No. ___

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY GLENN HUTCHINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2025, AT 6:00 P.M.

Chelsea Shirley
Counsel of Record
Lisa Fusaro
Alicia Hampton
Office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Northern Region
1004 DeSoto Park Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32301
(850) 487-0922
Chelsea.Shirley@ccrc-north.org

Counsel for Petitioner

INDEX TO APPENDIX

A1

Florida Supreme Court Order
Affirming Denial of Third Successive Motion
for Postconviction Relief
April 21, 2025

2025 WL 1155717
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
Supreme Court of Florida.

Jeffrey Glenn HUTCHINSON, Appellant
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee

SC2025-0497
|
APRIL 21, 2025

Lower Tribunal No.: 461998CF001382XXXACX

Opinion

***1** Jeffrey Glenn Hutchinson, now subject to an active death warrant, appeals an order of the circuit court summarily denying his third successive motion seeking postconviction relief in state court. We affirm. [1]

[1] We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.

In 1998, Hutchinson lived with his girlfriend Renee Flaherty and her three children: four-year-old Logan, seven-year-old Amanda, and nine-year-old Geoffrey. One day, after drinking and getting into an argument with Renee, Hutchinson left the house and drove to a nearby bar. After consuming more alcohol, Hutchinson returned to the house where he proceeded to shoot and kill Renee and all three children with his 12-gauge, pump-action shotgun.

Moments after the shooting, law enforcement responded to a 911 call originating from Renee's house. Deputies found Hutchinson on the garage floor near a phone, which was still connected to the 911 dispatcher. Deputies detained Hutchinson and secured physical evidence from the home, including Hutchinson's shotgun on the kitchen counter. At the time of his arrest, Hutchinson had gunshot residue on his hands.

The State charged Hutchinson with four counts of first-degree murder and sought the death penalty. At trial, the State presented "overwhelming" evidence of guilt. And consistent with that evidence, the jury found Hutchinson guilty as charged on all counts.

After discussions with his family and counsel, Hutchinson waived a penalty phase jury. During the ensuing bench penalty phase, the State introduced evidence to prove multiple aggravators for the murder of each child, including that all three were under the age of twelve. In contrast, to support his case for a life sentence, Hutchinson presented evidence that he served admirably in the Gulf War as an army ranger, that he contracted Gulf War Illness based on that military service, and that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The trial court credited the mitigating evidence regarding Hutchinson's military service and Gulf War Illness. Nevertheless, as to the murders of the three children, the trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating evidence. Accordingly, the court imposed three death sentences. [2]

[2] The trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder of Renee.

Hutchinson appealed, but we affirmed the convictions and sentences. *Hutchinson v. State*, 882 So. 2d 943, 961 (Fla. 2004). In the twenty-plus years that have followed, Hutchinson has unsuccessfully sought collateral relief in both state court and federal court. *Hutchinson v. State*, 17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2009) (initial state postconviction proceeding); *Hutchinson v. State*, 243 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018) (successive state proceeding); *Hutchinson v. State*, 343 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2022) (successive state proceeding); *Hutchinson v. Florida*, No. 5:09-cv-261-RS, 2010 WL 3833921 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2010) (federal habeas proceeding), *aff'd*, 677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012); [3] *Hutchinson v. Crews*, No. 3:13-cv-128-MW, 2013 WL 1765201 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013) (successive federal habeas proceeding).

[3] Hutchinson later sought relief from the judgment dismissing his first federal habeas petition, but the federal district court declined to grant relief. *Hutchinson v. Inch*, No. 3:13-cv-128-MW, 2021 WL 6335753, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2021), *certificate of appealability denied*, No. 21-10508-P, 2021 WL 6340256, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021); *Hutchinson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.*, No. 3:13-cv-128-MW, at *15-18 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2025).

***2** In early 2025, Hutchinson filed the motion at issue in this appeal. He alleged newly discovered evidence of brain damage and cognitive impairment that he claims would likely produce an acquittal of first-degree murder or, at the very least, a mitigated sentence. *See Jones v. State*, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) (establishing the standard for claims seeking entitlement to relief based on the probable effect of evidence

that was unknown and not ascertainable through due diligence at the time of trial). Hutchinson relied on two evidentiary sources in support of his *Jones* claim—blast overpressure and Gulf War Illness. The State filed a response urging the circuit court to summarily deny the motion in its entirety. The court held a case management hearing but deferred a ruling on whether the claim could be decided on the preexisting record. After the warrant was signed, the case was transferred to a different judge who denied the motion on timeliness grounds without receiving any additional evidence.

On appeal, Hutchinson argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his third successive postconviction motion. We disagree.

First, the court correctly determined that the motion and the *Jones* claim raised in it were untimely. Under the rules of criminal procedure, a postconviction motion must be filed within one year of the judgment and sentence becoming final. *See* Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). Hutchinson's convictions and death sentences became final in 2004, 90 days after issuance of our judgment affirming his convictions and death sentences. *See* Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(A). His claim, then, is decades late unless a timeliness exception applies. *See* Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2).

Here, the only potentially applicable exception is for claims "predicated" on facts which "were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). In Hutchinson's motion, though, he alleged facts that were known at or before his trial—that he was exposed to sarin gas and numerous explosions while serving in the Middle East as well as his various post-war symptoms. As for the diagnoses or conditions on which Hutchinson relies, we acknowledge that the scientific understanding of Gulf War Illness has evolved over time. However, the illness was a well-known diagnosable condition at the time of Hutchinson's trial. Indeed, even at that time, experts recognized that the illness encompassed mental-health and cognitive effects. [4]

[4] Notably, if Hutchinson is right, any expansion of scientific knowledge regarding a particular diagnosable condition or subject would give rise to a new period to file postconviction claims. That, however, would be inconsistent with our case law. *Sliney v. State*, 362 So. 3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023) ("If we were to accept Sliney's timeliness argument, every new study or publication related to brain development in young adults could be invoked to restart the clock for filing a successive rule 3.851 motion. That would be at odds with the finality interests served by the rule."); *Zack v. State*, 371 So. 3d 335, 345 (Fla. 2023) (new scientific consensus and new opinions based on "previously existing and scientific information" are not new facts for purposes of rule 3.851(d)(2)(A)'s timeliness exception).

Additionally, traumatic brain damage, neurocognitive impairment, and PTSD, regardless of their specific causation, are not new diagnosable conditions either.

Second, although not a basis for the circuit court's ruling, Hutchinson's claim also fails on the merits. That is, he satisfied neither prong of the *Jones* test. He cannot meet the requirements of the knowledge-or-diligence prong for the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph. As for the probable-effect prong, he cannot show that the evidence would likely lead to an acquittal or a reduced sentence at a subsequent proceeding.

For the acquittal factor, Hutchinson claims that the new evidence would have bolstered his voluntary-intoxication defense. Based on Hutchinson's conduct in firing the murder weapon, witness observations of him following the crimes, and other evidence demonstrating premeditation, we do not believe that the new evidence would have likely led the jury to accept the voluntary-intoxication defense.

***3** In addition, we disagree with Hutchinson's assertion that this evidence would be "powerful" in its mitigating effect. We say this for two reasons.

First, Hutchinson downplays the nature of the aggravating evidence in his case. Hutchinson murdered four people, including three defenseless children. These murders served as prior violent felonies—that is, for each child's murder, the other two murder convictions provided aggravation. In addition, the youth aggravator applied with significant force here. Each child victim was under the age of 10, with the youngest being only four years old. What's more, with regard to Geoffrey, he was aware of the shootings in the adjacent room and came face to face with his killer. Perceiving the grave danger posed by Hutchinson, Geoffrey put his arm up in an attempt to shield his body from the gunfire. But predictably, his defensive efforts were not successful. The bullet, after hitting Geoffrey's arm, struck the child squarely in the chest. Hutchinson pumped the shotgun again and shot

Geoffrey a second time—this time in the head. At the time of this gunshot, Geoffrey was in a kneeling position and still conscious.

Second, as to mitigation, the trial court heard evidence regarding (1) Hutchinson's admirable military service, (2) Gulf War Illness and how that illness potentially affected Hutchinson (and others like him), and (3) cognitive and mental-health issues that affected Hutchinson. In light of this, the additional mitigation concerning brain injury and cognitive issues would only have a marginal effect at a new penalty phase. Put differently, it is highly unlikely that the new evidence would lead to a life sentence for any of the three children's murders.

As his last issue, Hutchinson faults the circuit court for "fail[ing] to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding Appellant's Eighth Amendment claim." We agree with the State that the claim was not properly presented below. Indeed, the paragraph discussing the Eighth Amendment is conclusory. *See Cole v. State*, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2024). [5]

5 Even if Hutchinson had properly presented this claim, we think it is meritless under our case law. *See Ford v. State*, 402 So.3d 973 (Fla. 2025); *James v. State*, No. SC2025-0280, —— So.3d ——, —— – ——, 2025 WL 798376, at *5-7 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2025); *Cole*, 392 So. 3d at 1063-64.

For the reasons given above, we affirm the denial of Hutchinson's third successive motion for postconviction relief. Additionally, we deny Hutchinson's requests for a stay and oral argument in this case. No motion for rehearing will be considered.

A True Copy

Test:

John A. Tomasino

Clerk, Supreme Court

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

All Citations

--- So.3d ----, 2025 WL 1155717

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A2

First Judicial Circuit Court Okaloosa County
Order Denying Third Successive Motion
for Postconviction Relief
April 4, 2025

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY GLENN HUTCHINSON,

Defendant.

CASE NO.: 1998-CF-1382
DIV.: 001
S. CT. CASE NO.: SC2001-0500
DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
FOR EXECUTION - MAY 1, 2025

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
SUCCESSIVE MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
WITH DIRECTIONS TO CLERK

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Successive Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence, filed by Defendant's postconviction counsel on January 15, 2025, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Having considered the motion, State's response, record - including the digital recording and transcript of the case management conference held on this motion on March 6, 2025[1] - and applicable law, the Court finds as follows:

Background

In January of 2001, Defendant was convicted of four counts of first degree murder for the deaths of [redacted] and her three children, [redacted]. Defendant waived jury trial for the penalty phase, and after presenting mitigation to the Court, he was ultimately sentenced on February 6, 2001, to life in prison for the murder of [redacted]

[1] The undersigned judge was assigned to this case on April 1, 2025.

and to death for the murder of each child. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of first degree murder and sentences of death on July 1, 2004.[2]

On October 20, 2005, Defendant filed a motion to vacate judgments and sentences in which he raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Then on June 13, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for DNA testing, which the Court denied on November 3, 2006. On August 15, 2007, Defendant filed an amended motion for postconviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing on October 22, 2007, the Court entered an order on January 3, 2008, denying the motion. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion.[3]

Then on July 25, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction DNA testing, which the Court denied on November 3, 2011. Defendant appealed, but it was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Supreme Court on March 8, 2012. Then on March 20, 2013, Defendant filed another motion for postconviction relief, which the Court dismissed on April 12, 2013, as an improper *pro se* filing. Defendant then filed through counsel a successive motion for postconviction relief in light of Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016); the Court denied Defendant's motion on May 30, 2017, and the Florida Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Court's decision.[4]

Then on June 12, 2020, Defendant filed another successive motion to vacate and set aside his judgments of conviction and sentences due to violations by the State under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Defendant filed an amended motion on July 13, 2020. The motions were stricken with leave to amend on July 16, 2020. On September 14, 2020, Defendant filed his second amended successive motion for

[2] Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2004).
[3] Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2009).
[4] Hutchinson v. State, 243 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018).

postconviction relief. The Court entered an order denying the motion on December 4, 2020, which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.[5] Defendant subsequently filed the present successive motion for postconviction relief based on two claims of newly discovered evidence. On March 6, 2025, a case management conference was held on the motion. On April 1, 2025, this case was reassigned to the undersigned following Governor DeSantis's signing of Defendant's death warrant.

Claim 1

In his first claim, Defendant submits to the Court that he suffers from a mild neurocognitive disorder from a blast-related traumatic brain injury ("TBI") and avers that this new diagnosis would have significantly impacted the successfulness of the voluntary intoxication defense presented at trial. According to Defendant, this evidence, which explains and mitigates his behavior in the hours before, during, and after the murders, was unavailable at the time of trial. Defendant asserts that had this evidence been presented to the jury, "there is a probable chance that [Defendant] would have been found guilty of second-degree murder and/or received a life sentence."

Defendant states that between October 29, 2024, and November 5, 2024, Drs. Cynthia He and Mikel Matto evaluated Defendant four separate times, as well as "reviewed numerous records from collateral sources including prior mental health evaluations, medical records, military records, and summaries of witness interviews with former U.S. servicemembers who served with [Defendant]." They ultimately concluded that Defendant suffered from "Mild Neurocognitive Disorder due to Traumatic Brain Injury." Although Defendant "experienced other known injuries from direct head impact, his repeated exposures to blast overpressure

[5] Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2022).

injuries during his military service 'were the most significant cause of his subsequent neurocognitive disorder.'" (citation omitted). Defendant alleges that repeated exposure to blast overpressure "left him sensitive to the effects of subsequent traumas, as well as the effects of additional types of exposures such as chemical agents" because "individuals with a history of TBI have an 'increased sensitivity to intoxicants, including alcohol, and they are more vulnerable to intoxicant effects including diminished executive processing, disinhibition, impulsivity, aggressive behavior, balance problems, and memory impairment.'" (citation omitted). Defendant also alleges that his PTSD was exacerbated by the repeated exposure to blast overpressure.

Defendant argues that this evidence "was directly relevant to his voluntary intoxication defense" because "no one testified what effect alcohol has on a brain damaged person . . . ." Defendant argues that instead, "the jury was left with inconsistent testimony and no rational explanation" for his behavior. Conversely, Defendant argues that had the jury been presented with evidence of Defendant's Mild Neurocognitive Disorder due to Traumatic Brain Injury, in combination with Defendant's high blood alcohol level, the jury "would have found he met his burden for the voluntary intoxication defense." This is because Dr. He and Dr. Matto's findings supposedly explain Defendant's "increased sensitivity to alcohol and why he had a high blood alcohol level after less than two beers[,]" since Defendant's "history of traumatic brain injuries, combined with his PTSD, increased his vulnerability to the intoxicating effects of alcohol including diminished executive functioning, disinhibition, impulsivity, aggressive behavior, balance problems, and memory impairment."

Postconviction counsel alleges that they did not become aware of this research "until January 19, 2024, when the New York Times reported on the issue;" accordingly, postconviction counsel filed the present motion "within one year from the date." Defendant asserts that this

evidence is newly discovered because "[i]t could not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and [Defendant] and his counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence." (quotations omitted). For support, Defendant attaches to the motion a report written by Dr. Bryan Pfister, a Professor of Biomedical Engineering and the Director of the Center for Injury Biomechanics, Materials and Medicine at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, and asserts that "a blast related TBI injury is a new concept in the medical and scientific field." "Only within the last ten years has the scientific and medical literature recognized the dangers of these activities and began to study the effects of repeated low-level exposures. And only within *the last five years* has the recognition of the 'effects of occupational exposure to repetitive low-level blasts has emerged.'" (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Defendant claims that "[h]is repeated exposures to blast injuries during his military service, with additional injury from direct head impact, resulted in his subsequent neurocognitive disorder." Defendant claims this evidence shows that he "was intoxicated at the time of the offense and thus unable to form the intent necessary to commit first-degree murder thereby providing reasonable doubt as to his culpability for first-degree murder. At the very least, it provides powerful mitigation evidence which the factfinder never heard and which would probably result in a life sentence."

Claim 2

In his second claim, Defendant submits to the Court that he suffers from Gulf War Illness ("GWI"). More specifically, Defendant states that Dr. Robert Haley "found that [Defendant] met the diagnostic criteria for GWI due to his sarin gas exposure." According to Dr. Haley's report, "Although GWI varies somewhat from patient to patient, it generally interferes with the function of virtually every organ of the body." Relying on Dr. Haley's report, Defendant states that "GWI

has been known to cause symptoms related to mood change, including mood swings, aggression, unusual irritability, unusual anger, outbursts of anger and frequent rage[,]" as well as "significant changes to the amygdala which is known to cause aggressive tendencies." (quotations omitted). Defendant asserts that "this evidence is powerful mitigation that the factfinder did not hear." Consequently, Defendant argues that this new evidence renders his convictions and sentences unreliable and "warrants relief."

Defendant asserts that evidence of his "sarin-caused GWI" and its impact on his "neurological mechanisms for controlling impulses such as rage" was unavailable and thus not considered at the time of trial because "the scientific advances upon which these insights rested . . . would not be made **for another 10-20 years, only now being fully appreciated**." Defendant concedes that multiple experts testified at sentencing regarding the effects of GWI; however, Defendant asserts that "their testimony was incorrect." "For example, Dr. Larson testified that GWI only results in physical symptoms, not psychological ones." Defendant believes that the jury should have heard "how GWI causes mood swings, aggression, unusual irritability, unusual anger, outbursts of anger, and frequent rage" had this evidence been available at the time of trial. Defendant asserts, "Had the factfinder had this information, there is more than a probability that [Defendant] would have received a verdict of second-degree murder and/or a life sentence."

Legal Authority

"Generally, postconviction claims in capital cases are untimely if filed more than a year after the judgment and sentence became final." Mungin v. State, 320 So. 3d 624, 625 (Fla. 2020). "Although claims that could have been raised in a prior postconviction motion are procedurally barred, . . . a defendant may file successive postconviction relief motions that are based on newly discovered evidence." Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. 2003). "For an otherwise

untimely claim to be considered timely as newly discovered evidence, it must be filed within a year of the date the claim became discoverable through due diligence." Mungin, 320 So. 3d at 625-6. Additionally, "the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 125 (Fla. 2008). "It is incumbent upon the defendant to establish the timeliness of a successive postconviction claim." Mungin, 320 So. 3d at 626. "If the motion, files and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).

Analysis and Discussion of Claim 1

The record reflects that this motion was filed on January 15, 2025, almost one year after postconviction counsel claims to have encountered the New York Times article in January of 2024. Postconviction counsel asserts that "[t]he facts and expert conclusions supporting this motion could not have been reasonably discovered earlier." However, counsel neglects to provide any explanation as to why this assertion is true. Rather, Dr. Pfister's report appears to refute the timeliness of Defendant's claim. In summarizing the overall state of current available research, Dr. Pfister states that "recognition of the effects of occupational exposure to repetitive low-level blasts has emerged *within the past five years*." (emphasis added). More specifically, Dr. Pfister states that "[f]rom 2018 dedicated funding for repetitive blast injury, scientific studies and broad public awareness has emerged with most concentrated *within the last five years*." (emphasis added). Defendant even directly includes this excerpt from the report in his motion: "And only within the last five years has the recognition of the 'effects of occupational exposure to repetitive low-level blasts has emerged.'" (citation omitted). Postconviction counsel's assertion that evidence of Defendant's new diagnosis could not have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence prior to January 1, 2024, is directly contradicted by their own expert's report.

Additionally, the report produced by Drs. He and Matto following their evaluations of Defendant on October 29, November 1, November 5, and November 7, 2024, does not provide that these evaluations could not have been conducted sooner. Rather, Drs. He and Matto were obtained by postconviction counsel to evaluate and diagnose Defendant after counsel happened upon the New York Times article. Defendant is attempting to establish January 19, 2024, as the date from which the timeliness of his claim should be evaluated in order to overcome this procedural bar. This does not satisfy the standard. Because Defendant fails to show that this evidence "could not have been ascertained long ago by the exercise of due diligence," he is not entitled to relief. Mungin, 320 So. 3d at 626. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to deny Defendant's claim. See Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) ("Thus, [Defendant's] claim could be summarily denied if a timeliness exception does not apply.").

Analysis and Discussion of Claim 2

While Defendant claims that evidence of his sarin-caused GWI diagnosis is newly discovered, he fails to allege this claim was filed "within a year of the date the claim became discoverable through due diligence." Mungin, 320 So. 3d at 625-6. Defendant does not specify when evidence of this new diagnosis became discoverable, nor does Defendant provide the date this evidence was actually discovered; Defendant only states that the evidence was "only discoverable 20 years later." This is insufficient to meet one of the timeliness exceptions set forth in rule 3.851(d)(2). Even if the Court were to assess the timeliness of this claim based on the assertion that this evidence could not have been discovered until 20 years after the trial occurred,

that would mean Defendant could have become aware of the new evidence, through the exercise of due diligence, beginning in **2021.** Therefore, the Court finds that is claim is clearly untimely.

Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant appears to have had some knowledge of his GWI stemming from "exposure to chemical agents, including nerve gas causing cognitive disabilities and defects" back in 2013.[6] On March 6, 2025, Defendant's counsel filed 18 attachments in support of his successive postconviction motion for relief, one of which was a transcript from a hearing held on November 18, 2013, concerning Defendant's entitlement to new counsel. Clearly, evidence of Defendant's new diagnosis could have discovered, through the exercise of due diligence, prior to the filing of this motion in 2025. Consequently, it is clear to the Court that this claim is untimely and should summarily be denied. See Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 787.

Ruling

Therefore, it is **ORDERED AND ADJUDGED** that Defendant's Successive Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence is **DENIED.** Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(D), **the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED** to promptly serve on each party a copy of this Order, noting thereon the date of service by an appropriate certificate of service.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Walton Beach, Okaloosa County, Florida.

04/04/2025 16:39:05

signed by CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE LACEY POWELL CLARK 04/04/2025 04:39:05 Y1t2gLJf

LACEY POWELL CLARK
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

LPC/mrf

Copies of the foregoing Order to be served by the Clerk of Court on the following parties:

Jeffrey Glenn Hutchinson, DC No. 124849, Florida State Prison, P.O. Box 800, Raiford, Florida 32083

[6] Attachment A: Defendant's Exhibit 18.

Chelsea Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel
Chelsea.Shirley@ccrc-north.org

Alicia Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel
Alicia.Hampton@ccrc-north.org

Lisa Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel
Lisa.Fusaro@ccrc-north.org

Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General
Charmaine.millsaps@myfloridalegal.com

Sheena M. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Sheena.kelly@myfloridalegal.com
Capapp@myfloridalegal.com
Amahjah.wallace@myfloridalegal.com
Arianna.balda@myfloridalegal.com

Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General
jason.rodriguez@myfloridalegal.com

Bridgette Jensen, Assistant State Attorney
Bjensen@osa1.org

Matthew Casey, Assistant State Attorney
mcasey@osa1.org

Meridith L. Pardo, Executive Office of the Governor
Meredith.Pardo@eog.myflorida.com
Gov.Legal@eog.myflorida.com

Zachary Loyed, Executive Office of the Governor
Zachary.Loyed@eog.myflorida.com
Meredith.Pardo@eog.myflorida.com
Gov.Legal@eog.myflorida.com

Christina Porrello, Florida Department of Corrections
christina.porrello@fdc.myflorida.com

Florida Supreme Court, warrant@Flcourts.org

Susan Crawford, Okaloosa County Clerk of Court
scrawford@okaloosaclerk.com