

1 No.  
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In THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

9 MICHAEL EDWARD AGUILAR,  
10 PETITIONER.

12 v.  
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GENE COCA,  
Respondent.

Addressed To JUSTICE KAGAN, CIRCUIT JUSTICE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

MICHAEL EDWARD AGUILAR #220506002  
Post Office Box 951  
Tucson, Arizona 85702

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3 22-70207 (9th Cir.)

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5 Cooper v. Pima County Sheriff D. Penk  
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7

8 Crawford-El v. Britton

9 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) 1113, 4

11 Harris v. New York

12 401 U.S. 222, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 1643 (1971)

7

14 Jensen v. Schild

15 609 F. Supp. 3d 789 (D. Ariz. Jun. 30, 2022)

6

17 Jensen v. Thornell

18 CIV 12-00601-PHX-RGS (D. Ariz.)

10

20 Jensen v. Thornell

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24 498 U.S. 1301, 111 S.Ct. 902, 112 L.Ed.2d 10216 (1991)

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28	

## JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The district court had jurisdiction over Aguilar's civil rights action under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1331, 1343. Venue was proper in the District of Arizona because the constitutional violation occurred in that district. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1331(b)(2).

THE CIRCUIT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINAL JUDGMENT. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291. On October 18, 2021, the district court entered its final judgment. Dist. Ct. Doc. 24. AGUILAR'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY RECEIVED ON OCTOBER 25, 2021. Id. at Doc. 26.

This Court has jurisdiction to review cases in the Courts of Appeals. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1254(1). On February 22, 2022, Aguilar filed his opening brief. Cir. Ct. Dkt Entry 13. On February 23, 2023, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. Id. at Dkt Entry 17. On May 16, 2023, the Circuit Court denied panel and en banc rehearing. Dkt Entry 34; see Sup. Ct. R. 13.3.

1 Substantive To Be Reviewed

2

3 In THIS PRISONER-FIRST AMENDMENT-RETALIATION  
4 ACTION BROUGHT UNDER 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, AGUILAR  
5 SEEKS RELIEF FROM A PRISON OFFICIAL ORDERING SUB-  
6 ORDINATES TO TAKE HUNDREDS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF PROP-  
7 ERTY FROM AGUILAR FOR ASSISTING A FELLOW PRISONER  
8 INITIATE THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES  
9 AS REQUIRED BY THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT.  
10 THE PRISON OFFICIAL WHOSE HAS ORDERED HIS SUB-  
11 ORDINATES TO TAKE AGUILAR'S FOOD COMMISSARY AND  
12 APPLIANCES WAS AT THE TIME THE GRIEVANCE COORDI-  
13 NATOR AND SECOND-IN-COMMAND AT THE PRISON; AND  
14 AFTER ALSO ORDERING SUBORDINATES TO WITHHOLD FROM  
15 AGUILAR THE SOURCE OF THE ORDER TO TAKE HIS PROP-  
16 ERTY, THE GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR ADVANCED EVALUATING  
17 PRETEXT IN RESPONSE TO AGUILAR'S PREVAILING REBUTTALS.  
18 SEE APPENDIX A AT 13-15.

19

20 In A DISINGENIOUS REVIEW OF AGUILAR'S THIRD  
21 AMENDED COMPLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT SUBSTITUTED  
22 THE FACT IT WAS A DORM-SETTING WHERE AGUILAR'S  
23 PROPERTY WAS TAKEN WITH A CELL-SETTING, WHERE NO  
24 WITNESSES EXIST. SEE AGUILAR V. COCA, 21-16789, DKT-  
25 ENTRY 27 AT 8-9 (9TH CIR. APR. 14, 2023) ("IT IS IMPER-  
26 APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT NOT TO OVERLOOK THAT NUNZIE  
27 ZEPPS INCORPORATED SLEIGHTS OF HAND WITHIN A FACT FOR  
28 THE SOLE PURPOSE OF DISMISSING THE CLAIM.").

1 WHERE THE SUPREME COURT BANDED A HEIGHTENED  
2 PLEADING STANDARD IN PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-RETALIATION CASES A QUARTER-CENTURY AGO IN  
3 CRAWFORD-EL V. BRITTON, IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER  
4 COURT'S PLAINTIFF DISMISSAL OF AGUILAR'S CLAIM -  
5 WITHOUT SO MUCH AS ADDRESSING ONE WORD OF THE  
6 MERITS IN HIS OPENING BRIEF - THE NINTH CIRCUIT  
7 DEFIED THIS COURT'S BAN WHEN IT HELD "AGUILAR  
8 FAILED TO ALLEGGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT  
9 DEFENDANT COCA ACTED WITH A RETALIATORY MOTIVE."  
10 APPENDIX B. IN ITS SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FACTS,  
11 THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALSO HELD THAT "THE TAKING OF  
12 ADVERSE ACTION'S ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH  
13 RETALIATORY MOTIVE." *Id.* (UNDERLINE ADDED). AGUILAR  
14 SUBMITS THAT ORDERING SUBORDINATES TO KEEP THE  
15 IDENTITY OF A PRISON OFFICIAL SECRET WHILE HE IS  
16 ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF STATE LAW SCREAMS  
17 "GUILTY!" SEE APPENDIX A AT 12 ("LATER THE SAME  
18 DAY WHEN AGUILAR MET WITH RIVAS AND ASKED THE  
19 OFFICER WHAT HAD ISSUED THE ORDER TO TAKE HIS  
20 APPLIANCES AND COMMISSARY, RIVAS STATED, 'I WAS TOLD  
21 NOT TO TELL YA!'").

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 I. Provision and Premise

2  
3 As provided by Supreme Court Rules 13.5,  
4 21, 22, 30 and 33.2, petitioner Michael Edward Ag  
5 uilar, as the single party, begs for a sixty day  
6 extension of time for the filing of a petition  
7 for a writ of certiorari. See Madden v. Texas,  
8 498 U.S. 1301, 111 S. Ct. 902, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1026 (1991).

9 The questions Aguililar intends to present in the  
10 petition originate from a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 prisoner-  
11 First-Amendment-retaliation claim, which arose while  
12 he was serving a state court imposed 11.25-year  
13 prison term for two counts of attempted armed  
14 robbery. State of Arizona v. Michael Edward  
15 Aguilar, Pinal County Superior Court No. CR2012-1308-  
16-01; see also State v. Aguililar, 2014 Ariz. App. LEXIS  
17 1557, at \*2-5 (Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2014)  
18 (planted BB gun with neither DNA nor fingerprints  
19 belonging to Aguililar admitted into evidence at trial  
20 through hearsay testimony deemed harmless error);  
21 Aguilar v. Shinn, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157454,  
22 at \*12-13 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2022) ("Aguilar argues  
23 that his counsel should have used evidence of  
24 communications in his cell phone to impeach S.B.'s  
25 testimony that S.B. did not know Aguililar."); Aguil-  
26 lar v. Shinn, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 14999 (9th Cir.  
27 Jun. 15, 2023) (denying certificate of appealability  
28 because Aguililar failed to show "jurists of reason"

1 would find it debatable whether the petition states  
2 a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional  
3 right...."). The record leaves no doubt, when the  
4 named respondent retaliated against petitioner for  
5 assisting a fellow prisoner file a grievance, see  
6 Appendix A at 11-17, Aguilar was an innocent man  
7 and victim of a farce and a sham. See Aguilar  
8 v. Ryan, 4:15-cv-00286-LCK at Doc. 1 (July 6, 2015);  
9 Aguilar v. Schindl, 4:19-cv-00359-JGZ at Doc. 1 (July  
10 15, 2019); see also Aguilar v. UNITED STATES DIST.  
11 COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZONA (In re Aguilar), 22-  
12 70207 at Dktentry 1 (9th Cir. Sep. 16, 2022) (full  
13 account of all factors surrounding manifest inis-  
14 tice).

15  
16 Within such a context, Aguilar begs the  
17 following be determined as good cause for the  
18 court to grant him a sixty day extension to  
19 file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

20  
21 II. Good Cause

22  
23 TITLE 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 2101 PROVIDES FOR  
24 "[A] JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, FOR GOOD  
25 CAUSE SHOWN, MAY EXTEND TIME FOR APPLYING FOR A  
26 WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING  
27 SIXTY DAYS." 28 U.S.C.S. § 2101(c). "THE PURPOSE  
28 OF STATUTES LIMITING THE PERIOD OF APPEAL IS TO

1 SET A DEFINITE POINT OF TIME WHEN LITIGATION  
2 SHALL BE AT AN END... TO ADVISE PROSPECTIVE  
3 APPELLEES THAT THEY ARE FREE OF APPELLANT'S  
4 DEMANDS." MATTON S.B. CO. V. MURPHY, 319 U.S. 412,  
5 413, 63 S.Ct. 1126, 87 L.Ed. 1483 (1943). THE OPERATIVE  
6 COMPLAINT AT BAR WAS DISMISSED SJIA SPONTE BY  
7 THE DISTRICT COURT. SEE APPENDIX A AT 9. UNTIL  
8 THE SOLE DEFENDANT NAMED IN THE COMPLAINT IS  
9 SERVED WITH IT BY RULE A "PROSPECTIVE APPELLEE"  
10 EXISTS IN THEORY, ALONE. HENCE, TIME NO LONGER IS  
11 OF THE ESSENCE.

12

13 A. THE QUESTIONS

14

15 CRAWFORD-EL V. BRITTON, 523 U.S. 574,  
16 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998), HAS, FOR ALMOST  
17 ONE QUARTER OF A CENTURY, GOVERNED OVER THE  
18 PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-RETALIATION PLEADING ANAL-  
19 YTICAL STANDARD: "NEITHER THE TEXT OF § 1983 OR  
20 ANY OTHER FEDERAL STATUTE, NOR THE FEDERAL RULES  
21 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDES ANY SUPPORT FOR IMPOSING  
22 THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING BURDEN OF PROOF ON PLAINTIFFS  
23 EITHER AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE OR  
24 THE TRIAL ITSELF." 523 U.S. 574 AT 594. YET, TODAY,  
25 THE STANDARDS APPLIED TO THE PRISONER-FIRST-AMEND-  
26 MENT-RETALIATION INQUIRY ARE AS DIVERSE AND BUR-  
27 DENOME AS A MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT. SEE, E.G., A-  
28 AGUILAR V. COCA, 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 199817, AT \*12.

1 (D. ARIZ. Oct. 15, 2021) ("THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE BUR-  
2 DEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT HIS EXERCISE OF HIS  
3 FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WAS A SUBSTANTIAL OR  
4 MOTIVATING FACTOR BEHIND THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT.");  
5 Aguilar v. Coca, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 4290 at Ap-  
6 pendix B below ("The district court properly dis-  
7 missed Aguilar's action because Aguilar failed to  
8 ALLEG FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT CO-  
9 CA ACTED WITH A RETALIATORY MOTIVE."). "THE UNPREC-  
10 EDENTED CHANGE MADE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN  
11 THIS CASE [ ] LACKS ANY COMOTION LAW PREIGREE AND ALTERS  
12 THE CAUSE OF ACTION ITSELF IN A WAY THAT UNDERMINES  
13 THE VERY PURPOSE OF § 1983 - TO PROVIDE A REMEDY  
14 FOR THE VIOLATION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS." CRAWFORD-EL,  
15 523 U.S. at 594-595. "IRONICALLY, THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD  
16 OF PROOF DIRECTLY LIMITS THE AVAILABILITY OF THE REM-  
17 EDY IN CASES INVOLVING THE SPECIFIC EVIL AT WHICH THE  
18 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871 (THE PREDECESSOR OF § 1983)  
19 WAS ORIGINALLY AIMED - RACE DISCRIMINATION." SEE DON-  
20 ROE V. PAPP, 365 U.S. 167, 174-175, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 81  
21 S.Ct. 473 (1961). CRAWFORD-EL AT n.16.

23 Aguilar assures the Court that the diver-  
24 sity over the Prisoner-First-Amendment-Retaliation  
25 claim concerning the application of analytical stan-  
26 dards is more helter-skelter than ever before,  
27 because of an exponential increase in cases of pri-  
28 son-official retaliation in direct correlation with

1 THE PETITIONER REQUIRES THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINI-  
2 STRATIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION RE-  
3 FORM ACT. THE PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-RETALIA-  
4 TION ENIGMA HAS AT ITS CORE AN OBSTRUCTION TO THE  
5 COURTS. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE "PUBLIC"-CON-  
6 CERN IMPLICATIONS WHICH NORMALLY FRAME FIRST A-  
7 MENDMENT DEBATE. THE PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-  
8 RETALIATION RIDDLE IS SOLVED WITHIN THE PETITION  
9 CLAUSE CONTEXT AS A DISTINCT AND NOVEL ISSUE, WHERE  
10 CHRONOLOGY AND LEGITIMATE-PENOLOGICAL-INTEREST ACT  
11 AS THE CONTROLLING BENCHMARKS IN THE COURT'S CO-  
12 NON LAW CRAFTING OF A SET OF OBJECTIVE ANALYTICAL  
13 STANDARDS FOR THE PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-RE-  
14 TALIATION INQUIRY.

16 BECAUSE AGUILAR HAS SPENT ALMOST THIRTY-  
17 FIVE YEARS INAILS AND PRISONS HE MUST BE VIEWED  
18 BY THE COURT AS AN EXPERT WITH VALUABLE INSIGHT.  
19 ALLOWING HIM AN ADDITIONAL SIXTY DAYS TO FURTHER  
20 RESEARCH AND DEVELOP HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF  
21 CERTIORARI WILL PROVIDE THE COURT WITH AMPLE IN-  
22 FORMATION CONCERNING THE URGENT DEMANDS FOR UNI-  
23 FORTIFY WITHIN THE PRISONER-FIRST-AMENDMENT-RE-  
24 TALIATION CONTEXT. THERE EXISTS A DIRE NEED FOR  
25 ADDITIONAL INERTIA TO THE MOMENT. IT AN HONORABLE  
26 CHAMPION HAD THE COURAGE TO ACTIVATE: "AGAIN, THE  
27 CHANGES NECESSARY TO ALLEVIATE THE RISK OF HARM  
28 TO THE SUBCLASS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL. GIVEN THE

1 SUBSTANTIAL DYSFUNCTION IN DEFENDANTS' OPERA-  
2 TIONS, THE COURT WILL PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT DETAIL  
3 REGARDING MEDICAL CARE, MENTAL HEALTH CARE, AND  
4 CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE SUBCLASS TO RENDER  
5 THE EXECUTIVE'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS." JENSEN  
6 v. THORNELL, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101747, AT \*10  
7 N.2 (D. ARIZ. APR. 07, 2023) (District Judge  
8 Honorable Roslyn O. Silver granting permanent  
9 injunctive relief to the prisoners of the Arizona  
10 Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry  
11 such as Kendall Johnson). "Johnson's treatment  
12 was far from negligent. It was - and may continue  
13 to be - a paradigmatic example of the most cal-  
14 lous and inhumane indifference." JENSEN v. SHAW,  
15 609 F. Supp. 3d 789, 825-826 (D. Ariz. July 30,  
16 2022) ("Johnson explained she passes time in her  
17 housing unit by 'counting the ceiling tiles' because  
18 she does not go outside.").

20 B. A GOOD CAUSE AS GOOD CAUSE

21  
22 IN THAT A SIXTY DAY EXTENSION OF TIME  
23 AGUILAR MUST FILE HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF  
24 CERTIORARI BY AUGUST 14, 2023. SEE APPENDIX  
25 C. THE PETITION IS ONE OF FOUR LEGAL ACTIONS  
26 PENDING UNDER THE NAME MICHAEL EDWARD AGUILAR.  
27 CURRENTLY AS A DETAINEE IN THE PIMA COUNTY ADULT  
28 DETENTION COMPLEX (PCADC), AGUILAR IS A VERY VULNERABLE

1 trial. Indeed, and context must be provided to the  
2 court for insight as to why, on June 8, 2023,  
3 the Honorable Roslyn O. Silver initiated a new  
4 civil action under Aguilar v. Thornell, 4:23-cv-  
5 00264-RCC (D. Ariz.).

6  
7 After his arrest over an act of self-  
8 defense, on May 5, 2022, see Appendix D, Aguil-  
9 lar was booked into PCADC. State v. Aguilar,  
10 CR20221602-001. In the middle of the night, on  
11 June 2, 2022, Aguilar was taken to PCADC medical  
12 unit and tortured. See Aguilar v. Shunk, 4:19-cv-  
13 00359-JGZ at Docs. 83, 85. The law is but a  
14 punch line for Piña County government officials:

16 "IT IS ABDING TRUTH THAT 'Nothing  
17 CAN DESTROY A GOVERNMENT MORE  
18 QUICKLY THAN ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE  
19 ITS OWN LAWS, OR WORSE, ITS DISREGARD  
20 OF THE CHARTER OF ITS OWN EXISTENCE.'"

22 Cooper v. Piña County Sheriff Dupnik, 903 F.2d  
23 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Ore-  
24 gon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 724-725, 43 L.Ed.2d 570,  
25 95 S.Ct. 1215 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (quoting  
26 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232, 28 L.Ed.2d 1,  
27 91 S.Ct. 1043 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).

1      1.      Louis C. TAYLOR

2  
3      " [T]his prosecution relates in detail the  
4      horrific sequence of events which transpired at  
5      the Pioneer International Hotel in Tucson late  
6      evening of December 19 and morning of December  
7      20, 1970, and which resulted in the deaths of twenty-  
8      eight persons and injury to many others. STATE  
9      v. TAYLOR, 112 ARIZ. 69, 71, 537 P.2d 938, 941 (1975).

10     " Louis C. Taylor, an Africa American man, was  
11    convicted of twenty-eight counts of first degree  
12    murder... and sentenced on each count to life  
13    imprisonment." Id. Taylor's "rendition of his activity  
14    that night and the manner in which he was han-  
15    dled by police is in conflict with the testimony  
16    of the various police officers and others with  
17    whom he came in contact." TAYLOR, 112 ARIZ. AT 72.

18     "A Caucasian man suspected of starting three  
19    other fires at the Pioneer Hotel was neither  
20    questioned nor investigated." TAYLOR v. COUNTY OF  
21    PIMA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222808, at \*4 (D. ARIZ.  
22    MAR 16, 2017).

23  
24     "The deputy county attorney assigned to  
25    [Taylor's] prosecution was Horton Weiss, who was  
26    well known to the Arizona judiciary as an over-  
27    zealous and unethical prosecutor with a record  
28    of violating or potentially violating criminal defend-

1 PLANTIFFS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. TAYLOR V. COUNTY OF  
2 PIMA, SUPRA, AT \*4-5. AT TRIAL AN "EXPERT" FOR  
3 THE STATE "TESTIFIED HE BELIEVED [TAYLOR] WAS  
4 GUILTY BECAUSE 'BLACK BOYS' ARE MORE LIKELY TO  
5 START FIRES." Id. AT \*5. AND BEFORE TRIAL, "WEISS  
6 REFERRED TO A WHITE LAWYER REPRESENTING AN AF-  
7 RICAN AMERICAN CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AS A 'NIGGER  
8 LAWYER.'" Id. AT \*9.

9  
10 WITHHELD FROM TAYLOR'S DEFENSE TEAM WAS  
11 "EXCLEATORY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF A WRITTEN RE-  
12 PORT KNOWN AS THE 'TRUESDALE' REPORT, WHICH FOUND  
13 THAT NO EVIDENCE OF ACCELERANTS WAS DISCOVERED  
14 DURING POST-FIRE INSPECTIONS OF THE HOTEL." Id. AT \*5.  
15 "OVER FORTY YEARS LATER... A PANEL OF FIRE EXPERTS  
16 WHO, AFTER REVIEWING ALL THE EVIDENCE IN [TAYLOR'S]  
17 CASE, CONCLUDED THAT THE PIONEER HOTEL FIRE COULD  
18 NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS ARSON." Id. AT \*5-6.

19  
20 UNFORTUNATELY, NOW THAT LOUIS C. TAYLOR SEEKS  
21 JUSTICE:

22  
23 ON MAY 19, 2022, PLAINTIFF [TAYLOR]  
24 FILED A MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENT UN-  
25 DER SEAL. (Doc. 406.) IN THE MOTION,  
26 PLAINTIFF REQUESTED LEAVE TO FILE A  
27 WITNESS DECLARATION UNDER SEAL AND  
28 ARGUED THAT PUBLICLY REVEALING THE

1           IDENTITY OF THE DECLARANT WOULD  
2           SUBJECT THE DECLARANT TO SERIOUS  
3           HARM OR DEATH.

4

5           TAYLOR v. COUNTY OF PIMA, 2022 U.S. DIST. LEXIS  
6           1360272, AT BACKGROUND (D. ARIZ. JUL. 29, 2022). LET  
7           THE COURT BE REINFORCED COUNTY OF PIMA IS A STATE  
8           GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, NOT ORGANIZED CRIME.

9

10          2.       THE PIMA COUNTY JAIL AKA PCADC

11

12          A QUICK SEARCH REVEALS DETAINEE-DEATHS  
13          IN PCADC ARE NOT THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE. "ON  
14          MAY 19, 2023, PLAINTIFF MICHAEL AGUILAR... FILED  
15          A 'OTION FOR ANCILLARY JURISDICTIONAL RELIEF' IN  
16          JENSEN v. THORNELL, CV 12-00001-PHX-RGS (D. ARIZ.),  
17          A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT. AGUILAR v. THORNELL, SUPRA,  
18          AT Doc. 3. "IN HIS MOTION, PLAINTIFF APPEARS TO SEEK  
19          RELIEF PERTAINING TO THE CONDITIONS OF HIS CONFINEMENT  
20          IN THE PIMA COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER." Id.  
21

22          Aguilar must now FILE A 42 U.S.C. § 1983  
23          PRISONER COMPLAINT OR BEFORE JULY 22, 2023, AND  
24          BEGS FOR THE COURT TO FIND GOOD CAUSE IN SUCH A  
25          CAUSE. THROCKMORTON FEAR AND INTIMIDATION PIMA COUNTY  
26          HAS BECOME A RUTHLESSLY OFFICIAL CULTURE OF COR-  
27          RUPTION. PLEASE ALLOW FOR AGUILAR'S WARRIOR FANTASIES  
28          TO BE FULFILLED.

1 C. THE NOVEL CLAIM

2  
3 In STATE V. AGUILAR, CR20121308, SUPRA, on  
4 OCTOBER 30, 2013, THE STATE (1) ADMITTED A BB GUN  
5 INTO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THROUGH HEARSAY TESTIMONY.  
6 AND (2) PUT A CRIME SCENE SPECIALIST ON THE STAND  
7 TO TELL THE JURY NEITHER AGUILAR'S PRINTS NOR  
8 DNA TESTED POSITIVE ON THE GUN. SEE AGUILAR V.  
9 SIMON, 4:19-cv-00359-JGZ, Doc. 1 at 6 et seq. On  
10 THE FOLLOWING DAY, AT CLOSING REBUTTAL, ON SEVERAL  
11 SEPARATE OCCASIONS THE STATE TOLD THE JURY "IT  
12 DOESN'T HAVE TO BE THAT GUN" FOR THEM TO CONVICT.  
13 ID. PERHAPS UNWISE AS TRIAL STRATEGY, BUT THE STATE'S  
14 PLOY WAS IN NO WAY NOVEL.

15  
16 AGUILAR BEGAN DIRECTING POLICE TO HIS CELL  
17 PHONE ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION AS EVIDENCE THE DRUG  
18 DEALER AND TOPLESS DANCER ALLEGED VICTIMS HAD  
19 LIED TO POLICE. Id. AT 17 ET SEQ. AFTER THE PHONE SAT  
20 IN POLICE EVIDENCE FOR 529 DAYS, ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2013,  
21 TRIAL COUNSEL SERVED VERIZON WIRELESS LEGAL COMPLI-  
22 ANCE WITH A CRIMINAL SUBPOENA FOR AGUILAR'S CELL PHONE  
23 RECORD. Id. ON OCTOBER 10, 2013, COUNSEL HAD TO FILE AN  
24 ORDER TO TAKE CUSTODY OF THE PHONE FROM POLICE. Id.  
25 IN A VIDEO STATE, ON OCTOBER 21, 2013, COUNSEL IS RE-  
26 PEATABLY HEARD STATING, "OH THAT'S HELPFUL" AS HER  
27 INVESTIGATOR READS ALOUD TEXT MESSAGES FROM AGUIL-  
28 LAR'S PHONE. Id. ON OCTOBER 29, 2013, AFTER THE COUNSEL'S

1 OF VOIR DIRE, THE STATE ANNOUNCED ON RECORD HE WOULD  
2 ORDER THE CASE DETECTIVE TO DELIVER THE DANCER AND  
3 DRUG-DEALER TO TRIAL ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. *Id.* It is  
4 AT THIS POINT THAT TRIAL COUNSEL GRABBED AGUILAR'S  
5 PHONE OFF THE EVIDENCE TABLE AND ALLOWED THE  
6 STATE TO REVIEW ITS CONTENT. *Id.* ON THE FOLLOWING DAY  
7 ONLY THE DRUG-DEALER WAS DELIVERED TO TRIAL. *Id.*

8

9 AT THE END OF HIS TESTIFYING, THE DRUG-DEAL-  
10 ER WAS ASKED BY A JUROR IF HE KNEW AGUILAR PRIOR  
11 TO THE NIGHT IN QUESTION. AGUILAR V. SHAW, 4:19-cr-  
12 00359-JRZ, Doc. 1 at 17 et seq. He answered in the  
13 NEGATIVE, AND AGUILAR IMMEDIATELY WROTE THE FOLLOWING  
14 ON A NOTEPAD RESTING IN FRONT OF TRIAL COUNSEL:  
15

16 WE CAN PROVE HE'S LYING HIS #S  
17 IN MY PHONE HE CALLED ME IN  
18 THE PAST

19

20 *Id.* COUNSEL READ THE NOTE BUT DID NOT USE THE PHRASE  
21 TO IMPEACH THE DRUG-DEALER. *Id.*

22

23 ON FEBRUARY 27, 2018, TRIAL COUNSEL TESTIFIED  
24 THAT HER INVESTIGATOR HAD RECENTLY INFORMED HER IN  
25 2014 HE MAILED THE PHONE TO AGUILAR AT A PRISON  
26 IN BUCKEYE, ARIZONA. *Id.* ON APRIL 2, 2018, THE INVESTI-  
27 GATOR TESTIFIED THAT HE TOLD COUNSEL NO SUCH THING.  
28 *Id.* WHAT THE INVESTIGATOR STATED HE HAD RECEIVED