

No. 25-1173

**In the
Supreme Court of the United States**

JOHN E. HALL,

Petitioner,

v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

**On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit**

PETITION FOR REHEARING

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June 23, 2026

SUPREME COURT PRESS



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BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

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PETITION FOR REHEARING

1. Petitioner John E. Hall respectfully petitions for rehearing under Supreme Court Rule 44.2 from the June 8, 2026 order denying his petition for a writ of certiorari.

2. This petition is limited to Rule 44.2 grounds. After denial, the City of Houston filed a June 9, 2026 response asserting that no Internal Affairs Division investigation, no IAD file, and no concealed evidence exists. That new factual position directly conflicts with the May 31, 2018 City of Houston record that Petitioner placed in the district-court record and carried into the Fifth Circuit record.

3. The issue is not an ordinary reargument. The judgment rests on: (a) the manipulation of court records; (b) court-document pages separated and filed in different locations, (c) mislabeling of court records; (d) false judicial attributions, (e) intentional judicial concealment of fabricated evidence, *i.e.* May 31, 2018 record; (f) “straw man claims”; (g) intentional concealment and suppression of available records; and (h) the Court’s refusal to subject adversarial testing to fabricated evidence before dismissal and preclusive consequences attached constitutes Fraud on the Court.

4. The May 31, 2018 City record stated that Petitioner was the target of a criminal investigation involving wiretaps and pen registers. Petitioner has consistently alleged that the record was fabricated, altered, or unsupported by lawful authorization, that no valid IAD notice or file was disclosed, and that the record was used to stigmatize, discredit, dismiss, and

preclude his claims without discovery or evidentiary testing.

5. The timing of City's June 9, 2026 declaration that there was no criminal investigation, no file, and no concealed evidence is critical. On June 8, 2026, the writ of certiorari was denied. The City of Houston concealed the fabricated evidence until the writ of certiorari was denied; by injecting the fraud listed in item 3 to deny adversarial testing of the May 31, 2018; then, the City could use the Supreme Court's denial of the writ to validate the fraud in item 3 to shield itself from liability for preparing a fabricated May 31, 2018 record. Under *Christopher v. Harbury*, defendants' concealment of the May 31, 2018 document prevented effective litigation and loss remedies: adversarial testing of the May 31, 2018 fabricated record, discovery of fabrication claims, loss of evidentiary hearings, loss of meaningful appellate review, loss of name clearing hearing, loss of opportunity to establish municipal liability, loss of access or records to support constitutional claims, and *the opportunity to overcome a 12(b)(6) dismissal based on disputed facts, regarding the fabricated May 31, 2018 record, now admitted to by the City at the pleading stage.*

6. The order denying certiorari was entered on June 8, 2026. A Rule 44.2 petition seeking rehearing from an order denying certiorari must be filed within 25 days, making the filing deadline July 3, 2026. The time cannot be extended.

7. Petitioner certifies that this petition is restricted to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect and substantial grounds not previously presented, and that it is presented in good faith and not for delay.

I. Question Presented on Rehearing

8. Whether rehearing should be granted where, one day after denial of certiorari, the City of Houston filed a response stating that no IAD investigation, no IAD file, and no concealed evidence exists, although the May 31, 2018 City record indicates a criminal investigation involving wiretaps and pen registers; where Petitioner avers that Defendants, Court Officers, and Judicial Officials engaged in fraudulent Item 3 conduct which must invalidate the judgment. *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, fraud affecting the judicial process.

II. Relevant Record Background

9. Petitioner has repeatedly challenged the May 31, 2018 City of Houston record as fabricated evidence. The record is material because it purportedly identifies Petitioner as the target of criminal surveillance and affected his stigma-plus, due-process, retaliation, equal-protection, and access-to-courts claims.

10. Petitioner filed the May 31, 2018 evidence in Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-02882 as Document 10 on August 19, 2024. Petitioner avers that when the evidence entered the court record, the last two pages were omitted or removed, leaving only page 23 and page 24 rather than the full May 31, 2018 evidence.

11. Petitioner includes the full May 31, 2018 evidence as Exhibit A for record-integrity purposes: to show what was omitted, to show that the lower courts did not adjudicate the complete evidence after adversarial testing, and to show that the City's June 9 denial is based on fraud when compared to Exhibit A.

12. The district court did not require the City to authenticate the May 31, 2018 record, identify the author or custodian, produce the LAD file, produce any wiretap or pen-register authorization. The appellate court breached its duty to correct the fabricated May 31, 2018 record leaving a judgment based on fraud intact. See item 3.

13. The lower courts allowed dismissal and preclusive consequences without discovery, an evidentiary hearing, complete record reconstruction, or claim-specific findings testing the disputed May 31, 2018 evidence. On April 17, 2025, the false attributions and straw man practices were used to recast Petitioner's fabricated evidence concern with the May 31, 2018 to Judicial created FOIA motion for all defendants to compel production of wire tap authorization records.

III. Specific Contradictions Requiring a Response

14. First, the May 31, 2018 record indicates that Petitioner was targeted in a criminal investigation involving pen registers and wiretaps. The City's June 9 response asserts that there was no IAD investigation. Those positions cannot both be accepted without authentication, custodian testimony, retention proof, and production of the underlying file or a sworn explanation of nonexistence.

15. Second, the May 31, 2018 record necessarily implies a source record, custodian record, investigative predicate, authorization, request, case file, or communication sufficient for HPD or the City to make the surveillance statement. The City's June 9 response denies any such file.

16. Third, pen-register and wiretap references ordinarily require legal authorization, applications, orders, minimization or custody records, and statutory retention records. The City's denial of any investigation or evidence leaves no lawful record basis for those surveillance references and makes the record fabricated.

17. Fourth, the Document 10 court-record version allegedly reflected only page 23 and page 24, while the complete June 9, 2026 May 31 evidence includes omitted pages. If pages 3 and 4 identify HPD Staff Attorney Kristie Lewis, then the source issue was not unknowable speculation as one appellate panel attributed.

IV. The June 9, 2026 City Filing Is a Material Intervening Circumstance

18. The June 9, 2026 City filing post-dates this Court's denial of certiorari and materially changes the posture. It is a factual denial by the same municipal defendant whose May 31, 2018 record allegedly indicated that Petitioner was the target of criminal surveillance.

19. If the May 31, 2018 record was fabricated, altered, incomplete, or unsupported by any lawful investigative file, the lower courts erred by allowing it to affect dismissal, preclusion, and appellate review without testing its authenticity as petitioner sought.

20. This is precisely the type of substantial post-denial circumstance Rule 44.2 permits: a new factual contradiction, created after the denial order, that goes to whether the judgment below rested on an untested and unreliable municipal record.

V. False Attributions and the Record-Integrity Problem

21. Petitioner alleges that the district court falsely characterized his record-verification letters as a FOIA motion to compel defendants to produce wiretap records. That attribution changed the legal character of Petitioner's filing and diverted attention from due process, stigma-plus injury, retaliation, equal protection, access to courts, and the May 31, 2018 surveillance-record issue.

22. Petitioner further alleges that the November 13, 2025 Fifth Circuit panel in No. 25-20068 affirmed dismissal after treating the May 31, 2018 record issue as procedurally unavailable, unsupported, outside the Rule 12 posture, or otherwise not properly before the court. Petitioner contends that attribution was materially wrong because at least two pages of the May 31, 2018 evidence were filed in the district-court record as Document 10, and the record issue was raised in briefing and the January 17, 2025 transcripts.

23. Petitioner also relies on the earlier Fifth Circuit attribution in No. 21-20451, on which Judge Don R. Willett sat, which treated Hall's allegations concerning IAD wiretaps and pen registers as uncertainty by Hall. This attribution was false because the FBI memo in the record excerpt Tab 61 stated the May 31, 2018 was fabricated evidence.

24. The false attributions, record suppression, record misplacement, and record mislabelling operated together: the earlier panel minimized the May 31, 2018 record as uncertainty; the later panel treated the record problem as non-existent and unavailable; the district court recast record verification of wiretap

authorization as a fraudulent FOIA motion; and the City now denies the existence of any IAD investigation, file, or concealed evidence. Petitioner asks this Court to rehear the denial, call for a response, and prevent an admitted fabricated May 31, 2018 record contradiction from supporting claim and issue preclusion based on fraud.

VI. Legal Grounds Supporting Rehearing

25. Rule 44.2 permits rehearing of an order denying certiorari when the grounds are limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or other substantial grounds not previously presented. The City's June 9 filing satisfies that standard because it post-dates denial and materially sharpens the record-integrity issue.

26. *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238 (1944), recognizes the courts' inherent authority to protect judicial proceedings from fraud. *United States v. Beggerly*, 524 U.S. 38 (1998), reserves independent fraud relief for grave miscarriages of justice. A municipal record suggesting criminal surveillance, followed by a municipal denial that any supporting file exists, is grave enough to warrant rehearing and a response.

27. *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), confirms that government use of false evidence undermines due process. *Greenlaw v. United States*, 554 U.S. 237 (2008), and *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*, 590 U.S. 371 (2020), reinforce the party-presentation principle. *Johnson v. City of Shelby*, 574 U.S. 10 (2014), forbids dismissal of civil-rights claims based on imperfect labels rather than fair notice. *Twombly* and *Iqbal* do not permit courts to resolve disputed facts against a

plaintiff at the pleading stage. Rule 12(d) requires conversion and a reasonable opportunity to present material when matters outside the pleadings are used to resolve Rule 12(b)(6) issues. *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), limits preclusion where a party lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Together, these authorities require testing, not attribution, when a government record's authenticity, completeness, source, custody, and legal effect are disputed.

VII. Why the Court Should Call for a Response

28. Rule 44.3 provides that the Clerk will not file a response to a rehearing petition unless the Court requests one and that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court will not grant rehearing without first requesting a response. Extraordinary circumstances exist because the City has now created a direct contradiction with the May 31, 2018 record.

29. Respondents should be required to answer: (a) whether the May 31, 2018 document is authentic, fabricated, altered, incomplete, or unsupported by City records because the denial of certiorari occurred while the Court lacked knowledge of a material post-judgment admission that directly undermines the factual foundation of the judgment; (b) whether a judgment based on an untested fabricated record should be sustained; (c) whether any IAD investigation, criminal investigation, authorization, complaint, file, retention record, destruction record, metadata, or custodian record exists concerning Petitioner; and (d) whether Respondents and 5th Circuit Panels relied on the fabricated May 31 record, the truncated record, or the challenged judicial attributions to obtain dismissal, preclusion, or affirmance.

VIII. Relief Requested

30. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing under Rule 44.2, vacate the June 8, 2026 order denying certiorari, call for a response, and reconsider the petition in light of the June 9, 2026 City filing, and the fraudulent claims in Item 3.

31. Alternatively, Petitioner requests a response limited to the May 31, 2018 City evidence, the City's June 9 denial of any IAD investigation or concealed evidence, the alleged removal of the last two pages from Document 10, the lower courts' treatment of that disputed record, and the judicial attributions that converted a City-authored record problem into supposed uncertainty or procedural insufficiency by Petitioner.

32. Petitioner further requests any other relief necessary to protect the integrity of this Court's certiorari process and prevent preclusive effect from attaching to a judgment allegedly infected by fabricated municipal evidence, missing record pages, and false attributions never subjected to adversarial testing.



CONCLUSION

This petition presents an extraordinary Article III injury: the district court and the court of appeals permitted the fabricated May 31, 2018 HPD/IAD record to control the characterization, dismissal, and appellate treatment of Petitioner's claims while denying Petitioner any meaningful adversarial testing of that record. Petitioner alleged that the May 31, 2018 record was fabricated, concealed, and later contradicted by the City's own position that no criminal investigation existed. Yet the lower courts dismissed the claims without requiring production, authentication, evidentiary testing, or a name-clearing process which violated 12(b)(6) standards regarding resolving disputed facts at the pleading stage.

That concealment was not harmless. If the May 31, 2018 record is tested and confirmed fraudulent, then Petitioner's pleading did far more than speculate. It identified the adverse record, the governmental actors involved, the stigma-plus injury, the concealment of access to personal IAD records, the due-process deprivation, and the City's liability for using or preserving fabricated evidence to impair Petitioner's rights. Those allegations satisfy Rule 8's notice standard because they state who acted, what record was used, how it injured Petitioner, and why the City's own admissions make the controversy plausible rather than imaginary.

The lower courts' refusal to permit adversarial testing effectively insulated the disputed evidence from scrutiny and converted a pleading-stage dismissal into a merits determination against Petitioner without process. Rehearing is therefore necessary to prevent fabricated or concealed governmental records from becoming immune from review merely because the courts declined to test them. The petition should be reheard, the judgment vacated, and the case remanded for adversarial testing of the May 31, 2018 record and related municipal liability issues.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John E. Hall

John E. Hall

Petitioner Pro Se

17818 Running Brook Lane

Spring, TX 77379

(832) 886-9370

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June 23, 2026

RULE 44.2 CERTIFICATE

I, Dr. John E. Hall, Petitioner Pro Se, certify that this Petition for Rehearing is restricted to the grounds specified in Supreme Court Rule 44.2, namely intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect and substantial grounds not previously presented. I further certify that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John E. Hall

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June 23, 2026

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Exhibit H.

Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg
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Confidential Information Contradicts HPD
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Authorization on John E. Hall
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Exhibit L.

Texas Public Information Act Request for
Wiretap and Pen Register Records on John E.
Hall (April 2, 2025)..... 36a

Reh.App.1a

**ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
FOIA, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION
(APRIL 16, 2025)**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

JOHN E. HALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-2882

Before: Keith P. ELLISON, U.S. District Judge.

ORDER

Plaintiff John E. Hall brought this suit against Defendants Experian Information Solutions, Inc., an Unknown Houston Police Internal Affairs Investigator, Jefferson Capital Collection Agency, IC Systems, Easy Pay Loans, Newman Book Publishing, Carlos Sauzo, Judge L. Korduba, the Department of Education, the City of Pearland, Joaquina Spikes, the City of Houston,

National Auto Group, Elissa Mohammed, and Credit Acceptance (“Defendants”). The Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. *See* Doc. No. 130. Since then, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Relief under FRCP 60(b)(2) and FRCP 60(b)(3) (Doc. No. 151) and a Motion for a “FOIA Request for Wiretap and Pen Register Authorization on John E. Hall” (Doc. No. 146). Plaintiff has also appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Doc. No. 136.

Because Plaintiff has appealed his case, his Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. No. 151) is DENIED as MOOT. *See* Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(a) (“[b]ut after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court's leave”).

Mr. Hall has also filed a motion pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 to compel Defendants to produce “any records pertaining to the authorization of a criminal wiretap or pen register on John E. Hall” (Doc. No. 146). United States District Courts are vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over FOIA cases by Section (a)(4)(B) of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). That section provides that: “On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” *Id.*

Thus, by its express terms, Section (a)(4)(B) requires one making a FOIA request to file a FOIA “complaint” in order to confer jurisdiction upon the district court. *See United States v. Whitfield*, No. 18-5718, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 578, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2019) (“Based on the plain language of § 552(a) (4)(B) and the foregoing persuasive authority, we find that a

party must file a complaint in a separate civil action in order to challenge an adverse FOIA determination.”). A “motion for FOIA request” in an existing civil matter is not the same as a “complaint” under the Act. *See id.*; compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 (distinguishing between motions and types of pleadings, such as complaints).

In short, this motion is not the appropriate vehicle to seek compliance with a FOIA request. Mr. Hall’s failure to file a complaint in a separate civil action means that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the FOIA request at issue. It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for FOIA Request (Doc. No. 146) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on this the 16th of April 2025.

/s/ Keith P. Ellison
U.S. District Judge

**EXHIBIT A.
LETTER FROM KRISTIE L. LEWIS
(MAY 31, 2018)**

CITY OF HOUSTON

Houston Police Department
1200 Travis - Houston, Texas 77002-6000
713/308-1600

Sylvester Turner, Mayor

City Council Members:

Brenda Stardig
Jerry Davis
Ellen R. Cohen
Dwight A. Boykins
Dave Martin
Steve Le
Greg Travis
Karla Cisneros
Robert Gallegos
Mike Laster
Martha Castex-Tatum
Mike Knox
David W. Robinson
Michael Kubosh
Amanda K. Edwards
Jack Christie

City Controller: Chris B. Brown

The Honorable Ken Paxton
Texas Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Reh.App.5a

Attention: Open Records Division

Re: Public Information Act request received clarification on May 10, 2018 from John Hall requesting for various information from HPD; ORU No. 18-04440.

Dear General Paxton:

This is a follow-up to my letter dated May 23, 2018 (Exhibit 1A). The Houston Police Department ("HPD") received the above-referenced clarified request on May 10, 2018 (Exhibit 1). HPD notes that Monday, May 28, 2018 was observed as a City Holiday. By copy of this letter, HPD is informing the requestor that HPD believes responsive information (Exhibits 2 and 3) is excepted from public disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Government Code. HPD notes that Exhibit 3 is a representative sample. HPD also advises that it will release a portion of the responsive documents to requestor.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Tex. Gov't Code § 552.101.

IAD Investigatory File

Section 552.101 encompasses information protected by other statutes. The City of Houston is a civil service city under chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code. Section 143.1214 of the Local Government Code provides in part:

- (b) The [police] department shall maintain an investigatory file that relates to a disciplinary

action against a . . . police officer that was overturned on appeal, or any document in the possession of the [police] department that relates to a charge of misconduct against a . . . police officer, regardless of whether the charge is sustained, only in a file created by the [police] department for the [police] department's use. The [police] department may only release information in those investigatory files or documents relating to a charge of misconduct:

- (1) to another law enforcement agency or fire department;
 - (2) to the office of a district or United States attorney; or
 - (3) in accordance with Subsection (c).
- (c) The [police] department head or the [police] department head's designee may forward a document that relates to disciplinary action against a . . . police officer to the director or the director's designee for inclusion in the firefighter's or police officer's personnel file maintained under Sections 143.089(a)-(f) only if:
- (1) disciplinary action was actually taken against the . . . police officer;
 - (2) the document shows the disciplinary action taken; and
 - (3) the document includes at least a brief summary of the facts on which the disciplinary action was based.

Reh.App.7a

The information contained in Exhibit 2 consists of an investigation conducted by the HPD's Internal Affairs Division of alleged misconduct by a police officer. Information contained in Exhibit 2 is maintained in the police department's investigatory files and is not part of the police officer's civil service personnel file. The allegations of misconduct were not sustained and no disciplinary action was taken. As such, the information in question does not meet the conditions specified by section 143.1214(c) for inclusion in the police officer's personnel files under section 143.089(a) of the Local Government Code.

The City of Houston claimed that LT Hall was the requestor, as a Third party entity, rather than requesting his own files under Texas Government Code 552.023, which grants him a special right of access to the information relating to him; there is no confidentiality issue barring him from his own records. Hall's records were denied due to the falsity.

Therefore, the May 31, 2018 record is fraudulent here.

Additionally, the requester is not a representative of another law enforcement agency, a fire department, or the office of a district or United States attorney. *See id.* § 143.1214(b)(1)-(2). Accordingly, the Department believes that it must withhold the information contained in Exhibit 2 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 143.1214(b) of the Local Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either consti-

tutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. This section encompasses information protected by other statutes. Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure pertains to the detection, interception, and use of wire, oral, or electronic communications, the sealing of orders. Specifically, section 11 of article 18.20 provides in relevant portion that “[a] judge shall seal each application made and order granted under this article . . . [and] . . . [a]n application or order may be disclosed only on a showing of good cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction and may not be destroyed until at least 10 years after the date it is sealed.”

Furthermore, section 1 of article 18.20 provides that a “judge of competent jurisdiction” is defined as “a judge from the panel of nine active district judges with criminal jurisdiction appointed by the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals as provided by section 3 of this article.”

The responsive information submitted as Exhibit 2 contains interception applications filed in various District Courts of Harris County by Assistant District Attorneys for Harris County. Each application involves Houston Police Department officers assigned as investigators on each respective investigation. All applications and orders have been sealed by their respective judge and each application and order is so designated on its cover. Although the Department has received a request for public information for the sealed applications and orders, the instant request does not constitute a showing of good cause. Furthermore, the public disclosure of the sealed applications and orders has not

been presented to a judge of competent jurisdiction. As such, the Department believes it must withhold the responsive information contained in Exhibit 2 pursuant to section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with article 18.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Furthermore, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. section 3123(d), each “order [must] be sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court.” To date, the respective courts have not lifted the seal of any of the requested orders. As such, the Department believes that the requested orders must be withheld in accordance with section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. Section 3123(d).

Section 552.107 of the Government Code

Section 552.107 of the Government Code states that information is excepted from required public disclosure if:

- (1) it is information that the attorney general or an attorney of a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; or
- (2) a court by order has prohibited disclosure of the information.

Section 552.107(2) of the Government Code excepts information from public disclosure if “a court by order has prohibited disclosure of the information” Gov’t Code § 552.107(2). Article 18.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a court, on application by a prosecutor, to issue an order authorizing the interception of

wire, oral, or electronic communications; the installation or use of a pen register, ESN reader, trap and trace device, mobile tracking device, or similar equipment; or the disclosure of a stored communication, information subject to an administrative subpoena, or information subject to access under article 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *See* Crim. Proc. Code art. 18.20 §§ 6, 9; *see also id.* § 1 (defining terms). Section 11 of article 18.20 states “[t]he judge shall seal each application made and order granted under this article.” *Id.* § 11. Article 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a court, on application by a prosecutor, to issue an order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register, ESN reader, trap and trace device, or similar equipment. *See* Crim. Proc. Code Art. 18.21 § 2; *see also id.* § 1 (defining terms). Article 18.21 also permits a court to issue an order authorizing the disclosure of contents, records, or other information of a wire or electronic communication. *See id.* § 5. Section 2 of article 18.21 states the court “shall seal an application and order granted under this article.” *Id.* § 2(g). In this instance, the submitted documents, Exhibit 3 consist of court orders granted under articles 18.20 and 18.21 and the corresponding applications for the orders. The orders and applications likewise reflect that all the documents at issue are filed under seal. As such, the Department believes it must withhold the responsive information contained in Exhibit 3 pursuant to section 552.107 of the Government Code in conjunction with articles 18.20 and 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Lastly, the Department notes that it does not have responsive documents for requested Items 7 (exclusive

Reh.App.11a

of HPD background investigations), 7a, 8, 8b, 8c, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 36, 37, 38, and 45.

HPD respectfully requests a ruling on this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me at 713308-1660 if you need additional information. Please include ORU No. 18-04440 in any future correspondence concerning this request.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kristie L. Lewis
HPD Staff Attorney

kl:jz

Enclosures

cc: Dr. John Hall
17818 Running Brook Ln.
Spring, Texas 77379
Sent via Regular Mail
(W/o Exhibits)

Reh.App.12a

**EXHIBIT B.
LETTER FROM KRISTIE L. LEWIS
(MAY 31, 2018)**

CITY OF HOUSTON

Houston Police Department
1200 Travis - Houston, Texas 77002-6000
713/308-1600

Sylvester Turner, Mayor

City Council Members:

Brenda Stardig
Jerry Davis
Ellen R. Cohen
Dwight A. Boykins
Dave Martin
Steve Le
Greg Travis
Karla Cisneros
Robert Gallegos
Mike Laster
Martha Castex-Tatum
Mike Knox
David W. Robinson
Michael Kubosh
Amanda K. Edwards
Jack Christie

City Controller: Chris B. Brown

The Honorable Ken Paxton
Texas Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Attention: Open Records Division

Re: Public Information Act request received clarification on May 10, 2018 from John Hall requesting for various information from HPD; ORU No. 18-04440.

Dear General Paxton:

This is a follow-up to my letter dated May 23, 2018 (Exhibit 1A). The Houston Police Department (“HPD”) received the above-referenced clarified request on May 10, 2018 (Exhibit 1). HPD notes that Monday, May 28, 2018 was observed as a City Holiday. By copy of this letter, HPD is informing the requestor that HPD believes responsive information (Exhibits 2 and 3) is excepted from public disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Government Code. HPD notes that Exhibit 3 is a representative sample. HPD also advises that it will release a portion of the responsive documents to requestor.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101.

IAD Investigatory File

Section 552.101 encompasses information protected by other statutes. The City of Houston is a civil service city under chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code. Section 143.1214 of the Local Government Code provides in part:

- (b) The [police] department shall maintain an investigatory file that relates to a disciplinary

action against a . . . police officer that was overturned on appeal, or any document in the possession of the [police] department that relates to a charge of misconduct against a . . . police officer, regardless of whether the charge is sustained, only in a file created by the [police] department for the [police] department's use. The [police] department may only release information in those investigatory files or documents relating to a charge of misconduct:

- (1) to another law enforcement agency or fire department;
 - (2) to the office of a district or United States attorney; or
 - (3) in accordance with Subsection (c).
- (c) The [police] department head or the [police] department head's designee may forward a document that relates to disciplinary action against a . . . police officer to the director or the director's designee for inclusion in the firefighter's or police officer's personnel file maintained under Sections 143.089(a)-(f) only if:
- (1) disciplinary action was actually taken against the . . . police officer;
 - (2) the document shows the disciplinary action taken; and
 - (3) the document includes at least a brief summary of the facts on which the disciplinary action was based.

The information contained in Exhibit 2 consists of an investigation conducted by the HPD's Internal Affairs Division of alleged misconduct by a police officer. Information contained in Exhibit 2 is maintained in the police department's investigatory files and is not part of the police officer's civil service personnel file. The allegations of misconduct were not sustained and no disciplinary action was taken. As such, the information in question does not meet the conditions specified by section 143.1214(c) for inclusion in the police officer's personnel files under section 143.089(a) of the Local Government Code.

Additionally, the requester is not a representative of another law enforcement agency, a fire department, or the office of a district or United States attorney. *See id.* § 143.1214(b)(1)-(2). Accordingly, the Department believes that it must withhold the information contained in Exhibit 2 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 143.1214(b) of the Local Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Tex. Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses information protected by other statutes. Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure pertains to the detection, interception, and use of wire, oral, or electronic

[. . .]

EXHIBIT C.
CITY OF HOUSTON RESPONSE DENYING
CONTENT OF MAY 31, 2018 DOCUMENT
ADMITS TO FABRICATED EVIDENCE
CONTRADICTING EXHIBIT A
(JUNE 9, 2026)

[...]

II.

Additionally, Plaintiff's Motion is yet another attempt to obtain discovery prior to a ruling on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. *See* Doc. 12, 17, 20, 21, 30, 31, 37, 47, 76, 79, 86. The Court has denied his prior attempts. [Doc. 38, 85]. Plaintiff has provided no new grounds which would make discovery appropriate at this point in the proceedings.

In cases such as this, where the review on a Rule 12 motion is confined to the pleadings and a limited class of documents, pre-ruling discovery has been characterized by the Fifth Circuit as "a meaningless expense on the defendants." *See Van Dicer v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n*, 582 Fed. Appx. 279, 283 (5th Cir. 2014). It would be improper to conduct discovery in this case until after the 12(b)(6) motions have been adjudicated.

Additionally, and importantly, the documents that Plaintiff seeks to uncover through discovery simply do not exist. While Plaintiff has a strong and undying belief that HPD is maintaining a secret Internal Affairs Division file about him, there is no such file. There was no IAD investigation. No evidence has been concealed.

In the First Lawsuit, Judge Hughes examined all of Houston's records about Mr. Hall and determined, "Whatever Hall believed would be included in them to instigate his complaint does not exist." [Doc. 39-3, p.2]. Discovery will not create documents out of thin air where none exist. Plaintiff's motion, and this lawsuit, are frivolous and vexatious. The motion should be denied.

III. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, Defendants City of Houston and Ursula Williams respectfully request the Court to issue an Order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Confirm the Veracity and Record Basis of City of Houston's Res Judicata Assertion and Request for Order Requiring Claim-Specific Proof Before Any Preclusive Effect is Applied, and for all such other and further relief to which Defendant may be justly entitled.

EXHIBIT D.
APPELLATE PANEL CONCEALED
FABRICATED MAY 31, 2018 CITY OF
HOUSTON RECORD – FBI MEMO
RECORD EXCERPT TAB 61
(AUGUST 1, 2022)

Case: 21-20451 – Doc. 00516415056 – P. 8

Willett PANEL - MADE MATERIAL FALSE
ATTRIBUTION THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT
IDENTIFY THE AUTHOR OF THE May 31, 2018
GOVERNMENT RECORD TO AVOID
ADVERSARIAL TESTING

[. . .]

. . . coaching [Malveaux] on domestic violence scenarios in order to disqualify Hall.” As a result, a complaint was placed in Hall’s internal affairs file without his notice “for over 25 years.” He contends “that the internal affairs division used illegal wiretap and pen register investigative equipment to assist Malveaux in the divorce proceedings because she was politically connected.” After further investigation, Hall explained that a “May 31, 2018 open records correspondence [reveals that] the police department targeted Hall for a criminal investigation using pen registers and wire-taps.” Hall is still unsure about the accuracy of this information. “Despite exercising due diligence, Hall could not determine the accuracy of the information or the identity of the complainant.”

Hall is frustrated because the district court judge refused “to make the City Attorney and the internal affairs division produce any court orders signed by Judges.” He explains that “[c]ourt orders are

public records; therefore, the absence of the court orders meant that the use of the pen registers and wiretaps were illegally conducted.” He concludes that the absence of court orders indicates fraud and that fraud tolls the statute of limitations.

The district court is correct that a two-year statute of limitations bars Hall’s claims. Hall brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and the Interception of Wire and Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520. “Section 1981 does not contain a limitations period [so] courts have traditionally applied the relevant state personal injury limitations period.”²⁰ Under Texas law, “the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Texas controls.”²¹ The same is true for Section 1983 and 1985

²⁰ *Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc.*, 398 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2005).

²¹ *Jones v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 339 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2003).

**EXHIBIT E.
FBI MEMO CITING MAY 31, 2018 HAS
FABRICATED EVIDENCE
(AUGUST 19, 2024)**

Case 4:24-cv-02882 – Document 10-1 – Page 8 of 26

FBI Memo Citing May 31, 2018 Has Fabricated Evidence

Judge Ellison concealed the May 31, 2018 fabricated evidence in the record

FBI needs to investigate public corruption:

Evidence that Exhibit 2 (referenced in May 31, 2018 letter) was fabricated, or does not exist.

If Exhibit #2 has been sealed it is up to the courts to unseal, and is not a FBI matter.

SA Steve Lupo

**EXHIBIT F.
CLERK OR IAD SEPARATED RECORDS
IDENTIFIES CITY ATTORNEY KRISTIE
LEWIS AS AUTHOR OF MAY 31, 2018
CITY DOCUMENT
(AUGUST 19, 2024)**

Case 4:24-cv-02882 – Document 10-1 – Page 1-2 of 26

Clerk or IAD Separated Records Identifies City Attorney
Kristie Lewis As Author of May 31, 2018 City Document

Record Integrity Issue Concealed May 31, 2018
Fabricated Record

[. . .]

. . . communications, the sealing of orders. Specifically, section 11 of article 18.20 provides in relevant portion that “[a] judge shall seal each application made and order granted under this article . . . [and] . . . [a]n application or order may be disclosed only on a showing of good cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction and may not be destroyed until at least 10 years after the date it is sealed.”

Furthermore, section 1 of article 18.20 provides that a “judge of competent jurisdiction” is defined as “a judge from the panel of nine active district judges with criminal jurisdiction appointed by the presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals as provided by section 3 of this article.”

The responsive information submitted as Exhibit 2 contains interception applications filed in various District Courts of Harris County by Assistant District Attorneys for Harris County. Each application involves Houston Police Department officers assigned as inves-

tigators on each respective investigation. All applications and orders have been sealed by their respective judge and each application and order is so designated on its cover. Although the Department has received a request for public information for the sealed applications and orders, the instant request does not constitute a showing of good cause. Furthermore, the public disclosure of the sealed applications and orders has not been presented to a judge of competent jurisdiction. As such, the Department believes it must withhold the responsive information contained in Exhibit 2 pursuant to section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with article 18.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Furthermore, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. section 3123(d), each “order [must] be sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court.” To date, the respective courts have not lifted the seal of any of the requested orders. As such, the Department believes that the requested orders must be withheld in accordance with section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. Section 3123(d).

Section 552.107 of the Government Code

Section 552.107 of the Government Code states that information is excepted from required public disclosure if:

- (1) it is information that the attorney general or an attorney of a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; or

- (2) a court by order has prohibited disclosure of the information.

Section 552.107(2) of the Government Code excepts information from public disclosure if “a court by order has prohibited disclosure of the information” Gov’t Code § 552.107(2). Article 18.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a court, on application by a prosecutor, to issue an order authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications; the installation or use of a pen register, ESN reader, trap and trace device, mobile tracking device, or similar equipment; or the disclosure of a stored communication, information subject to an administrative subpoena, or information subject to access under article 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *See* Crim. Proc. Code art. 18.20 §§ 6, 9; *see also id.* § 1 (defining terms). Section 11 of article 18.20 states “[t]he judge shall seal each application made and order granted under this article.” *Id.* § 11. Article 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a court, on application by a prosecutor, to issue an order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register, ESN reader, trap and trace device, or similar equipment. *See* Crim. Proc. Code Art. 18.21 § 2; *see also id.* § 1 (defining terms). Article 18.21 also permits a court to issue an order authorizing the disclosure of contents, records, or other information of a wire or electronic communication. *See id.* § 5. Section 2 of article 18.21 states the court “shall seal an application and order granted under this article.” *Id.* § 2(g). In this instance, the submitted documents, Exhibit 3 consist of court orders granted under articles 18.20 and 18.21 and the corresponding applications for the orders. The orders and applications likewise reflect that all the documents at issue are filed under seal.

Reh.App.24a

As such, the Department believes it must withhold the responsive information contained in Exhibit 3 pursuant to section 552.107 of the Government Code in conjunction with articles 18.20 and 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Lastly, the Department notes that it does not have responsive documents for requested Items 7 (exclusive of HPD background investigations), 7a, 8, 8b, 8c, 14, 15, 23, 25, 26, 36, 37, 38, and 45.

HPD respectfully requests a ruling on this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me at 713308-1660 if you need additional information. Please include ORU No. 18-04440 in any future correspondence concerning this request.

Sincerely,

/s/ Kristie L. Lewis
HPD Staff Attorney

kl:jz

Enclosures

cc: Dr. John Hall
17818 Running Brook Ln.
Spring, Texas 77379
Sent via Regular Mail
(W/o Exhibits)

**EXHIBIT G.
DENNIS, ENGLEHARDT, WILSON
ATTRIBUTED THAT APPELLANT WAS
CLAIMING THAT THE FABRICATED
MAY 31, 2018 RECORD WAS OUTSIDE
THE COURT RECORD
(NOVEMBER 13, 2025)**

Case No. 25-20068 – Document 125-1 – Page 3

Dennis, Englehardt, Wilson Attributed that Appellant was Claiming that the Fabricated May 31, 2018 Record was Outside the Court Record

District Court records contradict panel's concealment of the fabricated May 31, 2018 record to avoid adversarial testing

[. . .]

. . . Hall fails to explain how the district court erred in dismissing his claims under Rule 12(b)(6). *Brinkmann v. Dall Cnty Deputy Sheriff Abner*, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that appellant forfeited an argument by failing to address the district court's analysis and explain how it erred). Hall generally argues the court applied a more stringent pleading standard. But he fails to cite portions of the record in support of this argument or otherwise explain how the court erred on these grounds beyond a conclusory level. *Rollins v. Home Depot USA*, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021).³

we impose on all complaints in federal court: It must contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. In re *S. Scrap Material Co.*, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. Hall's motion for judicial notice is DENIED AS MOOT.

[. . .]

³ We address three of Hall's remaining arguments. Hall argues (1) the district court prematurely dismissed Hall's case when it issued its "sua sponte dismissal," which violated his due process rights; (2) that the district court "emboldened defendants to continue" their conspiracy through relying on fabricated evidence outside the court record in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56; and (3) the district court committed numerous instances of judicial misconduct. These challenges are without merit. First, before dismissing the action, the court gave Hall numerous opportunities to amend his complaint, held a hearing on the pending motions to dismiss, explained to Hall the deficiencies in his complaint, permitted Hall to amend his complaint a fourth time, and advised him to seek counsel. The court did not unfairly dismiss the suit without giving Hall fair notice and an opportunity to respond. *Davoodi v. Aus. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing *Lozano v. Omen Fed. Bank, FSB*, 489 F.3d 636, 642-43 (5th Cir. 2007)) (explaining that in dismissing an action, fairness usually requires notice of the court's intention and an opportunity to respond). Second, because the district court assessed Hall's claims under Rule 12(b)(6), any argument pertaining to Rule 56 is inapplicable. And finally, Hall's arguments on appeal concerning judicial misconduct are not properly before us. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (providing procedure to assert judicial misconduct complaint with clerk of court).

**EXHIBIT H.
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
KIM OGG DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AUDIT
FROM 1981 TO PRESENT DAY
(NOVEMBER 28, 2023)**

Case 4:23-cv-01620 – Document 54-1 – Page 1 of 1

THE HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Kim Ogg Domestic Violence Audit from 1981 to
Present Day November 28, 2023 Conducted a
Domestic Violence Audit from 1981 to Present Day
and found no Domestic Violence complaints against
me; which contradicts Exhibit A, criminal
investigation.

David Mitcham
First Assistant/Chief of Courts

Vivian King
First Assistant/Chief of Staff

Harris County District Attorney's Office
1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
Houston, TX 77002

HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
KIM OGG

November 28, 2023

John Hall

Via email: jayeal2007@yahoo.com

Re: Public Information Act Request of November
11, 2023 PIC ID: 2023.11 – 0035

Reh.App.28a

Mr. Hall,

You recently requested the following from our office:

[A]ny domestic violence complaints against me at any time.

A reasonably diligent search of our records has revealed that we possess no information responsive to your request.

Should you have any questions, I may be reached by phone at 713-274-5816, or by email at scott_meagan@dao.hctx.net.

Sincerely,

/s/ Meagan Scott

Assistant General Counsel
Office of the District Attorney
(713) 274-5816

EXHIBIT I.
SEC. 552.023 - SPECIAL RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
CONTRADICTS HPD REFUSAL TO
RELEASE MY IAD FILES BASED ON
THE CONTENT IN EXHIBIT A
(AUGUST 19, 2024)

Case 4:24-cv-02882 – Document 10 – Page 22 of 24

Sec. 552.023 - Special Right of Access to Confidential Information Contradicts HPD Refusal to Release My IAD Files Based On the Content in Exhibit A

[. . .]

- (g) A fire or police department may maintain a personnel file on a fire fighter or police officer employed by the department for the department's use, but the department may not release any information contained in the department file to any agency or person requesting information relating to a fire fighter or police officer. The department shall refer to the director or the director's designee a person or agency that requests information that is maintained in the fire fighter's or police officer's personnel file.

143.089(g)

Sec. 552.023. SPECIAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. (a) A person or a person's authorized representative has a special right of access, beyond the right of the general public, to information held by a governmental body that relates to the person and that is protected from public disclo-

Reh.App.30a

sure by laws intended to protect that person's privacy interests.

(b) A governmental body may not deny access to information to the person, or the person's representative, to whom the information relates on the grounds that the information is considered confidential by privacy principles under this chapter but may assert as grounds for denial of access other provisions of this chapter or other law that are not intended to protect the person's privacy interests.

(c) A release of information under Subsections (a) and (b) is not an offense under Section 552.352.

(d) A person who receives information under this section may disclose the information to others only to the extent consistent with the authorized purposes for which consent to release the information was obtained.

(e) Access to information under this section shall be provided in the manner prescribed by Sections 552.229 and 552.307.

[. . .]

**EXHIBIT J.
JUDGE ELLISON CREATED A FALSE FOIA
MOTION AND ATTRIBUTED IT TO HALL
(JANUARY 17, 2025)**

Judge Ellison was asked at the January 17, 2025 hearing to check with the clerk to verify if Hall had a legitimate wiretap placed on him. There was no record.

Judge Ellison Create a False FOIA Motion and Attributed it to Hall.

This Page is contained in my legal brief.

[. . .]

**Argument X. Fraudulent Concealment,
Continuing Violation, and Lack of Adversarial
Testing Defeat Res Judicata and Limitations
Defenses.**

In the City of Houston's claim for res judicata, they referenced a series of dismissal motions but none of their dispositive motions could show where the May 31, 2018 record was subject to adversarial testing. Plaintiff-appellant claims that under Texas Government Code 552.023 and 614.023 that he was entitled to his IAD files. Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, wiretap records become judicial courts. The Judge issues a defendant an inventory notice within 90 days of the surveillance ending. Under 18 USC 2518 and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.20, wiretap records are maintained by the issuing Clerk of the Court. Judge Ellison was given constructive notice at the January 17, 2025 hearing of the fabricated May 31, 2018 record. Instead of verifying

the record with the Federal Clerk Office. Judge Ellison created a fraudulent FOIA Motion knowing that the Federal Court Clerk had no wiretap orders signed by a Federal Judge against Hall; therefore, the existence of no wiretap records was an indication that the May 31, 2018 record was fabricated. Judge Ellison ignored this fact based evidence and created the false FOIA Motion to conceal the May 31, 2018 but also to imply that Plaintiff-Appellant was “mentally unstable” to make such a demand in lieu of the above statutes.

The June 9, 2026 admission was a calculated maneuver based on coordinated efforts to conceal the May 31, 2018 record by judicial actors, clerk personnel, unknown IAD investigators; Hall claims they were already aware that no wiretap applications existed on him at the Federal Court.

[. . .]

**EXHIBIT K.
FOIA REQUEST FOR WIRETAP AND
PEN REGISTER AUTHORIZATION
ON JOHN E. HALL
(APRIL 2, 2025)**

DOCUMENT 146 – LETTER TO CLERK
reference May 31, 2018

[...]

John E. Hall
17818 Running Brook Ln
Spring, Texas 77379
Email: Jayearl2007@yahoo.com
832-886-9370
April 2, 2025

Clerk of the Court
Nathan Ochsner
Darlene Hansen
darlene_hansen@txs.uscourts.gov
United States District Court
515 Rusk Street
Houston, TX 77002

Subject: FOIA Request for Wiretap and Pen Register
Authorization on John E. Hall

Dear Clerk of the Court,

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, I respectfully request any records pertaining to the authorization of a criminal wiretap or pen register on John E. Hall, D.O.B. 01-28-52, submitted by the Houston Police Department or any federal agency from 1992 to the present.

Mr. Hall was employed as an officer with the Houston Police Department from 1981 until 2004. On May 31, 2018, Mr. Hall received a letter from the Houston Police Department indicating that he was a target of a criminal investigation in which wiretaps and pen registers were utilized by the department's Internal Affairs Division. To verify the authenticity and legal basis of this claim, I seek copies of any federal court orders authorizing such surveillance, including:

1. Any applications, affidavits, or requests submitted to a federal judge for approval of a wiretap or pen register on Mr. Hall.
2. Any judicial orders or warrants approving or denying such requests.
3. The name of the presiding judge and the specific court that issued any such authorization.
4. Any documents reflecting the duration and scope of the wiretaps or pen registers.

If any portion of this request is denied, please cite the specific legal exemption that justifies withholding the information. If the requested records have been destroyed or are otherwise unavailable, please provide any documentation reflecting the retention schedule for such records.

I am willing to pay any reasonable fees associated with the processing of this request. However, if fees exceed \$50, please notify me before processing the request. If possible, I request a fee waiver as the disclosure of this information is in the public interest.

Reh.App.35a

Please provide the requested documents in electronic format if available, or in printed form via mail. If you require any additional information to process this request, please contact me at my email: Jayearl2007@yahoo.com.

Thank you for your time and assistance. I look forward to your prompt response in accordance with the statutory time limits.

Sincerely,

/s/ John E. Hall
17818 Running Brook Ln
Spring, TX 77379

EXHIBIT L.
TEXAS PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT
REQUEST FOR WIRETAP AND PEN
REGISTER RECORDS ON JOHN E. HALL
(APRIL 2, 2025)

DOCUMENT 148

Letter to the Texas Department of Public Safety

[. . .]

John E. Hall
17818 Running Brook Ln
Spring, Texas 77379
Email: Jayearl2007@yahoo.com
832-886-9370
April 2, 2025

Texas Department of Public Safety
Office of General Counsel

Email: www.TxDPS.State.Tx.US/PIA.HTM

Email: publicrecords@dps.texas.gov

Email: openrecords@dps.texas.gov

P.O. Box 4087
Austin, TX 78773-0001
512-424-2000

Subject: Texas Public Information Act Request for
Wiretap and Pen Register Records on John E. Hall

Dear Records Custodian,

Pursuant to the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA), Texas Government Code § 552, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 18A, I respectfully request copies of any records related to

the authorization, execution, or results of a wiretap or pen register targeting John E. Hall, D.O.B. 01-28-52, initiated by the Houston Police Department or any Texas law enforcement agency from 1992 to the present.

Mr. Hall was employed as a police officer with the Houston Police Department from 1981 to 2004. On May 31, 2018, he received a letter from HPD stating that he was a target of a criminal investigation utilizing wiretaps and pen registers through the department's Internal Affairs Division. I seek to verify the authenticity of this claim and to obtain the following information:

1. Any requests submitted by law enforcement agencies for judicial authorization of a wiretap or pen register on Mr. Hall.
2. Any orders, warrants, or authorizations issued by a Texas state or federal judge permitting such surveillance.
3. The name of the court and judge that approved or denied such requests.
4. Records indicating the duration, scope, and justification for such surveillance.

If any of these records are exempt from disclosure, please specify the exemption and provide a written explanation. If the records are no longer available, please provide any documentation of their retention schedule and destruction policy.

I agree to pay reasonable processing fees but request notification if the fees exceed \$50. Additionally, I request a fee waiver as this information is in the public interest. If possible, please provide the records in electronic format via email, or in print by mail.

Reh.App.38a

Should you require further clarification, please contact me at Email: Jayearl2007@yahoo.com. I appreciate your attention to this matter and request a response within the timeframe outlined by Texas law.

Sincerely,

/s/ John E. Hall



SUPREME COURT
PRESS