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**OPINION, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
(DECEMBER 19, 2025)**

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

AMERICAN TELECOM COMPANY, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

AMERICAN TELECOM GROUP – USA L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC OF LEBANON,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 25-1506

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan

Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS,
Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge.

In 2004, American Telecom Company, L.L.C.
and American Telecom Group–USA, L.L.C. (together,

“American Telecom”) sued the Republic of Lebanon alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud arising from Lebanon’s cellular-network tender process. The district court dismissed the action after holding that Lebanon was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) because no statutory exception applied. We affirmed.

Nearly two decades later, American Telecom moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reinstate the case based on what it characterized as newly discovered evidence of fraud, including unsworn letters purportedly originating in Lebanese government offices. The district court denied the motion as untimely and meritless. American Telecom then sought reconsideration and moved to recuse the district court judge, pointing to a footnote in the court’s order that dismissed Plaintiffs’ allegations of misconduct as “not well-taken.” The district court denied both motions.

American Telecom now appeals. Because the Rule 60(b) motion was filed long after the one-year deadline and, in any event, fails on the merits, and because nothing in the record would cause a reasonable observer to question the district judge’s impartiality, we affirm.

I.

The underlying dispute is familiar to this court from our prior decision. Lebanon initially launched an “Auction Tender” for contracts to manage its cellular telephone networks. *Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (Am. Telecom II)*, 501 F.3d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 2007). American Telecom paid \$25,000 to participate, but Lebanese officials disqualified its bid without explanation. *Id.* Lebanon abandoned that tender and initiated a “New Public Tender,” requiring a new

\$5,000 entry fee. *Id.* To participate, bidders were required to comply with the Tender Information and Procedures (“TIP”), including submission of a tender bond and extensive technical and financial documents. *Id.* at 536–37. American Telecom alleges it spent over \$500,000 compiling these materials. *Id.* at 536. American Telecom submitted its materials electronically, purportedly after receiving assurances from a Lebanese employee that email submission would be acceptable, but Lebanon disqualified the bid because the TIP required original hard-copy documentation. *Id.* at 537.

Thereafter, American Telecom filed suit in 2004, invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 as a suit against a foreign state. *Id.* Lebanon initially failed to appear, and the district court entered a default judgment, which Lebanon then moved to set aside based on sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604. *Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (Am. Telecom I)*, 408 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The district court held that the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception did not apply because Lebanon’s conduct produced no “direct effect” in the United States, and it therefore dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. *Id.* at 413–15. We affirmed. *Am. Telecom II*, 501 F.3d at 541.

In 2024, American Telecom returned to the district court seeking Rule 60(b) relief, asserting “newly discovered” evidence in the form of unsworn letters purporting to show (1) that Lebanon never intended to consider American Telecom’s bid, (2) that officials coerced the Consul General into executing a false affidavit regarding service of process, and (3) that Lebanese officials attempted to influence the presiding judge.

In March 2025, the district court denied the motion. The court first held that the motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1), because it was filed more than a year after entry of the final judgment. The court alternatively concluded that, even if timely, the motion failed on the merits because the new evidence did not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis that had underpinned the original dismissal, and the unsworn letters did not establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence or otherwise justify relief. The court addressed American Telecom’s suggestion that Lebanese officials had improperly influenced the judge in a footnote, stating that those allegations were “not well-taken.”

In response, American Telecom moved for reconsideration and for recusal, arguing that the district court’s footnote stating the allegations were “not well-taken” reflected judicial hostility. The district court rejected both motions. This appeal followed.

II.

A.

We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. *See Stokes v. Williams*, 475 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Rule 60(c)(1) requires that motions under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) be filed within one year of judgment, an absolute deadline that cannot be extended. *Id.*; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). American Telecom’s motion was filed nearly two decades after entry of judgment, far beyond the one-year limit. A court abuses its discretion if it grants an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion. *See In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC*, 109 F.4th 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2024). Thus, the district court correctly denied the motion as untimely.

Even setting timeliness aside, Rule 60(b)(2) “newly discovered evidence” must be material and likely to change the result, and the movant must show due diligence. *Luna v. Bell*, 887 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2018). In *American Telecom II*, we determined that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims. The unsworn letters that American Telecom submitted nearly two decades later do not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis, because even if they are authentic, they have no bearing on whether Lebanon’s conduct caused a direct effect in the United States. *See Am. Telecom II*, 501 F.3d at 541. Evidence that is merely cumulative of prior allegations of fraud does not justify Rule 60 relief. *See Good v. Ohio Edison Co.*, 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998).

Rule 60(b)(3) requires proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. *See Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc.*, 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008). Unsworn hearsay assertions of unclear origin do not meet that burden. The district court therefore acted within its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3).

B.

We review the denial of a motion to disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) for abuse of discretion. *See Burley v. Gagacki*, 834 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2016). Recusal is warranted only if a reasonable observer aware of all the facts would question the judge’s impartiality. *Id.* Judicial rulings ordinarily do not constitute evidence of bias unless they reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” that makes fair judgment impossible. *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

American Telecom first points to statements in the letters asserting that Lebanon believed the district judge was predisposed to rule in its favor. But the subjective belief of a litigant—or of foreign officials—is insufficient to require recusal. *United States v. Sammons*, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990). Unsworn, uncorroborated letters amount to “conclusory allegations” inadequate to compel disqualification. *See United States v. Sypher*, 684 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2012).

Second, American Telecom argues that the district court “ignored” its allegations, but the district court expressly addressed them by stating they were “not well-taken.” Judicial disagreement with a party’s position does not demonstrate bias. *Williams v. Anderson*, 460 F.3d 789, 814 (6th Cir. 2006).

Third, American Telecom contends that the “not well-taken” footnote was a veiled threat, but properly understood, the phrase simply means not “well-grounded” or “justifiable,” a legally commonplace response to unsupported allegations. *Well-Taken*, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, <https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/well-taken> (last visited 11/07/2025). Even if the statement were construed as a reprimand or pejorative attack, judicial remarks expressing frustration or impatience do not require recusal absent deep-seated antagonism. *See Liteky*, 510 U.S. at 555–56. Even construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the footnote here amounts to an “ordinary admonishment[]” at best, which simply does not support a motion for recusal. *See id.* at 556; *see also United States v. Adams*, 722 F.3d 788, 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of recusal motion because the “judge’s statements amount[ed] to criticism and disapproval of defendants . . . not deep-seated favoritism or antagonism”).

The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

**JUDGMENT, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
(DECEMBER 19, 2025)**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

AMERICAN TELECOM COMPANY, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

AMERICAN TELECOM GROUP-USA,
Plaintiff,

v.

REPUBLIC OF LEBANON,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 25-1506

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS,
Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was submitted on the briefs without oral argument.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

App.9a

Entered By Order of the Court

/s/ Kelly L. Stephens
Clerk

**OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR
REINSTATEMENT AND RECONSIDERATION,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
(MARCH 10, 2025)**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN TELECOM CO., LLC, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON,
Defendant.

Case No. 04-72596
(ECF 2:04-cv-72596-NGE-MKM)

Before: Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds, U.S. District Judge.

**OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR
REINSTATEMENT AND RECONSIDERATION
OF ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT**

American Telecom Company, LLC and American
Telecom Group-USA, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiff”) init-

iated this lawsuit against Defendant, the Republic of Lebanon, in 2004. (ECF No. 1.) This Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the next year. *See Am. Telecom Co., LLC v. Republic of Lebanon*, 408 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. *See Am. Telecom Co., LLC v. Republic of Lebanon*, 501 F.3d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 2007). And the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 42, 43.) Now, over fifteen years later, Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of the case and reconsideration of a previous order issued by the Court setting aside the default judgment entered against Defendant. (ECF No. 47.) And even though this case remains closed, Plaintiff has also filed a motion for entry of default. (See ECF No. 51.) Defendant has not responded to these motions. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions.

I. Background

Plaintiff was a bidder for a contract to manage cellular telephone networks in Lebanon. Upon Defendant's invitation to bid, Plaintiff paid \$25,000 to participate in an Auction Tender but was disqualified without explanation during the pre-qualification stage. Due to questionable conduct by the officials conducting the Auction Tender, however, Defendant cancelled it in favor of a New Public Tender. According to Plaintiff, officials persuaded it to pay another \$5,000 and participate in the New Public Tender with assurances of fairness and good faith. Plaintiff claims that it spent over \$500,000 preparing its bid. In a rush to comply with the submission deadline, Plaintiff submitted several required documents, including a tender bond, via email, allegedly in reliance on a verbal approval by an

employee. Defendant disqualified Plaintiff because the tender bond was an email and not an original document; it pre-qualified seven other companies, none of which was an American company. Ultimately, a German company won the contract for one network and a Kuwaiti company won the other.

After its disqualification, Plaintiff sued Defendant in this Court on July 14, 2004, alleging breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of quasi contract. Subject matter jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Plaintiff served Defendant at its Office of the Consulate General in Detroit, Michigan. When Defendant failed to answer, Plaintiff sought and obtained a Clerk's entry of default, moved for default judgment, appeared for a motion hearing, and obtained a default judgment in the amount of approximately \$420 million. (See ECF No. 8.) Counsel for Defendant eventually responded, filed a special appearance in this Court, and moved to set aside the default judgment and the default. After the Court granted that motion, (ECF No. 23), Defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it is entitled to absolute immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). The Court granted that motion as well, finding that Defendant's conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States and therefore the 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) commercial activity exception to FSIA immunity did not apply. (ECF No. 33.) On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found no error in this reasoning and affirmed. *See Am. Telecom Co.*, 501 F.3d at 536. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, but it was denied by the Supreme Court in 2008. (ECF Nos. 42, 43.) Plaintiff brought the present motions in 2024.

II. Legal Standard

Plaintiff cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as the basis for relief in its motion for reinstatement and reconsideration but does not identify which subsection it is relying on. Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

A district court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *See Franklin v. Jenkins*, 839 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 2016).

III. Analysis

The Court first notes that Plaintiff does not acknowledge that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of this case or even mention that there was an appeal anywhere in its motions. But “[a] district court must regard the appellate decision as conclusive unless the party brings to its attention the sort of circumstances which justify relief under Rule 60(b).” *See United States v. 429 S. Main St.*, 906 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (citing *Barrow v. Falck*, 11 F.3d 729,

731 (7th Cir. 1993)). “A district court also does not have jurisdiction to alter an appellate ruling where the appellate court has already considered and rejected the basis for relief cited in the Rule 60(b) motion.” *Id.* at 1159 (citing *DeWeerth v. Baldinger*, 38 F.3d 1266, 1270 (2d Cir. 1994); *Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.*, 679 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1982)).

Here, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s conclusion that federal jurisdiction is lacking, finding that including or excluding an American company from the process of bidding on a contract in Lebanon does not cause a direct effect in the United States. *See Am. Telecom Co.*, 501 F.3d at 541. Plaintiff claims it has “newly discovered evidence” and evidence of alleged “fraud,” but even if the unsworn letters it has filed can be construed as such,¹ they do not alter the relevant analysis. For example, Plaintiff has submitted letters suggesting a false affidavit was previously filed by Defendant regarding whether it was properly served with the complaint prior to entry of the default judgment. But the issue of service was considered by the Court when it set aside the default judgment, not when it dismissed the case.² And while Plaintiff also repeats its argument regarding the effect it believes Defendant’s actions had in the United States, the Sixth Circuit

¹ To the extent Plaintiff has submitted letters calling into question the impartiality of this Court and tarnishing the reputation of certain officials, these claims are not well-taken.

² Even the decision to set aside the default judgment did not turn on the issue of service. In that order, the Court found that Defendant was properly served prior to entry of the judgment, explicitly rejecting Defendant’s claim that it was unaware of the lawsuit until after the default judgment was entered. (ECF No. 23, PageID.610-11.)

already considered and rejected a similar argument. *See id.* Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction to reinstate the case.

But even if the Court did have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's motion, Plaintiff would not prevail. To the extent Plaintiff relies on "newly discovered evidence" or alleged "fraud," its motion is untimely. *See* Rule 60(c)(1) ("A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding."). And as noted above, Plaintiff has not presented anything that would alter the analysis regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to sidestep the issue of jurisdiction by arguing that Defendant was "attempting to cover [the evidence] up by having the lawsuit dismissed on a jurisdictional argument," (ECF No. 47, PageID.1464), as the Sixth Circuit stated in its opinion affirming the dismissal of this case, jurisdiction is a threshold issue; "there is no doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction that enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt." *See* *Am. Telecom Co.*, 501 F.3d at 537 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Because federal jurisdiction is lacking, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff the relief it seeks.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, Plaintiff's motions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
U.S. District Judge

App.16a

Dated: March 10, 2025

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on March 10, 2025, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

/s/ Marlana Williams
Case Manager

**ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DISQUAL-
IFICATION, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
(APRIL 29, 2025)**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN TELECOM CO., LLC, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON,
Defendant.

No. 04-72596
(ECF 2:04-cv-72596-NGE-MKM)

Before: Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds, U.S. District Judge.

**OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR
REINSTATEMENT AND RECONSIDERATION
OF ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT [47] AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT [51]**

In 2024, Plaintiff attempted to reopen this case, which was dismissed over fifteen years ago, by filing a

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for “reinstatement” of the case and “reconsideration” of a previous order setting aside the default judgment entered against Defendant. The Court recently denied that motion (along with another motion filed by Plaintiff). (ECF No. 56.) In so doing, the Court noted that Plaintiff had not even acknowledged in its motions that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of this case. Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of that opinion and order. (ECF No. 57.) Plaintiff also seeks to disqualify Judge Nancy Edmunds. (ECF No. 58.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions.

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 57)

Plaintiff once again invokes Rule 60(b). But Plaintiff does not cite any authority that would allow it to rely on Rule 60(b) to seek review of the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b). *See Simmons v. Brewer*, No. 23-1638, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1460, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (noting that “Rule 60(b) provides relief from a judgment, not orders denying motions for reconsideration”). Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(4) explicitly states that “[a] motion to reconsider an order denying a motion for reconsideration may not be filed.” Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. But even if this motion were proper, Plaintiff would not be entitled to relief.

Plaintiff continues to disregard the fact that there was an unsuccessful appeal. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the Court “missed or obviated” new facts and ignored certain arguments.¹ Plaintiff argues that

¹ Plaintiff expresses surprise that the Court denied its motions

the Court should have at least held an evidentiary hearing. But the Court considered Plaintiff's arguments on the merits and found that the alleged "newly discovered evidence" would not alter the previous finding made by this Court, and affirmed on appeal, that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking over Plaintiff's claims.² Thus, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing; nor was there any basis for reopening this case.

II. Plaintiff's Motion for Disqualification and/or Recusal (ECF No. 58)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge of the United States is required to "disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The statute imposes an objective standard; thus, a judge must recuse herself only "where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." *Burley v. Gagacki*, 834 F.3d 606, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2016) (quotations and citation omitted). "[T]he judge need not recuse [her]self based on the subjective view of a party no matter how strongly that view is held." *United States v. Sammons*, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990) (quotations and citation

despite the lack of a response from Defendant. As Plaintiff itself acknowledges, however, it bore the burden of establishing at least one of Rule 60(b)'s requirements. See *Ghaleb v. Am. S.S. Co.*, 770 F. App'x 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that "the party seeking to set aside a final judgment[] b[ears] the heavy burden of showing [its] entitlement to Rule 60 relief") (citations omitted). Thus, the lack of a response was in no way outcome determinative.

² The Court also found that it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate the case and that to the extent Plaintiff relied on newly discovered evidence or alleged fraud, the motion was untimely.

omitted). “[A] judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” *Scott v. Metro. Health Corp.*, 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

The Court first notes that Plaintiff’s request is largely moot. This case has been closed for over fifteen years, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that dismissal. Indeed, the Court denied Plaintiff’s previous motions after finding, in part, that it lacked the jurisdiction to reopen this case. To the extent Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of that ruling, however, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s request.

As the basis for recusal, Plaintiff relies in large part on the notion that the Court made “a veiled or vague threat” in the first footnote of its previous opinion and order. But the Court did no such thing. Instead, the Court simply noted that Plaintiff’s claims “calling into question the impartiality of this Court and tarnishing the reputation of certain officials” were “not well-taken.”³ (*See* ECF No. 56, PageID.1719 n.1.) Plaintiff now emphasizes that those allegations stem from documents allegedly drafted by Defendant. Plain-

³ In the motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff’s Counsel states that he “has a great deal of respect for this Court and assumed this Court would be upset by/bothered by the suggested impropriety and was not accusing this Court of anything untoward.” (ECF No. 57, PageID.1729). Even if the Court were to accept this characterization of the allegations, the Court notes that being “bothered” is not a basis to reopen a case over which it does not have jurisdiction.

tiff notes that one of the letters indicates that former Defense attorneys told their client that “they got the judge already predisposed to rule in [their] favor.” But the Court reasonably found that the unsworn letters containing these unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations did not warrant further consideration. In sum, Plaintiff has not presented anything that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Judge Edmunds’ impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
U.S. District Judge

Dated: April 29, 2025

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on April 29, 2025, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

/s/ Marlana Williams
Case Manager