

APPENDIX

**APPENDIX TO THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Reversing Preliminary Injunction (Sept. 28, 2023).....	1a
Appendix B: Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Granting Preliminary Injunction (June 28, 2023)	104a
Appendix C: Judgment and Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Staying Preliminary Injunction (July 8, 2023).....	191a
Appendix D: Order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Denying Defendants’ Motion for a Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (June 30, 2023).....	216a
Appendix E: Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Granting United States’ Motion to Intervene (May 16, 2023).....	221a
Appendix F: Order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee Denying Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate Preliminary Injunction Hearing With Trial on the Merits (May 8, 2023).....	230a
Appendix G: State of Tennessee Senate Bill No. 1	238a

1a

APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-5600

L. W., by and through her parents and next friends,
Samantha Williams and Brian Williams;
SAMANTHA WILLIAMS; BRIAN WILLIAMS; JOHN DOE,
by and through his parents and next friends,
Jane Doe and James Doe; JANE DOE; JAMES DOE;
RYAN ROE, by and through his parent and
next friend, Rebecca Roe; REBECCA ROE;
SUSAN N. LACY, on behalf of herself and her patients,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

JONATHAN THOMAS SKRMETTI, in his official
capacity as the Tennessee Attorney General
and Reporter, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 23-5609

JANE DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

2a

v.

WILLIAM C. THORNBURY, JR., M.D., in his
official capacity as the President of the
Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, et al.,

Defendants,

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY *ex rel.*
DANIEL CAMERON, Attorney General of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky,

Intervenor-Appellant.

23-5600 On Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:23-cv-00376—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.

23-5609 On Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:23-cv-00230—David J. Hale, District Judge.

Argued: September 1, 2023

Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; WHITE and THAPAR,
Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL

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ON BRIEF: Clark L. Hildabrand, Steven J. Griffin, Brooke A. Huppenthal, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL & REPORTER, Nashville, Tennessee, Adam K. Mortara, LAWFAIR LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, Cameron T. Norris, Tiffany H. Bates, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Arlington Virginia, for Tennessee Appellants. Barbara Schwabauer, Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Jonathan L. Backer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Appellee. Joshua A. Block, Chase Strangio, James D. Esseks, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, Stella Yarbrough, Lucas Cameron-Vaughn, ACLU FOUNDATION OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, Sruti J. Swaminathan, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., New York, New York, Tara Borelli, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Decatur, Georgia, Christopher J. Gessner, David Bethea, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., Dean L. Chapman, Jr., AKIN GUMP, New York, New York, for L. W. Appellees. Victor B. Maddox, Matthew F. Kuhn, Alexander Y. Magera, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Intervenor-Appellant. Corey Shapiro, Heather Gatnarek, Crystal Fryman, Kevin Muench, ACLU OF KENTUCKY FOUNDATION, Louisville, Kentucky, Stephanie Schuster, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C.,

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SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which THAPAR, J., joined. WHITE, J. (pp. 42–73), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

SUTTON, Chief Judge. At issue in these two cases is whether the United States Constitution prohibits Kentucky and Tennessee from limiting certain sex-transition treatments for minors experiencing gender dysphoria.

I.

A.

Before gender dysphoria had a name, the medical profession offered a variety of treatments for individuals suffering from a lack of alignment between their biological sex and perceived gender. In the 1960s and 1970s, cross-sex hormones and sex-reassignment surgeries emerged as “the option of choice” to treat the condition. Walter O. Bockting & Eli Coleman, *A Comprehensive Approach to the*

Treatment of Gender Dysphoria, 5 J. Psych. & Hum. Sexuality 131, 132 (1992). A 1979 study, however, concluded that these treatments did not alleviate the mental distress caused by the condition, prompting care centers to pull back on these forms of care. See Jeremi M. Carswell et al., *The Evolution of Adolescent Gender-Affirming Care: An Historical Perspective*, 95 Hormone Rsch. Paediatrics 649, 652 (2022). Given the “irreversibility of hormonal and surgical sex reassignment,” many providers instead prioritized more holistic approaches that explored a range of options—including therapy and living as the desired gender—before considering physical interventions. Bockting & Coleman, *supra*, at 136; *id.* at 134, 143.

In 1979, the Harry Benjamin Society, now called the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, published the first standards of care for treating gender dysphoria. *Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons* (1st ed. 1979). In line with the prevailing caution practiced by healthcare providers, the standards permitted hormonal and surgical interventions only for adults and only after the patients received other types of care. *Id.* §§ 4.3.4, 4.14.4, 4.15.1. Because hormone treatments have “some irreversible effects,” they were not permitted until an individual received therapy and lived as the desired gender for three months. *Id.* §§ 4.4.2, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3. Invasive surgery required more. Non-genital surgeries required three months of therapy and at least six months of living as the desired gender, while genital surgeries required therapy and a full year of living comfortably as the desired gender. *Id.* §§ 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.4.

In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association first classified gender dysphoria as a medical condition, initially calling it “gender identity disorder” and describing it as a “persistent sense of discomfort” with one’s biological sex. Ky. R.47-11 at 10; DSM-III 261 (3d ed. 1980). The diagnostic criteria for adults and minors were similar but not identical. *Id.* at 261–66. Without specifying appropriate treatments for either condition, the Association cautioned that the “long-term” effects of surgery remain “unknown.” *Id.* at 262.

Over the next two decades or so, various medical organizations, most prolifically the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, offered new standards of care. Throughout this period, the Association expressed caution about using medical interventions that would alter the secondary characteristics of an individual’s biological sex. The standards also recognized various non-physical treatments for gender dysphoria, including support groups, participation in recreational activities of the desired sex, cross-dressing, dressing unisexually, hair removal or application, vocal therapy, changes in grooming, breast binding, and prostheses. *See Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 21, 23, 26, 30, 35 (5th ed. 1998). During these twenty years, the Association’s standards of care continued to support hormonal and surgical treatments only for adults and not for minors. *See, e.g., Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons* § 4.14.4 (4th ed. 1990). Such treatments, the guidelines explained, are “extensive in [their] effects,” “invasive to the integrity of the human body,” and “are not, or are not readily, reversible.” *Id.* § 4.1.1.

What the medical profession has come to call gender-affirming care was not available for minors until just before the millennium. In the late 1990s, healthcare workers in the Netherlands began using puberty blockers—designed to slow the development of male and female physical features—to treat gender dysphoria in minors. Carswell et al., *supra*, at 652–53. The “Dutch Protocol” permitted puberty blockers for minors during the early stages of puberty, allowed hormone therapy at 16, and allowed genital surgery at 18. *Id.* at 652–53.

In 1998, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health revised its standards to endorse the Dutch Protocol. *See Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 19 (5th ed. 1998). The standards permitted puberty blockers, considered “reversible,” at the onset of puberty when taken in conjunction with psychotherapy. *Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 10 (6th ed. 2001). They permitted cross-sex hormones, a “partially reversible” treatment, for those 16 or older but only after six months of therapy. *Id.* And they permitted “irreversible” surgical interventions only after the individual had lived for at least two years as the desired gender and only after they turned 18. *Id.* at 11.

In 2012, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health relaxed these guidelines further. The new standards permitted cross-sex hormones for adults and minors, including minors under the age of 16. *See Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People* 19–20 (7th ed. 2012); Wylie C. Hembree et al., *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline*, 102 *J. Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism* 3869, 3883 (2017). Around this time, some American doctors

began using these treatments for children. Ky. R.17-3 at 15.

Today, these guidelines permit the use of puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones from the early stages of pubertal development. See *Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8*, 23 Int'l J. of Transgender Health S1, S64–65 (2022) (“2022 WPATH Guidelines”); *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, supra*, at 3880, 3883. Therapy or time spent living as the desired gender is no longer required before or along with such treatments. *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at S48. Many surgical treatments initially restricted to adults have become available to minors in the past six years, often without any prerequisites for therapy or cross-sex hormone treatments. See *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, supra*, at 3894; *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at § 6.12, S66. On the whole, the standards of care for minors “have become less restrictive over the course of time so that fewer procedures require mental health evaluation, fewer recommendation letters are required, and more types of professionals are viewed as capable of providing such evaluations.” Tonia Poteat et al., *History and Prevalence of Gender Dysphoria*, in *Transgender Medicine* 1, 14–15 (eds. Leonid Poretsky & Wylie C. Hembree, 2019).

In the last few years, the number of doctors prescribing sex-transition treatments and the number of children seeking them have grown. See *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at S43. The number of private clinics that specialize in hormonal and surgical treatments, for example, has “grown from just a few a decade ago to more than 100 today.” Ky. R.47-3 at 1. The percentage of youth identifying

as transgender has doubled from 0.7% of the population to 1.4% in the past few years, while the percentage of adults (0.5% of the population) has remained constant. Carswell et al., *supra*, at 653. By one account, 2021 saw three times more diagnoses of gender dysphoria among minors than 2017 did.

B.

In addition to sharing a border, Kentucky and Tennessee share an interest in regulating the medical treatments offered to children suffering from gender dysphoria. Tennessee was the first of the two States to regulate the treatments.

Tennessee. On March 2, 2023, Tennessee enacted the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101. Seeking to “protect[] minors from physical and emotional harm,” *id.* § 68-33-101(m), the legislature identified several concerns about recent treatments the medical profession offers to children with gender dysphoria. The legislature appreciated that gender dysphoria is a medical condition involving “distress from a discordance between” a person’s perceived gender and biological sex. *Id.* § 68-33-101(c). But it was concerned that some treatments for this condition “can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences.” *Id.* § 68-33-101(b). It was concerned that the long-term harms of these treatments, some potentially irreversible, remain unknown and outweigh any near-term benefits because the treatments are “experimental in nature and not supported by high-quality, long-term medical studies.” *Id.* And it noted that other helpful, less

risky, and non-irreversible treatments remain available. *See id.* § 68-33-101(c).

These findings convinced the legislature to ban certain medical treatments for minors with gender dysphoria. A healthcare provider may not “administer or offer to administer” “a medical procedure” to a minor “for the purpose of” either “[e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or “[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” *Id.* § 68-33-103(a)(1). Prohibited medical procedures include “[s]urgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs” and “[p]rescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone.” *Id.* § 68-33-102(5). The Act does not restrict these procedures for Tennesseans 18 and over. *Id.* § 68-33-102(6).

The Act contains two relevant exceptions. It permits the use of puberty blockers and hormones to treat congenital conditions, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury. *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). And it has a continuing care exception until March 31, 2024, which permits healthcare providers to continue administering a long-term treatment, say hormone therapy, that began before the Act’s effective date, July 1, 2023. *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B).

The Act authorizes the Tennessee Attorney General to enforce these prohibitions. *Id.* § 68-33-106(b). It permits the relevant state regulatory authorities to impose “professional discipline” on healthcare providers that violate the Act. Tenn. R.1 ¶ 56; *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-107. It creates a private right of action, enabling an injured minor or nonconsenting parent to sue a healthcare provider for violating the

law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105(a)(1)–(2). And it extends the statute of limitations for filing such lawsuits to 30 years after the minor reaches 18. *Id.* § 68-33-105(e).

Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor sued several Tennessee officials, claiming the Act violated the United States Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. L.W. is 15 years old, was born a biological male, and for several years has identified as a girl. A therapist diagnosed L.W. with gender dysphoria in December 2020, and a specialist prescribed puberty blockers in August 2021 and estrogen hormone therapy in September 2022. John Doe is 12 years old, was born a biological female, and has identified as a boy for many years. A therapist diagnosed Doe with gender dysphoria in 2020, and, after enduring considerable anxiety about going through puberty, Doe received puberty blockers in February 2021. Ryan Roe is 15, was born a biological female, identifies as a boy, and has suffered serious anxiety about going through puberty as a female. A specialist began prescribing testosterone for Roe at 14. All three adolescents say that this care has provided considerable comfort to them.

The plaintiffs challenged the Act’s bans on puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sex-transition surgery for children. They moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent those features of the Act from going into effect on July 1, 2023.

On June 28, the district court granted the motion in part. It concluded that the challengers lacked standing to contest the ban on surgeries but could challenge the ban on hormones and puberty blockers. As to due process, the court found that the Act

infringes on the parents’ “fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children.” Tenn. R.167 at 14. As to equal protection, the court reasoned (1) that the Act improperly discriminates on the basis of sex and that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class and (2) that the State could not satisfy the heightened scrutiny that comes with such regulations. The district court concluded that the Act was facially unconstitutional (with the exception of the surgery and private enforcement provisions), and it issued a statewide injunction against its enforcement. Tennessee appealed. This court stayed the injunction pending appeal. *L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti*, 73 F.4th 408 (6th Cir. 2023).

Kentucky. On March 29, 2023, the Kentucky General Assembly overrode Governor Andy Beshear’s veto to pass “An Act Relating to Children.” See 2023 Ky. Acts 775 (codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372). The law followed extended public debate before legislative committees on the potential risks of sex-transition treatments. See *Hearing on H.B. 470 Before the Kentucky House Judiciary Committee* (Mar. 2, 2023), <https://tinyurl.com/vvsfuw25>; *Hearing on H.B. 470 Before the Kentucky Senate Families & Children Committee* (Mar. 14, 2023), <https://tinyurl.com/352xh2f9>. Stemming from many of the same concerns undergirding the Tennessee law, the Kentucky law shares many features with it.

Under the Kentucky Act, a medical provider may not offer certain types of care “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372(2). The provider may not use drugs “to delay or stop normal

puberty” or to increase a patient’s hormone levels above what would be expected for a person of the patient’s age and sex. *Id.* § 311.372(2)(a)–(b). The provider also may not perform “sterilizing” surgeries on children. *Id.* § 311.372(2)(c)–(e). The law does not restrict these treatment options for individuals over 17. *Id.* § 311.372(1)(a).

The Act contains two exceptions. It allows these treatments for minors with certain sexual developmental disorders and for minors who seek care for injuries caused by procedures that the Act prohibits. *Id.* § 311.372(3)(a)–(c). And it allows a minor to continue an existing course of treatment for a period “during which the minor’s use of the drug or hormone is systematically reduced.” *Id.* § 311.372(6).

The Act provides two methods of enforcement. A regulatory agency “shall revoke” the license or certification of a provider who violates the Act. *Id.* § 311.372(4). And the Act extends the statute of limitations—to three years after the person “reasonably should have discovered” an injury or until the person reaches the age of 30, whichever is later—to file lawsuits for damages caused by violations of the Act. *Id.* § 311.372(5).

Seven transgender minors and their parents sued various Kentucky officials, claiming that the Act violated their federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Much like the Tennessee children, the Kentucky children have experienced gender dysphoria and have found (or anticipate finding) puberty blockers and hormones to be helpful treatments for it. All of these plaintiffs fear the return of their gender dysphoria, depression, and other illnesses if they cannot access these treatments. They challenged the Act’s ban on puberty blockers

and hormone therapy, but they did not challenge its regulation of surgical procedures. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent those features of the Act from going into effect on June 29, 2023.

On June 28, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. As to the due process claim, the court held that the Act infringed on the fundamental right of parents to obtain medical treatment for their children. As to the equal protection claim, it concluded that the Act discriminates based on sex and that the State could not meet the rigorous scrutiny that comes with such regulations. The court concluded that the Act's ban on drug and hormone therapy was facially unconstitutional and issued a statewide injunction.

Kentucky appealed and moved for a stay of the injunction. The district court granted the stay, and we declined to lift it, *Doe 1 v. Thornbury*, 75 F.4th 655, 656–57 (6th Cir. 2023) (per curiam). We consolidated the appeals, expedited them, and agreed to resolve them by the end of September 2023.

II.

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Courts may grant one only if the plaintiffs present “a clear showing” that they are likely to prevail on the merits, that they face irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of equities favors them, and that the public interest supports an injunction. *Id.* As is often the case in a constitutional challenge, the likelihood-of-success inquiry is the first among equals. *Roberts v. Neace*, 958 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). In this instance, it is largely dispositive. While we

assess the trial court’s “ultimate decision” whether to grant a preliminary injunction for “abuse of discretion,” we assess its legal determinations with “fresh eyes.” *Arizona v. Biden*, 40 F.4th 375, 381 (6th Cir. 2022).

III.

The claimants face several initial headwinds in obtaining relief. *First*, they do not argue that the original fixed meaning of the due process or equal protection guarantees covers these claims. That prompts the question whether the people of this country ever agreed to remove debates of this sort—over the use of innovative, and potentially irreversible, medical treatments for children—from the conventional place for dealing with new norms, new drugs, and new public health concerns: the democratic process. Life-tenured federal judges should be wary of removing a vexing and novel topic of medical debate from the ebbs and flows of democracy by construing a largely unamendable Constitution to occupy the field.

Second, while the challengers do invoke constitutional precedents of the Supreme Court and our Court in bringing this lawsuit, not one of them resolves these claims. In each instance, they seek to extend the constitutional guarantees to new territory. There is nothing wrong with that, to be certain. But this reality does suggest that the key premise of a preliminary injunction—a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits—is missing. Constitutionalizing new areas of American life is not something federal courts should do lightly, particularly when “the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful” debates about the issue. *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).

Third, the States are indeed engaged in thoughtful debates over this issue, as the recent proliferation of legislative activity across the country shows. By our count, nineteen States have laws similar to those in Tennessee and Kentucky, all of recent vintage. *See* Ala. Code § 26-26-4; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-1502(a); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R.64B8-9.019; Ga. Code Ann. § 31-7-3.5; Idaho Code § 18-1506C; Ind. Code § 25-1-22-13; Iowa Code § 147.164; La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1098 (effective Jan. 1, 2024); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-141-1-9; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 191.1720; S.B. 99, 68th Leg., 2023 Sess. (Mont. 2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-7301-07; H.B. 808, 2023 Sess. (N.C. 2023); N.D. Cent. Code. § 12.1-36.1-02; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2607.1; H.B. 1080, 98th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2023); S.B. 14, 88th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2023); Utah Code Ann. § 58-68-502(1)(g); W. Va. Code § 30-3-20 (effective Jan. 1, 2024). At least fourteen other States, meanwhile, provide various protections for those seeking treatments for gender dysphoria, all too of recent vintage. *See* Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2023-12; Cal. Penal Code § 819; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-30-121(1)(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-571n, 54-155b; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/28-10; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11 et seq.; Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2023.08; Minn. Stat. § 260.925; N.J. Exec. Order No. 326; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-4; N.Y. Educ. § 6531-b(2); H.B. 2002, 82nd Leg., 2023 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2023); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 150; Wash. Rev. Code § 7.002.002.

Most of this legislative activity occurred within the last two years. Failure to allow these laws to go into effect would start to grind these all-over-the-map gears to a halt. Given the high stakes of these nascent policy deliberations—the long-term health of children facing gender dysphoria—sound government usually benefits from more rather than less debate,

more rather than less input, more rather than less consideration of fair-minded policy approaches. To permit legislatures on one side of the debate to have their say while silencing legislatures on the other side of the debate under the Constitution does not further these goals. That is all the more critical in view of two realities looming over both cases—the concept of gender dysphoria as a medical condition is relatively new and the use of drug treatments that change or modify a child’s sex characteristics is even more recent. Prohibiting citizens and legislatures from offering their perspectives on high-stakes medical policies, in which compassion for the child points in both directions, is not something life-tenured federal judges should do without a clear warrant in the Constitution.

IV.

As doctors, legislators, and citizens work through the risks and benefits of various treatments for children with gender dysphoria, lawyers and litigants debate the right standard for reviewing such constitutional challenges. Sometimes the Constitution is neutral about an issue, say whether a state should embrace policies that lean conservative or progressive, regulatory or deregulatory, fiscally tight or lax, republican or democratic. Other times the Constitution is not neutral about an issue, say over free speech, voting, and race discrimination. When the Constitution is neutral about an issue, legislatures have considerable discretion to regulate the matter. In that setting, the key premise of a democracy prevails—that the people’s electoral representatives will identify the strengths and weaknesses of any policy and presumptively be allowed to enact it, the antidote for mistakes being the passage

of time and the good sense and self-interest of election-tenured public officials to fix them. When the Constitution is not neutral about the issue, skeptical judicial review applies to the law from the start.

The threshold question is whether the Constitution is neutral about legislative regulations of new and potentially irreversible medical treatments for minors. The plaintiffs claim that it is not neutral on this issue under the due process and equal protection guarantees. We consider each theory in turn.

A.

Due process. “No State,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The claimants, as noted, do not claim that the original, procedure-based meaning of the guarantee covers these claims. But that does not end the inquiry. The provision over time has come to secure more than just procedural rights. It also requires heightened scrutiny for substantive protections “against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. Courts identify such rights by looking for norms that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” *Id.* at 721 (quotation omitted). Before starting down this road, it is well to remember that the most deeply rooted tradition in this country is that we look to democracy to answer pioneering public-policy questions, meaning that federal courts must resist the temptation to invoke an unenumerated guarantee to “substitute” their views for those of legislatures. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2277 (2022) (quotation omitted). Aptly mindful of the reality that substantive due process is “a treacherous field,”

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977), and appreciative of the risk that comes with it—loss of democratic control over public policies that the people never delegated to the judiciary—the federal courts have become ever more “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process” to new areas, *Collins v. City of Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).

No such expansion is warranted here. This country does not have a “deeply rooted” tradition of preventing governments from regulating the medical profession in general or certain treatments in particular, whether for adults or their children. Quite to the contrary in fact. State and federal governments have long played a critical role in regulating health and welfare, which explains why their efforts receive “a strong presumption of validity.” *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); see *Kottmyer v. Maas*, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (6th Cir. 2006). State governments have an abiding interest “in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731, and “preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,” *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (quotation omitted). These interests give States broad power, even broad power to “limit[] parental freedom,” *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944); see *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 605–06 (1979), when it comes to medical treatment, cf. *Watson v. Maryland*, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).

This opening presumption of legislative authority to regulate healthcare gains strength in areas of “medical and scientific uncertainty.” *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007); see also *Marshall v. United States*, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974); cf. *Collins v. Texas*, 223 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1912). In that setting,

courts face two risks of error, not just one—first, that they will assume authority over an area of policy that is not theirs to regulate and, second, that they will impose a constitutional straightjacket on legislative choices before anyone knows how that “medical and scientific uncertainty” will play out.

Confirming all of this is the reality that we have developed substantial regulatory bodies designed to approve and regulate new drugs and medical treatments. At the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration determines when new drugs are safe for public use. Neither doctors, adults, nor their children have a constitutional right to use a drug that the FDA deems unsafe or ineffective. *See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d 695, 703, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). That is true even if the FDA bars access to an experimental drug that a doctor believes might save a terminally ill patient’s life. *Id.* at 701, 711; *see also id.* at 710 & n.18 (collecting similar cases). Nor is it unusual for the FDA to permit drugs to be used for some purposes but not others, or to allow some drugs to be used by adults but not by children. *See, e.g.*, 21 C.F.R. § 201.23(a) (requiring separate pediatric studies for certain drugs already in off-label use); *id.* § 201.57(c)(9)(iv)–(v) (providing labeling requirements for approved FDA pediatric and geriatric uses); *cf. In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Prac. Litig.*, 915 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2019) (describing how the FDA has limited approval for antidepressants by age).

At the local level, we have more of the same. There is a long tradition of permitting state governments to regulate medical treatments for adults and children. So long as a federal statute does not stand in the way

and so long as an enumerated constitutional guarantee does not apply, the States may regulate or ban medical technologies they deem unsafe. See *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 574–75, 581 (2009) (vaccine labels); *Vacco v. Quill*, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997) (assisted suicide); *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996) (pacemaker design); *Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 281–82 (1990) (withdrawal of life support).

Washington v. Glucksberg puts a face on these points. 521 U.S. 702. Harold Glucksberg claimed that Washington State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide violated his patients’ due process rights. *Id.* at 707–08. The Court disagreed. It allowed the State to prohibit individuals from receiving the drugs they wanted and their physicians wished to provide, all despite the “personal and profound” liberty interests at stake and all despite the reality that the drugs at issue often could be used for other purposes. *Id.* at 725–26. The Court reasoned that there was no “deeply rooted” tradition of permitting individuals or their doctors to override contrary state medical laws. *Id.* at 727. The right to refuse medical treatment in some settings, it reasoned, cannot be “transmuted” into a right to obtain treatment, even if both involved “personal and profound” decisions. *Id.* at 725–26. Nor did the observation that some rights under the Due Process Clause arose from concern over “personal autonomy” lead to the conclusion that “any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.” *Id.* at 727. Even as Glucksberg lost his challenge to the Washington law, the Court’s decision did not curtail the nationwide “earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.” *Id.* at 735. Rather, its

decision “permit[ted] this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.” *Id.*

Abigail Alliance hews to this path. The claimant was a public interest group that maintained that terminally ill patients had a constitutional right to use experimental drugs that the FDA had not yet deemed safe and effective. 495 F.3d at 697. As these “terminally ill patients and their supporters” saw it, the Constitution gave them the right to use experimental drugs in the face of a grim health prognosis. *Id.* at 697–701. How, they claimed, could the FDA override the liberty of a patient and doctor to make the cost-benefit analysis of using a drug for themselves given the stark odds of survival the patient already faced? *Id.* at 700–01. In a thoughtful en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim. The decision invoked our country’s long history of regulating drugs and medical treatments, concluding that substantive due process has no role to play. “Our Nation’s history and traditions,” the decision explained, “have consistently demonstrated that the democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology, and are entitled to deference in doing so.” *Id.* at 713; *see id.* at 710–11 & n.18 (collecting similar cases); *see also Dent v. West Virginia*, 129 U.S. 114, 121–24 (1889) (explaining how regulation of medical and other professions was a power of the States “from time immemorial”); *Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA*, 13 F.4th 531, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that Congress continued to “leave[] the regulation of doctors to the states” following the Fourteenth Amendment).

As in these cases, so in this one, indeed more so in this one. “The state’s authority over children’s

activities is broader than over like actions of adults.” *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 168. A parent’s right to make decisions for a child does not sweep more broadly than an adult’s right to make decisions for herself. See *Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977); *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pub. Health Tr.*, 696 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New Jersey*, 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting “a right of parents to demand that the State make available a particular form of treatment”). Libertarian and non-libertarian approaches to government all appreciate the distinct capacities of adults and children to look after their long-term interests. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* 127 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651); John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* 147, 208 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1947) (1689); John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* 13–14 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).

Parental rights do not alter this conclusion because parents do not have a constitutional right to obtain reasonably banned treatments for their children. Plaintiffs counter that, as parents, they have a substantive due process right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). At one level of generality, they are right. Parents usually do know what’s best for their children and in most matters (where to live, how to live, what to eat, how to learn, when to be exposed to mature subject matter) their decisions govern until the child reaches 18. But becoming a parent does not create a right to reject democratically enacted laws. The key problem is that the claimants overstate the parental right by climbing up the ladder of generality to a perch—in which parents control all drug and other medical treatments for their children—that the

case law and our traditions simply do not support. Level of generality is everything in constitutional law, which is why the Court requires “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721 (quotation omitted).

So described, no such tradition exists. The government has the power to reasonably limit the use of drugs, as just shown. If that’s true for adults, it’s assuredly true for their children, as also just shown. This country does not have a custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments in the process. Any other approach would not work. If parents could veto legislative and regulatory policies about drugs and surgeries permitted for children, every such regulation—there must be thousands—would come with a springing easement: It would be good law until one parent in the country opposed it. At that point, either the parent would take charge of the regulation or the courts would. And all of this in an arena—the care of our children—where sound medical policies are indispensable and most in need of responsiveness to the democratic process.

Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health & Human Services does not alter this conclusion. 927 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2019). A Michigan law required healthcare organizations to collect blood samples from newborns and to store the samples for future use, all without parental consent and all without any explanation why the law advanced the health of the babies. *Id.* at 403–04. This compulsory storage program, we held, violated nonconsenting parents’ rights “to make decisions concerning the medical care

of their children.” *Id.* at 418. But there is a night and day difference between that program and this one. The Michigan program *compelled* medical care, while the Tennessee and Kentucky laws *restrict* medical care. It is one thing for the State to impose a procedure on someone; it is quite another to deem it unsafe and prohibit it. All of this explains why the laws at issue here, in marked contrast to the Michigan law, rest on the legislative judgment that they will protect “the health of the child.” *Id.*, 927 F.3d at 421; *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(b); *Hearing on H.B. 470 Before the Kentucky Senate Families & Children Committee, supra*. While our longstanding traditions may give individuals a right to refuse treatment, there is no historical support for an affirmative right to specific treatments. *See Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 725–26.

Other courts have drawn the same sensible line, noting a material distinction between the State effectively sticking a needle in someone over their objection and the State prohibiting the individual from filling a syringe with prohibited drugs. The cases simply do not support the claimants’ position. They “reject[] arguments that the Constitution provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the Government.” *Abigail All.*, 495 F.3d at 710 & n.18 (collecting cases); *see U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius*, 705 F.3d 588, 599 (6th Cir. 2013); *Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych.*, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000); *Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs*, 66 F.3d 639, 645 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1995); *Rutherford v. United States*, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980); *see also Lambert v. Yellowley*, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (rejecting affirmative right to prescribe a drug even when physician attests that

the use of that treatment is “both advisable and necessary”). In some situations, it is true, governments may impose medical treatments on unwilling patients, but the exceptional settings of these cases confirm their limited scope. See *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11, 27–32 (1905) (permitting municipal health authorities to require vaccination in the face of threats to public health); *Sell v. United States*, 539 U.S. 166, 179–80 (2003) (allowing the government to administer antipsychotics against a patient’s wishes so that he could stand trial on “serious criminal charges”).

Parham v. J. R. does not help the claimants either. 442 U.S. 584. Georgia empowered parents to commit their children to state mental institutions. *Id.* at 587, 605. Several minors sued, claiming that their “liberty interest in not being confined” cut back on any parental right to make decisions for a child. *Id.* at 600. The claim was resolved on procedural, not substantive, due process grounds. See *id.* at 599–600, 620 n.23. Recognizing that States possess “constitutional control over parental discretion,” the Court held that States must provide “some kind of inquiry”—a classic procedural due process form of relief—to guard against “the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care.” *Id.* at 603, 606. This traditional due process ruling does not support today’s untraditional request for relief under substantive due process. Nothing in *Parham* supports an affirmative right to receive medical care, whether for a child or an adult, that a state reasonably bans. See *Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 286–87 (noting that *Parham* “allowed” a state to credit parents’ health decisions but did not create “a constitutional requirement” that a state “recognize such decisionmaking”).

The plaintiffs insist that these treatments are not new and do not involve experimental care. Even if that were true, that alone does not give parents a fundamental right to acquire them. As long as it acts reasonably, a state may ban even longstanding and nonexperimental treatments for children. It is difficult, at any rate, to maintain that these treatments have a meaningful pedigree. It has been about a decade since the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, the key medical organization relied upon by the plaintiffs, first said that hormone treatments could be used by all adolescents, no matter how young. And some of the same European countries that pioneered these treatments now express caution about them and have pulled back on their use. How in this setting can one maintain that long-term studies support their use—and that the Constitution requires it? Until more time has passed, it is difficult to gauge the risks to children—whether by physically transitioning as a child or not—making it reasonable for accountable democracies to consider, reconsider, and if need be reconsider again the best approach to these issues.

What about the reality that the best time to treat gender dysphoria, according to some doctors and some parents, may be before a child goes through puberty? The nature of the condition, the plaintiffs urge, turns on a lack of alignment between a child's biological sex and perceived gender, a mismatch that will increase during puberty and a mismatch that could make surgery more likely if the condition persists. We see the point. But we also see why this concern gets to the nub of the regulatory challenge, one illustrated by the shifting standards of care over the last two decades and one confirmed by the accepted reality that these drug treatments come

with “both risks and benefits.” *See* Cal. Amicus Br. 15. Changing the sex characteristics of a child’s body, in short, carries material risks in either direction. States may reasonably exercise caution in these circumstances, with some States focusing on the near-term risk of increasing the symptoms of gender dysphoria and other States focusing on the irreversible risks of providing such care to a minor. The Due Process Clause does not resolve this regulatory debate.

Invocation of medical associations and other experts in the medical community does not alter this conclusion. The plaintiffs separately frame their claim as the right of parents “to obtain established medical treatments” for their children, emphasizing the many medical organizations that now support this treatment for adults and minors. Ky. R.2 ¶ 80. At least three problems stand in the way of accepting this argument. One is that the plaintiffs never engage with, or explain how they meet, the “crucial” historical inquiry to establish this right. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721. There is, to repeat, no such history or tradition. Grounding new substantive due process rights in historically rooted customs is the only way to prevent life-tenured federal judges from seeing every heart-felt policy dispute as an emerging constitutional right.

A second problem is that the relevant medical and regulatory authorities are not of one mind about the cost-benefit tradeoffs of this care. Consider the work of the Food and Drug Administration, an agency whose existence is premised on a form of medical expertise of its own. Under a highly reticulated process that requires considerable long-range testing, the FDA determines when new drugs are safe for

public use, including use by minors, and when new drugs are safe for certain purposes but not others. In making these decisions, the Constitution rarely has a say over the FDA's work. *Abigail All.*, 495 F.3d at 703. Gender-transitioning procedures often employ FDA-approved drugs for non-approved, "off label" uses. Kentucky and Tennessee decided that such off-label use in this area presents unacceptable dangers. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372(2)(a)–(b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(b), (e), (g). Many medical professionals and many medical organizations may disagree. But the Constitution does not require these two States to view these treatments in the same way as the majority of experts or to allow drugs for all uses simply because the FDA approved them for others. Cf. *Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft*, 444 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that off-label use is legal "[a]bsent state regulation"). It is difficult to maintain that the medical community is of one mind about the use of these hormones for gender dysphoria when the FDA is not prepared to put its credibility and testing protocols behind the use. What is new, evolving, and conflicting often prompts change and eventually leads to different best practices, something the Constitution facilitates rather than handcuffs. Also diverse are the practices of other nations, so much so that amicus States on both sides claim support in foreign approaches, with one group emphasizing that the European countries who initiated these treatments are having second thoughts and raising the bar for using them, with the other group emphasizing that these countries have not yet completely banned the treatments. Compare Ala. Amicus Br. 21–24, *with* Cal. Amicus Br. 20 & n.39.

The third problem is the absence of judicially manageable standards for ascertaining whether a treatment is “established” or “necessary.” *Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause*, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019). One of the *amicus curiae* briefs in the case, in supporting the plaintiffs, forthrightly invokes three goals of the medical profession—“autonomy,” “beneficence,” and “justice”—as a source of guidance in the area. Bioethics Br. 16. Useful as these principles may be to the medical profession and accurate as they may be in describing how judges would assess the validity of these laws under the plaintiffs’ approach, they do not offer meaningful guidance in determining whether to invalidate such laws. Even the most unwieldy and subjective balancing tests offer more guidance than these generalized principles.

Recognizing such a right also would mean that the state and federal legislatures would lose authority to regulate the healthcare industry whenever the subject of regulation—the medical profession and drug companies—found such regulation unnecessary or otherwise inconsistent with autonomy, beneficence, and justice. *See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear*, 920 F.3d 421, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a similar argument). Put to the side the risks of placing the subjects of regulation in charge of regulation, how would judges know when these rights came into existence? The best evidence of the correct standard of care, plaintiffs say, comes from the standards adopted by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. *See* L.W. Appellees’ Br. 4–5; Doe Appellees’ Br. 7–8. But the Kentucky and Tennessee laws largely mirror those standards of care—at least they did so for most of the time gender dysphoria has been a diagnosable condition. Not until 2012, remember, did the Associa-

tion remove any age limits on hormone treatments. Compare *Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 10 (6th ed. 2001) (setting threshold of “as early as age 16”), with *Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People* 20 (7th ed. 2012) (removing age limit).

What if past is precedent—and this association and others change course in the future? Would the States’ authority reappear at that point? What is it in the Constitution, moreover, that entitles experts in a given field to overrule the wishes of elected representatives and their constituents? Is this true in other areas of constitutional law? Must we defer to a consensus among economists about the proper incentives for interpreting the impairment-of-contracts or takings clauses of the Constitution? Or to a consensus of journalists about the meaning of free speech? Or even to a consensus of constitutional scholars about the meaning of a constitutional guarantee?

Question after question arises under plaintiffs’ approach. And answer after answer confirms that expert consensus, whether in the medical profession or elsewhere, is not the North Star of substantive due process, lest judges become spectators rather than referees in construing our Constitution. See *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2267 (criticizing use of “the ‘position of the American Medical Association’” to indicate “the meaning of the Constitution”); *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2005) (explaining that Congress may prohibit marijuana use even when doctors approve its use for medical purposes); *EMW Women’s*, 920 F.3d at 439 (reasoning that a state’s “authority to regulate” does not turn on consistency with the “views of certain medical groups”); *Otto v. City of*

Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 869 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the “institutional positions [of medical associations] cannot define the boundaries of constitutional rights”). The plaintiffs are not likely to establish a due process violation.

B.

Equal protection—statutory classifications. “No state,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, “shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Under this guarantee, laws ordinarily are valid if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. *San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). Laws premised on classifications based on age or medical condition receive deferential review. See *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985) (mental disability); *Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (per curiam) (age). Laws premised on protected classifications, such as sex or race, receive heightened review. See *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996); *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995). Through it all, a law that treats individuals “evenhandedly”—that treats like people alike—does not trigger heightened review. *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 800.

The Tennessee and Kentucky laws treat similarly situated individuals evenhandedly. And that is true however one characterizes the alleged classifications in the law, whether as premised on age, medical condition, or sex. Consider each possibility.

A key distinction in the laws turns on age. Adults may use drugs and surgery to transition from one gender to another. But children may not. That classi-

fication is eminently reasonable and does not trigger heightened review. Even those who disagree with the policies behind these laws can appreciate that laws distinguishing between adults and children are not unusual. It is the rare drug, for example, that does not have separate rules for children and adults, whether by lowering the dosage for children or banning it altogether for children. This distinction readily satisfies the deferential review that applies to age-based classifications. *See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents*, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000); *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).

A second key distinction in both laws turns on the medical condition at issue: gender dysphoria. The problem underlying the condition turns on the physical mismatch between the child's perceived gender and biological sex. The answer according to both States is to treat the condition without physical interventions, including irreversible and potentially irreversible treatments, until the patient reaches 18. This reasonable approach—waiting to use potentially irreversible treatments until the child becomes an adult—also satisfies the deferential review that applies in this setting. A state may reasonably conclude that a treatment is safe when used for one purpose but risky when used for another, especially when, as here, the treatment is being put to a relatively new use. *See Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 445–46; *Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 369–70 (2001).

The third potential classification in both laws, and the one on which plaintiffs train their arguments, turns on sex. This kind of classification, it is true, receives heightened review. *See Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 532–33. But no such form of discrimination occurs in

either law. The laws regulate sex-transition treatments for all minors, regardless of sex. Under each law, no minor may receive puberty blockers or hormones or surgery in order to transition from one sex to another. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372(2). Such an across-the-board regulation lacks any of the hallmarks of sex discrimination. It does not prefer one sex over the other. *See Reed*, 404 U.S. at 73, 76 (preferring male executors). It does not include one sex and exclude the other. *See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (denying entry to men); *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 519–20 (denying entry to women); *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (excluding potential jurors based on sex). It does not bestow benefits or burdens based on sex. *See Michael M. v. Super. Ct.*, 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (plurality opinion) (making “men alone criminally liable” for statutory rape); *Orr v. Orr*, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (requiring men, but not women, to pay alimony). And it does not apply one rule for males and another for females. *See Sessions v. Morales-Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 58 (2017) (setting one immigration “rule for mothers, another for fathers”); *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976) (allowing women under 21 to buy beer but not men under 21). By guarding against the risks of physically invasive, often irreversible, changes to a child’s secondary sex characteristics until the individual becomes an adult, the law does not trigger any traditional equal-protection concerns. And by limiting access to sex-transition treatments to “all” children, the bans do not “constitute[] a denial of ‘the equal protection of the laws.’” *Palmer v. Thompson*, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971); *accord Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 800; *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). There thus is no reason to apply

skeptical, rigorous, or any other form of heightened review to these laws.

References to a child's biological sex in the laws does not alter this conclusion. Not so quick, the plaintiffs counter. They point out that the statutes treat minors differently based on sex because a boy with abnormally low testosterone levels could receive a testosterone booster in adolescence, but a girl could not receive testosterone to transition. Likewise, a girl could receive estrogen to remedy a genetic condition, but a boy could not receive estrogen to transition. In this way, the plaintiffs claim, the availability of cross-sex hormone treatments implicates the minor's sex.

We accept the premise but not the conclusion. It is true that, by the nature of their biological sex, children seeking to transition use distinct hormones for distinct changes. But that confirms only a lasting feature of the human condition, not that any and all lawmaking in the area is presumptively invalid. One year ago, and nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court explained that laws regulating “medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo” ordinarily do not “trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46; see *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (“While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation.”). Just so with the banned hormone treatments. Testosterone transitions a minor from female to

male, never the reverse. That means only females can use testosterone as a transition treatment. Estrogen transitions a minor from male to female, never the reverse. That means that only males can use estrogen as a transition treatment. These treatments, by biological necessity, are “medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo.” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245. If a law restricting a medical procedure that applies only to women does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as in *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, these laws, which restrict medical procedures unique to each sex, do not require such scrutiny either.

Another flaw accompanies this argument. It assumes that any administration of these hormones is one treatment. That’s not so. Using testosterone or estrogen to treat gender dysphoria (to transition from one sex to another) is a different procedure from using testosterone or estrogen to treat, say, Klinefelter Syndrome or Turner Syndrome (to address a genetic or congenital condition that occurs exclusively in one sex). These distinct uses of testosterone and estrogen stem from different diagnoses and seek different results. Because the underlying condition and overarching goals differ, it follows that the cost-benefit analysis does too, permitting States to legislate in the area without the assumption that they have presumptively violated the Constitution. States may permit varying treatments of distinct diagnoses, as the “Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” *Tigner v. Texas*, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 808.

The Acts mention the word “sex,” true. But how could they not? The point of the hormones is to help a

minor transition from one gender to another, and laws banning, permitting, or otherwise regulating them all face the same linguistic destiny of describing the biology of the procedures. If any reference to sex in a statute dictated heightened review, virtually all abortion laws would require heightened review. *See Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2285–2300 (listing numerous laws regulating abortion that refer to sex). Skeptical review also would extend to statutes that regulate medical procedures defined by sex. *See, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 116(a)(1) (criminalizing “female genital mutilation”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-51-201(d)(1) (testicular cancer); *id.* § 56-7-2354(a) (prostate cancer); *id.* § 68-58-101 (breastfeeding); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.315(11)(b) (death benefits for prostate cancer, testicular cancer, and cervical cancer); *id.* § 218A.274 (pregnancy); *id.* § 205.617(1)(c) (cervical cancer); *id.* § 304.17A-145 (insurance coverage for vaginal deliveries and Cesarean sections); *id.* § 304.17A-647 (mandatory coverage for annual pap smear); *cf. id.* § 311.715(2) (regulating in-vitro fertilization). None of these laws is presumptively unconstitutional.

One simply cannot define, or create, a protected class *solely* by the nature of a denied medical benefit: in this instance childhood treatment for gender dysphoria. Else every medical condition, procedure, and drug having any relation to biological sex could not be regulated without running the gauntlet of skeptical judicial review. Far from “command[ing] ‘dissimilar treatment for [boys] and [girls] who are similarly situated,’” *Frontiero*, 411 U.S. at 688 (quotation omitted), the States treat boys and girls exactly the same for constitutional purposes—reasonably limiting potentially irreversible procedures until they become adults.

What is true for the word “sex,” if plaintiffs’ and the federal government’s arguments were accepted, also would be true for the word “gender.” That would mean that any State that opted to address treatments for “gender dysphoria,” whether in a permissive or less permissive way, would trigger heightened review. Recall the fourteen States that statutorily permit some treatments in this area. One of them requires medical insurance companies to cover treatments for gender dysphoria if the patient is 16 or older. Would heightened review apply just because the words sex or gender appear in the law? Would courts then have the final say over whether the cut-off should be 14 or 15? For equal protection purposes, as opposed to conversational purposes, a law does not “classif[y] based on sex” whenever it “uses sex-related language.” *Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala.*, __ F.4th __, 2023 WL 5344981, at *19 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) (Brasher, J., concurring). In this instance, the legally relevant classifications turn on presumptively valid age and medical conditions.

States may not permit sex-based discrimination, we appreciate, on the assumption that men as a group and women as a group would be disadvantaged to a similar degree. Separate after all is inherently unequal even if all people might superficially experience the same segregation. *Brown v. Bd. of Educ.*, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). That’s because the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] *persons*, not *groups*.” *Adarand Constructors*, 515 U.S. at 227. And that’s why allowing sex-based peremptory challenges violates equal protection even though the jury system ultimately may not favor one sex over the other. *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 140–42, 146. Even so, the Court has never “equat[ed] gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race.” *Virginia*,

518 U.S. at 532. When laws on their face treat both sexes equally, as these laws do, a challenger must show that the State passed the law because of, not in spite of, any alleged unequal treatment. *Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). By contrast, “racial classifications” always receive strict scrutiny “even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally.” *Johnson v. California*, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005). “Mechanistic classification of all [gender] differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.” *Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS*, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).

The key to the constitutionality of today’s laws, moreover, has nothing to do with groups; it’s that they do not disadvantage “persons” based on their sex. The availability of testosterone, estrogen, and puberty blockers does not turn on invidious sex discrimination but on the age of the individual and the risk-reward assessment of treating this medical condition (as opposed to another) with these procedures. Confirming the point is the remedy the plaintiffs seek. They do not ask the States to equalize treatment options by making a procedure given to one sex available to the other. They want both sexes to receive the same gender-transitioning care. In other words, the outcome is that both sexes get a type of care or neither one does. The plaintiffs in this case, in contrast to the plaintiffs in the jury cases or for that matter the race-based-exclusion cases, do not claim a sex-discrimination right to hormones if it is denied for all children for all treatments. *See Eknes-Tucker*, __ F.4th at ___, 2023 WL 5344981, at *20 (Brasher, J., concurring) (observing that an injunction against a similar law would “not require the government to treat boys and girls the same” but would force the State “to *either* ban puberty blockers

and hormones for all purposes *or* allow them for all purposes”).

Plaintiffs’ sex-classification argument, moreover, does not work on its own terms. Recall that the States prevent minors from taking cross-sex hormones *and* puberty blockers for the purpose of transitioning. In contrast to cross-sex hormones, puberty blockers involve the same drug used equally by gender-transitioning boys and girls. *See 2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at S113 (recommending the use of gonadotropin releasing hormone agonists (GnRHa) as puberty blockers, and explaining how GnRHa blocks puberty in boys and girls); Tenn. R.113-4 at 18–19 (“Even the dosing is the same for males and females . . .”). That shows that plaintiffs’ only remedial request—the elimination of bans on cross-sex hormones *and* puberty blockers—does not match their sex-classification theory. And that raises the risk that acceptance of this sex-classification theory would (1) sidestep the conventional discretion given to legislatures that draw distinctions based on age and medical condition or (2) create a new suspect class (more on this later) by other means.

What of language in the cases saying that “all” sex-based classifications receive heightened review? *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 555 (quoting *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 136); *see Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 724–25. The laws in those cases used sex classifications to bestow unequal treatment on men and women. *See Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 519 (excluding female applicants); *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 719 (excluding male applicants). Those cases show only that the government cannot classify individuals by sex when doing so perpetuates invidious stereotypes or unfairly allocates benefits and burdens.

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131, 137 (striking potential jurors “based on gender stereotypes”).

But those harms, and the necessity of heightened review, will not be present every time that sex factors into a government decision. As we have already shown, heightened review does not apply in the context of laws that regulate medical procedures unique to one sex or the other. *See Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46; *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. Likewise, the government does not trigger heightened review when it houses men and women separately at a prison without making distinctions in funding or programming available to members of each sex. *Cf. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corrs. v. District of Columbia*, 93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The same is true of a sex-based decision to place urinals only in men’s rooms. So too with these laws. Their necessary references to “enduring” differences between men and women do not trigger heightened review. *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 533.

If plaintiffs and the federal government were correct that the only material question in a heightened review case is whether a law contains a reference to sex or gender, the Court would have said so in invalidating bans on same-sex marriage in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). But it did not. The Court indeed did not even apply heightened review to the laws. *Id.* at 663–76. Mere appearance of the words sex or gender in a law does not by itself require skeptical review under the Constitution.

Bostock does not alter this conclusion. Moving from constitutional to statutory cases, the plaintiffs and the federal government invoke a Title VII case, *Bostock v. Clayton County*, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). The Court concluded that Title VII’s prohibition on

employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” covers gay and transgender individuals. *Id.* at 1743; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). But that text-driven reasoning applies only to Title VII, as *Bostock* itself and many subsequent cases make clear. *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (declining to “prejudge” other discrimination laws); *Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021) (refusing to apply *Bostock* to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); *Meriwether v. Hartop*, 992 F.3d 492, 510 n.4 (6th Cir. 2021) (reasoning that Title VII analysis does not apply to Title IX).

Differences between the language of the statute and the Constitution supply an initial reason why one test does not apply to the other. Title VII focuses on but-for discrimination: It is “unlawful . . . for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Equal Protection Clause focuses on the denial of equal protection: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “That such differently worded provisions”—comparing the Constitution and Titles VI and VII—“should mean the same thing is implausible on its face.” *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.*, 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2220 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (distinguishing the Equal Protection Clause from Title VI); *see id.* at 2209 (concluding that Title VI and Title VII’s terms are “essentially identical”); *see Eknes-Tucker*, __ F.4th at __, 2023 WL 5344981, at *16 (majority op.) (“Because *Bostock* therefore concerned a different law (with materially different language) and a different factual context, it bears minimal relevance to the instant case.”). All of this explains why Title VII covers disparate impact

claims, *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971), and the Fourteenth Amendment does not, see *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976).

Importing the Title VII test for liability into the Fourteenth Amendment also would require adding Title VII’s many defenses to the Constitution: bona fide occupational qualifications and bona fide seniority and merit systems, to name a few. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-2. Plaintiffs never explain how, when, or whether these defenses, all tailored to employment settings, would apply to constitutional cases and the medical setting of this dispute. “[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution,” not a statute, “we are expounding.” *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).

Even aside from the differences in language between this statute and the Constitution, there is a marked difference in application of the anti-discrimination principle. In *Bostock*, the employers fired adult employees because their behavior did not match stereotypes of how adult men or women dress or behave. In this case, the laws do not deny anyone general healthcare treatment based on any such stereotypes; they merely deny the same medical treatments to all children facing gender dysphoria if they are 17 or under, then permit all of these treatments after they reach the age of majority. A concern about potentially irreversible medical procedures for a child is not a form of stereotyping.

Plaintiffs object to this conclusion on several grounds. They counter that two cases show that these different texts have the same meaning. The first says only that cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause “are a useful starting point in interpreting

[Title VII].” *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976). That point does little for the plaintiffs who try to use Title VII in the other direction—to interpret the Constitution. What is more, Congress ultimately disagreed with the Court’s observation, amending Title VII to negate *Gilbert*’s extension of equal protection precedent. *See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 85, 88–89 (1983).

The second case—*Smith v. City of Salem*—does little more in word or deed. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). It briefly and inconclusively *says* that claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII involve the “same elements.” *Id.* at 577 (quoting *Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch.*, 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 2003)). But *Smith* never addresses the textual differences between these documents—or the different stakes of broadly reading a statute versus broadly reading a largely unamendable constitution. All of the cases pre-date *Bostock*. And nearly all concern workers with overlapping employment-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. *See, e.g., Lautermilch*, 314 F.3d at 275. But a case about potentially irreversible medical procedures available to children falls far outside Title VII’s adult-centered employment bailiwick.

What the *Smith* decision *does* has even fewer parallels to today’s case. Jimmie Smith, a transgender firefighter, began “expressing a more feminine appearance” at work. *Smith*, 378 F.3d at 568. Smith was fired soon after. Smith “alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind [the decision].” *Id.* at 572. Based on this sex-stereotyping theory, the court found that Smith alleged violations of Title VII and the Equal

Protection Clause. *See id.* at 577. That holding was not the watershed plaintiffs make of it. *Smith* did not purport to break new ground, *see id.* at 571, or to create a new rule for transgender discrimination, *id.* at 570. Our subsequent cases have largely taken the hint, refusing to extend *Smith* beyond claims about discrimination over dress or appearance—something the Kentucky and Tennessee laws do not regulate. *See Chisholm v. St. Mary’s City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 947 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2020); *Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.*, 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).

All told, *Smith* tells us nothing about whether a state may regulate medical treatments for minors facing gender dysphoria. Recognizing and respecting biological sex differences does not amount to stereotyping—unless Justice Ginsburg’s observation in *United States v. Virginia* that biological differences between men and women “are enduring” amounts to stereotyping. 518 U.S. at 533. Any other approach to *Smith* would nullify *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, which to repeat make clear that legislative references to biological differences do not by themselves require heightened review. *See Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46. The Eleventh Circuit recently, and correctly, reached this precise conclusion in distinguishing a similar stereotyping case. *See Eknes-Tucker*, __ F.4th at __, 2023 WL 5344981, at *17 (11th Cir. 2023) (reasoning that Alabama’s ban on sex-transition procedures “does not further any particular gender stereotype” and “simply reflects biological differences”).

C.

Equal protection—suspect class. The plaintiffs and the federal government separately invoke a distinct theory of equal protection—that the Act violates the rights of a suspect class: transgender individuals.

But neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has recognized transgender status as a suspect class. Until that changes, rational basis review applies.

The bar for recognizing a new suspect class is a high one. The Supreme Court “has not recognized any new constitutionally protected classes in over four decades, and instead has repeatedly declined to do so.” *Ondo*, 795 F.3d at 609; see *City of Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 442 (mental disability is not a suspect class); *Murgia*, 427 U.S. at 313–14 (age is not a suspect class); *Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. at 28–29 (poverty is not a suspect class); see also *Obergefell*, 576 U.S. 644 (declining to address whether gay individuals qualify as a suspect class).

That hesitancy makes sense. Regulation of treatments for gender dysphoria poses fraught line-drawing dilemmas, not unlike the problem facing regulations premised on wealth, age, and disability, including laws designed to allocate benefits on these grounds. Plenty of challenges come to mind in the context of medical treatments for childhood gender dysphoria. Counseling versus drugs. Puberty blockers versus hormone treatments. Hormone treatments versus surgeries. Adults versus minors. One age cutoff for minors (16) versus another (18). And that’s just the line-drawing challenges that accompany treatments for gender dysphoria. What of other areas of regulation that affect transgender individuals? Bathrooms and locker rooms. Sports teams and sports competitions. Others are sure to follow.

Even when accompanied by judicial tiers of scrutiny, the U.S. Constitution does not offer a principled way to judge these lines. Removing these trying policy choices from fifty state legislatures to one Supreme Court will not solve them and in truth runs

the risk of making them harder to solve. Instead of the vigorous, sometimes frustrating, “arena of public debate and legislative action” across the country and instead of other options provided by fifty governors and fifty state courts, we would look to one judiciary, suddenly delegated with authority to announce just one set of rules. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. That is not how a constitutional democracy is supposed to work—or at least works best—when confronting evolving social norms.

Other considerations that the Court has highlighted when recognizing a new suspect class do not improve plaintiffs’ chances of success.

Not an immutable group. To establish a new classification, plaintiffs must show that transgender individuals “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.” *Bowen v. Gilliard*, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quotation omitted). It is difficult to see, at least at this stage of the case, how transgender identity fits that description. Unlike existing suspect classes, transgender identity is not “definitively ascertainable at the moment of birth.” *Ondo*, 795 F.3d at 609. It is not necessarily immutable, as the stories of “detransitioners” indicate and as plaintiffs do not dispute. See *Detransitioners’ Amicus Br.* 19–25. Instead of defining a “discrete group,” *Bowen*, 483 U.S. at 602, “transgender” can describe “a huge variety of gender identities and expressions,” *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at S15.

Not a politically powerless group. Concerns about a “political[ly] powerless[]” group and a dysfunctional political process also do not supply a reason for heightened review. *Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. at 28. Whatever may have been true in the past about our

society's treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria, some of it surely lamentable, it is difficult to maintain that the democratic process remains broken on this issue today. The President of the United States and the Department of Justice support the plaintiffs. A national anti-discrimination law, Title VII, protects transgender individuals in the employment setting. Fourteen States have passed laws specifically allowing some of the treatments sought here. Twenty States have joined an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. The major medical organizations support the plaintiffs. And the only large law firms to make an appearance in the case all entered the controversy in support of the plaintiffs. These are not the hallmarks of a skewed or unfair political process—and they offer no explanation for inviting a greater political dysfunction problem: the difficulty of amending the Constitution if the federal courts err in choosing to occupy the field.

Not an animus-driven law. Plaintiffs also have not made the case that animus toward transgender individuals as a class drives this law. Assessing legislative “motives or purposes” is “a hazardous matter,” and it’s not the point of the inquiry. *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). Instead of asking judges to read the hearts and minds of legislators, the inquiry asks whether the law at issue is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018). The key problem is that a law premised only on animus toward the transgender community would not be limited to those 17 and under. The legislature plainly had other legitimate concerns in mind. A fair-minded legislature could review the evidence in the area and call for a pause, demanding more proof that these procedures are safe before continuing on the path the

plaintiffs propose. Neither risk aversion nor a fair-minded policy dispute about the best way to protect children shows animus.

The novelty of these treatments also undercuts any claim of animus. Physicians began offering specialized care for transgender minors only in the 1990s, and the first clinic to treat transgender youth in America opened around 2007. American doctors began using puberty blockers and hormones to treat gender dysphoria around the same time. A similar timeline applies to the guidelines from the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. Its guidance documents from 1979 to 2000 generally disfavored using puberty blockers or hormones for minors, and only in 2012 did it abandon age limits for cross-sex hormones. *Compare, e.g., 1998 Standards of Care, supra, at 6–7, with 2012 Standards of Care, supra, at 14.* Even today, it notes the “limited data” on “the long-term physical, psychological, and neuro-developmental outcomes in youth.” *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra, at S65.* Abroad, several European nations, including the ones who paved the way for early drug-related and surgical treatments, have since limited these medical interventions for minors. At home, the FDA has not approved these relatively new uses for puberty blockers and hormones.

The laws do not draw constitutionally irrational lines. Even under deferential review, the challengers contend, they should prevail because banning puberty blockers and hormones for some purposes and not for other purposes is irrational. Confirming the point, they say, is the Court’s determination that it was irrational for states to deny contraception to single individuals but not to married couples. *See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447–53 (1972).*

The analogy does not hold. Marital status by itself has nothing to do with the risks associated with pregnancy, which doomed the *Eisenstadt* law. *See id.* Not so with the dividing line here. A legislature could conclude that treating congenital conditions with puberty blockers and hormones carries less risk than using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria for the purpose of changing an individual's secondary sex characteristics. Drawing such lines "is peculiarly a legislative task." *Murgia*, 427 U.S. at 314. The States also could be concerned that some adolescents, say a 13-year-old, lack the capacity to consent to such a significant and potentially irreversible treatment.

The unsettled, developing, in truth still experimental, nature of treatments in this area surely permits more than one policy approach, and the Constitution does not favor one over the other. This ongoing debate provides "persuasive evidence" that Kentucky and Tennessee could choose fair-minded caution and their own approach to child welfare, just as other jurisdictions could rationally adopt another path. *Trump*, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.

The challengers rely on the district courts' endorsements of their position and evidence to question the States' interests. But recall that each district court ruled that heightened review applied to these classifications. As shown, that would require an extension of existing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, an extension not justified in this setting. Rational basis review applies, and it requires deference to legislatures, not to medical experts or trial court findings. At any rate, no such deference applies to a written record like this one and the dueling affidavits that accompany it. *See Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc.*, 52 F.3d 1373,

1381 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n a case such as this, where the district court’s decision was made on the basis of a paper record, without a[n] evidentiary hearing, we are in as good a position as the district judge to determine the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction.” (quotation omitted)).

Plenty of rational bases exist for these laws, with or without evidence. Rational basis review requires only the possibility of a rational classification for a law. *FCC v. Beach Commc’ns*, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). It does not generally turn on after-the-fact evidentiary debates. *Id.* at 315. But even if we account for the evidence submitted at the preliminary injunction hearing, Kentucky and Tennessee offered considerable evidence about the risks of these treatments and the flaws in existing research. Administering puberty blockers to prevent pubertal development can cause diminished bone density, infertility, and sexual dysfunction. Introducing high doses of testosterone to female minors increases the risk of erythrocytosis, myocardial infarction, liver dysfunction, coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, hypertension, and breast and uterine cancer. And giving young males high amounts of estrogen can cause sexual dysfunction and increases the risk of macroprolactinoma, coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, cholelithiasis, and hypertriglyceridemia.

The challengers disagree, citing experts of their own. But no one disputes that these treatments carry risks or that the evidence supporting their use is far from conclusive. See *Eknes-Tucker*, __ F.4th at __, 2023 WL 5344981, at *7–8, *13; Doe Appellees’ Br. 44–45; L.W. Appellees’ Br. 35–36. The Endocrine Society’s guidelines recognize that puberty blockers can cause “adverse effects on bone mineralization”

and “compromised fertility,” along with “unknown effects on brain development.” *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, supra*, at 3882. The World Professional Association for Transgender Health likewise cautions that hormone therapy can impair fertility, and it notes the “major gaps in knowledge” in this area. *2022 WPATH Guidelines, supra*, at S103, S118. At bottom, the challengers simply disagree with the States’ assessment of the risks and the right response to those risks. That does not suffice to invalidate a democratically enacted law on rational-basis grounds.

V.

The preliminary injunctions suffer from another merits-related problem: their scope. Each one rests on a facial invalidation of each Act, as opposed to an as-applied judgment, and each one applies to every individual in the state. Each premise is mistaken.

The challengers claim that the Tennessee and Kentucky laws facially violate the Constitution. But litigants raising “a facial challenge to a statute normally ‘must establish that *no set of circumstances* exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’” *United States v. Hansen*, 143 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2023) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). That’s a “strict standard” that we have no authority to “dilute[.]” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2275. We have many cases adhering to the *Salerno* test. *See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States*, 62 F.4th 221, 231 (6th Cir. 2023); *United States v. Fields*, 53 F.4th 1027, 1038 (6th Cir. 2022); *Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett*, 700 F.3d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 2012); *Warshak v. United States*, 532 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); *Aronson v. City of Akron*, 116 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1997). Under this standard, plaintiffs must

rule out every potentially valid application, say with respect to individuals too young to consent to a regimen of hormone treatments or with respect to some physically invasive drug treatments in particular, before we may declare a law facially invalid. Yet they have not tried to meet this standard, and that by itself undercuts the preliminary injunctions.

Turn to the nature of the injunctions. District courts “should not issue relief that extends further than necessary to remedy the plaintiff’s injury.” *Kentucky v. Biden*, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023). One injunction prohibits Tennessee from enforcing its law against the nine challengers *and* against the other seven million residents of the Volunteer State. The other injunction prohibits Kentucky from enforcing its law against seven minors and their parents *and* against the other 4.5 million residents of the Bluegrass State. Absent a properly certified class action, these individuals do not represent every citizen of their States. And it is doubtful that the nature of federal judicial power—or for that matter Article III—permits such sweeping relief without the existence of a properly certified class or an extraordinary reason for ignoring these normal limits on the federal judicial power. Article III confines the “judicial power” to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Federal courts may not issue advisory opinions or address statutes “in the abstract.” *California v. Texas*, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2115 (2021) (quotation omitted). They instead must operate in a party-specific and injury-focused manner. *See id.*; *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018). A court order that goes beyond the injuries of a particular plaintiff to enjoin government action against nonparties exceeds the norms of judicial power. *See Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 702

(1979); see, e.g., *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599–601 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also *Doster v. Kendall*, 54 F.4th 398, 439 (6th Cir. 2022); Samuel L. Bray, *Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction*, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 457–82 (2017).

Even if courts in some instances may wield such power, the district courts likely abused their discretion by deploying it here. See, e.g., *Biden*, 57 F.4th at 557; see also *United States v. Texas*, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1985–86 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (considering the systemic harms of overbroad injunctions as part of abuse-of-discretion review). Neither order offers any meaningful reason for imposing such broad relief.

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that statewide relief is necessary to remedy their injuries. Medical providers, they point out, could choose not to treat the minor plaintiffs if they cannot also treat other minors. Such “speculation” about third-party behavior will not do. *Biden*, 57 F.4th at 557. Plaintiffs add that an injunction confined to the minors in this case “would also force those who proceeded pseudonymously to reveal their identities in order to obtain care.” L.W. Appellees’ Br. 58. Plaintiffs did not argue the point below. And even if they had, plaintiffs cite no authority that privacy interests alone could justify statewide relief. Besides, a statewide injunction is not the only path to privacy. Medical providers are no strangers to patient confidentiality. Through each variation on these themes, plaintiffs fail to explain why a class action would not solve these problems.

We leave for the district courts on remand to consider one other issue: standing, more specifically

redressability. *See Arizona*, 40 F.4th at 383 (noting that, at the preliminary injunction phase, Article III standing goes to the “likelihood of success” on the merits). Before reaching the final injunction stage of the case, the parties may wish to introduce evidence about whether any of the plaintiff doctors plan to offer these treatments in the future if they succeed on these constitutional claims. As a factual and legal matter, the point is undeveloped and potentially knotty.

VI.

The other preliminary injunction factors largely favor the States as well. If the injunction remains in place, Tennessee and Kentucky will suffer harm from their inability to enforce the will of their legislatures, to further the public-health considerations undergirding the laws, and to avoid health risks to their children.

As for harm to others, Tennessee permits the challengers to continue their existing treatments until March 31, 2024, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B), and Kentucky permits an indefinite period of treatment to “systematically reduce[]” the use of drugs or hormones, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372(6). These features of the laws lessen the harm to those minors who wish to continue receiving treatment. But we appreciate that they do not answer the concerns of those who might wish to continue treatment beyond what these States allow or of those minors who might seek treatment for the first time in the future. That creates an irreversible problem of its own, one that lies at the crux of the case. Both sides have the same fear, just in opposite directions—one saying the procedures create health risks that cannot be undone, the other saying the

absence of such procedures creates risks that cannot be undone. This choice in this instance is not for judges to make. Elected representatives, as it happens, made these precise cost-benefit decisions and did not trigger any reason for judges to second-guess them.

As for the public interest, Tennessee and Kentucky's interests in applying these laws to their residents and in being permitted to protect their children from health risks weigh heavily in favor of the States at this juncture.

No one in these consolidated cases debates the existence of gender dysphoria or the distress caused by it. And no one doubts the value of providing psychological and related care to children facing it. The question is whether certain additional treatments—puberty blockers, hormone treatments, and surgeries—should be added to the mix of treatments available to those age 17 and under. As to that, we return to where we started. This is a relatively new diagnosis with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age limits of any sort for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing a difficult-to-amend Constitution should be humble and careful about announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.

For these reasons, we reverse the preliminary injunctions issued in these cases and remand them for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

DISSENT

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The statutes we consider today discriminate based on sex and gender conformity and intrude on the well-established province of parents to make medical decisions for their minor children. Despite these violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority concludes that the statutes are likely constitutional and reverses district court orders enjoining the statutes. I respectfully dissent.

I.

We consider whether to uphold injunctions against the enforcement of Tennessee and Kentucky statutes insofar as they ban the use of puberty suppressants and hormone therapy to treat minors who are diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

A.

At birth, an infant is assigned a sex, either male or female. An assignment is usually based on the appearance of external genitalia, although the term *sex*, as used in the medical community, also comprises other things, such as internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary sex characteristics. *Gender identity*, in contrast, “is the medical term for a person’s internal, innate sense of belonging to a particular sex.” No. 23-5609, R. 17-1, PID 148. Assigned sex and gender identity match for most individuals, but for transgender individuals, they do not align.

For a small segment of the population, incongruity between assigned sex and gender identity can result in *gender dysphoria*, a medical condition character-

ized by significant psychological distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. The condition is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Version 5 (DSM-5), the diagnostic and coding compendium for mental-health professionals, and can arise during childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. If untreated, gender dysphoria may result in severe anxiety and depression, eating disorders, substance-use issues, self-harm, and suicidality.

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) and the Endocrine Society have published clinical-practice guidelines on how best to treat gender dysphoria. The WPATH is the leading association of medical and mental-health professionals with expertise in treating gender dysphoria, and the Endocrine Society is an organization representing more than 18,000 endocrinologists. The groups are the largest professional associations in the United States in their respective fields. The first set of guidelines dates to 1979, and the organizations have revised the guidelines several times since.

The goal of treatment for gender dysphoria is to reduce distress and improve functioning by enabling an affected person to live in conformity with the person's gender identity, and the process of undergoing such treatment is often called *gender transition* or *gender-affirming care*. The precise treatment for gender dysphoria depends on an individual's medical and mental-health circumstances and age—whether the individual is a pre-pubescent child, an adolescent, or an adult.

Transition typically starts with a series of steps known as *social transition*. Those steps often include using a name and pronouns, wearing clothes, and

practicing grooming habits associated with the person's gender identity. Beginning with adolescence, a healthcare provider may recommend medical interventions, including prescription medications. Minors often experience intensification of gender dysphoria when entering adolescence due to the development of secondary sex characteristics, such as facial and body hair for males and breasts for females. Providers do not consider these interventions until the onset of puberty.

Under the WPATH and the Endocrine Society guidelines, an adolescent may receive medical interventions only if the adolescent: (1) has gender incongruence that is both marked and sustained over time; (2) meets the diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria; (3) demonstrates sufficient emotional and cognitive maturity to provide informed consent for the treatment; (4) actually provides such consent with the adolescent's parents after being informed of the potential reproductive and other side effects; and (5) has no mental-health concerns that may interfere with diagnosis or treatment. The guidelines "recommend health care professionals involve the relevant disciplines, including mental health . . . professionals, to reach a decision about whether" gender-affirming care is "appropriate and remain[s] indicated throughout the course of treatment until the transition is made to adult care." No. 23-5600, R. 113-9, PID 1792.¹ Treatment may consist of puberty-suppressing

¹ Because "not all patients and families are in the position or in a location to access multidisciplinary care, the lack of available disciplines should not preclude a young person from accessing needed care in a timely manner," but "[w]hen disciplines are available," the guidelines "recommend[] efforts be made to include the relevant providers." No. 23-5600, R. 113-9, PID 1792.

medications and hormone therapy. Pubertal suppression prevents the worsening of gender dysphoria by limiting the development of secondary sex characteristics and is appropriate only if the adolescent's gender dysphoria has worsened with the onset of puberty. Hormone therapy—testosterone for adolescent transgender boys and testosterone suppression and estrogen for adolescent transgender girls—also reduces distress by facilitating physiological changes consistent with the adolescent's gender identity and on a similar timeline as the adolescent's non-transgender peers.

A substantial body of evidence—including cross-sectional and longitudinal studies as well as decades of clinical experience—shows that these medical interventions work. Gender-affirming care improves short- and long-term outcomes for adolescents with gender dysphoria by reducing rates of depression, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidality, and brings their mental health into alignment with their peers. Adverse side effects, moreover, are infrequent, and healthcare providers can easily manage them. Providers have used puberty suppressants to treat precocious (or early) puberty for decades, and suppressants have no long-term effects on fertility or sexual functioning. Suppression is also reversible; if treatment ceases, endogenous puberty normally resumes. Hormone therapy likewise is safe and poses a low risk of side effects or adverse consequences. The percentage of individuals who later come to regret undergoing such care is low—only about one percent.

The WPATH and the Endocrine Society guidelines constitute the prevailing standard of care for individuals with gender dysphoria. They are based on the same quality of evidence as other clinical-practice

guidelines. And every professional association for medical and mental-health providers in the United States—including the American Medical Association, American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychiatric Association—has endorsed the guidelines.

B.

Tennessee Plaintiffs are transgender adolescents L.W., John Doe, and Ryan Roe (Tennessee Minor Plaintiffs), their parents Samantha and Brian Williams, Jane and James Doe, and Rebecca Roe (Tennessee Parent Plaintiffs), and Dr. Susan Lacy (Tennessee Physician Plaintiff), a physician licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee. All Tennessee Minor Plaintiffs were undergoing gender-affirming care when Tennessee’s statute took effect. All have benefitted from their care.

L.W., a fifteen-year-old transgender girl, first began to question her gender identity when she was ten years old. She felt like she was “trapped” or “drowning” and found it hard to focus in school or connect with her friends. No. 23-5600, R. 22, PID 196–97. She started getting sick at school and routinely developed urinary tract infections because she was not using the restroom out of distress with the sex-separated facilities. L.W. saw a therapist, who diagnosed her with gender dysphoria. L.W. began puberty at age thirteen, and the prospect of changes like a deeper voice and facial hair terrified her. Thus, her physician at Vanderbilt Children’s Hospital (VCH) discussed treatment options, including puberty suppressants and, later, hormone therapy. L.W. and her parents decided that treatment was right for her. Now, L.W. is a happy, confident, and outgoing teenager.

Ryan Roe is a fifteen-year-old transgender boy. By the time he entered the fifth grade, he had begun puberty and became depressed and anxious. He had a panic attack when he had his first period. In the sixth grade, Ryan often vomited from anxiety in the morning before school, and his distress persisted despite treatment with anti-anxiety medication. Ryan's peers bullied him. He stopped talking in public because of the sound of his voice and began engaging in self-harm. Two years of psychotherapy provided Ryan minimal benefit, and after the seventh grade, his therapist diagnosed him with gender dysphoria. Ryan and his parents consulted with an endocrinologist at VCH, and after months of weighing the benefits and risks of treatment, Ryan elected to undergo hormone therapy. Treatment transformed Ryan's life: he has returned to his vocal, outgoing self, raises his hand in school, and willingly joins in family photographs.

John Doe is a twelve-year-old transgender boy. He knew that he was a boy beginning when he was two or three years old. When John was three or four years old, he adopted a typically male name and began telling his friends that he was a boy. Participating in sex-separated activities with girls made him miserable; he was upset playing on an all-girls soccer team, and he asked his mother why he could not wear the boy's outfit or dance the boy's part in his dance classes and recitals. During first grade, John started seeing a therapist, who diagnosed him with gender dysphoria. When John was nine, his mom gave him the female version of *The Care and Keeping of You*, a book designed to teach children about the changes that their bodies undergo in adolescence. John became mortified of the prospect of female puberty. His pediatrician referred him to an endo-

crinologist to explore treatment options. The endocrinologist monitored John for years, and once John began puberty, John and his parents decided that puberty suppression was the best course for John. Because of treatment, John has “finally” arrived at a “healthy, happy place,” and when the time is right, he hopes to begin hormone therapy. No. 23-5600, R. 24, PID 212–13.

Dr. Lacy, the Tennessee Physician Plaintiff, is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology and licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee. At her practice in Memphis, she treats both cisgender and transgender patients, including twenty minor transgender patients with gender dysphoria. Dr. Lacy has seen first-hand how integral such care is to her patients’ well-being. No patient has expressed to Dr. Lacy any regret from treatment.

Kentucky Plaintiffs are three transgender boys and four transgender girls (Kentucky Minor Plaintiffs) and their parents (Kentucky Parent Plaintiffs). At the time Kentucky’s statute took effect, six of the Kentucky Minor Plaintiffs were undergoing gender-affirming care under the supervision of their medical providers and with the consent of their parents. The remaining Kentucky Minor Plaintiff, who is nine years old, anticipates needing care once she begins puberty.

Gender-affirming care has benefited the Kentucky Minor Plaintiffs tremendously. John Minor Doe 1 (JM1), for example, is a twelve-year-old transgender boy whose mental health deteriorated when he began menstruating. His parents hospitalized him when he became suicidal. After consultations with therapists, psychiatrists, a pediatric nurse practitioner, and an endocrinologist, JM1 was diagnosed with gender

dysphoria. He later began gender-affirming care and experienced an immediate improvement in his wellbeing; his suicidality abated, and he returned to the happy child he was before his first period. The stories of John Minor Doe 2, Jane Minor Doe 3, and John Minor Doe 5 are similar—they received diagnoses of gender dysphoria after consultations with their healthcare providers and saw noticeable improvements in their wellbeing after starting gender-affirming care. Their parents fear that their children will revert to their prior distressed states if the care ceases.²

C.

Tennessee and Kentucky passed statutes this year prohibiting the use of puberty suppressants and hormone therapy “for the purpose of” providing gender-affirming care to minors.³ Tennessee’s statute set forth an effective date of July 1, 2023. *See* 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1. Kentucky’s legislature overrode the governor’s veto, enacting its statute on March 29, 2023, with an effective date of June 29, 2023. *See* Ky. Acts 775–79.

² *See also generally* Brief of Amici Curiae Elliott Page and Fifty-Six Other Individuals (detailing personal triumphs and societal contributions of transgender individuals across myriad industries, many of whom benefited from gender-affirming care as minors or later in life and “describe it as crucial to their wellbeing and even survival”).

³ In addition to restricting use of puberty blockers and hormone therapy, the statutes restrict certain surgeries, but Kentucky Plaintiffs do not challenge those restrictions, see Kentucky Appellees Br. 16 n.1, and Tennessee Plaintiffs do not appeal the district court’s ruling that they do not have standing to challenge the surgery restrictions, *see L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti*, No. 23-CV-00376, 2023 WL 4232308, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2023).

Tennessee’s statute prohibits a healthcare provider from performing, administering, or offering to perform or administer on a minor “any puberty blocker or hormone to a human being,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(5)(B), “for the purpose of” either (1) “[e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or (2) “[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity,” *id.* § 68-33-103(a). The statute exempts from the prohibition any treatment for a “congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury,” *id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1), but forbids treatment for “gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, gender incongruence, or any mental condition, disorder, disability, or abnormality,” *id.* § 68-33-102(1). Minors who began treatment before July 1, 2023, may phase out medication until March 31, 2024, if their providers certify that “ending the medical procedure would be harmful.” *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B), (b)(3).

Under Kentucky’s statute, a healthcare provider may not, “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex, knowingly” provide certain forms of care. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(2). Prohibited care includes “[p]rescrib[ing] or administer[ing] any drug to delay or stop normal puberty” or “testosterone, estrogen, or progesterone, in amounts greater than would normally be produced endogenously in a healthy person of the same age and sex.” *Id.* § 311.372(2)(a)–(b). The statute exempts treatment for certain minors from the ban:

67a

- (a) A minor born with a medically verifiable disorder of sex development, including external biological sex characteristics that are irresolvably ambiguous;
- (b) A minor diagnosed with a disorder of sexual development, if a health care provider has determined, through genetic or biochemical testing, that the minor does not have a sex chromosome structure, sex steroid hormone production, or sex steroid hormone action, that is normal for a biological male or biological female; or
- (c) A minor needing treatment for an infection, injury, disease, or disorder that has been caused or exacerbated by any action or procedure prohibited by [the statute].

Id. § 311.372(3).

Both statutes authorize licensing sanctions for healthcare providers. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-107; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(4). Tennessee's statute further authorizes its Attorney General to bring a civil action against healthcare providers. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-106. And both statutes include mechanisms for private civil enforcement, *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(5), though Plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of these mechanisms.

D.

Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions to enjoin enforcement of these statutes, arguing that the statutes discriminate based on sex and transgender

status in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and deprive Parent Plaintiffs of their fundamental right to make medical decisions for their children in violation of the Due Process Clause.⁴

The district courts in both cases issued statewide preliminary injunctions, concluding that the statutes are likely unconstitutional on due-process and equal-protection grounds. *See L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti*, 2023 WL 4232308, at *6; *Doe 1 v. Thornbury*, No. 23-CV-230, 2023 WL 4230481, at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2023). The Tennessee district court reasoned that the state’s statute infringed Parent Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to make medical decisions for their children and that the state failed to establish a compelling interest supporting the law and show that the law was narrowly tailored in support of any asserted interest. *See* 2023 WL 4232308, at *6–8. The court also reasoned that the statute discriminated based on sex and transgender status, which the court found to be a semi-suspect class. *See id.* at *9–19. The Kentucky district court followed the same analysis regarding Kentucky’s statute but concluded that it did not need to decide whether transgender persons are a semi-suspect class. *See* 2023 WL 4230481, at *3 n.5.

State officials in both cases brought emergency motions to stay these preliminary injunctions, which

⁴ Kentucky Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the presidents of the state medical and nursing boards, whom the Kentucky statute tasked with enforcement of the treatment ban, but the presidents had “no objection to” the injunction and agreed “it would behoove [licensed physicians and nurses] and their patients for the Court to grant the injunction and maintain the status quo pending final ruling on the merits of the suit.” No. 23 5609, R. 41, PID 478–7. The Kentucky Attorney General intervened.

this panel considered in July. The majority stayed the Tennessee preliminary injunction over my dissent, becoming the first court in this country to find that such restrictions on gender-affirming care for transgender youth are likely constitutional. *See L.W. ex rel. Williams v. Skrmetti*, 73 F.4th 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2023).⁵ However, the majority emphasized: “These initial views, we must acknowledge, are just that: initial. We may be wrong. It may be that the one week we have had to resolve this motion does not suffice to see our own mistakes.” *Id.* The majority later upheld the Kentucky district court’s stay of its own preliminary injunction, again over my dissent. *See Doe 1 v. Thornbury*, 75 F.4th 655, 657 (6th Cir. 2023).

We now hear these cases to reach a merits decision whether to affirm the district courts’ preliminary injunctions. Plaintiffs reiterate their arguments that the statutes are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because they discriminate based on sex, gender conformity, and transgender status and the Due Process Clause because they deny parents the fundamental right to make medical decisions for their children.

II.

“We review a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion,” reviewing its “legal conclusions *de novo* and its factual findings for clear error.” *Obama for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2012). “The injunction will seldom be disturbed unless the district court relied upon clearly

⁵ I recognize that *Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Alabama*, — F.4th —, 2023 WL 5344981 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023), followed our decision and upheld Alabama’s statute.

erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard.” *Id.* (quoting *Mascio v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio*, 160 F.3d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1998)).

“Courts reserve the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction for those cases where it is necessary to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of the merits.” *La.-Pac. Corp. v. James Hardie Bldg. Prod., Inc.*, 928 F.3d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2019). “In deciding whether to issue an injunction, a district court weighs four factors: ‘(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.’” *Id.* (quoting *S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.*, 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017)). “As long as a plaintiff demonstrates *some* likelihood of success on the merits, a court should balance rather than tally these factors,” although “our cases warn that a court must not issue a preliminary injunction where the movant presents no likelihood of merits success.” *Id.*

III.

I start by evaluating Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits and conclude that the statutes are likely unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

A.

“[O]ur Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,’ . . . a history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all

gender-based classifications today.” *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (quoting *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion)). “[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.” *Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting *Kirchberg v. Feenstra*, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). “The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” *Id.* (quoting *Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.*, 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). This standard is known as “intermediate scrutiny.” *Clark v. Jeter*, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).

Contrary to the majority, I conclude that Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes cannot pass constitutional muster. First, the statutes trigger heightened scrutiny because they facially discriminate based on a minor’s sex as assigned at birth and on a minor’s failure to conform with societal expectations concerning that sex. Second, Tennessee and Kentucky do not show an exceeding persuasive justification or close means-ends fit for their classifications.⁶

⁶ Plaintiffs also argue that transgender persons are a suspect or semi-suspect class and that the statutes impermissibly discriminate based on transgender status, but it is unnecessary to resolve this question today. According to this argument: “Transgender people satisfy all the indicia of a suspect class: (1) they have historically been subject to discrimination; (2) they have a defining characteristic that bears no relation to their

Equal-protection jurisprudence is clear: When a “challenged [statute] expressly discriminates among [persons] on the basis of gender, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 723 (citing *Reed v. Reed*, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)). Express discrimination, or a facial classification, exists if the statutory language requires reference to a person’s sex to determine whether some activity is permitted or prohibited. *See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982) (noting that a law is not “facially unrelated to race” because it “dealt in explicitly racial terms”). “A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification.” *Wayte v. United States*, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) (citing *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). Put simply, if a statute facially “provides that different treatment be accorded to [persons] on the basis of their sex,” the statute necessarily “establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” *Reed v. Reed*, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); *see also Latta v. Otter*, 771 F.3d 456, 480 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“A law that facially dictates that a man may do X while a woman may not, or vice versa, constitutes, without more, a gender classification.”).

ability to contribute to society; (3) they may be defined as a discrete group by obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics; and (4) they are a minority group lacking political power.” Kentucky Appellees Br. 40–42 (citing *Windsor v. United States*, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2013)); *see also* Tennessee Appellees Br. 30–32. Although Plaintiffs present weighty arguments, the complex questions involved need not be resolved here because the statutes clearly discriminate based on sex.

It is just as clear that a classification based on gender stereotypes triggers heightened scrutiny. *See J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 138 (concluding that the government’s use of peremptory jury strikes based on the presumption that the potential jurors’ views corresponded to their sexes was unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny). And this court held nearly twenty years ago that differential treatment because a person “fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender” is “[s]ex stereotyping,” *Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004), and “easily constitute[s] a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,” *id.* at 577. Further, just three years ago, the Supreme Court confirmed that if the government treats differently “a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in a[] [person] identified as female at birth,” or vice versa, the person’s “sex plays an unmistakable . . . role.” *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741–42 (2020).

Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes classify based on a minor’s sex as assigned at birth. Tennessee prohibits medical procedures when sought to “[e]nabl[e] a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to “[t]reat[] purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a). Kentucky likewise prohibits procedures “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor’s perception of, the minor’s sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(2). Thus, “medical procedures that are permitted for a minor of one sex are prohibited for a minor of another sex.” 73 F.4th at 422 (White, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (quoting *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 669 (8th Cir. 2022)). “[A] person identified male at birth could receive testosterone therapy to conform to a male identity,” for example, “but a person identified female at birth could not.” *Id.*; see also *Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd.*, 57 F.4th 791, 801 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“The School Board’s bathroom policy requires ‘biological boys’ and ‘biological girls’—in reference to their sex determined at birth—to use either bathrooms that correspond to their biological sex or sex-neutral bathrooms. This is a sex-based classification.”); *A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Metro. Sch. Dist.*, 75 F.4th 760, 772 (7th Cir. 2023) (similar).

The statutes also condition the availability of procedures on a minor’s conformity with societal expectations associated with the minor’s assigned sex. Each law bars treatment when sought “for the purpose of” inducing physiological changes, like secondary sex characteristics, that are “inconsistent with” how society expects boys and girls to appear. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(2) (prohibiting procedures “to alter the *appearance* of, or to validate a minor’s *perception* of, the minor’s sex, *if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex*” (emphasis added)). A minor assigned the male sex at birth cannot, for example, obtain puberty suppressants or estrogen to attain a feminine appearance, but a minor assigned the male sex at birth and born with intersex traits may obtain treatments to induce changes “consistent with” maleness. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a) (exempting treatment for a “congenital defect”); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.372(3)(a) (exempting treatment for “[a] minor born with a medically verifiable disorder of sex development, including external biological sex

characteristics that are irresolvably ambiguous”). Classifications like these—motivated by perceptions of “typically male or typically female ‘tendencies’”—are the kind of “generalizations” at which courts must “take a ‘hard look.’” *United States v. Virginia (VMI)*, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (citation omitted).

The statutes accordingly “penalize[]” treatment for a minor “identified as male at birth” but “tolerate[]” the same treatment for a minor “identified as female at birth,” *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1741, and vice versa. That is a facial classification, pure and simple.

2.

Since sex and gender conformity each “play[] an unmistakable . . . role,” *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1742, in determining the legality of a medical procedure for a minor, these statutes should raise an open-and-shut case of facial classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny. Yet the majority concludes otherwise.

The majority first reasons that “no [classification] occurs in either law” because the statutes “regulate sex-transition treatments for all minors, regardless of sex,” and “[u]nder each law, no minor may receive puberty blockers or hormones or surgery in order to transition from one sex to another.” Maj. Op. 24. This reasoning invokes an “equal application” principle, which was once acceptable in the Supreme Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence, *see Pace v. Alabama*, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (upholding a statutory scheme that punished interracial fornication and adultery more severely than intra-racial fornication and adultery because “[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same”), *overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida*, 379 U.S.

184 (1964). But the Court has since rejected that principle—emphatically and repeatedly.

In *Loving v. Virginia*, the Court held unconstitutional anti-miscegenation laws that applied to black and white persons alike. In so doing, the Court “reject[ed] the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations.” 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). The key, the Court said, was that “[t]he statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races.” *Id.* at 11. Because the statutes “rest[ed] . . . upon distinctions drawn according to race,” “the Equal Protection Clause demand[ed] that [the] classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’” *Id.* (citation omitted). Just as the illegality of a marriage under the statutes in *Loving* hinged on a person’s race, so too here does the legality of medical procedures hinge on a person’s sex.

The Supreme Court has confirmed in numerous post-*Loving* cases, moreover, that laws that classify on suspect lines do not escape heightened scrutiny despite “evenhandedly” classifying all persons. In *Powers v. Ohio*, the Court “reject[ed] . . . the view that race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection scrutiny because members of all races are subject to like treatment,” namely, “that white jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other jurors.” 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). “The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons,” the Court stated, “is no more authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem.” *Id.* (citing *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). “This idea

has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree.” *Id.*; see also *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 146 (extending the holding of *Powers* to “discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender”).

The Court in *Johnson v. California* again rejected the notion that a classification escapes heightened review if the classification applies “equally” to all. There, the Court considered a state department of corrections’ policy of temporarily segregating new prisoners based on race to allow assessment of a prisoner’s danger predicated on the risk of interracial violence between race-based gangs. See 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005). The department argued “that its policy should be exempt from” strict scrutiny “because it is ‘neutral’—that is, it ‘neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more than any other group or individual.’ In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply because all prisoners are ‘equally’ segregated.” *Id.* at 506 (citation omitted). The Court disagreed, noting its “repeated command that ‘racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally’” and its rejection of “the notion that separate can ever be equal—or ‘neutral’—50 years ago in *Brown v. Board of Education.*” *Id.* (citations omitted).

The majority also reasons that statutes “regulating ‘medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo’ ordinarily do not ‘trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.’” Maj Op. 25 (alteration in original) (quoting *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2245–46 (2022)). The majority invokes “distinctions involving pregnancy,” which do not trigger

heightened scrutiny unless shown to be “mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.” *Id.* (quoting *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)). “Testosterone transitions a minor from female to male,” and “[e]strogen transitions a minor from male to female, never the reverse,” the majority says, and “[i]f a law restricting a medical procedure that applies only to women does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as in *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, laws that restrict these medical procedures unique to each sex do not require such scrutiny either.” *Id.* at 26.

This contention misreads *Geduldig* and *Dobbs*, which merely reiterated *Geduldig*’s language. At issue in *Geduldig* was a state disability-insurance program that excluded coverage for “any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy.” 417 U.S. at 489. The Court determined that “[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics,” thus the program “d[id] not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely remove[d] one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.” *Id.* at 496 n.20. The Court also rejected the argument that a facial classification based on pregnancy was necessarily a proxy for sex- or gender-based discrimination. *See id.*

The statutes here, by contrast, expressly reference a minor’s sex and gender conformity—and use these factors to determine the legality of procedures. Further, discrimination based on inconsistency between gender identity and sex as assigned at birth can be seen as a proxy for discrimination against transgender individuals, which “necessarily” is discrimination “because of sex,” *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1744—

just like “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews,” *Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic*, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993); see also *Rice v. Cayetano*, 528 U.S. 495, 514–15 (2000) (treating discrimination on the basis of Hawaiian ancestry as a facial race classification because “ancestry [was] a proxy for race”); *Castaneda v. Partida*, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (concluding discrimination in jury procedure based on “Spanish surnames” was “not racially neutral with respect to Mexican-Americans”); *Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez*, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (“[Supreme Court] decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in th[e] context [of sexual orientation discrimination].”).

To further support the majority’s contention that heightened review does not apply, the majority gives as an example that the government may “house[] men and women separately at a prison” if it does not “mak[e] distinctions in funding or programming available to members of each sex.” Maj. Op. 29. I do not read *Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia* as supporting the majority’s position. There, the D.C. Circuit considered an equal-protection challenge to the District of Columbia offering fewer programs to its female than its male inmates, not the separation of inmates based on sex. See 93 F.3d 910, 923–24 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court did not address what level of scrutiny applied, or whether the programming survived scrutiny, because the resolution of the case depended on the “[t]he threshold inquiry” whether the female and male inmates were “similarly situated.” *Id.* at 924. The court said the inmates were not, noting in particular “the striking disparities between the sizes of the prison populations.” *Id.* at 925. “It is hardly surpris-

ing, let alone evidence of discrimination, that the smaller correctional facility” where the women were housed “offered fewer programs than the larger one” where the men were housed. *Id.* at 925. Indeed, the court favorably cited its earlier precedent, *Pitts v. Thornburgh*, *see id.* at 926, which held that “heightened scrutiny,” not the deferential rational-basis review, applied when reviewing the incarceration of female inmates at facilities significantly farther from the District than similarly situated male inmates, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The majority also argues that, “in invalidating bans on same-sex marriage in *Obergefell v. Hodges*,” the Supreme Court “would have said”—but “did not” say—that laws with sex- or gender-based conditions trigger heightened scrutiny if such scrutiny did, in fact, apply. Maj. Op. 30. True, the Court did not specify in *Obergefell* the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny. But the Court’s silence is just that—silence. We should be wary of reading much (if anything) into the Court’s resolution of the issues presented there without discussion of the applicable level of scrutiny. The Court held that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause all the same. *See* 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015). Laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex relationships include notable similarities to the laws at issue here—they condition the availability of something (marriage versus medical procedures) based on a person’s sex. And the Court subsequently clarified in *Bostock* that “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual . . . without discriminating against that individual based on sex,” 140 S. Ct. at 1741, despite, for example, Justice Kavanaugh’s contention in dissent that, in *Obergefell* and other cases, “the Court

never suggested that sexual orientation discrimination is just a form of sex discrimination,” *id.* at 1832 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

The majority further concludes that decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, like *Bostock*, do not control today’s decision. Its reasoning rests on “[d]ifferences [in] the language”—Title VII makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex,” while the Equal Protection Clause bars a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Maj. Op. 30 (first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), then quoting U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1).

To be sure, Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are not identical. The former forbids sex- or gender-based discrimination (subject to certain defenses), for example, while the latter allows such discrimination if the classification satisfies heightened scrutiny. *Cf. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.*, 143 S. Ct. 2141, 2220 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (distinguishing Title VI’s categorical bar on discrimination based on race, color, or national origin and the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement of strict scrutiny).

But the majority does not explain why or how any difference in language requires different standards for determining whether a facial classification exists in the first instance. Indeed, Supreme Court decisions under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause imply the opposite, often citing one another. *See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 125, 133–34 (1976) (noting that “court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause . . . are a useful starting point” for Title VII “concepts of discrimination” given

“the similarities between [Title VII] and some of those decisions” in extending *Geduldig* to the Title VII context).⁷

Our decision in *Smith v. City of Salem* also forecloses the majority’s position. Plaintiff “Smith—biologically and by birth a male—[wa]s a transsexual and ha[d] been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (‘GID’),” an earlier name for gender dysphoria. 378 F.3d at 568. “After being diagnosed with GID, Smith began ‘expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis’—including at work [at a municipal fire department]—in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID.” *Id.* That feminine appearance, Smith alleged, led to adverse employment action. *See id.* at 569. This court concluded that Smith had a viable Title VII claim: “[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination directed against [a woman], who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.” *Id.*

⁷ The majority also suggests that “[i]mporting the Title VII test for liability into the Fourteenth Amendment also would require adding Title VII’s many defenses to the Constitution: bona fide occupational qualifications and bona fide seniority and merit systems, to name a few.” Maj. Op. 31. But no one suggests that the “test for liability” is the same under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, only that the standard for determining the existence of a facial classification is the same. And the majority itself acknowledges implicitly that separate provisions of Title VII codify those defenses, *see id.* (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-2), thus belying any notion that those defenses must apply in equal-protection cases were we to conclude that a facial classification under Title VII is also a facial classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, those considerations factor into the heightened-scrutiny balancing analysis.

at 575 (discussing *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). And these facts in support Smith’s “claims of gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII easily constitute[d] a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause.” *Id.* at 577; see also *Boxill v. O’Grady*, 935 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2019) (“We review § 1983 discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause using the same test applied under Title VII.”).

The majority’s attempts to distinguish *Smith* are unpersuasive. “*Smith* never addresses the textual differences between these documents—or the different stakes of broadly reading a statute versus broadly reading a largely unamendable constitution”—the majority says. Maj Op. 32. For reasons already discussed, neither the “textual differences” nor “the different stakes” affect the preliminary question whether a facial classification exists. And regardless whether the majority’s “arguments” about the persuasiveness of *Smith*’s reasoning “have merit,” *Smith* “remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the . . . decision.” *Dingle v. Bioport Corp.*, 388 F.3d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

The majority next says that “[a]ll of the cases [that *Smith* relied on] pre-date *Bostock*,” “[a]nd nearly all concern workers with overlapping employment-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause,” while “a case about [medical treatments] available to children falls far outside Title VII’s adult-centered employment bailiwick.” Maj Op. 32. Why does the vintage of the authorities that *Smith* cites or the employment-versus-medical

context matter for determining whether a facial classification exists at all? The majority does not explain. And if anything, *Bostock* reinforces the validity and applicability of *Smith*.

Then, the majority asserts that “[o]ur subsequent cases have largely taken the hint, refusing to extend *Smith* beyond claims about discrimination over dress or appearance,” citing *Chisholm v. St. Mary’s City School District* and *Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center* in support. *Id.* The majority misapprehends both cases. *Chisholm* concluded that a coach’s comments that athletes were “pussies” and not tough enough did not constitute “sex stereotyping.” 947 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir. 2020). “Toughness, while sometimes celebrated in men, is certainly not discouraged in women, especially in a professional or team setting.” *Id.* at 352. And the coach “was not offering a commentary on whether [the athletes] were exemplars of their sex”; in his “somewhat boorish mind, a ‘pussy’ was a wimp or coward, perhaps a ‘snowflake’ in the current lexicon, but, critically, not a feminine individual.” *Id.* *Vickers* held that the plaintiff’s “claim fail[ed] because [he] has failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any observable way at work.” 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006). “[T]he harassment [at issue] [wa]s more properly viewed as harassment based on [his] perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity.” *Id.* at 763. After *Bostock*, however, that conclusion is dubious. See 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual . . . without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”).

Finally, the majority asserts that “*Smith* tells us nothing about whether a State may regulate medical

treatments for minors facing gender dysphoria.” Maj. Op. 32. “Recognizing and respecting biological sex differences does not amount to stereotyping—unless Justice Ginsburg’s observation in *United States v. Virginia* that biological differences between men and women ‘are enduring’ amounts to stereotyping.” *Id.* (quoting 518 U.S. at 533). But the existence of “enduring” “[p]hysical differences between men and women,” 518 U.S. at 533, bears on whether a sex- or gender-based classification *survives* scrutiny—it cannot render a facial classification sex- or gender-neutral. *See id.* (mentioning “enduring” differences in explaining that “[t]he heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification”); *Nguyen v. INS*, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (subjecting a classification that “takes into account a biological difference between” mothers and fathers to intermediate scrutiny).

3.

Because Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes facially classify based on sex and gender conformity, they are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Under that standard, the “burden . . . rests entirely on the” government to come forward with an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for the classification. *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533. The government satisfies its burden “only by showing at least that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting *Wengler*, 446 U.S. at 150). “If the State’s objective is legitimate and important,” the question is “whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present.” *Id.* at 725. “The purpose of

requiring that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.” *Id.* at 725–26.

The statutes fail intermediate scrutiny. To start, they lack an exceedingly persuasive justification. “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented *post hoc* in response to litigation.” *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533. “[T]he mere recitation of a benign . . . purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.” *Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld*, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); *see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 69–70 (2017) (rejecting that the government’s proffered justification actually motivated the challenged sex-based classification). Here, Tennessee’s statute includes legislative findings proclaiming the state’s “interest in encouraging minors to appreciate their sex, particularly as they undergo puberty.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(m). And both statutes’ texts effectively reveal that their purpose is to force boys and girls to *look* and *live* like boys and girls. Statutes, like these, that “rely on overbroad generalizations about” how “males and females” should appear and behave, *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533, cannot survive scrutiny.

Even taking Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s word that their purpose is solely to protect minors, *see* Tennessee Appellants Br. 44; Kentucky Appellants Br. 3, the states still fail to show that “the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present,” *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 725 (quoting *Wengler*, 446 U.S. at 150). In each lawsuit, the

district court made robust factual findings based on an extensive record, and neither court found that banning these treatments is beneficial to minors, nor has any district court confronting similar laws outside this circuit. I defer to these factual findings and, on my review of the record, see no error, clear or otherwise.

Gender-affirming care is well accepted as treatment for gender dysphoria. The WPATH and the Endocrine Society, the two most prominent organizations in transgender healthcare, have promulgated widely accepted clinical-practice guidelines for treatment. Tennessee and Kentucky try to discredit these guidelines by noting that the conclusions therein are based on “low-quality evidence” under the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) system, a formal process for assessing the quality of scientific evidence. *See* Tennessee Appellants Br. 14; Kentucky Appellants Br. 4. But “[r]ecommendations for pediatric care made by professional associations in guidelines are seldom based on well-designed and conducted randomized controlled trials due to their rarity.” No. 23-5600, R. 30, PID 293. And, in any event, the GRADE system permits drawing conclusions based on “low-quality evidence,” and doing so is neither novel nor uncommon. For example, about twenty percent of the American Heart Association’s recommendations in its Guideline for Pediatric Basic and Advanced Life Support are strong recommendations based on evidence of similar quality.

Other courts have relied on these guidelines. *See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “[m]ost courts agree” that WPATH guidelines “are the internationally recog-

nized guidelines for the treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria” and collecting cases). And, as the Ninth Circuit noted in *Edmo*, the medical profession does as well:

[M]any of the major medical and mental health groups in the United States—including the American Medical Association, the American Medical Student Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Family Practice Association, the Endocrine Society, the National Association of Social Workers, the American Academy of Plastic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, the HIV Medicine Association, the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Physician Assistant Caucus, and Mental Health America—recognize the [guidelines] as representing the consensus of the medical and mental health communities regarding the appropriate treatment for transgender and gender dysphoric individuals.

Id.

The record also supports that, over the short- and long-term, gender-affirming care benefits adolescents with gender dysphoria. It reduces rates of depression, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidality. Further, providers have used puberty suppressants and hormone therapy for years to treat other conditions, so the side effects are well known—as well as infrequent and easily managed.

In short, the “actual state purposes” undergirding the statutory classifications here, *VMI*, 518 U.S. at

535, rested on improper generalizations about boys and girls. And “[a] purpose genuinely to” protect children “is not served by” the classifications, *id.* at 539–40. “That is not *equal* protection.” *Id.* at 540.

B.

“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.” *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). “The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” *Id.* at 720. This protection encompasses “two categories of substantive rights”: “rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments” and “a select list of fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution.” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2246. “In deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories, the Court has long asked whether the right is ‘deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition’ and whether it is essential to our Nation’s ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’” *Id.* (quoting *Timbs v. Indiana*, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019)). The “substantive component” of due process “forbids the government to infringe [recognized] ‘fundamental’ liberty interests *at all*, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement” satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, the infringement “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

Unlike the majority, I conclude that Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes violate the Due Process Clause because they prohibit Parent Plaintiffs from deciding whether their children may access medical care that the states leave available to adults. The statutes thereby infringe on their fundamental right

to control medical choices for their children, a right deeply rooted in this nation's history and protected as a matter of Supreme Court and binding circuit precedent.

1.

“Substantive due process” is “a treacherous field.” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting *Moore v. East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). As cautioned in *Dobbs*, courts “must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what [the Fourteenth] Amendment protects with [their] own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy.” *Id.* Accordingly, “the Court has long been ‘reluctant’ to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution.” *Id.* (quoting *Collins v. Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).

Despite this hesitancy, the Court has found clarity in some areas. “[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.” *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also *Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (“[It is] plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’” (quoting *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); *Pierce v. Soc’y of the*

Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).

Thus, we have squarely held that “[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children.” *Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 927 F.3d 396, 418 (6th Cir. 2019). In *Kanuszewski*, we considered a Michigan program under which the state collected and stored blood samples from newborns to test for diseases. *See id.* at 404. We concluded that qualified immunity shielded state employees from the parent plaintiffs’ claims regarding the initial collection, *see id.* at 415–16, but that the ongoing storage without informed consent violated the parents’ fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, *see id.* at 418–21.

Kanuszewski flows naturally from the Court’s parental-autonomy decisions. “[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is ‘the mere creature of the State’ and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally ‘have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.’” *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Pierce*, 268 U.S. at 535). “Surely,” the Supreme Court has noted, “this includes a ‘high duty’ to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice.” *Id.* “The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions,” *id.*, and “historically it has recog-

nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children,” *id.* (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law). Here, no one can seriously doubt whether Parent Plaintiffs and others like them are motivated by “natural bonds of affection” and their children’s “best interests.”

In *Parham*, the petitioner “sought a declaratory judgment that Georgia’s voluntary commitment procedures for children under the age of 18 . . . violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and requested an injunction against their future enforcement.” *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 588. The Court applied its balancing test from *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), for procedural due-process claims, concluding that “the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry should be made by a ‘neutral factfinder’ to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied” and that Georgia’s procedures were constitutional. 442 U.S. at 606 (quoting *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).

Much of the Court’s analysis focused on the rights and role of parents in American society as caretakers for their children. “[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized,” but “[t]he statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in *all* cases because *some* parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603. “Simply because the decision of a parent . . . involves risks does not automatically

transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. The same characterizations can be made for a tonsillectomy, appendectomy, or other medical procedure.” *Id.* Ultimately, “[p]arents *can and must make those judgments.*” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Applying these principles, Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes plainly intrude on parental autonomy in violation of Parent Plaintiffs’ substantive due-process rights. Although this case presents issues at the center of political controversies, the legal analysis on this point is rather simple. “Parents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children.” *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 418. Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes prohibit parents from deciding whether medical treatment otherwise available to adults is appropriate for their minor children. And given that the statutes fail intermediate scrutiny, they fail strict scrutiny as well.

2.

The majority thinks differently, finding that Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s statutes do not intrude on any deeply rooted right of Parent Plaintiffs.

The majority begins by framing the issue as whether “[t]his country [has] a ‘deeply rooted’ tradition of preventing governments from regulating the medical profession in general or certain treatments in particular” and concludes “[q]uite to the contrary.” Maj. Op. 14. It notes that “governments have long played a critical role in regulating health and welfare,” *id.*, including “the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” *id.* (quoting *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731), and “medical treatment,” *id.*, and

that such regulations “receive ‘a strong presumption of validity,’” *id.* (quoting *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). Accordingly, the majority reasons, “[t]he government has the power to reasonably limit the use of drugs,” and “[i]f that’s true for adults, it’s assuredly true for their children.” *Id.* at 17. “A parent’s right to make decisions for a child does not sweep more broadly than an adult’s right to make decisions for herself.” In short, “[t]his country does not have a custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments in the process.” *Id.* at 17–18.

The majority’s focus on the government’s power over medical treatment in general misses the mark.⁸

⁸ In discussing the historical practice of governments regulating medical treatment, the majority posits that it is not “unusual for the [Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] to permit drugs to be used for some purposes but not others, or to allow some drugs to be used by adults but not by children.” Maj. Op. 15. The majority misapprehends the significance of the regulations it cites. The FDA does not permit a drug for some uses and not others or allow a drug for use by adults but not children. “The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act [(FDCA)] forbids pharmaceutical manufacturers from marketing or selling a drug until the Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] has approved it as safe and effective for its intended use or uses (the drug’s ‘indications’).” *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 822 F.3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 2016). The FDCA “does not go further by regulating a doctor’s practice of medicine.” *Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. FDA*, 13 F.4th 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, the FDA “[can]not prohibit doctors from prescribing an FDA-approved drug (say, a chemotherapy drug approved to treat leukemia) for an ‘off-label’ use (say, treatment of other cancers).” *Id.* A doctor prescribing a drug approved for adult use to a child is just one example of off-label use, which is “commonplace in the medical community,” *Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP*, 634 F.3d 1352, 1356 (6th

It is true, as the majority says, that the government has wide latitude to regulate the public's access to medical treatments or providers without having to go through the wringer of strict scrutiny. *See, e.g., Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 723–27 (holding that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide); *Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that there is no “fundamental right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs”); *see also Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (“The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”). But Tennessee and Kentucky did not ban treatment for adults and minors alike; they banned treatment for minors *only*, despite what minors or their parents wish. Thus, the issue is not the *what* of medical decision-making—that is, any right to a *particular* treatment or a *particular* provider. Rather, the issue is the *who*—who gets to decide whether a treatment otherwise available to an adult is right or wrong for a child? Do parents have the right to make that call, or does the government get to decide for

Cir. 2011). Some of the authorities the majority cites, *see* Maj. Op. 15, discuss this distinction. *See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. FDA*, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that a “a drug that has been tested and approved” by the FDA “for adult use” may “be prescribed by a physician for her pediatric patients”). The regulations the majority cites simply permit the FDA to require a manufacturer to submit studies on the safety and efficacy of a drug in pediatric populations, *see* 21 C.F.R. § 201.23(a), develop a pediatric formulation for a drug, *see id.*, and include information relevant to uses in pediatric populations in the drug label, *see id.* § 201.57(c)(9)(iv).

itself, notwithstanding the parents' determinations of what is in their children's best interests?

Once the issue is properly framed, the answer becomes clear: parents have, in the first instance, a fundamental right to decide whether their children should (or should not) undergo a given treatment otherwise available to adults, and the government can take the decision-making reins from parents only if it comes forward with a sufficiently convincing reason to withstand judicial scrutiny. That conclusion is faithful to our holding in *Kanuszewski* that “[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children.” 927 F.3d at 418. And it comports with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “parents generally ‘have the right, coupled with the high duty, . . . to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice.” *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602 (quoting *Pierce*, 268 U.S. at 535).

The majority’s reasoning to the contrary is unconvincing. It says that “there is a night and day difference between th[e] program” in *Kanuszewski* and the statutes here because “[t]he Michigan program *compelled* medical care, while the Tennessee and Kentucky laws *restrict* medical care. It is one thing for the State to impose a procedure on someone; it is quite another to deem it unsafe and prohibit it.” Maj. Op. 18. The court in *Kanuszewski* never framed the right as solely to deny unwanted care. Yet it very easily could have. After all, the court noted elsewhere in its analysis that a competent person has a separate “constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,” 927 F.3d at 414 (quoting *Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990)), and that any such right for

minors “devolve[s] upon the parents or legal guardians of the children,” *id.* at 415, since “[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves,” *id.* at 414–15 (quoting *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)). But instead of framing the parental right as one to refuse unwanted care for the child, the court said that “[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children,” 927 F.3d at 418—period. It makes little sense to read the right as nothing more than a veto of forced treatment.

The majority further says that “*Parham v. J. R.* does not help [Parent Plaintiffs] either” because at issue in *Parham* were the minor plaintiffs’ “procedural, not substantive, due process” rights. Maj. Op. 19. However, the Court said, in no uncertain terms, that a parent has the “right” and “‘high duty’ to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice” on behalf of the child. 442 U.S. at 602. This language concerning a parent’s “right” and “high duty,” moreover, was a quote from *Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary*, a substantive due-process decision on the parental right to send a child to a private instead of a public school, *see* 268 U.S. at 534–36. In fact, every other case cited in that paragraph of *Parham* was a substantive due-process decision. *See* 442 U.S. at 602 (citing *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 166; *Meyer*, 262 U.S. at 400). Clearly, the Court in *Parham* was expounding the substantive due-process right of parents to direct their children’s medical care, although the discussion was in the context of addressing the minor plaintiffs’ procedural due-process claims.

To be sure, none of this is to say “that parents’ control over their children is without limit.” *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 419. As noted, “a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.” *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603. The state may, therefore, prohibit a parent from submitting a child to a genuinely harmful treatment. *See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown*, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223, 1232, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that parents had no fundamental right to give children a “treatment that the state has *reasonably* deemed harmful” given “the well-documented” and “overwhelming consensus” “of the medical and psychological community that” sexual orientation change efforts therapy “was harmful and ineffective” (emphasis added)), *abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J.*, 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (adopting *Pickup*’s holding); *cf. Abay v. Ashcroft*, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[F]emale genital mutilation is extremely painful, permanently disfigures the female genitalia, and exposes the girl or woman to the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications, including bleeding, infection, urine retention, stress, shock, psychological trauma, and damage to the urethra and anus.” (cleaned up)).

But a state cannot simply deem a treatment harmful to children without support in reality and thereby deprive parents of the right to make medical decisions on their children’s behalf. Allowing the state to do so is tantamount to saying there is no fundamental right. *Cf. Schall*, 467 U.S. at 265 (“[I]f parental control falters, the State must play its part as *parens patriae*.” (emphasis added)); *Prince*, 321

U.S. at 166 (noting “that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside *first* in the parents” (emphasis added)). A fundamental right backed up by strict scrutiny demands more. “Of course [judges] are not scientists, but neither may [they] abandon the field when government officials . . . infringe a constitutionally protected liberty. The whole point of [heightened] scrutiny is to test the government’s assertions.” *S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2021) (statement of Gorsuch, J.). Our nation’s constitutional history teaches that, when a treatment option remains otherwise available to the public, legislatures should not decide whether that treatment is right or wrong for minor children; parents should make these decisions.

IV.

“In constitutional cases,” such as this one, the other factors governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction tend to fall to the wayside because “the first factor”—likelihood of success on the merits—“is typically dispositive.” *Vitolo v. Guzman*, 999 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2021). Still, those additional factors favor upholding the district courts’ injunctions. “A plaintiff’s harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages. When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed.” *Husted*, 697 F.3d at 436 (cleaned up). Minor Plaintiffs’ injuries are all the more irreparable because progressing through adolescence untreated leads to daily anguish and makes adult treatment more complicated. “The two remaining preliminary injunction factors—whether issuing the injunction would harm others and where the public interest

lies—merge when,” as is true here, “the government is the defendant.” *Kentucky v. Biden*, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023). “[N]o cognizable harm results from stopping unconstitutional conduct, so ‘it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” *Vitolo*, 999 F.3d at 360 (citation omitted).

V.

The last question is the scope of district courts’ preliminary injunctions. On review of Tennessee’s emergency motion to stay the district court’s injunction of its statute, I agreed with the majority “that the district court abused its discretion in granting a statewide preliminary injunction” while reiterating “the majority’s caveat that today’s decision is preliminary only.” 73 F.4th at 423 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With the benefit of more time, I now conclude that the district courts properly issued statewide injunctions.

“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Although such relief generally should not run “in favor of persons other than” the plaintiffs to an action, “district courts are not categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief benefitting an entire class in an individual suit.” *Warshak v. United States*, 532 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Sharpe v. Cuerton*, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003)). The reason is simple: “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.” *Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. at 702.

Here, the district courts did not abuse their discretion in concluding that enjoining all enforce-

ment was necessary to afford complete relief to Plaintiffs. As the district court in the Tennessee case noted, “it is far-fetched that healthcare providers . . . would continue care specifically for Minor Plaintiffs when they cannot do so for any other individual to whom [the statute] applies.” 2023 WL 4232308, at *34. This reasoning reflects the pragmatic realities of the treatment bans, which operate directly on third parties—healthcare providers—rather than patients, and of the practice of medicine. *See Bresgal v. Brock*, 843 F.2d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding injunction requiring Secretary of Labor to apply Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act to non-plaintiff forestry workers because “labor contractors,” not workers, “are most directly affected by the injunction” and “[t]he Act cannot be enforced only against those contractors who have dealings with named plaintiffs, or against those contractors only insofar as they have dealings with named plaintiffs”); *Husted*, 697 F.3d at 437 (upholding injunction requiring a state to offer the same early in-person voting hours to military and non-military voters, including to non-military voters who were not plaintiffs to the suit).

I do not agree with the majority that the effect on Minor Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain treatment if they alone are able to undergo treatment, while treatment is prohibited for all others throughout Tennessee and Kentucky, is “speculation.” Maj. Op. 39 (quoting *Biden*, 57 F.4th at 557). It is not. “The court is not required either to wear blinders or to leave common sense out of the equation.” *United States v. West*, 799 F. App’x 322, 328 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting *United States v. Miller*, 478 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2007)). “Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on

the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.” *Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project*, 582 U.S. 571, 579 (2017) (per curiam). The district courts here exercised their discretion appropriately.

VI.

As the majority notes, the heated political debate over gender-affirming care has yielded varying laws in Tennessee, Kentucky, and throughout our country. In the normal course, the Constitution contemplates the states acting as laboratories of democracies to resolve the controversies of the day differently. *See New State Ice Co v. Liebmann*, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

But when a fundamental right or freedom from discrimination is involved, experimentation has no place. “The very purpose of” our constitutional system “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.” *W. Va. St. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Our “fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.” *Id.* Similarly, “[n]o plebiscite can legalize an unjust discrimination.” *Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assemb.*, 377 U.S. 713, 736 n.29 (1964) (citation omitted).

Tennessee’s and Kentucky’s laws tell minors and their parents that the minors cannot undergo medical care because of the accidents of their births and their failure to conform to how society believes boys and girls should look and live. The laws further deprive the parents—those whom we otherwise recognize

103a

as best suited to further their minor children's interests—of their right to make medical decisions affecting their children in conjunction with their children and medical practitioners. For these reasons, I dissent.

104a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

No. 3:23-cv-00376

L.W. *et al.*, by and through her parents and next
friends, Samantha Williams and Brian Williams

Plaintiffs,

v.

JONATHAN SKRMETTI *et al.*,

Defendants.

JUDGE RICHARDSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 21, "Motion"), which is accompanied by a memorandum in support (Doc. No. 33). Defendants filed a response (Doc. No. 112), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. No. 146). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. A corresponding order will be entered separately.

BACKGROUND FACTS¹

¹ The majority of the facts contained in this section are undisputed, and therefore, the Court treats these facts as true. As for facts in this section that are disputed, the Court has found an adequate basis in the record to treat these facts as true for the purposes of the instant Motion.

On March 2, 2023, the Governor of Tennessee signed into law Senate Bill 1 (hereinafter “SB1” or “the law”), codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101 *et seq.* (Doc. No. 33 at 11). SB1 will go into effect on July 1, 2023. (*Id.* at 7). SB1 prohibits any minor in Tennessee from receiving certain medical procedures² if the purpose of receiving those procedures is to enable that minor to live with a gender identity³ that is inconsistent with that minor’s sex at birth. Therefore, SB1 does not completely ban any medical treatments but rather bans specified medical treatments administered for a particular purpose.⁴

² SB1 defines “medical procedure” as “surgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs of a human being” and “prescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone to a human being.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(5)(A)–(B).

³ SB1 does not define the term “identity,” and it does not use the term “gender identity.” However, it appears undisputed that the term “gender identity” refers to a person’s understanding of belonging to a particular gender. (Adkins Decl. at 4). Everyone has a gender identity. (*Id.*). Those whose gender identity aligns with their sex at birth are cisgender. (*Id.*). Those whose gender identity is different from their sex at birth are transgender. (*Id.*).

Plaintiffs do not discuss what it is that accounts for a person’s understanding that he or she belongs to a particular gender. Presumably, such understanding would be based on the person’s particular beliefs about the defining characteristics of that gender—and the person’s belief that his or her own characteristics match the gender’s defining characteristics such that the person must belong to that gender. But the Court need not delve into this topic.

⁴ Although SB1 bans medical procedures only when used for a particular specified purpose, for the sake of conciseness the Court hereinafter refers to the medical procedures that are banned if used for a particular specified purpose as simply being banned; such references will omit any qualification reflecting that the

Specifically, SB1 sets forth bans as follows:

68-33-103. Prohibitions.

(a)(1) A healthcare provider shall not knowingly perform or offer to perform on a minor, or administer or offer to administer to a minor, a medical procedure if the performance or administration of the procedure is for the purpose of:

(A) Enabling a minor^[5] to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex^[6]; or

(B) Treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity.

(2) Subdivision (a)(1) applies to medical procedures that are:

(A) Performed or administered in this state; or

(B) Performed or administered on a minor located in this state, including via telehealth, as defined in § 63-1-155.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)–(2). Although SB1 becomes effective on July 1, 2023, the law permits minors who were receiving the medial procedures

medical procedures are banned only if used for a particular specified purpose.

⁵ SB1 defines “minor” as an individual who is under eighteen years of age. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(6).

⁶ SB1 defines “sex” as “a person’s immutable characteristics of the reproductive system that define the individual as male or female, as determined by anatomy and genetics existing at the time of birth.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(9).

banned by SB1 before July 1, 2023, to continue to receive them until March 31, 2024. *See id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B) (hereinafter, the “continuing care exception”). If such a minor would like to continue receiving these procedures until March 31, 2024, then the minor’s treating physician must certify in writing that “in the physician’s good-faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, ending the medical procedure would be harmful to the minor.” *Id.* at § 68-33-103(b)(3). The certification must also include findings supporting the certification and must be made part of the minor’s medical record. *Id.*

SB1 specifies that knowingly performing or offering to perform a medical procedure on a minor does not violate the law if the “medical procedure is to treat a minor’s congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury.” *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). “Disease” does not include “gender dysphoria, gender identify disorder, gender incongruence, or any mental condition, disorder disability, or abnormality.” *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(2). Therefore, SB1 permits administration of medical procedures as defined in the law if the purpose of the procedures is to resolve a congenital defect or precocious puberty but prohibits the administration of such procedures if the purpose is to enable a minor to live with a gender identity that is different from that minor’s sex at birth.

Plaintiffs L.W., John Doe, and Ryan Roe (“Minor Plaintiffs”) are transgender minors who all suffer from the condition of gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 33 at 14–17 (citing Doc. Nos. 22 (Declaration of L.W.); 23 (Declaration of Samantha Williams); 25 (“Jane Doe Decl.”); 24 (Declaration of John Doe); 26 (Declaration of Ryan Roe); 27 (Declaration of Rebecca Roe))). Plaintiffs Brian and Samantha Williams, James and

Jane Doe, and Rebecca Roe are the parents of L.W., John Doe, and Ryan Roe, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 23; 25; 27). Plaintiff Dr. Lacy is a physician practicing in Memphis, Tennessee and has been treating patients for gender dysphoria since 2016. (Doc. No. 28 (Declaration of Dr. Susan N. Lacy) at 1–2).

Gender dysphoria is a common condition for transgender people. It arises from the incongruence that transgender people experience between their gender identity and their sex at birth. (Doc. Nos. 33 at 8–9 (citing Doc. No. 29 at 5 (“Adkins Decl.”)); 113-7 at 13 (“Laidlaw Decl.”). Gender dysphoria can be treated through medical intervention. (Adkins Decl. at 1; Laidlaw Decl. at 14–15). The goal of gender dysphoria treatment (sometimes called “gender-affirming treatment,”⁷ “gender transition,” “transition-related care,” or “gender-affirming care”) is to enable individuals receiving the treatment to live in alignment with their gender identity. (Adkins Decl. at 7; Laidlaw Decl. at 15). When a minor receives treatment for gender dysphoria, the goals of the treatment will always be to “enable [that] minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with [that] minor’s sex” and to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between [that] minor’s sex and asserted identity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)(A)–(B). Therefore, SB1 in effect bans minors from receiving all treatment for gender dysphoria.

⁷ The term “gender-affirming treatment” is used by both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ experts herein to describe the procedures used to treat gender dysphoria and/or to permit an individual to live in a manner that is consistent with the gender with which they identify at the time that the individual seeks treatment, and so at times the Court herein uses the same term to mean the same thing.

On April 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that SB1 violates the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 1). The complaint includes a prayer for relief for a state-wide preliminary injunction. (*Id.*). The following day, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that the Court enjoin Defendants from enforcing any provision of SB1 during the pendency of this litigation. (Doc. No. 21). As noted above, Defendants filed a response (Doc. No. 112), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. No. 146). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” *Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t*, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). “The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears a burden of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable harm and likelihood of success.” *Kentucky v. U.S. ex rel. Hagel*, 759 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Michigan Cath. Conf. & Cath. Fam. Servs. v. Burwell*, 755 F.3d 372, 382 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Those seeking a preliminary injunction must meet four requirements.⁸ They must show a likelihood of

⁸ Some published Sixth Circuit cases stand unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are *factors* rather than *requirements*, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors). *See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch.*, 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent with more recent Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court case law (including the two cases cited above) describing these as all being

success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; that the balance of equities favors them; and that public interest favors an injunction. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County*, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but rather must come forward with more than “scant evidence” to substantiate their allegations. *See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted*, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); *Cameron v. Bouchard*, 815 F. App’x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no evidentiary showing on some elements of their claim, but instead made mere allegations regarding the treatment of Covid-19 in prisons); *McNeilly v. Land*, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a “small showing” of evidence); *United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit*, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915, *1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations); *Boulding v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2008), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich. May 15, 2008) (“Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary injunction]. Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations do not suffice.” (citations omitted)). In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, a court may consider the entire record, including affidavits and other hearsay evidence. *Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.*, 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2019);

requirements. The Court believes that it is constrained the follow the latter line of cases.

J.S.R. by & through J.S.G. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018). In conducting the preliminary injunction analysis, the Court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding. *Express Franchise Servs., L.P. v. Impact Outsourcing Sols., Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2017); *Action NC v. Strach*, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (explaining that district courts may look to, and indeed in appropriate circumstances rely on, hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is warranted). *See also Ohio State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted*, 768 F.3d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2014), *vacated on other grounds*, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge alleging that SB1 is unconstitutional.⁹ According to Plaintiffs, SB1

⁹ The Court discusses below whether Plaintiffs have succeeded on their facial challenge.

“In an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional.” *Doe #1 v. Lee*, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (quoting *Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists*, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), *denying cert. to* 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992)). When a plaintiff succeeds in an as-applied challenge, the law may not be applied to the plaintiff, but may continue to be enforced “in circumstances where it is constitutional.” *Doe v. Rausch*, 461 F. Supp. 3d 747, 769 (E.D. Tenn. 2020). By contrast, a plaintiff that challenges a law “on its face” attempts “to invalidate the law in each of its applications, to take the law off the books completely.” *Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett*, 791 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Speet v. Schuette*, 726 F.3d

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it interferes with the right of a minor’s parents to direct the medical care of their children. (Doc. No. 33 at 26). Plaintiffs further contend that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the law imposes disparate treatment on the bases of transgender status and sex and is not substantially related to an important state interest.

As for the requested remedy, Plaintiffs’ Motion indicates that Plaintiffs request a statewide injunction of SB1 in its entirety. (Doc. No. 21 at 1) (requesting an injunction restraining Defendants from enforcing “any provision” of SB1); (Doc. No. 33 at 31). In their reply, however, Plaintiffs state that their proposed relief does not encompass the private right of action codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105. (Doc. No. 146 at 9). Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ requested relief as an injunction to enjoin all provisions of SB1, *except* the private right of action codified at § 68-33-105. Furthermore, as discussed immediately below, Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge SB1’s ban on “surgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs of a human being” when the purpose of such procedures is to “enable a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-33-103(a)(1)(A)–(B); 68-33-102(5)(A)–(B). Accord-

867, 871 (6th Cir. 2013)). The Court notes, however, that the effect on a law invalidated pursuant to a facial challenge is that it becomes unenforceable, not that it literally gets deleted from code books. *See United States v. Sineneng-Smith*, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1585 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).

ingly, any relief provided Plaintiff pursuant to the Motion will not impact SB1’s ban on such surgeries.¹⁰

1. STANDING

Before addressing the merits of the Motion, the Court first addresses two standing issues. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish “(1) an injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest [that] is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, i.e., the injury complained of must be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and “(3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” *Phillips v. DeWine*, 841 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Dr. Lacy does not have standing to assert the rights of her patients and of the parents of her patients. (Doc. No. 112 at 21). But “[w]hen one party has standing to bring a claim, the identical claims brought by other parties to the same lawsuit are justiciable.” See *Knight v. Montgomery Cnty. Tenn.*, 592 F. Supp. 3d 651, 671 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). So “in a multiple-plaintiff case, a court need not consider the standing of other plaintiffs once one plaintiff is determined to have standing.” *Id.*; see also *Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff must have standing for each claim pursued in federal court.

¹⁰ For conciseness, the Court hereinafter refers to this ban as a ban on surgeries as treatment for gender dysphoria.

[] However, only one plaintiff needs to have standing in order for the suit to move forward.”) (internal citation omitted). Dr. Lacy and the other Plaintiffs bring the same claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. Defendants do not contest that the other Plaintiffs have standing for their due process claim and equal protection claim, and the Court is satisfied that they do in fact have standing for these claims. Because Plaintiffs other than Dr. Lacy have standing for the same claims as those brought by Dr. Lacy, the Court need not determine whether Dr. Lacy also has standing.¹¹

Defendants also contend that no Plaintiff in this action has standing to challenge SB1’s ban on surgeries as treatment for gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 112 at 21); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-33-102, 68-33-103. The Court agrees. As Defendants point out, no Plaintiff alleges that a prohibition on surgery will affect his or her treatment for gender dysphoria. Perhaps this is to be expected, given that the medical guidelines recommend surgeries involving gonadectomy or hysterectomy only once an individual has reached eighteen years of age. (Doc. No. 113-10 (“Endocrine Society Guidelines”) at 27) (“We suggest that clinicians delay gender-affirming genital surgery. . . until the patient is at least 18 years old”). Regardless of the reason, however, the fact is that none of Minor Plaintiffs express a desire or plan to receive surgery for their treatment of gender dysphoria, and Dr. Lacy does not contend that SB1’s

¹¹ The Court notes that its finding below that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge SB1’s ban on surgeries does not affect its analysis as to Dr. Lacy. Plaintiffs have standing in all other respects for their due process and equal protection claims, and therefore the Court need not concern itself with whether Dr. Lacy also has standing.

prohibition on these surgeries inhibits her ability to treat patients. In their reply, Plaintiffs do nothing to counter Defendants' argument. Plaintiffs have therefore not demonstrated a likelihood that they will suffer a concrete and particularized injury due to enforcement of SB1's ban on surgeries as treatment for gender dysphoria. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established standing to challenge this provision of the law at the instant preliminary-injunction stage and thus are not entitled to a preliminary injunction with respect to that provision. *See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett*, 978 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that although the plaintiff's failure to establish a likelihood of standing on a motion for a preliminary injunction does not require dismissal of claims, it does require denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction associated with such claims); *Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health*, 900 F.3d 250, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). *Cf. K.C. v. Individual Members of Medical Licensing Board of Ind.*, 1-23-cv-595, 2023 WL 4054086, at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge surgery provisions of Indiana law banning gender-affirming treatment because it was undisputed that no plaintiff could receive such surgeries regardless of the law in question).¹²

The Court's analysis below thus focuses on whether Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their argument that the remaining portions of SB1 (*i.e.*, SB1 to the extent that it bans other kinds of "medical

¹² The Court declines to opine herein gratuitously on the extent to which its constitutional analysis might be different with respect to surgery than it is with respect to the other banned medical procedures (as set forth below).

procedure[]”) that Plaintiffs challenge violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.

2. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

A. Due Process Claim

i. Infringement on a Fundamental Right

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “Substantive due process is [t]he doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed.” *Johnson v. City of Saginaw, Mich.*, 980 F.3d 497, 514 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “These limitations are meant to provide heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” *Does v. Munoz*, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the undersigned put it decades ago, “a substantive due process violation occurs when the government deprives a person of a protectable interest . . . under unconstitutional criteria.” Eli J. Richardson, *Eliminating Double-Talk from the Law of Double Jeopardy*, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 119, 163 (1994).

Plaintiffs allege that SB1 infringes on a parent’s fundamental right to direct the medical care of his or her child. (Doc. No. 33 at 26). “The existence of a fundamental right means that [g]overnment actions that burden the exercise of [the right] are subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.” *Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t of Health and Human Services*, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs' reliance on a parent's fundamental right to direct the medical care of his or her child is flawed because Plaintiffs describe the right with excessive generality. (Doc. No. 112 at 8–9). Defendants further argue that no right of a parent to have the medical treatments banned by SB1 be administered on that parent's child existed at the time of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore such a right is not fundamental for the purposes of the Due Process Clause. (*Id.*).

The Court certainly grasps Defendants' argument. But the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Kanuszewski* stands in direct contradiction to Defendants' argument. In *Kanuszewski*, the Sixth Circuit assessed whether the Michigan Newborn Screening Program (“NSP”) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 403–404. The NSP involved the mandatory collection of blood samples from newborns to test for diseases, and these blood samples would then be stored by the Michigan Neonatal BioBank for future use by the state. *See id.* The parents of minor children who had been part of the NSP sued, alleging that the program violated their fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children. *See id.* at 413.

On appeal from the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the Sixth Circuit was faced with the plaintiffs' assertion of two alleged fundamental rights, one against the *collection* of the blood samples and one against the *retention* of the blood samples. As for the alleged violation of the asserted right against collection of blood samples under the NSP, the court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not yet clearly established that parents

had a right to control their children's medical care. *See id.* at 415.

The court then turned to whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Due Process Clause based on Defendants' *retention* of the blood sample under the NSPs. *See id.* at 418.¹³ The court explained that the Supreme Court in *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) found that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the "care, custody, and control of their children, [] which would seem to naturally include the right to direct their children's medical care." *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The court therefore found that "[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." *See id.* Returning to the issue of the constitutionality of the defendants' retention of the blood samples, the court found that "[d]efendants' actions constitute a denial of the parents' fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, and their actions must survive strict scrutiny." *See id.* at 420.

The court in *Kanuszewski* therefore defined the fundamental right at issue at the same level of generality as Plaintiffs do in this case. Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, the court in *Kanuszewski* did not find that the parents had a fundamental right specifically to not have their children's blood samples stored by the state and potentially used later. Instead, the court found that parents have a fundamental right more broadly to direct the medical care of their

¹³ Because the plaintiffs sought prospective relief for this claim, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. *See Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 418. The Court therefore did not need to determine whether the right in question was clearly established.

children, which encompassed the right to refuse to have their children's blood stored under the NSP. The Court therefore rejects Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs define the parents' fundamental right at too high a level of generality.

Defendants argue that the Court should decline to rely on *Kanuszewski* because it involved whether the parents had a right to *refuse* the drawing of the blood samples and long-term storage of the samples, whereas the issue in this case is a parent's right for their children to *receive* certain procedures. (Doc. No. 112 at 9). This distinction, between what may be considered a "negative" right and a "positive" right, is certainly cognizable; it is one thing to have a right against a non-consensual invasion of the body, and another thing to have a right to have affirmative treatment of the body (invasive or otherwise). But the distinction ultimately is inconsequential here. The court in *Kanuszewski* gave no indication that its analysis of the parents' due process claim turned on the fact that the parents were seeking to refuse rather than receive medical treatment for their children—*i.e.*, were asserting a negative right rather than a positive (affirmative) right. The court in *Kanuszewski* could have said that the parents had a right to refuse medical care for their children, but it did not do so; instead, it chose to define the recognized right as a right of the parent to *direct* the medical care of their children. Absent any court-provided limitation on the term, the right to "direct" care would naturally include the right to refuse certain treatments *and* the right to request provision of certain treatments. For this reason also, Defendants' reliance on *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), is unavailing. True, in *Washington*, the Court said that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is not equal to "a right to assistance in committing suicide." *See id.* at 725–26.

This point by the Court, however, has no import here where the Sixth Circuit—several years after *Washington*—has plainly found that parents have a fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children without indicating that the right pertains only to the *refusal* of certain medical treatments.

The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, parents have a fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, which naturally includes the right of parents to request certain medical treatments on behalf of their children.

The Court is not alone in finding the existence of such a right, as three other district courts to assess laws almost identical to SB1 have done likewise. *See Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (finding that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children includes the right to seek care for their children); *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892–893 (E.D. Ark. 2021) (“The Court finds that the Parent Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to seek medical care for their children and, in conjunction with their adolescent child’s consent and their doctor’s recommendation, make a judgment that medical care is necessary.”), *affirmed* 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022)¹⁴; *Doe*

¹⁴ The Court further notes that on June 20, 2023, Judge Moody of the Eastern District of Arkansas rendered the final judgment in *Brandt v Rutledge*. *See Brandt*, 4-21-cv-450, 2023 WL 4073727 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023). Following a bench trial, Judge Moody found that the Arkansas law banning gender transition procedures for minors was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. *See id.* Based on his rulings, Judge

v. Ladapo, 4-23-cv-114, 2023 WL 3833848 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on the merits for their claim that Florida’s ban violated parents’ rights under the Due Process Clause). Given that SB1 infringes on a parent’s fundamental right to direct the medical care of that parent’s child by banning medical treatments given for particular purposes, SB1 must survive strict scrutiny.

ii. Application of Strict Scrutiny

A law that infringes on a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest (*i.e.*, it must survive strict scrutiny). *See Carey v. Wolnitzek*, 614 F.3d 189, 200 (6th Cir. 2010). “If a law does too much, or does too little, to advance the [state’s] objectives, it will fail.” *Id.* at 201. The state bears the burden of demonstrating that the law at issue survives strict scrutiny. *See Reform America v. City of Detroit, Michigan*, 37 F.4th 1138, 1156 (6th Cir. 2022). As discussed in detail below, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that SB1 is substantially related to an important government interest as to survive intermediate scrutiny. It necessarily follows that SB1 does not meet the more demanding requirements of strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim.

Moody entered a permanent injunction. *See id.* Although this decision plainly reflects final judgment in that case, the Court herein relies primarily on Judge Moody’s opinion on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The reason being that the analysis in the preliminary injunction opinion is more apt for the Court’s discussion on the instant motion, as it was provided under the same standard as the Court applies here.

B. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause provides that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” *Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett*, 791 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove that the government (i) treated the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated persons, and (ii) that the disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect [or quasi-suspect] class, or has no rational basis.” *Pratt Land & Development, LLC v. City of Chattanooga*, 581 F. Supp. 3d 962, 977 (E.D. Tenn. 2022).

Plaintiffs argue that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause because SB1 treats transgender minors differently from non-transgender minors, and that in doing so, SB1 targets the quasi-suspect class of transgender persons¹⁵ and the quasi-suspect classification of sex.¹⁶ (Doc. No. 33 at 22). In Plaintiffs’ view, because

¹⁵ Below, the court refers to class-based disparate treatment of transgender persons as disparate treatment “based on transgender status,” with the understanding that the reference is (as just indicated) to disparate treatment of members of the class of transgender persons.

¹⁶ The Court acknowledges the distinction between a “quasi-suspect *class*” and a “quasi-suspect *classification*.” Though courts often use the term “class” and “classification” interchangeably in the equal-protection context, the terms undoubtedly have distinct meanings. The latter refers to a *categorization* of persons into multiple (usually two) groups (for example, categorization of persons as male or female), whereas the former refers to *one group* of individuals thus categorized (for example, females). Under the Equal Protection Clause, both quasi-suspect *classes*

SB1 targets a quasi-suspect class and reflects a quasi-suspect classification, intermediate scrutiny applies.¹⁷ Defendants, on the other hand, contend that mere rational basis-review is applicable. (Doc. No. 112 at 10). As discussed in detail immediately below, the Court finds that intermediate scrutiny applies to SB1 for Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

and quasi-suspect *classifications* are cognizable bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny. *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding that sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny); *37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control*, 113 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the “legislation uniquely affect[ing]” quasi-suspect classes of “gender” or “illegitimacy” requires application of intermediate scrutiny); *Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (describing “women” and “illegitimates” as quasi-suspect classes) (Marshall J., dissenting). *Cf. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to recognize persons with intellectual disabilities as a “quasi-suspect class”). Without going into more detail than necessary here, the Court notes that in some cases the distinction makes a real difference in whether a particular plaintiff can succeed in having the law at issue subjected to something more stringent than rational-basis review. But the Court further notes, again without more ado than is necessary here, that with respect to SB1, Plaintiffs would achieve such success even if the Court were to view SB1 as raising an issue of quasi-suspect class rather than quasi-suspect classification—a view the Court declines to take because the real cognizable concern about SB1 is not that it makes a *classification* (of persons into the groups of transgender and cisgender) that needs to be justified by the state, but rather that it is directed at a particular *class* of persons and thus needs to be justified by the state.

¹⁷ Although Plaintiffs do not use the term “intermediate scrutiny” in their briefs, they contend that SB1 must be “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest” (Doc. No. 33 at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted)), which is the test applied to a law when so-called “intermediate scrutiny” is warranted.

i. Disparate Treatment Based on Transgender Status

To show that a law violates the Equal Protection Clause based on transgender status or sex, “[g]enerally, a plaintiff must show that [] [the] policy. . . had discriminatory intent. But such a showing is unnecessary when the policy tends to discriminate on its face.” *Fain v. Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313, 326 (S.D. W. Va. 2022). “The Court looks to the language of the policy to determine whether it is facially neutral or whether it explicitly references gendered or sex-related terms.” *Id.*; *Kadel v. Folwell*, 620 F. Supp. 3d 339, 375 (M.D.N.C. 2022) (“A facial inquiry is what it sounds like: a review of the language of the policy to see whether it is facially neutral or deal[s] in explicitly racial [or gendered] terms.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

SB1 bans a medical procedure if (and only if) the purpose of the procedure is either (i) to enable a minor to live consistently with his or her gender identity if that identity is inconsistent with the minor’s sex, or (ii) to treat discomfort from a discordance between the minor’s sex and the minor’s gender identity. As discussed above, transgender individuals are those whose gender identity is inconsistent with their sex at birth. Gender dysphoria is a condition that results from this incongruence.

According to Plaintiffs, SB1 facially discriminates based on transgender status. (Doc. No. 33 at 18). The court’s analysis in *Crouch*, is instructive on this issue. In that case, the court had to determine whether West Virginia’s policy of denying healthcare coverage for “transsexual surgery” violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating based on transgender status. *See id.* at 319. The court noted that “inherent in a gender dysphoria diagnosis is a person’s identity as

transgender. In other words, a person cannot suffer from gender dysphoria without identifying as transgender.” *See id.* at 324–325. With this principle in mind, the court found that the exclusion “targets transgender people because they are transgender.” *See id.* at 325.

The analysis in *Crouch* applies with equal force to SB1. Although SB1 does not use the word “transgender,” the law plainly proscribes treatment for gender dysphoria—and Defendants do not contest that only transgender individuals suffer from gender dysphoria. The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that SB1 expressly and exclusively targets transgender people. *See also Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (finding that Alabama law preventing minors from accessing medical procedures performed “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor’s perception of his or her gender or sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex as defined in this act” “prohibits transgender minors—and only transgender minors—from taking transitioning medications due to their gender nonconformity.”).

Defendants’ argument that SB1 does not discriminate based on transgender status is unpersuasive. According to Defendants, not all transgender individuals want the medical procedures banned by SB1, and therefore SB1 does not discriminate on the basis of transgender status. (Doc. No. 112 at 13). Defendants’ argument, however, improperly characterizes the group of people that are affected by SB1. The relevant class is not “individuals who want to receive the medical procedures that are banned by SB1.” Instead, the relevant group is transgender minors. Confronting the exact same argument in *Eknes-Tucker*, the court in that case explained that the “fundamental flaw in this

argument is that the first category [*i.e.* transgender minors who want the procedures] consists entirely of transgender minors.” See *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. In other words, *only* transgender minors were affected by the law at issue in *Eknes-Tucker*, even if not necessarily *all* transgender minors were affected by the law. The same is true of SB1.

It does not take much creative thinking to understand why Defendants’ argument holds no weight. Imagine a law that said that “no Black individuals can attend graduate school.” Under Defendants’ logic, the law would not discriminate based on race, and thus strict scrutiny would not apply, because there are Black individuals who do *not* want to attend graduate school as well as Black individuals who do want to attend graduate school. But applying a standard other than strict scrutiny would be preposterous because the law clearly prescribes disparate treatment on the basis of race; under the law, *no* Black individuals could ever attend graduate school whereas individuals from other races potentially could do so. Therefore, the relevant class would be Black individuals, *not* “Black individuals who want to attend graduate school.” Likewise in the present case. Under SB1, the only group of individuals that are denied treatment are transgender persons (in particular, transgender minors). It is not relevant that some transgender persons (transgender minors) may not seek out these procedures, just as it would not have been relevant in the example that some Black individuals may not want to go to graduate school.¹⁸

¹⁸ Defendants also briefly reference *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), in support of their argument that SB1 does not discriminate based on transgender status. (Doc. No. 112 at 13). According to Defendants, *Dobbs*

Defendants' reliance on a footnote from *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) also gets them nowhere. In *Geduldig*, the Supreme Court held that a California disability insurance system administered by the state that excluded coverage for disabilities resulting from pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. *See id.* In assessing whether the system violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court explained that pregnancy was an “objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics,” and therefore classifications based on pregnancy could not automatically be understood as improper sex-based discrimination. *See id.* at 496 n.20. The Supreme Court also observed that because there are both men and women who can receive benefits under the system (as long as they were not seeking pregnancy-related disability benefits), the system did not discriminate on the basis of sex. The idea seems to be that a disability insurance system can exclude coverage for an “objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics” because such a system really is geared towards the *physical condition* rather than any class of *persons*, even if the condition is one that happens to be associated only with one particular class of persons.

Defendants' *Geduldig*-based argument is not original. In rejecting the same argument very recently in *Ladapo*, Judge Hinkle explained that California's system treated men and women the same because under that system “nobody had health coverage for

confirms that regulation of procedures pertaining only to one sex are not necessarily subjected to intermediate scrutiny. As the Court has noted repeatedly, SB1's prohibitions on certain procedures do not merely involve transgender status; they are directly and exclusively targeted at minors who are transgender. Therefore, Defendants' analogy to *Dobbs* is not persuasive.

pregnancy,” whereas under the law at issue in *Ladapo* “transgender and cisgender individuals are not treated the same.” *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *10. Judge Hinkle’s rationale applies equally to SB1.¹⁹

Additionally, the court in *Kadel* considered whether North Carolina’s state healthcare plan that excluded certain treatments for gender transformation and in connection with sex changes or modifications violated the Equal Protection Clause. 620 F. Supp. 3d at 378. In rejecting the defendants’ analogy to *Geduldig*, the court explained that the unlike the system in *Geduldig*—which excluded benefits based on an “objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics”—North Carolina’s plan could not be explained without reference to sex, gender, or transgender status. *See id*; *Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 317 (rejecting analogy to *Geduldig* because West Virginia’s state Medicaid program treated non-transgender individuals more favorably by allowing them to access the same surgeries that were otherwise banned under the program’s policy); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *8 (distinguishing *Geduldig* on the ground that Indiana law prohibiting procedures when used for gender transition turned on “sex-based classification,” whereas pregnancy “is not “necessarily a proxy for sex.”). For the reasons expressed in *Ladapo* and *Kadel*, the Court declines to find that *Geduldig* supports Defendants’ argument that SB1 does not impose disparate treatment based on transgender status.

Having found that the law subjects individuals to disparate treatment based on transgender status, the

¹⁹ Although the Court does not necessarily embrace Judge Hinkle’s opinion in all respects, and certainly realizes that it need not follow this non-binding opinion, the Court finds persuasive every aspect of that opinion upon which the Court relies herein.

Court must next determine whether doing so requires the Court to evaluate SB1 under intermediate scrutiny, as would be the case if transgender individuals constituted a so-called quasi-suspect class.²⁰ The Supreme Court considers four factors to determine whether a class (such as transgender persons as a group) is quasi-suspect, such that disparate treatment of members of that class is subjected to intermediate scrutiny:

(1) whether the class has been historically “subjected to discrimination,” *Lyng v. Castillo*, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S. Ct. 2727, 91 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1986); (2) whether the class has a defining characteristic that “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,” *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); (3) whether the class exhibits “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” *Lyng*, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S. Ct. 2727; and (4) whether the class is “a minority or politically powerless,” *id.*

Ray v. McCloud, 507 F. Supp. 3d 925, 936–937 (S.D. Ohio 2020).

“There is no binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit regarding whether transgender people are a quasi-suspect

²⁰ As for the implication of the term that something is to a degree “suspect,” it bears mentioning that what is “suspect” are not the class members, but rather the *disparate treatment* of those class members.

class.”²¹ *See id.* at 937. The overwhelming majority of courts to consider the question, however, have found

²¹ The Court finds unavailing Defendants’ reliance on *Ondo v. City of Cleveland*, 795 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) to support their argument that transgender individuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect class. (Doc. No. 112 at 12). In *Ondo*, the Sixth Circuit declined to recognize homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class. *See Ondo*, 795 F.3d at 608. In arriving at this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a particular class or classification as suspect only when “the trait [associated with the particular class or classification] is definitively ascertainable at the moment of birth . . .” *See id.* As explained by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court so far has recognized only illegitimacy as a quasi-suspect class and sex as a quasi-suspect classification. Defendants argue that the Court should follow the reasoning of *Ondo* and decline to recognize transgender individuals as a quasi-suspect class because transgender individuals do not (according to Defendants) have a “definitively ascertainable [characteristic] at birth.”

Defendants’ argument, however, would require the Court to make a logical leap. Although the Supreme Court to date has recognized quasi-suspect classes (and classifications) only where the distinguishing trait can be ascertained at birth (assuming that it in fact can be ascertained at birth), it does not necessarily follow that a group with a distinguishing trait that *cannot* be ascertained at the moment of birth cannot be either a quasi-suspect class or subject to a quasi-suspect classification. The four prongs used by the Supreme Court to identify suspect classes that warrant heightened scrutiny say nothing about whether the distinguishing characteristics of a class can be ascertained by a third party at the moment of birth. The Court therefore declines to defer to what is most likely dicta in *Ondo* in lieu of binding Supreme Court precedent. In short, until the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court rules on whether transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, the four prongs set forth by the Supreme Court govern the analysis.

As an aside, the undersigned queries whether the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in *Ondo* rests on solid grounds. For example, presumably the Sixth Circuit was not implying that being homosexual is something like a choice that is made later in life

that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. *See, e.g., Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class); *Bd. of Educ. Of the Highland Local School District v. United States Dep't of Educ.*, 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class both because discrimination on the basis of transgender status is discrimination based on sex and because transgender individuals as a group fulfill the four prongs used by the Supreme Court to define a quasi-suspect class); *Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. School Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 610 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class); *Brandt by and through Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 670 n.4 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding that the district court did not commit clear error when it found

rather than a characteristic that a person is born with. Instead, it seems that what the Sixth Circuit in *Ondo* meant was that for a class to be quasi-suspect class, the trait associated with that class must be ascertainable based on criteria that are immediately observable at the time of birth. So sex would fit neatly into that category because most of the time, a person's sex (if designated by external genitalia as it is in Tennessee) is immediately ascertainable at birth regardless of whether that person is yet aware of their sex. But the undersigned is not persuaded that the same can be said for illegitimacy, which is the second quasi-suspect class identified by the Supreme Court. Indeed, there is nothing regarding a baby's physical appearance that indicates (*i.e.*, makes it ascertainable) that it was conceived or born out of wedlock. Presumably, a third party could ascertain this only from the say-so of the mother or father or perhaps to on-point state records to which the third party has access. Therefore, the undersigned is skeptical of *Ondo's* identification of the common thread among the two classes that the Supreme Court has determined to be suspect classes.

that transgender individuals constituted a quasi-suspect class); *M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. Of Talbot Cnty.*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719–720 (D. Md. 2018) (finding that all four prongs of the quasi-suspect class test justify treating transgender people as a quasi-suspect class); *Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs.*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952–953 (W.D. Wisc. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs had made a strong showing that transgender individuals are a quasi-suspect class); *F.V. v. Barron*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (D. Idaho 2018) (finding that transgender people bear “all of the characteristics of a quasi-suspect class. . .”); *Evancho v. Pine-Richland School Dist.*, 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that transgender individuals fulfill all four prongs of the quasi-suspect-class test); *Norsworthy*, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (“[T]he Court concludes that discrimination based on transgender status independently qualifies as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause because transgender persons meet the indicia of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect classification” identified by the Supreme Court.”); *Adkins v. City of New York*, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that transgender people are a quasi-suspect class).

The Court is satisfied that current precedent supports the finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. As the court in *Ray* explained, “there is not much doubt that transgender people have historically been subject to discrimination including in education, employment, housing, and access to healthcare.” *See, e.g., Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (internal quotation marks omitted); *Adkins*, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (finding that “transgender people have suffered a history of persecution and discrimination”); *Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local School Dist.*, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (finding that

transgender individuals have been historically subject to discrimination).²² Transgender individuals are also “no less capable of contributing value to society than”²³ non-transgender individuals. *See, e.g., Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937. Transgender individuals have “obvious immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” namely the distinguishing characteristic that their respective gender identities do not align with their respective sexes at birth.²⁴ *See, e.g., id.* Finally, transgender individuals are both a

²² On this point, the current record in this case is not fulsome. If Defendants wish to attempt to create such doubt at later stages of this case via presentation of evidence on point, they are free to do so. Though the Court notes that even if Defendants are able to persuade the Court that transgender individuals are not a quasi-suspect class under the four prongs provided by the Supreme Court, the scrutiny applied to the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims may not change. Indeed, the Court has provided two alternative bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny herein—that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it explicitly delineates its prohibitions based on sex, and that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex because it imposes disparate treatment based on transgender status.

²³ The Court feels compelled to note, as an aside, that it feels presumptive to present oneself as an arbiter of what constitutes “value to society” and of who does and does not “contribute” to such “value.” These are patently subjective and value-laden determinations. But under applicable law, it falls to the Court to call it like it sees it, and it makes the above-referenced call without difficulty.

²⁴ That is not to say that a transgender person’s gender identity could never change so that it aligns with their sex at birth, thus rendering the person no longer transgender. In other words, the Court’s view is not categorically, “once a transgender person, always a transgender person.” However, even if transgender status is not “obviously immutable” for all transgender persons, transgender status is a “distinguishing characteristic” that defines persons with such status as a distinct group.

minority and lack political power. *See, e.g., id.* (explaining that less than 1% of the adult population in the United States are transgender); *Windsor v. U.S.*, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that whether a group is “politically powerless” focuses on whether the group has “strength to politically protect [itself],” for example by achieving relative equal representation in political bodies), *affirmed*, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).²⁵ Given that transgender individuals fulfill all four prongs, the Court finds that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class. Therefore, SB1 must survive intermediate scrutiny.²⁶

ii. Disparate Treatment Based on Sex

Satisfied that SB1 imposes disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status, and that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, the Court could end here its analysis of what scrutiny applies.

²⁵ From *Windsor’s* description, it appears that for purposes of this factor, a group can be deemed to lack political power even if it has a substantial voice in the media, substantial support in the non-profit and public-interest sector, and the support of a substantial number of elected representatives or executive-branch officials. In making this observation, the Court does not mean to imply that these examples apply to transgender individuals as a group; the Court’s point is only that even if these examples did apply, that would not by itself suffice to show an absence of political power.

The Court notes additionally that here it is making the reasonable assumption that when the challenge is to a state law, the focus should be on the group’s political power specifically within the state at issue.

²⁶ Defendants fail to acknowledge the weight of (non-binding) authority supporting the finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class; by not even dealing with such authority, Defendants lose an opportunity to show the Court why transgender persons are not a quasi-suspect class.

The Court, however, finds it prudent to address, additionally and alternatively, Plaintiffs' argument that SB1 is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it imposes disparate treatment on the basis of sex. (Doc. No. 33 at 18). And as discussed below, over Defendants' opposition, the Court finds that SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex, which in turn provides an alternative basis for the application of intermediate scrutiny.

a) Sex-Based Classification

Several courts have found that laws similar to SB1 (*i.e.* those that deny access or healthcare coverage to medical procedures if the purpose is to allow the minor to live inconsistently with that minor's sex at birth) impose disparate treatment on the basis of sex. *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *8 (finding that Florida's ban discriminates based on sex because to know how the ban applied, one must know the sex of the person); *Fletcher v. Alaska*, 443 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030 (D. Alaska 2020) ("AlaskaCare covers vaginoplasty and mammoplasty surgery if it reaffirms an individual's natal sex, but denies coverage for the same surgery if it diverges from an individual's natal sex. That is discrimination because of sex and makes defendant's formal policy, as expressed in the provisions of AlaskaCare, facially discriminatory."); *Kadel*, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 376 (finding that North Carolina's denial of healthcare coverage for treatments leading to or in connection with sex changes or modifications and related care discriminated on the basis of sex because "[i]t is impossible to determine whether a particular treatment is connected to 'sex changes or modifications and related care'—and thus, whether the exclusion applies—without comparing the member's biological sex before the treatment to how it might be impacted by the treatment."); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *8–*9

(explaining that although Indiana law banning gender-affirming treatment for minors “prohibit[ed] both male and female minors from using puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for gender transition,” it reflected a sex-based classification because under the law it was “impossible for a medical provider to know whether a treatment is prohibited without knowing the patient’s sex.”). And as the court in *Kadel* explained, “[a] policy that uses racial or gendered terms ‘falls into an inherently suspect [or-quasi-suspect] category’ even if it creates classifications that are not ‘obviously pernicious.’” *See Kadel*, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 375 (quoting *Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982)).

SB1 prohibits a minor from receiving medical procedures if the purpose is to enable the minor to live as an “identity inconsistent” with the minor’s sex. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. 68-33 103(a)(1)(A). SB1 also prohibits these medical procedures if the purpose is to treat discomfort arising from discordance between the minor’s sex and identity. *Id.* at § 68-33-103(a)(1)(B). Whether a medical procedure is banned by SB1—a case-specific question that must be asked on a minor-by-minor basis—therefore requires a comparison between the minor’s sex at birth and the minor’s (gender) identity; that is, it requires the ascertainment of whether the minor’s sex at birth is consistent with that minor’s (gender) identity. So if a minor’s sex is female at birth and that minor wants to access hormone therapies²⁷ to enable her to conform her gender identity to her sex at birth (*i.e.* she wants to live as a girl), SB1 would allow this minor to access such care. However, if a minor’s sex at birth is male and that

²⁷ By “hormone therapies,” the Court refers to the dispensing of puberty blockers or of cross-sex hormones.

minor wanted access the same treatment for the same purpose (*i.e.* live as a girl), SB1 would deny that minor access to the treatment. These disparate outcomes under SB1 are due to the fact that the minors had sexes at birth different from one another. Therefore, contrary to Defendants' assertion (which is not frivolous) that SB1 merely "implicat[es]" sex, the Court finds that SB1 demarcates its ban(s) based on a minor's sex. The Court is therefore persuaded that SB1 creates a sex-based classification on its face, and thus it imposes disparate treatment on the basis of sex.

The Court's finding is also supported by the recent decision from Judge Hinkle in *Ladapo* to enjoin a Florida statute's general ban (hereinafter, "Florida's ban") on the use of puberty blockers or hormones to "affirm a person's perception of his or her sex if that perception is inconsistent with the person's [natal] sex." Fla. Stat. § 456.001(9)(a)1 & 2. In *Ladapo*, the court employed virtually identical reasoning in finding that Florida's ban discriminated based on sex:

Consider an adolescent, perhaps age 16, that a physician wishes to treat with testosterone. Under the challenged statute, is the treatment legal or illegal? To know the answer, one must know the adolescent's sex. If the adolescent is a natal male, the treatment is legal. If the adolescent is a natal female, the treatment is illegal. This is a line drawn on the basis of sex, plain and simple. *See Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 669 ("Because the minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, [the law] discriminates on the basis of sex."); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a policy under which

entry into a designated bathroom was legal or not depending on the entrant's natal sex).

See Ladapo, 2023 WL 3833848, at *8. The Court agrees with the point made here and rejects Defendants' argument (Doc. No. 112 at 10) that SB1 treats minors of all sexes the same. As the Court has demonstrated above, when two individuals want the same procedure under SB1 for the same purpose, whether they respectively can access that procedure will depend on their respective sexes. As many courts have found with respect to materially similar laws to SB1, this constitutes disparate treatment based on sex.²⁸

On this point, Defendants' argument suffers from a major inconsistency. On the one hand, Defendants assert that minors of both sexes are treated equally under SB1, but they then invoke the Supreme Court's rationale in *Dobbs* for the proposition that the fact that only one sex can receive a medical treatment does not

²⁸ The Court acknowledges that the sex-based classification contained in SB1 may not be characteristic of what many would consider a sex-based classification. For example, unlike sex-based classifications in some other contexts, SB1 does not state that only females or only males are subject to SB1's ban on medical procedures. And it is true that in one sense, both males and females are equally affected by SB1 if they seek treatment to live inconsistently with their sex at birth. However, as demonstrated above, it is plain that under SB1, a healthcare provider must know a prospective patient's sex in order to determine whether the patient can access care under SB1. The Court is satisfied that this is a form of disparate treatment based on sex (*i.e.* a sex-based classification). The Court's finding is also supported by the Court's reasoning in *Bostock* (albeit it provided in a different context), that a sex-based classification exists when one cannot "writ[e] out instructions" on who is affected by a law or policy "without using the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym)." *See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1746 (2020).

necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny. By thus analogizing to *Dobbs*, however, the state suggests that only one sex can receive the medical procedures described in SB1, which is directly contrary to Defendants’ argument that SB1 treats all sexes equally.²⁹

For these reasons, the Court finds that SB1 contains a sex-based classification on its face, and therefore intermediate scrutiny is warranted.³⁰

b) Disparate Treatment Based on Transgender-Status is a Form of Imposing Disparate Treatment Based on Sex

Although the Court has found that SB1 on its face subjects individuals to disparate treatment on the basis of sex, the Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that SB1 subjects individuals to disparate treatment on the basis of sex because it imposes disparate treatment

²⁹ The Court is also not persuaded by Defendants’ reliance on *Dobbs*. Writing for the majority in *Dobbs*, Justice Alito explained that the Supreme Court’s precedent had made it clear that regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification. 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2245–2246 (2022). Unlike SB1, laws regulating pregnancy generally do not make explicit sex-based classifications. Therefore, the Court does not find *Dobbs* instructive in determining whether SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex.

³⁰ The Court is able to conclude that intermediate scrutiny applies to this sex-based classification without any need to apply the four-factor test to determine whether the classification is a quasi-suspect classification (and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny *on that basis*). The Supreme Court has made clear, even without using the terms “quasi-suspect classification” or “intermediate scrutiny,” that classifications based on sex are subject to the above-referenced test that applies to laws subject to “intermediate scrutiny.” *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).

based on transgender status.³¹ In support of their argument that SB1 imposes disparate treatment on

³¹ There is a subtle, though potentially not a practically consequential, distinction between (a) finding that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it explicitly delineates based on sex and (b) a finding that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it imposes disparate treatment based on transgender status. The first finding may be thought of as a finding of a “directly” sex-based classification, and the latter finding may be thought of as a finding of an “indirectly” sex-based classification.

A finding that SB1 makes a directly sex-based classification is appropriate because as demonstrated in Section (2)(B)(ii)(a), the Court could draw its conclusion that SB1 makes a sex-based classification without ever using the word “transgender.” Indeed, one would not even have to know what “transgender” means to be able to determine that SB1 contains a sex-based classification. For example, § 6-33-103(a)(1)(A) bans medical procedures if they are used to enable “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)(A). Even without any knowledge of what it means to be transgender or of the condition of gender dysphoria, one would know, based on the text of SB1, that it is a minor’s sex in relation to the minor’s gender identity that determines whether the minor is subject to ban under SB1. One would also understand that if the minor’s gender identity was not different from that minor’s sex at birth—and thus was consistent with his or her sex at birth—that treatment would be available. This is an explicit (*i.e.*, direct) sex-based classification.

A finding that SB1 makes an indirectly sex-based classification is slightly different. Rather than relying primarily on the text of SB1, this finding hinges on the definition of the term “transgender”: incongruence between a person’s sex at birth and the person’s gender identity. To determine whether to find that SB1 indirectly makes a sex-based classification, the Court first must determine whether SB1 in fact imposes disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status, and, if so, then determine whether disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status necessarily entails disparate treatment on the basis of sex, *i.e.*, a sex-based classification. Therefore, whether SB1 contains a sex-based classification on the grounds that it may impose disparate

the basis of sex, Plaintiffs rely on the rationale of the Court in *Bostock v. Clayton County*, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) and of the Sixth Circuit in *Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). Both of these cases involved the question of whether discrimination based on *transgender status* necessarily constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

In *Bostock*, the Court had to determine whether Title VII's proscription against discrimination "because of such individual's . . . sex" encompassed discrimination on the basis of an individual's status as transgender. *See* 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch explained that "it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being [] transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex." *See id.* 140 S. Ct. at 1741. As the Court explained,

[T]ake an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.

treatment based on transgender-status is a separate (though undoubtedly related inquiry) as to whether SB1 contains a sex-based classification due to an explicit delineation based on sex. The Court finds it valuable to discuss the arguments for (and against) each of these two potential findings.

See id. 140 S. Ct. at 1741–1742.³² Although *Bostock* was a Title VII case, the Court finds that its rationale is applicable to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. As discussed above, SB1 bans any minor from accessing certain medical procedures if their purpose is either to allow the minor to live inconsistently with the minor’s sex at birth or to treat gender dysphoria. Both of these bans affect only transgender minors. The Court need not rehash (and declines to second-guess) the reasoning of *Bostock* here; suffice it to say that discordance between a person’s sex at birth and gender identity is what makes the person transgender. Indeed, if the person’s sex at birth had been different than it actually was (and thus was not discordant with the person’s gender identity), the person would not be transgender despite having the same gender identity. Therefore, in the Equal Protection context, disparate treatment based on being transgender is disparate treatment based on sex. *See Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (relying on *Bostock* to support conclusion that

³² Defendants argue that (unlike in the employment context involved in *Bostock*) in medical-related contexts like the ones implicated by SB1, the physical differences between the sexes legitimately can be taken into account. The Court does not agree with Defendants, however, that this distinction weighs against the application of *Bostock*’s rationale to this case; this is because Justice Gorsuch’s reasons for why discrimination based on transgender status is discrimination based on sex were not at all affected by or specific to the Title VII-related context implicated in *Bostock*; his reasons were general in nature rather than context-specific. And the Court notes that “inherent differences” between the sexes is one of the primary bases on which the Supreme Court has relied to justify the imposition of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533–534 (1996) (explaining that something less than strict scrutiny applies to sex-based classification because “[p]hysical differences between men and women” are “enduring” and “inherent”).

discrimination based on transgender status in the equal protection context constitutes discrimination based on sex); *Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 889 (citing *Bostock* in support of finding that heightened scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the law at issue discriminated on the basis of transgender status).

In arguing that the rationale of *Bostock* does not apply in this case, Defendants assert that disparate treatment based on transgender status cannot be disparate treatment based on sex because in the decades after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, laws prohibiting cross-dressing were common. (Doc. No. 112 at 10). This argument suffers from several problems.

The mere existence of these laws does not mean that they were constitutional. As Justice Thomas very recently noted: “‘Standing alone,’ . . . ‘historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,’ *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983), even when the practice in question ‘covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it,’ *Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York*, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).” *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc.*, 143 S. Ct. 1720 at 1740–1741 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting).³³ And a plurality of the

³³ The Court does not fault Defendants for drawing the Court’s attention to laws passed after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to support their argument that SB1 does not unlawfully impose disparate treatment based on sex due to its targeting of transgender individuals. Defendants’ approach here, with its focus on events close to the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally added to the U.S. Constitution (upon ratification), may seem to reflect some form of originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, those who subscribe to “original public meaning” originalism have in the past looked to post-ratification practices to determine the original public

meaning of constitutional provisions. *See, e.g., New York State Rifle Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2136 (2022) (explaining that the Court in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) found that evidence of how the Second Amendment was interpreted immediately after its ratification was a “critical tool of constitutional interpretation”). However, as Justice Thomas recently explained in writing for the majority in *Bruen*, the use of post-ratification practices as evidence of original public meaning has some serious limitations. As Justice Thomas explained, “we must guard against giving postenactment history more weight than it can rightly bear.” *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2136–37. Justice Thomas went on to explain that “where a governmental practice has been *open, widespread, and unchallenged* since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.” *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Defendants’ references to laws passed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, without more, do not meet the standard set forth in *Bruen* as to when a court can rely on post-ratification practices.

Without attempting or purporting to give a general primer on originalism, the Court further notes that original public meaning originalism, though likely the most prominent form of originalism as of late, is not the only type of originalism that exists. There are multiple forms of originalism, and more forms are conceived of and discussed by scholars over time. *See* Lawrence B. Solum, *Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate*, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1243, 1296 (2019) (listing the four primary types of originalism as 1) “public meaning,” 2) “intentionalism,” 3) “original methods,” and 4) “original law.”); Lorianne Updike Toler et. al., *Pre-“Originalism,”* 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 277, 290 (2013) (“Originalism has evolved, much like the Reformation, in a near-linear ideological succession until, in recent years, it has spawned a myriad of ideological streams. These camps include Intentionalism, first Framers’ Intentionalism and then Ratifiers’ Intentionalism, and Original Public Meaning--whose variants include Semantic Originalism, Original Expected Application Originalism, and Original Methods Originalism.”). Although (as just discussed) original public meaning originalism finds some value—albeit in limited circumstances—in post-ratification practices, not all originalists place such emphasis on laws passed (or informal

Supreme Court has outright rejected the historical approach urged by Defendants. See *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding statute that discriminated based on sex violated the Equal Protection Clause despite numerous laws passed in the 19th century that discriminated against women) (plurality).³⁴ Moreover, the Court does not write on a blank slate in finding that *Bostock*'s rationale applies to the equal-protection context. The Sixth Circuit has already found that a rationale similar to that provided in *Bostock* under Title VII applies to equal protection claims.³⁵

practices that were common) close in time to the enactment of certain provisions of the Constitution.

For some schools of originalist thought, reliance on post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification practices is inappropriate. One early school of originalism, for example, posits that “the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment reposes in the intentions of its congressional drafters, rather than in those of its state legislative ratifiers” (or, it follows, in the acts of state legislature in the decades following ratification). See Michael J. Klarman, *Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell*, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1934 (1995) (setting forth the author’s view of the kind of originalism embraced by Professor (later Circuit Judge) and now-again Professor Michael McConnell). Under this school of originalism, the Fourteenth Amendment should not be interpreted based on the laws passed thereafter by state legislatures.

³⁴ Although the plurality’s analysis in *Frontiero* is not binding, the Court finds it persuasive and therefore affords it significant weight.

³⁵ Similarly unpersuasive is Defendants’ reliance on *Pelcha v. AIW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2021), for the proposition that *Bostock*'s rationale is necessarily limited to the Title VII context. True, in *Pelcha*, the Sixth Circuit found that *Bostock*'s reasoning under Title VII did not govern the outcome of the plaintiffs’ ADEA claim. In arriving at this conclusion, however,

In *Smith v. City of Salem Ohio*, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Jimmie Smith, a former lieutenant of the Salem Fire Department, had stated a Title VII claim and equal protection claim based on sex discrimination after being pressured to resign and ultimately suspended due to being transgender. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). In addressing the Title VII claim, the court found that Smith had stated a claim for impermissible sex-stereotyping because the complaint pled facts that Smith had suffered adverse actions due to non-conformance to Smith's sex at birth. *See id.* at 575. Relying on *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the court explained that an employer who discriminates against a person (like Smith) whose sex is female a birth because the person does not “wear dresses or makeup,” is culpable of “engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex.”³⁶ *See Smith*, 378 F.3d at

the Sixth Circuit noted that there was binding precedent from the Supreme Court on the ADEA-related issue before the court, and therefore it need not defer to *Bostock*. *See id.* at 324. By contrast, in this case, there is no binding precedent to dictate the outcome on whether disparate treatment based on transgender status constitutes disparate treatment based on sex for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. True, in the present context, *Bostock* is not binding, and the Court does not treat it as such. The Court, however, does find the rationale of *Bostock* to be analytically applicable.

³⁶ It makes perfect sense that a person whose sex is female at birth does not have to conform with traditional (or purportedly traditional) notions of how females are to act; as the expression goes, this is a free country, after all, and persons do not have to conform to traditional or stereotypical notions of how a female or male is supposed to act or appear. *Smith* stands for the proposition that there are multiple ways females may act or appear. That being so, one might ask what it means to have a “female” gender identity, since being “female” can mean multiple things—different things to different people. But a person born male who is

574. The court went on to find that “sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.” *See id.* at 575.

Turning then to Smith’s equal protection claim, the court found that the facts pled by Smith in support of a Title VII claim “easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.” *See id.* at 577. The court therefore viewed its Title VII analysis as applying to the equal protection claim. Furthermore, in finding that Smith had stated an equal protection claim, the court did not concern itself with laws passed following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment that also may have discriminated based on sex. Although the reasoning under Title VII was slightly different in *Bostock* than in *Smith*, the court’s analysis in *Smith* demonstrates that when it comes to discrimination based on sex, reasoning used to analyze a claim under Title VII can be applied with relative ease to a claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on the same facts (and that the Sixth Circuit has endorsed this approach on at least one occasion). The analysis of the court in *Smith*, coupled with the rejection of the historical approach by the plurality *Frontiero*, clearly

transgender is transgender because they self-identify as “female,” irrespective of *why* the person identifies as female and what exactly the person believes it means to be “female.” Likewise, a person born female who is transgender is transgender because they self-identify as “male,” irrespective of why they identify as male and what exactly the person believes it means to be “male.”

militates against Defendants' argument that *Bostock's* rationale cannot be extended to the present case.³⁷

In summary, the Court finds that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex due to the fact that the law on its face includes a sex-based classification. In the alternative, the Court also finds that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex because it treats similarly-situated individuals differently based on transgender status. For these reasons, in addition to the Court's finding that SB1 discriminates based on transgender status and that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, SB1 must survive intermediate scrutiny. The Court now turns to whether the record supports Defendants' contention that SB1 is substantially related to an important state interest.

*iii. Weight of Defendants' Expert Testimony*³⁸

At the outset, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the testimony of Dr. Cantor and Dr. Hruz is minimally persuasive³⁹ given that neither of them state that they have ever diagnosed or treated a minor with gender dysphoria. This apparent deficiency in their experience as to the topics to which they testify is relevant given that Plaintiffs present several experts that have diagnosed and treated hundreds of individuals with gender

³⁷ Having provided three alternative bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny, the Court need not decide whether SB1 also discriminates based on sex due to sex-based stereotyping.

³⁸ In referring to the parties' "experts," the Court means only that the parties wish these individuals to be treated as experts by the Court. These individuals have not been certified as experts.

³⁹ Notably, the Court here is concerned with the relative persuasiveness of the two sides' experts based on the current record, and not with declaring which side's experts ultimately are in the right.

dysphoria. This diminution of their testimony is consistent with the findings of other courts on this issue. For example, in assessing whether Dr. Hruz could testify as an expert, the court in *Kadel* found that

Hruz is not qualified to offer expert opinions on the diagnosis of gender dysphoria, the DSM, gender dysphoria’s potential causes, the likelihood that a patient will “desist,” or the efficacy of mental health treatments. Hruz is not a psychiatrist, psychologist, or mental healthcare professional. He has never diagnosed a patient with gender dysphoria, treated gender dysphoria, treated a transgender patient, conducted any original research about gender dysphoria diagnosis or its causes, or published any scientific, peer-reviewed literature on gender dysphoria.

See Kadel, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 364; *see also Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–1143 (giving Dr. Cantor’s testimony “very little weight” because he had never provided care to a transgender minor under the age of sixteen). Most recently, Judge Hinkle commented that Dr. Hruz’s testimony was that of a “deeply biased advocate, not [] an expert sharing relevant evidence-based information and opinions,” which then led Judge Hinkle to credit Hruz’s testimony only insofar as it was consistent with that of other defense experts. *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *2 n.8. The undersigned sees no current need or basis to accuse Dr. Hruz of being a deeply biased advocate posing as an expert, but he does discern the need to discount Dr. Hruz’s testimony somewhat for the reasons mentioned.

Although research may be a reasonable basis on which to form conclusions, ultimately individuals who have never administered the medical procedures

banned by SB1 or sought to mitigate the risks lack real-world experience regarding the negative side effects allegedly associated with these treatments.⁴⁰

The Court acknowledges that typically credibility determinations in resolving a motion for a preliminary injunction can be made only where a court has held an evidentiary hearing. *See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp.*, 511 F.3d 535, 553 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court, however, provided the parties with an opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing that included testimony from the parties' respective experts, but the parties did not indicate to the Court that they found such a hearing necessary

⁴⁰ The Court also notes that the testimony of both Dr. Laidlaw and Dr. Levine, on topics virtually identical to those on which they testify on behalf of Defendants in this case, has been treated by courts with a dose of skepticism. *See Edmo v. Idaho Dep't of Correction*, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1125–1126 (D. Idaho) (“Dr. Levine is considered an outlier in the field of gender dysphoria and does not ascribe to the WPATH Standards of Care. [¶] His training materials do not reflect opinions that are generally accepted in the field of gender dysphoria.”), *affirmed in relevant part* by 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); *C.P. by and through Pritchard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill.*, 3-20-cv-06145, 2022 WL 17092846 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2022) (allowing Dr. Laidlaw to testify as an expert but finding that it is a “close question” given that “[¶]less than five percent of his patients are under the age of 18 and he has treated two patients with gender dysphoria. [¶] He has done no original research on gender identity and bases his opinions on his general experience as an endocrinologist and a review of literature.”). The Court need not decide at present whether it shares the same kind of skepticism, and instead notes that it understands these courts' concerns but also does not treat a person's status as a so-called “outlier” as *per se* dispositive of whether the person's testimony should be excluded or discounted.

before the resolution of the present Motion.⁴¹ Therefore, in the Court’s view, the parties have waived any argument that the Court cannot make credibility findings based on the written evidence of the parties’ experts.

iv. WPATH and Endocrine Society Guidelines

Next, the Court finds it necessary to evaluate the parties’ arguments regarding the reliability of the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. WPATH is the leading association of medical and mental health professionals in the treatment of transgender individuals. (Adkins Decl. at 3). The Endocrine Society is an organization representing more than 18,000 endocrinologists. (*Id.* at 6). The Endocrine Society and WPATH have published widely accepted guidelines for treating gender dysphoria. (*Id.* at 6). The guidelines are based on scientific research and clinical experience. (*Id.*). The guidelines have been endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”), which is an association representing more than 67,000 pediatricians. (*Id.*). AAP, WPATH, and the Endocrine Society are the largest professional associations in these fields of medicine in the United States. (*Id.*). On behalf of Plaintiffs, Dr. Adkins has testified that the “[t]he Endocrine Society Guideline for treatment of gender dysphoria is comparable to other clinical practice guidelines that I follow as a pediatric endocrinologist to treat other medical conditions such as those practice guidelines for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) and Polycystic Ovary Syndrome (PCOS).” (*Id.* at 8).

Defendants attempt to discredit the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines by pointing out that the conclusions contained therein are based on “low-

⁴¹ The transcript of the Court’s conversation with the parties on this issue is available at Doc. No. 125.

quality evidence.” (Doc. No. 112 at 15). The Court does not begrudge Defendants trying to make hay out of this, but ultimately Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. As explained by Dr. Antommaria, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (“GRADE”) system permits conclusions to be drawn based on what is considered “low-quality evidence.” (Doc. No. 142 (Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria) at 6). And as Dr. Antommaria demonstrated, the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines, to the extent that they rely on what is considered “low-quality evidence,” are not unique in this respect. For example, 20% of the American Heart Association’s Guideline for Pediatric Basic and Advanced Life Support include strong recommendations based on evidence of similar quality. (*Id.*). That portions of the Endocrine Society and WPATH guidelines are based on “low-quality evidence” as determined by the GRADE system is therefore not itself a reason to find the guidelines unreliable. The court in *Ladapo*, in assessing the argument regarding “low quality evidence,” arrived at the same conclusion:

[T]he fact that research-generated evidence supporting these treatments gets classified as “low” or “very low” quality on the GRADE scale does not mean the evidence is not persuasive, or that it is not the best available research-generated evidence on the question of how to treat gender dysphoria, or that medical treatments should not be provided consistent with the research results and clinical evidence. It is commonplace for medical treatments to be provided even when supported only by research producing evidence classified as “low” or “very low” on this scale

2023 WL 3833848, at *11. The Court finds further support for its reliance on information contained in the guidelines in the fact that several courts in cases similar to this have relied on these guidelines. *See, e.g., id.* (finding that WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines represent the well-established standards of care for treatment of gender dysphoria); *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (relying on WPATH guidelines and explaining that “[t]he American Medical Association, the American Pediatric Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and at least eighteen additional major medical associations endorse these guidelines as evidence-based methods for treating gender dysphoria in minors.”); *Edmo v. Corizon Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that most courts agree that the WPATH guidelines are the international recognized guidelines for treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria); *Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 329–330 (explaining that the Endocrine Society has published “a clinical practice guideline providing protocols for the medically necessary treatment of gender dysphoria.”). The Court thus evaluates Defendants’ evidence in light of the prevailing standards of care and conclusions contained in the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines, as well as compared to the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts.

v. Important State Interest

When a law contains a quasi-suspect classification or treats individuals differently based on their membership in a quasi-suspect class, the law must survive intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court has stated that intermediate scrutiny requires that the law be supported by an “exceedingly persuasive

justification.”⁴² *See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Highlocal Local School Dist.*, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 871 (explaining that the Supreme Court has consistently found that a party seeking to defend “discriminatory classifications on the basis of sex must offer” an exceedingly persuasive justification). But the Supreme Court has also stated more specifically that to meet this burden, the state must demonstrate that the law is substantially related to an important state interest. *See id.* The state interest must be real rather than speculative. *See id.* The Court will rely on the specific test for intermediate scrutiny, rather than the ultimately unhelpful characterization that intermediate scrutiny requires an “exceedingly persuasive justification.” *See United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion finding

⁴² The undersigned notes that the crux of the Equal Protection Clause is protection against differential treatment for individuals who are similarly situated. Therefore, unlike in a substantive due process claim, in an equal protection claim challenging a regulation of or ban on certain activity, the assertion is not that the state cannot impose the regulation or ban. Instead, the assertion is that the state is (improperly) treating *a particular class of persons differently* with respect to the regulation or ban—meaning, in the instant case, imposing a ban on specific activities upon a particular class of persons while allowing those outside that class to engage in that activity. Naturally, if a state cannot persuade a court that it has an important interest banning specific activity *at all* (i.e., *for anyone*), then the court need not turn to whether the differential treatment (i.e., banning the activity only for a particular class of persons) is justified. To be sure, these issues can bleed together in an equal-protection analysis.

With regard to SB1, the Court finds it prudent to assess whether the state has demonstrated an important interest in banning certain medical procedures. The Court also discusses whether the state has justified differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.

Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women from citizen-soldier training violative of the Equal Protection Clause, on the ground that it is supported “[o]nly by the amorphous ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny.”).

Defendants assert that the state has an important interest in protecting minors from the risks associated with the medical procedures banned by SB1 because ultimately the risks outweigh the benefits. (Doc. No. 112 at 14–21). Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs argue the inverse—that the state does not have an important interest, because (according to Plaintiffs) the benefits outweigh the risks associated with these procedures.

The Court finds it prudent to make a few initial observations about what some may expect the effects to be of the medical procedures banned by SB1. It is feasible that one might assume that because these procedures are intended to have the treated minor’s body do something that it otherwise would not do (rather than allow the body to function in a purportedly “natural” manner), the procedure must be “bad” or “harmful” to the minor. But assumptions are not a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to resolve a motion for a preliminary injunction. And unlike individuals that may base their conclusions about the effects of the procedures banned under SB1 on mere assumptions, the Court fortunately has a voluminous (albeit still preliminary) evidentiary record on which to base its current conclusions. Thus, the Court can, must, and does base its current conclusions on the record to date, without resort to any unsupported, bare medical assumptions.

a) Defendants' Allegations of Harms
Caused by the Medical Procedures
Banned by SB1

According to Defendants, the negative side effects from the medical procedures banned by SB1 include risk of “delayed development, permanent sterilization, loss of sexual function, decreased bone density, increased risk of cardiovascular disease and cancer, negative psychological consequences, and a lifetime dependence on these drugs.” (Doc. No. 112 at 14). In making these allegations, Defendants rely on the testimony of Drs. Cantor, Hruz, Levine and Laidlaw. As noted above, the Court finds Dr. Cantor and Hruz’s testimony minimally persuasive based on the current record. The Court addresses each possible negative side effect in turn in light of the record.⁴³

⁴³ The Court does not find it necessary to address in detail Defendants’ allegation that the medical procedures banned by SB1 may lead to a lifetime dependence on certain medications. Defendants do not explain why such dependence should itself be considered a negative side effect. The Court, however, can infer that generally speaking, having to take medications every day is an inconvenience. To the extent that this is what Defendants mean when referring to the drawback of a lifetime of dependence, the Court is confident that helping individuals avoid this inconvenience is not an important government interest. Moreover, however severe this inconvenience may be, Minor Plaintiffs do not indicate that such inconvenience would dissuade them from pursuing their treatment. Unlike the purported *medical risks*—which the Court acknowledges may not be disregarded in the Court’s analysis solely because Minor Plaintiffs are willing to bear them—*inconvenience* occasioned by dependence on medications seems like a matter of interest solely to the individual who is inconvenienced.

To the extent that Defendants instead mean that a lifetime of dependence is bad because it exposes the patient to the medical

As for causing delayed development (a reference, the Court presumes, to brain development), Defendants rely on the testimony of Dr. Cantor. (Doc. No. 112 at 15). A review of his testimony on this topic reveals that Dr. Cantor does not provide a conclusion that treatment for gender dysphoria has a negative impact on brain development. (Doc. No. 113-3 (“Cantor Decl.”) at 98) (explaining that there have been no “substantial studies to identify such impacts” and that the only two existing studies had “conflicting results”). By contrast, Dr. Adkins, who has treated hundreds of transgender “youth,”⁴⁴ testified that “[t]here is no research suggesting that treatment has negative impact on brain development or executive functioning and I have not seen this in my practice at all.” (Doc. No. 141 (“Adkins Rebuttal Decl.”) at 7). In light of the weaknesses in Dr. Cantor’s testimony and the support for Dr. Adkins’ conclusion provided by her experience with treating transgender youth, the Court is not persuaded that the medical procedures banned by SB1 pose a risk of delayed development.

The risk discussed perhaps most extensively by Defendants’ experts is the risk that a patient can experience infertility as a result of the procedures banned by SB1. (Doc. Nos. 113-5 (“Levine Decl.”) at 70, Laidlaw Decl. at 21). However, the evidence of record overwhelmingly demonstrates that many individuals receiving puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones will

risks associated with the medications, the Court believes that it has herein adequately accounted for these risks in its analysis.

⁴⁴ Dr. Adkins does not define the term “youth,” but the Court infers that at least a portion of, if not all, the individuals that Dr. Adkins considers “youth” are minors.

remain fertile for procreation purposes, and that the risk of negative impacts on fertility can be mitigated.

In her declaration, Dr. Adkins testified that “[m]any transgender individuals conceive children after undergoing hormone therapy. Pregnancy among trans men after undergoing testosterone therapy is very common.” (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 12); Doc. No. 30 (“Antommara Decl.”) at 19 (“[T]ransgender men and women are also capable of producing eggs and sperm respectively both during and after the discontinuation of gender-affirming hormone treatment”). Indeed, as explained by Dr. Adkins, “a recent eight-year study found that four months after stopping testosterone treatment, transgender men had comparable egg yields to non-transgender women.” (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 12). Dr. Adkins also acknowledged that patients who move directly from puberty blockers to cross-sex hormones (referred to by Dr. Adkins as “gender-affirming hormones”) may have their fertility impacted. (*Id.*). For these patients, fertility preservation options are available. (*Id.*). For example, as Dr. Janssen has explained, he has had adolescent transgender patients “who chose to preserve their sperm and or eggs for future assisted reproduction by stopping puberty suppression briefly before initiating gender-affirming hormones [*i.e.* cross-sex hormones].” (Doc. No. 31 (“Janssen Decl.”) at 16).

The testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts is consistent with the information provided by the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. Indeed, the WPATH guidelines explain that “there is evidence that fertility is still possible for individuals taking estrogen and testosterone.” (Doc. No. 113-9 (“WPATH Guidelines”))

at 90).⁴⁵ Though the record does reflect that the procedures banned by SB1 pose some risk to fertility, it also demonstrates that not all individuals will experience this negative side effect of the treatments and that there are fertility preservation measures available to those who have concerns about fertility. The Court is therefore not convinced that possible negative impacts on fertility warrant an outright ban on procedures used to treat gender dysphoria in minors.

Defendants' expert Dr. Levine contends that some individuals who have received puberty blockers and then received cross-sex hormones will experience a "diminished sexual response."⁴⁶ (Levine Decl. at 70–71). Notably, Dr. Levine neither cites studies or research in support of these contentions nor defines in any way what he means by "some" individuals. Without additional detail, the Court is left in the dark as to what Levine believes the prevalence of this risk to be in individuals who receive the described treatment. Dr. Levine, seem-

⁴⁵ The guidelines also recommend that healthcare providers take measures to ensure that any patients facing risk of harm to fertility provide informed consent for procedures giving rise to this risk. For example, the WPATH guidelines also state that physicians should "discuss the potential impact of hormone therapy on fertility prior to initiation. This discussion should include fertility preservation options . . ." (WPATH Guidelines at 90). The Endocrine Society guidelines contain very similar guidance. (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 4 ("We recommend that clinicians inform and counsel all individuals seeking gender-affirming medical treatment regarding options for fertility preservation prior to initiating puberty suppression in adolescents and prior to treating with hormonal therapy of the affirmed gender in both adolescents and adults.")).

⁴⁶ Though Dr. Levine does not define "sexual response," the Court infers that he is referring to the ability of an individual to participate in sexual intercourse free of abnormal obstacles.

ingly without a basis, also speculates that physicians and parents are likely too “uncomfortable” to discuss this side effect with patients. (*Id.* at 71).

Moreover, the guidelines tell a different story on all fronts. The Endocrine Society guidelines state that “genital sexual responsivity and other aspects of sexual function are usually preserved” even following genital-affirming surgery.⁴⁷ (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 26). The WPATH guidelines, while acknowledging the risk of negative effects on sexual function, also state that “gender affirming care can help [transgender individuals] improve their sexual function and increase their sexual pleasure and satisfaction.” (WPATH Guidelines at 170). The guidelines also recommend that physicians discuss with patients possible adverse consequences on sexual function.⁴⁸ For the reasons stated, the Court does not find Dr. Levine’s testimony

⁴⁷ The Court acknowledges that the content of the Endocrine Society and WPATH guidelines is hearsay to the extent that it sets forth *assertions* that are cited *for the truth of the matter asserted* (as opposed to, for example, *recommendations*, which are not assertions at all). The Court, however, can rely on hearsay in resolving the instant Motion. *See Doe #11*, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 592. Furthermore, Defendants are the ones who put the guidelines in the record. Therefore, Defendants have exposed themselves to the Court’s present reliance the guidelines, including aspects of the guidelines that constitute hearsay.

⁴⁸ (WPATH Guidelines at 167 (“We recommend health care professionals who provide care to transgender and gender diverse people discuss the impact of gender-affirming treatments on sexual function, pleasure, and satisfaction.”)). The Court further notes that Dr. Laidlaw’s testimony regarding loss of sexual function is equally as unpersuasive as Dr. Levine’s testimony on the subject. In discussing the potential impact of gender-affirming treatment on sexual function, Dr. Laidlaw relies on the presentation of an individual who appeared on a reality TV show. (Laidlaw Decl. at 22).

on this subject persuasive, particularly in light of the conclusions contained in the guidelines that contradict his findings.

Dr. Levine also testified to the concerns of bone density problems in connection with the administration of puberty blockers. (Levine Decl. at 66). Although Dr. Levine testified that the treatment cannot be considered “safe,” he also admits that the “available evidence remains limited and conflicting” and that some “studies have found less-concerning effects on bone density.” (*Id.*). And Dr. Adkins’ testimony reveals that studies have shown “no changes in bone mineralization” among patients who received puberty blockers for a period of three to five years for precocious puberty. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 6–7). Dr. Adkins also explains that the longest her patients receive puberty blockers is three years.⁴⁹ (*Id.* at 8). Given that Dr. Levine’s testimony itself contains the above-discussed inconsistencies and illogical inferences, and in light of the testimony of Dr. Adkins, the Court is not persuaded that puberty blockers pose a serious risk to a patients’ bone density. The Court also notes that it is not alone in observing that Dr. Levine’s testimony includes illogical inferences that undermine his conclusions. *See Norsworthy v. Beard*, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (giving Dr. Levine’s opinions “very little weight” given that his report “contains illogical inferences”).

Relying on the testimony of Dr. Laidlaw and Levine, Defendants allege that the procedures banned by SB1 also increase the risk of cardiovascular disease.

⁴⁹ The Court further notes that the record does not reflect that puberty blockers are administered for more than five years when used to treat gender dysphoria.

Dr. Levine’s testimony on this topic is not persuasive. Levine explains that although there may be an increased risk of cardiovascular issues with the use of cross-sex hormones, he agrees with the Endocrine Society committee that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that these procedures have the outcome of increased risk of cardiovascular disease and that more research is necessary. (Levine Decl. at 71).

Dr. Laidlaw’s testimony regarding an increased risk of cardiovascular disease appears to rest on firmer ground than that of Dr. Levine, but it ultimately falls short in light of the additional evidence in the record pertaining to this subject. (Laidlaw Decl. at 31–35). Beginning with Dr. Adkins’ rebuttal declaration, based on treating over 600 “youth” for gender dysphoria, Dr. Adkins testified that an increased risk of cardiovascular disease in transgender women is “usually only present when a patient is denied care and self-administers the treatment without appropriate clinical supervision.” (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 9–10). Dr. Adkins further stated that “[t]ransgender men do not have more cardiovascular disease like stroke or heart attack than cisgender men,” and that risks of cardiovascular disease in transgender women (which Adkins explains can be present when the patient is taking older formulations of estrogen) can be ameliorated through being closely monitored by a physician. (*Id.* at 10).⁵⁰

Dr. Adkins’ testimony is also consistent with the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. For example,

⁵⁰ The Court recognizes that not all transgender individuals receive hormone therapy. Although Dr. Adkins at times refers to individuals experiencing certain side effects as “transgender men” or “transgender women,” her declaration indicates that she is referring specifically to individuals who do in fact receive hormone therapy.

the WPATH guidelines state that primary care physicians can mitigate against the risk of cardiovascular disease during hormone therapy by “providing a timely diagnosis and treatment of risk conditions and by tailoring their management in a way that supports ongoing gender-affirming interventions.” (WPATH Guidelines at 150); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 24 (“Clinicians should manage cardiovascular risk factors as they emerge according to established guidelines.”)).⁵¹ The weight of the evidence, including the testimony of Defendants’ own expert (Dr. Levine), supports the conclusion that any increased risk of cardiovascular disease in patients receiving treatment for gender dysphoria is either speculative or, to the extent that

⁵¹ The WPATH guidelines’ observation that these risks “can” and “should” be mitigated does not speak to how successful, or how often successful, mitigation measures are. But from the observation that risks “can” be mitigated, it is inferable that mitigation has been shown to be possible; the observation thus constitutes evidence (albeit underwhelming evidence standing alone) to the effect that mitigation is possible.

The Court acknowledges that the record at this stage does not support a conclusion regarding the degree of effectiveness of the mitigation techniques discussed in the guidelines and by Plaintiffs’ experts in lessening the chance and severity of negative side effects caused by the treatments banned under SB1. Nonetheless, the fact that the Court cannot gauge how effective the mitigation strategies are at this juncture does not prevent it from reaching its conclusion that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the state has an important interest in banning the procedures under SB1. The Court finds it sufficient at this stage (in which the Court’s findings are preliminary) that the record reflects that mitigation techniques are available, and that they—by the virtue of being “mitigation” techniques—assist in addressing the risks posed by the procedures. As this litigation progresses, however, the Court urges the parties to provide evidence on the degree of effectiveness on mitigation techniques.

such risk exists, it can be mitigated by the treating physician.

Finally, the Court turns to Defendants' allegation that treatment for gender dysphoria increases the risk of cancer. In support of this allegation, Defendants cite relevant portions of Drs. Cantor, Hruz, and Laidlaw's declarations, all of whom aver that hormone treatment may lead to an increased risk of certain cancers. (Cantor Decl. at 102, Doc. No. 113-4 (Declaration of Dr. Hruz) at 41, Laidlaw Decl. at 31–32). Dr. Adkins, by contrast, testified that in her clinical experience, she has "rarely seen" the side effect of an increased risk of cancer in her patients. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 9). Dr. Adkins' observation based on clinical experience—which neither Dr. Cantor nor Dr. Hruz has—is consistent WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. For example, the WPATH guidelines note that "the risk of cancer in individuals seeking gender-affirming breast augmentation or mastectomy is similar to that in the general population (even in the setting of hormone use)" and therefore "existing screening guidelines need to be followed." (WPATH Guidelines at 134); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 25) (discussing the risk of cancer in transgender population and explaining that studies have not suggested an increased risk of breast cancer, prostate cancer, or endometrial cancer though acknowledging that some cases of ovarian cancer have been reported). Though a close question, ultimately the weight of the evidence of record does not support Defendants' allegation that the medical procedures banned by SB1 increase an individual's risk of certain cancers.

The Court is not of the mind that the medical procedures banned by SB1 pose no risk to the patients receiving them. Indeed, as with virtually all medical procedures, treatment for gender dysphoria carries

with it the risk of negative side effects. The Court also acknowledges that evaluating and weighing the competing views of the parties' experts and conclusions in the guidelines is not a perfect science. As in many cases, the Court is forced to make a judgment call on what position is best supported by the record. In doing so, the Court has not turned a blind eye to the risks associated with the medical procedures banned by SB1. To the contrary, the Court has reviewed the relevant evidence on the record and has found that ultimately Defendants' allegations of these harms and their prevalence is not supported by the record.⁵² Instead, the record reflects that there is at best conflicting evidence as to whether the relevant procedures increase a person's likelihood of experiencing certain illnesses, and that even if there is an increased risk, that it can be mitigated.⁵³

⁵² The Court notes that Defendants' allegations of harm focus solely on the *medical* risks associated with gender-affirming treatment. Defendants do not rely on other harms or risks to support their argument that the state has an important interest in banning the procedures under SB1. For example, Defendants do not make a policy argument that gender-affirming treatment is undesirable because gender-transitions are undesirable. Defendants also do not rely on any purported ability of SB1 to resolve various concerns expressed in the very text of the law itself, including but not limited to: (a) a concern that pharmaceutical companies are seeking to profiteer off of minors via the administration of drugs and devices that is banned by the law; and (b) a concern that healthcare providers are seeking to profiteer off of minors via the performance on minors of the surgeries that is banned by the law. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(i) & (j). The Court therefore has focused its analysis on the medical risks asserted by Defendants.

⁵³ Defendants' reliance on the practices of European countries regarding treatment for gender dysphoria in support of SB1 is also unpersuasive. As of the date of this opinion, the Southern District of Indiana is the most recent court to reject analogies to

The Court’s analysis would also not be complete without evaluating the evidence suggesting that the medical procedures banned by SB1 confer certain benefits on the recipients (*i.e.* the patients). *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *12 (“that there are risks does not end the inquiry.”). Certainly, whether a medical procedure is beneficial affects whether the state has an important interest in banning that

practices of European countries in support of laws that outright ban treatment for gender dysphoria. *See K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *11. As Judge Hanlon explained with respect to the defendants in *K.C.*, “[m]ost detrimental to [defendants’] position is that no European country that conducted a systematic review responded with a ban on the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones. . . .” *See id.*; *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *14 (“the treatments are available in appropriate circumstances in all the countries cited by the defendants, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand”). The observations of Judge Hanlon and Judge Hinkle are directly applicable here. Indeed, the Court agrees that Defendants’ reliance on the practices of European nations is not an apt analogy where none of these countries have gone so far as to ban hormone therapy entirely. The Court further notes that Defendants do not attempt to persuade the Court that the bases (clinical or otherwise) of certain European practices are highly persuasive. Defendants instead point merely to the practices themselves as evidence that the medical procedures under SB1 are unsafe.

Then there is the additional problem that the Court can put only so much weight on the practice of other nations. After all, the Court cannot outsource to European nations the task of preliminarily determining, for purposes of the instant Motion, the extent to which the treatments at issue are safe. Ultimately, the most the Court at present could properly say about the practices of European nations is that they reflect a caution that *might* ultimately prove prudent and *might* be supported by particular studies. But the Court lacks a basis to conclude anything from the mere existence of particular European practices that are purportedly supported by studies the Court cannot assess based on the limited information about them Defendants have put in the record.

procedure. Therefore, having evaluated the evidence regarding Defendants' allegations of the risks associated with treatment for gender dysphoria, the Court now turns to the purported benefits of the procedures.

b) Benefits of the Medical Procedures Banned by SB1

Plaintiffs contend that the medical procedures banned by SB1 confer important benefits on patients. (Doc. No. 33 at 12). Based on its review of the record, the Court agrees. Dr. Adkins has testified that “[a]ll of [her] patients who have received medical treatment for gender dysphoria have benefitted from clinically appropriate treatment.” (Adkins Decl. at 5). As explained by Adkins, “many individuals with gender dysphoria have high rates of anxiety, depression[,] and suicidal ideation. I have seen in my patients that without appropriate treatment this distress impacts every aspect of life.” (*Id.* at 5). Dr. Adkins also noted in her testimony that “[f]or some individuals, this treatment can eliminate or reduce the need for surgical treatment.” (*Id.* at 14–15).

Consistent with Dr. Adkins' observations based on her clinical experience, Dr. Antommara has testified that “the available evidence indicates that gender-affirming care improves, rather than worsens, psychological outcomes.” (Antommara Decl. at 20–21). His conclusion is consistent with the findings contained in the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. (WPATH Guidelines at 39) (explaining that recent longitudinal studies suggest that “mental health symptoms experienced by” transgender individuals “tend to improve following” receipt of gender-affirming treatment”); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 15 (explaining that a study from the Netherlands showed a decrease in depression and an improvement in general mental

health during pubertal suppression and a steady improvement in psychological function following cross-sex hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery)). Furthermore, as pointed out by Dr. Adkins, with regard to suicidal ideations

In a 2020 study published in *Pediatrics*, the official journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics, researchers concluded that “[t]reatment with pubertal suppression among those who wanted it was associated with lower odds of lifetime suicidal ideation when compared with those who wanted pubertal suppression but did not receive it. Suicidality is of particular concern for this population because the estimated lifetime prevalence of suicide attempts among transgender people is as high as 40%.”

(Adkins Decl. at 16). Defendants’ assertion that gender-affirming treatment does not improve mental health outcomes relies solely on the testimony of Dr. Cantor, who seems never to have treated an individual for gender dysphoria. But the weight of evidence in the record suggests the contrary—that treatment for gender dysphoria lowers rates of depression, suicide, and additional mental health issues faced by transgender individuals. And at the risk of sounding like a broken record, the Court notes that several courts, based on the respective records in those cases, have found the same. *See Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“Every major expert medical association recognizes that gender-affirming care for transgender minors may be medically appropriate and necessary to improve the physical and mental health of transgender people.”); *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *5 (crediting expert testimony that denial of gender-affirming treatment

will “increase anxiety, depression, and risk of suicide.”); *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (“The record shows that, without transitioning medications, Minor Plaintiffs will suffer severe medical harm, including anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance abuse, self-harm, and suicidality.”); *Fain*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (finding that “[t]he medical treatments for gender dysphoria have been studied extensively, and have been shown to improve “quality of life and measures of mental health” for patients. . .”). The Court therefore finds that the benefits of the medical procedures banned by SB1 are well-established by the existing record.

c) Defendants Have Not Met Their
Burden of Demonstrating an Important
State Interest

To summarize the Court’s findings on the alleged harms and benefits of the medical procedures banned under SB1, the Court ultimately finds that the weight of the evidence at this stage in the proceedings does not support Defendants’ allegations that either puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones pose serious risks to the minors receiving these treatments for gender dysphoria. As discussed in detail above, the record suggests that either 1) the risks identified by Defendants are not more prevalent in transgender individuals receiving the procedures banned by SB1 than in individuals not receiving these procedures; 2) to the extent that individuals receiving these procedures experience the negative side effects raised by Defendants, that the prevalence of these effects is low, or 3) the risk of negative side effects resulting from the use of such medical procedures banned by SB1 can be mitigated. And the fact that some pediatric treatments may pose certain risks is not sufficient, in the Court’s view, to support a finding that the state has an important

interest in banning these treatments. *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *13 (finding that the risks attendant to gender-affirming treatment for minors did not satisfy intermediate scrutiny such that would warrant taking away the decision for treatment from patients, doctors, and parents and instead allowing the state to make the decision). *Cf. Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (finding that the fact that pediatric treatments involve risks does not justify transferring power or decision-making authority from parents to the state). Indeed, a conclusion to the contrary would leave several pediatric treatments targeting something other than gender dysphoria vulnerable to severe limitations on access.

The Court acknowledges that the state feels strongly that the medical procedures banned by SB1 are harmful to minors. The medical evidence on the record, however, indicates otherwise. It is undisputed that every major medical organization to take a position on the issue, which includes the AAP, American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association, and American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychiatry, agrees that puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapy are appropriate and medically necessary treatments for adolescents when clinically indicated. (Janssen Decl. at 10). It is of little surprise, therefore, that all major medical organizations oppose outright bans on gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 32 (“Turban Decl.”) at 4); *see also Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“[e]very major expert medical association recognizes that gender-affirming care for transgender minors may be medically appropriate and necessary to improve the physical and mental health of transgender people.”). The opinions of major medical organizations as they exist at any one time are not

necessarily correct merely by the virtue of being the opinion of a major medical organization—which is why they have been known to change on a particular topic over time—and the Court does not herein find conclusively that the opinions here are correct. But they certainly are entitled to weight in a context like the present one.

As illustrated by the discussions above, the Court finds that at this juncture, SB1 is not supported by an important state interest. In other words, for the purposes of determining whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the preliminary relief they seek, the Court is not persuaded that Defendants have met their burden in showing that SB1 survives intermediate scrutiny. It follows that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. Of course, the Court recognizes that at summary judgment or trial, Defendants potentially could provide additional evidence that suffices to meet their burden.

Though the Court has already found that Defendants have failed to demonstrate an important interest based on the current record, and therefore could end its analysis here, the Court finds it prudent to address whether SB1 is substantially related to the state’s purported interest.

vi. Substantial Relation Requirement

Even where a law reflects an important state interest, the law survives intermediate scrutiny only if the law in question is substantially related to that interest. *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit has found that a law is “substantially related” to an important state interest where there is a “reasonable

fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.” *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be narrowly tailored, intermediate scrutiny imposes the less burdensome requirement that the scope of the law in question be in proportion to the state’s interest. *See id.* The Court is aware that the term “related to” is subjective and amorphous. *See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1033–34 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring). *Cf. Dubin v. United States*, No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518, at *6 (June 8, 2023) (noting likewise with respect to term “in relation to”). The same can be said for “substantially” and “in proportion.” The application of such terms often is in the eye of the beholder. But here, it has fallen to the undersigned to be the beholder, and therefore, he must call it like he sees it.

At this stage in the litigation, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated that SB1 is substantially related to the state’s asserted interest. Defendants’ argument is that the state has an important interest in protecting minors from allegedly dangerous medical procedures. Yet, the medical procedures banned by SB1 because they are purportedly unsafe to treat gender dysphoria in minors (which, as discussed above, necessarily means treatment for transgender minors) are not banned when provided to treat other conditions. Indeed, SB1 explicitly permits the very medical procedures that it bans for treatment of gender dysphoria, if those procedures are being used to “treat a minor’s congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease [excluding gender dysphoria], or physical injury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). The record reflects that the same treatments received by minors for gender dysphoria are received by minors also for different conditions. (Adkins Decl. at 17–18)

(explaining that cisgender girls with delayed puberty are treated with estrogen, and cisgender girls with polycystic ovarian syndrome (“PCOS”) are treated with testosterone suppression).

True, all that is required under intermediate scrutiny is a “reasonable fit” between the state’s interest and the challenged law. However, in the Court’s view, the difference in treatment under SB1 between gender dysphoria and other conditions is not “reasonable”; it is instead in all likelihood arbitrary. Consider the following example involving a hypothetical minor who is diagnosed with precocious puberty at the age of eight years old (meaning that the minor has started puberty at eight years of age). The minor’s parents agree with a doctor to place the minor on puberty blockers to delay puberty until the proper age. Under SB1, this treatment would be permissible. A few years pass by, and the minor realizes that he is in fact a transgender boy, and he exhibits symptoms of gender dysphoria. Around this time is when he would also stop receiving puberty blockers for precocious puberty. The minor and his parents make an appointment with a doctor who treats gender dysphoria. The doctor decides that the proper treatment for the minor’s gender dysphoria for his age is the use of puberty blockers. Under SB1, although the minor was lawfully on puberty blockers for several years to treat precocious puberty and is slated to come off of them for this treatment, SB1 would not allow him to continue to take the *exact same* drugs for treatment of his gender dysphoria.

The only evidence in the record that Defendants identify to justify this disparate treatment (evidently in an attempt to meet the substantial-relationship requirement) is that the Food and Drug Administra-

tion (“FDA”) has approved the use of certain hormone therapies for precocious puberty but has not yet done the same for gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 112 at 16). However, as explained by Dr. Turban, “[p]rescribing FDA approved medications without specific FDA indications for the condition being treated is common in medicine generally and particularly in pediatrics. It is referred to as ‘off-label’ prescribing.” (Turban Decl. at 5). Dr. Turban went on to clarify that as “[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics has explained, it is important to note that the term ‘offlabel’ does not imply an improper, illegal, contraindicated, or investigational use.” (*Id.*) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the record reflects that off-label use of medications does not itself indicate that there are greater risks associated with those uses than when used for the purpose that is approved by the FDA—or that the FDA has even considered any such risks. Therefore, while understanding why Defendants would seek to score metaphorical points from the fact that the FDA has yet to approve certain hormone therapies for gender dysphoria, the Court declines to draw from that fact a negative inference regarding the risks of gender-affirming treatment.

In short, the Court agrees with Judge Hinkle’s observation in finding “[t]hat the FDA has not approved these drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria says precisely nothing about whether the drugs are safe and effective when used for that purpose. Off-label use of drugs is commonplace and widely accepted across the medical profession. . . .” *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *15.⁵⁴ As Judge Hinkle went onto explain, [t]he FDA

⁵⁴ Judge Hinkle’s comments here relate to off-label prescribing as a general matter. Perhaps a specific instance of off-label prescribing would be problematic based on the particular circum-

approval goes no further—it does not address one way or the other the question of whether using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is as safe and effective as on-label uses.” *See id.* Although FDA approval of the mediations to treat gender dysphoria could have benefited Plaintiffs’ argument that the medications are safe when used for this purpose, the fact that the FDA has not yet given this approval does not advance Defendants’ argument that use of the medications for this purpose is unsafe. Defendants do not even suggest that pharmaceutical companies have applied for FDA approval or are planning to do so. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the fact of the FDA’s silence on the approval of the medical procedures banned under SB1 for treatment of gender dysphoria somehow indicates that these treatments are unsafe when used for that purpose.⁵⁵

SB1 is not alone in suffering from the fatal defect of falling short on the substantial-relation requirement. The court in *Brandt* discussed essentially the same

stances involved—for example, hypothetically, if it resulted not from a wholly independent medical judgment of the prescribing physician, but rather from undue influence from a pharmaceutical sales representative. But Defendants point to nothing indicating any circumstances that indicate any such troubling circumstances associated with the off-label nature of the prescribing of drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria.

⁵⁵ Having been provided no scientific basis, or otherwise supported policy reason, for this disparate treatment, the Court is left to draw the conclusion that Defendants perceive gender dysphoria to be a condition less worthy of treatment than conditions like PCOS. Indeed, Defendants’ assertion that these procedures are so dangerous that the state should be permitted to ban them entirely for treatment of gender dysphoria rings hollow when the state has no such qualms with minors receiving these procedures to treat other conditions.

issue plaguing the defendants' defense of a very similar law in that case. In finding that the law in that case was not substantially related to protecting minors from the risks of gender transition procedures, the court observed that

If the State's health concerns were genuine, the State would prohibit these procedures for all patients under 18 regardless of gender identity. The State's goal in passing Act 626 was not to ban a treatment. It was to ban an outcome that the State deems undesirable. In other words, Defendants' rationale that the Act protects children from experimental treatment and the long-term, irreversible effects of the treatment, is counterintuitive to the fact that it allows the same treatment for cisgender minors as long as the desired results conform with the stereotype of their biological sex.

See Brandt, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891. The Court breaks ranks with *Brandt* insofar as *Brandt* afforded significance to the state's sincerity (or lack thereof) in its expression of concerns for the health of minors. The Court declines to opine on the state's sincerity of such expression in this case, since what matters here is not the state's sincerity (a subjective matter) but rather the degree of reasonableness of the fit between such concerns and the ban imposed by SB1 (an objective matter). On the (objective matter) at issue here, the Court finds on the present record that SB1 is not proportionate to the state's interest of protecting children from allegedly dangerous medical treatments. Instead, SB1 objectively is severely underinclusive in terms of the minors it protects from the alleged medical risks of the banned procedures; it bans these

procedures for a tiny fraction of minors, while leaving them available for all other minors (who would be subjected to the very risks that the state asserts SB1 is intended to eradicate). For these reasons, the Court finds that SB1 likely is not substantially related to the state's asserted interest. SB1 therefore likely fails intermediate scrutiny, even assuming *arguendo* (contrary to the Court's finding above) that the state interest was deemed likely to be an important interest.

In light of the evidence on the record, and the Court's discussion above, the Court finds that SB1 is unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, the Court finds that the record does not support a finding that Defendants are likely to succeed on their position that SB1 is substantially related to an important state interest. It follows that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their claim that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause to the extent that it prohibits medical procedures other than surgery. The Court now turns to whether Plaintiffs have fulfilled the remaining requirements necessary to issue a preliminary injunction.⁵⁶

3. IRREPARABLE HARM

To be successful in a request for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable harm. "A plaintiff's harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages." *Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't*, 305 F.3d 56, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). To constitute irreparable harm

⁵⁶ Although Plaintiffs contend that SB1 also would fail under rational basis review, the Court need not reach this issue in light of its conclusion that intermediate scrutiny applies to Plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

(meaning, as just indicated, irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction), the harm must be “actual and imminent harm rather than harm that is speculative or unsubstantiated.” *See Abney v. Amgen, Inc.*, 443 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated irreparable harm. As the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged, “a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an injunction will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” *See Overstreet*, 305 F.3d at 578. The Court has found that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their claims that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Therefore, a denial of the requested injunction (and enforcement of SB1) would cause irreparable harm by infringing on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Looking beyond this basis for demonstrating irreparable harm, the Court also agrees that Minor Plaintiffs likely⁵⁷ will suffer actual and imminent injury in the form of emotional and psychological harm as well as unwanted physical changes if they are deprived access to treatment of their gender dysphoria under SB1.⁵⁸ Indeed, each Minor Plaintiff has submitted

⁵⁷ Courts have not always been ideally clear (or consistent) about the degree of certainty required for the plaintiff-movant’s mandatory showing of irreparable harm. However, the Supreme Court has stated that the plaintiff movant “‘must establish [among other things] . . . that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary [injunctive] relief.’” *Ramirez v. Collier*, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1268 (2022) (quoting *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

⁵⁸ Because all Plaintiffs seek the same relief, the demonstration of irreparable harm on the part of just the Minor Plaintiffs (rather than all Plaintiffs) shows irreparable harm sufficient to support issuance in its entirety of the preliminary injunction

a declaration that details the negative consequences they expect to endure as a result of SB1 becoming effective.⁵⁹ (Doc. Nos. 22, 24, 26). These expectations are not mere conjecture but instead are supported by the medical evidence on the record. (Adkins Decl. at 5) (explaining that leaving gender dysphoria untreated can result in severe anxiety, depression, self-harm, and suicidal ideation). Several courts have found similar imminent harms to satisfy the irreparable harm

requested collectively by all Plaintiffs. The Court also notes that irreparable harm in the form of infringement of constitutional rights affects all Plaintiffs.

⁵⁹ Contrary to Defendants' argument, the fact that Minor Plaintiffs merely *expect* to suffer (rather than have suffered, or are guaranteed to suffer) these negative effects does not render their harms speculative. There is substantial evidence on the record from Plaintiffs' experts that denial of treatment for gender dysphoria results in significant harms to patients. And Minor Plaintiffs themselves have provided declarations explaining the fear they have of the negative repercussions of enforcement of SB1. Although Minor Plaintiffs do not themselves use terms like "anxiety" and "depression," they very clearly outline the physical and psychological consequences they expect to suffer as a result of SB1. Minor Plaintiffs are laypersons, not doctors, and the Court will not fault them for using laymen terms in their declarations rather than medical terminology.

On the other hand, the Court questions the relevance, to the irreparable-harm analysis, of what Minor Plaintiffs expect to endure, where (as here) there is medical evidence on the record that supports a finding of irreparable harm. After all, Minor Plaintiffs, though understandably concerned about the impact of SB1, are not as well-positioned as medical experts to comment on the risk of various harms (including physical changes) they face as a result of no longer being able to access their treatments for gender dysphoria. Of course, Minor Plaintiffs' testimony on the harms they face do not hurt their case. But in the Court's view, the testimony of the medical experts have more impact on the irreparable-harm issue than the expectations of Minor Plaintiffs.

requirement. *See Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (finding suffering of anxiety, depression, and suicidality as a result of inability to access gender-affirming care constituted irreparable harm); *Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 892 (finding that plaintiffs met the irreparable harm requirement because denial of access to gender-affirming care will cause physical and psychological harm); *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *16 (finding irreparable harm requirement met where denial of gender-affirming care will cause “unwanted and irreversible onset and progression of puberty in [the plaintiffs’] natal sex. . .”).

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs have not met the irreparable-harm requirement are unavailing. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ harms are not irreparable because although SB1 becomes effective on July 1, 2023, Plaintiffs can continue to receive treatment until March 31, 2024 under the continuing-care exception, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B). (Doc. No. 112 at 22). In doing so, Defendants ignore two key points. First, the continuing care exception comes with constraints. With respect to irreparable harm, the most significant constraint is that a minor receiving care under this exception cannot receive treatment that is different from that which was received prior to July 1 if the change in treatment is to treat gender dysphoria. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(4). So for example, a minor who was receiving puberty blockers on July 1 could not proceed to receiving cross-sex hormones, even if that change was the safe and proper treatment plan for that minor. Without the ability to make appropriate adjustments, whatever those changes may be, Plaintiffs’ treatment would be devoid of necessary flexibility and thus likely will be severely impacted even under the continuing-care exception.

Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the record demonstrates undisputedly that the continuing care exception will cause doctors to titrate down their minor patients' medications. (Doc. No. 113-1 at 111 (page from Declaration of Dr. Cassandra Brady); Doc. No. 140 (Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Susan N. Lacy) at 1; Jane Doe Decl. at 1). Titrating down (meaning decreasing the dosages) the treatments for gender dysphoria will lead to physical changes that are consistent with the patients' sex at birth (*i.e.* inconsistent with their current gender identity), which will have the follow-on effect of worsening the patients' dysphoria. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 14). And although SB1 does not explicitly refer to any requirement to "wean off" or "titrate down" in the lead up to March 31, 2024, the record reflects that the natural consequence of the continuing care exception is that physicians will be winding down care for patients beginning on July 1, 2023. And, of course, this was to be expected given that the exception explicitly forbids changes in treatment that would further combat gender dysphoria. Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated that they likely would suffer actual and imminent harm beginning on July 1, 2023.

Defendants further contend that Vanderbilt University Medical Center ("VUMC") has announced that it will not provide care under the continuing care exception and will not resume any care, even if an injunction is granted, given a fear of civil liability under the private-cause-of-action provision (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105) of SB1 (which Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin). (Doc. No. 112 at 23–24).⁶⁰ It is true that VUMC has decided that it will cease all care that is banned

⁶⁰ The record reflects that Minor Plaintiffs all receive treatment for their gender dysphoria at VUMC. (Doc. Nos. 22, 25, 26).

under SB1 after July 1, 2023. (Doc. No. 113-1 at 107 (page from Declaration of Dr. C. Wright Pinson)). However, Defendants' contention that VUMC will not change its decision regarding cessation of care *even in the event of a preliminary injunction* stands in direct contradiction to the record. Dr. Pinson, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Chief Health System Officer at VUMC, has testified that “[s]hould enforcement of [SB1’s] provisions *prohibiting Hormone Therapy be deferred, delayed, or enjoined*, VUMC would continue to provide Hormone Therapy consistent with the prevailing standards of care for persons with gender dysphoria to those minor patients of VUMC. . . .” (Doc. No. 113-1 at 108) (emphasis added).

Dr. Pinson’s declaration clearly indicates two related things. First, contrary to Defendants’ argument that VUMC will not continue treatment following an injunction, Pinson plainly states that VUMC would continue treatment if there is a deferral or delay in the enforcement of SB1. A preliminary injunction would serve both to defer and to delay enforcement of SB1. Second, Pinson’s declaration plainly states that VUMC will continue care as long as the provisions of SB1 prohibiting hormone therapies are enjoined. Contrary to Defendants’ position, Pinson does not indicate that VUMC will abstain from providing care, due to fear of civil liability, even if a preliminary injunction has been entered and is in effect. A preliminary injunction therefore *will* (preliminarily) address Plaintiffs’ harms because Plaintiffs will then be able to resume care at VUMC. For this reason, and those stated above, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the irreparable harm requirement.⁶¹

4. BALANCE OF EQUITIES & PUBLIC INTEREST

“The third and fourth [requirements] of the preliminary injunction analysis—harm to others and the public interest—merge when the Government is the opposing party.”⁶² *Does #1–9 v. Lee*, 574 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563 (M.D. Tenn. 2021). On the one hand, the Court recognizes that a state suffers harm when a statute that was passed using democratic processes is enjoined. *See Doe #11 v. Lee*, 609 F. Supp. 3d 578, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 2022). This principle, however, plainly does not extend to statutes that are substantially likely to be uncon-

⁶¹ The Court notes that it does *not* base its finding of irreparable harm in any way on the specific implication that some parents of transgender children will, absent relief, be forced “to flee the State.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 6). This implication strikes the Court as hyperbolic, to the extent that it conjures up images of Plaintiffs having to make a run for the state border prior to July 1 to avoid persecution. But the notion that Plaintiffs, absent an injunction, would have to go outside Tennessee to obtain treatment is not hyperbolic and supports the finding of irreparable injury.

⁶² The Court notes that there are different formulations even within the Sixth Circuit of the third requirement of a preliminary injunction. As illustrated, sometimes this requirement is referred to as balancing equities, and sometimes it is referred to as the harm that a defendant will face if the requested injunction is issued. Whichever formulation is chosen, the job of the Court is essentially the same—to determine whether an injunction is equitable in light of harms that it may cause.

The Court also notes that the quoted text to which this footnote is appended uses the term “Government,” which is typically used in federal judicial opinions to refer to the federal government. But the quoted text would be equally valid were “the Government” replaced by “a state official with relevant statutory enforcement authority.”

stitutional. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “no cognizable harm results from stopping unconstitutional conduct, so it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” *Vitolo v. Guzman*, 999 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2021). Given that the Court here has found it substantially likely that SB1 is unconstitutional, the Court is satisfied that the merged-third-and-fourth requirements for a preliminary injunction have been met.

5. SCOPE OF THE REMEDY

Having determined that all requirements for a preliminary injunction are met, the Court must determine the scope of the injunction warranted. As discussed at the outset of the opinion, any injunction will not affect the private right of action under SB1 or SB1’s ban on surgeries.

“A preliminary injunction must be no more burdensome than necessary to provide a plaintiff complete relief, and a district court abuses its discretion in ordering an overly broad injunction.” *Sony/ATV Publishing, LLC v. Marcos*, 651 Fed. App’x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2016). Even considering this demanding standing, the Court agrees that a state-wide injunction of SB1 is necessary to redress Plaintiffs’ injuries. As Plaintiffs point out, it is far-fetched that healthcare providers in Tennessee would continue care specifically for Minor Plaintiffs when they cannot do so for any other individual to whom SB1 applies. (Doc. No. 146 at 18). Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that VUMC for example would continue treating Minor Plaintiffs in particular for gender dysphoria, while keeping the rest of the practice shuttered as to any other minors seeking treatment for gender dysphoria.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that SB1 is most likely unconstitutional on its face—indeed, the Court has not had to defer to the individual facts of Plaintiffs in drawing its conclusions that SB1 likely fails intermediate scrutiny—and a state-wide injunction is typically an appropriate remedy in such circumstances. *See, e.g., Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1151 (granting state-wide preliminary injunction of Alabama’s ban on gender-affirming care for minors due to the substantial likelihood that it is unconstitutional); *Brandt by and through Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 672 (finding that district court did not abuse discretion in granting state-wide injunction of Arkansas’ ban on gender-affirming care for minors based on its conclusion that it likely failed intermediate scrutiny); *Hecox v. Little*, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930 at 988–989 (D. Idaho 2020) (granting state-wide injunction of Idaho law excluding transgender women from participating in women’s sports teams because the law was likely unconstitutional); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *14 (granting state-wide injunction based on finding that Indiana law banning procedures for gender transitioning were likely unconstitutional); *Friends of George’s, Inc. v. Tenn.*, No. 2-23-cv-02176, 2023 WL 2755238 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2023) (granting state-wide temporary restraining order of enforcement of Tennessee law that likely violated the First Amendment).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not met the standard for showing that SB1 is unconstitutional on its face. (Doc. No. 112 at 29). As Defendants point out, in *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court explained that a plaintiff has made a successful facial challenge when the plaintiff has established that “no set of circumstances exists under which” the law would be valid. *Id.* at 746. Seemingly contrary to

this guidance, however, the Supreme Court has also instructed that “[i]n determining whether a law is facially invalid, [a court] must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ case.” *See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party*, 552 U.S. 442 (2008). Yet, this is exactly what Defendants ask the Court to do here. Defendants provide hypotheticals in which they believe SB1 could be constitutionally applied. Though the Court concedes that the standard from *Salerno* would invite such an argument, more recent precedent clearly counsels against considering these hypotheticals. More importantly, the Supreme Court has explained in its jurisprudence since *Salerno*, that “[t]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. . . .” *See City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel*, 576 U.S. 409, 418 (2015). Defendants’ examples raise the issue of hypothetical individuals to whom SB1 would be inapplicable because these individuals could not access the procedures banned under SB1 for reasons entirely separate from the restrictions imposed by the law. SB1 would therefore have no application to these individuals. Given that the Supreme Court has stated that a court should not consider hypotheticals in its application of *Salerno* and that the proper focus for a facial challenge is the group of individuals affected by the given law, the Court does not agree with Defendants that their hypotheticals demonstrate that SB1 is constitutional in some circumstances.

Despite the Court’s rejection of Defendants’ hypotheticals as irrelevant, it is still incumbent on Plaintiffs to show why they have succeeded under *Salerno*’s standard. In other words, Defendants do not bear the burden under *Salerno*. But the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have carried that burden here. The Court has concluded that SB1 is most likely unconstitutional. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied on the words of the law itself and did not have to turn to the individual circumstances of Plaintiffs. The Court has therefore found that SB1 is unconstitutional on its face, which necessarily means that it is unconstitutional in all of its applications.

The Court's finding is supported by the discussion provided by the Tenth Circuit in *Doe v. City of Albuquerque*, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). In *Doe*, the Tenth Circuit found that *Salerno* does not provide an additional test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutional on its face. *Id.* at 1127. Instead, “where a statute fails the relevant constitutional test [], it can no longer be constitutionally applied to anyone—and thus there is no set of circumstances in which the statute would be valid. The relevant constitutional test, however, remains the proper inquiry.” *See id.* Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet endorsed this approach to *Salerno*, the Court finds that it is the only logical application of the “no set of circumstances” standard when a court has found that a law fails the relevant constitutional test without reliance on the circumstances of individual plaintiffs. As noted, here, the Court has found that SB1 on its face likely fails intermediate scrutiny, meaning that the Court relied on the text of SB1 to arrive at its conclusion rather than relying on the facts pertaining to Plaintiffs. It necessarily follows that SB1 is likely unconstitutional in all of its applications.

Defendants' reliance on *Salerno*, and in particular its “no set of circumstances” language, is understandable. After all, Defendants are invoking the actual words used by the Supreme Court. But Defendants'

argument regarding *Salerno* raises the question of whether the “no set of circumstances” language of *Salerno* has been rendered a dead-letter by more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Supreme Court itself has criticized the case and has offered a significantly more lenient test for facial challenges. *See U.S. v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (explaining that a plaintiff can succeed on a facial challenge where he demonstrates that the statute lacks any “plainly legitimate sweep. . .”). Furthermore, as the Tenth Circuit has pointed out, “the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly considered facial challenges simply by applying the relevant constitutional test to the challenged statute without attempting to conjure up whether or not there is a hypothetical situation in which application of the statute might be valid[, though the latter practice would seem otherwise crucial to any *Salerno* analysis].” *See Doe*, 667 F.3d at 1124. Even assuming that *Salerno* remains the relevant precedent, however, the Court finds that for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have shown that there is likely no set of circumstances in which SB1 could be constitutionally applied because SB1 likely fails intermediate scrutiny based on the text of the statute and without regard to the individual circumstances of Plaintiffs. The Court therefore finds that a state-wide injunction of SB1 during the pendency of this litigation—subject to the exceptions delineated above—is warranted.

6. SECURITY

Plaintiffs request that the Court waive any bond requirement in this case on the grounds that Defendants are unlikely to sustain any costs or damages as a result of the preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 21). Defendants do not appear to oppose this request,

which in the Court's experience is routinely made and granted when a state statute is preliminarily enjoined. The Court therefore finds that a security bond under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is unnecessary in this case.

CONCLUSION

The Court realizes that today's decision will likely stoke the already controversial fire regarding the rights of transgender individuals in American society on the one hand, and the countervailing power of states to control certain activities within their borders and to use that power to protect minors.

The Court, however, does not stand alone in its decision. As repeatedly emphasized above, several federal courts across the country have been confronted with laws that mirror SB1 in material respects. To the Court's knowledge, every court to consider preliminarily enjoining a ban on gender-affirming care for minors has found that such a ban is likely unconstitutional. And at least one federal court has found such a ban to be unconstitutional at final judgment. Though the Court would not hesitate to be an outlier if it found such an outcome to be required, the Court finds it noteworthy that its resolution of the present Motion brings it into the ranks of courts that have (unanimously) come to the same conclusion when considering very similar laws.

The Court also acknowledges that it must tread carefully when enjoining from enforcement a law that was enacted through a democratic process. The Court does not take providing such relief lightly. The legislative process, however, is not without constraints. If Tennessee wishes to regulate access to certain medical procedures, it must do so in a manner that

does not infringe on the rights conferred by the United States Constitution, which is of course supreme to all other laws of the land. With regard to SB1, Tennessee has likely failed to do just this.

Even though the Court's findings are preliminary, the Court is aware that many will be disappointed by the ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion, and still, many others will be pleased. It borders on the obvious, however, to say that Defendants retain the right to seek to change the Court's mind about the constitutionality of SB1 and to receive a final judgment that is favorable to them. The Court's job is to evaluate the parties' arguments and evidence in light of precedent, relevant case law, and the then-existing record and make a proper determination on the matter immediately at hand. The Court is confident that it has done so in the resolution of the present Motion.

In light of the Court's findings provided herein, the Motion at Doc. No. 21 will be granted in part and denied in part. A corresponding order will be entered separately.

/s/ Eli Richardson
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

191a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-5600

L. W., by and through her parents and next friends,
Samantha Williams and Brian Williams;
SAMANTHA WILLIAMS; BRIAN WILLIAMS; JOHN DOE,
by and through his parents and next friends,
Jane Doe and James Doe; JANE DOE; JAMES DOE;
REBECCA ROE; SUSAN N. LACY, on behalf of herself
and her patients; RYAN ROE, by and through his
parent and next friend, Rebecca Roe,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

JONATHAN THOMAS SKRMETTI, in his official capacity
as the Tennessee Attorney General
and Reporter, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Appellee.

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; WHITE and THAPAR,
Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Emergency Motion for Stay
of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal

192a

UPON CONSIDERATION of the pleadings of counsel,
IT IS ORDERED that the district court's preliminary
injunction is STAYED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ Debora S. Hunt

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

193a

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0146p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-5600

L. W., by and through her parents and next friends,
Samantha Williams and Brian Williams;
SAMANTHA WILLIAMS; BRIAN WILLIAMS; JOHN DOE,
by and through his parents and next friends,
Jane Doe and James Doe; JANE DOE; JAMES DOE;
REBECCA ROE; SUSAN N. LACY, on behalf of herself
and her patients; RYAN ROE, by and through his
parent and next friend, Rebecca Roe,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

JONATHAN THOMAS SKRMETTI, in his official capacity
as the Tennessee Attorney General
and Reporter, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Appellee.

On Emergency Motion for Stay of Preliminary
Injunction Pending Appeal
United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:23-cv-00376—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 8, 2023

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; WHITE and THAPAR,
Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL

ON EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL and REPLY: Clark L. Hildabrand, Steven J. Griffin, Brooke A. Huppenthal, OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL & REPORTER, Nashville, Tennessee, Adam K. Mortara, LAWFAIR LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, Cameron T. Norris, Tiffany H. Bates, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellants. ON RESPONSE: Joshua A. Block, Chase Strangio, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, Stella Yarbrough, Lucas Cameron-Vaughn, ACLU FOUNDATION OF TENNESSEE, Nashville, Tennessee, Sruti J. Swaminathan, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., New York, New York, Tara Borelli, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Decatur, Georgia, Christopher J. Gessner, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON AMICUS BRIEF: Jonathan F. Mitchell, MITCHELL LAW PLLC, Austin, Texas, Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., A. Barrett Bowdre, OFFICE OF THE ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Montgomery, Alabama, for Amici Curiae.

SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which THAPAR, J., joined. WHITE, J. (pp. 16–17), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Tennessee enacted a law that prohibits healthcare providers from performing gender-affirming surgeries and administering hormones or puberty blockers to transgender minors. After determining that the law likely violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the district court facially enjoined the law’s enforcement as to hormones and puberty blockers and applied the injunction to all people in the State. Tennessee appealed and moved for an emergency stay of the district court’s order. Because Tennessee is likely to succeed on its appeal of the preliminary injunction, we grant the stay.

I.

In March 2023, Tennessee enacted the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101. It was scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2023. Seeking to “protect[] minors from physical and emotional harm,” *id.* § 68-33-101(m), the legislature identified several concerns about recent treatments being offered by the medical profession for children with gender dysphoria. It was concerned that some treatments for gender dysphoria “can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences.” *Id.* § 68-33-101(b). It was concerned that the long-term costs of these treatments remain unknown and outweigh any near-term benefits because they are “experimental in nature and not supported by high-quality, long-term medical studies.” *Id.* And it noted that other helpful, less risky, and non-irreversible treatments remain available. *Id.* § 68-33-101(c).

These findings convinced the legislature to ban certain medical treatments for minors with gender dysphoria. A healthcare provider may not “administer or offer to administer” “a medical procedure” to a minor “for the purpose of” either “[e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex,” or “[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” *Id.* § 68-33-103(a)(1). Prohibited medical procedures include “[s]urgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs” and “[p]rescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone.” *Id.* § 68-33-102(5).

The Act contains two relevant exceptions. It permits the use of these medical procedures to treat congenital defects, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury. *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). And it has a “continuing care” exception until March 31, 2024, which permits healthcare providers to continue administering a long-term treatment, say hormone therapy, that began before the Act’s effective date. *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B).

The Act authorizes the Tennessee Attorney General to enforce these prohibitions. *Id.* § 68-33-106(b). It permits the relevant state regulatory authorities to impose “professional discipline” on healthcare providers that violate the Act. R.1 ¶ 56; Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-107. And it creates a private right of action, enabling an injured minor or nonconsenting parent to sue a healthcare provider for violating the law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105(a)(1)–(2).

Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor sued several state officials, claiming the Act violated the United States Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs

challenged the Act's prohibitions on hormone therapy and its surgery prohibitions, but they did not challenge its private right of action. They moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent those features of the Act from going into effect on July 1, 2023.

On June 28, the district court granted the motion in part. It concluded that the challengers lacked standing to contest the ban on surgeries but could challenge the ban on hormones and puberty blockers. As to due process, the court found that the Act infringes the parents' "fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children." R.167 at 14. As to equal protection, the court reasoned (1) that the Act improperly discriminates on the basis of sex and (2) that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class and that the State could not satisfy the necessary justifications that come with this designation. The district court concluded that the Act was facially unconstitutional (with the exception of the surgery and private enforcement provisions), and it issued a statewide injunction against its enforcement. Tennessee appealed. It unsuccessfully sought a stay in the district court and moves for a stay here.

II.

A request for a stay pending appeal prompts four questions: "Is the applicant likely to succeed on the merits? Will the applicant be irreparably injured absent a stay? Will a stay injure the other parties? Does the public interest favor a stay?" *Roberts v. Neace*, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020). As is often the case in a constitutional challenge, the likelihood-of-success inquiry is the first among equals. *Id.* at 416. In this instance, it is largely dispositive. While we assess "the district court's ultimate decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion," we

assess “its legal determination, including the likelihood of success on the merits, with fresh eyes.” *Arizona v. Biden*, 40 F.4th 375, 381 (2022) (quotation omitted).

There are two merits-related problems with the district court’s order. One relates to its scope. The other relates to its assessment of plaintiffs’ chances in challenging the Act on due process and equal protection grounds.

A.

Scope. The district court rested its preliminary injunction on a facial invalidation of the Act, as opposed to an as-applied invalidation of the Act, and it assumed authority to issue a statewide injunction. We doubt each premise.

The challengers claim that Tennessee’s law facially violates the Constitution. But litigants raising “a facial challenge to a statute normally ‘must establish that *no set of circumstances* exists under which the [statute] would be valid.’” *United States v. Hansen*, 2023 WL 4138994, at *5 (U.S. June 23, 2023) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). That’s a “strict standard” that we have no authority to “dilute[.]” *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2275 (2022). The district court questioned whether the test applied and declined to engage with Tennessee’s arguments that it could lawfully apply the Act in some settings. But it is not for lower-court judges to depart from *Salerno*, meaning that plaintiffs must show no set of valid applications of a law before we may declare it invalid in all of its applications. *Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc.*, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court alone exercises “the prerogative of overruling” its decisions). Consistent with the point, we have many

cases adhering to the *Salerno* test. *See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States*, 62 F.4th 221, 231 (6th Cir. 2023); *United States v. Fields*, 53 F.4th 1027, 1038 (6th Cir. 2022); *Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett*, 700 F.3d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 2012); *Warshak v. United States*, 532 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); *Aronson v. City of Akron*, 116 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1997).

Turn to the nature of the injunction. District courts “should not issue relief that extends further than necessary to remedy the plaintiff’s injury.” *Commonwealth v. Biden*, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023). The court’s injunction prohibits Tennessee from enforcing the law against the nine challengers in this case *and* against the other seven million residents of the Volunteer State. But absent a properly certified class action, why would nine residents represent seven million? Does the nature of the federal judicial power or for that matter Article III permit such sweeping relief? A “rising chorus” suggests not. *Doster v. Kendall*, 54 F.4th 398, 439 (6th Cir. 2022); *see, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York*, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599–601 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); *see also* Samuel Bray, *Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction*, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 457–82 (2017).

Article III confines the “judicial power” to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Federal courts may not issue advisory opinions or address statutes “in the abstract.” *California v. Texas*, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2115 (2021) (quotation omitted). They instead must operate in a party-specific and injury-focused manner. *Id.*; *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018). A court order that goes beyond the injuries of a particular plaintiff to enjoin government action against nonparties exceeds the norms of judicial power.

Even if courts may in some instances wield such power, the district court likely abused its discretion by deploying it here. *See, e.g., Biden*, 57 F.4th at 557; *see also United States v. Texas*, 2023 WL 4139000, at *17 (U.S. June 23, 2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (considering the systemic harms of overbroad injunctions as part of the abuse-of-discretion review). In particular, it did not offer any meaningful reason for granting such relief, creating considerable doubt about the survival of this overriding feature of the decision on appeal.

B.

The challengers also are unlikely to prevail on their due process and equal protection claims. Start with several considerations that apply to both claims. *First*, the challengers do not argue that the original fixed meaning of either the due process or equal protection guarantee covers these claims. That prompts the question whether the people of this country ever agreed to remove debates of this sort—about the use of new drug treatments on minors—from the conventional place for dealing with new norms, new drugs, and new technologies: the democratic process. Lifetime federal judges should be wary of removing a vexing and novel topic of medical debate from the ebbs and flows of democracy by construing a largely unamendable federal constitution to occupy the field.

Second, while the challengers do invoke constitutional precedents of the Supreme Court and our Court in bringing this lawsuit, not one of them resolves these claims. In each instance, they seek to extend the constitutional guarantees to new territory. There is nothing wrong with that, to be sure. But it does suggest that the key premise of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits—is missing. The burden of establishing an imperative for constitution-

alizing new areas of American life is not—and should not be—a light one, particularly when “the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful” debates about the issue. *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).

Third, the States are indeed engaged on these issues, as the recent proliferation of legislative activity across the country shows. *Compare* Ga. Code Ann. § 31-7-35 (banning gender-affirming treatments for minors) *and* Idaho Code § 18-1506C (similar), *with* Cal. Penal Code § 819 (prohibiting cooperation with other states as to gender-affirming care provided to out-of-state minors in California), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-30-121(1)(d) (designating gender-affirming care as “legally protected health-care activity”), *and* Minn. Stat. § 260.925 (refusing to enforce out-of-state laws that would limit a parent’s custody rights for consenting to gender-affirming care). *See also* Ala. Code § 16-1-52 (restricting sports participation by transgender students); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-25-102 (similar); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-7X1(1)(f) (requiring parental consent for changes in a child’s pronouns). Leaving the preliminary injunction in place starts to grind these all-over-the-map gears to a halt. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. Given the high stakes of these nascent policy deliberations—the long-term health of children facing gender dysphoria—sound government usually benefits from more rather than less debate, more rather than less input, more rather than less consideration of fair-minded policy approaches. To permit legislatures on one side of the debate to have their say while silencing legislatures on the other side of the debate under the U.S. Constitution does not further these goals.

That many members of the medical community support the plaintiffs is surely relevant. But it is not

dispositive for the same reason we would not defer to a consensus among economists about the proper incentives for interpreting the impairment-of-contracts or takings clauses of the U.S. Constitution. At all events, the medical and regulatory authorities are not of one mind about using hormone therapy to treat gender dysphoria. Else, the FDA would by now have approved the use of these drugs for these purposes. That has not happened, however, giving us considerable pause about constitutionalizing an answer they have not given or, best we can tell, even finally studied.

Due process. The challengers argue that the Act violates their due process right to control the medical care of their children. “No State,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The provision over time has come to secure more than just procedural rights. It also includes substantive protections “against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. Courts identify such rights by looking for norms that are “fundamental” or are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” *Id.* at 720–21 (quotation omitted); *Timbs v. Indiana*, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (same). Experience has shown that substantive due process is “a treacherous field.” *Moore v. City of E. Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). Increasingly appreciative of that danger, the federal courts have become ever more “reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process” to new areas. *Collins v. City of Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).

Parents, it is true, have a substantive due process right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). But the Supreme Court cases

recognizing this right confine it to narrow fields, such as education, *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and visitation rights, *Troxel*, 530 U.S. 57. No Supreme Court case extends it to a general right to receive new medical or experimental drug treatments. In view of the high stakes of constitutionalizing areas of public policy, any such right must be defined with care. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721 (requiring “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” (quotation omitted)). The challengers have not shown that a right to new medical treatments is “deeply rooted in our history and traditions” and thus beyond the democratic process to regulate. *Id.* at 727.

Constitutionalizing new parental rights in the context of new medical treatments is no mean task. On the one side of the ledger, parents generally can be expected to know what is best for their children. On the other side of the ledger, state governments have an abiding interest in “preserving the welfare of children,” *Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019); *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2284, and “in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731. These interests give States broad power, even broad power to “limit[] parental freedom,” *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944); see *Parham v. J. R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979), particularly in an area of new medical treatment. We doubt, for example, that there are many drug-regulatory agencies in the world that, without satisfactory long-term testing, would delegate to parents and a doctor exclusive authority to decide whether to permit a potentially irreversible new drug treatment.

More generally, state legislatures play a critical role in regulating health and welfare, and their efforts are

usually “entitled to a ‘strong presumption of validity.’” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2284 (quotation omitted); *Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft*, 444 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2006). As a result, federal courts must be vigilant not to “substitute” their views for those of legislatures, *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2284, a caution that is particularly apt when construing unenumerated guarantees, see *Collins*, 503 U.S. at 125.

Judicial deference is especially appropriate where “medical and scientific uncertainty” exists. *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007); see also *Marshall v. United States*, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974); *Collins v. Texas*, 223 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1912). In this respect, consider the work of the Food and Drug Administration. Under a highly reticulated process that requires considerable long-range testing, the FDA determines when new drugs are safe for public use, including use by minors, and when new drugs are safe for certain purposes but not others. In making these decisions and in occasionally frustrating those who would like to have access to new drugs sooner, the Constitution rarely has a say over the FDA’s work. There is no constitutional right to use a new drug that the FDA has determined is unsafe or ineffective. *Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007). And that is true even if the FDA bars access to an experimental drug that a doctor believes might save a terminally ill patient’s life. Invoking our nation’s long history of regulating drugs and medical treatments, the D.C. Circuit correctly held that the Constitution does not take over this field. *Id.* at 711; see also *id.* at 710 & n.18 (collecting similar cases).

Today’s case has many parallels to that one. Gender-affirming procedures often employ FDA-approved

drugs for non-approved, “off label” uses. Tennessee decided that such off-label use in this area presents unacceptable dangers. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(b), (e), (g). Many medical professionals and many medical organizations may disagree. But the Constitution does not require Tennessee to view these treatments the same way as the majority of experts or to allow drugs for all uses simply because the FDA has approved them for some. *Cf. Taft*, 444 F.3d at 505 (explaining off-label use is legal “[a]bsent state regulation”); *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2005) (explaining that Congress may prohibit marijuana use even when doctors approve its use for medical purposes). It is well within a State’s police power to ban off-label uses of certain drugs. At the same time, it is difficult to maintain that the medical community is of one mind about the use of hormone therapy for gender dysphoria when the FDA is not prepared to put its credibility and careful testing protocols behind the use.

Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health and Human Services does not alter this conclusion. 927 F.3d 396. A Michigan health program collected blood samples from newborns and stored the samples for future use. *Id.* at 403–04. This compulsory storage program, we held, violated nonconsenting parents’ rights “to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children.” *Id.* at 418. This case differs from that one in at least two material ways. Unlike the Michigan program, the Tennessee Act rests on the legislative judgment that it will protect “the health of the child.” *Id.* at 421; *see* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(a), (b); *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (noting that States retain authority, notwithstanding parental rights, to protect children’s health). And the Michigan program *compelled* medical care, while the Tennessee Act law *prohibits* certain medical care. Although individuals sometimes

have a constitutional right to refuse treatment, the Supreme Court has not handled affirmative requests for treatment in the same way. *See Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 725–26. Most circuits have drawn the same line, “reject[ing] arguments that the Constitution provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the Government.” *Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d at 710 & n.18 (collecting cases).

Glucksberg illuminates the point. 521 U.S. 702. Harold Glucksberg claimed that Washington State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide violated his patients’ due process rights. *Id.* at 708. The Court held that the Constitution did not bestow an affirmative right to physician assistance in committing suicide. *Id.* at 725–26. The State could prohibit individuals from receiving care they wanted and their physicians wished to provide, all despite the “personal and profound” liberty interests at stake. *Id.* at 725. As in that case, so in this one, indeed more so in this one. There’s little reason to think that a parent’s right to make decisions for a child sweeps more broadly than an adult’s right to make decisions for herself. *Cf. Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977); *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 166. All told, the plaintiffs’ efforts to expand our substantive due process precedents to this new area are unlikely to succeed.

Equal protection. “No state,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, “shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Statutory classifications are ordinarily valid if they are rationally related to and further a legitimate state interest. *San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). More exacting scrutiny applies when a law implicates protected classes. *See Reed v.*

Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).

It's highly unlikely, as an initial matter, that the plaintiffs could show that the Act lacks a rational basis. The State plainly has authority, in truth a responsibility, to look after the health and safety of its children. In this area of unfolding medical and policy debate, a State has more rather than fewer options. Tennessee could rationally take the side of caution before permitting irreversible medical treatments of its children.

The challengers pin their main claims for likelihood of success on the assumption that heightened scrutiny applies. They first argue that the Tennessee Act discriminates on the basis of sex and thus requires the State to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. We are skeptical.

The Act bans gender-affirming care for minors of both sexes. The ban thus applies to all minors, regardless of their biological birth with male or female sex organs. That prohibition does not prefer one sex to the detriment of the other. *See Reed*, 404 U.S. at 76. The Act mentions the word "sex," true. But how could it not? That is the point of the existing hormone treatments—to help a minor transition from one gender to another. That also explains why it bans procedures that administer cross-sex hormones but not those that administer naturally occurring hormones. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). A cisgender girl cannot transition through use of estrogen; only testosterone will do that. A cisgender boy cannot transition through use of testosterone; only estrogen will do that. The reality that the drugs' effects correspond to sex in these understandable ways and that Tennessee regulates them does not require skeptical scrutiny. *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46; *see Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S.

484, 496 n.20 (1974); *see also Reed*, 404 U.S. at 76. “The regulation of a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny unless the regulation is a ‘mere pretext[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.’” *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (quoting *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). No such pretext has been shown here. If a law restricting a medical procedure that applies only to women does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as in *Dobbs*, a law equally applicable to all minors, no matter their sex at birth, does not require such scrutiny either.

The plaintiffs separately claim that the Act amounts to transgender-based discrimination, violating the rights of a quasi-suspect class. But neither the Supreme Court nor this court has recognized transgender status as a quasi-suspect class. Until that changes, rational basis review applies to transgender-based classifications. In the context of a preliminary injunction and the need to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, that should be nearly dispositive given the requirement of showing a “clear” right to relief. *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis omitted); *see Winter v. NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); *Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson*, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021).

The bar for recognizing a new quasi-suspect class, moreover, is a high one. The Supreme Court has recognized just two such classes, *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (gender and illegitimacy), and none in recent years. The Court “has not recognized any new constitutionally protected classes in over four decades, and instead has repeatedly declined to do so.” *Ondo v. City of Cleveland*, 795 F.3d 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2015); *Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 442

(holding that mental disability is not a quasi-suspect class); *Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that age is not a quasi-suspect class); see *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (declining to address whether gay individuals qualify as a suspect class).

That hesitancy makes sense here. Gender identity and gender dysphoria pose vexing line-drawing dilemmas for legislatures. Plenty of challenges spring to mind. Surgical changes versus hormone treatment. Drugs versus counseling. One drug versus another. One age cutoff for minors versus another. Still more complex, what about sports, access to bathrooms, definitions of disability? And will we constitutionalize the FDA approval rules in the process? Even when accompanied by judicial tiers of scrutiny, the U.S. Constitution does not offer a principled way to judge each of these lines—and still others to boot. All that would happen is that we would remove these trying policy choices from fifty state legislatures to one Supreme Court. Instead of the vigorous, sometimes frustrating, “arena of public debate and legislative action” across the country and instead of other options provided by fifty governors and fifty state courts, we would look to one judiciary to sort it all out. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. That is not how a constitutional democracy is supposed to work—or at least works best—when confronting evolving social norms and innovative medical options.

Bostock v. Clayton County does not change the analysis. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompasses discrimination against persons who are gay or transgender, the Court concluded. *Id.* at 1743; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). But that reasoning applies only to Title VII, as *Bostock* itself and our subsequent

cases make clear. *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1753; *Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021) (refusing to apply *Bostock* to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); *Meriwether v. Hartop*, 992 F.3d 492, 510 n.4 (6th Cir. 2021) (reasoning that Title VII analysis does not apply to Title IX); *see also Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard Coll.*, 2023 WL 4239254, at *59–60 (U.S. June 29, 2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that Title VI differs from the Equal Protection Clause).

Smith v. City of Salem does not move the needle either. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). It was an employment case, it involved an adult, and it concerned “sex stereotyping,” not whether someone’s body is male or female. *Id.* at 574–75. In that setting, it held that a transgender employee fired for dressing as a woman established a cognizable equal protection claim. *See id.* at 573, 577 (resting the holding on “[t]he facts Smith has alleged”). It did not hold that every claim of transgender discrimination requires heightened scrutiny, least of all in the fraught context of whether a State may limit irreversible medical treatments to minors facing gender dysphoria. And *Dobbs* prevents us from extending *Smith* that far, as it held that medical treatments that affect only one sex receive rational-basis review. *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245–46; *see Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.

We recognize that other courts and judges have taken different approaches to these issues. *See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 608 (4th Cir. 2020) (differential treatment of transgender person triggers intermediate scrutiny); *id.* at 627–28 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 670 (8th Cir. 2022) (ban on gender-transition procedures constituted sex-based

discrimination); *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 2022 WL 16957734, at *1 & n.1 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (Stras, J., dissental); *Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty.*, 57 F.4th 791, 801, 803 n.5 (11th Cir. 2022) (sex-based bathroom policy did not violate equal protection); *id.* at 823 (Wilson, J., dissenting).

We recognize, too, that several district courts have addressed similar laws in other States and assessed those laws in much the same way as the district court did in this case. *See Brandt v. Rutledge*, 2023 WL 4073727 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023); *K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind.*, 2023 WL 4054086 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023); *Doe v. Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023); *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. 2022). And our thoughtful colleague has reached a similar conclusion. We appreciate their perspectives, and they give us pause. But they do not eliminate our doubts about the ultimate strength of the challengers' claims for the reasons just given.

All told, the challengers lack a "clear showing" that they will succeed on the merits, *Mazurek*, 520 U.S. at 972 (emphasis omitted), and that is particularly so in view of the burdensome nature of a facial attack and the fraught task of justifying statewide relief.

III.

The other stay factors largely favor the State as well. If the injunction remains in place during the appeal, Tennessee will suffer irreparable harm from its inability to enforce the will of its legislature, to further the public-health considerations undergirding the law, and to avoid irreversible health risks to its children. As for harm to others, the Act's continuing care exception permits the challengers to continue their

existing treatments until March 31, 2024. That feature of the law lessens the harm to those minors who wish to continue receiving treatment. But we appreciate that it does not answer the concerns of those who might wish to continue treatment after that date or to those minors who might seek treatment for the first time in the future. That creates an irreversible problem of its own, one that lies at the crux of the case. Both sides have the same fear, just in opposite directions—one saying the procedures create health risks that cannot be undone, the other saying the absence of such procedures creates risks that cannot be undone. What makes it bearable to choose between the two sides is the realization that not every choice is for judges to make. In this instance, elected representatives made these precise cost-benefit decisions and did not trigger any reasons for skeptical review in doing so. As for the public interest, Tennessee's interests in applying the law to its residents and in being permitted to protect its children from health risks weigh heavily in favor of the State at this juncture.

* * *

These initial views, we must acknowledge, are just that: initial. We may be wrong. It may be that the one week we have had to resolve this motion does not suffice to see our own mistakes. In an effort to mitigate any potential harm from that possibility, we will expedite the appeal of the preliminary injunction, with the goal of resolving it no later than September 30, 2023. In the interim, the district court's preliminary injunction is stayed.

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Because I believe that Tennessee’s law is likely unconstitutional based on Plaintiffs’ theory of sex discrimination, I would not stay the district court’s injunction, although I would narrow its scope. I do not find it necessary to address Plaintiffs’ alternative theories of constitutional injury at this time.

Tennessee’s law likely discriminates against Plaintiffs on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, thus triggering intermediate scrutiny. Although the state argues that the act “appl[ies] equally to males and females,” Appellant’s Br. 8-9, the law discriminates based on sex because “medical procedures that are permitted for a minor of one sex are prohibited for a minor of another sex,” *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 669 (8th Cir. 2022). To illustrate, under the law, a person identified male at birth could receive testosterone therapy to conform to a male identity, but a person identified female at birth could not.¹ See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1). Indeed, until today, every federal court addressing similar laws reached the same conclusion as *Brandt*.²

¹ Defendants raise in their reply brief the argument that “[b]oth sexes use the same puberty blockers, so prohibiting them for gender dysphoria does not even consider sex.” Reply Br. 3. But this does not solve the problem. Under Tennessee’s law, someone identified male at birth could take puberty blockers consistent with a treatment plan that contemplates development consistent with a male identity, but someone identified female at birth could not. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1).

² See *Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 669; *Doe 1 v. Thornbury*, No. 3:23-CV-230-DJH, 2023 WL 4230481, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2023); *Brandt v. Rutledge*, No. 4:21CV00450 JM, 2023 WL 4073727, at

In the Title VII context, the Supreme Court has made clear that sex discrimination occurs when an “employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.” *Bostock v. Clayton County*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). That principle is directly on point here and highly persuasive. *Cf. Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding transgender plaintiff raised Title VII claim based on sex-stereotyping and concluding that the facts supporting the Title VII claim “easily constitute[d] a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause”); *Boxill v. O’Grady*, 935 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2019) (“We review § 1983 discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause using the same test applied under Title VII.”).

“Like racial classifications, sex-based discrimination is presumptively invalid.” *Vitolo v. Guzman*, 999 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2021). “Government policies that discriminate based on sex cannot stand unless the government provides an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification,’” *id.* (quoting *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)), which requires showing that the “classification serves ‘important governmental objectives,’ and . . . is ‘substantially and directly related’ to the government’s objectives,” *id.* (quoting *Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). Applying this standard, I fail to see how the state can justify denying access to hormone therapies for treatment of

*31 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023); *K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana*, No. 123CV00595JPHKMB, 2023 WL 4054086, at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023); *Doe v. Ladapo*, No. 4:23CV114-RH-MAF, 2023 WL 3833848, at *8 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023); see also *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1146 (M.D. Ala. 2022).

minor Plaintiffs' gender dysphoria while permitting access to others, especially in light of the district court's robust factual findings on the benefits of these treatments for transgender youth.

However, I agree that the district court abused its discretion in granting a statewide preliminary injunction. As the majority observes, "District courts 'should not issue relief that extends further than necessary to remedy the plaintiff's injury.'" Maj. Op. at 5 (quoting *Commonwealth v. Biden*, 57 F.4th 545, 556 (6th Cir. 2023)). I would uphold the stay as it applies to Plaintiffs and also Vanderbilt University Medical Center.

Lastly, I reiterate the majority's caveat that today's decision is preliminary only. I CONCUR in part and DISSENT in part.

216a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

No. 3:23-cv-00376

L.W. *et al.*, by and through her parents and next
friends, Samantha Williams and Brian Williams

Plaintiffs,

v.

JONATHAN SKRMETTI *et al.*,

Defendants.

JUDGE RICHARDSON

ORDER

On June 28, 2023, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 167, “Memorandum Opinion”) and entered an order (Doc. No. 168, “Order”) granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Order enjoined Defendants from enforcing most of the provisions of Senate Bill 1 (hereinafter “SB1” or “the law”), codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101 *et seq.* Just hours later, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. No. 169) and an “Emergency Motion for a Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal” (Doc. No. 170, “Motion”). In the Motion, Defendants request that if the Court is to deny the Motion, that it do so “quickly, without waiting for a response from Plaintiffs, so that Defendants can

proceed to the Sixth Circuit.” (Doc. No. 170). Cognizant of the time-sensitive nature of certain features of this action, and given that the Court’s ruling on the instant Motion does not prejudice Plaintiffs, the Court herein exercises its discretion to rule on the instant Motion before the time period for a response from Plaintiffs has expired. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be denied.¹

“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and “[t]he propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” *Id.* at 433–434. Four factors govern whether a stay is warranted: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits [of the appeal]; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether

¹ Although the filing of a Notice of Appeal generally strips the district court of jurisdiction with respect to matters involved in the appeal, district courts retain jurisdiction to “grant[], continue, modif[y], refuse[], dissolve[], or refuse[] to dissolve or modify an injunction. . . .” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d), (a); *Gutierrez v. CogScreen, LLC*, No. 17-cv-2378, 2018 WL 3006121, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2018) (explaining that district courts retain jurisdiction for injunctions even where a notice of appeal has been filed); *Prater v. Commerce Equities Management Co., Inc.*, Civ. Act. No. H-07-2349, 2009 WL 172826, *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2009) (“[A] district court retains jurisdiction to entertain a motion to stay a judgment or order being appealed.”). The Court is therefore satisfied that it has jurisdiction to consider the instant Motion, despite the pending appeal overlapping with issues raised by the instant Motion.

issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” *See id.* at 434. “Because the state is the moving party, its own potential harm and the public’s interest merge into a single factor.” *SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer*, 963 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2020). “The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 433. “There is substantial overlap between these and the factors governing preliminary injunctions, []; not because the two are one and the same, but because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action has been conclusively determined.” *See id.* (internal citation omitted).

The Court acknowledges that its Memorandum Opinion (Doc. No. 167) does not necessarily dictate the outcome of the instant Motion. Indeed, Defendants could raise (and have raised) in the Motion issues distinct from those resolved by the Court in its Memorandum Opinion. However, as for the four-factor test that generally governs whether a stay is warranted, Defendants assert the same arguments (with one exception discussed below) in *support* of the instant Motion as they previously posed in *opposition* to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Certainly, the Court does not begrudge Defendants for doing so—the issues raised by the instant Motion are substantially identical to those resolved in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion. Because Defendants’ arguments in support of the four factors listed above are essentially identical to those that they posed in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court is satisfied that none of the four factors (substantial likelihood of success on the merits,

irreparable harm, injury to the other parties, and the public interest) weigh in favor of a stay.

Defendants argue that even where the above-four factors do not weigh in favor of a stay, a stay is nonetheless warranted where a movant has shown that a court's ruling on an injunction poses "serious questions going to the merits." (Doc. No. 170 at 2). In other words, they argue that if there are serious questions going to the merits of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and this Court's ruling thereon, Defendants need not show either that those questions are likely to be resolved on appeal in their favor (*i.e.*, that they have a likelihood of success on appeal) or any of the other above-referenced three factors. Defendants' argument relies on the Sixth Circuit's fairly recent decision in *Antonio v. Garland*, 38 F.4th 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2022). But *Antonio* neither says nor suggests that a stay is warranted where a court's ruling on an injunction poses serious questions on the merits, even where none of the above-four factors favoring a stay. Instead, *Antonio* states that "*even if a movant can demonstrate irreparable harm*, he is still required to show, at a minimum, serious questions going to the merits." *See id.* (emphasis added). Contrary to Defendants' position, *Antonio* does not indicate that a movant meets his or her burden for a stay by showing only that a court's ruling on an injunction to be stayed poses serious questions on the merits. Therefore, even if the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order pose serious questions on the merits, Defendants have not met their burden for a stay because none of the four factors favor such a stay.²

² The Court's finding that a stay is unwarranted should come as no surprise because, even though a stay of a preliminary injunction is never automatically out of the question at the outset,

220a

For the reasons stated herein, the Court in its discretion DENIES the Motion (Doc. No. 170).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eli Richardson
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

“the grant of a stay of a preliminary injunction pending appeal will almost always be logically inconsistent with a prior finding of irreparable harm that is imminent as required to sustain the same preliminary injunction.” *Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono*, 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1999).

221a

APPENDIX E

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

No. 3:23-cv-00376

L.W. *et al.*, by and through her parents and next
friends, Samantha Williams and Brian Williams

Plaintiffs,

v.

JONATHAN SKRMETTI *et al.*,

Defendants.

JUDGE RICHARDSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER¹

Pending before the Court is the United States' motion to intervene (Doc. No. 38, "Motion") and an accompanying memorandum in support of the Motion (Doc. No. 39). Defendants filed a response (Doc. No. 81), and the United States filed a reply (Doc. No. 101). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be granted.

DISCUSSION

On April 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1), which alleges that Senate Bill 1, codified as Tennessee Code Annotated § 68-33-101 *et seq* (hereinafter,

¹ The foregoing discussion and analysis pertains only to the resolution of the instant Motion.

“SB1”) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 35, 37). The complaint also alleges that SB1 is preempted by the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and violates the ACA. (*Id.* at 38, 40).

On April 26, 2023, the United States filed a motion to intervene under Section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2.² (Doc. No. 38). Defendants do not dispute that the United States has the right to intervene in this action. (Doc. No. 81 at 1). In their response, however, Defendants request that the Court circumscribe the United States’ participation in the action. Specifically, Defendants argue that the United States may intervene to seek relief only from alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause due to discrimination based on sex rather than from discrimination based on transgender status (*i.e.*, an individual being transgender).³ (*Id.* at 3). Defendants further contend that the United States cannot seek relief broader than any relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled, because (according to Defendants) it lacks standing to do so. (*Id.* at 4–6). The Court addresses each argument in turn below.

² Though not explicitly stated by the United States, the Court assumes that the United States seeks to intervene as a plaintiff in this case, as evidenced by its filing of its complaint in intervention (Doc. No. 38-2).

³ “A transgender person is someone who fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—*i.e.* someone who is inherently gender non-conforming.” *Equal Employ’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral homes, Inc.*, 884 F.3d 560, 576 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. The United States Has the Right to Intervene
in this Action

As noted above, Defendants do not dispute that the United States has the right to intervene in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2, which reads:

Whenever an action has been commenced in any court of the United States seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, the Attorney General for or in the name of the United States may intervene in such action upon timely application if the Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public importance. In such action the United States shall be entitled to the same relief as if it had instituted the action.

42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2.⁴ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) recognizes that the “court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). It is widely recognized that § 2000h-2 confers such an unconditional right to intervene upon the United States.⁵

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs seek relief from the denial of equal protection on the basis of sex discrimination. And the Court recognizes that although

⁴ Attorney General Merrick Garland has certified that this case is of general public importance. (Doc. No. 38-1 at 2).

⁵ As explained by Wright & Miller: “The United States also has an unconditional statutory right to intervene in actions seeking relief from the denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution on account of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1906 (3d ed.)

Plaintiffs allege that SB1 discriminates against individuals who identify as transgender, the Supreme Court has found that “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being [] transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” See *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Ga.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). Although the Court in *Bostock* made this finding within the context of Title VII, the Court finds that it is equally applicable to the Equal Protection context, at least insofar as it pertains to § 2000h-2. Defendants, for the purposes of the present Motion, do not appear to disagree with this conclusion—indeed, they do not dispute that the United States’ intervention on the basis of alleged sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause is permissible. Therefore, the Court agrees that the United States has the right to intervene in this case because Plaintiffs seek relief from SB1 on the basis that (according to Plaintiffs) it discriminates against individuals who identify as transgender, which (according to the Supreme Court) necessarily constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

2. The United States’ Ability to Seek Relief from Discrimination Based on Transgender Status

Defendants argue that under § 2000h-2, the United States is limited to seeking relief for alleged discrimination based on sex and cannot also seek relief for discrimination based on transgender status. (Doc. No. 81 at 4). In its reply, the United States argues that there is no distinction between (1) discrimination against an individual who is transgender being unconstitutional because it is a form of sex discrimination, and (2) discrimination against an individual who is transgender being unconstitutional because the individual is transgender (*i.e.* because of their transgender

status). (Doc. No. 101 at 3). The Court, however, is of the view that there is a distinction between these two concepts. It is one thing to say that discrimination against an individual who is transgender is unlawful because it is a form of sex discrimination, and it is quite another thing to say that such discrimination is unlawful because discriminating against a person based on transgender status is itself impermissible; unlike the former concept, the latter concept posits a direct link between unlawful discrimination and transgender status. And a review of the pertinent case law reveals that courts indeed treat these arguments as analytically distinct. *See e.g., Equal Employ't Opportunity Comm'n.*, 884 F.3d at 576 (analyzing discrimination on the basis of sex and sex stereotypes separately from discrimination on the basis of transgender/transitioning status); *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 889 (E.D. Ark. 2021) (finding that intermediate scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim because the law in question relied sex-based classifications and because transgender people constituted a quasi-suspect class), *aff'd* 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022); *Fain v. Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313, 324 (S.D.W.V. 2022) (explaining that the Fourth Circuit applies intermediate scrutiny to laws discriminating based on sex or transgender status); *Flack v. Wis. Dept. of Health Servs.*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952 (W.D. Wisc. 2018) (recognizing that "heightened scrutiny may be appropriate either on the basis of sex discrimination or through recognizing of transgender as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.").

Even accepting that these arguments are analytically distinct, however, the Court does not agree with Defendants that § 2000h-2 limits the United States' ability to seek relief on the basis that SB1 unlawfully discriminates based on transgender status. Section

2000h-2 describes the types of cases in which the United States may intervene—and, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, it does not circumscribe, or otherwise dictate, the scope of the United States’ participation in the litigation once it has been granted intervenor-status.⁶ It states, in pertinent part, that “whenever an action has been commenced. . . seeking relief from the denial of equal protection. . . on account of. . . sex. . . the United States may intervene in such action. . .” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2. The provision says nothing about the *scope* of the United States’ intervention in such actions.

At least one other court has discussed the issue of the scope of the United States’ intervention under § 2000h-2. In *Spangler v. United States*, the Ninth Circuit in discussing the United States’ intervention under § 2000h-2 remarked that

A leading commentator, in referring to the intervenor with an absolute right to intervene, states, ‘It would be meaningless to give him an absolute right to intervene in order to protect his interests, if once in the proceedings he was barred from raising questions necessary for his own protection,’ 4 Moore’s

⁶ The only plausible limitation that the Court can divine from § 2000h-2 as to the United States’ participation in an action in which it has a right to intervene is the provision’s instruction that the “United States shall be entitled to the same relief as if it had instituted the action.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2. Defendants, however, do not argue that this part of the provision affects the *basis* of the United States’ relief. In other words, Defendants do not argue that the United States cannot pursue relief on the basis of discrimination based on transgender status because it would not be entitled to that relief had it (rather than Plaintiffs) instituted the action. Thus, the Court does not address that issue here.

Fed. Practice, Par. 24.16(4), p. 117 (2d ed. 1968). Prior to the adoption of the F. R. Civ. P. in 1937, old equity Rule 37 barred an intervenor from raising issues which were not 'subordinate' to the original parties' pleadings. No similar provision was carried over into the 1937 rules, and courts have not generally adhered to the old subordination doctrine. See, 4 Moore's Fed. Practice, Par. 24.16(1), pp. 108-112 (2d ed. 1968).

415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969). This discussion in *Spangler* highlights that intervenors are generally conferred the same ability to participate in the litigation as the original plaintiff(s). See e.g., *United States v. \$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized From Bank of America Account Ending in 2653*, 942 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[u]nder federal law, an intervenor of right is treated as he were an original party and has equal standing with the original parties.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *United States v. UCB, Inc.*, 970 F.3d 835, 853 (7th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that an ordinary intervenor-plaintiff has the same right as the original plaintiff); *Hughes v. Abell*, 09 220, 2014 WL 12787807, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2014) (explaining that intervenors have the same rights under the Federal Rules as do parties).

Importantly, Defendants point to nothing that suggest that the language of § 2000h-2 was intended to change the ordinary rules applicable to intervenors. Therefore, given the ordinary treatment of intervenors as having the same rights as an original party, and in light of the plain text of § 2000h-2, the Court finds that § 2000h-2 does not prohibit the United States from seeking relief from discrimination based on transgender status. In other words, the United States at its option

may pursue an argument that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates on the basis of transgender status.

3. The Scope of Relief that the United States May Seek

Defendants next argue that the United States cannot seek relief broader than that to which Plaintiffs are entitled. The Court need not decide this issue at this juncture. As the United States points out in its reply, the United States seeks the “exact same relief that [] Plaintiffs seek.” (Doc. No. 101 at 6). Indeed, both Plaintiffs and the United States seek a statewide injunction of SB1. Should the Court at some point find that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief narrower than that which the United States seeks, the Court will consider whether it would be appropriate to award broader relief to the United States than to Plaintiffs. However, the Court need not reach this issue at this juncture given that it has not yet determined whether (and, if so, to what extent) Plaintiffs are entitled to relief.

4. Briefing Schedule

In their response, Defendants request that the briefing schedule for the United States’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 40) be decided separately from the briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 21). The Court agrees that Defendants have had no obligation to respond to the United States’ motion for a preliminary injunction prior to the Court’s resolution of the present Motion. Given that the Court will permit the United States to intervene, the Court finds it appropriate to allow Defendants fourteen (14) days to respond to the United States’ motion for a preliminary injunction from the date of entry of this order. A separate order

229a

consistent with this order will also be entered setting forth the briefing schedule on the United States' motion for a preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion at Doc. No. 38 is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to update the case caption to reflect the United States as an intervenor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eli Richardson

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

230a

APPENDIX F

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

No. 3:23-cv-00376

*L.W. et al., by and through her parents and next
friends, Samantha Williams and Brian Williams*

Plaintiffs,

v.

JONATHON SKRMETTI *et al.*,

Defendants.

JUDGE RICHARDSON

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion (Doc. No. 74, "Motion") to reset the briefing schedule and to consolidate a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits. Plaintiffs filed a response. (Doc. No. 79). The United States, which has filed both a motion to intervene (Doc. No. 38) and its own motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 40) upon the heels of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 21), also filed a response.¹ (Doc. No. 80).

¹ The Court has not yet ruled on the United States' motion to intervene at Doc. No. 38.

Defendants then filed a reply. (Doc. No. 84).² For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion will be denied.

Defendants seek consolidation of a preliminary injunction hearing and the trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). Rule 65(a)(2) reads in full:

Before or after beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing. Even when consolidation is not ordered, evidence that is received on the motion and that would be admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at trial. But the court must preserve any party's right to a jury trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). As an initial matter, the Court has not determined whether it will hold a hearing on the pending motions for preliminary injunctions. (Doc. Nos. 21, 40). At present, the Court is not of the view that a preliminary injunction hearing is necessary, although the Court may change its view following the completion of briefing on the pending motions for preliminary injunctions. The text of Rule 65(a)(2)

² Although Defendants' reply predominantly rehashes the arguments they raise in the Motion, it does raise two new issues. The first is whether Plaintiff Dr. Lacy has standing, and the second concerns the scope of the United States' putative intervention. The Court need not resolve these issues in the resolution of this Motion, because the Court's analysis relies neither on arguments that Plaintiffs make in their response as to Dr. Lacy, nor does the Court rely on the United States' ability to intervene or the potential scope of its intervention. Moreover, the Court does not perceive the resolution of the present Motion to be an appropriate forum in which to address questions of standing and the merits of the United States' motion to intervene.

evidently permits consolidation only when a preliminary hearing is held. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (“*Before or after* beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. . . the court may advance trial on the merits. . .”) (emphasis added). Because the Court has yet to determine whether a preliminary injunction hearing will occur, Defendants’ Motion is procedurally premature (and would never become ripe, if no preliminary injunction hearing is held).

Moreover, even if the Court were to decide at a later point to hold a preliminary injunction hearing, however, the Court finds that consolidation in this case is not appropriate. The decision whether to consolidate a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits is within the sound discretion of the trial court. *See e.g., Paris v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development*, 713 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1983). Defendants advance two primary theories as to why consolidation is appropriate in this case. Neither are persuasive.

First, Defendants argue that the Court should consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial because Plaintiffs have failed to allege imminent irreparable harm. (Doc. No. 74 at 5). Defendants contend that there is no imminency to resolve the preliminary injunction motions because the law permits those who are currently receiving medical treatments described in the statute to continue do so until March 31, 2024. (*Id.* at 5).

Under the statute in question, individuals who began medical treatments to which the statute is applicable before July 1, 2023 lawfully may continue these treatments until March 31, 2024. Tenn. Code § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B). These individuals must have their treating physicians certify in writing that “in the

physician's good-faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, ending the medical procedure would be harmful to the minor." *See id.* § 68-33-103(b)(3). The statute further states that the exception permitting continued medical treatment to individuals who began treatment prior to July 1, 2023, does not permit "a healthcare provider to perform or administer a medical procedure that is different from the medical procedure performed prior to the effective date of this statute" when the sole purpose of the procedure is to "(A) Enable the minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or "(B) Treat purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity." *See id.* at § 68-33-103(4).

The plain text of the statute is inconsistent with Defendants' suggestion that Plaintiffs' allegations of imminency are refuted by the statute's allowance of an eight-month period for medical treatments to continue for some individuals who are subject to the statute (hereinafter referred to as "affected individuals"). After July 1, 2023, no affected individual who seeks the medical treatments described in the statute can receive such treatments if such affected individual had not begun the treatment prior to July 1, 2023. Therefore, after July 1, 2023, the absolute prohibition on treatments covered by the statute will become effective for an entire group of affected individuals. Furthermore, after July 1, 2023, affected individuals who are able to continue treatments until March 31, 2024 will be prevented from making any alterations (*i.e.* receiving any "medical procedure that is different") to those treatments. Finally, the natural effect of the statute will be that at least some affected individuals will have to alter their respective medical treatments in order to

prepare for the March 31, 2024 cut-off. Of course, this alteration would be permitted under the statute as long as such alteration is not for the purposes described in § 68-33-103(4)(A) or (B)—which would be the case whenever the alteration is implemented for the purpose of weaning the affected individual off the medical treatments in order to comply (with less abruptness to the individual) with the absolute prohibition that is to go into effect on March 31, 2024 . Though Defendants assert that the statute does not *require* medical professionals to “wean” their patients off of the patient’s medical treatments during the eight-month period beginning July 1, 2023, weaning patients off of treatments would logically be the *natural consequence* of the statute becoming effective on July 1, 2023. Therefore, even though the statute does not describe the eight-month period as “weaning period,” it is reasonable for the Court to infer—particularly in light of the statute’s proscription on changing an affected individual’s medical treatments if they are for either of the purposes described in § 68-33-103(4)(A) and (B)—that the effect of the statute becoming effective on July 1, 2023 is that many affected individuals will begin to be weaned off of their treatments around that date. Therefore, the Court does not agree with Defendants that there is no imminency as to Plaintiffs’ alleged harms. As evidenced, the plain text of the statute and the natural consequences of the prohibitions contained in the statute indicate that the effects of the statute (whether they be “good” or “bad,” constitutional or unconstitutional) will be felt starting on July 1, 2023.³

³ In making these findings with respect to the present Motion, the Court does not suggest that it has made any determinations about Plaintiffs’ showing of imminency or irreparability of harm

Defendants' argument as to imminency also reveals a fundamental misunderstanding as to the operation of Rule 65(a)(2). The purpose of consolidation under Rule 65(a)(2) is not to delay a preliminary injunction hearing until such time as a trial can be held (held, that is, after the parties have had sufficient time to prepare for the trial). As Plaintiffs point out in their response, consolidation under Rule 65(a)(2) is plainly intended to foster judicial efficiency by preventing repetition of evidence. (Doc. No. 79 at 4). As stated in the Notes of the Advisory Committee for Rule 65, "[t]he fact that the proceedings have been consolidated should cause no delay in the disposition of the application for the preliminary injunction. . . ." See Notes on Advisory Committee on Rules—1966 Amendment. The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that it is not appropriate to consolidate a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial where the effect of consolidation would be to leave the "preliminary injunction motions to languish for months." (Doc. No. 79 at 4). In short, Rule 65(a)(2) contemplates in effect moving up the trial so as to coincide with the preliminary injunction hearing (if indeed such a hearing is to be held); it does not contemplate delaying the preliminary injunction hearing until the time of trial. Defendants' suggestion that the Court wait to rule on the preliminary injunction motions until January 2024 is thus inconsistent with the purpose (and intended functioning) of Rule 65(a)(2).

Second, Defendants argue that consolidation is warranted because Plaintiffs waited more than a month and a half after the statute was enacted to file this action. (Doc. No. 74 at 9). The Court does not

in support of their *motion for a preliminary injunction*. The Court makes these findings only to the extent that they address and resolve arguments raised by Defendants in the *present Motion*.

begrudge Defendants' suggestion that under circumstances like the present, the sooner the filing the better. And Defendants might have gotten more traction on this point were there a smaller gap of time between the filing of this action (and Plaintiff's contemporaneous motion for a preliminary injunction) and the effective date of the statute. But Defendants have not identified any binding precedent on point which would cause the Court to find that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in filing this action seven weeks after the statute was enacted (and roughly ten weeks before it is to go into effect). Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs' delay in filing this action is not justifiable under the circumstances is also undermined by Defendants' request that the Court set Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion for October 16, 2023—several months after the motion was filed; it tends to reflect a recognition that litigating the preliminary injunction motion here at issue is something that takes some time, and this reality applies to Plaintiffs getting their ducks in a row before filing this action and the preliminary injunction motion in the first place. The Court therefore declines to find that Plaintiffs' delay in filing this action warrants consolidation.

The only remaining issue for the Court to address is Defendants' request in the Motion to extend the deadline for their response to June 2, 2023 in the event that the Court denies their request for consolidation under Rule 65(a)(2). On May 2, 2023, the Court entered an order extending the deadline for Defendants' response from May 8, 2023 to May 15, 2023. (Doc. No. 75). The Court has therefore afforded three weeks for Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which the Court considers sufficient time for Defendants to organize their response. The Court

237a

also finds that a deadline of June 2, 2023 for Defendants' response would not permit sufficient time upon the completion of briefing by both parties to fully consider the issues raised in Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion—and potentially hold a hearing—prior to the effective date of the statute. The Court therefore declines to extend the deadline to June 2, 2023. May 15, 2023 remains the effective deadline for Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, although for good cause shown the Court potentially could grant a slight extension beyond May 15.

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion at Doc. No. 74 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eli Richardson
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

238a

APPENDIX G

STATE OF TENNESSEE

PUBLIC CHAPTER NO.

SENATE BILL NO. 1

By Johnson, Yager, Haile, Bowling, White, Crowe,
Bailey, Hensley, Jackson, Reeves, Stevens, Rose, Taylor

Substituted for: House Bill No. 1

By Lamberth; Mr. Speaker Sexton; Faison, Garrett,
Ragan, Zachary, Todd, Kumar, Rudder, Keisling,
Grills, White, Rudd, McCalmon, Sherrell, Capley,
Warner, Richey, Raper, Littleton, Helton-Haynes,
Cochran, Fritts, Tim Hicks, Vital, Butler, Alexander,
Haston, Darby, Moon, Crawford, Doggett, Cepicky,
Brock Martin, Hulsey, Slater, Hale, Hawk, Bricken,
Williams, Bulso, Davis, Carringer, Marsh, Howell,
Lynn, Sparks, Gant, Leatherwood, Eldridge, Holsclaw,
Reedy, Campbell, Baum, Moody, Boyd, Powers

AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title
28; Title 29; Title 33; Title 34; Title 36; Title 37; Title
39; Title 40; Title 49; Title 56; Title 63; Title 68 and
Title 71, relative to medical care of the young.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE:

SECTION 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 68, is
amended by adding the following as a new chapter:

68-33-101. Findings.

(a) The legislature declares that it must take action
to protect the health and welfare of minors.

(b) The legislature determines that medical proce-
dures that alter a minor's hormonal balance, remove a
minor's sex organs, or otherwise change a minor's

physical appearance are harmful to a minor when these medical procedures are performed for the purpose of enabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex or treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity. These procedures can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering from adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences. Moreover, the legislature finds it likely that not all harmful effects associated with these types of medical procedures when performed on a minor are yet fully known, as many of these procedures, when performed on a minor for such purposes, are experimental in nature and not supported by high-quality, long-term medical studies.

(c) The legislature determines that there is evidence that medical procedures that alter a minor's hormonal balance, remove a minor's sex organs, or otherwise change a minor's physical appearance are not consistent with professional medical standards when the medical procedures are performed for the purpose of enabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex or treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity because a minor's discordance can be resolved by less invasive approaches that are likely to result in better outcomes for the minor.

(d) The legislature finds that medical procedures are being performed on and administered to minors in this state for such purposes, notwithstanding the risks and harms to the minors.

(e) The legislature finds that health authorities in Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom have

recognized similar trends and, after conducting systematic reviews of the evidence, have found no evidence that the benefits of these procedures outweigh the risks and thus have placed severe restrictions on their use.

(f) The legislature finds that Dr. John Money, one of the earliest advocates for performing or administering such medical procedures on minors and a founder of the Johns Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic, abused minors entrusted to his care, resulting in the suicides of David and Brian Reimer.

(g) The legislature finds that such medical procedures are being performed on and administered to minors in this state with rapidly increasing frequency and that supposed guidelines advocating for such treatment have changed substantially in recent years.

(h) The legislature finds that minors lack the maturity to fully understand and appreciate the life-altering consequences of such procedures and that many individuals have expressed regret for medical procedures that were performed on or administered to them for such purposes when they were minors.

(i) The legislature finds that many of the same pharmaceutical companies that contributed to the opioid epidemic have sought to profit from the administration of drugs to or use of devices on minors for such purposes and have paid consulting fees to physicians who then advocate for administration of drugs or use of devices for such purposes.

(j) The legislature finds that healthcare providers in this state have sought to perform such surgeries on minors because of the financial incentive associated with the surgeries, not necessarily because the surgeries are in a minor's best interest.

241a

(k) The legislature finds that healthcare providers in this state have threatened employees for conscientiously objecting, for religious, moral, or ethical reasons, to performing or administering such medical procedures.

(l) The legislature finds that healthcare providers in this state have posted pictures of naked minors online to advertise such surgeries.

(m) The legislature declares that the integrity and public respect of the medical profession are significantly harmed by healthcare providers performing or administering such medical procedures on minors. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting minors from physical and emotional harm. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the ability of minors to develop into adults who can create children of their own. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in promoting the dignity of minors. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in encouraging minors to appreciate their sex, particularly as they undergo puberty. This state has a legitimate, substantial, and compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession, including by prohibiting medical procedures that are harmful, unethical, immoral, experimental, or unsupported by high-quality or long-term studies, or that might encourage minors to become disdainful of their sex.

(n) Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit medical procedures from being administered to or performed on minors when the purpose of the medical procedure is to:

242a

(1) Enable a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex;
or

(2) Treat purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity.

68-33-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

(1) "Congenital defect" means a physical or chemical abnormality present in a minor that is inconsistent with the normal development of a human being of the minor's sex, including abnormalities caused by a medically verifiable disorder of sex development, but does not include gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, gender incongruence, or any mental condition, disorder, disability, or abnormality;

(2) "Healthcare provider" means a healthcare professional, establishment, or facility licensed, registered, certified, or permitted pursuant to this title or title 63 and under the regulatory authority of:

(A) The department of health;

(B) An agency, board, council, or committee attached to the department of health; or

(C) The health facilities commission;

(3) "Hormone" means an androgen or estrogen;

(4) "Knowing" and "knowingly" have the same meaning as the term "knowing" is defined in § 39-11-302;

(5) "Medical procedure" means:

243a

(A) Surgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs of a human being; or

(B) Prescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone to a human being;

(6) “Minor” means an individual under eighteen (18) years of age;

(7) “Parent” means any biological, legal, or adoptive parent or parents of the minor or any legal guardian of the minor;

(8) “Puberty blocker” means a drug or device that suppresses the production of hormones in a minor’s body to stop, delay, or suppress pubertal development; and

(9) “Sex” means a person’s immutable characteristics of the reproductive system that define the individual as male or female, as determined by anatomy and genetics existing at the time of birth.

68-33-103. Prohibitions.

(a)(1) A healthcare provider shall not knowingly perform or offer to perform on a minor, or administer or offer to administer to a minor, a medical procedure if the performance or administration of the procedure is for the purpose of:

(A) Enabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex; or

(B) Treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.

(2) Subdivision (a)(1) applies to medical procedures that are:

244a

(A) Performed or administered in this state; or

(B) Performed or administered on a minor located in this state, including via telehealth, as defined in § 63-1-155.

(b)(1) It is not a violation of subsection (a) if a healthcare provider knowingly performs, or offers to perform, a medical procedure on or administers, or offers to administer, a medical procedure to a minor if:

(A) The performance or administration of the medical procedure is to treat a minor's congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury; or

(B) The performance or administration of the medical procedure on the minor began prior to the effective date of this act and concludes on or before March 31, 2024.

(2) For purposes of subdivision (b)(1)(A), "disease" does not include gender dysphoria, gender identity disorder, gender incongruence, or any mental condition, disorder, disability, or abnormality.

(3) For the exception in subdivision (b)(1)(B) to apply, the minor's treating physician must certify in writing that, in the physician's good-faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, ending the medical procedure would be harmful to the minor. The certification must include the findings supporting the certification and must be made a part of the minor's medical record.

(4) The exception in subdivision (b)(1)(B) does not allow a healthcare provider to perform or administer a medical procedure that is different from the medical procedure performed prior to the effective

245a

date of this act when the sole purpose of the subsequent medical procedure is to:

(A) Enable the minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex; or

(B) Treat purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity.

(c)(1) It is not a defense to any legal liability incurred as the result of a violation of this section that the minor, or a parent of the minor, consented to the conduct that constituted the violation.

(2) This section supersedes any common law rule regarding a minor's ability to consent to a medical procedure that is performed or administered for the purpose of:

(A) Enabling the minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex; or

(B) Treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity.

68-33-104. Distribution of Hormones or Puberty Blockers to Minors.

A person shall not knowingly provide a hormone or puberty blocker by any means to a minor if the provision of the hormone or puberty blocker is not in compliance with this chapter.

68-33-105. Private Right of Action.

(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(2), a minor, or the parent of a minor, injured as a result of a violation of this chapter, may bring a civil

246a

cause of action to recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses, against the healthcare provider alleged to have violated § 68-33-103 or any person alleged to have violated § 68-33-104.

(2) The parent of a minor injured as a result of a violation of this chapter shall not bring a civil cause of action against a healthcare provider or another person if the parent consented to the conduct that constituted the violation on behalf of the minor.

(b) The parent or next of kin of a minor may bring a wrongful death action, pursuant to title 20, chapter 5, part 1, against a healthcare provider alleged to have violated § 68-33-103, if the injured minor is deceased and:

(1) The minor's death is the result of the physical or emotional harm inflicted upon the minor by the violation; and

(2) The parent of the minor did not consent to the conduct that constituted the violation on behalf of the minor.

(c) If a court in any civil action brought pursuant to this section finds that a healthcare provider knowingly violated § 68-33-103, then the court shall notify the appropriate regulatory authority and the attorney general and reporter by mailing a certified copy of the court's order to the regulatory authority and the attorney general and reporter. Notification pursuant to this subsection (c) shall be made upon the judgment of the court being made final.

(d) For purposes of subsection (a), compensatory damages may include:

247a

(1) Reasonable economic losses caused by the emotional, mental, or physical effects of the violation, including, but not limited to:

(A) The cost of counseling, hospitalization, and any other medical expenses connected with treating the harm caused by the violation;

(B) Any out-of-pocket costs of the minor paid to the healthcare provider for the prohibited medical procedure; and

(C) Loss of income caused by the violation; and

(2) Noneconomic damages caused by the violation, including, but not limited to, psychological and emotional anguish.

(e) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, an action commenced under this section must be brought:

(1) Within thirty (30) years from the date the minor reaches eighteen (18) years of age; or

(2) Within ten (10) years of the minor's death if the minor dies.

(f) This section is declared to be remedial in nature, and this section must be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

68-33-106. Attorney General and Reporter's Right of Action.

(a) The attorney general and reporter shall establish a process by which violations of this chapter may be reported.

(b) The attorney general and reporter may bring an action against a healthcare provider or any person that knowingly violates this chapter, within twenty (20) years of the violation, to enjoin further violations,

to disgorge any profits received due to the medical procedure, and to recover a civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars (\$25,000) per violation. Each time a healthcare provider performs or administers a medical procedure in violation of § 68-33-103 constitutes a separate violation.

(c) A civil penalty collected pursuant to this section must be paid into the general fund of this state.

(d) The attorney general and reporter is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses if the attorney general and reporter prevails in an action brought pursuant to this section.

(e) Jurisdiction for an action brought pursuant to this section is in the chancery or circuit court of Williamson County or circuit court in the county where the violation occurred.

68-33-107. Healthcare Provider Licensing Sanctions.

A violation of § 68-33-103 constitutes a potential threat to public health, safety, and welfare and requires emergency action by an alleged violator's appropriate regulatory authority. Upon receiving notification pursuant to § 68-33-105(c), or upon otherwise becoming aware of an alleged violation of § 68-33-103, the appropriate regulatory authority shall proceed pursuant to title 63 or this title, as applicable.

68-33-108. Minor Immunity.

A minor upon whom a medical procedure is performed or administered must not be held liable for violating this chapter.

68-33-109. Application.

This chapter does not prohibit or restrict psychological practice regulated pursuant to title 63, chapter 11; the practice of professional counseling regulated pursuant to title 63, chapter 22; or the practice of social work regulated pursuant to title 63, chapter 23.

SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 63-1-169, is amended by deleting the section.

SECTION 3. If any provision of this act, or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, then the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to that end, the provisions of this act are severable.

SECTION 4. The headings in this act are for reference purposes only and do not constitute a part of the law enacted by this act. However, the Tennessee Code Commission is requested to include the headings in any compilation or publication containing this act.

SECTION 5. This act takes effect July 1, 2023, the public welfare requiring it, and applies to actions occurring on or after that date.

250a

SENATE BILL NO. 1

PASSED: February 23, 2023

/s/ Randy McNally
RANDY McNALLY
SPEAKER OF THE SENATE

/s/ Cameron Sexton
CAMERON SEXTON, SPEAKER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APPROVED this 2nd day of March 2023

/s/ Bill Lee
BILL LEE, GOVERNOR