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**In the United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit**

No. 23-1353

ROBERT BEVIS, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF NAPERVILLE, ILLINOIS and JASON ARRES,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Intervening Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-04775 – **Virginia M. Kendall**, *Judge*.

No. 23-1793

JAVIER HERRERA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KWAME RAOUL, *et al.*,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cv-00532 – **Lindsay C. Jenkins**, *Judge*.

No. 23-1825¹

CALEB BARNETT, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

KWAME RAOUL and BRENDAN F. KELLY,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:23-cv-00209-SPM – **Stephen P. McGlynn**, *Judge*.

ARGUED JUNE 29, 2023 – DECIDED NOVEMBER 3, 2023

Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and BRENNAN, *Circuit Judges*.

WOOD, *Circuit Judge*. The Second Amendment to the Constitution recognizes an individual right to “keep and bear Arms.” Of that there can be no doubt, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008);

¹ Consolidated with No. 23-1826, *Harrel v. Raoul* (S.D. Ill. No. 3:23-cv-00141-SPM); No. 23-1827, *Langley v. Kelly* (S.D. Ill. No. 3:23-cv-00192-SPM); and No. 23-1828, *Federal Firearms Licensees of Illinois, et al. v. Pritzker* (S.D. Ill. No. 3:23-cv-00215-SPM).

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McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); *Catano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411 (2016) (*per curiam*); and *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). But as we know from long experience with other fundamental rights, such as the right to free speech, the right peaceably to assemble, the right to vote, and the right to free exercise of religion, even the most important personal freedoms have their limits. Government may punish a deliberately false fire alarm; it may condition free assembly on the issuance of a permit; it may require voters to present a valid identification card; and it may punish child abuse even if it is done in the name of religion. The right enshrined in the Second Amendment is no different.

The present cases, which we have consolidated for disposition, relate to the types of “Arms” that are covered by the Second Amendment.² This presents a line-drawing problem. Everyone can agree that a personal handgun, used for self-defense, is one of those Arms that law-abiding citizens must be free to “keep and bear.” Everyone can also agree, we hope, that a nuclear weapon such as the now-retired M388 Davy Crockett system, with its 51-pound W54 warhead, can be reserved for the military, even though it is light enough for one person to carry.³ Many weapons, however, lie

² For ease of exposition, we will use the term Arms to refer to those weapons that fall within the scope of the Second Amendment.

³ See Matthew Seelinger, *The M28/M29 Davy Crockett Nuclear Weapon System*, THE ARMY HISTORICAL FOUNDATION, <https://armyhistory.org/them28m29-davy-crockett-nuclear-weapon-system/>; see also Jeff Schogol, *The Story of the ‘Davy Crockett,’ a Nuclear*

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between these extremes. The State of Illinois, in the legislation that lies at the heart of these cases, has decided to regulate assault weapons and high-capacity magazines – a decision that is valid only if the regulated weapons lie on the military side of that line and thus are not within the class of Arms protected by the Second Amendment. Several municipalities have done the same. The plaintiffs in these cases challenge that conclusion. Using the tools of history and tradition to which the Supreme Court directed us in *Heller* and *Bruen*, we conclude that the state and the affected subdivisions have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. We therefore affirm the decisions of the district courts in appeals No. 23-1353 and 23-1793 refusing to enjoin these laws, and we vacate the injunction issued by the district court in appeals No. 23-1825, 23-1826, 23-1827, and 23-1828.

I. Background

A. The Act

At the center of these appeals lies a new statute in Illinois that took effect on January 10, 2023 – a measure called the Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116 (2023) (“the Act”). Some of the consolidated cases also implicate three municipal laws that cover much of the same ground, though the details vary: Cook County Ordinances No. 54-210 to 54-215;

Recoilless Rifle Once Fielded by the US Army, TASK & PURPOSE (Sept. 19, 2022), <https://taskandpurpose.com/history/army-davy-crockett-tactical-nuclear-weapon/>.

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City of Chicago Municipal Ordinances 8-20-010 to 8-20-100; and City of Naperville Ordinances No. 3-19-1 to 3-19-3. We make note of the municipal laws only when their specific provisions affect our analysis. For the interested reader, the chart in the Appendix to this opinion summarizes the relevant differences among these enactments.

The Act is a sprawling piece of legislation made up of 99 sections that cover a vast array of regulatory and record-keeping matters, along with the provisions of interest here. The Act's wide scope led to a challenge in Illinois's courts for failing to comply with state-law requirements such as the single-subject rule, the three-readings requirement, and the ban on special legislation. See *Caulkins v. Pritzker*, 2023 IL 129453 (Aug. 11, 2023). The state supreme court upheld the Act against those contentions, and it also ruled that the Act did not violate the state constitution's equal protection clause. It did not reach any argument about the Second Amendment, because it found that the plaintiffs had waived any reliance on that theory. The plaintiffs in these cases have not argued that the Act is invalid under state law.

The critical part of the Act for our purposes is its treatment of so-called assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. Those sections institute something close to a ban on "assault weapons," through the Act's general prohibitions of the sale, possession, and use of a defined set of weapons. The Act also bans large-capacity magazines. The plaintiffs have not specified exactly which provisions of the Act they believe are

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unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, but we assume that their principal targets are 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9 and 5/24-1.10. Section 5/24-1.9 addresses the “[m]anufacture, possession, delivery, sale, and purchase of assault weapons, .50 caliber rifles, and .50 caliber cartridges,” and section 5/24-1.10 deals with “[m]anufacture, delivery, sale, and possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices.”

The Act defines “assault weapon” using language that is largely borrowed from the expired Federal Assault Weapons Ban, which was a subsection of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.⁴ The Illinois Act bans certain semiautomatic rifles and pistols. A semiautomatic rifle falls under the Act’s proscriptions if it has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine and one or more of the following features: a pistol grip or thumbhole stock; any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip for the non-trigger hand; a folding, telescoping, thumbhole, or detachable stock or a stock that otherwise enhances the concealability of the weapon; a flash suppressor; a grenade launcher; or a barrel shroud. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(A). The definition also includes a semiautomatic rifle with a fixed magazine capacity of greater than 10 rounds, except those that accept only .22 caliber rimfire ammunition. *Id.* 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(B). Finally, there is a lengthy list of particular models that fall within the scope of the statute. See 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(J). Subpart (i) of that section

⁴ The more formal name of the relevant part of the law was the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act.

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covers all AK weapons, and subpart (ii) covers all AR types. In the remainder of this opinion, we will refer often to the AR-15 as a paradigmatic example of the kind of weapon the statute covers. We use it only illustratively, however; our analysis covers everything mentioned in the Act.

The Act makes it unlawful for any person within Illinois knowingly to “manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase . . . an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge.” *Id.* 5/24-1.9(b). (Unless the context requires otherwise, from this point we use the term “assault weapon” to cover all four covered items, in the interest of readability.) With some exceptions, the Act also makes it unlawful as of January 1, 2024, for any person within the state knowingly to “possess an assault weapon.” *Id.* 5/24-1.9(c).

There are two significant exceptions to these prohibitions. Using the terminology the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted in *Caulkins*, the first is for “trained professionals” and the second is for “grandfathered individuals.” 2023 IL 129453 at ¶ 1. The list of trained professionals, set forth in 5/24-1.9(e), includes peace officers; qualified active and retired law-enforcement officers; prison wardens and “keepers”; members of the Armed Services, Reserves, or Illinois National Guard; nuclear facility guards; and licensed private security personnel. *Id.* 5/24-1.9(e)(1)-(7). The “grandfather” provision can be found at 5/24-1.9(d). It states that the Act’s prohibitions do “not apply to a person’s possession of an assault weapon . . . if the person lawfully

possessed” that weapon as of the effective date of the law and then the person “provide[s] in an endorsement affidavit, prior to January 1, 2024, under oath or affirmation” certain specified information to the Illinois State Police. *Id.* 5/24-1.9(d)(1)-(3). A completed endorsement affidavit “creates a rebuttable presumption that the person is entitled to possess and transport the assault weapon.” *Id.* 5/24-1.9(d), at ¶ 2. The Act restricts the places where authorized persons may possess their weapons to the following: (1) private property owned or controlled by the person; (2) other private property, with the express permission of the owner or controller; (3) premises of a licensed firearms dealer or gunsmith for lawful repairs; (4) licensed firing ranges or sport shooting competition venues; and (5) in transit to or from any of those locations, if the weapon is unloaded and in a container. *Id.* 5/24-1.9(d), at ¶ 3(1)-(5). The parties have not focused on these locational restrictions, and so neither will we.

Section 5/24-1.10 sets out the rules for large-capacity ammunition feeding devices. They are defined as a magazine (or similar mechanism) that can accept “more than 10 rounds of ammunition for long guns and more than 15 rounds of ammunition for handguns.” *Id.* 5/24-1.10(a), at ¶ 3(1). This provision also grandfathers in those who lawfully possessed a large-capacity magazine before the effective date of the Act, so long as the device is used in a permitted place. *Id.* 5/24-1.10(d). It has an analogous set of exceptions for trained professionals. *Id.* 5/24-10(d), at ¶ 1.

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Broadly speaking, violations of the assault-weapon ban are classified as felonies when the violation involves guns or gun parts, and as misdemeanors when the violation involves .50 caliber cartridges. *Id.* 5/24-1(b).

B. The Lawsuits

The ink was barely dry on the pages of the Act when litigation began. Before us now are six related cases, in which 26 plaintiffs have challenged the Act and the three municipal ordinances we mentioned earlier. All of the challengers contend that the legislation in question violates their Second Amendment right to keep and bear Arms. A brief review of the individual cases should help keep the issues straight.

1. *Bevis v. City of Naperville* (No. 23-2353)

This case, filed in the Northern District of Illinois, was brought by three parties: (1) Robert Bevis, a Naperville resident and owner of Law Weapons, Inc.; (2) Law Weapons, Inc., a commercial firearms store in Naperville; and (3) the National Association for Gun Rights. We refer to them collectively as Bevis. Once the suit was filed and landed in Judge Kendall's court, Bevis's first step was to seek a preliminary injunction against both the Naperville ordinance and the Act. They were unsuccessful. Applying the standard four-part test for preliminary injunctions established in *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), Judge Kendall decided that the

plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits. This would have been an easy conclusion under our decision in *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), but the judge was concerned that *Friedman*'s methodology may have been undermined by *Bruen*, and so she undertook a fresh analysis of the merits using only *Bruen*. (We address *Friedman*'s continuing vitality below.)

Judge Kendall's efforts convinced her that "[t]he history of firearm regulation . . . establishes that governments enjoy the ability to regulate highly dangerous arms (and related dangerous accessories)." *Bevis v. City of Naperville*, No. 22 C 4775, 2023 WL 2077392, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2023). She took particular note of longstanding regulations on Bowie knives and other "melee weapons." *Id.* at *10-11. Next, she found that assault weapons fit within this tradition because they pose "an exceptional danger" compared with "standard self-defense weapons such as handguns." *Id.* at *14. Critically for our purposes, after citing statistics about the lethality and injury rates of assault weapons, *id.*, she highlighted the fact that "[a]ssault rifles can . . . be easily converted to . . . mimic military-grade machine guns," *id.* at *15. Quoting from the Fourth Circuit, she observed that

the very features that qualify a firearm as a banned assault weapon – such as flash suppressors, barrel shrouds, folding and telescoping stocks, pistol grips, grenade launchers, night sights, and the ability to accept

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bayonets and large-capacity magazines – serve specific, combat-functional ends.

Id. (quoting *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114, 137 (4th Cir. 2017) (*en banc*), *abrogated on other grounds by Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-27) (cleaned up). Finally, the judge noted that the high-capacity magazines exhibited similar dangers. *Id.*

This was enough, in her view, to show that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. Quickly looking at the other three criteria for a preliminary injunction, she also found that without a presumption of irreparable harm related to the alleged Second Amendment violation, plaintiffs could not satisfy that factor. Bevis had not shown that the gun shop would lose substantial sales because of the two laws, and the organizational members retained other effective weapons for self-defense. *Id.* at *16. Finally, Judge Kendall concluded that neither the balance of equities nor the public interest favored plaintiffs sufficiently to overcome the inadequate showing on the other issues. *Id.* at *17.

2. *Herrera v. Raoul* (No. 23-1793)

The plaintiff in our next case, Javier Herrera, is a Chicago emergency room doctor who owns several assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. After the Act was passed, he filed a suit seeking both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the Act, the Chicago ordinance, and the Cook County ordinance. Unlike Bevis, he also challenged the

Act's registration requirements (through which the grandfathering provisions are administered). This case was assigned to Judge Jenkins, who largely agreed with the reasoning in *Bevis*. See *Herrera v. Raoul*, No. 23 CV 532, 2023 WL 3074799 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2023). She rejected Herrera's attempt to distinguish *Bevis* on the ground that his suit focused on the defense of his home, rather than on the public-carry right. Although she recognized that the analogies to Bowie knives and melee weapons were not perfect, she noted that *Bruen* did not demand a "dead ringer" or a "historical twin," especially if there are "'dramatic technological changes' or 'unprecedented societal concerns' [that] may require a 'more nuanced approach.'" *Id.* at *7, *9 (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133, 2132).

With respect to the need to register a covered weapon in order to take advantage of the Act's grandfathering provision, Judge Jenkins first assured herself that the question was ripe even though Herrera had not yet taken steps to register his guns. *Id.* at *8. Herrera made clear that he intended to disobey that law, that his intended conduct "[ran] afoul of a criminal statute," and that the effective date of the registration requirement was "sufficiently imminent." *Id.* (quotations omitted). On the merits, however, she concluded that Herrera was unlikely to succeed because historical evidence showed that the "colonies required gun registration in a variety of ways," such as colonial "muster" requirements and a variety of tax requirements, "which in essence required that firearms be identified and disclosed to the government." *Id.* at *9.

She also took note of several 19th- and 20th-century laws as evidence of a “continuing tradition of state and national registration requirements.” *Id.* She found support for her ruling in the *Bruen* Court’s comment that “nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of existing ‘shall-issue’ licensing laws.” *Id.* at *10 (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9 (cleaned up)).

Although lack of likely success on the merits pointed strongly toward denial of preliminary injunctive relief, Judge Jenkins also looked briefly at the other three factors and found that they pointed in the same direction. She rejected the argument that there is an established presumption of irreparable harm for all Second Amendment challenges. *Id.* at *11. She was also unpersuaded by Herrera’s argument that the laws prevented him from protecting himself in his home and attending his monthly SWAT training (because of the commute time to retrieve his assault weapons from an out-of-county location). Herrera owned other compliant guns suitable for self-defense, and he had managed the commute since 2018. *Id.* at *12. Lastly, she found that neither the public interest nor the equities pushed the needle far enough to justify an injunction. *Id.* at *13.

3. *Barnett v. Raoul* (No. 23-1825)

The perspective reflected in the third case, which arose in the Southern District of Illinois, is quite different from the first two. In *Barnett* and the three other

cases that were consolidated with it, the plaintiffs included individual gun owners, commercial firearms dealers, and various organizations devoted to protecting and enhancing Second Amendment rights. Like their counterparts in the Northern District, these plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the Act. Unlike the others, they succeeded. Judge McGlynn concluded that because the plaintiffs had brought a facial challenge to the Act, “the entirety of [the Act] as codified will be enjoined.” *Barnett v. Raoul*, No. 3:23-cv-00209-SPM (Lead Case), 2023 WL 3160285, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2023). (We put to one side the fact that there are many provisions of the Act that have nothing to do with gun ownership or regulation. See generally Pub. Act 102-1116 (2023). Presumably the judge did not mean to enjoin them, but if that is so, then the injunction does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. That rule requires an injunction to indicate clearly what is forbidden or mandated – a rule necessitated by the fact that injunctions are enforceable by contempt. We need not explore this further, given our ultimate conclusion in these appeals.)

With obvious reference to the two sections of the Act that address assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, Judge McGlynn chose to start with the issue of irreparable injury, rather than likelihood of success on the merits. He found that there is a presumption of irreparable harm when plaintiffs mount a facial challenge under the Second Amendment, and even if there were not, these plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury because the restrictions on

their ability to buy or sell the weapons and accessories covered by the Act limited their right to armed self-defense. 2023 WL 3160285, at *4-5.

The judge then moved on to likelihood of success on the merits. He rejected the defendants' arguments that many of the Act's provisions regulated only accessories (such as threaded barrels and pistol grips), which in themselves were not the Arms protected by the Second Amendment. Those items were "important corollar[ies] to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense." *Id.* at *8 (quoting *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011)). He then moved on to consider whether the Act was "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." *Id.* at *9. For this purpose, he assigned to the defendants the burden of "(1) demonstrat[ing] that the 'arms' in [the Act] are not in 'common use;' and (2) 'identify[ing] a well-established and representative historical analogue' to [the Act]." *Id.* (quoting *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2128, 2133). He rejected the defendants' argument that the weapons had to be in common use for self-defense. The defendants failed to carry their burden, he held, because they "focused almost entirely on AR-15 rifles and their commonality or lack thereof" instead of the many other weapons and accessories covered by the Act. *Id.* at *10. Accepting an argument of the plaintiffs in the cases now before us (as well as their *amici curiae*), the judge held that AR-15s and large-capacity magazines are "in common use" because a large number of people own them. *Id.*

Wrapping up, the judge characterized the defendants’ proposed historical analogues as inapt, because they were simply concealed-carry regulations, not outright bans on possession. *Id.* at *11. The balance of harms, in his view, decidedly favored the plaintiffs, as (in his words) “there can be no harm to a government agency when it is prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute,” *id.* (cleaned up and quotation omitted), and he saw no evidence in the record indicating how the Act would help Illinois communities. He noted that the Act “was purportedly enacted in response to the Highland Park [mass] shooting,” *id.* at *12, but that fact was not enough to overcome the injury it inflicted.

II. Governing Law

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

As our account of the proceedings in the district courts shows, we are not here today to rule definitively on the constitutionality of the Act or any of the municipal ordinances. The only issue before us concerns preliminary injunctive relief. The *Bevis* and *Herrera* courts denied motions for such an injunction, which would have suspended the operation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9 and 5/24-1.10 (and the corresponding Naperville, Chicago, and Cook County ordinances), and the *Barnett* court granted the injunction (ostensibly against the entire Act, as we mentioned). We entered a stay of the *Barnett* injunction pending the resolution of these interlocutory appeals, which are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); the order stipulated that the stay

would remain in effect “until these appeals have been resolved and the court’s mandate has issued.”

As we mentioned earlier, the leading Supreme Court decision establishing the standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). The Court summarized the pertinent requirements as follows:

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

Id. at 20. It elaborated on these factors in a later case dealing with the criteria for staying a court decision, *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), noting there that “[t]here is substantial overlap between [the criteria for a stay] and the factors governing preliminary injunctions.” *Id.* at 434 (citing *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 24). The two most important considerations are likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. *Id.* With respect to the former, the Court said that “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” *Id.* (quoting and disapproving *Sofinet v. INS*, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)). Nor is a mere possibility enough. *Id.* As we put it in *Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker*, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020), although the party seeking the injunction need not demonstrate likelihood of success by a

preponderance of the evidence, that party must nevertheless make a “strong” showing that reveals how it proposes to prove its case. Similarly, a mere possibility of irreparable harm will not suffice. See *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 434-35; *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22.

Decisions such as *Winter* and *Nken* reflect the fact that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 24. The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of showing that this type of relief is warranted. *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 433-34. We must also bear in mind, when a party is seeking to enjoin a statute, that legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. See *Flemming v. Nestor*, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (quoting *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810)). Though we carefully evaluate any claim that a statute violates the Constitution, we assume that the legislative body – whether Congress or a state legislature – was aware of constitutional limitations and endeavored to follow them.

Finally, we note that a hybrid standard of review applies to interlocutory review of a preliminary injunction: “we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, its legal conclusions *de novo*, and its balancing of the factors for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” *Doe v. University of Southern Indiana*, 43 F.4th 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022) (brackets and quotation omitted).

B. The Second Amendment

The basic contours of the second article of the Bill of Rights have become familiar, and so we will only summarize them here. In a crisp, if not enigmatic, way, it says this: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. For many years, both the Supreme Court and scholars thought that there was a relation between the prefatory clause, which refers to the Militia, and the operative clause, which refers to the right to keep and bear Arms. See, *e.g.*, ROBERT H. BORK, *SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE* 166 (rev. ed. 2003). But in *Heller* the Supreme Court severed that connection. Undertaking its own examination of the events that led up to the Amendment’s inclusion in the Constitution, it concluded that the Amendment recognized an individual right to keep and bear Arms.

At the same time, *Heller* held that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” 554 U.S. at 626. It continued as follows:

From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.

Id. This opened up new frontiers of litigation: Which weapons are covered? What manner of “keeping and

bearing” is protected? What purpose must or may the user have? Which people hold this right? The *Heller* Court recognized that there was much left to be resolved. It did give some hints, however. One important tea leaf for present purposes was its refusal to endorse the idea that the Amendment protects “only those weapons useful in warfare.” *Id.* at 624. It called this a “startling reading,” since that would have implied that machineguns – quintessential weapons used exclusively by the military, not private citizens – could not be regulated, in the face of the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on those weapons. *Id.*; see also Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).

Perhaps the most important expansion of *Heller* occurred in *McDonald*, in which the Supreme Court confirmed that the Second Amendment, like the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, applies to the states through incorporation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See 561 U.S. at 750. The late date of the *McDonald* decision – 2010 – explains why there are so few cases exploring the Second Amendment implications of state laws regulating weapons from the time the Amendment became part of the Constitution (1791) to the present. Under the view that prevailed until *McDonald*, the states were free to regulate weapons in any way compatible with their own constitutions. See generally Jeffrey S. Sutton, *51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law* (2018). And they did so in countless ways – a point of some significance when we come

to consider the history and tradition of regulation in this area.

After *McDonald*, most courts of appeals adopted a two-step test for legality under the Second Amendment. See, e.g., *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 702-03. Step one asked whether the “challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was understood [historically].” *Id.* If the regulated activity was unprotected, then the law in question was not subject to further Second Amendment review. If, however, history showed that the activity was protected, or the evidence was inconclusive, step two called on the court to balance the public benefit the government was seeking to achieve against the regulatory means it selected, using a form of heightened scrutiny. *Id.* at 703.

Some courts, including our own, steered clear of that two-step approach. That explains the path we chose in *Friedman*, which dealt with exactly the same issue we face now: a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. Although the district court in *Bevis* thought that the reasoning in *Friedman* might not have survived *Bruen*, we see *Friedman* as basically compatible with *Bruen*, insofar as *Friedman* anticipated the need to rest the analysis on history, not on a free-form balancing test.

After briefly reviewing the holdings in *Heller* and *McDonald*, *Friedman* turned to the question of the scope of the individual right to keep and bear Arms. It

began by summarizing the Court's own historical analysis in *Heller*:

[The Court] cautioned against interpreting the [*Heller*] decision to cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions,” including the “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” [554 U.S.] at 623, 627. It observed that state militias, when called to service, often had asked members to come armed with the sort of weapons that were “in common use at the time”, *id.* at 624, and it thought these kinds of weapons (which have changed over the years) are protected by the Second Amendment in private hands, while military-grade weapons (the sort that would be in a militia's armory), such as machine guns, and weapons especially attractive to criminals, such as short-barreled shotguns, are not. *Id.* at 624-25.

784 F.3d at 407-08. The plaintiffs in *Friedman* had contended that “there is no ‘historical tradition’ of banning possession of semi-automatic guns and large-capacity magazines.” *Id.* at 408. But, we observed, “this argument proves too much: its logic extends to bans on machine guns, . . . [but] *Heller* deemed a ban on private possession of machine guns to be obviously valid.” *Id.* (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 624). That was so even though states “didn’t begin to regulate private use of machine guns until 1927,” and the federal government did not do so until 1934. *Id.*

The critical question of “[h]ow weapons are sorted between private and military uses,” we noted, “has

changed over time.” *Id.* Anticipating *Bruen*, we rejected a historical focus on the 1920s, when these bans started to come into existence, and turned instead to the time of the Second Amendment’s adoption. *Id.* With respect to the common ownership and use question, we cautioned against circular reasoning:

Machine guns aren’t commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they are illegal; semi-automatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned more commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that there is a statute banning it, so that it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be the source of its own constitutional validity.

Id. at 409.⁵ We were not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ efforts to put semiautomatic weapons on the “private” or “mixed” side of the line between private or mixed private/military weapons, on the one hand, and weapons exclusively for military use, on the other. We were reluctant to place semiautomatic weapons in the former category for the simple reason that the *Heller* Court had not done so. Instead, in distinguishing *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), we reaffirmed “the rule that the Second Amendment does not authorize private persons to possess weapons such as

⁵ The dissent embraces the reasoning we rejected in *Friedman*; it asserts that circularity concerns are more hypothetical than actual. See *post* at 1212 n.4 (citing *Friedman*, 784 F.3d at 416 n.5 (Manion, J., dissenting)).

machine guns and sawed-off shotguns that the government would not expect (or allow) citizens to bring with them when the militia is called to service.” 784 F.3d at 408.

Conspicuously absent from our *Friedman* analysis is any hint of the two-part test that *Bruen* disapproved. We looked instead to the type of Arms that the Second Amendment has always protected for private use and contrasted them with weapons reserved for military use. We expressly declined to subject Highland Park’s law to means-end scrutiny. *Id.* at 410. Instead, we said, “we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ . . . and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.” *Id.* (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 622 (quoting *Miller*, 307 U.S. at 178)). This approach, we believe, is consistent with the methodology approved in *Bruen*.

Pointing to *Wilson v. Cook County*, 937 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2019) (*per curiam*), the dissent sees *Friedman* differently. It notes that one can find language in *Wilson* that characterizes *Friedman* as “evaluat[ing] the importance of the reasons for the [assault weapons ban] to determine whether they justified the ban’s intrusion on Second Amendment rights.” 937 F.3d at 1036. But this language is pure *dicta*. It may represent the *Wilson* panel’s attempt to put a gloss on *Friedman*, but it did not change the actual legal test that *Friedman* applied. The issue in *Wilson*, recall, was whether

Friedman could be reconciled with *Ezell*, which struck down Chicago’s ban on firing ranges within city limits. See *id.* at 1035. On that issue, *Wilson* found that “*Friedman* fits comfortably under the umbrella of *Ezell*” and that it “represents the application and extension of its principles to the specific context of a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines.” *Id.* at 1036. Indeed, *Wilson* is notable for what it did *not* say: it never said that *Friedman* had used intermediate scrutiny or means-end balancing; and it did not depict *Friedman* as evaluating only the importance of the reasons behind the ordinance at issue there. The fleeting reference to the city’s reasons for adopting the ordinance, in short, was not part of the panel’s reasoning, and so, while certainly disapproved in *Bruen*, does not undermine the central analysis in the case.

We have now referred many times to *Bruen*, and finally, it takes center stage. Rejecting the two-part test adopted by the courts of appeals (which it derided as having “one step too many,” 142 S. Ct. at 2127), the *Bruen* Court elaborated on the test that *Heller* requires. See 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. First, it said, the trial court must decide whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” *Id.* If so, then “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” *Id.* at 2130. The analysis then moves to the second step, which calls on the “government [to] justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Id.* The Court predicted that this second step would be relatively easy in some instances, when

historical analogues are easy to find. But in other instances, it recognized that the task would be challenging. It singled out “cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes,” which “may require a more nuanced approach.” *Id.* at 2132.

Bruen also confirmed some additional points that inform our analysis. First, the Court said (not for the first time) that the Arms protected by the Second Amendment are not limited to those that were in existence at the time of its ratification, 1791, or at the time the Fourteenth Amendment took effect, 1868. *Id.* Second, the search is for a historical regulation that is *relevantly similar*, not identical. Bearing in mind that “the *central component*” of the Second Amendment right is individual self-defense, *id.* at 2133 (quoting *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767 (emphasis in original)), the question is whether the modern and historical regulations “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified,” *id.* And the Court made it clear that this search was a meaningful one, not just a subterfuge for either upholding or striking down all modern laws:

[A]nalogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straight-jacket nor a regulatory blank check. On the one hand, courts should not uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue, because doing so risk[s] endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted. On the other hand, analogical

reasoning requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical *analogue*, not a historical *twin*. So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.

Id. (quotation and citation omitted, and second alteration and emphases in original). Finally, the Court’s decision in *Bruen* builds on, rather than disturbs, *Heller* and *McDonald*. See *id.* at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring); *id.* at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Justice Alito in particular took care to make this point when he wrote “[n]or does [*Bruen*] decide anything about the kinds of weapons that people may possess.” *Id.* at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring). *Bruen* simply “made the constitutional standard endorsed in *Heller* more explicit” and applied it to the handgun regulation at issue. *Id.* at 2134.

Our task is to apply *Bruen*’s methodology to the four laws before us. We begin by assessing whether the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines described in those laws are Arms for purposes of the Second Amendment. If not, then the Second Amendment has nothing to say about these laws: units of government are free to permit them, or not to permit them, depending on the outcome of the democratic process. If they are properly characterized as Arms, then we must proceed to *Bruen*’s second step, at which the governments bear the burden of proof, and determine whether these laws pass muster.

III. Application to the Cases

A. Are the Covered Weapons “Arms”?

We begin by looking at the “plain text” of the Second Amendment to see whether the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines (terms that we, like the parties, continue to use as short-hand for the many items covered by these laws) fall within the scope of the “Arms” that individual persons are entitled to keep and bear. Both Supreme Court decisions and historical sources indicate that the Arms the Second Amendment is talking about are weapons in common use for self-defense. That is not to say that there are no other lawful uses for weapons – sporting uses, collection, and competitions come to mind as examples. But the constitutional protection exists to protect the individual right to self-defense, and so that will be our focus.

Our starting point is, once again, *Heller*. It began by interpreting the object of the Second Amendment right: Arms. See 554 U.S. at 581. It is worth a close look at this part of the opinion:

The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 *Dictionary of the English Language* 106 (4th ed.) (reprinted 1978). Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” 1 *A New and Complete Law Dictionary*; see

also N. Webster, *American Dictionary of the English Language* (1828) (reprinted 1989) (similar).

The term was applied, then as now, to *weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity*. For instance, Cunningham’s legal dictionary gave as an example of usage: “Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on *Sundays*, &c. and not bear other arms.” . . . Although one founding-era thesaurus limited “arms” (as opposed to “weapons”) to “instruments of offence *generally* made use of in war,” even that source stated that all firearms constituted “arms.” 1 J. Trusler, *The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English Language* 37 (3d ed. 1794) (emphasis added).

554 U.S. at 581-82 (first emphasis and ellipsis added, and “hereinafter” parentheticals omitted). Summarizing, the Court said that “the Second Amendment extends, *prima facie*, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms.” *Id.* at 582.

But what exactly falls within the scope of “bearable” Arms? Not machineguns, the Court said, because they can be dedicated exclusively to military use. See *id.* at 624. Yet a normal person can certainly pick up and carry a machinegun, or for that matter the portable nuclear weapons we mentioned at the outset. “Bearable” thus must mean more than “transportable” or “capable of being held.” See *id.* at 627 (discussing

“weapons that are most useful in military service – M16 rifles and the like,” which “may be banned”).

The Court’s comments about the role of the militia shed light on the scope of the term “Arms.” It explained that “[t]he traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.” *Id.* at 624. It then concluded that “the Second Amendment does *not* protect those weapons *not* typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the right.” *Id.* at 625 (emphasis added). We take from this that the definition of “bearable Arms” extends only to weapons in common use for a lawful purpose. That lawful purpose, as we have said several times, is at its core the right to individual self-defense.

This approach is consistent with the historical antecedents on which the Second Amendment was based. Chief among those was the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which is a key precursor to the bills of rights in the U.S. state and federal constitutions. The 1689 Bill of Rights “explicitly protected a right to keep arms for self-defense.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 768. Similarly, Blackstone explained that at the root of the right to bear arms, there is a “natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139, *140). State constitutional protections from the Founding Era confirm this understanding. As *Heller*

observed, “nine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th . . . enshrined a right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state or bear arms in defense of himself and the state.” 554 U.S. at 584-85, 585 n.8 (citing the state constitutions of Pennsylvania, Vermont, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut, Alabama, and Missouri) (quotations omitted).

In order to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiffs in each of the cases before us thus have the burden of showing that the weapons addressed in the pertinent legislation are Arms that ordinary people would keep at home for purposes of self-defense, not weapons that are exclusively or predominantly useful in military service, or weapons that are not possessed for lawful purposes. This search for the correct meaning of “Arms” for the Second Amendment is consistent with our approach to its companions in the Bill of Rights. When interpreting the text of a constitutional provision or a statute, we often resort to contemporaneous dictionaries or other sources of context to ensure that we are understanding the word in the way its drafters intended. In Fourth Amendment cases, we ask whether the place or item searched falls within the Amendment’s scope. See, e.g., *California v. Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (aerial view of backyard). For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, before we apply the Confrontation Clause we must ensure that a particular statement was testimonial. See, e.g., *Ohio v. Clark*, 576 U.S. 237, 243-44, 247 (2015) (child’s responses to questions from a teacher). The

famous Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-in-crimination attaches only if the person is in custody, despite no mention of custody in the “plain text” of the Amendment. See, *e.g.*, *New York v. Quarles*, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).

We find substantial support for the proposition that the Arms protected by the Second Amendment do not include weapons that may be reserved for military use. We already have pointed to language in the Supreme Court’s opinions to this effect.⁶ The dissent, relying heavily on *Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), contends that the Court has already decided that the AR-15 is in common use, and thus that the weapon is presumptively immune from regulation. See *post* at 1214-15. We see no such holding in *Staples*. That case had nothing to do with the Second Amendment, which is mentioned no-where in the opinion. The Court handed down the *Staples* decision five months *before* Congress enacted the Federal Assault Weapons Ban, when as a matter of federal law it was lawful to

⁶ We note, too, that this court was not the first to observe the line that *Heller* recognized, and which was applied to the states in *McDonald*. For example, over a decade ago, and three years before *Friedman*, one scholar of the Second Amendment wrote that “*Heller* and *McDonald* . . . focused on the right of a law-abiding person to have a handgun in his or her home for self-protection,” but “[n]either case foreclosed reasonable gun regulations,” including “bans on military weapons wholly unnecessary for ordinary self-defense,” “limits on the size of gun clips,” and “registration and permit requirements.” See Akhil Reed Amar, *Gun Control After Newtown* (Dec. 26, 2012), *reprinted in* THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE ISSUES OF OUR ERA 230, 231 (2016).

own an AR-15. (We assume that this statute is of little relevance to our historical inquiry, given the Supreme Court’s insistence that the relevant time to consult is 1791, or maybe 1868, not the late 20th century.) The status of the AR-15 at the time *Staples* was decided provides a ready explanation for why the Court asserted (with no empirical support) that the AR-15 is among the weapons that have been “widely accepted as lawful possessions.” 511 U.S. at 612. Interestingly, the *Staples* Court contrasted the AR-15s with grenades, the possession of which it said “is not an innocent act.” *Id.* at 610 (quotation omitted). It said the same about “machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces.” *Id.* at 611. Overall, we see nothing in *Staples* that decides whether the Second Amendment protects AR-15s, though we do find much in the opinion that reinforces the line we discern from *Heller*, and which is confirmed by history.

When we compare the AR-15s and other semiautomatic weapons covered by the Act and its counterparts, we come to the same conclusion. Indeed, we asked the plaintiffs at oral argument to explain what distinguishes AR-15s from M16s, the military’s counterpart that is capable of both fully automatic operation and semiautomatic operation. The question is important precisely because *Heller* itself stated that M16s are not among the Arms covered by the Second Amendment; they are instead a military weapon. See 554 U.S. at 624, 627.

The plaintiffs’ responses to our question were unconvincing. They argued, for instance, that civilians do

not regard machineguns as useful for self-defense, but that is because they cannot purchase machineguns. It is not too much of a stretch to think that some people might like the fully automatic feature of a machinegun, if they were hoping to defend their families, their property, and themselves from invaders. The plaintiffs also noted that machineguns are more expensive than semiautomatic weapons, but we cannot believe that an item's entitlement to constitutional protection depends on its price. Finally, with a nod to the "lawful use" criterion, the plaintiffs said that when machineguns were available to civilians (early in the 20th century), they were primarily used by criminals. But this tells us nothing about how use of those guns would have evolved, had they remained legal and readily available.⁷

Coming directly to the question whether the weapons and feeding devices covered by the challenged legislation enjoy Second Amendment protection, at the first step of the *Bruen* analysis, we conclude that the answer is no. We come to this conclusion because these assault weapons and high-capacity magazines are much more like machineguns and military-grade weaponry than they are like the many different types of

⁷ It appears that there is a large and growing demand for guns in general. Since 1986, the number of guns manufactured each year has almost quadrupled, from around 3 million in 1986 to almost 11 million in 2013. See Scott Horsley, *Guns in America, by the Numbers*, NPR (Jan. 5, 2016), <https://www.npr.org/2016/01/05/462017461/guns-in-america-by-the-numbers>. There is no reason to think that machineguns would not have followed the same pattern, had they been lawful in civilian hands.

firearms that are used for individual self-defense (or so the legislature was entitled to conclude).⁸ Indeed, the AR-15 is almost the same gun as the M16 machinegun. The only meaningful distinction, as we already have noted, is that the AR-15 has only semiautomatic capability (unless the user takes advantage of some simple modifications that essentially make it fully automatic), while the M16 operates both ways. Both weapons share the same core design, and both rely on the same patented operating system.⁹

The similarity between the AR-15 and the M16 only increases when we take into account how easy it is to modify the AR-15 by adding a “bump stock” (as the shooter in the 2017 Las Vegas event had done) or auto-sear to it, thereby making it, in essence, a fully automatic weapon. In a decision addressing a ban on bump stocks enacted by the Maryland legislature, another federal court found that bump-stock devices enable “rates of fire between 400 to 800 rounds per minute.” *Maryland Shall Issue v. Hogan*, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2018) (quotation omitted).

⁸ Obviously, many weapons are “dual use”: private parties have a constitutionally protected right to “keep and bear” them and the military provides them to its forces. In this sense, there is a thumb on the scale in favor of Second Amendment protection. When we refer to “military” weapons here, we mean weapons that may be essentially reserved to the military.

⁹ See ARMALITE, INC., *Technical Note 54: Direct Impingement Versus Piston Drive* (July 3, 2010), available at <https://wayback.archiveit.org/all/20120905024032/http://www.armalite.com/images/Tech%20Notes%5CTech%20Note%2054,%20Gas%20vs%20Op%20Rod%20Drive,%20020815.pdf>.

To the same effect, the Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]he difference between the fully automatic and semiautomatic versions of [the AR-15 and AK-47] is slight. That is, the automatic firing of all the ammunition in a large-capacity thirty-round magazine takes about two seconds, whereas a semiautomatic rifle can empty the same magazine in as little as five seconds.” *Kolbe*, 849 F.3d at 125. The District of Columbia Circuit also noted that “semiautomatics . . . fire almost as rapidly as automatics.” *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011), *on remand from Heller*, 554 U.S. 570; see also ATF Ruling 2006-2, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2006) (discussing a device (apparently the “Akins Accelerator,” an early bump-stock device) that “is advertised to fire approximately 650 rounds per minute”).

There are a few other differences between the AR-15 and the M16, but none that is relevant. The M16 has an automatic firing rate of 700 rounds per minute, while the AR-15 has a semiautomatic rate of “only” 300 rounds per minute – unless, as we have just noted, it is modified with, for example, a bump stock or a “binary” trigger, which can double the rate at which semiautomatic weapons can be fired. Both models use the same ammunition, deliver the same kinetic energy (1220-1350 foot-pounds), the same muzzle velocity (2800-3100 feet per second), and the same effective range (602-875 yards). And these comments apply with equal force to the high-capacity handguns that are restricted by these laws. The latter are almost indistinguishable from the 17- or 21-round M17 and M18 pistols that are standard-issue in the military.

But what about the possibility that the AR-15 (and its many cousins covered by the Act) *as sold* is an Arm, even though simple modifications can transform it into a military weapon? On the one hand, this might support an argument against the Act, which focuses initially on the product as sold. On the other hand, there is a serious question whether the legislature sought to prevent users from deconstructing weapons into (or assembling weapons from) their constituent parts in order to evade the core regulation. If the AR-15 by itself is not a machinegun because it fires “only” at the rate of 300 rounds per minute, and the auto-sear is also not a machinegun because it is just a component that holds a hammer in the cocked position, that would be a road map for assembling machineguns and avoiding legitimate regulations of their private use and carry. A question of this nature is raised in *VanDerStok v. Garland*, No. 4:22-cv-00691-O, 2023 WL 4539591 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2023), *appeal docketed*, No. 23-10718, 2023 WL 4945360 (5th Cir. July 24, 2023), *and stay pending appeal granted sub nom. Garland v. Vanderstok*, No. 23A82, 2023 WL 5023383 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2023), where the Supreme Court has issued a stay of a district court’s order vacating a federal “ghost gun” regulation, 87 Fed. Reg. 24652 (Apr. 26, 2022). See also *Garland v. Blackhawk Mfg. Grp., Inc.*, No. 23A302, 2023 WL 6801523 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2023) (vacating a second injunction limited to the parties).

Neither the parties nor the evidence before us addressed these points, but the district courts may explore them as the cases move forward. Better data on

firing rates might change the analysis of whether the AR-15 and comparable weapons fall on the military or civilian side of the line. We note in this connection that it is one thing to say that the AR-15 is capable of firing at a rate of 300 rounds per minute and the comparable rate for the M16 is 700 rounds per minute, but quite another to address actual firing capacity, which accounts for the need to change magazines. No one here has suggested that the M16 comes with a 700-round magazine, or for that matter that the AR-15 comes with a 300-round magazine. Either one must be reloaded multiple times to fire so many rounds. Factoring in the reloading time, the record may show that the two weapons differ more – or less – than it appears here.

Turning now to large-capacity magazines, we conclude that they also can lawfully be reserved for military use. Recall that these are defined by the Act as feeding devices that have in excess of 10 rounds for a rifle and 15 rounds for a handgun. Anyone who wants greater firepower is free under these laws to purchase several magazines of the permitted size. Thus, the person who might have preferred buying a magazine that loads 30 rounds can buy three 10-round magazines instead.

Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the AR-15 is materially different from the M16. *Heller* informs us that the latter weapon is not protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore may be regulated or banned. Because it is indistinguishable from that machinegun, the AR-15 may be

treated in the same manner without offending the Second Amendment.

We conclude this portion of the opinion by stressing again that this is just a preliminary look at the subject. That assessment persuades us, as it did Judges Kendall and Jenkins, that the plaintiffs have not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. But, as we previously have recognized, Second Amendment challenges to gun regulations often require more evidence than is presented in the early phases of litigation. See *Atkinson v. Garland*, 70 F.4th 1018, 1023-25 (7th Cir. 2023) (vacating the district court’s order dismissing a Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute and remanding with a list of specific questions to consider as the case proceeded). There thus will be more to come, and we do not rule out the possibility that the plaintiffs will find other evidence that shows a sharper distinction between AR-15s and M16s (and each one’s relatives) than the present record reveals.

B. Historical Tradition

Although we are satisfied that these appeals can be resolved at the first step of the *Bruen* framework – are the weapons among the Arms protected by the Second Amendment – for the sake of completeness we now turn to the question whether, if the weapons covered by the statutes before us ought to be considered bearable “Arms,” the laws nonetheless pass muster under *Bruen*’s second step. In short, are these laws consistent with the history and tradition of firearms regulation?

Here, too, at the preliminary injunction stage, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not shown the necessary likelihood of success on the merits.

In discussing whether these assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are Arms protected by the Second Amendment, we have (as instructed by *Bruen*) confined ourselves to textual considerations. There is another aspect of the *Bruen* framework, which is whether the regulated weapons are “in common use.” There is no consensus on whether the common-use issue belongs at *Bruen* step one or *Bruen* step two. The plaintiffs argue that it belongs at the second step. We will assume (without deciding the question) that this is a step two inquiry, where the state bears the burden of proof. Even with that leeway, we do not find this factor to be very helpful.

In this respect, we find the analysis in *Friedman* to be particularly useful, and unlike the district courts, we do not believe that the relevant portion was undermined by *Bruen*. We recognized in *Friedman* that “common use” is a slippery concept. Suppose, for example, a new type of handgun is introduced to the market on January 1, 2024. As of that day, zero guns of that type have been sold. Yet if its characteristics are analogous to those of the many other types of handguns available for consumers, no one would say that this new handgun was not within the class of Arms protected by the Second Amendment. At the other end of the spectrum, consider the actual case of machineguns, which for a time were available for civilian purchase, but which were eventually withdrawn from that

market. However popular machineguns might have been, either in organized crime circles or more generally, because their characteristics were military in nature, the decision to reserve them to military use was within the power of the legislature.

The dissent repeatedly makes the point that the assault weapons covered by the challenged legislation are obviously in common use, because there are so many in private hands. Indeed, the dissent's argument boils down to two propositions: first, it contends that the fact that many people own assault weapons insulates them from regulation; and second, it makes the surprising assertion that assault weapons are not particularly dangerous. The latter proposition finds no empirical support in the record, and the former, as we will explain, does not carry the day.

The plaintiffs present basically the same argument. One brief asserts that at least 20 million AR-15s and similar rifles are owned by some 16 million citizens (though they do not specify how many of these owners would fall within the large carveout created by the grandfather and the trained professional exceptions to the Act). The plaintiffs also assert that at least 150 million magazines with a capacity greater than 10 rounds have been bought for private use. (The state criticizes these numbers for being based, it says, on "an unpublished, non-peer-reviewed paper recounting an online survey that does not disclose its funding or measurement tools." We have no need for present purposes to resolve that dispute.) Cook County offers a different perspective, noting that of all the firearms in the

country, only 5.3% are assault weapons, and that percentage includes those held by law-enforcement agencies. One is reminded of Mark Twain’s apocryphal remark, “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics.”

For the reasons set forth in more detail in *Friedman*, we decline to base our assessment of the constitutionality of these laws on numbers alone. Such an analysis would have anomalous consequences. The problem with this approach can be seen in the case of the AR-15. When, in 1994, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban made civilian possession of AR-15s (among other assault weapons) unlawful, see Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110102, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996, few civilians owned AR-15s. But in 2004, after the legislation was allowed to expire pursuant to its sunset provision, *id.* § 110105(2), 108 Stat. at 2000, these weapons began to occupy a more significant share of the market. Indeed, most of the AR-15s now in use were manufactured in the past two decades.¹⁰ Thus, if we looked to numbers alone, the federal ban would have been constitutional before 2004, but unconstitutional thereafter. This conclusion is essential to the plaintiffs’ position, yet it lacks both textual and historical provenance.

As this example illustrates, the idea of “common use” cannot be severed from the historical scope of the

¹⁰ See Aaron O’Neill, *Annual Share of AR-15 Assault Rifles in the Total Number of Firearms Manufactured in the United States from 1990 to 2020*, STATISTA (June 2, 2023), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1388010/sharear-15-united-states-firearm-production-historical/>.

common-law right that the Second Amendment was designed to protect against encroachment. In other words, the relevant question is what are the modern analogues to the weapons people used for individual self-defense in 1791, and perhaps as late as 1868. This would exclude the weapons used exclusively by the military – and every Framer of the Second Amendment was well aware by 1791 that the King of England had an impressive standing army, and that such weapons existed. The weapons used for self-defense are the ones that *Heller*, *McDonald*, *Caetano*, and *Bruen* had in mind – not a militaristic weapon such as the AR-15, which is capable of inflicting the grisly damage described in some of the briefs.

Bruen recognized that even Arms (*i.e.*, non-militaristic weapons) may be regulated, as long as the regulation is “part of an enduring American tradition of state regulation.” 142 S. Ct. at 2155. A regulation is a part of this tradition if one can provide answers to two questions: (1) how, and (2) why, does a given regulation “burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense”? *Id.* at 2133. With respect to the “how” question, judges are instructed to consider “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden” on that right. *Id.* For all its disclaiming of balancing approaches, *Bruen* appears to call for just that: a broader restriction burdens the Second Amendment right more, and thus requires a closer analogical fit between the modern regulation and traditional ones; a narrower restriction with less impact on the constitutional right might survive with a looser fit. It is at this stage

that many courts, as well as the state parties here, point to the long-standing tradition of regulating the especially dangerous weapons of the time, whether they were firearms, explosives, Bowie knives, or other like devices. (The regulations we list below are representative of this tradition.) The dissent cannot deny that regulation existed; it relies only on the fact that the particulars of those regulations varied from place to place, and that some were more absolute than others. But the same is true in our case. The laws before us have one huge carve-out: people who presently own the listed firearms or ammunition are entitled to keep them, subject only to a registration requirement that is no more onerous than many found in history. In addition, as we noted at the outset, the laws do not purport to regulate many other special uses. This is enough, in our view, to satisfy the “how” question *Bruen* identified.

The “why” question is another one that at first blush seems hard to distinguish from the discredited means/end analysis. But we will do our best. *Bruen* makes clear that the question whether a burden is “comparably justified” cannot be answered by pointing to the gravity of the harms the legislation was designed to avert and the appropriateness of the mechanism they adopt. See *id.* at 2133, 2129. The dissent chooses to take a purposive approach to this question: what were the reasons motivating the historical regulations, and do they map well onto the reasons behind the modern law? We confess to some skepticism about any test that requires the court to divine legislative

purpose from anything but the words that wound up in the statute. Legislator A may have had one goal; Legislator B may have had another; and Legislator C might have agreed to vote for one bill in exchange for a reciprocal vote for Legislator D's pet project later. That is why, as the author of *Heller* reminded us, "The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed." ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997).

The best one can say is that if the text of the legislation evinces its purpose (perhaps in an introductory Statement of Purpose, which many bills contain, or in some other prefatory provision), that is a valid source to consult in answering the "why" question. When we consult the text of the Act, we find the best indication of its purpose in its name: "Protect Illinois Communities Act." See Pub. Act. 102-1116, at § 1 (2023). *Cf. Johnson v. Robison*, 415 U.S. 361, 377 (1974) (noting that the name of a statute can emphasize its purpose). Historical regulations show that at least since the Founding there has been an unbroken tradition of regulating weapons to advance similar purposes.

Once again, the dissent cannot dispute the existence of this enduring American tradition. It tries to escape it, asserting that "stop[ping] a mass casualty event," or perhaps "stopping escalating gun violence," is the purpose of the statute, *post* at 1217, 1218, yet it points to nothing in the Act that supports either of these specific characterizations. To be sure, the dissent notes that the bill enacted by the City of Naperville

recites a few of the many mass shootings that have occurred during the last decade. See *post* at 1217 n.13.¹¹ But the bill also expressly states that the purpose of the ordinance is to protect public health, safety, and welfare. See City of Naperville, Ill., Ordinance No. 22-099, at 4 (Aug. 16, 2022). The mass-shooting details appear to be nothing more than particular examples illustrating that broader purpose. The state’s attorney also informs us that the legislation was enacted after the Highland Park July 4 massacre. But we have not rested our opinion on this point, because in our view it comes too close to the means/end scrutiny that *Bruen* rejected. In any event we do not think it is appropriate to rely on extratextual considerations to answer the “why” question. The issue, whether we separate out “how” and “why” or we consider them a unified test, is whether the tools the legislature used were limited to those that the Second Amendment left for it, after (as the Court said in *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635, and *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133 n.7) the Second Amendment itself performed the necessary means/end balancing. As we have explained, we think that the legislatures involved here did stay within those boundaries.

Harking back to our examination of covered Arms, we find the distinction between military and civilian weaponry to be useful for *Bruen*’s second step, too.

¹¹ Indeed, the dissent relies *solely* on the municipal bill’s recitations as proof of the state statute’s purpose. It is quite the puzzle to try to square this interpretive method with the dissent’s lengthy criticism of our brief invocation of the name of the Act. See *post* at 63-65.

Both the states and the federal government have long contemplated that the military and law enforcement may have access to especially dangerous weapons, and that civilian ownership of those weapons may be restricted.¹² Many other weapons remain that are more universally available. That is enough to assure us that we are not creating some unbounded “military veto” over the types of Arms that can be regulated. History and tradition leave no doubt that certain weaponry is for the state only: weapons such as the grenades, the machineguns, the artillery pieces, and the like mentioned in *Staples*. See 511 U.S. at 611-12. (And recall that the laws before us carve out not only the military, but police and security forces too, from their coverage.) And, as we now show, the distinction between the two uses is one well rooted in our history.

The following examples suffice to make the point:

- In 1746, Boston outlawed the discharging of any cannon, gun, or pistol within city limits, but it explained that soldiers were still permitted to discharge weaponry on their training days. See Chapter 11 – An

¹² We realize that all guns are dangerous when used as intended: a gunshot wound may be fatal or life-threatening. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that 48,830 people died as a result of a firearm in 2021. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, *National Center for Health Statistics: All Injuries* (Sept. 13, 2023), <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm>. But the record indicates that there are important differences in the lethality of the military-grade weapons, as compared with guns that are commonly owned and used for self-defense and other lawful purposes.

Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Charged with Shot[t] or Ball in the Town of Boston, §§ 1-3, *in* 3 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1742-1756, at 309 (1878).

- Other cities, such as Cleveland, Ohio, implemented similar ordinances throughout the 19th century, again exempting military companies during drills. See Chapter 33 – Fire Arms, §§ 417-423, *in* ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND 136-37 (H.L. Vail & L.M. Snyder, eds., 1890).
- There are dozens of examples of Bowie knife regulations, forbidding or limiting the use of these dangerous weapons. Several of those featured military exceptions. In 1884, for example, Arkansas outlawed the sale of all dirks, Bowie knives, caneswords, metal knuckles, and pistols, except as for use in the army or navy of the United States. See Chapter 53 – Carrying Weapons, §§ 1907-1909, *in* A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS 490 (W.W. Mansfield, ed., 1884).
- Several city ordinances in the late 1800s followed suit, restricting the carry of a wide array of dangerous and concealable weapons (slingshots, metal knuckles, Bowie knives, daggers, pistols, and clubs), but exempting “peace officers” and “conservator[s] of the peace.” See Chapter 6 – Offenses Against the Peace of the City, § 182, *in* THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF

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PROVO CITY 106-07 (1877); Chapter 534 – Ordinances of Baltimore, § 742A, in THE BALTIMORE CITY CODE 297-98 (John Prentiss Poe, ed., 1893).

- The federal government continued this tradition when it began passing gun control laws. The National Firearms Act of 1934 imposed taxation and registration requirements on all guns, but it exempted transfers to the U.S. government, states, territories, political subdivisions, and peace officers. See Pub. L. No. 73-474, §§ 1-12, § 13, 48 Stat. 1236, 1236-40, 1240 (1934).
- Federal restrictions expanded in 1968, when sale and delivery of destructive devices (defined as an “explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, mine, rocket, missile, or similar device”) and machineguns were severely restricted. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 921(a)(4), § 922(b), 82 Stat. 197, 227, 230 (1968). Once again, these provisions did not apply to items sold to the United States or to any individual state. *Id.* § 925(a), 82 Stat. at 233.
- Machineguns were banned by the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986. Since then, civilian ownership has been capped at pre-1986 levels and only military and law enforcement have access to

these weapons. See Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(9), 100 Stat. 449, 453 (1986).

In short, there is a long tradition, unchanged from the time when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution, supporting a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use. The legislation now before us respects and relies on that distinction.

IV. Concluding Observations.

We conclude with a few remarks about several additional issues in some of these cases that do not require immediate attention, and a reminder about the limits on our ruling.

First, we briefly comment on Herrera's challenge to the constitutionality of the registration requirement that implements the grandfather exemption. He regards it as a burden on his Second Amendment rights, and he worries that it may in the future lead to confiscatory acts on the part of the state. If we are correct in our prediction that the state will prevail in its defense of the Act against the Second Amendment arguments, then the registration requirement will be valid as long as it can withstand rational basis review. At this juncture, we see nothing particularly onerous about it, though as with everything we have said, this is a preliminary assessment. Herrera has until the end of 2023 to file the necessary forms, and if he does so, he may retain all of the covered weapons he already owns;

the Act will prohibit only his acquisition of additional assault weapons or high-capacity feeding devices. For its own reasons, the dissent agrees with us that the registration requirement should not be enjoined. See *post* at 1219.

Second, in this court none of the parties has developed any coherent argument that would distinguish restrictions on possession, on the one hand, from restrictions on sale or manufacture, on the other. One of the parties in *Bevis* is a gun store, but the implications of that have yet to be addressed. We thus have no comment on it.

Finally, we have no need to decide whether an alleged Second Amendment violation gives rise to a presumption of irreparable harm, and if so, whether any such presumption is rebuttable or ironclad. Given our decision that the plaintiffs have not shown that they have a strong likelihood of success on the merits, we think it best to save this point for another day. We also have no comment on the other two parts of the *Winter* inquiry: where the balance of equities lies, and what the public interest dictates.¹³

¹³ The governmental parties devoted considerable attention in their briefs to the horrors of the mass shootings that have occurred with distressing regularity throughout the country. Illinois reports that the mass shooting in the town of Highland Park on July 4, 2022, in which seven people were killed and another 48 were injured, inspired the Act. We have not relied on this point, however, because, as we have mentioned, it appears to depend on the type of means/end analysis that *Bruen* disapproved.

We close with an important reminder. Nothing that we have said here indicates that any state or municipality *must* enact restrictions on the ownership of assault weapons or high-capacity magazines. Unless preemptive federal legislation requires otherwise, this is an issue for the political process in each jurisdiction. The people of some states may find the arguments in favor of a lack of restrictions to be persuasive; the people of other states may prefer tighter restrictions. As long as those restrictions do not infringe on the constitutionally protected right to keep and bear the Arms covered by the Second Amendment, either choice is permissible. In the cases now before us, however, the plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, based on the fact that military weapons lie outside the class of Arms to which the individual right applies.

In Nos. 23-1353 and 23-1793, we AFFIRM the district courts' orders denying preliminary injunctive relief. In Nos. 23-1825, 23-1826, 23-1827, and 23-1828, we VACATE the district court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief. We also confirm that the stay we issued in these appeals will remain in effect until our mandate issues.

SO ORDERED.

APPENDIX

Jurisdiction	Actions Prohibited	Firearms Covered	Magazines Covered
Illinois	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manufacture • Delivery • Sale • Purchase • Possession (pre-existing possession and private post-Act use are permissible if registration requirements are met) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semiautomatic rifles that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic pistols that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic shotguns with a revolving cylinder or that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Various assault weapons listed by name 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rifles – over 10 rounds • Handguns – over 15 rounds

Jurisdiction	Actions Prohibited	Firearms Covered	Magazines Covered
Naperville	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commercial sale 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semiautomatic rifles that can accept more than 10 rounds or that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Devices that accelerate the rate of fire of a semiautomatic rifle • Various assault weapons listed by name 	N/A

Jurisdiction	Actions Prohibited	Firearms Covered	Magazines Covered
Cook County	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manufacture • Sale • Offer or display for sale • Give • Lend • Transfer of ownership • Acquire • Carry • Possession 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semiautomatic rifles that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic pistols that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic shotguns with a revolving cylinder or that have or one more assault rifle-like modifications • Combination kits from which an assault weapon can be assembled • Various assault weapons listed by name 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Magazines over 10 rounds

Juris-diction	Actions Prohibited	Firearms Covered	Magazines Covered
Chicago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Import • Sale • Manufacture • Transfer of ownership • Possession 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semiautomatic rifles with the ability to accept a detachable magazine and that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic rifles that have a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds • Devices that accelerate the rate of fire of a semiautomatic rifle • Shotguns that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Semiautomatic handguns that have one or more assault weapon-like modifications • Various assault weapons listed by name 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Handguns – over 15 rounds

BRENNAN, *Circuit Judge*, dissenting. The Second Amendment “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is not a second-class right. Yet the State of Illinois and several Illinois municipalities have categorically banned law-abiding citizens from keeping and bearing a sweeping range of firearms and magazines. In a remarkable conclusion, the majority opinion decides that these firearms are not “Arms” under the Second Amendment. Because the banned firearms and magazines warrant constitutional protection, and the government parties have failed to meet their burden to show that their bans are part of the history and tradition of firearms regulation, preliminary injunctions are justified against enforcement of the challenged laws. I respectfully dissent.

I

The Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116, challenged in each case before us, dramatically redefines the legality of firearms and magazines in Illinois. It goes far beyond the prohibition of “assault rifles.” The Act eliminates the ownership, possession, and use for self-defense of many of the most commonly-owned semiautomatic handguns, shotguns, rifles, and magazines. Exceptions to the Act are narrow.

Specifically, the Act covers firearms, magazines, and an endorsement process for registration. The Act bans the manufacture, delivery, sale, import, and purchase of a vast array of weapons, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/24-1(a)(16), 75/24-1.9(a), 5/24-1.10(a)-(b),

prohibiting them by their features, by their functions, and by name. The Act bans semiautomatic rifles with detachable magazines and one additional qualifying attachment, such as a pistol grip or a flash suppressor. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(A). “[A]ll AR type[]” rifles are banned, including 43 named variants, such as the AR-15. The Act further prohibits “copies, duplicates, variants, or altered facsimiles with the capability of any such weapon.” *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(J)(ii). It also bans almost 100 more rifles by name. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(J).

The Act restricts various other firearms as well. For example, a law-abiding citizen in Illinois can no longer purchase semiautomatic pistols that have “a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 15 rounds,” regardless of any attachments. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(D). The same goes for a semiautomatic shotgun with a fixed magazine holding more than five shells. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(F)(v). The list of restricted weapons includes nearly all detachable magazines holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition for long guns and 15 rounds of ammunition for handguns. *Id.* § 5/24-1.10(a)(1)-(2). Many handguns, the “quintessential self-defense weapon” for the American people, *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008), come standard with magazines carrying more than 15 rounds. As with semiautomatic rifles, after banning pistols by their features, the Act bans “[a]ll AR type[] pistols” and approximately 40 semiautomatic pistols by name. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(K).

Three municipal laws are also challenged, which are as or more restrictive than the Act. The City of

Naperville ordinance is similar to the Act in most respects; both are challenged in *Bevis*. The Cook County and City of Chicago ordinances, challenged along with the Act in *Herrera*, are even broader. Cook County bans possession of “assault weapons,” COOK COUNTY, ILL. CODE § 54-211 and § 54-212, which includes semiautomatic pistols with the capacity to accept a detachable magazine and contain a qualifying attachment (such as a muzzle brake). The City of Chicago ordinance is similar. *See* CHI. MUN. CODE §§ 8-20-010, 8-20-075, 8-20-085.¹

¹ The majority opinion uses the phrase “assault weapon” to simplify the covered arms. The appendix to the majority opinion uses a variety of terms to summarize the types of arms the four challenged laws categorically ban.

Still, the description in the appendix of the Act’s ban is underinclusive in some ways. The Act bans semiautomatic rifles with fixed magazines over 10 rounds (unless it fires .22 rimfire and is loaded with a tubular mechanism). ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(B). The appendix uses the phrase “[s]emiautomatic pistols that have one or more assault weaponlike modifications,” most likely a reference to ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(C). More precisely, the Act also bans semiautomatic pistols with fixed magazines over 15 rounds. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(D). Not included in the appendix are bump stocks and binary triggers (a device enabling the firing of two-rounds per trigger pull), which are both prohibited by the Act. *Id.* § 5/24-1(a)(14).

The Cook County ordinance mirrors the Act’s prohibitions, although it is stricter than the Act in that it bans semi-automatic handguns with fixed magazines over 10 rounds (as opposed to 15 rounds under the Act). COOK COUNTY, ILL. CODE § 54-211(2).

The City of Chicago ordinance is underinclusive in its description of the magazines covered. The ordinance prohibits any magazine holding greater than 15 rounds, encompassing magazines for all types of firearms (except for attached devices that

II

The parties dispute whether the state, county, and city bans respect the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. In *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), the Supreme Court set forth the framework for addressing those disputes. Rejecting means-end scrutiny, the Court held: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30.

The Second Amendment states in part, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The amendment presents several conditions for plain text coverage, which raise questions including:

- Is the regulated population a covered “people?” See, e.g., *Range v. Att’y Gen. United States*, 69 F.4th 96, 101-03 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc); *United States v. Sitladden*, 64 F.4th 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2023); and
- Is the conduct regulated “keep[ing]” or “bear[ing]” arms? See, e.g., *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582-92.

only accept and operate with .22 rimfire ammunition), not just handguns. CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-010.

We consider another question: Are the instruments regulated “Arms”?

“Arms” in the Second Amendment is a broad term that “covers modern instruments that facilitate armed self-defense.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. The term “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582. When the plain text of the Second Amendment covers an individual’s conduct, then the Constitution presumptively protects the conduct. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. That presumptive protection is of all bearable instruments that facilitate armed self-defense, even those not in existence at the time of the Founding. *Id.* at 2132, 2143 (citing *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 411-412 (2016) (per curiam), and *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627).²

As an initial matter, magazines – ammunition feeding devices without which semiautomatic firearms cannot operate as intended – are “Arms.” Such devices are required as part of the firing process. This court has recognized that corollaries to firearms fall within Second Amendment protection. *See Wilson v. Cook*

² When the Supreme Court issued *Bruen*, it vacated several federal appellate decisions upholding gun controls laws, remanding them for reconsideration. Two of them – *Duncan v. Bonta*, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021), and *Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J.*, 974 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020) – concerned magazine limits of 10 rounds, and *Bianchi v. Frosh*, 858 F. App’x 645 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished), upheld Maryland’s “assault weapons” ban.

County, 937 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011)). Further, the Act’s ban on magazines holding more than ten rounds for rifles and more than fifteen rounds for handguns effectively bans firearms that come standard with magazines over the limit.

As for the broader definition of “Arms,” that term should be read as “Arms” – not “Arms in common use at the time.” In *Heller*, the Supreme Court recognized a “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons,’” 554 U.S. at 627, which may be regulated – a point it repeated in *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2143.

The Court “did not say that dangerous and unusual weapons are not *arms*.” *Teter v. Lopez*, 76 F.4th 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original) (ruling that Hawaii statute banning butterfly knives violated Second Amendment). To be sure, this does not mean that the Second Amendment bars governments from regulating weapons long held improper for civilian use. This reading of *Bruen* permits the government, for example, to preclude civilian ownership of military weaponry when the history and tradition of weapons regulation so dictates. As other examples, the government may prohibit sawn-off rifles and shotguns, which properly qualify as dangerous and unusual firearms as they are not ordinarily used by law-abiding citizens. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 625 (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as

short-barreled shotguns.”). But that distinction does not determine whether a weapon is an “Arm.”

The government parties limit the Second Amendment right by importing the phrase “in common use” to assess whether firearms are “Arms.” But their reading improperly restricts the constitutional right. The banned firearms propel bullets by explosive force from gunpowder, yet the government parties ask us to conclude that these rifles and pistols are not “Arms.” As one amicus curiae submitted, “in common use” is a sufficient condition for finding arms protected under the history and tradition test in *Bruen*, not a necessary condition to find them “Arms.”³ The nature of an object does not change based on its popularity, but the regulation of that object can.

The government parties also incorrectly attempt to place a burden on the plaintiffs to show that the plain text of “Arms” includes the banned firearms. *Bruen* does not say that. Instead, *Bruen* states that when the Second Amendment’s text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects it. 142 S. Ct. at 2126, 2129-30. It is undisputed that the government then bears the burden of proof under *Bruen*’s history and tradition framework.

Whether a firearm is “in common use” is asked as part of the history and tradition analysis. At least two reasons support this reading. First, the “in common use” test in *Bruen* is drawn from the “historical

³ See D.E. 99, Brief for Amici Curiae Idaho, *et al.*, at 6.

tradition” of restrictions on “dangerous and unusual weapons.” *Id.* at 2143. The test is not drawn from a historical understanding of what an “Arm” is. *Id.* at 2132. Second, if a weapon is an “Arm,” it is only prima facie protected by the Second Amendment. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582); see *Teter*, 76 F.4th at 949-50 (placing “in common use” test in history and tradition test of *Bruen*).

The limitation of the Second Amendment right is addressed in *Bruen*’s history and tradition test. This requires the government to identify well-established and representative historical analogues to show that the modern regulation is consistent with a historical tradition of firearms regulation. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. In performing this analogical inquiry, it is critical to fly at the right level of generality. *Id.* (“[A]nalogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check.”); see J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 44 (2012). Fly too high, and we risk any historical firearms regulation becoming an analogue. Under *Bruen*, courts must not “uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. (quoting *Drummond v. Robinson*, 9 F.4th 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2021)). Fly too low, and we risk myopia – nitpicking differences because a historical regulation is not a “dead ringer.” *Id.* We are looking for “a well-established and representative historical *analogue*, not a historical *twin*.” *Id.*

Before reviewing the approach to decide whether a regulation is an analogical fit, it helps to address

what history and tradition refer to here. “History” means that analogous laws must be “longstanding” and from the relevant “timeframe.” *Id.* at 2131, 2133 (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626). “History” helps establish the public meaning of the Constitution as “understood . . . when the people adopted” it. *Id.* (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634-35). The Court tells us that only two historical timeframes are relevant to the public understanding of the Second Amendment – the adoption of the Second Amendment in 1791 and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. *Id.* at 2136. Laws enacted after the “end of the 19th century” must be given little weight. *Id.* at 2136-37 (cleaned up). “Tradition” means that the comparison must be to laws with wide acceptance in American society. *Id.* at 2136. Laws that enjoyed “widespread” and “unchallenged” support form part of our tradition. *Id.* at 2137.

In *Bruen*, the Court reaffirmed that “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right,” *id.* at 2133 (citing *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 599)), and expressly identified two questions to assess the analogical strength of a historical regulation: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Id.* at 2133. Put another way, *how* does the regulation limit the Second Amendment right, and *why* does it do so?

How. How a historical regulation addressed a particular problem, or whether it did at all, matters. “[I]f earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also

could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.” *Id.* at 2131. Whether a given regulation was ever enforced, and to what extent, can be relevant here as well. *Id.* at 2149.

Courts must also evaluate how historical “regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” *Id.* at 2133. Modern regulations that impose a “comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” are more likely to be upheld. *Id.*

In assessing these comparable burdens, we consider the breadth of the ban and the weapon banned. For the breadth of the ban, the more expansive the limitation, the greater the burden on the Second Amendment right, which necessarily requires a close analogical fit. For the weapon banned, the burden on the right to keep and bear arms necessarily correlates with whether the prohibited weapon is “in common use at the time” of regulation. *Id.* at 2128, 2134, 2143. So, it is natural that categorical bans of weapons in common use will require an even stronger analogical fit with historical regulations. *See id.* at 2143-44 (rejecting the analogical value of alleged colonial era categorical bans on “dangerous and unusual” weapons because handguns are “unquestionably in common use today”).

Why. Why a historical regulation addressed a particular problem, or whether it did at all, is also key to evaluating its analogical value. In considering whether a historical regulation is an analogical fit, courts are to address whether the modern regulation and proposed

historical analogue have comparable justifications for burdening the right to bear arms. *Id.* at 2133. If the reasons motivating the historical and modern regulations differ, there is no analogue. *See id.* at 2140, 2144. Beyond doubt, this inquiry should not allow a return to interest balancing. *See id.* at 2131 (explaining that the Second Amendment itself “is the very *product* of an interest balancing by the people” (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635)). Rather, the state’s current rationale for arms regulation only matters insofar as a historical regulation was motivated by similar reasons. If not, the analogy fails. *See id.* at 2144 (discussing the context of the colonial New Jersey restrictions, in which land disputes between planters and the colony’s proprietors caused planters to carry pistols).

The government can only defend a regulation by proving it is consistent with this country’s history and tradition. *See Atkinson v. Garland*, 70 F.4th 1018, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2023). Whether that history and tradition allows regulating firearms in sensitive places, for the mentally ill, and for felons, is currently under debate. *See, e.g., United States v. Rahimi*, 61 F. 4th 443, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2023) (ruling that federal statute prohibiting possession of firearm by individual subject to domestic violence restraining order violates Second Amendment as inconsistent with historical tradition), *cert. granted* 143 S. Ct. 2688 (2023).

This understanding of the *Bruen* framework is different from that of my colleagues. First, the majority opinion acknowledges *Bruen*’s “in common use” language but criticizes it as spawning unworkable

circularity issues: If the Second Amendment protects firearms in common use, then that right would turn on how quickly a state enacts regulations. If a firearm is outlawed quickly following its introduction to the market, then it has no chance of gaining common use and enjoys only limited or no Second Amendment protection. This cannot be how the Second Amendment functions, the argument goes, as the speed of regulation should not bear on an arm's constitutionality.

This circularity concern is far less pressing when the “in common use” language is properly situated. Because that consideration plays into the history and tradition analysis – and not the scope of the Second Amendment's text – it is not an “on-off” switch for constitutional protection. Just because a weapon is not in common use does not mean it falls outside the text of the Second Amendment; and just because a weapon is in common use does not necessarily mean a government is barred from regulating it. Proper inquiry requires full examination of the government's evidence and historical analogues, keeping in mind that bans of weapons “in common use” are constitutionally suspect.

The Supreme Court certainly was not worried about circularity. In *Bruen*, the Court explicitly linked the Second Amendment analysis to “in common use.” See 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629) (explaining that “the Second Amendment protects only the carrying of weapons that are those ‘in common use at the time,’ as opposed to those that ‘are highly unusual in society at large’”). The Court reasoned that even if handguns were once “dangerous and unusual,”

such firearms “are unquestionably in common use today” and therefore receive robust Second Amendment protection. *Id.* at 2143. In *Caetano*, the Court addressed Second Amendment protections for a new electronic weapon. So many were in circulation (200,000 stun guns, far fewer than the approximately 25 million AR rifles) that the electronic weapon was deemed “commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. . . .” 577 U.S. at 420. We are not free to ignore the Court’s instruction as to the role of “in common use” in the Second Amendment analysis.⁴

Next, my colleagues disagree with my approach to *Bruen*’s “why” question, raising the specter of purposivism. The majority opinion urges respect for the text of a statute alone, which I share. Indeed, a fair reading of a statute always “requires an ability to comprehend the *purpose* of the text, which is a vital part of its context.” See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS* 33 (2012); see also John O. McGinnis, *The Contextual Textualism of Justice Alito*, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM, at 2 (2023) (describing Justice Alito’s use of context in interpretation). This is certainly a different task than interpreting a statute by reference to the intent of its drafters, which I agree is an inappropriate job for judges.

⁴ The circularity argument also is not new. See *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). As Judge Manion explained in dissent, circularity concerns deal in the hypothetical more than the actual. *Id.* at 416 n.5.

Still, *Bruen* requires us to consider the historical context giving rise to the statute (the “why”). *Bruen* looks at history and tradition to determine “the content of the preexisting legal right to bear arms.” Randy E. Barnett & Lawrence B. Solum, *Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy*, 118 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 469 (2023). And *Bruen*’s history and tradition approach is a different endeavor than statutory interpretation.

Often a statute takes center stage for a purpose other than to discern the scope of its legal rule, even when determining whether it violates a constitutional right. See *Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (considering whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in a city’s zoning rules). For example, in *Bruen* the Court considered Henry VIII’s “displeasure with handguns” due to his concern that they would “threaten[] Englishmen’s proficiency with the longbow,” which led to Parliament’s passage of handgun restrictions. 142 S. Ct. at 2140. East New Jersey prohibited the concealed carry of pocket pistols in response to “‘strife and excitement’ between planters and the Colony’s proprietors ‘respecting titles to the soil.’” *Id.* at 2143-44. And *Heller* discusses the “public-safety reasons” behind several Colonial-era individual-arms-bearing statutes. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 601.

When looking to the text in its “why” analysis, the majority opinion relies on the Act’s title, Protect Illinois Communities Act. Set aside for the moment that “for interpretive purposes,” courts should only rely on titles to “shed light on some ambiguous word or

phrase” in the text. *See Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.*, 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947). Titles and section headings have a short history in the Anglo-American interpretive tradition – legislatures did not always include the title while debating the act. *See* SCALIA & GARNER at 221. If there is serious doubt as to whether those titles and headings received a fair shake in the legislative process, relying on them would make little sense. One influential treatise implores judges to check a state’s constitution for provisions that vouchsafe interpretive usefulness on a statutory title. *See id.* at 224.

As it turns out, the title of the Protect Illinois Communities Act has little interpretive utility. The Illinois Constitution has a provision grounding the title in the legislative process, but there is serious doubt whether the legislature obeyed it here. The so-called three-readings clause states: “A bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house.” ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d). Reading rules exist precisely to ensure “that each House knows what it is passing and passes what it wants.” *Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.*, 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the federal three-readings rule helps draw a line where debate ends and drafting begins).

Consider the procedural path of the Act, during which the Illinois legislature may very well have ignored the three-readings rule. *See Caulkins v. Pritzker*, No. 129453, 2023 WL 5156850, at *17 (Ill. Aug. 11, 2023) (White, J., dissenting). A group of firearms owners challenged the Act in Illinois state court, arguing it

violated several provisions of the Illinois Constitution. *Id.* at *1. The three-readings clause is one of these provisions, and the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected that claim only because the plaintiffs failed to cross-appeal it, a jurisdictional error warranting dismissal. *Id.* This legislation began in the Illinois House with the title, “an Act concerning regulation,” and its synopsis described changes to the state’s insurance code. *Id.* at *17 (White, J., dissenting). The House read it three times by this title, then sent it to the Illinois Senate. *Id.* The Senate read it twice before the Senate adopted an amendment that “completely stripped the insurance provisions[,] . . . replaced them with the ‘Protect Illinois Communities Act[,]’” and added the new bill’s popular title. *Id.* The day the legislation became the “Protect Illinois Communities Act,” the Senate read it for the first time under the new title and passed it. *Id.* The Act was returned to the House the day after that and passed without a reading. *Id.* The Illinois Governor signed it later that day. *Id.*⁵

Though the Act’s possible three-readings problem bears on neither the Second Amendment question nor the Act’s legitimacy, it remains a good reason to be skeptical of the interpretive value of language extrinsic to the operative text. Instead, I focus on permissible indicators of meaning.

⁵ The Illinois Supreme Court decided that the Act does not violate certain provisions of that state’s constitution. *Caulkins*, 2023 WL 5156850, at *4-6. The court also ruled that a challenge based on the federal Second Amendment had been waived. *Id.* at *6.

III

Turning to this interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs make a facial challenge to the Act and ordinances at the preliminary injunction stage. According to the Supreme Court in *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), the two most important considerations at this stage are likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. For the reasons explained below, plaintiffs have satisfied both considerations.

A

As for likelihood of success on the merits, the firearms and magazines banned by the Act and ordinances are “Arms” under the plain text of the Second Amendment. These firearms and magazines are therefore presumptively protected.⁶ The government parties embrace a contrasting, very narrow view of the scope of the Second Amendment. They would limit this constitutional right to the facts in *Heller* and *Bruen*. Yet, as examples, the First and Fourth Amendments would surely not be read in such a cramped manner.

Under *Bruen*’s history and tradition test, the government parties bear the burden to show that the banned arms are not in common use – or in other words, are not dangerous and unusual – and to identify historical analogues. As described above, *Bruen* reviewed *Heller* and set forth its test to determine if

⁶ Debates about grenades or rocket launchers are off subject. Some military weaponry is covered by federal statute, *see* 18 U.S.C. ch. 44, which is not challenged here.

regulations satisfied the “how” and “why” test. *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-34).

The Act and ordinances here do not fall within a “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627; see *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2143. The banned arms are “in common use,” including for self-defense, hunting, and sporting pursuits. Each side chooses its metric – regulators divide the banned guns by the total number of firearms, and gun owners use gross numbers of the banned guns and magazines. Under either measure, the banned weapons and magazines meet the definition of “common”: “the quality of being public or generally used.” BRYAN GARNER, *GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE* 179 (Oxford, 3d ed. 2011). More than 24 million AR rifles are estimated to be in circulation in this country.⁷ Magazines number far more: in 2020 it was estimated that approximately 160 million pistol and rifle magazines with a capacity of 11 rounds or more were in U.S. consumer possession from 1990-2018.⁸

⁷ *Commonly Owned: NSSF Announces over 24 Million MSRs in Circulation*, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (July 20, 2022), <https://www.nssf.org/articles/commonly-owned-nssf-announces-over-24-million-msrs-in-circulation/> [https://perma.cc/2LX6-UN3B].

⁸ *Firearm Production in the United States*, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. 7 (2020), <https://www.nssf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/IIR-2020-Firearms-Production-v14.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3WK8-TVAV] (sum of pistol and rifle magazines with 11 or more rounds).

Federal courts have recognized that the AR-15 rifle is common. In *Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), the Supreme Court offered comments in dicta stating how common AR-15s were at that time in this country. That case, which did not address the Second Amendment, turned on the question of mens rea, and the Court decided that to convict a person of possession of an unregistered machinegun, the government must prove the defendant knew that it would fire automatically. *Id.* at 619. In *Staples*, the Court contrasted the semiautomatic AR-15 with the automatic M16. *Id.* at 602 n.1, 603. Acknowledging “a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country,” the Court stated, “[e]ven dangerous items can, in some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation.” *Id.* at 610-11. *Staples* contrasted ordinary firearms such as the AR-15 in that case with “machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces,” stating “guns falling outside those categories traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions.” *Id.* at 612.

Albeit pre-*Bruen*, two federal appellate courts also concluded that AR platform rifles are common. *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 255 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Even accepting the most conservative estimates cited by the parties and by amici, the assault weapons and large-capacity magazines at issue are ‘in common use’ as that term was used in *Heller*.”); *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We think it clear enough in the

record that semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use,’ . . .”). The firearms banned by the Act and ordinances here have achieved common use in the United States. They are not unusual.

As for magazines, *Heller* recognizes that ammunition feeding devices may store rounds in a way that the ammunition can be used immediately. 554 U.S. at 630. The Act and ordinances limit the number of rounds a magazine may contain to 10 and 15. Nothing in the record supports these arbitrary limits. “Large” or “high”-capacity magazine is a relative term, as pistols may ship with magazine sizes ranging from 5 to 20 rounds, and common self-loading rifles have a standard magazine capacity of between 20 and 30 rounds.⁹ The numbers chosen in the Act and ordinances do not track the gun market and are not “in common use.”

Even if AR platform rifles were unusual, they are not more dangerous than handguns. (Recall the test is “dangerous *and* unusual.” (emphasis added). *See id.* at

⁹ David B. Kopel, *The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions*, 78 ALB. L. REV. 849, 874 (2015) (“It is indisputable in the modern United States that magazines of up to thirty rounds for rifles and up to twenty rounds for handguns are standard equipment for many popular firearms.”); *id.* at 859 (“The most popular rifle in American history is the AR-15 platform, a semiautomatic rifle with standard magazines of twenty or thirty rounds.”). Springfield, for example, ships a small handgun with a 5-round magazine. *See XD-S Mod.2 OSP 3.3” Single Stack .45 ACP Handgun*, SPRINGFIELD ARMORY (2023), <https://www.springfield-armory.com/xd-series-handguns/xd-s-mod-2-osp-handguns/xd-s-mod-2-osp-3-3-single-stack-45-acp-handgun> [https://perma.cc/64NQ-KRWM].

627; *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2143.) The semiautomatic mechanism in an AR-15 rifle is, in all material respects, the same as in a semiautomatic handgun. That mechanism is gas powered, and the impact of the pin firing the bullet pushes back the lock mechanism, ejects the old shell, and loads the new round from the magazine. If *Bruen* and *Heller* provide that semiautomatic handguns do not fail under the “dangerous” prong, the mechanism in the AR-15 must survive scrutiny. Indeed, a handgun could be viewed as more dangerous than an AR-15 rifle because the handgun is less accurate and more concealable.¹⁰

AR-15s are not more dangerous because of the projectile used. The regulations challenged here do not speak to the type of round employed, but to the capacity of the magazines and the rate of fire. In this respect, an AR-15 and a semiautomatic handgun are very similar. Controlling for the same caliber of round, the

¹⁰ One pre-*Bruen* analysis offered a test for “Arms” consistent with the elements *Heller* pointed to: common use, unusualness, dangerousness, and use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Eugene Volokh, *Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda*, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1481-82 (2009). Volokh suggested that “Arms” with the same level of practical dangerousness as those in common use are protected. *Id.* Machineguns fail this test due to their rapid rate of fire and the difficulty of firing them in a discriminating way. The same with short-barreled shotguns, which combine the lethality of a shotgun at the short distance characteristic of a criminal attack, and the concealability of a handgun. *Id.* at 1482.

The weapons banned by the Act and the ordinances here have the same practical dangerousness as those in common use among law-abiding citizens. *See id.* at 1485.

difference between a Glock semiautomatic pistol and an AR-15 is just the stock and barrel length. Their rate of fire depends on how fast a trigger can be pulled. On that metric, an AR-15 is closer to a semiautomatic handgun (protected in *Bruen* and *Heller*) than an automatic rifle such as the M16.¹¹

Though dangerousness can be measured by many metrics, it is best to focus on what we know. The traditional demarcation for regulation has been between automatic and semiautomatic weapons. Fully automatic weapons have long been heavily regulated, and lawfully owned, fully automatic firearms are very rare and expensive.¹² The Act and ordinances violate that tradition.

The banned arms are “in common use.” They are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, including self-defense. They may be “dangerous” – as are all firearms – but they are not “unusual,” and thus would not be within the history and tradition recognized in *Heller* of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual” weapons.

The Act and ordinances burden the rights of hundreds of thousands of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear the types of weapons and magazines that have

¹¹ See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, *AMERICA’S RIFLE: THE CASE FOR THE AR-15*, at 9 (2022) (“The features that make an otherwise legal semiautomatic firearm an ‘assault weapon’ under various laws do nothing to affect the firearm’s functional operation and, if anything, promote safe and accurate use.”).

¹² See GARY KLECK, *TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL* 108-10 (1997).

long been deemed appropriate for self-defense. This leaves one option for the government parties – they must identify analogous weapons regulations from at or near the time of the Founding. These are the “how” and “why” questions of *Bruen*’s history and tradition test – “how” did the regulation burden the Second Amendment right, and “why” was this regulation adopted? The government parties offer a variety of historical regulations on weapons. These regulations show, they argue, that the Act and ordinances are consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition. But the governments’ examples are not relevantly similar – their “how” and “why” set them apart from the Act and ordinances here.

The government parties first point to regulations limiting the public carry of certain weapons, such as pistols, dirks (a long-bladed dagger), Bowie knives, and clubs. *See, e.g.*, 1813 Ky. Acts 100 (restricting concealed carry of weapons like pocket pistols, dirks, or swords in a cane, unless the individual was “travelling on a journey”); 1813 La. Acts. 172; 1819 Ind. Acts 39. But those regulations are limited only to the public carry of certain weapons. The Act and ordinances here do more, prohibiting the sale and eventually the possession of the banned firearms. The “how” of the current regulations is more burdensome than historical regulations limiting public carry of weapons.

The Bowie knife example offered by the government parties and relied on by the district court in *Bevis* falls short as a historical analogue under the “how” and “why” questions. The Bowie knife was not categorically

banned, just burdened in certain ways. The “how” is different, as it was taxed, or it could not be carried. The “why” for the Bowie knife was also different. The knife was regulated because it was used in duels, not to stop a mass casualty event – the “why” proffered here.¹³ Laws banning Bowie knives are also a poor analogue because of what they ban. Guns and knives present different dangers. Bodily harm is inflicted up-close and personal with a knife, and from a distance with a gun. These differences caution that the “how” and “why” behind historical Bowie knife regulations are not so comparable to justify the bans here.

Elsewhere, the government parties note historical bans on the sale, possession, and carry of pocket pistols, revolvers, and other kinds of weapons. Such regulations appear to have been uncommon. One example is an 1837 Georgia statute stating, “it shall not be lawful for any merchant . . . or any person or persons whatsoever, to sell, or offer to sell, or to keep, or to have about their person or elsewhere, any of the hereinafter described weapons, to wit: Bowie, or any other kinds of knives, manufactured and sold for the purpose of weapon, or carrying the same as arms of offence or defense, pistols, dirks, sword canes, spears . . . save such pistols as are known and used as horseman’s pistols. . . .” 1837 Ga. Acts 90, § 1; *see also* 1879 Tenn. Pub. Acts 135-36, An Act to Prevent the Sale of Pistols, chap.

¹³ For example, the Naperville ordinance states its bans are a direct response to mass shootings over the last decade. *See* NAPERVILLE, ILL. MUN. CODE tit. 3, ch.19 (reciting list of mass shootings and incorporating them into text of the ordinance).

96 § 1; 1881 Ark. Acts 192, An Act to Preserve the Public Peace and Prevent Crime, ch. XCVI, § 3.

These regulations also tended to restrict only unusual kinds of pistols, preserving the right to continue carrying army or navy pistols. Even more, *Heller*, *McDonald*, and *Bruen* have solidified the constitutional right to own and carry handguns, so it is unclear what insights to draw from these defunct regulations. The “how” of regulations like the Georgia statute are thus distinguishable. The current regulations do far more than limit small, uncommon handguns or other outlier weapons. They limit access to many of the most popular models of semiautomatic rifles, handguns, shotguns, and magazines. The Act and ordinances therefore impose a far greater burden on the right to keep and bear arms. If all that is not enough, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the 1837 statute unconstitutional to the extent it limited one’s constitutional right to carry arms openly. See *Nunn v. State*, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2147 (discussing *Nunn* and the 1837 Act).

Cook County contends that historical regulations on gunpowder support their current ordinance. The County argues that the “why” of those regulations is comparable to the “why” of the Act and the county’s ordinance – preventing mass casualty events. But the County’s argument “flies too high.” The “why” of the gunpowder regulations was to stop fires resulting from the combustion of stored flammable materials. Moreover, while gunpowder storage was regulated, purchasing and possessing gunpowder was not prohibited.

Fire-safety laws do not create a comparable burden to an absolute ban on arms. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 632 (“Nothing about those fire-safety laws undermines our analysis; they do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as an absolute ban on handguns.”). Even more, the Court rejected this gunpowder analogy in *Heller*. *Id.* (“Justice Breyer cites . . . gunpowder-storage laws that he concedes did not clearly prohibit loaded weapons, but required only that excess gunpowder be kept in a special container or on the top floor of the home. Nothing about those fire-safety laws undermines our analysis; they do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.”).

Various government parties also offer as historical analogues regulations on trap or spring guns, fully automatic machineguns, and short-barreled rifles and shotguns. *See, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) (short-barreled shotguns and rifles); *id.* § 922(o) (machineguns); 1763-1775 N.J. Laws 346, An Act for the Preservation of Deer and Other Game, and to Prevent Trespassing with Guns, ch. 539, § 10 (trap guns). But the “how” and “why” of those restrictions are materially different as well. Trap or spring guns – rigged to fire when a string or other device is triggered by contact – do not provide a historical analogue. They fire indiscriminately, and the “why” of banning them – the imbalance of using lethal force to protect property versus human life – is different than the “why” the Act and ordinances seek to address of stopping escalating gun violence. Just so, machineguns can expend hundreds more rounds per

second than even the fastest semiautomatic firearm, disqualifying such a law as an analogue.

The majority opinion also relies on anti-carry laws as analogues. But the challenged Act and ordinances ban possession of arms. The distinction between anti-carry and anti-possession laws is critical: the first limits only the way a person may use a firearm in public; the second categorically denies possession of a firearm for any purpose. To elide this difference between anti-carry and anti-possession laws ignores *Heller* and *Bruen*. *Bruen* states that the “central” consideration in assessing historical analogues is “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified.” 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

This leaves only those regulations restricting semiautomatic firearms and ammunition feeding devices, but those regulations all come from the twentieth century. Even if valid for other reasons, *Bruen* states that regulations so far from the time of the Founding cannot meaningfully inform the history and tradition analysis. 142 S. Ct. at 2136-37 (“[W]e must also guard against giving postenactment history more weight than it can rightly bear.”).

Even if the government parties had identified a historical analogue that satisfied the “how” and “why” inquiries of *Bruen*’s history and tradition test, a single such regulation was not enough in that case. 142 S. Ct. at 2153. In fact, three analogues were not enough in *Bruen*. *Id.* One can ask if there is any “why” in support

of the Act and ordinances that did not also apply to the ownership and public carry of handguns in *Bruen*. If the “how” and “why” of handguns did not satisfy *Bruen*, what about these regulations supply a different “why”? This question was not adequately answered at oral argument.¹⁴

Because the Act and ordinances fail the “how” and “why” questions of *Bruen*, the government parties have not met their burden that these regulations are “relevantly similar” to a historical law. Some hypothetical laws might satisfy the history and tradition test – say, a law that banned carbine rifles that hold more than six rounds, or possession of a pistol that need not be reloaded. Magazines fall within the category of “Arms,” so banning them must also satisfy the history and tradition test. For example, if there had been a historical analogue of “25 or fewer bullets is the number of shots a gun shall fire,” the government parties might rely on that. But no such laws have been cited for firearms or magazines. The government parties have failed to show that the Act and ordinances are consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation. History and tradition do not support banning firearms and magazines so many citizens own, possess, and use for lawful purposes.

To finish up likelihood of success on the merits, I agree with my colleagues that on this record, the

¹⁴ Oral Arg. at 15:20.

registration requirement does not appear to be unconstitutional.

B

On the second consideration for a preliminary injunction, an alleged constitutional violation often constitutes irreparable harm. *See Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Loc. 365 v. City of East Chicago*, 56 F.4th 437, 450 (7th Cir. 2022); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2022) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved. . . . most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”). For some constitutional violations, particularly First Amendment violations, irreparable harm is presumed. *Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker*, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a presumption of irreparable harm for Second Amendment violations, it has emphasized that the constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (citing *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion)).

This court has held that when a law is facially challenged under the Second Amendment, “the form of the claim and the substance of the Second Amendment right” create a “harm [that] is properly regarded as irreparable and having no adequate remedy at law.”

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699-700. In *Ezell*, the court likened the plaintiff's alleged Second Amendment harm to a First Amendment challenge, implying a presumption of irreparable harm. *Id.* In accord, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is a presumption of irreparable harm where a Second Amendment right is violated. See *Baird v. Bonta*, 81 F.4th 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e presume that a constitutional violation causes a preliminary injunction movant irreparable harm and that preventing a constitutional violation is in the public interest.”) Pre-*Bruen*, the D.C. Circuit concluded the same. See *Wrenn v. District of Columbia*, 864 F.3d 650, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

Accordingly, a violation of the Second Amendment right presumptively causes irreparable harm. The Act and other ordinances challenged here violate the Second Amendment, and thus, irreparable harm has occurred. The majority opinion does not speak to irreparable harm.

Neither of the final two preliminary injunction factors – balance of the equities and what the public interest dictates – cuts against the plaintiffs. Gunshot victims and gun owners each claim harms, and what is in the public interest on questions of gun possession and ownership is constantly under public debate. So, I would rule that preliminary injunctions are justified against enforcement of the challenged laws.

IV

In reaching the opposite result, the majority opinion applies precedent and reasoning that *Bruen* abrogated.

A

Notwithstanding *Bruen*, the majority opinion relies on reasoning from this court's decision in *Friedman v. City of Highland Park*, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). *See also Wilson v. Cook County*, 937 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 2019) (relying on *Friedman* to dismiss a Second Amendment challenge to the Cook County ordinance banning assault weapons and large-capacity magazines). It is true that the Act regulates firearms and magazines in substantially the same way as the ordinances in *Friedman* (Highland Park) and in *Wilson* (Cook County), which were upheld. *Compare* 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/24-1.9(a)(1), 1.10(a) *with Friedman*, 784 F.3d at 407 *and Wilson*, 937 F.3d at 1029-30. As noted in I., the City of Chicago and City of Naperville ordinances are functionally similar to the Act and the Cook County ordinance.

In *Friedman*, this court announced a unique test for Second Amendment questions: “whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ . . . and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.” 784 F.3d at 410. The government parties assert *Friedman* focused

on the considerations identified by *Heller* and *Bruen*, specifically, historical evidence and the impact of the regulation on an individual's meaningful opportunities for self-defense. *Id.*; *Wilson*, 937 F.3d at 1033. *Friedman* is therefore compatible with the constitutional analysis endorsed by *Bruen*, the government parties submit, and *Friedman* remains good law and should control the outcome here.

But after *Bruen*, *Friedman*'s test is no longer viable, and much of *Friedman* is inconsistent with it. The Second Amendment's "reference to 'arms' does not apply only to those arms in existence in the 18th century." *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (cleaned up). That amendment's operative clause "does not depend on service in the militia." *Id.* at 2127. Indeed, the dissent in *Bruen* admitted that under the majority opinion's holding the scope of the right to bear arms has "nothing whatever to do with service in a militia." *Id.* at 2177-78 (Breyer, J. dissenting). And "the right to bear other weapons is 'no answer' to a ban on the possession of protected arms." *Caetano*, 577 U.S. at 421 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629).

This court in *Friedman* based its decision in substantial part on its view of the benefits of the ordinance, including that the arms ban reduced "perceived risk" and "makes the public feel safer." 784 F.3d at 411-12. But *Bruen* emphatically rejected this sort of interest-balancing. 142 S. Ct. at 2127. *Friedman* also held that categorical bans may be proper even if the limits do not "mirror restrictions that were on the books in 1791." 784 F.3d at 410. The *Bruen* decision superseded

that, concluding that a restriction on Second Amendment rights will survive scrutiny only if “the government identif[ies] a well-established and representative historical analogue” to the regulation. 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

Friedman looked to history when it held that a court must ask whether the arms were common at the time of ratification. 784 F.3d at 410. But in *Bruen*, the Court was clear that “the Second Amendment’s definition of ‘arms’ . . . covers modern instruments that facilitate armed self-defense,” “‘even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.’” 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582); see *Caetano*, 577 U.S. 411-12 (holding lower court’s decision that arms were unprotected because they were not in common use at the time of ratification was “inconsistent with *Heller*”).

In *Wilson*, this court described *Friedman* as “evaluat[ing] the importance of the reasons for the [ban] to determine whether they justified the ban’s intrusion on Second Amendment rights,” such as the “‘substantial’ interest[.]” in “making the public feel safer” and “overall dangerousness.” *Wilson*, 937 F.3d at 1036. But *Bruen* rejected that interest-balancing approach as “inconsistent with *Heller*’s historical approach.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129. Governments may no longer “simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest,” *id.* at 2126, or advances a “substantial benefit,” *Friedman*, 784 F.3d at 412. *Wilson* described *Friedman*’s application of an interest-balancing test as

“intermediate scrutiny,” *Wilson*, 937 F.3d at 1036, the approach *Bruen* expressly left behind.

Recently, in *Atkinson v. Garland*, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023), this court considered the new world *Bruen* presented for Second Amendment jurisprudence, in the context of possession of a firearm as a felon. *Id.* at 1022. There, we declined to avoid a *Bruen* analysis by relying on *Heller* and instead stated, “[w]e must undertake the text-and-history inquiry the Court so plainly announced and expounded upon at great length.” *Id.* Neither the majority nor the dissent in *Atkinson* discussed or even cited *Friedman*, although those opinions relied on other pre-*Bruen* precedents from our court.

In sum, *Bruen* effectively abrogated *Friedman* and *Wilson*. The “history and tradition” methodology of *Bruen* is not the framework applied in either of those cases. “Stare decisis cannot justify adherence to an approach that Supreme Court precedent forecloses.” *Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC*, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2019). “When an intervening Supreme Court decision unsettles [this court’s] precedent, it is the ruling of the [Supreme] Court . . . that must carry the day.” *United States v. Wahi*, 850 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 2017). That happened here, and the district court in *Bevis* correctly concluded that *Friedman* cannot be reconciled with *Bruen*. This court should review the challenged laws under *Bruen*’s framework, distinct from any interest-balancing approach, and separate from the reasoning employed in *Friedman* and *Wilson*.

The majority opinion is correct that *Friedman*'s test differs from the two-step interest balancing test of other courts that *Bruen* replaced. Nevertheless, *Friedman* cites to history to compare the arms the regulation bans, rather than the regulations themselves. 784 F.3d at 410. *Friedman* discusses the features of the weapons, including whether they are in common use for militia or police functions. *Id.* It also examines the gun's characteristics – such as its weight, caliber, and magazine capacity – as determinative of its value to self-defense. *Id.* at 411. Representative of that analysis, the majority opinion engages in a matching exercise between the AR-15 and the M16, assessing the similarity and differences of the characteristics of the two firearms.

In stark contrast, in *Bruen* the Court did not say “Arms” are defined by using the history and tradition of military versus civilian weaponry, such as the line drawn in the majority opinion. Rather, the Court looked to common usage to define the term “Arms.” Even more, the assessment in *Bruen* is whether a firearm *regulation* has a historical analogue, 142 S. Ct. at 2133, not whether a *weapon* does. Under *Bruen*'s framework, courts can entertain the parties' arguments as to whether a regulation is a historical analogue. Per *Bruen*, whether firearm regulations were historically grounded in a military versus civilian distinction is to be performed as part of the history and tradition analysis, not in the plain text review, as the majority opinion does.

B

The majority opinion’s reasoning departs from *Bruen* in other ways, which I examine next.

1. *A weapon’s military counterpart does not determine whether it is an “Arm.”*

The AR-15 is a civilian, not military, weapon. No army in the world uses a service rifle that is only semi-automatic.¹⁵ Even so, the majority opinion uses a civilian firearm’s military counterpart to determine whether it is an “Arm.” But neither *Heller* nor *Bruen* draw a military/civilian line for the Second Amendment. Similarity between the AR-15 and the M16 should not be the basis on which to conclude that the AR-15 is not a weapon used in self-defense.

The majority opinion concludes that *Heller* limits the scope of “Arms” in the amendment to those not “dedicated to military use” and those possessed for a lawful purpose. Citing to “historical support” that “the Arms protected by the Second Amendment do not include weapons for the military,” the majority opinion focuses on *Heller*’s comment about the M16 rifle. 554 U.S. at 627. The AR-15 and the M16 are similar weapons, my colleagues conclude, which means the AR-15 is beyond protection under the Second Amendment.

My colleagues read the passages in *Heller* discussing weapons with military capabilities too broadly,

¹⁵ E. Gregory Wallace, “Assault Weapon” *Myths*, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 193, 205-06 (2018).

however, placing controlling weight on supporting or explanatory language in that decision. For example, *Heller* did not limit the scope of “Arms” to those without an analogous military capacity. 554 U.S. at 581-82. The majority opinion emphasizes the statement in *Heller* that “Arms” are “weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity.” Maj. Op. at 1193 (emphasis omitted). But this passage most naturally means that the public understanding of “Arms” encompassed more than weapons designed for or employed in a military capacity. At that section of *Heller*, the Court was refuting the argument that the Second Amendment only protected a military right to keep and bear arms. Instead, “Arms” was broad enough to include “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to coast at or strike another.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581. That passage in *Heller* does not support a reading that weapons the military uses are not “Arms.”

Relying on *Heller*’s discussion of *United States v. Miller* – the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision upholding a conviction under the National Firearms Act against a Second Amendment challenge – the majority opinion points out that militaristic weapons are not “bearable” and thus not “arms” at all. Justice Stevens in dissent in *Heller* viewed *Miller* as endorsing a military-only view of the Second Amendment. To him, *Miller* says regulating “the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons” is fine – so the Amendment protects only the

“right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes.” *Id.* at 637-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

But according to *Heller*, *Miller* does not say that the Second Amendment protects machineguns as part of ordinary military equipment. Rather, *Miller* explains that a short-barreled shotgun, the weapon at issue, is not “any part of the ordinary military equipment” nor “could contribute to the common defense.” *Id.* at 622 (quoting *Miller*, 307 U.S. at 178). In *Heller*, the Court explained, “we therefore read *Miller* to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.” *Id.* at 625.

The majority opinion here quotes this passage and reframes it as a military-analogue test. It introduces the passage with *Heller*’s observation that an M16 is “most useful in military service.” *Id.* at 627. But *after Heller*, we know *Miller* does not address a weapon’s military use. Because the National Firearms Act of 1934 targeted the firearms most commonly used by criminals and gangs, *Miller*’s “lawful use” language relates to criminal use, not military use.

One example of this military-analogue test falling short is when the majority opinion compares the rates of fire of the AR-15 and the M16. My colleagues credit the AR-15’s rate of fire as “‘only’ 300 rounds per minute,” which they do not see as a relevant difference from the M16’s 700 rounds per minute. Maj. Op. at 1196-97. The two record sources they point to do not

support a 300-rounds-per-minute rate; in fact, those sources give good reasons to doubt that figure.

The first is the district court's opinion in *Bevis*, which explains: "[A] shooter using a semiautomatic weapon can launch thirty rounds in as little as six seconds, with an effective rate of about a bullet per second for each minute of firing, meeting the U.S. Army definition for 'rapid fire.'" Set to the side the district court's concession that the effective rate is actually only sixty rounds per minute. For the 300-rounds-per-minute figure, the district court cited a law journal article that spends nine pages discussing the dubious origins of the 300-rounds-per-minute claim.¹⁶ Wallace agrees that 30 shots in six seconds is possible – if you are an expert at operating firearms and you neglect aiming and reloading.¹⁷

The second source that might be referenced for the figure is a government witness's report in *Herrera*. James Yurgealitis included a chart listing weapons, an ammunition type, and the "semiautomatic cyclic rate" of each. Each rifle, including "M-16/AR-15 Rifle," has a cyclic rate of exactly 300 rounds per minute, and the three pistols have a rate of "300-400 rounds per minute." Yurgealitis offers no source for his calculations. He does not describe the firing conditions or how the shooter timed the shots.

¹⁶ See Wallace, *supra* note 15 at 214-22.

¹⁷ See *id.* at 217-18.

Yurgealitis describes the rate as “cyclic,” a type of fire where “the gunner holds the trigger to the rear while the assistant gunner feeds ammunition into the weapon.” DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY TRAINING PUBLICATION: INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD, ATP 3-21.8, at Appendix F. The cyclic rate “produces the highest volume of fire the machine gun can fire” and is a drastic step, as it “can permanently damage the machine gun and barrel and should be used only in case of emergency.” *Id.* It is difficult to see how a gunner could fire an AR-15 cyclically. Because it is a semiautomatic firearm, if the trigger were held to the rear, the cyclic rate would be one round per minute. Yurgealitis does not explain how this can be done.

The effective rate of fire, rather than the cyclic rate, would be a better comparison. There, Yurgealitis helps. He includes in his report a table from an Army field manual on rifle marksmanship listing the M16’s maximum semiautomatic effective rate at 45 rounds per minute – more than four times slower than its maximum automatic effective rate.

Heller does not draw a line between firearms that are military counterparts and those that are not. That demarcation should not decide whether firearms and magazines are protected under the Second Amendment.

2. *A “military weapon” is defined too broadly.*

Even if *Heller* drew such a line, the majority opinion’s standard for what constitutes a “military weapon”

renders the “military” category substantially overbroad.

The majority opinion draws a line between “private” or “mixed private/military” weapons on one side (also characterized as “dual use” weapons) and “military weapons” on the other side. Military weapons are defined as “weapons that may be essentially reserved to the military,” Maj. Op. at 1195 n.8 – meaning that a military weapon is one not made available for public use. The only “characteristic” that matters is that the government decided to ban it. “Dual use” weapons are those “private parties have a constitutionally protected right to ‘keep and bear’” and “the military provides [] to its forces.” *Id.* “In this sense, there is a thumb on the scale in favor of Second Amendment protection.” *Id.* Under the majority opinion’s definition, “dual use” weapons are on the side of the line protected by the Second Amendment.

Applying their framework, my colleagues find the AR-15 “more like” the M16 by comparing the firearms’ characteristics. *Id.* To my colleagues, the firearms look the same (“same core design”), operate the same (“same patented operating system”), and have similar specifications (same ammunition, kinetic energy, muzzle velocity, and effective range), identifying “the only meaningful distinction” as an M16’s automatic-fire capability. *Id.* at 1195. But because the AR-15 is not “essentially reserved to the military” and shares characteristics with “private” weapons, such as being semiautomatic, the AR-15 is at most a “dual use”

weapon. So under the majority opinion’s categories, the AR-15 should warrant Second Amendment protection.

In any event, because the majority opinion defines a military weapon as any that “may be essentially reserved to the military,” a weapon’s characteristics are not relevant to how it is categorized. Thus, any combat weapon would be a military weapon. This effectively allows the U.S. Armed Forces to decide what “Arms” are protected under the Second Amendment. Such a “military veto” is mistaken for at least three reasons.

First, the military has historically selected for commission firearms already publicly available and thus on the “dual use” side of the line. Privately available repeating and semiautomatic rifles, and the arms the American military selected for wartime use, overlapped substantially at least until the 1930’s.

When the Second Amendment was ratified, repeaters – firearms capable of repeated firing before they required manual reloading – were useful for military purposes and were widely available for civilian purchase. The Girandoni air rifle, for example, was invented for the Austrian army.¹⁸ The “state-of-the-art repeater” at the time, the Girandoni was useful for hunting as well – Meriwether Lewis took one on his expedition.¹⁹ In 1828, the military awarded a contract to a gunsmith to produce the Jennings repeater for

¹⁸ NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 2206 (3d ed., 2021).

¹⁹ *See id.*

military use.²⁰ But the military only “considered the guns promising” after seven years of “private use,” as the repeater had been circulating at least since 1821.²¹ Another repeater, the Henry, won a military contract after a Union captain used it to defend his home against seven Confederates who ambushed him while eating dinner with his family.²²

In 1900, the military began considering semiautomatic rifles but, after years of searching, decided to stick with the .30’06 Springfield bolt-action rifle.²³ Even though “semi-automatic rifles for the civilian market were abundant,” the military declined to select one because they were too complicated and brittle for field use.²⁴ In the 1930s, the military’s desire to issue semi-automatic rifles caused it to “encourage[] . . . private experimentation” in development and testing.²⁵ A military veto contravenes the robust history of “dual use” weapons beyond the private sector.

Second, the military has historically commissioned pistols, a firearm that is an “Arm” under *Heller*. Pistols have always been standard-issue military

²⁰ See *id.* at 2221.

²¹ *Id.*

²² HORACE WILLIAM SHALER CLEVELAND, HINTS TO RIFLEMEN 180-81 (1864). See also *id.* at 179 (reproducing letter from a private citizen testifying to the exceptional quality of the weapon).

²³ See JOHNSON at 2233-34.

²⁴ *Id.* at 2233.

²⁵ *Id.* at 2234.

firearms. Under the majority opinion's approach, *Heller* would have been mistaken.

Major Pitcairn began the American Revolution with a shot from his pistol.²⁶ General George Washington carried pistols into battle at Valley Forge, Monmouth, and Yorktown.²⁷ In 1811, a brigade major in the Massachusetts militia described the pistol as a standard weapon for an infantryman in a comprehensive guide to the day's military science.²⁸

The military has not stopped issuing pistols. In 1911, after lengthy trials and revisions with Colt and gun designer John Browning, the military selected for its troops the Colt Model 1911.²⁹ It is unclear whether that model was available for civilian purchase after the military contract in 1911. But like more common civilian handguns, the M1911 was semiautomatic and had an eight-round magazine.³⁰ Indeed, the Civilian Marksmanship Program, a federally chartered 501(c)(3) entity responsible for arranging sales of

²⁶ See CHARLES WINTHROP SAWYER, 1 FIREARMS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1600 TO 1800, at 72 (1910).

²⁷ See Evan Brune, *Arms of Independence: The Guns of the American Revolution*, AM. RIFLEMAN (July 2, 2021), <https://www.americanriflemans.org/content/arms-of-independence-the-guns-of-the-american-revolution> [<https://perma.cc/9S69-T56Y>].

²⁸ See E. HOYT, PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MILITARY OFFICERS 111 (1811).

²⁹ See JOHNSON at 2232.

³⁰ See *id.*

decommissioned military service weapons to the public, sells Colt M1911s today.³¹

In the 1980s, the military switched to the Beretta M9, a handgun with a counterpart available for purchase today on Beretta’s website. In fact, the M9 was designed and available to civilians a decade before the military selected it as the Beretta 92.³² The only differences between the military-issue M9 and the one for public sale are the markings, the dots on the sights, and the screw heads.³³ Under the majority opinion, the military’s decision to award Beretta a military contract for the Beretta 92 would take the firearm out of the “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment.

Third, the military’s decommissioning and sale of its surplus weapons would mean that the Second

³¹ See *About*, CIV. MARKSMANSHIP PROG. (2023), <https://thecmp.org/about/> [<https://perma.cc/L7T5-6T5D>]; *1911 Information*, CIV. MARKSMANSHIP PROG. (2023), <https://thecmp.org/sales-and-service/1911-information/> [<https://perma.cc/7HQW-G3VJ>].

³² See *American Service Pistols & Civilian Counterparts*, KEYSTONE SHOOTING CTR. (2023), <https://keystoneshootingcenter.com/blog/american-service-pistols-civilian-counterparts> [<https://perma.cc/UG45-V46Q>].

³³ See Christopher Bartocci, *Beretta Government vs Commercial M9 Identification*, SMALL ARMS SOLUTIONS LLC (May 28, 2018), <https://smallarmssolutions.com/home/beretta-government-vs-commercial-m8-identification> [<https://perma.cc/EDT4-JEXT>]; Bob Campbell, *Range Report: Beretta’s M9 Civilian Version*, CHEAPER THAN DIRT: THE SHOOTER’S LOG (Feb. 22, 2016), <https://blog.cheaperthandirt.com/berettas-m9-civilian-version> [<https://perma.cc/VL7T-ZXQA>] (“The M9 is a variant that’s as close to the military M9 as possible. The sights are marked in a different manner, and the finish differs from the standard M92.”).

Amendment right might spring into and out of life. The military sometimes decommissions service weapons and sells them to the public through the Civilian Marksmanship Program, as mentioned above. As with the M16, the military also decides not to renew contracts for weapons it deems no longer fit for military use. The majority opinion does not explain the status of a weapon like this, including whether the right to possess it springs to life, or if its analogues become “Arms.”

3. *The examples given are not historical analogues.*

The majority opinion sets forth “the relevant question [a]s what are the modern analogues to the weapons people used for their personal self-defense in 1791, and perhaps as late as 1868.” Maj. Op. at 1199. But when declaring its holding in *Bruen*, the Court discussed historical analogues with reference not to weapons, but to regulations. Following *Heller*, *Bruen* considered “whether ‘historical precedent’ from before, during, and even after the founding evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2131-32. “Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’” *Id.* at 2126.

The seven historical examples the majority opinion offers as comparators are laws or ordinances which

it says support “a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use.” Maj. Op. at 1202. For my colleagues, the challenged Act and ordinances carry forward this same distinction. Under *Bruen*, though, these examples do not satisfy the “how” and “why” questions in the history and tradition test, and thus are not comparators for the challenged Act or ordinances.

The first example is a 1746 Boston ordinance outlawing the discharge of a cannon, gun or pistol within city limits.³⁴ The second is an allusion to similar ordinances in Cleveland in the nineteenth century. The fourth refers to late nineteenth century ordinances restricting the carry of various weapons, except for peace officers. Such prohibitions differ, however, from a categorical ban of a class of weapons from private ownership which burden the right of armed self-defense. Regulations against the discharge of weapons compare better to modern criminal statutes prohibiting, for example, the reckless discharge of a firearm. *See* 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.5(a). And prohibitions on the carrying of certain weapons do not amount to a categorical ban of whole classes of firearms. These examples thus fail the “how” question in *Bruen*.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh examples are the National Firearms Act of 1934 and two amendments to it: the Omnibus Crime control and Safe Streets Act of

³⁴ *Heller* rejected this regulation as a historical analogue. 554 U.S. at 633.

1968, and Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986. Yet these examples do not provide insight into the public understanding of the Second Amendment right in 1791 (or in 1868). They are too far removed from the ratification of the Constitution (or of the Fourteenth Amendment) to qualify as historical analogues under *Bruen*. They therefore fail the “why” question in *Bruen*.

The remaining third example cites dozens of Bowie knife regulations which forbid or limit their use, specifically citing an 1884 Arkansas statute outlawing “the sale of all dirks, Bowie knives, cane-swords, metal knuckles, and pistols, except as for use in the army or navy of the United States.” This law was passed after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and banned the sale of these knives. It did not categorically ban their possession. This example fails the “how” and the “why” test of *Bruen* for the reasons given previously.

Attempting to show that the “how” test has been correctly applied, my colleagues point to what they consider a “huge carve-out” in the Act. Maj. Op. at 1199. To the contrary, exceptions to the categorical ban in the Act are narrow. The Act outright forbids the manufacture, delivery, sale, importation, and purchasing of the covered arms within the state of Illinois. On January 1, 2024, a total ban on possession of the covered arms takes effect. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.9(c). Though an exception exists for those who submit a compliant “endorsement affidavit” to the Illinois State Police, *id.* § 5/24-1.9(d), the majority opinion mistakes its scope. The exception is limited to the sale or transfer of a covered arm: (1) to seven specially

excepted classes of authorized persons; (2) to the United States; or (3) in another state or for export. *Id.* § 5/24-1.9(e). And the only people who can take advantage of this exception are current in-state residents who possess a covered arm prior to January 1, 2024, and future in-state residents who move into Illinois already in possession of a covered arm. *Id.*³⁵ Such a narrow exception cannot legitimize a broad categorical ban on the ownership, possession, purchase, and sale of a vast swath of arms.

For my colleagues, it is sufficient that the seven regulations deemed similar “are representative of [the] tradition” of “regulating the especially dangerous weapons of the time.” Yet, *Bruen* requires more. The particulars of the historical analogues are critical; they illustrate whether the Act and the municipal ordinances place comparable burdens on the Second Amendment right when considered against historical analogues. *Bruen* itself gave weight to the differences between the particulars of regulations. 142 S. Ct. at 2148-49 (rejecting nineteenth century surety statutes as sufficiently analogous to restrictions on public carry because these laws did not constitute a “ban[] on public carry,” indicating their “burden” on public carry was “likely too insignificant.”). The examples the majority opinion cites may illustrate weapons regulation

³⁵ The municipal ordinances are even more limiting, excepting from their reach only military and law enforcement personnel. NAPERVILLE, ILL., MUN. CODE tit. 3 ch. 19 § 2; CHI. MUN. CODE § 8-20-075(b); COOK COUNTY, ILL. CODE § 54-212(a)(1).

generally. But none of them is a categorical ban on an entire class of arms.

V

Since *Bruen*, this is the first federal appellate court to uphold a categorical ban on semiautomatic weapons and certain magazines.

The decision in *Barnett* was correct. The district court properly rejected the notion that the Second Amendment protects only the possession and use of weapons for self-defense. The banned magazines are “Arms,” as are other appurtenances such as a pistol grip and a flash suppressor. The court correctly read *Heller* and *Bruen* to locate “in common use” in *Bruen*’s history and tradition and applied the “how” and “why” test to conclude that concealed carry regulation differs from a ban on possession and does not pass as a historical analog. This led the court to correctly issue an injunction against the Act.

The district court in *Bevis* correctly found standing, noted that unlike other constitutional amendments the Second Amendment protects a tangible item, and concluded that *Friedman* did not survive *Bruen*. I disagree, however, with the court’s decisions in *Bevis* to limit “Arms” to those weapons that are not “particularly dangerous,” and its justification of the Act and the Naperville ordinance under the historical test without mentioning *Bruen*’s “how” and “why” test. As noted above, the court’s Bowie knife analogue misses the mark. In *Herrera* the district court relied

heavily on the memorandum opinion and order in *Bevis*, incorporating large parts of that decision.

I would affirm the decision in *Barnett* and reverse the decisions in *Bevis* and *Herrera* and lift our court's stay on the injunction against the Act. I would vacate the decisions in *Bevis* and *Herrera* and remand for the district court to reconsider the denial of the injunction against the challenged municipal ordinances.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

CALEB BARNETT, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KWAME RAOUL, *et al.*,

Defendants.

**No. 3:23-cv-00209-
SPM (Lead Case)**

DANE HARREL, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KWAME RAOUL, *et al.*,

Defendants.

**No. 3:23-cv-00141-
SPM**

**JEREMY W. LANGLEY,
et al.,**

Plaintiffs,

v.

BRENDAN KELLY, *et al.*,

Defendants.

**No. 3:23-cv-00192-
SPM**

**FEDERAL FIREARMS
LICENSEES OF ILLINOIS,
et al.,**

Plaintiffs,

v.

JAY ROBERT “J.B.”

PRITZKER, *et al.*,

Defendants.

**No. 3:23-cv-00215-
SPM**

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(Filed Apr. 28, 2023)

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Before the Court are consolidated cases with requests for the imposition of a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) to prevent the enforcement of Illinois' Protect Illinois Communities Act ("PICA"), until there can be a final determination of the merits as to the law's constitutionality. Lead Plaintiffs Caleb Barnett, Brian Norman, Hoods Guns & More, Pro Gun and Indoor Range, and National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., along with Plaintiffs from companion cases (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), filed motions for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 10).¹ The Illinois Attorney General's Office, representing Attorney General Kwame Raoul, Governor Jay Robert Pritzker, and the Director of Illinois State Police, Brendan F. Kelly, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") filed an extensive response to the respective motions that included 14 exhibits. (Doc. 37).

On June 23, 2022, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). Amongst

¹ This Court consolidated the following cases: 23-cv-141, 23-cv-192, 23-cv-209, and 23-cv-215 for purposes of discovery and injunctive relief, with the Barnett case designated as the lead case. Because the respective cases all have similar Motions for Preliminary Injunction pending, this Order carries over to those cases as well. (Doc. 16 in 22-cv-00141, Doc. 6 in 22-cv-00192, and Doc. 28 in 22-cv-00215, respectively).

other things, the *Bruen* Court reaffirmed that “the right to ‘bear arms’ refers to the right to ‘wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’” 142 S. Ct. at 2134 (quoting *D.C. v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008)).

Less than two weeks later, family and friends gathered in Highland Park, Illinois to enjoy one of the mainstay festivities of this nation’s Independence Day celebration, a parade. They gathered to salute our Country, our liberty, and our freedoms. During the parade, a senseless tragedy occurred involving firearms and multiple paradegoers were killed and wounded.

Some months after that, the State of Illinois enacted PICA into law.² The proponents of PICA cited the Highland Park tragedy as an impetus for passing the law. That law placed sweeping restrictions and outright bans on the sale, purchase, manufacture, delivery, importation, and possession of many firearms, magazines, attachments, stocks, and grips. PICA was immediately challenged as unconstitutional.

As Americans, we have every reason to celebrate our rights and freedoms, especially on Independence Day. Can the senseless crimes of a relative few be so despicable to justify the infringement of the constitutional rights of law-abiding individuals in hopes that such crimes will then abate or, at least, not be as

² For purposes of this Order, the Court focuses on PICA’s changes to 720 ILCS 5/24-1 and additions of 1.9 and 1.10.

horrific? More specifically, can PICA be harmonized with the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and with *Bruen*? That is the issue before this Court. The simple answer at this stage in the proceedings is “likely no.” The Supreme Court in *Bruen* and *Heller* held that citizens have a constitutional right to own and possess firearms and may use them for self-defense. PICA seems to be written in spite of the clear directives in *Bruen* and *Heller*, not in conformity with them. Whether well-intentioned, brilliant, or arrogant, no state may enact a law that denies its citizens rights that the Constitution guarantees them. Even legislation that may enjoy the support of a majority of its citizens must fail if it violates the constitutional rights of fellow citizens. For the reasons fully set out below, the overly broad reach of PICA commands that the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs be granted.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Plaintiffs raised a federal question when filing these cases; specifically asking whether PICA violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution. As a result, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Furthermore, venue in non-diversity cases is proper in any judicial district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

STANDING

In order to have standing to bring a claim in federal court under the jurisdiction conferred by Art. III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must establish that he or she “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). While Defendants did not challenge the standing of any Plaintiff, courts must still consider this jurisdictional issue because standing is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1983).

Even a cursory review of the named Plaintiffs satisfies the three requisite elements. Furthermore, a plaintiff who wishes to engage in conduct that is arguably protected by the Constitution, but criminalized by a statute, successfully demonstrates an immediate risk of injury. *Bell v. Keating*, 697 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). In this case, Plaintiffs face criminal sanctions were they to sell or purchase any of the items banned by PICA, unless preliminary injunction issues.

FACIAL CHALLENGES AND SEVERABILITY

“Whether invalid provisions in a state law can be severed from the whole to preserve the rest is a question of state law.” *Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Doyle*, 186 F.3d 790, 804 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing *Leavitt v. Jane L.*, 116 S.Ct. 2068, 2069 (1996); *Brockett v.*

Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985)). However, “[i]n a facial challenge, *lex ipsa loquitur*: the law speaks for itself.” *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, *The Subjects of the Constitution*, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1238 (2010)). Meaning that “[o]nce standing is established” the Court must weigh “the applicable constitutional doctrine without reference to the facts or circumstances of particular applications.” *Id.* at 697-98 (quoting David L. Franklin, *Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause*, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 58 (2006)). A “facial challenge directs the judicial scrutiny to the terms of the statute itself, and demonstrates that those terms, measured against the relevant constitutional doctrine, and independent of particular applications, contains a constitutional infirmity that invalidates the statute in its entirety.” *Id.* at 698 (quoting Mark E. Isserles, *Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement*, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 387 (1998)). Therefore, because this Court finds a likelihood of facial unconstitutionality on the merits, the entirety of PICA as codified will be enjoined. *See Id.* It is important to note that the Court has *not* found that PICA, or any provision, is *in fact* unconstitutional, only that there is a likelihood that it will be.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy for which there must be a clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. *See Mazurek v.*

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve a party's position until a trial on the merits can be held. *GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield*, 922 F.3d 357, 371 (7th Cir. 2019). The issuance of a preliminary injunction should also minimize the hardship a party pending final judgment. See *Faheem-El v. Klinicar*, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988).

In the Seventh Circuit, “a district court engages in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases to decide whether such relief is warranted: a threshold phase and a balancing phase.” *Valencia v. City of Springfield, Ill.*, 883 F.3d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 2018). In order to survive the first phase, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy three requirements: (1) the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a final resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) the movant has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. See *HH Indianapolis, LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Cnty of Marion, Ind.*, 889 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2018). If a moving party fails to demonstrate any one of those three initial requirements, a court must deny the request for preliminary injunction. See *GEFT Outdoors, LLC*, 922 F.3d at 364. If, on the other hand, a moving party meets the initial threshold, the court then moves on to the balancing stage. See *Id.* (quoting *Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health*, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018)).

In the second phase, a court must weigh the irreparable harm to the moving party if the injunction were

denied against any irreparable harm the nonmoving party would suffer if the party were to grant the requested relief. *See Id.* When balancing the harm to each party, a court should also consider the effect of an injunction on the public interest. *See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

ANALYSIS OF REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

On April 12, 2023, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Court on the pending motions. At that time, Erin Murphy argued on behalf of Plaintiffs, while Christopher Wells argued on behalf of the state Defendants. Troy Owens argued on behalf of McHenry County Defendants, Patrick Kenneally, and Sheriff Robb Tadelman, as their position was contradictory to the state Defendants.³ Additionally, Thomas Maag argued certain issues not raised by Ms. Murphy.⁴

³ Of significance, Patrick Kenneally, in his official capacity as State's Attorney of McHenry County, is a plaintiff in the Northern District of Illinois where he is seeking similar injunctive relief against defendants Kwame Raoul and JB Pritzker regarding the constitutionality of PICA. (*See Kenneally v. Raoul et al.*, NDIL Case No. 3:23-CV-50039).

⁴ Mr. Maag distinguished a flare launcher from a grenade launcher and advised the Court that the exemplar identified by Defendants as a grenade launcher (Doc. 37-3) appears to be a Tac-D, which is a rescue, assistance, and/or self-defense device that does not involve the use of fragmentation devices. The device is often referred to as a flare launcher, flare gun, or Very gun and is commonly used for safety by hunters, and for rescue operations. In fact, such a launcher is required by the U.S. Coast Guard on larger vessels on navigable waterways for launching flares. (Doc. 88, pp. 40-44).

In light of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and the record, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. PHASE ONE

A. Irreparable Harm

A moving party must demonstrate that he or she will likely suffer irreparable harm absent obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. *See Whitaker by Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017). “Harm is irreparable if legal remedies are inadequate to cure it. Inadequate ‘does not mean wholly ineffectual; rather, the remedy must be seriously deficient as compared to the harm suffered.’” *Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc.*, 8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Foodcomm Intern. v. Barry*, 328 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted)).

The requirement of irreparable harm eliminates those cases where, although the ultimate relief sought is equitable, a plaintiff can wait until the end of trial to get that relief. *Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.*, 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). Interim injunctive relief is only available if a plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm before final judgment is entered, which requires “more than a mere possibility of harm.” *Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1045. It does not, however, require that the harm actually occur before injunctive relief is warranted nor does it require that the harm be certain to occur before a court may grant relief on the

merits. *Id.* Instead, the Seventh Circuit has found irreparable harm when it “cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial.” *Id.* (quoting *Girl Scouts of Monitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of America, Inc.*, 549 F.3d 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiffs claimed that the “assault weapon” ban enacted by PICA is unconstitutional as it contravenes the Second Amendment “right to keep and bear Arms.” (Doc. 10). For some constitutional violations, particularly involving First Amendment claims, irreparable harm is presumed. *Christian Legal Society v. Walker*, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a presumption of irreparable harm in regard to Second Amendment violations, it has emphasized that the Second Amendment and the constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (citing *McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill.*, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion)). When a law is facially challenged under the Second Amendment, “the form of the claim and the substance of the Second Amendment right” create a “harm [that] is properly regarded as irreparable and having no adequate remedy at law.” *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 699-700.

Assuming *arguendo* that there is no presumption of harm for an alleged violation of the Second Amendment, Plaintiffs still satisfy this element. For example, Barnett and Norman are no longer able to purchase

any firearm, attachment, device, magazine, or other item banned by PICA, while Hoods and Pro Gun are now prohibited from selling said any item banned by PICA. These harms are irreparable and in direct violation of the Second Amendment right to bear arms in self-defense. There is no question that the right to armed self-defense is limited by PICA, and in some cases, may be prohibited altogether. It is true that not all items are banned under PICA; however, if a lawful citizen only possesses items that are banned under PICA, he or she would have to purchase a non-banned firearm in order to legally defend oneself under the Second Amendment.

B. *No Adequate Remedy at Law*

Plaintiffs must next make a threshold showing that any remedy at law would be inadequate. An inadequate remedy of law is not necessarily wholly ineffectual; instead, it is deficient when compared to the harm suffered. *See Foodcomm*, 328 F.3d at 304. Accordingly, the Court must ask if the Plaintiffs can and will be made whole if they prevail upon the merits and are awarded damages. *See Roland*, 749 F.2d at 386. That answer is “No.”

But for PICA, Barnett and Norman would purchase additional banned firearms and magazines.⁵

⁵ As set forth in the declarations, Barnett indicated he “would like to purchase at least one more AR platform rifle and at least one more magazine with capacity of greater than 10 rounds” and Norman stated that he “would like to purchase more firearms

Should either one attempt to do so, he could face criminal penalties. There is no monetary award that can compensate for such an injury and make them whole.

There is also no question that both Hoods and Pro Gun have lost income and will continue to do so while PICA remains in effect. The declarations of both James Hood and Paul Smith, owners of Hoods and Pro Gun respectively, expressed that a large percentage of their income was derived from sales of items banned under PICA and that they currently had in their possession tens of thousands of dollars worth of inventory that they have been prohibited from selling since PICA's effective date. (Docs. 10-3, 10-4).⁶ As each month drags on, the injury, along with the inventory, remains. They are stuck with this inventory. While this injury is economic, which is generally not a basis for granting injunctive relief, because Plaintiffs can never recover their financial losses irreparable harm exists. *See e.g., Cmty. Pharmacies of Indiana, Inc. v. Indiana Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin.*, 801 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806 (S.D. Ind.

on the AR platforms and more magazines with capacity greater than 10 rounds.” (Docs. 10-1, ¶5 and 10-2, ¶7).

⁶ James Hood indicated that “approximately \$209,000, or 48%” of his purchases in 2021 and 2022 were attributable to firearms banned under PICA while approximately 25% of his gross revenue was attributable to said items. (Doc. 10-3, ¶¶ 5, 6). Paul Smith stated he had been selling and transferring the firearms, magazines, and products now deemed “assault weapons” under PICA for the past 7 years and estimated that more than half of Pro Gun’s revenue from sales was attributable to those items. (Doc. 10-4, ¶¶ 5-7).

2011). Again, there is clearly no adequate remedy at law that would make Plaintiffs whole.

C. *Likelihood of Success on the Merits*

This Court must now consider the third issue, likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiffs rely on recent Supreme Court decisions that made it clear that the Second Amendment protects the possession and use of weapons that are in common use. (Doc. 10, p. 1); *see Bruen*, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627). Plaintiffs contend there can be no question regarding the likelihood of success because the items banned under PICA are in common use today. (Doc. 10, p. 9).

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. A plain reading of this text would seem to lend itself to the notion that PICA is in fact violative of the Second Amendment. However, before weighing the parties’ arguments and the validity of PICA, it is first necessary to review the pertinent aspects of the *Bruen* decision as well as the *Heller* and *McDonald* decisions.

In *Heller*, the Supreme Court began its analysis by setting forth that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the principle that it was written to be understood by the “normal and ordinary” meaning of the words. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting *United States v. Sprague*, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). This principle leads to an interpretation of the Second

Amendment that contains two distinct clauses, the prefatory clause and the operative clause. *Id.* at 577.

The prefatory clause of the Second Amendment states, “[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State. . . .” The prefatory clause “announces a purpose” for the operative clause but “does not limit [it].” *Id.* Meaning that there “must be a link between the state purpose and command” but that the scope of the operative clause remains unchanged by the prefatory language. *See Id.* As the Supreme Court noted, the operative clause of the Second Amendment creates an individual right. *See Id.* at 598. Thus, logic demands that there be a link between an individual right to keep and bear arms and the prefatory clause. The link is clear, “to prevent elimination of the militia.” *Id.* at 599. During the founding era, “[i]t was understood across the political spectrum that the right . . . might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke down.” *Id.* Therefore, although “most undoubtedly thought [the Second Amendment] even more important for self-defense and hunting” the additional purpose of securing the ability of the citizenry to oppose an oppressive military, should the need arise, cannot be overlooked. *See Id.*

In *Heller*, the Court broke the operative clause down further into two sections, “Right of the People” and “Keep and Bear Arms.” *Id.* at 579-95. The “Right of the People” was then analyzed to determine the significance of “the people.” *Id.* at 579. The Court noted that “right of the people” is only used three times in

the amendments, in the First Amendment, in the Fourth Amendment, and most relevant to this case, in the Second Amendment. *See Id.* The usage of the term “right of the people” in each instance “unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights.” *Id.* The *Heller* Court then categorized “the people” to whom the Constitution refers as “all members of the political community” or “persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections with this country to be considered part of the community.” *Id.* at 580 (quoting *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). There is a “strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” *Id.* at 581.

The second section of the operative clause, “Keep and Bear Arms,” defines the substance of the right held by “the people.” *Id.* The *Heller* Court first turned to what constitutes “arms” and found that “arms” were understood, near the time of the ratification of the Second Amendment, to mean any weapon or thing that could be used for either offense or defense. *See Id.* The Court specifically noted that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” *Id.* at 582. Finally, the Court turned to the meaning of “keep” and “bear.” *Id.* at 582-92. These words are understood, in light of founding era history, to mean to “have” and to “carry” respectively. *See Id.* at 582-84. In sum, the operative clause of the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the

individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” *Id.* at 592.

Next, the Court looks to *McDonald*. The Supreme Court noted, “[t]he Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 754. However, the Due Process Clause extended protection of rights that are “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and allows them “to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.” *Id.* at 765-67 (first citing *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) then quoting *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). Whether the Second Amendment protections can be applied against a state turns on the incorporation of the right in the concept of due process. *See Id.* at 767. The right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is a “basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day.” *Id.* Further, the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” *Id.* (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). Consequently, the Court held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment.” *Id.* at 791.

Finally, this Court turns to *Bruen*. In analyzing the constitutional question presented, the *Bruen* Court first turned to its prior holdings in *Heller* and *McDonald*; in those cases, the Court “held that the Second . . . Amendment[] protect[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. The Court

then explained that in the years following *Heller* and *McDonald*, the Courts of Appeals analyzed the Second Amendment under a two-step test. *See Id.* at 2126. The first step included an analysis to determine if “the original scope of the right based on its historical meaning.” *Id.* The second step was a balancing test of either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny depending on “[i]f a ‘core’ Second Amendment right is burdened.” *See Id.* (quoting *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114, 133 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).

The *Bruen* Court firmly rejected this two-step framework, concluding that “[d]espite the popularity of this two-step approach, it is one step too many.” *Id.* at 2127. The Court instead adopted a single step test “rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history” under which the “government must affirmatively prove that its firearm regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” *Id.* Under this framework, “the Second Amendment protects the possession and use of weapons that are ‘in common use at the time.’” *Id.* at 2128 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627). The full standard for Second Amendment analysis is:

When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the

individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30 (quoting *Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.*, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961)).

The Court then turned to outlining the framework under which this Nation's historical tradition of fire-arm regulation must be analyzed. First, it noted that *Heller*, in its historical analysis, compares the right to keep and bear arms to the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2130. Thus, a similar approach can be taken to historical analysis of the Second Amendment as is taken when analyzing restrictions imposed on the freedom of speech and when a violation of the Establishment Clause is alleged. *Id.*

Examples are then given of situations where the historical analysis may be "fairly straightforward." *Id.* at 2131.

[W]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that could also be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.

Id. Thus, showing that a historical analogue need not be a “historical twin,” but rather a “relatively similar” and “well-established and representative historical analogue” will pass constitutional muster. *Id.* at 2132-33. Two metrics to apply in undertaking the historical analogue analysis are “how and why” the regulations burden the right to keep and bear arms. *Id.* at 2133.

The *Bruen* Court then noted that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have *when the people adopted them*” and “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created equal.” *Id.* at 2136 (emphasis original). A short-lived law long preceding the framing or a post-enactment law must not be given undue weight. *See Id.* Thus, no matter the “post-ratification adoption or acceptance” of a law that is inconsistent with the original public meaning of the Constitution, it cannot overcome or change the text. *See Id.* at 2137 (quoting *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). As the Court explained, “the scope of the protection applicable” to rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, including the right to keep and bear arms, “is pegged to the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.” *Id.*; *see e.g. Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan*, 564 U.S. 117, 122-25 (2011).

1. Plain Text Analysis

This Court must determine if the Second Amendment’s plain text, as it was originally understood, covers Plaintiffs’ conduct. If so, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. Defendants argued that PICA does burden “arms” as they are understood in the context of the Second Amendment. (Doc. 37, p. 15). Defendants argued that accessories and “weapons that are most useful in military service” are not “arms” under the plain text of the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 15-16. Defendants did not challenge that Plaintiffs are all “law-abiding” citizens such that they hold the individual right guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Further, Defendants did not challenge that possessing the restricted items falls within the ambit of “keep[ing]” for purposes of the Second Amendment.

This Court will first address Defendants’ contention that “non-essential accessories” are not within the scope of the Second Amendment’s plain text. PICA outlaws possession of a “semiautomatic pistol” with a detachable magazine if it is equipped with any of the following: “a threaded barrel,” “a shroud attached to the barrel or that partially or completely encircles the barrel,” “a flash suppressor,” or “arm brace.”⁷ 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9. PICA further outlaws possession of a magazine for a handgun capable of holding more than 15 rounds of ammunition and of “[a] semiautomatic pistol

⁷ The list provided is not exhaustive but rather meant to illustrate some features referred to as “accessories” by Defendants.

that has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 15 rounds.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9-10. Defendants contend that such items are not necessary to the functioning of a firearm and are thus not “arms” and therefore not protected by the Second Amendment. (Doc. 37, p. 17).

Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. The Seventh Circuit has recognized the Second Amendment as extending to “corollar[ies] to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.” *See Wilson v. Cook County*, 937 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 708). It is hard to imagine something more closely correlated to the right to use a firearm in self-defense than the ability to effectively load ammunition into the firearm. The Third Circuit recognized the importance of this corollary and held that “a magazine is an arm under the Second Amendment.” *See Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of New Jersey*, 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018). Further, Defendants’ own expert defined “high-capacity firearms” as “hand-held arms with a capacity greater than ten rounds, recognizing that Illinois’s statute allows up to 15 rounds for handguns.” (Doc. 37-13, p. 2). Defendants’ expert is clearly referencing magazines and incorporating such into his definition of a “firearm[.]” *Id.* This Court agrees that magazines are “arms” as used in the plain text of the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs are correct that “[t]his is not even a close call.” (Doc. 10, p. 16). If Defendants’ own expert incorporates magazine capacity into his definition of a firearm, given his level of expertise, it would be

unreasonable to expect the original public meaning of the plain text to not reflect a similar understanding.

The Seventh Circuit held in *Ezell* that Chicago could not prohibit law-abiding citizens from target practice at a firing range because doing so interfered with the meaningful exercise of their Second Amendment right. *See* 651 F.3d at 708. PICA also interferes with the meaningful exercise of Second Amendment rights for one group of individuals – those with disabilities. To provide one example, consider arm braces for semiautomatic pistols. As noted above, PICA prohibits the use of an arm brace on any semiautomatic pistol with a detachable magazine without any caveat or exceptions. The Department of Justice has also attempted to regulate possession and registration of arm braces.⁸ *See generally* Factoring Criteria for Firearms With Attached “Stabilizing Braces”, 88 FR 6478. However, one notable distinction exists. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) has recognized that such braces are necessary for those with disabilities to use a firearm by directing that “[t]his rule does not affect ‘stabilizing braces’ that are objectively designed and intended as a ‘stabilizing brace’ for use by individuals with disabilities.” Factoring Criteria for Firearms With Attached “Stabilizing Braces”, <https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/factoring-criteria-firearms-attached-stabilizing-braces>. As reason and the ATF final rule evidences, braces are

⁸ “Any weapons with ‘stabilizing braces’ or similar attachments that constitute rifles under the NFA must be registered no later than May 31, 2021.” 88 FR 6478-01.

needed by certain individuals with disabilities to operate a firearm. Thus, arm braces are an integral part of the meaningful exercise of Second Amendment rights for such individuals and can also be considered an “arm.”

Further, in *Ezell*, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use” is “an important corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.” 651 F.3d at 708. “[T]he core right wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice that make it effective.” *Id.* at 704. Undoubtedly, training, practice, and proficiency for effective exercise of Second Amendment rights refers to the ability of citizens to accurately shoot and hit their intended target in case of confrontation. Plaintiffs stated that “[a] pistol grip improves accuracy and reduces the risk of stray shots,” that “[t]humbhole stocks likewise . . . provide[] for greater accuracy and decreases the risk of dropping the firearm or firing stray shots,” and that “flash suppressors not only prevent users from being blinded in low lighting conditions . . . but also reduce recoil and muzzle movement, making the firearm less painful to use.” (Doc. 10, p. 10-11). Defendants’ have also recognized that such items “facilitate . . . sustained accuracy.” (Doc. 88, p. 80). This Court agrees that in the case of each of these items “[t]he defensive application is obvious, as is the public safety advantage in preventing stray shots.” *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 849 F.3d 114, 159 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Traxler, J., dissenting) (quoting David B. Kopel, *Rational Basis Analysis of “Assault Weapon”*

Prohibition, 20 J. Contemp. L. 381, 396 (1994)). Therefore, because the “meaningful exercise” of the right to armed self-defense is wholly dependent on the ability of citizens to utilize their arms and hit their intended target, items that aid in accuracy may be considered “arms” and are presumptively protected by the Second Amendment.

The aforementioned examples of “arms” regulated by PICA is by no means exhaustive. PICA is replete with other examples of “arms” being banned. However, at this stage, this Court need not address each example in an attempt to piece together the portions of PICA that may be constitutional.

2. This Nation’s Historical Tradition of Firearm Regulation

This Court must next determine if PICA is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Pursuant to *Bruen*, as outlined above, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 142 S. Ct. at 2126. The Supreme Court held the historical tradition supports “prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” but that “the Second Amendment protects the possession and use of weapons that are ‘in common use at the time.’” *Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627).⁹ Therefore, to bear its burden, Defendants

⁹ During oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that firearms are dangerous.

must: (1) demonstrate that the “arms” PICA bans are not in “common use;” and (2) “identify a well-established and representative historical analogue” to PICA. *See Id* at 2128, 2133.

Defendants first argued that PICA is consistent with historical tradition because “[n]either large capacity magazines nor assault weapons were in common use when the Second and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified.” (Doc. 37, p. 22). This argument is “bordering on the frivolous” because “the Second Amendment extends, *prima facie*, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 582. Defendants also argued that “[t]he Act restricts weapons and accessories not commonly used for self-defense today.” (Doc. 37, p. 26). Similarly, this argument is misplaced. *Bruen* clearly holds that the Second Amendment protects “possession and use” of weapons “in common use” not just weapons in common use for self-defense as Defendants’ argued. 142 S. Ct. at 2128. Even if there was a requirement that the “common use” of an “arm” be self-defense, AR-15 style rifles would meet such a test considering that 34.6% of owners utilize these rifles for self-defense outside of their home and 61.9% utilize them for self-defense at home. (Doc. 39-11, p. 34).

The only argument Defendants made to bear their burden of showing that the arms regulated by PICA are not in common use, rather than attempting to change the constitutional analysis, is that the “[s]ales and ownership numbers do not show commonality or

use.” (Doc. 37, p. 34). However, Defendants made no argument and present no evidence regarding the commonality of the two “arms” examples from the plain text analysis above.¹⁰ Such “arms” are part of semiautomatic pistols. As the Supreme Court found “handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense” and are thus clearly in common use and protected by the Second Amendment. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629.

Rather, Defendants’ focused almost entirely on AR-15 rifles and their commonality or lack thereof. (Doc. 37, p. 34-39). As then-Judge Kavanaugh noted, “[t]here is no meaningful or persuasive constitutional distinction between semi-automatic handguns and semi-automatic rifles.” *Heller*, 670 F.3d at 1269 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

However, supposing that Defendants need only show that AR-15 rifles are not in common use, they still fail. Plaintiffs asserted that “[p]ractically all modern rifles, pistols, and shotguns are semiautomatics.” (Doc. 10, p. 8) (quoting James B. Jacobs, *Why Ban “Assault Weapons”?*, 37 *CARDOZO L. REV.* 681, 685-87 (2015)). Plaintiffs added that “recent data showed that more than 24 million AR-15 style rifles are currently owned nationwide.” *Id.* at 9 (citing National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., *Commonly Owned: NSSF Announces over 24 Million MSRs in Circulation* (July 20,

¹⁰ Although this Court has not engaged in an exhaustive analysis of each item banned by PICA, it is worth noting that many of the items banned are used by a multitude of individuals for entirely lawful purposes including self-defense.

2022), <https://www.nssf.org/articles/commonly-owned-nssf-announces-over-24-million-msrs-in-circulation/>). As the Fourth Circuit noted “in 2012, the number of AR- and Ak-style weapons manufactured and imported into the United States was more than double the number of Ford F-150 trucks sold, the most commonly sold vehicle in the United States.” *Kolbe v. Hogan*, 813 F.3d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 2016) *rev’d*, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Twenty-four (24) million firearms dwarfs the 200,000 stun guns which the Supreme Court found sufficient to meet the “common use” test. *See Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411, 420 (2016) (per curiam) (Alito, J., concurring). Under the *Caetano* test, even 1% of the 24 million AR-15 style rifles held by citizens is sufficient to result in a finding that such arms are in common use. However, the Court need not rely solely on the current ownership numbers to determine commonality of use of these arms. The AR-15 style rifles are among the most popular arms produced “account[ing] for nearly half of the rifles produced in 2018 and nearly 20% of all firearms of any type sold in 2020.” (See Doc. 67, p. 7 (citing NSSF, *Firearm Production in the United States* 18 (2020), <https://bit.ly/3LwJvKh>)). AR-15 style rifles possess no “quasi-suspect character” and “traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions.” *Staples v. U.S.*, 511 U.S. 600, 612 (1973). Further, considering the commonality of magazines banned by PICA, which as this Court explained are “arms” for purposes of the Second Amendment, the analysis becomes even more clear. There are “about 39 million individuals” who “have owned magazines that hold over 10 rounds (up to 542

million such magazines in total).” (Doc. 39-11, p. 1-2). Thirty-nine million individuals is over three times the population of Illinois, the sixth most populous state in this Nation. *See US States – Ranked by Population 2023*, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/states>. Although “[t]here may well be some capacity above which magazines are not in common use . . . that capacity is surely not ten” and probably not fifteen either. *Heller*, 670 F.3d at 1261. Therefore, both AR-15 style rifles and magazines with a capacity of greater than ten are “in common use” and protected by the Second Amendment. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2128.

Although Defendants challenged the veracity of Plaintiffs’ evidence, they were unable to produce evidence showing that modern sporting rifles are both dangerous and unusual.¹¹ Consequently, Defendants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that the “arms” banned by PICA are “*dangerous and unusual*” and thus not protected by the Second Amendment. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (emphasis added).

Finally, although the commonality of “arms” banned under PICA is dispositive, Defendants shifted to the historical tradition of firearm regulation in an attempt to show the constitutionality of PICA. In determining if PICA is consistent with the historical

¹¹ In fact, the Illinois State Police has noted that firearm data relevant to the stated purpose of PICA (and required by 5 ILCS 830/10-5 to be collected) is “unattainable.” *2022 Gun Trafficking Legislative Report*, <https://isp.illinois.gov/StaticFiles/docs/Gun%20Trafficking/2022%20Gun%20Trafficking%20Legislative%20Report.pdf>.

tradition of firearm regulation, the question is whether there were “relevantly similar” regulations dating back to the Founding. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, *On Analogical Reasoning*, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 773 (1993)). Meaning that “even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” *Id.* at 2133. The government must only “identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.” *Id.* When assessing a historical analogue to determine if it passes “constitutional muster” a court is guided by two metrics: “how and why” the right to bear arms was burdened. *Id.*

Defendants relied on a litany of experts to support the proposition that a ban on “assault rifles” has sufficient historical analogues to pass constitutional muster. (*See* Docs. 37-10, 37-11, 37-12, 37-13, 37-14). However, the relevant analysis of each historic firearm regulation must be centered around “how and why” the regulation burdened Second Amendment rights. *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. As the Defendants’ counsel noted, the regulations cited by Defendants’ experts were “[c]onceal carry regulations . . . that’s what they were. They were largely conceal carry regulations.” (Doc. 91, p. 11). The “how and why” of a concealed carry regulation is categorically different than the “how and why” of a ban on possession and cannot pass “constitutional muster” as a historical analogue to demonstrate this Nation’s historical tradition regarding an “arms” ban.

II. PHASE TWO: BALANCING OF HARMS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

At phase two, a court proceeds to the balancing analysis; weighing the harm the denial of a preliminary injunction would cause a plaintiff against the harm to a defendant if a court were to grant it. *Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown*, 908 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2018). This balancing process involves a “sliding scale” approach: the more likely a plaintiff is to win on the merits, the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in his favor, and vice versa. *Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc.*, 237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001). That is, this Court must consider the irreparable harm to Plaintiffs if the preliminary injunction is wrongfully denied versus the irreparable harm to Defendants if the preliminary injunction is wrongfully granted. *See Turnell v. CentiMark Corp*, 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court must also consider the effects, if any, the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction would have on non-parties, *i.e.*, the public interest. *Id.*

There is no question that Plaintiffs are harmed by PICA and will continue to be harmed if this Court denies the motion for preliminary injunction. A constitutional right is at stake. Some Plaintiffs cannot purchase their firearm of choice, nor can they exercise their right to self-defense in the manner they choose. They are bound by the State’s limitations. Moreover, other Plaintiffs cannot sell their inventory, even to residents of other states that do not ban the “arms” identified in PICA.

To the contrary, there can be “no harm to a [government agency] when it is prevented from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.” *Joelner v. Vill. of Wash. Park*, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004); *see also Does v. City of Indianapolis*, Case No. 1:06-CV-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2927598, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2006) (“Defendants will not be harmed by having to conform to constitutional standards, and without an injunction, plaintiffs will continue to be denied their constitutional rights”).

However, this does not end the inquiry. The Court must also balance the severity of PICA against the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense with the public-interest justification of protecting Illinois communities. With respect to the public-interest justification, the answer is less clear-cut and there are two sides that need to be considered. It is uncontroverted that law-abiding members of society, including the elderly, infirmed, and disabled, have the constitutional right to arm themselves for self-defense. As discussed during briefing:

The need for self-defense is not insignificant. According to a report by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, household members are present for almost a third of all burglaries and become victims of violent crimes in more than a quarter of those cases. Studies on the frequency of defensive firearm uses in the United States have determined that there are up to 2.5 million instances each year in which civilians used firearms for home defense.

(Doc. 39, p. 11) (citing Gary Kleck, Marc Gertz, *Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun*, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995)). Handguns, many of which are limited under PICA, are “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629). It is also uncontroverted that many of the banned modifiers, including but not limited to pistol grips, protruding grips, flash suppressors, and shrouds, have legitimate purposes that assist law-abiding citizens in their ability to defend themselves. The other side is less clear – there is no evidence as to how PICA will actually help Illinois Communities. It is also not lost on this Court that the Illinois Sheriff’s Association and some Illinois States Attorneys believe PICA unconstitutional and cannot, in good conscience, enforce the law as written and honor their sworn oath to uphold the Constitution.

In no way does this Court minimize the damage caused when a firearm is used for an unlawful purpose; however, this Court must be mindful of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. While PICA was purportedly enacted in response to the Highland Park shooting, it does not appear that the legislature considered an individual’s right under the Second Amendment nor Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, PICA did not just regulate the rights of the people to defend themselves; it restricted that right, and in some cases, completely obliterated that right by criminalizing the purchase and the sale of more than 190 “arms.”

Furthermore, on January 1, 2024, the right to mere possession of these items will be further limited and restricted. *See* 735 ILCS 5/24-1.9(c). Accordingly, the balance of harms favors the Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden for a preliminary injunction. They have shown irreparable harm with no adequate remedy at law, a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, that the public interest is in favor of the relief, and the balance of harm weighs in their favor. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction are **GRANTED**. Defendants are **ENJOINED** from enforcing Illinois statutes 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b) and (c), and 720 ILCS 5/24-1.10, along with the PICA amended provisions set forth in 735 ILCS 5/24-1(a), including subparagraphs (11), (14), (15), and (16), statewide during the pendency of this litigation until the Court can address the merits.

The Court recognizes that the issues with which it is confronted are highly contentious and provoke strong emotions. Again, the Court's ruling today is not a final resolution of the merits of the cases. Nothing in this order prevents the State from confronting firearm-related violence. There is a wide array of civil and criminal laws that permit the commitment and prosecution of those who use or may use firearms to commit crimes. Law enforcement and prosecutors should take their obligations to enforce these laws seriously. Families and the public at large should report concerning

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behavior. Judges should exercise their prudent judgment in committing individuals that pose a threat to the public and imposing sentences that punish, not just lightly inconvenience, those guilty of firearm-related crimes.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 28, 2023

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge

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**United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604**

December 11, 2023

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, *Circuit Judge*

DIANE P. WOOD, *Circuit Judge*

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, *Circuit Judge*

Nos. 23-1825, 23-1826, 23-1827 & 23-1828

JEREMY W. LANGLEY,
et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

BRENDAN KELLY, in his
official capacity as Director
of the Illinois State Police,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the
United States District
Court for the Southern
District of Illinois.

No. 23-CV-00192

Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.

ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellees filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing *en banc* on November 8, 2023. No judge in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing *en banc*, and all members of the original panel have voted to deny panel rehearing. The petition for rehearing and rehearing *en banc* is therefore DENIED

U.S. Constitution, Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV

Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of

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representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

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Section 5

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Public Act 102-1116

HB5471 Enrolled LRB102 24372 BMS 33606 b

AN ACT concerning regulation.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 1. This Act may be referred to as the Protect Illinois Communities Act.

Section 3. The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act is amended by adding Section 5-45.35 as follows:

(5 ILCS 100/5-45.35 new)

Sec. 5-45.35. Emergency rulemaking. To provide for the expeditious and timely implementation of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, emergency rules implementing this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly may be adopted in accordance with Section 5-45 by the Illinois State Police. The adoption of emergency rules authorized by Section 5-45 and this Section is deemed to be necessary for the public interest, safety, and welfare.

This Section is repealed one year after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly.

Section 4. The Freedom of Information Act is amended by changing Section 7.5 as follows:

(5 ILCS 140/7.5)

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Sec. 7.5. Statutory exemptions. To the extent provided for by the statutes referenced below, the following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:

(a) All information determined to be confidential under Section 4002 of the Technology Advancement and Development Act.

(b) Library circulation and order records identifying library users with specific materials under the Library Records Confidentiality Act.

(c) Applications, related documents, and medical records received by the Experimental Organ Transplantation Procedures Board and any and all documents or other records prepared by the Experimental Organ Transplantation Procedures Board or its staff relating to applications it has received.

(d) Information and records held by the Department of Public Health and its authorized representatives relating to known or suspected cases of sexually transmissible disease or any information the disclosure of which is restricted under the Illinois Sexually Transmissible Disease Control Act.

(e) Information the disclosure of which is exempted under Section 30 of the Radon Industry Licensing Act.

(f) Firm performance evaluations under Section 55 of the Architectural, Engineering, and Land Surveying Qualifications Based Selection Act.

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(g) Information the disclosure of which is restricted and exempted under Section 50 of the Illinois Prepaid Tuition Act.

(h) Information the disclosure of which is exempted under the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, and records of any lawfully created State or local inspector general's office that would be exempt if created or obtained by an Executive Inspector General's office under that Act.

(i) Information contained in a local emergency energy plan submitted to a municipality in accordance with a local emergency energy plan ordinance that is adopted under Section 11-21.5-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code.

(j) Information and data concerning the distribution of surcharge moneys collected and remitted by carriers under the Emergency Telephone System Act.

(k) Law enforcement officer identification information or driver identification information compiled by a law enforcement agency or the Department of Transportation under Section 11-212 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(l) Records and information provided to a residential health care facility resident sexual assault and death review team or the Executive Council under the Abuse Prevention Review Team Act.

(m) Information provided to the predatory lending database created pursuant to Article 3 of the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act, except to the extent authorized under that Article.

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(n) Defense budgets and petitions for certification of compensation and expenses for court appointed trial counsel as provided under Sections 10 and 15 of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act. This subsection (n) shall apply until the conclusion of the trial of the case, even if the prosecution chooses not to pursue the death penalty prior to trial or sentencing.

(o) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 4 of the Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances Registry Act.

(p) Security portions of system safety program plans, investigation reports, surveys, schedules, lists, data, or information compiled, collected, or prepared by or for the Department of Transportation under Sections 2705-300 and 2705-616 of the Department of Transportation Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois, the Regional Transportation Authority under Section 2.11 of the Regional Transportation Authority Act, or the St. Clair County Transit District under the Bi-State Transit Safety Act.

(q) Information prohibited from being disclosed by the Personnel Record Review Act.

(r) Information prohibited from being disclosed by the Illinois School Student Records Act.

(s) Information the disclosure of which is restricted under Section 5-108 of the Public Utilities Act.

(t) All identified or deidentified health information in the form of health data or medical records contained in, stored in, submitted to,

transferred by, or released from the Illinois Health Information Exchange, and identified or deidentified health information in the form of health data and medical records of the Illinois Health Information Exchange in the possession of the Illinois Health Information Exchange Office due to its administration of the Illinois Health Information Exchange. The terms “identified” and “deidentified” shall be given the same meaning as in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191, or any subsequent amendments thereto, and any regulations promulgated thereunder.

(u) Records and information provided to an independent team of experts under the Developmental Disability and Mental Health Safety Act (also known as Brian’s Law).

(v) Names and information of people who have applied for or received Firearm Owner’s Identification Cards under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act or applied for or received a concealed carry license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, unless otherwise authorized by the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; and databases under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, records of the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, and law enforcement agency objections under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

(v-5) Records of the Firearm Owner’s Identification Card Review Board that are exempted from disclosure under Section 10 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

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(w) Personally identifiable information which is exempted from disclosure under subsection (g) of Section 19.1 of the Toll Highway Act.

(x) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 5-1014.3 of the Counties Code or Section 8-11-21 of the Illinois Municipal Code.

(y) Confidential information under the Adult Protective Services Act and its predecessor enabling statute, the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act, including information about the identity and administrative finding against any caregiver of a verified and substantiated decision of abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of an eligible adult maintained in the Registry established under Section 7.5 of the Adult Protective Services Act.

(z) Records and information provided to a fatality review team or the Illinois Fatality Review Team Advisory Council under Section 15 of the Adult Protective Services Act.

(aa) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 2.37 of the Wildlife Code.

(bb) Information which is or was prohibited from disclosure by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.

(cc) Recordings made under the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.

(dd) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 45 of the Condominium and Common Interest Community Ombudsman Act.

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(ee) Information that is exempted from disclosure under Section 30.1 of the Pharmacy Practice Act.

(ff) Information that is exempted from disclosure under the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.

(gg) Information that is prohibited from being disclosed under Section 7-603.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

(hh) Records that are exempt from disclosure under Section 1A-16.7 of the Election Code.

(ii) Information which is exempted from disclosure under Section 2505-800 of the Department of Revenue Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois.

(jj) Information and reports that are required to be submitted to the Department of Labor by registering day and temporary labor service agencies but are exempt from disclosure under subsection (a-1) of Section 45 of the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act.

(kk) Information prohibited from disclosure under the Seizure and Forfeiture Reporting Act.

(ll) Information the disclosure of which is restricted and exempted under Section 5-30.8 of the Illinois Public Aid Code.

(mm) Records that are exempt from disclosure under Section 4.2 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

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(nn) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 70 of the Higher Education Student Assistance Act.

(oo) Communications, notes, records, and reports arising out of a peer support counseling session prohibited from disclosure under the First Responders Suicide Prevention Act.

(pp) Names and all identifying information relating to an employee of an emergency services provider or law enforcement agency under the First Responders Suicide Prevention Act.

(qq) Information and records held by the Department of Public Health and its authorized representatives collected under the Reproductive Health Act.

(rr) Information that is exempt from disclosure under the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act.

(ss) Data reported by an employer to the Department of Human Rights pursuant to Section 2-108 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.

(tt) Recordings made under the Children's Advocacy Center Act, except to the extent authorized under that Act.

(uu) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 50 of the Sexual Assault Evidence Submission Act.

(vv) Information that is exempt from disclosure under subsections (f) and (j) of Section 5-36 of the Illinois Public Aid Code.

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(ww) Information that is exempt from disclosure under Section 16.8 of the State Treasurer Act.

(xx) Information that is exempt from disclosure or information that shall not be made public under the Illinois Insurance Code.

(yy) Information prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act.

(zz) Information prohibited from being disclosed under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.

(aaa) Information prohibited from being disclosed under Section 1-167 of the Illinois Pension Code.

(bbb) Information that is prohibited from disclosure by the Illinois Police Training Act and the Illinois State Police Act.

(ccc) Records exempt from disclosure under Section 2605-304 of the Illinois State Police Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois.

(ddd) Information prohibited from being disclosed under Section 35 of the Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Human Trafficking, or Stalking Act.

(eee) Information prohibited from being disclosed under subsection (b) of Section 75 of the Domestic Violence Fatality Review Act.

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(fff) Images from cameras under the Expressway Camera Act. This subsection (fff) is inoperative on and after July 1, 2023.

~~(ggg) (fff)~~ Information prohibited from disclosure under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section 14 of the Nurse Agency Licensing Act.

(hhh) Information submitted to the Department of State Police in an affidavit or application for an assault weapon endorsement, assault weapon attachment endorsement, .50 caliber rifle endorsement, or .50 caliber cartridge endorsement under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(Source: P.A. 101-13, eff. 6-12-19; 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 101-221, eff. 1-1-20; 101-236, eff. 1-1-20; 101-375, eff. 8-16-19; 101-377, eff. 8-16-19; 101-452, eff. 1-1-20; 101-466, eff. 1-1-20; 101-600, eff. 12-6-19; 101-620, eff. 12-20-19; 101-649, eff. 7-7-20; 101-652, eff. 1-1-22; 101-656, eff. 3-23-21; 102-36, eff. 6-25-21; 102-237, eff. 1-1-22; 102-292, eff. 1-1-22; 102-520, eff. 8-20-21; 102-559, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-946, eff. 7-1-22; 102-1042, eff. 6-3-22; revised 8-1-22.)

Section 5. The Illinois State Police Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois is amended by changing Sections 2605-35 and 2605-51.1 as follows:

(20 ILCS 2605/2605-35) (was 20 ILCS 2605/55a-3)

Sec. 2605-35. Division of Criminal Investigation.

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(a) The Division of Criminal Investigation shall exercise the following functions and those in Section 2605-30:

(1) Exercise the rights, powers, and duties vested by law in the Illinois State Police by the Illinois Horse Racing Act of 1975, including those set forth in Section 2605-215.

(2) Investigate the origins, activities, personnel, and incidents of crime and enforce the criminal laws of this State related thereto.

(3) Enforce all laws regulating the production, sale, prescribing, manufacturing, administering, transporting, having in possession, dispensing, delivering, distributing, or use of controlled substances and cannabis.

(4) Cooperate with the police of cities, villages, and incorporated towns and with the police officers of any county in enforcing the laws of the State and in making arrests and recovering property.

(5) Apprehend and deliver up any person charged in this State or any other state with treason or a felony or other crime who has fled from justice and is found in this State.

(6) Investigate recipients and providers under the Illinois Public Aid Code and any personnel involved in the administration of the Code who are suspected of any violation of the Code pertaining to fraud in the administration, receipt, or provision of assistance and pertaining to any violation of criminal law; and exercise the functions

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required under Section 2605-220 in the conduct of those investigations.

(7) Conduct other investigations as provided by law, including, but not limited to, investigations of human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, and illegal firearms trafficking.

(8) Investigate public corruption.

(9) Exercise other duties that may be assigned by the Director in order to fulfill the responsibilities and achieve the purposes of the Illinois State Police, which may include the coordination of gang, terrorist, and organized crime prevention, control activities, and assisting local law enforcement in their crime control activities.

(10) Conduct investigations (and cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies in the investigation) of any property-related crimes, such as money laundering, involving individuals or entities listed on the sanctions list maintained by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control.

(b) (Blank).

(c) The Division of Criminal Investigation shall provide statewide coordination and strategy pertaining to firearm-related intelligence, firearms trafficking interdiction, and investigations reaching across all divisions of the Illinois State Police, including providing crime gun intelligence support for suspects and firearms involved in firearms trafficking or the commission of a crime involving firearms that is investigated by the Illinois State Police and other federal, State, and

local law enforcement agencies, with the objective of reducing and preventing illegal possession and use of firearms, firearms trafficking, firearm-related homicides, and other firearm-related violent crimes in Illinois.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-1108, eff. 12-21-22.)

(20 ILCS 2605/2605-51.1)

(Section scheduled to be repealed on June 1, 2026)

Sec. 2605-51.1. Commission on Implementing the Firearms Restraining Order Act.

(a) There is created the Commission on Implementing the Firearms Restraining Order Act composed of at least 12 members to advise on the strategies of education and implementation of the Firearms Restraining Order Act. The Commission shall be appointed by the Director of the Illinois State Police or his or her designee and shall include a liaison or representative nominated from the following:

(1) the Office of the Attorney General, appointed by the Attorney General;

(2) the Director of the Illinois State Police or his or her designee;

(3) at least 3 State's Attorneys, nominated by the Director of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor;

(4) at least 2 municipal police department representatives, nominated by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police;

(5) an Illinois sheriff, nominated by the Illinois Sheriffs' Association;

(6) the Director of Public Health or his or her designee;

(7) the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board, nominated by the Executive Director of the Board;

(8) a representative from a public defender's office, nominated by the State Appellate Defender;

(9) a circuit court judge, nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;

(10) a prosecutor with experience managing or directing a program in another state where the implementation of that state's extreme risk protection order law has achieved high rates of petition filings nominated by the National District Attorneys Association; ~~and~~

(11) an expert from law enforcement who has experience managing or directing a program in another state where the implementation of that state's extreme risk protection order law has achieved high rates of petition filings nominated by the Director of the Illinois State Police; and

(12) a circuit court clerk, nominated by the President of the Illinois Association of Court Clerks.

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(b) The Commission shall be chaired by the Director of the Illinois State Police or his or her designee. The Commission shall meet, either virtually or in person, to discuss the implementation of the Firearms Restraining Order Act as determined by the Commission while the strategies are being established.

(c) The members of the Commission shall serve without compensation and shall serve 3-year terms.

(d) An annual report shall be submitted to the General Assembly by the Commission that may include summary information about firearms restraining order use by county, challenges to Firearms Restraining Order Act implementation, and recommendations for increasing and improving implementation.

(e) The Commission shall develop a model policy with an overall framework for the timely relinquishment of firearms whenever a firearms restraining order is issued. The model policy shall be finalized within the first 4 months of convening. In formulating the model policy, the Commission shall consult counties in Illinois and other states with extreme risk protection order laws which have achieved a high rate of petition filings. Once approved, the Illinois State Police shall work with their local law enforcement agencies within their county to design a comprehensive strategy for the timely relinquishment of firearms, using the model policy as an overall framework. Each individual agency may make small modifications as needed to the model policy and must approve and adopt a policy that

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aligns with the model policy. The Illinois State Police shall convene local police chiefs and sheriffs within their county as needed to discuss the relinquishment of firearms.

(f) The Commission shall be dissolved June 1, 2025 (3 years after the effective date of Public Act 102-345).

(g) This Section is repealed June 1, 2026 (4 years after the effective date of Public Act 102-345).
(Source: P.A. 102-345, eff. 6-1-22; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

Section 7. The Illinois Procurement Code is amended by changing Section 1-10 as follows:

(30 ILLS 500/1-10)

Sec. 1-10. Application.

(a) This Code applies only to procurements for which bidders, offerors, potential contractors, or contractors were first solicited on or after July 1, 1998. This Code shall not be construed to affect or impair any contract, or any provision of a contract, entered into based on a solicitation prior to the implementation date of this Code as described in Article 99, including, but not limited to, any covenant entered into with respect to any revenue bonds or similar instruments. All procurements for which contracts are solicited between the effective date of Articles 50 and 99 and July 1, 1998 shall be substantially in accordance with this Code and its intent.

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(b) This Code shall apply regardless of the source of the funds with which the contracts are paid, including federal assistance moneys. This Code shall not apply to:

(1) Contracts between the State and its political subdivisions or other governments, or between State governmental bodies, except as specifically provided in this Code.

(2) Grants, except for the filing requirements of Section 20-80.

(3) Purchase of care, except as provided in Section 5-30.6 of the Illinois Public Aid Code and this Section.

(4) Hiring of an individual as an employee and not as an independent contractor, whether pursuant to an employment code or policy or by contract directly with that individual.

(5) Collective bargaining contracts.

(6) Purchase of real estate, except that notice of this type of contract with a value of more than \$25,000 must be published in the Procurement Bulletin within 10 calendar days after the deed is recorded in the county of jurisdiction. The notice shall identify the real estate purchased, the names of all parties to the contract, the value of the contract, and the effective date of the contract.

(7) Contracts necessary to prepare for anticipated litigation, enforcement actions, or investigations, provided that the chief legal counsel to the Governor shall give his or her prior approval when the procuring agency is one subject to the

jurisdiction of the Governor, and provided that the chief legal counsel of any other procuring entity subject to this Code shall give his or her prior approval when the procuring entity is not one subject to the jurisdiction of the Governor.

(8) (Blank).

(9) Procurement expenditures by the Illinois Conservation Foundation when only private funds are used.

(10) (Blank).

(11) Public-private agreements entered into according to the procurement requirements of Section 20 of the Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation Act and design-build agreements entered into according to the procurement requirements of Section 25 of the Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation Act.

(12)(A) Contracts for legal, financial, and other professional and artistic services entered into by the Illinois Finance Authority in which the State of Illinois is not obligated. Such contracts shall be awarded through a competitive process authorized by the members of the Illinois Finance Authority and are subject to Sections 5-30, 20-160, 50-13, 50-20, 50-35, and 50-37 of this Code, as well as the final approval by the members of the Illinois Finance Authority of the terms of the contract.

(B) Contracts for legal and financial services entered into by the Illinois Housing Development Authority in connection with the issuance of bonds in which the State of Illinois is not obligated. Such contracts shall be awarded through a competitive

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process authorized by the members of the Illinois Housing Development Authority and are subject to Sections 5-30, 20-160, 50-13, 50-20, 50-35, and 50-37 of this Code, as well as the final approval by the members of the Illinois Housing Development Authority of the terms of the contract.

(13) Contracts for services, commodities, and equipment to support the delivery of timely forensic science services in consultation with and subject to the approval of the Chief Procurement Officer as provided in subsection (d) of Section 5-4-3a of the Unified Code of Corrections, except for the requirements of Sections 20-60, 20-65, 20-70, and 20-160 and Article 50 of this Code; however, the Chief Procurement Officer may, in writing with justification, waive any certification required under Article 50 of this Code. For any contracts for services which are currently provided by members of a collective bargaining agreement, the applicable terms of the collective bargaining agreement concerning subcontracting shall be followed.

On and after January 1, 2019, this paragraph (13), except for this sentence, is inoperative.

(14) Contracts for participation expenditures required by a domestic or international trade show or exhibition of an exhibitor, member, or sponsor.

(15) Contracts with a railroad or utility that requires the State to reimburse the railroad or utilities for the relocation of utilities for construction or other public purpose. Contracts included within this paragraph (15) shall include, but not be limited to, those associated with: relocations,

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crossings, installations, and maintenance. For the purposes of this paragraph (15), “railroad” means any form of non-highway ground transportation that runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways and “utility” means: (1) public utilities as defined in Section 3-105 of the Public Utilities Act, (2) telecommunications carriers as defined in Section 13-202 of the Public Utilities Act, (3) electric cooperatives as defined in Section 3.4 of the Electric Supplier Act, (4) telephone or telecommunications cooperatives as defined in Section 13-212 of the Public Utilities Act, (5) rural water or waste water systems with 10,000 connections or less, (6) a holder as defined in Section 21-201 of the Public Utilities Act, and (7) municipalities owning or operating utility systems consisting of public utilities as that term is defined in Section 11-117-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code.

(16) Procurement expenditures necessary for the Department of Public Health to provide the delivery of timely newborn screening services in accordance with the Newborn Metabolic Screening Act.

(17) Procurement expenditures necessary for the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, the Department of Human Services, and the Department of Public Health to implement the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Program and Opioid Alternative Pilot Program requirements and ensure access to medical cannabis for patients with debilitating medical conditions in accordance with the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Program. Act.

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(18) This Code does not apply to any procurements necessary for the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, and the Department of Public Health to implement the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act if the applicable agency has made a good faith determination that it is necessary and appropriate for the expenditure to fall within this exemption and if the process is conducted in a manner substantially in accordance with the requirements of Sections 20-160, 25-60, 30-22, 50-5, 50-10, 50-10.5, 50-12, 50-13, 50-15, 50-20, 50-21, 50-35, 50-36, 50-37, 50-38, and 50-50 of this Code; however, for Section 50-35, compliance applies only to contracts or subcontracts over \$100,000. Notice of each contract entered into under this paragraph (18) that is related to the procurement of goods and services identified in paragraph (1) through (9) of this subsection shall be published in the Procurement Bulletin within 14 calendar days after contract execution. The Chief Procurement Officer shall prescribe the form and content of the notice. Each agency shall provide the Chief Procurement Officer, on a monthly basis, in the form and content prescribed by the Chief Procurement Officer, a report of contracts that are related to the procurement of goods and services identified in this subsection. At a minimum, this report shall include the name of the contractor, a description of the supply or service provided, the total amount of the contract, the term of the contract, and the exception to this Code utilized. A copy of any or all of these contracts shall be made available to the

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Chief Procurement Officer immediately upon request. The Chief Procurement Officer shall submit a report to the Governor and General Assembly no later than November 1 of each year that includes, at a minimum, an annual summary of the monthly information reported to the Chief Procurement Officer. This exemption becomes inoperative 5 years after June 25, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-27).

(19) Acquisition of modifications or adjustments, limited to assistive technology devices and assistive technology services, adaptive equipment, repairs, and replacement parts to provide reasonable accommodations (i) that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to complete the job application process and be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires, (ii) that modify or adjust the work environment to enable a qualified current employee with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position held by that employee, (iii) to enable a qualified current employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by other similarly situated employees without disabilities, and (iv) that allow a customer, client, claimant, or member of the public seeking State services full use and enjoyment of and access to its programs, services, or benefits.

For purposes of this paragraph (19):

“Assistive technology devices” means any item, piece of equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially off the shelf, modified, or customized, that is used to increase,

maintain, or improve functional capabilities of individuals with disabilities.

“Assistive technology services” means any service that directly assists an individual with a disability in selection, acquisition, or use of an assistive technology device.

“Qualified” has the same meaning and use as provided under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act when describing an individual with a disability.

(20) Procurement expenditures necessary for the Illinois Commerce Commission to hire third-party facilitators pursuant to Sections 16-105.17 and 16-108.18 of the Public Utilities Act or an ombudsman pursuant to Section 16-107.5 of the Public Utilities Act, a facilitator pursuant to Section 16-105.17 of the Public Utilities Act, or a grid auditor pursuant to Section 16-105.10 of the Public Utilities Act.

(21) Procurement expenditures for the purchase, renewal, and expansion of software, software licenses, or software maintenance agreements that support the efforts of the Illinois State Police to enforce, regulate, and administer the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, the Firearms Restraining Order Act, the Firearm Dealer License Certification Act, the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS), the Uniform Crime Reporting Act, the Criminal Identification Act, the Uniform Conviction Information Act, and the Gun Trafficking Information Act, or establish or maintain record management systems necessary to

conduct human trafficking investigations or gun trafficking or other stolen firearm investigations. This paragraph (21) applies to contracts entered into on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly and the renewal of contracts that are in effect on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for contracts with an annual value of more than \$100,000 entered into on or after October 1, 2017 under an exemption provided in any paragraph of this subsection (b), except paragraph (1), (2), or (5), each State agency shall post to the appropriate procurement bulletin the name of the contractor, a description of the supply or service provided, the total amount of the contract, the term of the contract, and the exception to the Code utilized. The chief procurement officer shall submit a report to the Governor and General Assembly no later than November 1 of each year that shall include, at a minimum, an annual summary of the monthly information reported to the chief procurement officer.

(c) This Code does not apply to the electric power procurement process provided for under Section 1-75 of the Illinois Power Agency Act and Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act.

(d) Except for Section 20-160 and Article 50 of this Code, and as expressly required by Section 9.1 of the Illinois Lottery Law, the provisions of this Code do not apply to the procurement process provided for under Section 9.1 of the Illinois Lottery Law.

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(e) This Code does not apply to the process used by the Capital Development Board to retain a person or entity to assist the Capital Development Board with its duties related to the determination of costs of a clean coal SNG brownfield facility, as defined by Section 1-10 of the Illinois Power Agency Act, as required in subsection (h-3) of Section 9-220 of the Public Utilities Act, including calculating the range of capital costs, the range of operating and maintenance costs, or the sequestration costs or monitoring the construction of clean coal SNG brownfield facility for the full duration of construction.

(f) (Blank).

(g) (Blank).

(h) This Code does not apply to the process to procure or contracts entered into in accordance with Sections 11-5.2 and 11-5.3 of the Illinois Public Aid Code.

(i) Each chief procurement officer may access records necessary to review whether a contract, purchase, or other expenditure is or is not subject to the provisions of this Code, unless such records would be subject to attorney-client privilege.

(j) This Code does not apply to the process used by the Capital Development Board to retain an artist or work or works of art as required in Section 14 of the Capital Development Board Act.

(k) This Code does not apply to the process to procure contracts, or contracts entered into, by the

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State Board of Elections or the State Electoral Board for hearing officers appointed pursuant to the Election Code.

(l) This Code does not apply to the processes used by the Illinois Student Assistance Commission to procure supplies and services paid for from the private funds of the Illinois Prepaid Tuition Fund. As used in this subsection (l), “private funds” means funds derived from deposits paid into the Illinois Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund and the earnings thereon.

(m) This Code shall apply regardless of the source of funds with which contracts are paid, including federal assistance moneys. Except as specifically provided in this Code, this Code shall not apply to procurement expenditures necessary for the Department of Public Health to conduct the Healthy Illinois Survey in accordance with Section 2310-431 of the Department of Public Health Powers and Duties Law of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois.

(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 101-363, eff. 8-9-19; 102-175, eff. 7-29-21; 102-483, eff. 1-1-22; 102-558, eff. 8-20-21; 102-600, eff. 8-27-21; 102-662, eff. 9-15-21; 102-721, eff. 1-1-23; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

Section 10. The Firearm Owners Identification Card Act is amended by changing Sections 2, 3, 4, and 8 and by adding Section 4.1 as follows:

(430 ILCS 65/2) (from Ch. 38, par. 83-2)

Sec. 2. Firearm Owner's Identification Card required; exceptions.

(a) (1) No person may acquire or possess any firearm, stun gun, or taser within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the provisions of this Act.

(2) No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the provisions of this Act.

(b) The provisions of this Section regarding the possession of firearms, firearm ammunition, stun guns, and tasers do not apply to:

(1) United States Marshals, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(2) Members of the Armed Forces of the United States or the National Guard, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(3) Federal officials required to carry firearms, while engaged in the operation of their official duties;

(4) Members of bona fide veterans organizations which receive firearms directly from the armed forces of the United States, while using the firearms for ceremonial purposes with blank ammunition;

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(5) Nonresident hunters during hunting season, with valid nonresident hunting licenses and while in an area where hunting is permitted; however, at all other times and in all other places these persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(6) Those hunters exempt from obtaining a hunting license who are required to submit their Firearm Owner's Identification Card when hunting on Department of Natural Resources owned or managed sites;

(7) Nonresidents while on a firing or shooting range recognized by the Illinois State Police; however, these persons must at all other times and in all other places have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(8) Nonresidents while at a firearm showing or display recognized by the Illinois State Police; however, at all other times and in all other places these persons must have their firearms unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(9) Nonresidents whose firearms are unloaded and enclosed in a case;

(10) Nonresidents who are currently licensed or registered to possess a firearm in their resident state;

(11) Unemancipated minors while in the custody and immediate control of their parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to the minor if the parent or legal guardian or other person in loco parentis to the minor has a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card;

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(12) Color guards of bona fide veterans organizations or members of bona fide American Legion bands while using firearms for ceremonial purposes with blank ammunition;

(13) Nonresident hunters whose state of residence does not require them to be licensed or registered to possess a firearm and only during hunting season, with valid hunting licenses, while accompanied by, and using a firearm owned by, a person who possesses a valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card and while in an area within a commercial club licensed under the Wildlife Code where hunting is permitted and controlled, but in no instance upon sites owned or managed by the Department of Natural Resources;

(14) Resident hunters who are properly authorized to hunt and, while accompanied by a person who possesses a valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card, hunt in an area within a commercial club licensed under the Wildlife Code where hunting is permitted and controlled; and

(15) A person who is otherwise eligible to obtain a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under this Act and is under the direct supervision of a holder of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card who is 21 years of age or older while the person is on a firing or shooting range or is a participant in a firearms safety and training course recognized by a law enforcement agency or a national, statewide shooting sports organization; and

~~(16) Competitive shooting athletes whose competition firearms are sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee, the International~~

~~Paralympic Committee, the International Shooting Sport Federation, or USA Shooting in connection with such athletes' training for and participation in shooting competitions at the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games and sanctioned test events leading up to the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games.~~

(c) The provisions of this Section regarding the acquisition and possession of firearms, firearm ammunition, stun guns, and tasers do not apply to law enforcement officials of this or any other jurisdiction, while engaged in the operation of their official duties.

(c-5) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this Section regarding the possession of firearms and firearm ammunition do not apply to the holder of a valid concealed carry license issued under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act who is in physical possession of the concealed carry license.

(d) Any person who becomes a resident of this State, who is not otherwise prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm or firearm ammunition, shall not be required to have a Firearm Owner's Identification Card to possess firearms or firearms ammunition until 60 calendar days after he or she obtains an Illinois driver's license or Illinois Identification Card. (Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(430 ILCS 65/3) (from Ch. 38, par. 83-3)

(Text of Section before amendment by P.A. 102-237)

Sec. 3. (a) Except as provided in Section 3a, no person may knowingly transfer, or cause to be transferred, any firearm, firearm ammunition, stun gun, or taser to any person within this State unless the transferee with whom he deals displays either: (1) a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card which has previously been issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the provisions of this Act; or (2) a currently valid license to carry a concealed firearm which has previously been issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. In addition, all firearm, stun gun, and taser transfers by federally licensed firearm dealers are subject to Section 3.1.

(a-5) Any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer and who desires to transfer or sell a firearm while that person is on the grounds of a gun show must, before selling or transferring the firearm, request the Illinois State Police to conduct a background check on the prospective recipient of the firearm in accordance with Section 3.1.

(a-10) Notwithstanding item (2) of subsection (a) of this Section, any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer and who desires to transfer or sell a firearm or firearms to any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer shall, before selling or transferring the firearms, contact a federal firearm license dealer under paragraph (1) of subsection (a-15) of this Section to conduct the transfer or the Illinois State Police with the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number to determine

the validity of the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card under State and federal law including the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. This subsection shall not be effective until July 1, 2023. Until that date the transferor shall contact the Illinois State Police with the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number to determine the validity of the card ~~January 1, 2014~~. The Illinois State Police may adopt rules concerning the implementation of this subsection. The Illinois State Police shall provide the seller or transferor an approval number if the purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card is valid. Approvals issued by the Illinois State Police for the purchase of a firearm pursuant to this subsection are valid for 30 days from the date of issue.

(a-15) The provisions of subsection (a-10) of this Section do not apply to:

(1) transfers that occur at the place of business of a federally licensed firearm dealer, if the federally licensed firearm dealer conducts a background check on the prospective recipient of the firearm in accordance with Section 3.1 of this Act and follows all other applicable federal, State, and local laws as if he or she were the seller or transferor of the firearm, although the dealer is not required to accept the firearm into his or her inventory. The purchaser or transferee may be required by the federally licensed firearm dealer to pay a fee not to exceed ~~\$25~~ \$10 per firearm, which the dealer may retain as compensation for performing the functions required under this

paragraph, plus the applicable fees authorized by Section 3.1;

(2) transfers as a bona fide gift to the transferor's husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;

(3) transfers by persons acting pursuant to operation of law or a court order;

(4) transfers on the grounds of a gun show under subsection (a-5) of this Section;

(5) the delivery of a firearm by its owner to a gunsmith for service or repair, the return of the firearm to its owner by the gunsmith, or the delivery of a firearm by a gunsmith to a federally licensed firearms dealer for service or repair and the return of the firearm to the gunsmith;

(6) temporary transfers that occur while in the home of the unlicensed transferee, if the unlicensed transferee is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms and the unlicensed transferee reasonably believes that possession of the firearm is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the unlicensed transferee;

(7) transfers to a law enforcement or corrections agency or a law enforcement or corrections officer acting within the course and scope of his or her official duties;

(8) transfers of firearms that have been rendered permanently inoperable to a nonprofit historical society, museum, or institutional collection; and

(9) transfers to a person who is exempt from the requirement of possessing a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under Section 2 of this Act.

(a-20) The Illinois State Police shall develop an Internet-based system for individuals to determine the validity of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card prior to the sale or transfer of a firearm. The Illinois State Police shall have the Internet-based system updated ~~completed~~ and available for use by January 1, 2024 ~~July 1, 2015~~. The Illinois State Police shall adopt rules not inconsistent with this Section to implement this system, but no rule shall allow the Illinois State Police to retain records in contravention of State and federal law.

(a-25) On or before January 1, 2022, the Illinois State Police shall develop an Internet-based system upon which the serial numbers of firearms that have been reported stolen are available for public access for individuals to ensure any firearms are not reported stolen prior to the sale or transfer of a firearm under this Section. The Illinois State Police shall have the Internet-based system completed and available for use by July 1, 2022. The Illinois State Police shall adopt rules not inconsistent with this Section to implement this system.

(b) Any person within this State who transfers or causes to be transferred any firearm, stun gun, or taser shall keep a record of such transfer for a period of 10 years from the date of transfer. Any person within this State who receives any firearm, stun gun, or taser pursuant to subsection (a-10) shall provide a record of the transfer within 10 days of the transfer to a federally licensed firearm dealer and shall not be required to maintain a transfer record. The federally licensed firearm dealer shall maintain the transfer record for 20 years from the date of receipt. A federally licensed firearm dealer may charge a fee not to exceed \$25 to retain the record. The record shall be provided and maintained in either an electronic or paper format. The federally licensed firearm dealer shall not be liable for the accuracy of any information in the transfer record submitted pursuant to this Section. Such records record shall contain the date of the transfer; the description, serial number or other information identifying the firearm, stun gun, or taser if no serial number is available; and, if the transfer was completed within this State, the transferee's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number and any approval number or documentation provided by the Illinois State Police pursuant to subsection (a-10) of this Section; if the transfer was not completed within this State, the record shall contain the name and address of the transferee. On or after January 1, 2006, the record shall contain the date of application for transfer of the firearm. On demand of a peace officer such transferor shall produce for inspection such record of transfer. For any transfer pursuant to subsection (a-10) of this Section, on the demand of a

peace officer, such transferee shall identify the federally licensed firearm dealer maintaining the transfer record. If the transfer or sale took place at a gun show, the record shall include the unique identification number. Failure to record the unique identification number or approval number is a petty offense. For transfers of a firearm, stun gun, or taser made on or after January 18, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 100-1178), failure by the private seller to maintain the transfer records in accordance with this Section, or failure by a transferee pursuant to subsection a-10 of this Section to identify the federally licensed firearm dealer maintaining the transfer record, is a Class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense occurring within 10 years of the first offense and the second offense was committed after conviction of the first offense. Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any violation of subsection (a-5), the court may grant supervision pursuant to and consistent with the limitations of Section 5-6-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. A transferee or transferor shall not be criminally liable under this Section provided that he or she provides the Illinois State Police with the transfer records in accordance with procedures established by the Illinois State Police. The Illinois State Police shall establish, by rule, a standard form on its website.

(b-5) Any resident may purchase ammunition from a person within or outside of Illinois if shipment is by United States mail or by a private express carrier authorized by federal law to ship ammunition. Any

resident purchasing ammunition within or outside the State of Illinois must provide the seller with a copy of his or her valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card or valid concealed carry license and either his or her Illinois driver's license or Illinois State Identification Card prior to the shipment of the ammunition. The ammunition may be shipped only to an address on either of those 2 documents.

(c) The provisions of this Section regarding the transfer of firearm ammunition shall not apply to those persons specified in paragraph (b) of Section 2 of this Act.

(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

(Text of Section after amendment by P.A. 102-237)

Sec. 3. (a) Except as provided in Section 3a, no person may knowingly transfer, or cause to be transferred, any firearm, firearm ammunition, stun gun, or taser to any person within this State unless the transferee with whom he deals displays either: (1) a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card which has previously been issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the provisions of this Act; or (2) a currently valid license to carry a concealed firearm which has previously been issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. In addition, all firearm, stun gun, and taser transfers by federally licensed firearm dealers are subject to Section 3.1.

(a-5) Any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer and who desires to transfer or sell a firearm while that person is on the grounds of a gun show must, before selling or transferring the firearm, request the Illinois State Police to conduct a background check on the prospective recipient of the firearm in accordance with Section 3.1.

(a-10) Notwithstanding item (2) of subsection (a) of this Section, any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer and who desires to transfer or sell a firearm or firearms to any person who is not a federally licensed firearm dealer shall, before selling or transferring the firearms, contact a federal firearm license dealer under paragraph (1) of subsection (a-15) of this Section to conduct the transfer or the Illinois State Police with the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number to determine the validity of the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card under State and federal law, including the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. This subsection shall not be effective until July 1, 2023 ~~January 1, 2024~~. Until that date the transferor shall contact the Illinois State Police with the transferee's or purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number to determine the validity of the card. The Illinois State Police may adopt rules concerning the implementation of this subsection. The Illinois State Police shall provide the seller or transferor an approval number if the purchaser's Firearm Owner's Identification Card is valid. Approvals issued by the Illinois State Police for the purchase

of a firearm pursuant to this subsection are valid for 30 days from the date of issue.

(a-15) The provisions of subsection (a-10) of this Section do not apply to:

(1) transfers that occur at the place of business of a federally licensed firearm dealer, if the federally licensed firearm dealer conducts a background check on the prospective recipient of the firearm in accordance with Section 3.1 of this Act and follows all other applicable federal, State, and local laws as if he or she were the seller or transferor of the firearm, although the dealer is not required to accept the firearm into his or her inventory. The purchaser or transferee may be required by the federally licensed firearm dealer to pay a fee not to exceed \$25 per firearm, which the dealer may retain as compensation for performing the functions required under this paragraph, plus the applicable fees authorized by Section 3.1;

(2) transfers as a bona fide gift to the transferor's husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;

(3) transfers by persons acting pursuant to operation of law or a court order;

(4) transfers on the grounds of a gun show under subsection (a-5) of this Section;

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(5) the delivery of a firearm by its owner to a gunsmith for service or repair, the return of the firearm to its owner by the gunsmith, or the delivery of a firearm by a gunsmith to a federally licensed firearms dealer for service or repair and the return of the firearm to the gunsmith;

(6) temporary transfers that occur while in the home of the unlicensed transferee, if the unlicensed transferee is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms and the unlicensed transferee reasonably believes that possession of the firearm is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the unlicensed transferee;

(7) transfers to a law enforcement or corrections agency or a law enforcement or corrections officer acting within the course and scope of his or her official duties;

(8) transfers of firearms that have been rendered permanently inoperable to a nonprofit historical society, museum, or institutional collection; and

(9) transfers to a person who is exempt from the requirement of possessing a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under Section 2 of this Act.

(a-20) The Illinois State Police shall develop an Internet-based system for individuals to determine the validity of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card prior to the sale or transfer of a firearm. The Illinois State Police shall have the Internet-based system updated and available for use by January 1, 2024. The Illinois State Police shall adopt rules not inconsistent with

this Section to implement this system; but no rule shall allow the Illinois State Police to retain records in contravention of State and federal law.

(a-25) On or before January 1, 2022, the Illinois State Police shall develop an Internet-based system upon which the serial numbers of firearms that have been reported stolen are available for public access for individuals to ensure any firearms are not reported stolen prior to the sale or transfer of a firearm under this Section. The Illinois State Police shall have the Internet-based system completed and available for use by July 1, 2022. The Illinois State Police shall adopt rules not inconsistent with this Section to implement this system.

(b) Any person within this State who transfers or causes to be transferred any firearm, stun gun, or taser shall keep a record of such transfer for a period of 10 years from the date of transfer. Any person within this State who receives any firearm, stun gun, or taser pursuant to subsection (a-10) shall provide a record of the transfer within 10 days of the transfer to a federally licensed firearm dealer and shall not be required to maintain a transfer record. The federally licensed firearm dealer shall maintain the transfer record for 20 years from the date of receipt. A federally licensed firearm dealer may charge a fee not to exceed \$25 to retain the record. The record shall be provided and maintained in either an electronic or paper format. The federally licensed firearm dealer shall not be liable for the accuracy of any information in the transfer record submitted pursuant to this Section. Such records shall

contain the date of the transfer; the description, serial number or other information identifying the firearm, stun gun, or taser if no serial number is available; and, if the transfer was completed within this State, the transferee's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number and any approval number or documentation provided by the Illinois State Police pursuant to subsection (a-10) of this Section; if the transfer was not completed within this State, the record shall contain the name and address of the transferee. On or after January 1, 2006, the record shall contain the date of application for transfer of the firearm. On demand of a peace officer such transferor shall produce for inspection such record of transfer. For any transfer pursuant to subsection (a-10) of this Section, on the demand of a peace officer, such transferee shall identify the federally licensed firearm dealer maintaining the transfer record. If the transfer or sale took place at a gun show, the record shall include the unique identification number. Failure to record the unique identification number or approval number is a petty offense. For transfers of a firearm, stun gun, or taser made on or after January 18, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 100-1178), failure by the private seller to maintain the transfer records in accordance with this Section, or failure by a transferee pursuant to subsection a-10 of this Section to identify the federally licensed firearm dealer maintaining the transfer record, is a Class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense occurring within 10 years of the first offense and the second offense was committed after conviction of the first offense. Whenever any person

who has not previously been convicted of any violation of subsection (a-5), the court may grant supervision pursuant to and consistent with the limitations of Section 5-6-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. A transferee or transferor shall not be criminally liable under this Section provided that he or she provides the Illinois State Police with the transfer records in accordance with procedures established by the Illinois State Police. The Illinois State Police shall establish, by rule, a standard form on its website.

(b-5) Any resident may purchase ammunition from a person within or outside of Illinois if shipment is by United States mail or by a private express carrier authorized by federal law to ship ammunition. Any resident purchasing ammunition within or outside the State of Illinois must provide the seller with a copy of his or her valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card or valid concealed carry license and either his or her Illinois driver's license or Illinois State Identification Card prior to the shipment of the ammunition. The ammunition may be shipped only to an address on either of those 2 documents.

(c) The provisions of this Section regarding the transfer of firearm ammunition shall not apply to those persons specified in paragraph (b) of Section 2 of this Act.

(Source: P.A. 102-237, eff. 1-1-24; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

(430 ILCS 65/4) (from Ch. 38, par. 83-4)

Sec. 4. Application for Firearm Owner's Identification Cards.

(a) Each applicant for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card must:

(1) Submit an application as made available by the Illinois State Police; and

(2) Submit evidence to the Illinois State Police that:

(i) This subparagraph (i) applies through the 180th day following July 12, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-80). He or she is 21 years of age or over, or if he or she is under 21 years of age that he or she has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition and that he or she has never been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent, provided, however, that such parent or legal guardian is not an individual prohibited from having a Firearm Owner's Identification Card and files an affidavit with the Department as prescribed by the Department stating that he or she is not an individual prohibited from having a Card;

(i-5) This subparagraph (i-5) applies on and after the 181st day following July 12, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-80). He or she is 21 years of age or over, or if he or she is under 21 years of age that he or she has never been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent

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and is an active duty member of the United States Armed Forces or the Illinois National Guard or has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition, provided, however, that such parent or legal guardian is not an individual prohibited from having a Firearm Owner's Identification Card and files an affidavit with the Illinois State Police as prescribed by the Illinois State Police stating that he or she is not an individual prohibited from having a Card or the active duty member of the United States Armed Forces or the Illinois National Guard under 21 years of age annually submits proof to the Illinois State Police, in a manner prescribed by the Illinois State Police;

(ii) He or she has not been convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other jurisdiction;

(iii) He or she is not addicted to narcotics;

(iv) He or she has not been a patient in a mental health facility within the past 5 years or, if he or she has been a patient in a mental health facility more than 5 years ago submit the certification required under subsection (u) of Section 8 of this Act;

(v) He or she is not a person with an intellectual disability;

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(vi) He or she is not a noncitizen who is unlawfully present in the United States under the laws of the United States;

(vii) He or she is not subject to an existing order of protection prohibiting him or her from possessing a firearm;

(viii) He or she has not been convicted within the past 5 years of battery, assault, aggravated assault, violation of an order of protection, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction, in which a firearm was used or possessed;

(ix) He or she has not been convicted of domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction committed before, on or after January 1, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-158). If the applicant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to have an offense described in this clause (ix) tried by a jury, and by guilty plea or otherwise, results in a conviction for an offense in which a domestic relationship is not a required element of the offense but in which a determination of the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (9) is made under Section 112A-11.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, an entry by the court of a judgment of conviction for that offense shall be grounds for denying the issuance of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under this Section;

(x) (Blank);

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(xi) He or she is not a noncitizen who has been admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa (as that term is defined in Section 101(a) (26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (26))), or that he or she is a noncitizen who has been lawfully admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa if that noncitizen is:

(1) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes;

(2) an official representative of a foreign government who is:

(A) accredited to the United States Government or the Government's mission to an international organization having its headquarters in the United States; or

(B) en route to or from another country to which that noncitizen is accredited;

(3) an official of a foreign government or distinguished foreign visitor who has been so designated by the Department of State;

(4) a foreign law enforcement officer of a friendly foreign government entering the United States on official business; or

(5) one who has received a waiver from the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(y) (3);

(xii) He or she is not a minor subject to a petition filed under Section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 alleging that the minor is a delinquent minor for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(xiii) He or she is not an adult who had been adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(xiv) He or she is a resident of the State of Illinois;

(xv) He or she has not been adjudicated as a person with a mental disability;

(xvi) He or she has not been involuntarily admitted into a mental health facility; and

(xvii) He or she is not a person with a developmental disability; and

(3) Upon request by the Illinois State Police, sign a release on a form prescribed by the Illinois State Police waiving any right to confidentiality and requesting the disclosure to the Illinois State Police of limited mental health institution admission information from another state, the District of Columbia, any other territory of the United States, or a foreign nation concerning the applicant for the sole purpose of determining whether the applicant is or was a patient in a mental health institution and disqualified because of that status from receiving a Firearm Owner's Identification Card. No mental health care or treatment

records may be requested. The information received shall be destroyed within one year of receipt.

(a-5) Each applicant for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card who is over the age of 18 shall furnish to the Illinois State Police either his or her Illinois driver's license number or Illinois Identification Card number, except as provided in subsection (a-10).

(a-10) Each applicant for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card, who is employed as a law enforcement officer, an armed security officer in Illinois, or by the United States Military permanently assigned in Illinois and who is not an Illinois resident, shall furnish to the Illinois State Police his or her driver's license number or state identification card number from his or her state of residence. The Illinois State Police may adopt rules to enforce the provisions of this subsection (a-10).

(a-15) If an applicant applying for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card moves from the residence address named in the application, he or she shall immediately notify in a form and manner prescribed by the Illinois State Police of that change of address.

(a-20) Each applicant for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card shall furnish to the Illinois State Police his or her photograph. An applicant who is 21 years of age or older seeking a religious exemption to the photograph requirement must furnish with the application an approved copy of United States Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service

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Form 4029. In lieu of a photograph, an applicant regardless of age seeking a religious exemption to the photograph requirement shall submit fingerprints on a form and manner prescribed by the Illinois State Police with his or her application.

(a-25) Beginning January 1, 2023, each applicant for the issuance of a Firearm Owner's Identification Card may include a full set of his or her fingerprints in electronic format to the Illinois State Police, unless the applicant has previously provided a full set of his or her fingerprints to the Illinois State Police under this Act or the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

The fingerprints must be transmitted through a live scan fingerprint vendor licensed by the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. The fingerprints shall be checked against the fingerprint records now and hereafter filed in the Illinois State Police and Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal history records databases, including all available State and local criminal history record information files.

The Illinois State Police shall charge applicants a one-time fee for conducting the criminal history record check, which shall be deposited into the State Police Services Fund and shall not exceed the actual cost of the State and national criminal history record check.

(a-26) The Illinois State Police shall research, explore, and report to the General Assembly by January 1, 2022 on the feasibility of permitting voluntarily submitted fingerprints obtained for purposes other than

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Firearm Owner's Identification Card enforcement that are contained in the Illinois State Police database for purposes of this Act.

(b) Each application form shall include the following statement printed in bold type: "Warning: Entering false information on an application for a Firearm Owner's Identification Card is punishable as a Class 2 felony in accordance with subsection (d-5) of Section 14 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act."

(c) Upon such written consent, pursuant to Section 4, paragraph (a)(2)(i), the parent or legal guardian giving the consent shall be liable for any damages resulting from the applicant's use of firearms or firearm ammunition.

(Source: P.A. 101-80, eff. 7-12-19; 102-237, eff. 1-1-22; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-1030, eff. 5-27-22.)

(430 ILCS 65/4.1 new)

Sec. 4.1. Assault weapon, .50 caliber rifle, assault weapon attachment, or .50 caliber cartridge endorsement.

(a) The endorsement affidavit form completed pursuant to Section 24-1.9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 must be executed electronically through the individual's Firearm Owner's Identification Card account.

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(b) The Illinois State Police shall adopt rules in accordance with this Section for the electronic submission of an endorsement affidavit.

(c) Entering false information on the endorsement affidavit form is a violation of this Act and is also punishable as perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(430 ILCS 65/8) (from Ch. 38, par. 83-8)

Sec. 8. Grounds for denial and revocation. The Illinois State Police has authority to deny an application for or to revoke and seize a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued under this Act only if the Illinois State Police finds that the applicant or the person to whom such card was issued is or was at the time of issuance:

(a) A person under 21 years of age who has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense or adjudged delinquent;

(b) This subsection (b) applies through the 180th day following July 12, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-80). A person under 21 years of age who does not have the written consent of his parent or guardian to acquire and possess firearms and firearm ammunition, or whose parent or guardian has revoked such written consent, or where such parent or guardian does not qualify to have a Firearm Owner's Identification Card;

(b-5) This subsection (b-5) applies on and after the 181st day following July 12, 2019 (the

effective date of Public Act 101-80). A person under 21 years of age who is not an active duty member of the United States Armed Forces or the Illinois National Guard and does not have the written consent of his or her parent or guardian to acquire and possess firearms and firearm ammunition, or whose parent or guardian has revoked such written consent, or where such parent or guardian does not qualify to have a Firearm Owner's Identification Card;

(c) A person convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other jurisdiction;

(d) A person addicted to narcotics;

(e) A person who has been a patient of a mental health facility within the past 5 years or a person who has been a patient in a mental health facility more than 5 years ago who has not received the certification required under subsection (u) of this Section. An active law enforcement officer employed by a unit of government or a Department of Corrections employee authorized to possess firearms who is denied, revoked, or has his or her Firearm Owner's Identification Card seized under this subsection (e) may obtain relief as described in subsection (c-5) of Section 10 of this Act if the officer or employee did not act in a manner threatening to the officer or employee, another person, or the public as determined by the treating clinical psychologist or physician, and the officer or employee seeks mental health treatment;

(f) A person whose mental condition is of such a nature that it poses a clear and present

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danger to the applicant, any other person or persons, or the community;

(g) A person who has an intellectual disability;

(h) A person who intentionally makes a false statement in the Firearm Owner's Identification Card application or endorsement affidavit;

(i) A noncitizen who is unlawfully present in the United States under the laws of the United States;

(i-5) A noncitizen who has been admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa (as that term is defined in Section 101(a) (26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (26))), except that this subsection (i-5) does not apply to any noncitizen who has been lawfully admitted to the United States under a non-immigrant visa if that noncitizen is:

(1) admitted to the United States for lawful hunting or sporting purposes;

(2) an official representative of a foreign government who is:

(A) accredited to the United States Government or the Government's mission to an international organization having its headquarters in the United States; or

(B) en route to or from another country to which that noncitizen is accredited;

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(3) an official of a foreign government or distinguished foreign visitor who has been so designated by the Department of State;

(4) a foreign law enforcement officer of a friendly foreign government entering the United States on official business; or

(5) one who has received a waiver from the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(y)(3);

(j) (Blank);

(k) A person who has been convicted within the past 5 years of battery, assault, aggravated assault, violation of an order of protection, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction, in which a firearm was used or possessed;

(l) A person who has been convicted of domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, or a substantially similar offense in another jurisdiction committed before, on or after January 1, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-158). If the applicant or person who has been previously issued a Firearm Owner's Identification Card under this Act knowingly and intelligently waives the right to have an offense described in this paragraph (1) tried by a jury, and by guilty plea or otherwise, results in a conviction for an offense in which a domestic relationship is not a required element of the offense but in which a determination of the applicability of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is made under Section 112A-11.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, an entry by the court of a judgment of conviction for that offense shall be grounds for

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denying an application for and for revoking and seizing a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued to the person under this Act;

(m) (Blank);

(n) A person who is prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any Illinois State statute or by federal law;

(o) A minor subject to a petition filed under Section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 alleging that the minor is a delinquent minor for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(p) An adult who had been adjudicated a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for the commission of an offense that if committed by an adult would be a felony;

(q) A person who is not a resident of the State of Illinois, except as provided in subsection (a-10) of Section 4;

(r) A person who has been adjudicated as a person with a mental disability;

(s) A person who has been found to have a developmental disability;

(t) A person involuntarily admitted into a mental health facility; or

(u) A person who has had his or her Firearm Owner's Identification Card revoked or denied under subsection (e) of this Section or item (iv) of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Section 4 of this Act because he or she was a patient in a mental health

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facility as provided in subsection (e) of this Section, shall not be permitted to obtain a Firearm Owner's Identification Card, after the 5-year period has lapsed, unless he or she has received a mental health evaluation by a physician, clinical psychologist, or qualified examiner as those terms are defined in the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, and has received a certification that he or she is not a clear and present danger to himself, herself, or others. The physician, clinical psychologist, or qualified examiner making the certification and his or her employer shall not be held criminally, civilly, or professionally liable for making or not making the certification required under this subsection, except for willful or wanton misconduct. This subsection does not apply to a person whose firearm possession rights have been restored through administrative or judicial action under Section 10 or 11 of this Act.

Upon revocation of a person's Firearm Owner's Identification Card, the Illinois State Police shall provide notice to the person and the person shall comply with Section 9.5 of this Act.

(Source: P.A. 101-80, eff. 7-12-19; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-645, eff. 1-1-22; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-1030, eff. 5-27-22.)

Section 15. The Firearms Restraining Order Act is amended by changing Sections 40, 45, and 55 as follows:

(430 ILCS 67/40)

Sec. 40. Plenary ~~Six-month~~ orders.

(a) A petitioner may request a ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order for up to one year by filing an affidavit or verified pleading alleging that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. The petition shall also describe the number, types, and locations of any firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm presently believed by the petitioner to be possessed or controlled by the respondent. The firearms restraining order may be renewed for an additional period of up to one year in accordance with Section 45 of this Act.

(b) If the respondent is alleged to pose a significant danger of causing personal injury to an intimate partner, or an intimate partner is alleged to have been the target of a threat or act of violence by the respondent, the petitioner shall make a good faith effort to provide notice to any and all intimate partners of the respondent. The notice must include the duration of time that the petitioner intends to petition the court for a ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order, and, if the petitioner is a law enforcement officer, referral to relevant domestic violence or stalking advocacy or counseling resources, if appropriate. The petitioner shall attest to having provided the notice in the filed affidavit or verified pleading. If, after making a good faith

effort, the petitioner is unable to provide notice to any or all intimate partners, the affidavit or verified pleading should describe what efforts were made.

(c) Every person who files a petition for a plenary ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order, knowing the information provided to the court at any hearing or in the affidavit or verified pleading to be false, is guilty of perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

(d) Upon receipt of a petition for a plenary ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order, the court shall order a hearing within 30 days.

(e) In determining whether to issue a firearms restraining order under this Section, the court shall consider evidence including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The unlawful and reckless use, display, or brandishing of a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm by the respondent.

(2) The history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force by the respondent against another person.

(3) Any prior arrest of the respondent for a felony offense.

(4) Evidence of the abuse of controlled substances or alcohol by the respondent.

(5) A recent threat of violence or act of violence by the respondent directed toward himself, herself, or another.

(6) A violation of an emergency order of protection issued under Section 217 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 or of an order of protection issued under Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or Section 112A-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(7) A pattern of violent acts or violent threats, including, but not limited to, threats of violence or acts of violence by the respondent directed toward himself, herself, or another.

(f) At the hearing, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent poses a significant danger of personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(g) If the court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence to issue a plenary firearms restraining order, the court shall issue a firearms restraining order that shall be in effect for up to one year, but not less than 6 months, 6-month subject to renewal under Section 45 of this Act or termination under that Section.

(g-5) If the court issues a plenary 6-month firearms restraining order, it shall, upon a finding of probable cause that the respondent possesses firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, issue a search

warrant directing a law enforcement agency to seize the respondent's firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. The court may, as part of that warrant, direct the law enforcement agency to search the respondent's residence and other places where the court finds there is probable cause to believe he or she is likely to possess the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm. A return of the search warrant shall be filed by the law enforcement agency within 4 days thereafter, setting forth the time, date, and location that the search warrant was executed and what items, if any, were seized.

(h) A plenary 6-month ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order shall require:

(1) the respondent to refrain from having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving additional firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm for the duration of the order under Section 8.2 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act; and

(2) the respondent to comply with Section 9.5 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act and subsection (g) of Section 70 of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

(i) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i-5) of this Section, upon expiration of the period of safekeeping, if the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm or Firearm Owner's Identification Card cannot be

returned to the respondent because the respondent cannot be located, fails to respond to requests to retrieve the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, or is not lawfully eligible to possess a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, upon petition from the local law enforcement agency, the court may order the local law enforcement agency to destroy the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, use the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm for training purposes, or use the firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm for any other application as deemed appropriate by the local law enforcement agency.

(i-5) A respondent whose Firearm Owner's Identification Card has been revoked or suspended may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the respondent's petition, to transfer the respondent's firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm to a person who is lawfully able to possess the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm if the person does not reside at the same address as the respondent. Notice of the petition shall be served upon the person protected by the emergency firearms restraining order. While the order is in effect, the transferee who receives the respondent's firearms, ammunition, and firearm

parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she shall not transfer the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm to the respondent or to anyone residing in the same residence as the respondent.

(i-6) If a person other than the respondent claims title to any firearms, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm surrendered under this Section, he or she may petition the court, if the petitioner is present in court or has notice of the petition, to have the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm returned to him or her. If the court determines that person to be the lawful owner of the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm, the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm shall be returned to him or her, provided that:

(1) the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are removed from the respondent's custody, control, or possession and the lawful owner agrees to store the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner such that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm; and

(2) the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm are not otherwise unlawfully possessed by the owner.

The person petitioning for the return of his or her firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm must swear or affirm by affidavit that he or she: (i) is the lawful owner of the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm; (ii) shall not transfer the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm to the respondent; and (iii) will store the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm in a manner that the respondent does not have access to or control of the firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(j) If the court does not issue a firearms restraining order at the hearing, the court shall dissolve any emergency firearms restraining order then in effect.

(k) When the court issues a firearms restraining order under this Section, the court shall inform the respondent that he or she is entitled to one hearing during the period of the order to request a termination of the order, under Section 45 of this Act, and shall provide the respondent with a form to request a hearing.

(Source: P.A. 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 102-237, eff. 1-1-22; 102-345, eff. 6-1-22; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)

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(430 ILCS 67/45)

Sec. 45. Termination and renewal.

(a) A person subject to a firearms restraining order issued under this Act may submit one written request at any time during the effective period of the order for a hearing to terminate the order.

(1) The respondent shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent does not pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(2) If the court finds after the hearing that the respondent has met his or her burden, the court shall terminate the order.

(b) A petitioner may request a renewal of a firearms restraining order at any time within the 3 months before the expiration of a firearms restraining order.

(1) A court shall, after notice and a hearing, renew a firearms restraining order issued under this part if the petitioner proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent continues to pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

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(2) In determining whether to renew a firearms restraining order issued under this Act, the court shall consider evidence of the facts identified in subsection (e) of Section 40 of this Act and any other evidence of an increased risk for violence.

(3) At the hearing, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent continues to pose a danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another in the near future by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, and firearm parts that could be assembled to make an operable firearm.

(4) The renewal of a firearms restraining order issued under this Section shall be in effect for up to one year and may be renewed for an additional period of up to one year ~~6 months~~, subject to termination by further order of the court at a hearing held under this Section and further renewal by further order of the court under this Section.

(Source: P.A. 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 102-345, eff. 6-1-22.)

(430 ILCS 67/55)

Sec. 55. Data maintenance by law enforcement agencies.

(a) All sheriffs shall furnish to the Illinois State Police, daily, in the form and detail the Illinois State Police Department ~~Department~~ requires, copies of any recorded firearms restraining orders issued by the court, and any foreign orders of protection filed by the clerk of the

court, and transmitted to the sheriff by the clerk of the court under Section 50. Each firearms restraining order shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) on the same day it is issued by the court. If an emergency firearms restraining order was issued in accordance with Section 35 of this Act, the order shall be entered in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) as soon as possible after receipt from the clerk.

(b) The Illinois State Police shall maintain a complete and systematic record and index of all valid and recorded firearms restraining orders issued or filed under this Act. The data shall be used to inform all dispatchers and law enforcement officers at the scene of a violation of a firearms restraining order of the effective dates and terms of any recorded order of protection.

(c) The data, records, and transmittals required under this Section shall pertain to any valid emergency or plenary ~~6-month~~ firearms restraining order, whether issued in a civil or criminal proceeding or authorized under the laws of another state, tribe, or United States territory.

(Source: P.A. 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

Section 25. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by changing Section 24-1 and by adding Sections 24-1.9 and 24-1.10 as follows:

(720 ILCS 5/24-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 24-1)

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Sec. 24-1. Unlawful use of weapons.

(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

(1) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any bludgeon, black-jack, slung-shot, sand-club, sand-bag, metal knuckles or other knuckle weapon regardless of its composition, throwing star, or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or a ballistic knife, which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material or compressed gas; or

(2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, broken bottle or other piece of glass, stun gun or taser or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like character; or

(2.5) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, any firearm in a church, synagogue, mosque, or other building, structure, or place used for religious worship; or

(3) Carries on or about his person or in any vehicle, a tear gas gun projector or bomb or any object containing noxious liquid gas or substance, other than an object containing a non-lethal noxious liquid gas or substance designed solely for personal defense carried by a person 18 years of age or older; or

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(4) Carries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person's permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm, except that this subsection (a) (4) does not apply to or affect transportation of weapons that meet one of the following conditions:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card; or

(iv) are carried or possessed in accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; or

(5) Sets a spring gun; or

(6) Possesses any device or attachment of any kind designed, used or intended for use in silencing the report of any firearm; or

(7) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries:

(i) a machine gun, which shall be defined for the purposes of this subsection as

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any weapon, which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot without manually reloading by a single function of the trigger, including the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses, or carries any combination of parts designed or intended for use in converting any weapon into a machine gun, or any combination or parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person;

(ii) any rifle having one or more barrels less than 16 inches in length or a shotgun having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length or any weapon made from a rifle or shotgun, whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if such a weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches; or

(iii) any bomb, bomb-shell, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce for like purposes, such as, but not limited to, black powder bombs and Molotov cocktails or artillery projectiles; or

(8) Carries or possesses any firearm, stun gun or taser or other deadly weapon in any place which is licensed to sell intoxicating beverages, or at any public gathering held pursuant to a license issued by any governmental body or any public gathering at which an admission is charged, excluding a place where a showing, demonstration or

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lecture involving the exhibition of unloaded firearms is conducted.

This subsection (a) (8) does not apply to any auction or raffle of a firearm held pursuant to a license or permit issued by a governmental body, nor does it apply to persons engaged in firearm safety training courses; or

(9) Carries or possesses in a vehicle or on or about his or her person any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or firearm or ballistic knife, when he or she is hooded, robed or masked in such manner as to conceal his or her identity; or

(10) Carries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any public street, alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village, or incorporated town, except when an invitee thereon or therein, for the purpose of the display of such weapon or the lawful commerce in weapons, or except when on his land or in his or her own abode, legal dwelling, or fixed place of business, or on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person's permission, any pistol, revolver, stun gun, or taser or other firearm, except that this subsection (a) (10) does not apply to or affect transportation of weapons that meet one of the following conditions:

(i) are broken down in a non-functioning state; or

(ii) are not immediately accessible; or

(iii) are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who has been issued a

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currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card; or

(iv) are carried or possessed in accordance with the Firearm Concealed Carry Act by a person who has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

A "stun gun or taser", as used in this paragraph (a) means (i) any device which is powered by electrical charging units, such as, batteries, and which fires one or several barbs attached to a length of wire and which, upon hitting a human, can send out a current capable of disrupting the person's nervous system in such a manner as to render him incapable of normal functioning or (ii) any device which is powered by electrical charging units, such as batteries, and which, upon contact with a human or clothing worn by a human, can send out current capable of disrupting the person's nervous system in such a manner as to render him incapable of normal functioning; or

(11) Sells, manufactures, delivers, imports, possesses, or purchases any assault weapon attachment or .50 caliber cartridge in violation of Section 24-1.9 or any explosive bullet. For purposes of this paragraph (a) "explosive bullet" means the projectile portion of an ammunition cartridge which contains or carries an explosive charge which will explode upon contact with the flesh of a human or an animal. "Cartridge" means a tubular metal case having a projectile affixed at the front thereof and a cap or primer at the rear

end thereof, with the propellant contained in such tube between the projectile and the cap; or

(12) (Blank) ; or

(13) Carries or possesses on or about his or her person while in a building occupied by a unit of government, a billy club, other weapon of like character, or other instrument of like character intended for use as a weapon. For the purposes of this Section, "billy club" means a short stick or club commonly carried by police officers which is either telescopic or constructed of a solid piece of wood or other man-made material; or

(14) Manufactures, possesses, sells, or offers to sell, purchase, manufacture, import, transfer, or use any device, part, kit, tool, accessory, or combination of parts that is designed to and functions to increase the rate of fire of a semiautomatic firearm above the standard rate of fire for semiautomatic firearms that is not equipped with that device, part, or combination of parts; or

(15) Carries or possesses any assault weapon or .50 caliber rifle in violation of Section 24-1.9; or

(16) Manufactures, sells, delivers, imports, or purchases any assault weapon or .50 caliber rifle in violation of Section 24-1.9.

(b) Sentence. A person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(1) through (5), subsection 24-1(a)(10), subsection 24-1(a)(11), ~~or~~ subsection 24-1(a)(13), or 24-1(a)(15) commits a Class A misdemeanor. A person convicted of a violation of subsection

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24-1(a)(8) or 24-1(a)(9) commits a Class 4 felony; a person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(6), ~~or 24-1(a)(7)(ii), 24-1(a)(7)(iii), or 24-1(a)(16) or (iii)~~ commits a Class 3 felony. A person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(7)(i) commits a Class 2 felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years, unless the weapon is possessed in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle as defined in Section 1-146 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or on the person, while the weapon is loaded, in which case it shall be a Class X felony. A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of subsection 24-1(a)(4), 24-1(a)(8), 24-1(a)(9), ~~or 24-1(a)(10), or 24-1(a)(15)~~ commits a Class 3 felony. A person convicted of a violation of subsection 24-1(a)(2.5) ~~or 24-1(a)(14)~~ commits a Class 2 felony. The possession of each weapon or device in violation of this Section constitutes a single and separate violation.

(c) Violations in specific places.

(1) A person who violates subsection 24-1(a)(6) or 24-1(a)(7) in any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, in residential property owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a public park, in a courthouse, on the real property comprising any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, on residential property owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, on the real property comprising any public

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park, on the real property comprising any courthouse, in any conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a public transportation agency, or on any public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school, public park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development commits a Class 2 felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years.

(1.5) A person who violates subsection 24-1(a) (4), 24-1(a) (9), or 24-1(a) (10) in any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, in residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a public park, in a courthouse, on the real property comprising any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, on residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, on the real property comprising any public park, on the real property comprising any courthouse, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a public transportation agency, or on any public way within 1,000 feet of

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the real property comprising any school, public park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development commits a Class 3 felony.

(2) A person who violates subsection 24-1(a) (1), 24-1(a) (2), or 24-1(a) (3) in any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, in residential property owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, in a public park, in a courthouse, on the real property comprising any school, regardless of the time of day or the time of year, on residential property owned, operated or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development, on the real property comprising any public park, on the real property comprising any courthouse, in any conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school related activity, in any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a public transportation agency, or on any public way within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school, public park, courthouse, public transportation facility, or residential property owned, operated, or managed by a public housing agency or leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixed-income development commits a Class 4 felony. "Courthouse" means any building that is used

by the Circuit, Appellate, or Supreme Court of this State for the conduct of official business.

(3) Paragraphs (1), (1.5), and (2) of this subsection (c) shall not apply to law enforcement officers or security officers of such school, college, or university or to students carrying or possessing firearms for use in training courses, parades, hunting, target shooting on school ranges, or otherwise with the consent of school authorities and which firearms are transported unloaded enclosed in a suitable case, box, or transportation package.

(4) For the purposes of this subsection (c), “school” means any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university.

(5) For the purposes of this subsection (c), “public transportation agency” means a public or private agency that provides for the transportation or conveyance of persons by means available to the general public, except for transportation by automobiles not used for conveyance of the general public as passengers; and “public transportation facility” means a terminal or other place where one may obtain public transportation.

(d) The presence in an automobile other than a public omnibus of any weapon, instrument or substance referred to in subsection (a) (7) is prima facie evidence that it is in the possession of, and is being carried by, all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, instrument or substance is found, except under the following circumstances: (i) if such weapon, instrument or instrumentality is found upon

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the person of one of the occupants therein; or (ii) if such weapon, instrument or substance is found in an automobile operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his or her trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the driver.

(e) Exemptions.

(1) Crossbows, Common or Compound bows and Underwater Spearguns are exempted from the definition of ballistic knife as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section.

(2) The provision of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Section prohibiting the sale, manufacture, purchase, possession, or carrying of any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, does not apply to a person who possesses a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police or to a person or an entity engaged in the business of selling or manufacturing switchblade knives.

(Source: P.A. 101-223, eff. 1-1-20; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.9 new)

Sec. 24-1.9. Manufacture, possession, delivery, sale, and purchase of assault weapons, .50 caliber rifles, and .50 caliber cartridges.

(a) Definitions. In this Section:

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(1) “Assault weapon” means any of the following, except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection:

(A) A semiautomatic rifle that has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine or that may be readily modified to accept a detachable magazine, if the firearm has one or more of the following:

(i) a pistol grip or thumbhole stock;

(ii) any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand;

(iii) a folding, telescoping, thumbhole, or detachable stock, or a stock that is otherwise foldable or adjustable in a manner that operates to reduce the length, size, or any other dimension, or otherwise enhances the concealability of the weapon;

(iv) a flash suppressor;

(v) a grenade launcher;

(vi) a shroud attached to the barrel or that partially or completely encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide that encloses the barrel.

(B) A semiautomatic rifle that has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds, except for an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable

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of operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition.

(C) A semiautomatic pistol that has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine or that may be readily modified to accept a detachable magazine, if the firearm has one or more of the following:

(i) a threaded barrel;

(ii) a second pistol grip or another feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand;

(iii) a shroud attached to the barrel or that partially or completely encircles the barrel, allowing the bearer to hold the firearm with the non-trigger hand without being burned, but excluding a slide that encloses the barrel;

(iv) a flash suppressor;

(v) the capacity to accept a detachable magazine at some location outside of the pistol grip; or

(vi) a buffer tube, arm brace, or other part that protrudes horizontally behind the pistol grip and is designed or redesigned to allow or facilitate a firearm to be fired from the shoulder.

(D) A semiautomatic pistol that has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 15 rounds.

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(E) Any shotgun with a revolving cylinder.

(F) A semiautomatic shotgun that has one or more of the following:

(i) a pistol grip or thumbhole stock;

(ii) any feature capable of functioning as a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand;

(iii) a folding or thumbhole stock;

(iv) a grenade launcher;

(v) a fixed magazine with the capacity of more than 5 rounds; or

(vi) the capacity to accept a detachable magazine.

(G) Any semiautomatic firearm that has the capacity to accept a belt ammunition feeding device.

(H) Any firearm that has been modified to be operable as an assault weapon as defined in this Section.

(I) Any part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, including any combination of parts from which an assault weapon may be readily assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person.

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(J) All of the following rifles, copies, duplicates, variants, or altered facsimiles with the capability of any such weapon:

(i) All AK types, including the following:

(I) AK, AK47, AK47S, AK-74, AKM, AKS, ARM, MAK90, MISR, NHM90, NHM91, SA85, SA93, Vector Arms AK-47, VEPR, WASR-10, and WUM.

(II) IZHMASH Saiqa AK.

(III) MAADI AK47 and ARM.

(IV) Norinco 56S, 56S2, 84S, and 86S.

(V) Poly Technologies AK47 and AKS.

(VI) SKS with a detachable magazine.

(ii) all AR types, including the following:

(I) AR-10.

(II) AR-15.

(III) Alexander Arms Overmatch Plus 16.

(IV) Armalite M15 22LR Carbine.

(V) Armalite M15-T.

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(VI) Barrett REC7.

(VII) Beretta AR-70.

(VIII) Black Rain Ordnance
Recon Scout.

(IX) Bushmaster ACR.

(X) Bushmaster Carbon 15.

(XI) Bushmaster MOE series.

(XII) Bushmaster XM15.

(XIII) Chiappa Firearms
MFour rifles.

(XIV) Colt Match Target rifles.

(XV) CORE Rifle Systems
CORE15 rifles.

(XVI) Daniel Defense M4A1 ri-
fles.

(XVII) Devil Dog Arms 15 Se-
ries rifles.

(XVIII) Diamondback DB15 ri-
fles.

(XIX) DoubleStar AR rifles.

(XX) DPMS Tactical rifles.

(XXI) DSA Inc. 2M-4 Carbine.

(XXII) Heckler & Koch MR556.

(XXIII) High Standard HSA-15
rifles.

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(XXIV) Jesse James Nomad AR-15 rifle.

(XXV) Knight's Armament SR-15.

(XXVI) Lancer L15 rifles.

(XXVII) MGI Hydra Series rifles.

(XXVIII) Mossberg MMR Tactical rifles.

(XXIX) Noreen Firearms BN 36 rifle.

(XXX) Olympic Arms.

(XXXI) POF USA P415.

(XXXII) Precision Firearms AR rifles.

(XXXIII) Remington R-15 rifles.

(XXXIV) Rhino Arms AR rifles.

(XXXV) Rock River Arms LAR-15 or Rock River Arms LAR-47.

(XXXVI) Sig Sauer SIG516 rifles and MCX rifles.

(XXXVII) Smith & Wesson M&P15 rifles.

(XXXVIII) Stag Arms AR rifles.

(XXXIX) Sturm, Ruger & Co. SR556 and AR-556 rifles.

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(XL) Uselton Arms Air-Lite M-4 rifles.

(XLI) Windham Weaponry AR rifles.

(XLII) WMD Guns Big Beast.

(XLIII) Yankee Hill Machine Company, Inc. YHM-15 rifles.

(iii) Barrett M107A1.

(iv) Barrett M82A1.

(v) Beretta CX4 Storm.

(vi) Calico Liberty Series.

(vii) CETME Sporter.

(viii) Daewoo K-1, K-2, Max 1, Max 2, AR 100, and AR 110C.

(ix) Fabrique Nationale/FN Herstal FAL, LAR, 22 FNC, 308 Match, L1A1 Sporter, PS90, SCAR, and FS2000.

(x) Feather Industries AT-9.

(xi) Galil Model AR and Model ARM.

(xii) Hi-Point Carbine.

(xiii) HK-91, HK-93, HK-94, HK-PSG-1, and HK USC.

(xiv) IWI TAVOR, Galil ACE rifle.

(xv) Kel-Tec Sub-2000, SU-16, and RFB.

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(xvi) SIG AMT, SIG PE-57, Sig Sauer SG 550, Sig Sauer SG 551, and SIG MCX.

(xvii) Springfield Armory SAR-48.

(xviii) Steyr AUG.

(xix) Sturm, Ruger & Co. Mini-14 Tactical Rifle M-14/20CF.

(xx) All Thompson rifles, including the following:

(I) Thompson M1SB.

(II) Thompson T1100D.

(III) Thompson T150D.

(IV) Thompson T1B.

(V) Thompson T1B100D.

(VI) Thompson T1B50D.

(VII) Thompson T1BSB.

(VIII) Thompson T1-C.

(IX) Thompson T1D.

(X) Thompson T1SB.

(XI) Thompson T5.

(XII) Thompson T5100D.

(XIII) Thompson TM1.

(XIV) Thompson TM1C.

(xxi) UMAREX UZI rifle.

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(xxii) UZI Mini Carbine, UZI Model A Carbine, and UZI Model B Carbine.

(xxiii) Valmet MUS, M71S, and M78.

(xxiv) Vector Arms UZI Type.

(xxv) Weaver Arms Nighthawk.

(xxvi) Wilkinson Arms Linda Carbine.

(K) All of the following pistols, copies, duplicates, variants, or altered facsimiles with the capability of any such weapon thereof:

(i) All AK types, including the following:

(I) Centurion 39 AK pistol.

(II) CZ Scorpion pistol.

(III) Draco AK-47 pistol.

(IV) HCR AK-47 pistol.

(V) ID Inc. Bellpup AK-47 pistol.

(VI) Krinkov pistol.

(VII) Mini Draco AK-47 pistol.

(VIII) PAP M92 pistol.

(IX) Yugo Krebs Krink pistol.

(ii) All AR types, including the following:

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(I) American Spirit AR-15 pistol.

(II) Bushmaster Carbon 15 pistol.

(III) Chiappa Firearms M4 Pistol GEN II.

(IV) CORE Rifle Systems CORE15 Roscoe pistol.

(V) Daniel Defense MK18 pistol.

(VI) DoubleStar Corporation AR pistol.

(VII) DPMS AR-15 pistol.

(VIII) Jesse James Nomad AR-15 pistol.

(IX) Olympic Arms AR-15 pistol.

(X) Osprey Armament MK-18 pistol.

(XI) POF USA AR pistols.

(XII) Rock River Arms LAR 15 pistol.

(XIII) Uselton Arms Air-Lite M-4 pistol.

(iii) Calico pistols.

(iv) DSA SA58 PKP FAL pistol.

(v) Encom MP-9 and MP-45.

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(vi) Heckler & Koch model SP-89 pistol.

(vii) Intratec AB-10, TEC-22 Scorpion, TEC-9, and TEC-D09.

(viii) IWI Galil Ace pistol, UZI PRO pistol.

(ix) Kel-Tec PLR 16 pistol.

(x) All MAC types, including the following:

(I) MAC-10.

(II) MAC-11.

(III) Masterpiece Arms MPA A930 Mini Pistol, MPA460 Pistol, MPA Tactical Pistol, and MPA Mini Tactical Pistol.

(IV) Military Armament Corp. Ingram M-11.

(V) Velocity Arms VMAC.

(xi) Sig Sauer P556 pistol.

(xii) Sites Spectre.

(xiii) All Thompson types, including the following:

(I) Thompson TA510D.

(II) Thompson TA5.

(xiv) All UZI types, including Micro-UZI.

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(L) All of the following shotguns, copies, duplicates, variants, or altered facsimiles with the capability of any such weapon thereof:

(i) DERYA Anakon MC-1980, Anakon SD12.

(ii) Doruk Lethal shotguns.

(iii) Franchi LAW-12 and SPAS 12.

(iv) All IZHMASH Saiqa 12 types, including the following:

(I) IZHMASH Saiqa 12.

(II) IZHMASH Saiqa 12S.

(III) IZHMASH Saiqa 12S EXP-01.

(IV) IZHMASH Saiqa 12K.

(V) =MASH Saiqa 12K-030.

(VI) =MASH Saiqa 12K-040 Taktika.

(v) Streetsweeper.

(vi) Striker 12.

(2) "Assault weapon" does not include:

(A) Any firearm that is an unserviceable firearm or has been made permanently inoperable.

(B) An antique firearm or a replica of an antique firearm.

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(C) A firearm that is manually operated by bolt, pump, lever or slide action, unless the firearm is a shotgun with a revolving cylinder.

(D) Any air rifle as defined in Section 24.8-0.1 of this Code.

(E) Any handgun, as defined under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, unless otherwise listed in this Section.

(3) "Assault weapon attachment" means any device capable of being attached to a firearm that is specifically designed for making or converting a firearm into any of the firearms listed in paragraph (1) of this subsection (a).

(4) "Antique firearm" has the meaning ascribed to it in 18 U.S.C. 921(a) (16).

(5) ".50 caliber rifle" means a centerfire rifle capable of firing a .50 caliber cartridge. The term does not include any antique firearm, any shotgun including a shotgun that has a rifle barrel, or any muzzle-loader which uses black powder for hunting or historical reenactments.

(6) ".50 caliber cartridge" means a cartridge in .50 BMG caliber, either by designation or actual measurement, that is capable of being fired from a centerfire rifle. The term ".50 caliber cartridge" does not include any memorabilia or display item that is filled with a permanent inert substance or that is otherwise permanently altered in a manner that prevents ready modification for use as live ammunition or shotgun ammunition with a caliber measurement that is equal to or greater than .50 caliber.

(7) “Detachable magazine” means an ammunition feeding device that may be removed from a firearm without disassembly of the firearm action, including an ammunition feeding device that may be readily removed from a firearm with the use of a bullet, cartridge, accessory, or other tool, or any other object that functions as a tool, including a bullet or cartridge.

(8) “Fixed magazine” means an ammunition feeding device that is permanently attached to a firearm, or contained in and not removable from a firearm, or that is otherwise not a detachable magazine, but does not include an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable of operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, it is unlawful for any person within this State to knowingly manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase or cause to be manufactured, delivered, sold, imported, or purchased by another, an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), beginning January 1, 2024, it is unlawful for any person within this State to knowingly possess an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge.

(d) This Section does not apply to a person’s possession of an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge device if

the person lawfully possessed that assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge prohibited by subsection (c) of this Section, if the person has provided in an endorsement affidavit, prior to January 1, 2024, under oath or affirmation and in the form and manner prescribed by the Illinois State Police, no later than October 1, 2023:

(1) the affiant's Firearm Owner's Identification Card number;

(2) an affirmation that the affiant: (i) possessed an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly; or (ii) inherited the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge from a person with an endorsement under this Section or from a person authorized under subdivisions (1) through (5) of subsection (e) to possess the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge; and

(3) the make, model, caliber, and serial number of the .50 caliber rifle or assault weapon or assault weapons listed in paragraphs (J), (K), and (L) of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this Section possessed by the affiant prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly and any assault weapons identified and published by the Illinois State Police pursuant to this subdivision (3). No later than October 1, 2023, and every October 1 thereafter, the Illinois State Police shall, via rulemaking, identify, publish, and make available on its website, the list of assault

weapons subject to an endorsement affidavit under this subsection (d). The list shall identify, but is not limited to, the copies, duplicates, variants, and altered facsimiles of the assault weapons identified in paragraphs (J), (K), and (L) of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this Section and shall be consistent with the definition of “assault weapon” identified in this Section. The Illinois State Police may adopt emergency rulemaking in accordance with Section 5-45 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. The adoption of emergency rules authorized by Section 5-45 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act and this paragraph is deemed to be necessary for the public interest, safety, and welfare.

The affidavit form shall include the following statement printed in bold type: “Warning: Entering false information on this form is punishable as perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012. Entering false information on this form is a violation of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.”

In any administrative, civil, or criminal proceeding in this State, a completed endorsement affidavit submitted to the Illinois State Police by a person under this Section creates a rebuttable presumption that the person is entitled to possess and transport the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge.

Beginning 90 days after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, a person authorized under this Section to possess an assault

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weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge shall possess such items only:

(1) on private property owned or immediately controlled by the person;

(2) on private property that is not open to the public with the express permission of the person who owns or immediately controls such property;

(3) while on the premises of a licensed firearms dealer or gunsmith for the purpose of lawful repair;

(4) while engaged in the legal use of the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge at a properly licensed firing range or sport shooting competition venue; or

(5) while traveling to or from these locations, provided that the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, or .50 caliber rifle is unloaded and the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge is enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container.

Beginning on January 1, 2024, the person with the endorsement for an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge or a person authorized under subdivisions (1) through (5) of subsection (e) to possess an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge may transfer the assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber

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cartridge only to an heir, an individual residing in another state maintaining it in another state, or a dealer licensed as a federal firearms dealer under Section 923 of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Within 10 days after transfer of the weapon except to an heir, the person shall notify the Illinois State Police of the name and address of the transferee and comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of Section 3 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act. The person to whom the weapon or ammunition is transferred shall, within 60 days of the transfer, complete an affidavit required under this Section. A person to whom the weapon is transferred may transfer it only as provided in this subsection.

Except as provided in subsection (e) and beginning on January 1, 2024, any person who moves into this State in possession of an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge shall, within 60 days, apply for a Firearm Owners Identification Card and complete an endorsement application as outlined in subsection (d).

Notwithstanding any other law, information contained in the endorsement affidavit shall be confidential, is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and shall not be disclosed, except to law enforcement agencies acting in the performance of their duties.

(e) The provisions of this Section regarding the purchase or possession of assault weapons, assault weapon attachments, .50 caliber rifles, and .50

cartridges, as well as the provisions of this Section that prohibit causing those items to be purchased or possessed, do not apply to:

(1) Peace officers, as defined in Section 2-13 of this Code.

(2) Qualified law enforcement officers and qualified retired law enforcement officers as defined in the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (18 U.S.C. 926B and 926C) and as recognized under Illinois law.

(3) Acquisition and possession by a federal, State, or local law enforcement agency for the purpose of equipping the agency's peace officers as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (e).

(4) Wardens, superintendents, and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense.

(5) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard, while performing their official duties or while traveling to or from their places of duty.

(6) Any company that employs armed security officers in this State at a nuclear energy, storage, weapons, or development site or facility regulated by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and any person employed as an armed security force member at a nuclear energy, storage, weapons, or development site or facility regulated by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission

who has completed the background screening and training mandated by the rules and regulations of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and while performing official duties.

(7) Any private security contractor agency licensed under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004 that employs private security contractors and any private security contractor who is licensed and has been issued a firearm control card under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004 while performing official duties.

The provisions of this Section do not apply to the manufacture, delivery, sale, import, purchase, or possession of an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge or causing the manufacture, delivery, sale, importation, purchase, or possession of those items:

(A) for sale or transfer to persons authorized under subdivisions (1) through (7) of this subsection (e) to possess those items;

(B) for sale or transfer to the United States or any department or agency thereof; or

(C) for sale or transfer in another state or for export.

This Section does not apply to or affect any of the following:

(i) Possession of any firearm if that firearm is sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee and by USA Shooting, the national governing body for international shooting competition in the United States, but only when the firearm is in the actual possession of an Olympic target shooting competitor or target shooting coach for the purpose of storage, transporting to and from Olympic target shooting practice or events if the firearm is broken down in a nonfunctioning state, is not immediately accessible, or is unloaded and enclosed in a firearm case, carrying box, shipping box, or other similar portable container designed for the safe transportation of firearms, and when the Olympic target shooting competitor or target shooting coach is engaging in those practices or events. For the purposes of this paragraph (8), “firearm” has the meaning provided in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.

(ii) Any nonresident who transports, within 24 hours, a weapon for any lawful purpose from any place where the nonresident may lawfully possess and carry that weapon to any other place where the nonresident may lawfully possess and carry that weapon if, during the transportation, the weapon is unloaded, and neither the weapon nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of the transporting vehicle. In the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment, the weapon or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console.

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(iii) Possession of a weapon at an event taking place at the World Shooting and Recreational Complex at Sparta, only while engaged in the legal use of the weapon, or while traveling to or from that location if the weapon is broken down in a nonfunctioning state, is not immediately accessible, or is unloaded and enclosed in a firearm case, carrying box, shipping box, or other similar portable container designed for the safe transportation of firearms.

(iv) Possession of a weapon only for hunting use expressly permitted under the Wildlife Code, or while traveling to or from a location authorized for this hunting use under the Wildlife Code if the weapon is broken down in a nonfunctioning state, is not immediately accessible, or is unloaded and enclosed in a firearm case, carrying box, shipping box, or other similar portable container designed for the safe transportation of firearms. By October 1, 2023, the Illinois State Police, in consultation with the Department of Natural Resources, shall adopt rules concerning the list of applicable weapons approved under this subparagraph (iv). The Illinois State Police may adopt emergency rules in accordance with Section 5-45 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act. The adoption of emergency rules authorized by Section 5-45 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act and this paragraph is deemed to be necessary for the public interest, safety, and welfare.

(v) The manufacture, transportation, possession, sale, or rental of blank-firing assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles, or the weapon's respective attachments, to persons authorized or

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permitted, or both authorized and permitted, to acquire and possess these weapons or attachments for the purpose of rental for use solely as props for a motion picture, television, or video production or entertainment event.

Any person not subject to this Section may submit an endorsement affidavit if the person chooses.

(f) Any sale or transfer with a background check initiated to the Illinois State Police on or before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly is allowed to be completed after the effective date of this amendatory Act once an approval is issued by the Illinois State Police and any applicable waiting period under Section 24-3 has expired.

(g) The Illinois State Police shall take all steps necessary to carry out the requirements of this Section within by October 1, 2023.

(h) The Department of the State Police shall also develop and implement a public notice and public outreach campaign to promote awareness about the provisions of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly and to increase compliance with this Section.

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.10 new)

Sec. 24-1.10. Manufacture, delivery, sale, and possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices.

(a) In this Section:

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“Handgun” has the meaning ascribed to it in the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.

“Long gun” means a rifle or shotgun.

“Large capacity ammunition feeding device” means:

(1) a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device that has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than 10 rounds of ammunition for long guns and more than 15 rounds of ammunition for handguns; or

(2) any combination of parts from which a device described in paragraph (1) can be assembled.

“Large capacity ammunition feeding device” does not include an attached tubular device designed to accept, and capable of operating only with, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition. “Large capacity ammunition feeding device” does not include a tubular magazine that is contained in a lever-action firearm or any device that has been made permanently inoperable.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f), it is unlawful for any person within this State to knowingly manufacture, deliver, sell, purchase, or cause to be manufactured, delivered, sold, or purchased a large capacity ammunition feeding device.

(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f), and beginning 90 days after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, it

is unlawful to knowingly possess a large capacity ammunition feeding device.

(d) Subsection (c) does not apply to a person's possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device if the person lawfully possessed that large capacity ammunition feeding device before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, provided that the person shall possess such device only:

(1) on private property owned or immediately controlled by the person;

(2) on private property that is not open to the public with the express permission of the person who owns or immediately controls such property;

(3) while on the premises of a licensed firearms dealer or gunsmith for the purpose of lawful repair;

(4) while engaged in the legal use of the large capacity ammunition feeding device at a properly licensed firing range or sport shooting competition venue; or

(5) while traveling to or from these locations, provided that the large capacity ammunition feeding device is stored unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other container.

A person authorized under this Section to possess a large capacity ammunition feeding device may transfer the large capacity ammunition feeding device only

to an heir, an individual residing in another state maintaining it in another state, or a dealer licensed as a federal firearms dealer under Section 923 of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Within 10 days after transfer of the large capacity ammunition feeding device except to an heir, the person shall notify the Illinois State Police of the name and address of the transferee and comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of Section 3 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act. The person to whom the large capacity ammunition feeding device is transferred shall, within 60 days of the transfer, notify the Illinois State Police of the person's acquisition and comply with the requirements of subsection (b) of Section 3 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act. A person to whom the large capacity ammunition feeding device is transferred may transfer it only as provided in this subsection.

Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f) and beginning 90 days after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, any person who moves into this State in possession of a large capacity ammunition feeding device shall, within 60 days, apply for a Firearm Owners Identification Card.

(e) The provisions of this Section regarding the purchase or possession of large capacity ammunition feeding devices, as well as the provisions of this Section that prohibit causing those items to be purchased or possessed, do not apply to:

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(1) Peace officers as defined in Section 2-13 of this Code.

(2) Qualified law enforcement officers and qualified retired law enforcement officers as defined in the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 (18 U.S.C. 926B and 926C) and as recognized under Illinois law.

(3) A federal, State, or local law enforcement agency for the purpose of equipping the agency's peace officers as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection (e).

(4) Wardens, superintendents, and keepers of prisons, penitentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense.

(5) Members of the Armed Services or Reserve Forces of the United States or the Illinois National Guard, while their official duties or while traveling to or from their places of duty.

(6) Any company that employs armed security officers in this State at a nuclear energy, storage, weapons, or development site or facility regulated by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and any person employed as an armed security force member at a nuclear energy, storage, weapons, or development site or facility regulated by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission who has completed the background screening and training mandated by the rules and regulations of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and while performing official duties.

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(7) Any private security contractor agency licensed under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004 that employs private security contractors and any private security contractor who is licensed and has been issued a firearm control card under the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, Fingerprint Vendor, and Locksmith Act of 2004 while performing official duties.

(f) This Section does not apply to or affect any of the following:

(1) Manufacture, delivery, sale, importation, purchase, or possession or causing to be manufactured, delivered, sold, imported, purchased, or possessed a large capacity ammunition feeding device:

(A) for sale or transfer to persons authorized under subdivisions (1) through (7) of subsection (e) to possess those items;

(B) for sale or transfer to the United States or any department or agency thereof;
or

(C) for sale or transfer in another state or for export.

(2) Sale or rental of large capacity ammunition feeding devices for blank-firing assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles, to persons authorized or permitted, or both authorized and permitted, to acquire these devices for the purpose of rental for

use solely as props for a motion picture, television, or video production or entertainment event.

(g) Sentence. A person who knowingly manufactures, delivers, sells, purchases, possesses, or causes to be manufactured, delivered, sold, possessed, or purchased in violation of this Section a large capacity ammunition feeding device capable of holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition for long guns or more than 15 rounds of ammunition for handguns commits a petty offense with a fine of \$1,000 for each violation.

(h) The Department of the State Police shall also develop and implement a public notice and public outreach campaign to promote awareness about the provisions of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly and to increase compliance with this Section.

Section 95. No acceleration or delay. Where this Act makes changes in a statute that is represented in this Act by text that is not yet or no longer in effect (for example, a Section represented by multiple versions), the use of that text does not accelerate or delay the taking effect of (i) the changes made by this Act or (ii) provisions derived from any other Public Act.

Section 97. Severability. The provisions of this Act are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.

Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect upon becoming law.
