No. 25-1

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JAMES SKINNER,

Petitioner,

v.

LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO LOUISIANA'S 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

BRIEF OF THE INNOCENCE NETWORK AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

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INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*[1]

The Innocence Network (the "Network") is an association of independent organizations dedicated to providing pro bono legal and investigative services to incarcerated individuals for whom evidence discovered post-conviction can provide conclusive proof of innocence. The Network also promotes study and reform designed to enhance the accuracy and truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system, in order to ensure that past wrongful convictions are remedied, and future wrongful convictions are prevented. The Network's 71 current member organizations represent hundreds of incarcerated individuals with innocence claims in 49 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other countries around the world.[2]

The Network has a strong interest in the enforcement of the obligations set forth in *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, which are fundamental to the truth-seeking function of our adversarial system of criminal justice. The Network has repeatedly seen firsthand how the suppression of exculpatory evidence—including impeachment evidence—leads to wrongful convictions, especially in

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[1] Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, *amicus curiae* states that it provided timely notice to all counsel of its intent to file a brief. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, *amicus curiae* states that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and no entity or person, aside from *amicus curiae*, its members or its counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

[2] The Appendix to this brief lists the member organizations of the Network for *amicus* brief purposes.

cases with little or no physical or forensic evidence. The Network writes to offer its perspective on why this Court should grant relief to Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In *Brady v. Maryland*, this Court enshrined a bedrock constitutional principle: the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the criminally accused. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This obligation encompasses impeachment evidence, which "if disclosed and used effectively, [] may make the difference between conviction and acquittal." *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). *Brady*'s fundamental due process safeguard is central to "ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations." *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (citations omitted). Adherence to its requirements "ensure[s] that a miscarriage of justice does not occur." *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 675.

Experience has shown that *Brady* violations can result in the wrongful conviction of innocent persons. Of the more than 3,700 documented exonerations in the United States since 1989, more than half involved suppressed exculpatory evidence, most often impeachment evidence. Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, https://exonerationregistry.org/cases (last accessed July 30, 2025); Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, *Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent*, xvi-xvii, 81, 85–86 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/yckemxfn. Petitioner's case is yet another example. Because the *Brady* violations below have already been established in the case of one of

Petitioner's co-defendants, and because those violations were plainly material, this Court should summarily reverse Petitioner's wrongful conviction.

ARGUMENT

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF *BRADY* AND *GIGLIO* ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO FAIR TRIALS, TRUTH, AND VINDICATION OF THE INNOCENT

A. *Brady* and *Giglio* Establish Foundational Principles of the Criminal Justice System

In the landmark case of *Brady v. Maryland*, this Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Less than a decade later, in *Giglio v. United States*, the Court affirmed that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule." 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).

Though "[t]he prosecution's affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant" is "most prominently associated with this Court's decision in *Brady*," the constitutional footing on which *Brady* and *Giglio* stand is long-established: it "can trace its origins to early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation." *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419,

432 (1995); *see Brady*, 373 U.S. at 86–87 (describing its holding as "an extension of" prior decisions "where the Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process"); *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 153–54 (discussing same line of cases).

Just as *Brady* and *Giglio* trace their roots back in time, their holdings have been further cemented into the American justice system over the past half-century. In that time, this Court has clarified that: (a) prosecutors have a duty to disclose *Brady* evidence even where there has been no request by the accused, *United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); (b) *Brady* encompasses evidence known to "police investigators" and "others acting on the government's behalf," *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 437–38; (c) where multiple pieces of evidence have been suppressed, they should be "considered collectively, not item by item," *id.* at 436; and (d) to prevail on a *Brady* claim, a defendant need not prove that he "would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence," but only that "the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial,'" *id.* at 434 (quoting *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)).

"The *Brady* rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur." *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 675. The motivating rationale behind *Brady* is simple but fundamental: "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when

any accused is treated unfairly." *Brady*, 373 U.S. at 87.

The requirements of *Brady* impose a "burden" on the government, but as this Court has recognized, "[t]his is as it should be." *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 439. "Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative of a sovereignty whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations." *Id.* at 439–40 (quoting *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), and listing cases) (citation modified).

The Department of Justice Manual acknowledges that "Government disclosure of material exculpatory and impeachment evidence is part of the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial," U.S. Dep't of Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(B), and explains that compliance with *Brady* "will facilitate a fair and just result in every case, which is the Department's singular goal in pursuing a criminal prosecution," *id.* § 9-5.002, comment. All new federal prosecutors must complete a designated training on *Brady* and *Giglio* within their first year of employment, in addition to annual follow-up training. *Id.* § 9-5.001(E).

Of course, *Brady* imposes the same constitutional due process requirements on state prosecutors. *Agurs*, 427 U.S. at 107 (stating that *Brady* "deal[s] with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution," and that it "will apply equally to the comparable Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to trials in state courts"). It therefore comes as no surprise that the requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence is enshrined in state ethical rules, including in Louisiana. *See, e.g.*, La. Rules of Pro. Conduct, r. 3.8 ("Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor") (La. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. May 10, 2023) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows, or reasonably should know, either tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .").

B. *Brady* and *Giglio* Are Particularly Important in Cases Based Entirely on Incentivized Witness Testimony, Such as Petitioner's

This Court has held that in any criminal case, "[i]mpeachment evidence . . . falls within the *Brady* rule" because "[s]uch evidence is evidence favorable to an accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal." *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 676 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." *Id.* (quoting *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269); *see also Glossip v. Oklahoma*, 145 S. Ct. 612, 628 (2025) (same).

The importance of impeachment evidence is at its apex in cases such as Petitioner's, where "the difference between conviction and acquittal," *Bagley*, 473 U.S. at 676, rested *entirely* on the defense's ability to discredit the State's witnesses, who supplied the *only* evidence against Petitioner. As this Court long ago acknowledged, "[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). And central to cross-examination is the opportunity "to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness," with the goal of uncovering "biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness" so that the jury can make an informed decision about whether to credit the witness's testimony. *Id*.

In cases such as Petitioner's, where the prosecution's case rested solely on the uncorroborated testimony of cooperating witnesses, all of whom were incentivized to ingratiate themselves with law enforcement, it is all too predictable that *Brady* violations would lead directly to a wrongful conviction.

C. The *Brady* and *Giglio* Violations in Petitioner's Case Closely Resemble Those Found in Key Precedents of This Court

In *Giglio*, this Court found a *Brady* violation where the Government failed to disclose a single piece of evidence: "an alleged promise made to its key witness that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the Government." 405 U.S. at 150–51. Post-conviction, two prosecutors presented conflicting evidence as to whether such a promise was actually

made to the witness, a question the Court ultimately determined "we need not concern ourselves with." *Id.* at 152–53. Rather, all that mattered "is that one Assistant United States Attorney . . . now states that he promised [the witness] that he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated with the Government." *Id.* at 153. That was enough to reverse the conviction: Given that the witness's credibility was "an important issue in the case, . . . evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it." *Id.* at 154–55.

In Petitioner's case, the State: (a) withheld details of a deal made with Scott, one of its two star witnesses, Pet. 7–8; (b) assured the jury that the other star witness, Brown, was getting "nothing" when in fact Brown's 15-year sentence was replaced with probation shortly after Petitioner was convicted, Pet. 6, 8–9, 13; and (c) secured favorable testimony from a third witness, Stinson, by way of an undisclosed promise to transfer him to a different prison, Pet. 14.

In *Kyles*—a Louisiana homicide case where the defendant's first trial also resulted in a hung jury—"the essence of the State's case was the testimony of eyewitnesses" for whom "[d]isclosure of their statements would have resulted in a markedly weaker case for the prosecution and a markedly stronger one for the defense." 514 U.S. at 421, 441. So too here, where the parallels are uncanny. As to one witness against Kyles, the undisclosed changes in his statements over time would have "destroy[ed] confidence in [his] story and rais[ed] a substantial implication that the prosecutor had coached him to

give it." *Id.* at 443. The same can be said of Scott, one of the two key witnesses against Petitioner. *See* Pet. 12. And just as another witness against Kyles, "[i]f cross-examined," "would have had trouble explaining" why his initial description of the perpetrator differed so drastically from Kyles' appearance, so too would Brown—a key witness against Petitioner—"have had trouble explaining" why his initial statements to police did not mention Petitioner at all, and why he initially identified another man from a police photo array. *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 441; Pet. 12. After considering "the cumulative effect" of this evidence and "all such evidence suppressed by the government," the State's case becomes "a significantly weaker case" than the one the jury was actually permitted to hear—including "the first jury, which could not even reach a verdict." *Kyles*, 514 U.S. at 421, 454.

And of greatest relevance is *Wearry v. Cain*, 577 U.S. 385 (2016), a companion case to Petitioner's in which this Court summarily reversed the conviction based on the same underlying facts that are at issue here. *See* Pet. 18–27 (pointing out that, if anything, the evidence of *Brady* violations is even *stronger* in Petitioner's case than in *Wearry*).

II. *BRADY* AND *GIGLIO* VIOLATIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY LED TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Since 1989, there have been more than 3,700 known exonerations across the United States. Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, https://exonerationregistry.org/cases (last accessed July 30, 2025). In more than 1,900 of those cases,

exculpatory evidence was suppressed. *Id.*; *accord* Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, *Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent*, 81 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/yckemxfn (reporting that 1,064 of 2,400 known exonerations as of February 2019 involved the suppression of exculpatory evidence and that "concealing exculpatory evidence is the most frequent type of official misconduct among known exonerations"); Brandon L. Garrett, Adam M. Gershowitz & Jennifer Teitcher, *The Brady Database*, 114 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 185, 186 (2024) ("*Brady* violations are one of the most common and most serious types of prosecutorial misconduct, and frequently contribute to wrongful convictions that come to light.") (listing sources).[3]

The disclosure of impeachment evidence is especially imperative where, as in Petitioner's trial, the prosecution's case depends exclusively on the testimony of cooperators and jailhouse informants. *See, e.g.*, *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154–55 ("[E]vidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [the cooperating witness's] credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it.");

[3] The National Registry of Exonerations can be filtered to display only those exonerations in which exculpatory evidence was withheld. Notably, the Registry does not include cases such as Mr. Wearry's, where a defendant's conviction was vacated but the defendant was released from incarceration pursuant to a plea agreement as opposed to a dismissal, pardon, acquittal, or declaration of factual innocence. *See* Nat'l Registry of Exonerations, *Understanding the Registry*, https://exonerationregistry.org/understanding-registry (last visited July 30, 2025) (defining "exoneration" for purposes of the Registry).

Napue, 360 U.S. at 270 (holding that "[h]ad the jury been apprised of the true fact[]" that the cooperating witness attempted to make a deal before testifying, "it might well have concluded that [the cooperating witness] had fabricated testimony in order to curry the [prosecution's] favor"). As of February 2019, of all exonerations in which exculpatory information was concealed, approximately 80% involved the suppression of impeachment evidence. *Government Misconduct and Convicting the Innocent*, *supra*, at xvii, 85–86. The most common fact patterns include suppression of potential benefits offered to government witnesses, as well as non-disclosure of prior inconsistent statements—both of which occurred in Petitioner's case. *See id.* at xvii, 89–90.

The book *Actual Innocence*, groundbreaking when it was published in 2000, originally estimated that 21% of wrongful capital convictions were influenced by "snitch testimony." Alexandra Natapoff, *Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions*, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 109 (2006) (citing Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 156 (Doubleday 2000)). More refined studies published since then have consistently revealed that number to be even higher, closer to 40–50%, for both capital and non-capital murder convictions. *See id.* (detailing studies). Disclosing impeachment evidence for informants and cooperating witnesses is particularly important to a criminal defendant's ability to mount a trial defense. *Id*. at 120–24; *Giglio*, 405 U.S. at 154–55.

The foregoing data confirms the proposition articulated decades ago by this Court: the suppression

of exculpatory evidence perverts the justice system and corrupts the truth-seeking process of criminal trials. *See supra* Section I.A. Petitioner's case—in which the catalogue of suppressed evidence includes promises and deals offered to prosecution witnesses as well as a gold mine of prior inconsistent statements—contains all the hallmarks of a prototypical wrongful conviction. The accounts of real individuals in the National Registry of Exonerations who were also victims of ruinous *Brady* and *Giglio* violations highlight the danger to society when those with their freedom at stake are not afforded a fair trial.

1. Take, for example, Andre Hatchett. *See* https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/11961. In 1992, following his second trial (the first ended in a mistrial), Mr. Hatchett was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. He was convicted largely on the testimony of an alleged eyewitness, a career criminal who was arrested a week after the murder on an unrelated burglary charge. *See* Press Release, Dist. Att'y Kings County, *Brooklyn D.A. Moves to Vacate the Wrongful Conviction of Andre Hatchett Who Was Convicted of Murdering Acquaintance in 1991 in Bed-Stuy Park* (Mar. 10, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/3yvcpv9d. While in custody, that witness told police that he recognized another suspect at the station house (not Mr. Hatchett) as the person who had committed the murder. *Id.* Only after police investigated and confirmed that individual's alibi did the witness subsequently pick Mr. Hatchett out of a police lineup. *Id.*

Mr. Hatchett spent 24 years in prison before the Brooklyn District Attorney moved to vacate his

conviction in 2016, after its Conviction Review Unit unveiled that the witness's original identification of another suspect had never been disclosed to the defense. *Id.* The prosecution had also failed to disclose that the same witness admitted to smoking crack on the day of the murder, which he perjuriously testified he had not. *Id.* And in yet another striking parallel to Petitioner's case, the jury never heard evidence of Mr. Hatchett's medical condition on the night of the crime—he was on crutches and had a damaged trachea, which would have made carrying out the murder next to impossible. *Id.*

2. Another example is Kino Christian, one of four defendants sentenced to life in prison for the 2009 murder of a 14-year-old in Flint, Michigan. *See* https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/13470. In that case, the State suppressed the transcript of its first interview with its star witness, which revealed that the witness's original statement differed drastically—"in eight important ways"—from his testimony at trial. *People v. Christian*, 987 N.W.2d 29, 43 (Mich. 2022). As in Petitioner's case, the inconsistencies included "the location of the [crime]" and other important specifics about its commission. *Id.* at 43–45.

Even though it was "true that the defendants were able to highlight some inconsistencies between the versions of [the witness's] story they were aware of"—as was also true of Petitioner's trial—"the inconsistencies that could have been emphasized with the [earlier] interview [were] more significant." *Id.* at 45. Applying this Court's precedents, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the suppression of the

transcript "was material for three reasons": 1) "it would have provided far more substantial impeachment evidence than any of the evidence the defendants were provided"; 2) "it would have undermined the other prosecution evidence and supported the defendants' theory of defense"; and 3) it "call[ed] the thoroughness and good faith of the investigation into question." *Id.* at 43. Mr. Christian and his co-defendants were exonerated in 2022 after approximately 15 years behind bars.

3. A third example is Laurence Adams, who spent 30 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. *See* https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10220. In 1974, at the age of 19, Mr. Adams was convicted of murder and armed robbery by an all-white, all-male jury for the killing of a Boston transit worker. His conviction was vacated in 2004 following the revelation of previously undisclosed *Brady* evidence. *Commonwealth v. Adams*, No. 74652, 2004 WL 1588108, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 20, 2004).

Similar to Petitioner's case, the suppressed evidence included police reports showing "significant" variation in statements made by "a chief witness" who testified that Mr. Adams had admitted to the crime. *Id.* at *5. The Commonwealth also neglected to disclose the existence of "serious pending cases" against that same cooperating witness and a second prosecution witness—cases that were favorably resolved "the day after the conclusion of the Adams trial." *Id.* at *4–5. As a result of these *Brady* violations, "the defense was not able to cross examine [key witnesses] about their serious pending cases and what concessions each expected from the

Commonwealth," nor was it able to undermine the "admissions" that "were at the core of the Commonwealth's proof and theory of the case." *Id.* at *5. This suppressed evidence, in combination with additional undisclosed evidence that included the criminal records of various Commonwealth witnesses, "constitute[d] material exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed by the Commonwealth to the defense pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution[.]" *Id.* at *7.

4. A final example is Juwan Deering, sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for allegedly starting a fire in Michigan that resulted in the death of five children in 2000. *See* https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/13094. Two decades later, the Oakland County Prosecutor jointly moved with the defense to vacate the convictions and sentences because "Mr. Deering did not get a fair trial," and "critical evidence was buried in files in my office, and on a videotape and photo lineup in the investigator's files." *Juwan Deering Conviction Vacated by Judge*, OAKLAND COUNTY LEGAL NEWS, (Sept. 23, 2021), https://legalnews.com/Home/Articles?DataId=1503638; Joint Mot. to Vacate Def.'s Convictions and Sentences, *Michigan v. Deering*, No. 2006-2077873-FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sep. 1, 2021) ("Joint Mot. to Vacate").

The evidence against Mr. Deering consisted of testimony from three jailhouse informants who claimed that Deering had made inculpatory statements to them. Joint Mot. to Vacate 1–2. The prosecution—whose case "hinged on the jury hearing

and believing the inculpatory statements by the jail informants"—did not disclose that these witnesses had received, or expected to receive, favorable treatment from the prosecution in exchange for their testimony. *Id.* at 12–17. The State also withheld the second half of a videotaped police interview with a key eyewitness recorded shortly after the fire. *Id.* at 10–11. In the withheld portion of the videotape, the witness reviewed a photo lineup, identified the defendant as someone who lived in the neighborhood, and stated that "Juwan is not the person he heard outside before the fire" and that "he doesn't think the Juwan in the photo lineup started the fire." *Id.* at 11. Unaware of the existence of this invaluable evidence, Mr. Deering languished in prison until 2021.

Distressingly, there are many other examples of innocent individuals who were wrongfully sent to prison on the back of egregious *Brady* violations. *See, e.g.*, *Graves v. Dretke*, 442 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2006) (granting habeas for defendant wrongfully incarcerated on death row for 12 years, where suppressed statements by co-defendant would have provided "powerful ammunition" for cross-examination) (https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10485); *North Carolina v. Gell*, No. 95CRS1884, 2002 WL 35450047, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2002) (vacating capital murder conviction where State suppressed statements of witnesses that supported defendant's theory that the crime occurred at a time defendant had been in jail) (https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10468); *Jean v. Rice*, 945 F.2d 82, 83 (4th Cir. 1991) (vacating life sentence for rape conviction where corroborating

physical evidence was limited, and State failed to disclose audio recordings demonstrating that witness testimony had been enhanced using hypnosis) (https://exonerationregistry.org/cases/10554).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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July 31, 2025

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APPENDIX A

Member Organizations of the Innocence Network for *Amicus* Brief Purposes

Actual Innocence Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law

Alaska Innocence Project

Arizona Justice Project

Boston College Innocence Program

California Innocence Project

Connecticut Innocence Project/Post-Conviction Unit

Duke Center for Criminal Justice and Professional Responsibility

Exoneration Initiative (NY)

Exoneration Project (IL)

George C. Cochran Innocence Project at the University of Mississippi School of Law

Georgia Innocence Project

Great North Innocence Project

Griffith University Innocence Project (Australia)

Hawai'i Innocence Project

Idaho Innocence Project

Illinois Innocence Project

Indiana University McKinney Wrongful Conviction Clinic

The Innocence Center (CA)

Innocence Delaware

Innocence Project (NY)

Innocence Project Argentina

Innocence Project at University of Virginia School of Law

Innocence Project Brasil

Innocence Project Japan

Innocence Project New Orleans

Innocence Project of Florida

Innocence Project of Texas

Iowa State Public Defender Wrongful Conviction Division

Italy Innocence Project

Korey Wise Innocence Project (CO)

Legal Aid Society Wrongful Conviction Unit (NY)

Los Angeles Innocence Project

Loyola Law School Project for the Innocent (CA)

Manchester Innocence Project (UK)

Michigan Innocence Clinic

Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project

Midwest Innocence Project

Montana Innocence Project

New England Innocence Project

New Jersey Innocence Project at Rutgers University

New York Law School Post-Conviction Innocence Clinic

North Carolina Center on Actual Innocence

Northern California Innocence Project

Notre Dame Exoneration Justice Clinic

Office of the Ohio Public Defender Wrongful Conviction Project

Ohio Innocence Project

Oklahoma Innocence Project

Oregon Innocence Project

Proyecto Inocencia de Puerto Rico

Rocky Mountain Innocence Center (UT)

Taiwan Innocence Project

Tennessee Innocence Project

Thurgood Marshall School of Law Innocence Project (TX)

University of Arizona Innocence Project

University of Baltimore Innocence Project Clinic

University of Miami Law Innocence Clinic

Wake Forest University Law School Innocence and Justice Clinic

Washington Innocence Project

West Virginia Innocence Project

Wisconsin Innocence Project

Witness to Innocence (PA)