he would no longer see his Father, which MSC...[are]...aware was the "scariest thing" in W.O.R.'s life...[(see, publicly available, W.O.R.'s writings, and testimony to Webber, regarding abuse he suffered (citations available at App.-322-)]. App.-316-322-.

Screen shots, which the FBI and DOJ now possess, further demonstrate W.O.R.'s terror and the gut-wrenching reality of the harm of Respondents' frauds, which is even clearer in video—Respondents are perpetrating fraud attempting to ensure evidence of their willful child abuse, like this, does not see a jury or light of day.

W.O.R. and Rued's relationship is the closest relationship either of them has in the world. Rued's claims based upon the fraud and abuse of the government, both on Petition here and in the lower courts, are clearly parallel and intertwined with W.O.R.'s—Rued irrefutably has injuries in fact in all cases and W.O.R.'s age inhibits him vindicating his

rights, himself, here, for obvious irreparable harms, and bifurcating/delaying even legal claims risks preclusion, establishing all third-party standing requirements (*Powers*...410 (1991)). Rued easily fulfills standing for W.O.R.'s interests, possesses parental rights, including caring for W.O.R., here deployed (*Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)), and, in addition to legal duties, Rued has duties under Natural Law to seek W.O.R.'s protection through enforcement of his rights, also imposing duties upon any court (*Palmore*...432-434 (1984)), including here.

Judge Tunheim's motivation to fabricate facts in order to support application of jurisdictional bars he knows cannot be applied absent his fabricated facts is that Tunheim knows Petitioners' claims are extraordinary, well-supported, and cannot be lawfully inhibited under any legal mechanisms or limitation, including preclusion, immunities, abstention, or jurisdictional bars, which is the same motivation for EC to summarily affirm such illegal actions that cannot hope to comply with First, Fifth, and Seventh Amendment Requirements or Art. III jurisdictional requirements, which is the same motivation shared by Defendants/Respondents. Tunheim had to fabricate facts because Petitioners' claims cannot be lawfully inhibited (see 25-420 and 25A571) in order to attempt to cover up what Petitioners' claims inevitably will expose—systemic, willful child and citizen abuse by the lower judiciaries and Minnesota government and illegal Government actions, violating a litany of Constitutional guarantees, for over 7 years. Our Founders' greatest achievement was, excepting duty to preserve the same, Constitutionally proscribing subordination of individual rights to any purported greater good, which used to be the difference between

the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—Direct Respondents possess no discretion to fabricate facts to deny Petitioners' rights or to sustain the same, irrespective of motivations. At least the U.S.S.R. purported to subordinate individual rights for the good of the country, not just the judiciary or government.

REASONS WRIT OF PROHIBITION SHOULD ISSUE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

I. RELIEF SOUGHT.

Petitioners seek writ of prohibition as a matter of right directed to Judges Loken, Gruender, and Kobes of EC ("ECRJO") restraining these ECRJO from sustaining actions that sustain MDC's fabrications demonstrable on the face of the records in 25-1620, 25-1623, 25-1651 that Petitioners' Complaint in 24-CV-1763 asserts Rued argued Jayswal's admitted CHIPSP perjury to Furnstahl when such Complaint provides no such support, and specifically asserts Rued was prevented from litigating Jayswal's admissions at all, for failing to abide Art. III jurisdictional requirements, and HP seek a writ of prohibition as a matter of right directed to ECRJO restraining these ECRJO from sustaining actions sustaining determinations that HP' Petition in 25-CV-0468 seeks relief from anything other than physical confinement, as relief from physical confinement is the only relief sought, and determination otherwise is fabricated and is not based upon any genuine case or controversy in 25-CV-0468 and, thus, also 25-1614, demonstrable on the face of the records, for failing to abide Art. III jurisdictional requirements.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED.

It has long been held that petitioner(s) are entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of right when:

[I]t appears the court whose **action** is sought to be prohibited has clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, or of **some collateral matter arising therein**, [for a] party who has objected at the outset, and has no other [legal] remedy[, so long as the question of jurisdiction is not] doubtful...or depending on facts which are not made matter of record, [relief is not sought] by a stranger [and the lack of jurisdiction appears upon the] face of the proceedings[.] *In re Rice*...155 U.S., 396, 402-03...(1894) (emphasis added) (cited by EC (*In re...S.D.,...[at]...1161* (8th...1982))).

Of course, even under presumption of identifiable nexus to a genuine case and controversy and Constitutional compliance for MDC determinations regarding Petitioners' Complaint, sustained by EC, EC actions sustaining MDC's purported determinations on the merits (App.-29-) would necessarily be in absence jurisdiction, according to MDC and EC—given law and relief sought, such does not need to be raised here now.

To the extent U.S.Sup.Ct.R.20.1 modifies or abrogates prohibitive writ issuance as a matter of right against judicial actions failing to comply with clear jurisdictional requirements demonstrable on the face of the records when there is no other legal remedy, as here, then U.S.Sup.Ct.R.20.1 effects substantive law, affecting rights through abrogation, via rule promulgation. Resultingly, U.S.Sup.Ct.R.20.1

qualifications regarding issuance of all extraordinary writs under any circumstances to discretion are impermissible under §2072(b) (see also *Washington-S. Nav...* [at]...635-36...(1924) and footnote 7). Petitioners challenge any such effect of U.S.Sup.Ct.R.20.1 imposed here as statutorily prohibited action and invalid.

“Prohibition is a remedy...directed against unwarranted assumptions of jurisdiction or **excesses of it**” (*Petition of U.S.*, 263 U.S. 389, 392-93,...(1923) (**emphasis added**)). Contrary to circumstances in *Ex parte Oklahoma*,...31 S.Ct. 426, 431...(1911), there is no other avenue of relief available and Petitioners have promptly objected as soon as MDC took actions failing to comply with Art. III (App.-203-; App.-252-), which was preserved at EC (App.-133-) and raised on certiorari (25-420). No appellate avenue exists for this relief sought under extraordinary writ—only this Court has authority over EC and this extraordinary writ is in aid of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction (§1254(1)) targeting actions for which discretion is non-existent.

Criterion for issuance of a writ of prohibition as a matter of right is met here if actions taken by EC sustain actions that do not comply with jurisdictional requirements on the face of the records, which is the case because EC has taken action to sustain MDC’s dismissals/denial of Complaints and Petition based on complaints and a petition that do not exist, lacking any arguable nexus to any genuine case or controversy before EC. It is extraordinary that a Circuit Court would affirm and sustain district court actions demonstrably based upon the district court’s fabrications related to facts pled and relief targeted in these cases for which no genuine case or controversy

or possible defense of any kind can reasonably be argued to exist—these circumstances fulfilling issuance of a writ of prohibition as a matter of right necessarily also fulfill criterion for discretionary issuance of prohibition.

III. FACTS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

The facts necessary to understand the issues presented by this Petition for Writ of Prohibition are that this Court has not granted relief adequate to moot relief sought via Prohibition or otherwise adequately subjected such to certiorari, and EC has taken actions in 25-1614, 25-1620, 25-1623, and 25-1651 to sustain MDC's actions in 25-CV-0468, 24-CV-1763, 24-CV-2437, 24-CV-3409 determinatively based upon MDC's fabrications regarding Petitioners' pleadings, resulting in action lacking identifiable nexus to any genuine case or controversy. EC affirmed MDC assertions that Petitioners' Complaints asserted Rued argued Jayswal's CHIPSP's allegations against Rued were admitted perjury in a concluded state court proceeding, supporting MDC's application of Rooker-Feldman infringing upon Petitioners' rights to petition the government based upon MDC fabrications for which no genuine case or controversy exists demonstrable on the face of the records, mechanically mirrored in 25-0468 through MDC assertions HP' Petition seeks relief from child-custody determinations. App.-1-111. HP' Petition seeks only relief from physical confinement and Petitioners' Complaints do not assert Rued argued Jayswal's perjury to Furnstahl (App.-119-126-/App.-207-217-/App.-254-266-), which Petitioners identified to ECRJO, informing ECRJO that discretion for these actions not comports with jurisdictional

requirements does not exist (App.-136-). To avoid repetition, Petitioners incorporate the Statement of the Case for this Petition here.

IV. REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD ISSUE.

Absent arguable/identifiable basis in any genuine case or controversy, judicial actions cannot comport with jurisdictional requirements under Art. III for federal judicial action:

Where there is such a **concrete case** admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding **upon the facts alleged**, the judicial function may be appropriately exercised[.] *Aetna...*, 239 (1937) (**Emphasis added**).

Petitioners could have no standing regarding MDC's fabrications, which are also definitionally hypothetical, absent traceable nexus from facts alleged (*Steel...v....*523 U.S. 83, 101-103...(1998)—Art. III requirements must be fulfilled by litigants *and courts* at all stages of litigation for all actions ("requirements of Article III **no longer** are (or...never were) met." *U.S. Bancorp...v. Bonner...*513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994) (**emphasis added**)).

Lines demarcating Art. III jurisdiction must exist and those lines must delineate upon what is actually before a court, otherwise, once authority is invoked, anything could be determined by courts about anything—that demonstrable *judicial* fraud on the face of the records attributed to Complaints/Petition determinative to proceedings is captured as lacking jurisdictional requirements here follows from jurisdiction demarcation to *genuine* cases and

controversies *existing*, at all. Judges may not walk about espousing decrees and orders as they see fit absent genuine case and controversies coming before them—whether on bench, in chambers, or on street, jurisdictional requirements are the same. Federal judicial determinations must be based on genuine controversies before a judge—otherwise jurisdiction would be limitless once invoked, and MDC/EC could have ordered W.O.R., any Petitioner, or any non-party Tunheim might have *cognizance of* sterilized or killed *in these cases*.

Failure to comply with genuine case and controversy requirements results in, at least, action in excess of jurisdiction—absent identifiable nexus between the judicial act(s) and any genuine case/pleading or controversy, as here, existence of jurisdiction, *at all*, cannot be reasonably supported, which is absence of jurisdiction. If this were untrue, jurisdiction would necessarily be provisioned for *anything in any* case, including for non-parties, un-brought claims, or whatever a judge fancies. Here, MDC has specifically made determinations attributed to Petitioners'/HP' Complaint/Petition for which no reasonable argument can be made that such are based upon any pleadings that exist and are absent arguable nexus to any genuine case or controversy demonstrable on the face of the records, sustained by ECRJO, equivalently lack jurisdictional requirements, and is prohibited under Art. III jurisdictional requirements of genuine case and controversy and additionally prohibited under Fifth Amendment requirements of due process, including fundamental fairness (*Morgan v. U.S.*, 304 U.S. 1, 19... (1938); *Marks v. U.S.*, 430 U.S. 188, 192... (1977)).

No other court has authority to issue the relief sought here. Also, “[s]ingle justice[s] ha[ve] authority only to grant interim relief...to preserve the jurisdiction of the full Court to consider...claim[(s)] on the merits” (*Kimble v. Swackhamer*, 439 U.S. 1385,...(1978))—Petitioners’ relief seeks absolute, not interim, relief, and, only targeting actions for which discretion does not exist, does not perform the function of appellate review. Providing for remedy of deprivations is “one of the first duties of government” and “very essence of civil liberty” (*Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 163...(1803)), and, certainly, that duty cannot be fulfilled, nor associated right vindicated, by offering remedy, then denying/dismissing such sought through demonstrable *judicial* fabrications regarding Complaints/Petitions.

Federal judges openly and willfully violating Constitutional requirements to abuse citizens and deprive rights, as is occurring here, results in usurpation of *both* federal and a majority of state *legislative authorities*, in violation of separations of powers (*Ex Parte U.S.*, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916)), placing themselves above law and Constitution, proscribed as tyrannical since Magna Carta (*Loving v. U.S.*, 517 U.S. 748 (1996)). ECRJO have placed themselves above Constitution to accomplish illegitimate ends of government—willfully depriving protected rights, including fair appeals, of Petitioners in violation of Constitutional requirements because they personally dislike Petitioners’ claims and the inevitable result of adjudication of such in accordance with law, which is mere hostility to exercise of Constitutional rights (*Watson v. Memphis*, 373 U.S. 526, 535...(1963)).

CONCLUSION

This Petition presents indefensibly unconstitutional government action—this Court's response to this Petition is affirmative action subject to Constitutional requirements, including equal protections (*Martin v. Walton*, 368 U.S. 25, 28 (1961)) and Constitutional Supremacy. Absent this Court imposing Constitutionality here, the federal executive will have a duty, made absolute from the entire state and federal judiciary's war upon the Constitution, to ensure the United States Constitution is preserved, effective, and enforced (*United States v. Arthrex, Inc.*, 594 U.S. 1, 28–29, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1988–89, ...L. Ed....(2021)). Executive enforcement of the law against the judiciary bears no separations of powers issues—separations of powers issues, here, come from the violations of law, ratified in the Constitution and passed by the legislative branch for which no immunities exist, or lawfully could exist, to violate.

If the judiciary will not enforce the Constitution, the executive branch must, otherwise, the executive would also join the criminal conspiracy, which Petitioners do not believe President Trump has any intention of doing. This Court has no more discretion to deny the relief herein petitioned for than it does to willfully violate the Constitution.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Joseph Rued
Joseph D. Rued
9007 Avila Cove
Eden Prairie, MN 55347

rued.joseph@yahoo.com
239)276-4056

s/Scott Rued
Scott D. Rued
9007 Avila Cove
Eden Prairie, MN 55347
rued.scott@gmail.com
239)276-4040

s/Leah Rued
Leah J. Rued
9007 Avila Cove
Eden Prairie, MN 55347
lrue@comcast.net
952)465-5406

March 22, 2025

Pro Se Petitioners