ORIGINAL

24-7081

No. _____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Michael Anthony Galluzzo,
Petitioner in Propria Persona,

v.

ROBIN K. EDWARDS,
DBA, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY TREASURER, OHIO
Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio

---

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael Anthony Galluzzo
P.O. Box 710
St. Paris, Ohio the State [43072]
937-727-4505
Petitioner in Propria Persona

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. As a matter of Law, did the court commit plain error when it failed to adhere to the Constitutional requirement of an Oath of Office for persons appointed as a judicial officer of the several states pursuant to Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States of America and Article XV, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution? Where the magistrate did not have a proper Oath of Office, Petitioner argues that the magistrate was not lawfully on the bench and did not have lawful authority to act in a judicial capacity.

2. As a matter of Law, did the court commit plain error when it failed to dismiss the action under a default and estoppels by silence against the Respondent?

3. As a matter of Law, the court committed plain error and demonstrated bias and prejudice in favor of the Prosecution when it asserted that Petitioner could not answer for other family members or raise any challenge to the Treasurer's service by publication because he did not have a "license to practice law in Ohio" while at the same time ignoring the fact that the assistant prosecutor, as well, does not have an actual "license to practice law in Ohio" nor does the magistrate have an Oath of Office?

4. As a matter of Law, did the Trial Court commit plain error when it failed to require the Respondent to place jurisdiction and standing on the record when challenged by the Petitioners? The Respondent failed to provide any Constitutional authority for the Complaint and failed to defend it when given the opportunity.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Michael Anthony Galluzzo
Petitioner in Propria Persona,
c/o P.O. Box 710
St. Paris, Ohio the State [43072]

Larry Galluzzo and unknown spouse,

Petitioners
vs.

ROBIN K. EDWARDS,
DBA, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY TREASURER, OHIO
Respondent

Counsel for Respondent
Champaign County Prosecutor
200 North Main Street
Urbana, Ohio 43078

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, Petitioners Michael Anthony Galluzzo and family, respectfully prays this Court to grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the issues of the judgments below.

Petitioner additionally requests the Court appoint appropriate counsel to present these matters in oral arguments before the Court if necessary.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER, filed May 4, 2024 by the Champaign County Commom Pleas Court, Case No. 2022-CV-033. (Appendix A)

ENTRY OVERRULING OBJECTIONS, filed May 4, 2024 by the Champaign County Commom Pleas Court, Case No. 2022-CV-033. (Appendix B)

OPINION filed May 24, 2024 by the Court of Appeals for Champaign County, Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio at Dayton, Ohio, Case No. 2023-CA-21. (Appendix C)

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENT ENTRY, filed June 11, 2024 by the Court of Appeals for Champaign County, Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio at Dayton, Ohio, Case No. 2023-CA-21. (Appendix D)

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION, filed July 30, 2024 by the Court of Appeals for Champaign County, Second District Court of Appeals of Ohio at Dayton, Ohio, Case No. 2023-CA-21. (Appendix E)

ENTRY, filed November 26, 2024 by The Supreme Court of Ohio, Case No. 2024-1271. (Appendix F)

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §2101(c), §2104, §2106 and Supreme Court Rule 10(c) to review this case for the following reasons:

The Supreme Court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances. This court may address federal questions in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Constitutional provisions involved in this matter are:

(1) Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States of America, the right to a properly qualified judicial officer as trier of fact with a proper oath of office pursuant to Constitutional requirements of an Oath of Office for persons appointed as a judicial officer.

(2) Fifth Amendment of the Constitution; an individual's right to due process where a substantive right is implicated in matters of life, liberty, or property, the right to challenge jurisdiction, the right to inquire as to the complaint, the right to a trial by jury, the right to common law process pursuant to the Act of Congress of July 13, 1787.

STATUS OF PARTIES

Petitioners, Michael Anthony Galluzzo, his brother Larry Galluzzo and his spouse, are private, peaceful, flesh and blood, living people, of the free state Ohio, possessing and holding by title of occupancy the corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments conferred to the descendants of the Freeholding men of Foreign Sovereign Immunity who preceded the founding of the Great Republic of the United States of America.

Respondent, Robin K. Edwards, dba as Champaign County Treasurer, is an employee of the political subdivision, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, of the corporate STATE OF OHIO acting as a de facto agency under the color of law. The STATE OF OHIO is a corporate franchise of U.S., Inc., which overlays the Republic State Ohio. UNITED STATES, INC. (U.S., Inc.) is a foreign-owned bankrupt corporation created in 1871 and is situated in the city of Washington in the District of Columbia.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

This matter was commenced by the filing of a tax foreclosure Complaint by the Plaintiff/Respondent on January 15, 2020 in case# 2020CV007. **(Case #1)**

The Defendant/Petitioner (hereafter Petitioner) accepted service on or about April 5, 2021.

The Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint on May 1, 2021, raised a number of defenses and moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter Respondent) failed to respond.

On June 9, 2021, the Petitioner filed a notice of Default. The Respondent further failed to respond and defend the Complaint.

On July 7, 2021, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel a Default Judgment.

Two days later, on July 9, 2021, the Respondent filed a Motion for Summary judgment.

A motion hearing was held on August 31, 2021 and an Entry was entered on September 7, 2021 Granting Respondent's Summary Judgment and Denying Petitioner's Motions for Default Judgment and Dismissal.

Petitioner filed Objections to the Magistrate's Decision on September 17, 2021 and the Judge entered an Opinion in favor of the Petitioner dismissing the Complaint on October 14, 2021 for lack of jurisdiction.

On March 17, 2022, the Respondent filed another tax foreclosure Complaint as case# 2022CV033. **(Case# 2) (The primary case at issue in this Petition.)**

On May 2, 2022, Petitioner filed an Answer to the Complaint, filed a Counterclaim, a Cross Claim, a Request for Preliminary and Injunctive Relief and a Demand for a Trial by Jury.

On May 9, 2022, the court held a Motion Hearing.

On May 31, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to strike Counterclaim/Cross claim.

On June 15, 2022, Petitioner filed a Motion for leave to file First Amended Counterclaim.

On July 7, 2022, Petitioner filed an Amended Writ of Counterclaim/third party claim.

On August 4, 2022, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to Strike Counterclaim.

On August 12, 2022, Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond which was Granted on Aug. 15, 2022.

On September 6, 2022, Petitioner's response to Respondent's Request for a More Definite Statement was filed.

On September 20, 2022, the court filed a Journal Entry Granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Amended Writ of Counterclaim/third party claim and dismissing the same with prejudice.

On October 20, 2022, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal filed.

Case# 2022 CA 22.

On January 3, 2023, the Court of Appeals returned the case for lack of a Final Appealable Order.

On January 31, 2023, a Motion for Summary Judgment against Petitioner and for Default Judgment Petitioner's brother and his unknown spouse was filed by the Respondent.

On February 1, 2023, the court filed a Journal Entry setting default judgment hearing.

On February 27, 2023, Petitioner filed an Answer Contra to Respondent's motion for summary and default judgments.

Also on February 27, 2023, Petitioner filed their First Set of Interrogatories, Admissions, and request for Production of Documents.

In addition on February 27, 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion to Disqualify Magistrate Scott D. Schockling for cause.

On February 28, 2023, the court filed a Journal Entry Denying Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify the Magistrate, Scott D. Schockling for cause.

On March 10, 2023, the Magistrate's Decision Granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment was filed.

On March 23, 2023, Petitioner filed Objections to Magistrate's Decision.

On May 4, 2023, a Journal Entry was filed overruling Objections filed by Petitioner and granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and for Default Judgment

On May 4, 2023, a Journal Entry of Foreclosure was filed along with a Notice of Final Appealable Order.

On May 31, 2023, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal in the Second District Court of Appeals, **2023 CA 00021.**

Appeal - 2023 CA 00021

On June 12, 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion for an Extension of time to file the Brief. The Motion was Granted on June 14, 2023.

On July 31, 2023, Petitioner filed the Appellant Brief along with the Transcript of the March 9, 2023 hearing.

On August 18, 2023, Respondent filed the First Motion for Extension of time, Granted on

The Respondent filed the First Motion for Extension of Time to file Appellee Brief on August 18, 2023, a Second Motion on September 11, 2023, and a Third Motion on October 2, 2023. All Motions were Granted and the Appellee Brief was filed on October 23, 2023.

Oral Arguments were continued until January 9. 2025.

On January 4, 2024, Petitioner filed a Reply Brief.

Oral Arguments were heard on January9, 2023.

On May 24, 2024, a Journal Entry and Opinion were entered against the Appellants.

On June 11, 2024, a Motion for Leave to File a Reconsideration of the Opinion and the Journal Entry was filed due to lack of proper service of the Entry by the clerk and the court of appeals.

On July 30, 2024, Petitioner's application for Reconsideration improperly was Denied.

On September 12, 2024, Petitioner filed an Appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, Case #24-1271.

Ohio Supreme Court Case #2024-1271

On November 26, 2024, The Supreme Court Ohio Declined to take jurisdiction of the appeal.

Petitioners Motioned this court for an Extension of Time and now file this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION

EXAMINATION OF WHY THIS IS A CASE OF GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST AND INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

This case addresses several critical issues related to the fundamental rights of Citizens and the protections therein provided by the Organic Constitution for the United States of America, federal law and other Acts of Congress, against the routine deprivations of due process under the color of law by corporate administrative 'courts.' The People must know that their fundamental liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, are still intact, still the Law of the Land, and still protected by this Honorable Court from incursion by the lower courts and political subversives.

Where a court can arbitrarily deny access to a hearing, due process, justice, and violate the laws of the state and the United States of America, these decisions create a slippery slope of tyranny and undermine the principles of the Constitution for the United States of America.

The primary requirement of justice is due process in the actions against an individual. When the lower court errs, and when informed of the error of its way, continues to prosecute and ignore their error to the detriment of the People, one has to wonder where the people can actually find remedy and justice in America! As the American People have seen in the last 8 years, even a presidential candidate is not immune to the tyranny of radical judges and prosecutors.

The issue of fundamental constitutional protections of individuals from arbitrary government interference, addressed by the facts of this case, is one of critical importance to the majority of Americans at one point or another in their lives. The lack of judicial integrity attacks the very fundamental order of our society and the future of our nation as a whole. This is certainly true for the Petitioner as the issues of Constitutional Law in this case directly implicate Petitioner's fundamental liberties.

When these basic premises of justice and due process are intentionally ignored by the public servants, judges and attorneys, we are left with a system of corruption and injustice where the public servants have abdicated their duties and imposed a scheme that is more concerned with revenue and control of the people than with justice itself. These people have violated their Oaths and warred against Our Constitution!

It is easy for public servants to abuse their position and deny due process to self represented litigants knowing that the good old boy network will cover for them.

Americans have always looked to the Organic Documents for the United States of America for protection of their fundamental rights, e.g., life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. The state constitutions were based on those same principles. In recent years, many have lost faith in the 'Judiciary' to protect those very rights so endeared by our founding fathers; i.e., due process, free speech, freedom of religion, the right to bear arms, eminent domain, parental rights; as we

have seen them slowly eroded in favor of political correctness and the special interests of a few.

The right of the free inhabitant to due process at trial and the right to have a fair and impartial trier of fact, that follows the Law, raises issues of great importance to the American public and concerns about the impartiality of the lower corporate administrative courts. Such a process, under which trial courts would be free to disregard the requirements of due process, established precedent and our founding documents, opens the door for corrupt officials to subvert the rights of the individual and undermine the very existence of a free and peaceful society.

The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE addressed the most common practices that run afoul of the United States Constitution and/or other federal laws in the Department of Justice letter of March 14, 2016 which can be found at (https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/DOJDearColleague.pdf).

The DOJ stated that,

> "Recent years have seen increased attention on the illegal enforcement of fines and fees in certain jurisdictions around the country—often with respect to individuals accused of misdemeanors, quasi-criminal ordinance violations, or civil infractions." (footnotes omitted) They went on to say, "Furthermore, in addition to being unlawful, to the extent that these practices are geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward **raising revenue, they can cast doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal and erode trust between local governments and their constituents."** (Emphasis added)(footnotes omitted) It appears that the problems continue to this day.

This case, I believe, exemplifies the crux of the DOJ's letter. The decisions of the lower courts in this case threaten the fundamental liberties of ALL free People

of the Republic. Decisions abhorrent to federal law and the Constitution create a slippery slope of deterioration of all protected rights, *if we have any remaining*. Prosecutions and the loss of liberties based on invalid and/or prejudicial decisions cannot be tolerated if a judiciary expects to maintain its integrity and the faith of the People it 'serves.' Such actions should raise serious questions as to the true motives of the alleged "court," most generally to collect revenue.

In brief, this court should take up this case and address the violations of procedures and due process where the jurisdiction and proper operations of these administrative tribunals, confronting individuals on a daily basis, are of great public interest and importance to the general public whose safety and welfare are at stake, as well as the trust of the people in our Judicial institutions.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

ARGUMENTS

FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

As a matter of Law, did the court commit plain error when it failed to adhere to the Constitutional requirement of an Oath of Office for persons appointed as a judicial officer of the several states pursuant to Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution for the United States of America and Article XV, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution. Where the magistrate did not have a proper Oath of Office, Petitioner argues that the magistrate was not lawfully on the bench and did not have lawful authority to act in a judicial capacity.

In addressing the First Proposition of Law, the issue as to the Magistrate's Oath of Office was raised as soon as discovered.

In the Court's May 4, 2023, (See: Appendix B) *Journal Entry Overruling Objections Filed by Defendant Michael Galluzzo to Magistrate's Decision;* under "AUTHORITY OF THE MAGISTRATE" (pgs. 7 and 8), the court addresses the lack of an 'oath of office' for Magistrate Shockling finding that pursuant to Superintendence Rule 19(D)(1) "...that a magistrate, upon appointment, shall take an oath of office administered by the administrative judge of the court or division. Said oath shall be filed with the Clerk of Courts within 30 days of the appointment. Superintendence Rule 19(D)(2)." The court goes on to explain that this "rule" does not apply to appointments occurring before January 1, 2018 and Magistrate Shockling was appointed on February 5, 2013. Judge Selvaggio took an oath to the Constitution for the United States of America and the Ohio Constitution and not to the "Rules of Superintendence," as far as I know.

The Constitutional requirement for oaths takes precedence over any other authority because rules cannot abrogate the Law! As the Supreme Court stated in *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 137) (1803):

> **"It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it,** or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act." (Emphasis added)

And,

> "Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution for the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that **a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts,** as well as other departments, **are bound by that instrument."** (Emphasis added)

In 1789, the 1st United States Congress created an oath to fulfill the requirement of Article VI of the United States Constitution:

"I do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States."[1]

The Constitution for the United States (Article VI, clause 3) specifies:

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and **judicial officers**, both of the United States and **of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation**, to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." (Emphasis added)

Stat. I, Chap. I, Sec. 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate and [House of] Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the constitution of the United States, shall be administered in the form following, to wit: ... (Emphasis added)

Sec. 3. *And be it further enacted,* ... And the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive **and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed** after the said first day of August, **shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take the foregoing oath or affirmation;** ... (Emphasis added)

When Congress returned for its regular session in December 1861, members who believed that the Union had as much to fear from northern traitors as southern soldiers again revised the oath, adding a new first section known as the "Ironclad Test Oath." The war-inspired Test Oath, signed into law on July 2, 1862, required "**every person elected or appointed to any office ... under the Government of the United States** ... excepting the President of the United States" **to swear or affirm that they had never previously engaged in criminal or disloyal conduct.**

That was 1862! Though the oath may have changed some since that time, the **requirement to take an oath of office** under Article VI of the Constitution for the

[1] It also passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established an additional oath taken by federal judges.

United States of America has NOT changed!

And let's not forget, ***Oath of officers,*** Art. XV §7, of the Ohio Constitution:

In addition, Article XV, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, Oath of Officers states:

> "Every person chosen **or appointed** to any office under this state, before entering upon the discharge of its duties, shall take an oath or affirmation, to support the Constitution of the United States, and of this state, and also an oath of office." (Emphasis added)

This Law has been in effect since 1851!

The failure by Magistrate Schockling to take the oath of office violates TWO (2) constitutions and calls into question the jurisdiction of the court in this matter and the system of justice in our courts of Law, especially in Ohio, if judges can violate or disregard their oaths of office with impunity. A judge's duty is to properly administer his court.

> **"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.** No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. **All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.** It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and **every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.**" *United States v. Lee*, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 261. *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401 (1958). (Emphasis added)

Note: Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution for the United States of America wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

> The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it". See also *In Re Sawyer*, 124 U.S. 200 (188); *U.S. v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S. Ct. 471, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); *Cohens v. Virginia*, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).

The lower courts are attempting to suppress the Laws of the United States of America which have been in effect for over 240 years and the Laws of the state Ohio for over 170 years.

Their actions could very well be considered as Acts of Treason and sedition.

The Rights of the People guaranteed by the Constitution for the United States of American and placing restraints on government are fundamental to the protection of the People and the Republic. Those who have taken an Oath to that Constitution and failed in their duty to protect it are considered it to be "warring against the Constitution," the Republic and the People protected by that Constitution. When one breaks the Law of the Land, he is a Law breaker. If he breaks that Law in an office of honor, he is still a Law breaker and holds that office in "fraud" and actions in fraud may be challenged at any time. Likewise, Jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, even on appeal. (Citations omitted)

The lower court stated, "While both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution require a judicial officer to take an oath or affirmation, neither requires a magistrate's oath of office to be filed with the clerk of courts." If it is not on file, it must not exist! That is the purpose of "recording" documents, to insure to record and as proof of one's duty performed. All other public officers have oaths and

they are on file, with the clerk or some other department, but **they are on file.** Those Constitutional requirements long predate and negate the Superintendence Rules. (See: Marbury v. Madison, supra)

This is not a difficult matter to understand. Based on the foregoing, this case should have been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction in the trial court in favor of justice and in adherence with the principles established under the Constitution for the United States of America and the Ohio Constitution.

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

As a matter of Law, did the court commit plain error when it failed to dismiss the action under a default and estoppels by silence against the Respondent?

This issue was raised in the *Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate's Decision* in the Trial Court but not addressed by the Court in the *Final Appealable Order*. This issue goes directly to the challenge of jurisdiction which was never addressed in the Trial Court nor was such placed on the record. Jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, even on appeal.

The issues and the parties in this case, 2022 CV 033, are the same as the issues and the parties in the previous case, 2020 CV 007. When the Petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (May 3, 2021 - 2020CV007), a number of assertions and defenses were claimed. The Respondent failed to respond and further defend the Complaint. Petitioners filed a "Notice of Default" on June 9, 2021 and the Plaintiff again failed to respond. The Petitioners then filed a "Motion

to Compel Default Judgment" on July 7, 2021. The Respondent immediately filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on July 9, 2021 in an attempt to circumvent the legal process, not answer the Petitioners' assertions and deny the Petitioners due process. The Respondent, against whom the estoppels are asserted, had a full and fair opportunity to respond and litigate in the prior action and remained silent. The Respondent failed to respond to the Default or otherwise defend the action pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(C) and 55(C).

As the Respondent may not be "required" to respond to the allegations and defenses in the Answer, it is a well known fact of law that failure to respond is acquiescence to the assertions in the Petitioner's Answer. Where the Respondent has a duty to defend the complaint, the Respondent's silence can only be taken as agreement with the allegations. Where the jurisdiction of the court was challenged, the Plaintiff was once again silent.

> "However late this objection has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, it must be considered and decided, before any court can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." *Rhode Island v. Massachussetts*, 37 U.S. 657, 718, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838); "Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." *Maine v. Thiboutot*, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980), "The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 533 (1974). The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings and may be challenged even on appeal.

It was said by the Court of Appeals of New York in *Viele v. Judson,* 82 N.Y. 32, 40, of the cases holding a party to be estopped by his silence:

"In all of them, the silence operated as a fraud and actually itself misled. In all, there was both the specific opportunity and apparent duty to speak. To constitute an estoppel by silence, there must not only be an opportunity, but an obligation to speak."

A willful or culpable silence is absence of a duty to speak.

"Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading." United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (1977) citing *United States v. Prudden*, 425 F.2d 1021 (1970). (Emphasis added)

When the Defendants filed the "Default" in Case #2020 CV 007, it initiated an estoppel by silence in that case (See: Black's Law Dictionary, SILENCE, ESTOPPEL BY, pg. 1554) of **any further administrative or judicial action against the Petitioners of the same issues.**

"[T]he Government may be estopped by the "affirmative misconduct" of its agents", Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, at 59, 60, Federal Crop Ins. "It [the doctrine of Estoppel by Silence] arises where a person is under duty to another to speak or failure to speak is inconsistent with honest dealings." In Re McArdles Estate, 140 Misc. 257, et seq., and Silence, to work estoppel, must amount to bad faith, Wise v. United States, D.C. Ky., 38 F.Supp 130, 134, where one has a duty and opportunity to speak. "Silence" implies knowledge, and an opportunity to act upon it." *Pence v. Langdon*, 99 U.S. 578 @ 581, et seq.

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of silence by corporations in *Hale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) stating:

"While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges."

"*Silence is the door of consent.*" The failure of the Respondent to address the assertions in the Petitioners' Answer opened the door for the Petitioners to file a Default, which they did and perfected.

The Petitioner's "Default" is valid and the lower court was barred from taking any further actions, judicial or administrative.

THIRD QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

As a matter of Law, did the court commit plain error and demonstrated bias and prejudice in favor of the Prosecution when it asserted that Petitioner could not answer for other family members or raise any challenge to the Treasurer's service by publication because he did not have a "license to practice law in Ohio" while at the same time ignoring the fact that the assistant prosecutor, as well, does not have an actual "license to practice law in Ohio" nor does the magistrate have an Oath of Office.

In the Court's May 4, 2023, (See: Appendix B) *Journal Entry Overruling Objections Filed by Defendant Michael Galluzzo to Magistrate's Decision;* under "DEFAULT JUDGMENT" (pg. 7), the court addresses the alleged "unauthorized practice of law in Ohio" as I represent myself and family members in this matter.

As in the doctrine of the 9th Amendment, the fact that the 10th Amendment secures a right to counsel in all civil matters, it cannot be construed to deny that right. The right to counsel does not mean counsel must be a BAR member attorney. There are many lay people more knowledgeable than most attorneys.

On February 1-10, 1790, the United States Supreme Court held their first meeting in New York City. It was recorded that, "By adjournment on February 10,

a total of 19 counselors and 7 attorneys will be certified and take an oath drawn up by the justices." These 19 counselors were authorized to practice before the new Supreme Court. Why only 7 attorneys? Also, under the 14th Amendment, one may counsel as a Private Attorney General.

In any matter before a court or administrative tribunal is the requirement of "due process." Any rule of procedure, for the court, is there precisely to 'guarantee' due process of the law to the people as a matter of right.

> "Due process of law in the latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution for the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the common law." *Hurtado v. California*, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)

It is a "basic aspect" of the duty of government to follow a fair process when it acts to deprive a private man of his liberty and/or his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual, but more precisely, to protect him and his property from arbitrary encroachment.

An "impartial decision maker" is an essential right in any proceeding as well to guarantee that fundamental liberties will not be taken for granted or abused on the basis of an erroneous or a distorted conception of the law or facts.

In America we seem to be moving "backwards" with regard to rights and freedoms. The "Due Process Clause" is the assurance that all levels of American government must operate within the Law of the Land and provide fair procedures. The failure to do so is an act of Treason and a violation of a 'public servant's' Oath of Office.

> **"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority."** *Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co.*, 184 U.S. 540; *Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co.*, 24 A. 848; *O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co.*, 108 A. 887. (Emphasis added)
>
> "Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as a decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude. And the limitations imposed by our constitutional law upon the action of the governments, both State and national, are essential to the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative character of our political institutions. **The enforcement of these limitations by judicial process is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers, as against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the government.**" *Hurtado,* supra. (Emphasis added)

There is no question that the state has the inherent authority to regulate the "practice of law" and attorneys but there are limits to the state's authority. **The state cannot diminish the rights of the people.**

Just as the state <u>can</u> regulate the practice of medicine, plumbers, electricians, contractors, real estate agents, bankers, accountants, insurance agents, legal document assistants (LDAs), etc. to insure the public is protected from unscrupulous individuals, like attorneys, that authority is limited by personal contract between private parties. Is a "handyman" guilty of unauthorized practice for doing work as a private contractor? Did he deceive or mislead his client/customer? If you came across an accident or disaster and rendered medical assistance, are you practicing medicine without a license or just being a Good Samaritan?

It is not for the court to question the contract between brothers or any other parties, whether verbal or written, and one's inalienable right to counsel. A man cannot be forced, against his will, to contract with a BAR member attorney because the court wishes it so.

The Assistant prosecutor in this matter has repeatedly raised the issue of the Petitioner Michael Anthony Galluzzo not having a "license to practice law in Ohio" and to represent his brother... but she, herself, cannot produce a "license to practice law in the STATE OF OHIO" as well. Why the double standard?

The nature of lawyer-craft in America as per the United States Supreme Court: "The practice of Law cannot be licensed by any state/State." (*Schware v. Board of Examiners*, 353 U.S. 238, 239)

"The practice of Law is an occupation of common right." (*Sims v. Ahern*, 271 S.W.720 (1925))

Of licenses to practice law, the U.S. Supreme has stated:

> "Litigants may be assisted by unlicensed layman during judicial proceedings" (Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, sheriff, 407 U.S. 425), and "members of groups who are competent non-lawyers may assist other members of the group [family, association or class] achieve the goals of the group in court **without being charged with "Unauthorized practice of law."**" (*NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415; *United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715; and *Johnson v. Avery*, 89 S.Ct. 747 (1969)). (Emphasis added)

As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners*, 353 U.S. 232 (1957):

> **"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.** [Footnote 5] (Dent v. State of West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 632. *Cf.* Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216. See also: Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 565.)" (Emphasis added)
>
> [Footnote 5] We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons. **Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace.** Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379, 18 L.Ed. 366. (Emphasis added)

The state "BAR" is a "Non-Governmental, Private Professional Association", a foreign agency or power with respect to government and NOT a "Licensing Agency." The "State BAR" card is not a 'license' to practice Law! It is a Union Dues Card of current sustaining membership in a private professional association.

There is in fact no such document issued by any state or federal agency specifically called a "license to practice law." The fictitious "License to Practice Law" is merely a BAR card membership for permission/admission to practice before the state corporate administrative courts, thereby creating a legal monopoly to practice law and barring all others.

The definition of "unauthorized practice of law" is variable, and is often conclusory; *i.e.*, it is the doing of a lawyer's or counselor's work by a non-lawyer **for money**. The 'practice of law' is an enterprise for profit. In this case, there is no 'client' or 'customer'. Michael Anthony Galluzzo is not receiving any payment or

remuneration for his services and is not offering his opinions for remuneration. It is an endeavor for mutual benefit of family members... by agreement, a private verbal contract, to protect private property from unlawful seizure by a de facto government entity acting as the constitutional de jure government!

I have not held myself out as an attorney to the public, I am not requesting admission to the BAR Association, and there is no attempt to deceive or mislead anyone. Other cases cited by the Respondent on page 8 of the *Brief of Appellee* do not support the Respondent's arguments in this case where by definition; Michael Anthony Galluzzo is not 'practicing law.'

Freedom of contract is the process in which individuals and groups form contracts without government restrictions. Through "freedom of contract," individuals possess a general freedom to choose with whom to contract, whether to contract or not, and on which terms to contract. A contract presumes that the individuals are free and equal and freedom of contract as the expression of the independent decisions of separate individuals pursuing their own interests under a "minimal state." (See: 42 U.S. Code § 1981, Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 101, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071)

An examination of the same issues in the context of the 'law of contract liberty' and the Constitution's Obligation of Contracts clause, (See: U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §10, cl. 1.) occupational licensing is nothing more than a restriction on the kinds of contracts people would otherwise be at liberty to make. It says that certain people can enter into contracts to furnish legal services, but all other people cannot.

Consequently, licensing violates the inalienable right to contract within our right of liberty as much as it violates the inalienable right of equality. The actions of Petitioner Galluzzo are not in itself hurtful or conducted in a manner injurious to the public. It is a common right under our Constitution, as construed by former decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, can neither be prohibited nor hampered. (See: *Sims v. Ahrens*, supra.)

Since the Constitution for the United States of America was "ordained and established" by the people for their protection, not for the protection of a legal society, and since it may not be superseded by any other law, code, or ordinance of this state or any other state, it is within the power of the people to exercise such right. When the Constitution was written and ratified, the Bar Associations did not exist. Therefore, it is an absurdity to conclude that the Framers ever contemplated that only Bar Licensed Attorneys could appear as counsel for plaintiffs or defendants.

In the case at bar, the court and the prosecutor attempt to interfere with the rights of the Petitioners to agree to a defense by claiming I do not have the fictitious 'license to practice law' and cannot represent my family's interests in this matter. It also opens the door to promote a mischaracterization of failure of service, service by publication, and default judgment against Larry Galluzzo, prejudicing ALL the Petitioners.

If the Respondent can wrongfully prevail in their argument of the Petitioner's lack of a 'fictitious license to practice law,' they can, by default, prevail in their

argument of proper service by publication and be wrongfully awarded their default against Larry Galluzzo. It was noted that the publication for service was in the local Champaign County paper, the Urbana Daily Citizen, and not in the local area where service was attempted by mail, the Cincinnati area, and where it would be most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served. What was the Respondent's expectancy of service for a party over 100 miles outside the local area? That expectation is so unconscionable that any reasonable or informed person would agree that it would be unfair to the defending party.

Based on the foregoing, the assertion by the court that I cannot represent my family's interests in this matter is in contradiction to the Constitution and violates our fundamental liberties and Due Process. The lower court's findings on this matter and any related decisions based on those false representations are contra to the U.S. Supreme Court rulings. The Constitution for the United States and Supreme Court rulings are still the prevailing Law in this Land. The default judgment against Larry Galluzzo and his unknown spouse, in the interest of justice, must be reversed and vacated.

FOURTH QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

As a matter of Law, did the Trial Court commit plain error when it failed to require the Respondent to place jurisdiction and standing on the record when challenged by the Petitioners? The Respondent failed to provide any Constitutional authority for the Complaint and failed to defend it when given the opportunity.

On September 20, 2022, the court filed a "Journal Entry Granting Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Motion to Dismiss Defendants' (Petitioners') Amended Writ of Counterclaim/Third Party Claim" and dismissing the same with Prejudice which was not a Final Appealable Order. Therein, the Respondent seeks Dismissal on claims that Petitioners failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted even though the Petitioner states six (6) claims for relief. The Respondent's Motion may be granted if there are no genuine issues as to any material fact; however, in the instant matter, there are numerous facts asserted in the Petitioners' Answer that were not addressed by the Respondent and must be addressed in order to provide due process for the Petitioners. "As long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the complaint [Appeal], which would allow the plaintiff [Petitioner] to recover, the court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991)." (Journal Entry @ pg. 3.)

On page one (1) of the *Answer of Defendants by Affidavit*, May 2, 2022, a challenge to the jurisdiction and standing of the Plaintiff was asserted. There has been no such statement of jurisdiction placed on the record by the Respondent. In a plethora of federal court cases, jurisdiction must be placed on the record when challenged, not presumed, before the court may proceed.

> ***"[T]he law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings."*** *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 533; *Village Of Latana v. Hopper*, 102 F.2d 188 (1939); *Chicago v. New York*, 216 Fed.734-735 (1914); *Melo v. United States*, 505 F.2d 1026 (1974); *Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).* (Emphasis added)

> "The prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction are specifically defined, ... They are conditions which must be met by the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor. He must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction. If he fails to make the necessary allegations, he has no standing."
>
> "If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof... or the case be dismissed," And ". . . when they are questioned, as in this case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction." *McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)

In any proceeding, the defendant has the right to challenge the jurisdiction and standing of the Plaintiff including but not limited to subject matter, venue, territorial, personal jurisdiction, etc., in order to establish the 'standing' of the Plaintiff to bring the cause of action. The Plaintiff is required to answer all seven (7) elements of jurisdiction in writing and on the record.

> "**The presumption is that a cause is without the jurisdiction of the court, until the contrary appears. Defendant must await the plaintiff's declaration of jurisdiction**." *Lyell v. Goodwin*, 15 F. CAS. 1126, *4 McLean 29 Case No.* 8616 (1845). (Emphasis added)

No such Declaration of Jurisdiction appears on the record in this matter. So again, jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on appeal, and is hereby being raised again in this court.

> "However late this objection has been made, or may be made in any cause, in an inferior or appellate court of the United States, **it must be considered and decided, before any court can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.** Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them; the question is, whether on

> the case before a court, their action is judicial or extra-judicial; with or without the authority of law, to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction; what shall be adjudged or decreed between the parties, and with which is the right of the case, is judicial action, by hearing and determining it. 6 Peters, 709; 4 Russell, 415; 3 Peters, 203-7"; Cited by *State of Rhode Island v. Com. of Massachusetts*, 37 U.S. 657, 718 (1838) (Emphasis added)

In the transcript of March 9, 2023, pg. 23, (See: Transcript excerpt of March 9, 2023; Appendix G) Magistrate Shockling is dismissive of Petitioner's arguments which are an attempt to get answers related to jurisdictional issues and Respondent's standing. A defendant, brought before a court, has a right to be heard. He has a right to an impartial trier of facts. A defendant equally has a right to question the law. As throughout the hearing, it was improper to dismiss the First Set of Interrogatories filed by the Petitioners and dismiss questions claiming that those issues were over and done with, but those questions are on appeal. (See: Transcript of March 9, 2023, page 19, lines 20-23.) It strongly appears that the magistrate in this matter is more interested in covering for the Respondent than affording due process to a defendant. If it looks like bias and smells like bias, it must be bias! The Petitioners have additional questions on jurisdiction and standing that should be answered by the Respondent but they continue to hide and refuse to be forthcoming. At a minimum, this matter should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

The Champaign County Treasurer lacks authority under the Ohio Constitution to collect property taxes from private people, state nationals, i.e non-corporate entities. Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article XIII,:

> Corporations; ***Corporate property subject to taxation.*** §4 The property of **corporations**, now existing or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of individuals.

Section 5701.01 Person defined, of the Ohio Revised Code, clearly identifies an "individual" as a "business entity." Where the alleged Petitioners are "flesh and blood people," they are not 'business entities' and the property at issue is not a business or commercial property but private/personal property, a dwelling, and therefore not subject to property taxes under the Ohio Constitution.

> "**The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing**. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but **the individual's right to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed.**" *(Redfield v. Fisher*, 135 Or. 180, 292 P.813, 819 (Ore. 1930)) (Emphasis added)

And,

> "The exaction, as authorized by Ohio law, from the owner of property, via special assessment, of the cost of a public improvement in substantial excess of the benefits accruing to him **amounted to a taking of property for public use without compensation and was violative of due process.**" *(Norwood v. Baker*, 172 U.S. 269 (1898)) (Emphasis added)

Furthermore, the Petitioners raised the fact that the Treasurer was attempting to collect taxes in private script, i.e., federal reserve accounting units (notes) in violation of the Constitutional requirements of Article 1, Section 10, clause 1:

> "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; **make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts**; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." (Emphasis added)

The court relies on the *Legal Tender Cases* which primarily involved the constitutionality of the *Legal Tender Act of 1862*, 12 Stat. 345; and claims the Petitioners' assertions are meritless. The issue of paper currency in the 1860's under the *Legal Tender Act* did not change the requirement of the Constitution on gold and silver coin being "lawful" money. The United States Notes were redeemable for "lawful money." One must understand the difference between "lawful money" and "legal tender." For example, after the passage of the Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, United States Notes were no longer issued but Federal Reserve Notes (FRNs) became the "legal tender" currency. The new notes still contained, in one form or another, a certification of redemption in "lawful money." [From a 1934 Series note]

"THIS NOTE IS LEGALTENDER FOR ALL DEBTS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, AND IS REDEMABLE IN LAWFUL MONEY AT THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, OR AT ANY FEDERAL RSERVE BANK."

By the 1950's, the "redeemable in lawful money" had been removed from the FRNs as they are no longer backed by any redeemable asset.

As previously stated, the County Treasurer is an employee of the political sub-division of United States, Inc., a bankrupt entity, and if the Treasurer, or Auditor, is assessing a tax in Federal Reserve accounting units, and the accounting units are

worthless securities, i.e., instruments of debt used for barter, where is the authority for a bankrupt entity to assess and collect a tax denominated in a worthless private script?

The Treasurer accepts Federal Reserve Notes. Pursuant to the Clearfield Doctrine (See: *Clearfield Trust Company v. U.S.*, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)), when using private script, commercial paper, i.e. Federal Reserve notes, the government is no different than any other drawee, a corporation in fact. The Champaign County Treasurer is corporate in nature and acts as a 'de facto' government entity and **not** the 'de jure' Republic government as stated in the Constitution for the United States of America.

If the Treasurer is a corporate entity, where is the contract with the Petitioner to render the property for taxation?

Where the Respondent has failed to properly state jurisdiction and standing, failed to answer assertions and Interrogatories, the court further lacked jurisdiction and violated Petitioners' right to due process.

CONCLUSION

This matter is before this Supreme Court due to failures of the lower courts to adhere to the Constitutional mandates of the Framers of this Great Nation. The Founding Principles of Law have been thrown out in favor of preferential treatment, expediency and oath of office violations, taken or not taken, as required by two constitutions.

The decisions appealed in this matter are fundamentally flawed in their reasoning and dangerous in their implications for all citizens who may need to bring a case before a corporate administrative court. Three lower state courts have failed in their sworn duty to defend the Constitution and the fundamental liberties of the People. The decisions, or lack thereof, undermine the basic principles of due process and the application of the Civil Rules of Procedure.

A magistrate on the bench, that has not taken the proper oath of office for a public judicial servant, has demonstrated a profound bias in favor of the plaintiff by not requiring jurisdiction be defined on the record when challenged, by dismissing defendants' filings without requiring answers or response, by dismissing pleadings without cause and interfering with the defendants' due process rights and issuing rulings that are contra to settled law. .

Although this petition derives from failures of judicial process, the underlying principles of due process and justice and the adhesion to well settled principles of Law have been grossly abused and disregarded and manipulated to achieve the preconceived notions of the corporate administrative 'court's process for revenue collection above rights of the People.

In the First Question Argument regarding the magistrates Oath of Office, the court admits that the oath was not required under an inferior state rule. That rule violates the superiority of the Constitution and is not a lawful defense for a violation of the supremacy clause.

In the Second Question Argument regarding the Default and estoppels by silence, the record will show that the Respondent did not bother to answer assertions presented by the Petitioners. When faced with a motion for default judgment, the Respondent moved for a summary judgment to quash any inquiry into jurisdiction, standing, and any authority to bring the complaint. A corporate state entity cannot refuse to answer when "*there is a legal or moral duty to speak...*"

In the Third Question Argument regarding the representation of a family member and co-petitioner, the Respondent alleges that Petitioner Michael Anthony Galluzzo cannot represent his brother Larry Galluzzo and his spouse because he does not have a "license to practice law in Ohio" The practice of law is a profession for profit. The Respondent has produced no evidence that Petitioner Michael Anthony Galluzzo have represented himself as an attorney or received any remuneration for any services. This court has ruled that states cannot regulate the practice of law. Filing a brief or motion for one's self or a family member cannot be construed as practicing law.

In the Fourth Question Argument regarding the statement of jurisdiction, this court as well as many inferior courts, have found that a plaintiff must place a statement of the jurisdiction they assert on the record, especially if challenged by the defendant. The inferior courts often 'assume' jurisdiction and seldom require it, even when challenged. A defendant has a right to due process and when the magistrate dismisses any attempt to gain information on jurisdiction, authority and

dismisses interrogatories without cause, the due process required by Law is stripped from the defendant, in this case or any other.

For the reasons stated above and more, the Petitioners prays this high court will grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari and provide them the process and justice they are due.

UNDER WITNESS OF GOD: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 20, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,
Without prejudice, UCC 1-308,

Michael Anthony Galluzzo
Petitioner in Propria Persona
P.O. Box 710
St. Paris, Ohio the State [43072]
937-727-4505

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on April 21, 2025 a true copy of the foregoing Motion was served upon the following interested parties by United States Postal Service mail in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Champaign County Prosecutor
200 North Main Street
Urbana, Ohio 43078



Michael Anthony Galluzzo