

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

VIKKI E. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS
STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE
OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST;
CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN MICHAEL
PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; JAMES
D. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E.
PAULSON; MADELEINE PICKENS, INDIVIDUALLY;
AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE
MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE ALLEN
E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; AND AS TRUSTEE OF
THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON SEPARATE
PROPERTY TRUST,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN C. MALONEY, JR.
Counsel of Record
TRAFLET & FABIAN
264 South Street
Morristown, NJ 07960
(973) 631-6222
jmaloney@trafletfabian.com
Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Internal Revenue Service has significant powers to collect estate taxes under the Internal Revenue Code. The ordinary method is through an automatic ten-year tax lien which attaches to the decedent's estate. The IRS can also require the estate to post a surety bond or can require a special lien. Finally, the Internal Revenue Code allows the Government the additional, extraordinary power to pursue certain enumerated recipients of estate property personally for unpaid estate taxes under certain circumstances.

The question presented here is:

Does 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) allow the Government to impose personal liability on transferees, trustees or beneficiaries who receive property from the decedent's estate *only at the time of decedent's death*, as the Tax Court and every federal court which has considered the issue has held, or is the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correct that 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) allows the imposition of personal liability for estate taxes on persons who receive estate property *at any time after the decedent's death* and in amounts which could potentially exceed the current value of the property received?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners were Appellants in the Ninth Circuit: Vikki E. Paulson, individually and as statutory executor of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson, and as Co-Trustee of the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust; and Crystal Christensen, individually and as statutory executor of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson, and as Co-Trustee of the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust.

Respondents are the United States of America; John Michael Paulson, individually and as Executor of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson; James D. Paulson, individually and as statutory executor of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson; and Madeleine Pickens, individually and as statutory executor of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson, and as Trustee of the Marital Trust created under the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust, and as Trustee of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

PETITIONERS ARE NAMED INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-TRUSTEES OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST.

RESPONDENT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS ACTING IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY. RESPONDENT JOHN MICHAEL PAULSON IS NAMED INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON. RESPONDENT JAMES D. PAULSON IS NAMED INDIVIDUALLY AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON. RESPONDENT MADELEINE PICKENS IS NAMED INDIVIDUALLY AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST, AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON SEPARATE PROPERTY TRUST.

LIST OF RELATED CASES

United States v. James D. Paulson, et al., No. 21-55197; 21-55230, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgment entered May 17, 2023.

United States v. James D. Paulson, et al., No. 3:15-CV-02057-AJB-NLS, United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Judgment entered September 6, 2016.

Allen E. Paulson Living Trust, No. PN 24815, Superior Court of California, County of San Diego.

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CITATION OF OPINIONS

The opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 68 F.4th 528 (9th Cir. 2023), and is attached as Appendix A, 1a-78a. The findings of fact of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California is reported at 445 F. Supp. 3d 824 (S.D. Ca. 2020) and attached as Appendix B, 79a-94a. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California is reported at 204 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (S.D. Ca. 2016), and is attached as Appendix C, 95a-128a.

STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

A judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was entered on May 17, 2023. A petition for rehearing was denied on July 25, 2023.

Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) provides:

(a) Liens for estate tax. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)

(2) Liability of transferees and others.

If the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee (except the trustee of an employees' trust which meets the requirements of section 401(a)), surviving tenant, person in possession

of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax. Any part of such property transferred by (or transferred by a transferee of) such spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession, or beneficiary, to a purchaser or holder of a security interest shall be divested of the lien provided in paragraph (1) and a like lien shall then attach to all the property of such spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession, or beneficiary, or transferee of any such person, except any part transferred to a purchaser or a holder of a security interest.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 19, 2000, Allen E. Paulson ("Allen") died, leaving an estate (the "Estate") initially valued at over \$193 million. Allen Paulson had established the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust ("AEPLT") in 1986 which contained most of his assets. John Michael Paulson ("John Michael"), Allen's son, was the Executor and original Trustee. John Michael distributed most of the assets of the AEPLT, but he did not pay all the estate taxes which were due.

Petitioners Vikki Paulson ("Vikki") and Crystal Christensen ("Crystal") became successor Trustees of the AEPLT in March 2009 and February 2011, nine and eleven years after Allen's death, respectively. Allen was Vikki's father-in-law and Crystal's grandfather. Vikki replaced John Michael as Trustee after he was removed by the

California Probate Court for egregious misconduct and mismanagement, including unauthorized use of AEPLT assets for his personal gain. Crystal replaced James Paulson as Trustee after his removal for failure to follow court orders. Vikki and Crystal stepped in to manage the AEPLT at the request of and under the supervision of the California Probate Court. By this time, however, most of the AEPLT assets had been depleted.

In September 2015, fifteen years after Allen's death, Respondent United States of America (the "Government") filed an action against Vikki, Crystal and others, including John Michael and Madeleine Pickens, to collect the outstanding balance of \$9.6 million in unpaid estate taxes. The Government lawsuit alleged that the Successor Trustees, Madeleine Pickens and John Michael, were personally liable for estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), plus interest and penalties.

This was an extraordinary step which became necessary because the Government had failed to pursue the usual methods of tax enforcement. It had allowed the statutory ten-year estate tax lien to expire, and it had failed to protect the Government's interests in collection by requiring a surety bond or imposing a special lien. *See* 26 U.S.C. §§ 6324A, 6324(a)(1), 6165, 6166(k)(1)-(2). Compounding this failure, the Government also did not act promptly to hold John Michael— who had principal responsibility for payment of the estate taxes and had depleted the assets of the AEPLT which were needed to pay them—personally liable for the unpaid taxes. The Government lost its excellent opportunity to collect the unpaid estate taxes when it failed altogether to respond to John Michael's application for discharge of his Executor

liability pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2204. Moreover, after the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the claims against John Michael, the Government did not appeal that decision.

The District Court also dismissed the Government's claims against Vikki and Crystal under § 6324(a)(2), holding that § 6324(a)(2) does not impose personal liability on transferees, trustees or beneficiaries who did not receive property from the decedent's estate "upon the date of the decedent's death." *See* Petitioner's Appendix ("Pet. App.") 119a. The date of receipt of property from the decedent's estate was the critical factor in the decision. The District Court relied primarily on prior long-standing decisions interpreting § 6324(a)(2), especially *United States v. Johnson*, No. 2:11-CV-00087, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, at *14 (D. Utah, July 29, 2013) ("[U]nder section 6324(a)(2), the person must have or receive property from the gross estate immediately upon the date of decedent's death rather than at some point thereafter.>").

On appeal, in a 2-1 panel decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding of the District Court and announced a novel interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) which avoided any time limitation on the receipt of estate property presented by the statutory language "on the date of decedent's death" (the "Ninth Circuit decision"). Pet. App. 1a.

Now, according to the Ninth Circuit, a person who receives estate property either on the date of decedent's death or at any time thereafter, can be held personally liable for estate taxes, subject only to applicable statutes of limitation. *Id.* at 60a-61a. The Ninth Circuit based

its interpretation upon its strict application of the last antecedent rule of statutory construction. *Id.* at 16a-21a. Further, since the date for valuation of estate assets remained unchanged, the Ninth Circuit recognized that its novel interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) could result in severe and unjust financial consequences to a trustee or recipient of estate property. They could owe more to the Government than the value of the property they received. *Id.* at 66a-69a (Ikuta, J., dissenting).

For example, here, in March 2009, when Vikki became the successor Trustee, the AEPLT was insolvent, containing less than \$39,000 in cash and about \$10.8 million in total assets while owing over \$28 million in liabilities. If Vikki and Crystal become liable as successor trustees under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, their personal liability would be based on the value of those properties in the AEPLT on the "date of the decedent's death." 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). But the value of these assets on July 19, 2000, is unknown, and possibly unknowable. If the value of those assets went down over that time (which they almost certainly did, because some of those assets included uniquely depreciative horses in the AEPLT's possession), then Trustees Vikki and Crystal could become personally liable for more than the value of the property they received from the Estate.

However, the Ninth Circuit dismissed that concern of fundamental unfairness because the Government had made certain representations in its briefing to the effect that it can recover only the value of the property received. Pet. App. 38a. The Ninth Circuit believed that "judicial estoppel" applied to the Government's legal position and would bind the Government's enforcement

authority in future cases. *Id.* at 39a-42a. In short, the Ninth Circuit decided it could amend § 6324(a)(2) and restrict government enforcement of the nation’s tax laws on its own authority.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Ninth Circuit Decision Creates an Intolerable Conflict Regarding the Scope of Personal Liability Under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) with the Tax Court and Every Federal Court Which has Considered the Issue.

Under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), the Government may pursue certain categories of persons personally for unpaid estate taxes under specific conditions: here “the spouse, transferee, trustee . . . or beneficiary, *who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death*, property included in the gross estate,” shall be liable “to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent’s death, of such property.” 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s novel interpretation of the italicized language conflicts with the interpretation which every court which has interpreted this statute has given for more than sixty years. The Ninth Circuit decision allows the Government to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes for property received from the decedent’s estate “on the date of decedent’s death” as well as for property the estate distributes at any point in time. This is an extraordinary expansion of the Government’s authority to pursue individuals to collect estate taxes.

In 1959, the Tax Court—a specialized court of national jurisdiction—held that § 6324’s substantially-similar

predecessor, § 827(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, applies only to property received “immediately upon the date of the decedent’s death,” and not to property an estate distributes afterward. See *Englert v. Comm’r*, 32 T.C. 1008, 1015 (1959). The Internal Revenue Service formally acquiesced to that opinion. See *IRS Announcement Relating to: Englert*, 1960 WL 62561 (IRS ACQ, Dec. 31, 1960). *Englert* has been followed by every court since § 6324 was enacted in 1954, including the District Court below. See *Garrett v. Comm’r*, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2214, at *34-*43 (1994); *Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, at *8-*26.

These judicial authorities based their decisions on the plain language of § 6324(a)(2). Section 6324(a)(2) has a logical and plausible meaning applicable here: only a person who becomes a trustee of a trust on the date of decedent’s death becomes personally liable as a transferee for the estate tax because that person was in possession of property includable in decedent’s gross estate at the date of death. The terms “receive” and “has” are parallel words, expressed in the same verb tense, and are naturally modified by the term “on the date of the decedent’s death.” Further, as Judge Ikuta aptly noted in her vigorous dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision:

In this context, the words ‘receives’ and ‘has’ at the date of death refer to two different situations. The phrase ‘has on the date of decedent’s death’ refers to a person who holds property transferred within three years before the decedent’s death, which is considered part of the decedent’s gross estate for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 2035(c)(1). The phrase

‘receives . . . on the date of decedent’s death,’ refers to ‘property received by persons solely because of decedent’s death,’ and ‘which was not in the possession of one of the persons . . . at the moment of decedent’s death, but who immediately received such property solely because of decedent’s death.’

[Pet. App. 64a (collecting authorities).]

Further, the remainder of § 6324 supports this specific timing to trigger potential liability. Section 6324(a)(2) repeatedly refers to the assets “on the date of the decedent’s death,” and imposes personal liability on those individuals who have control over the estate’s assets at that time and, therefore, the ability to pay the estate’s taxes. The second sentence of § 6324(a)(2) differentiates property transferred (and accordingly received by another) after the date of the decedent’s death, which “shall be divested of the lien” imposed by paragraph (a)(1), from property received on the date of the decedent’s death, which creates personal liability under the first sentence of paragraph (a)(2). The “property included in the [decedent’s] gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive” (such as an interest in annuities, life insurance proceeds, or property subject to a general power of appointment), as pointed out by Judge Ikuta in her dissent, Pet. App. 69a-71a, and referenced in the Majority’s holding, *Id.* at 22a, is exactly the type of property which can be transferred on the date of decedent’s death. *Id.* at 70a-71a.

In short, until the Ninth Circuit’s decision, all courts have agreed that the phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” in § 6324(a)(2) modifies both the verbs “receives”

and “has.” Under that interpretation, personal liability can be imposed only on individuals who held or received estate property “immediately upon the date of decedent’s death.” *See* Special Liens for Estate and Gift Taxes, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 780 (1954). Moreover, if, as here, a person receives property after the date of death of decedent, she cannot be liable for unpaid estate taxes. The estate tax lien, of course, still attaches to the property itself for 10 years.

By departing entirely from the long-settled authority of the Tax Court’s interpretation of § 6324(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit decision dramatically increases the enforcement powers of the IRS as well as the potential for inconsistent tax judgments throughout the nation.

II. The Ninth Circuit Decision Conflicts with This Court’s Precedent Applying the Last Antecedent Rule of Statutory Construction and the Rule of Taxpayer Lenity.

Section 6324(a)(2) states that personal liability for unpaid estate taxes can be imposed on each of the six categories of listed persons “who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042.” The Ninth Circuit decision found that a missing comma (after the verb “has”) created an ambiguity in this statutory language; specifically, does the limiting phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” modify only the immediately preceding verb “has” or does it also modify the more remote verb, “receives.” The answer will determine the critical point in time for triggering potential personal liability of those who receive property from the estate: either it is limited to receipt of estate property on the

date of the decedent's death, or it is unlimited and includes receipt of estate property at any time on or after that date. Pet. App. 15a-16a. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the missing comma after the verb "has" triggered application of the canon of statutory construction called the "rule of the last antecedent" and therefore determined that the limiting phrase should be read as modifying only the verb "has" that it immediately follows. *Id.* at 17a-18a (citing *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016)). It did so because the limiting phrase "is not separated from both antecedents by a comma, and it does not follow an integrated clause that contains both antecedents." *Id.* at 20a. While the Ninth Circuit determined that § 6324(a) (2) was ambiguous, it nevertheless declined to apply the rule of taxpayer lenity. *Id.* at 45a-46a. In both rulings, the Ninth Circuit decision conflicts with this Court's precedent.

A. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied the Last Antecedent Rule.

The canon of the last antecedent is not an absolute rule to be applied in a mechanical way as the Ninth Circuit did here; rather, it is only "an interpretive presumption," *Payless Shoesource v. Travelers Cos., Inc.*, 585 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (10th Cir. 2009), based on the rules of grammar, and it "can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning." *Lockhart*, 577 U.S. at 352 (the "context," internal logic, legislative history and the provision's "place in the overall statutory scheme" should be considered); see also *Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid*, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1170 n.5 (2021); *United States v. Hayes*, 555 U.S. 415, 425 (2009); *Barnhart v. Thomas*, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). Recognizing the rule's limitations, this Court

and Courts of Appeals have declined to apply the rule where doing so would produce “implausible” results or require accepting “unlikely premises.” *Hayes*, 555 U.S. at 425-426 n.6; *see, e.g., United States v. One Sentinel Arms Striker-12 Shotgun Serial No. 001725*, 416 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2005); *Payless Shoesource*, 585 F.3d at 1371-72. That important limitation on the last antecedent canon holds true even where a statute, as here, contains a “misplaced comma.” Pet. App. 77a (Ikuta, J., dissenting).

In direct conflict with that precedent, the Ninth Circuit decision majority ignored two critical “indicia of the meaning” of § 6324(a)(2), either one of which takes precedence over the last antecedent canon. *Id.* at 67a (Ikuta, J., dissenting).

First, the Ninth Circuit totally ignored the legislative history regarding the scope and purpose of § 6324(a)(2). That legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended this provision to impose personal liability *only* on the person who “on the date of the decedent’s death” receives or holds the property of a transfer made in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death. *Higley v. Comm’r*, 69 F.2d 160, 162 (8th Cir. 1934) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1926)). The Ninth Circuit’s grammatical and punctuation exegesis is based on the premise that Congress would not have structured § 6324(a)(2) with missing commas. Pet. App. 18a-21a. But that is exactly what Congress did. Congress confirmed its acceptance of the Tax Court’s *Englert* decision in 1959, as discussed in Point I, *supra*, and the IRS’ formal acquiescence to that holding a year later. Congress amended § 6324 on several occasions, most recently in 1966—a fact which was ignored by the Ninth Circuit

decision. In each of those amendments, after review, Congress did not change the punctuation or grammar of § 6324(a)(2), indicating that Congress intended to adopt the interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) provided by the courts that had previously considered the statute. *See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit*, 547 U.S. 71, 85-86 (2006) (“[W]hen ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’”) (quoting *Bragdon v. Abbott*, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)); *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”) (collecting authorities). The Ninth Circuit decision fails to consider this critical indicator of § 6324’s meaning which would have clearly overcome the application of the last antecedent canon under binding precedents.

Second, the Ninth Circuit’s “hyper technical reading” of § 6324(a)(2) produces such “illogical results” as to bar the use of the last antecedent rule. Pet. App. 61a-62a. (Ikuta, J., dissenting). Section 6324(a)(2) establishes the measure of a recipient’s liability as the value of the property at the time of the decedent’s death. However, the actual value of the property received can decline afterward and that means that the Government could impose personal liability for estate taxes in an amount which exceeds the current value of the property. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself recognized that under its interpretation, recipients of estate property can “be personally liable for estate taxes that exceed the value of the property they received.” *Id.*

at 28a. But the Ninth Circuit applied the last antecedent canon anyway, despite the unfair and severe financial consequences to recipients. *Id.* at 35a. These “illogical” results are exactly why this Court’s precedent would not apply that canon in these circumstances.

Here, it would be more plausible to conclude that a Congress interested in improving and assuring tax collection would act rationally and choose to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes only on individuals who had either the opportunity or the assets with which to pay the estate taxes. *See United States v. Vohland*, 675 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1982). It is also plausible to conclude that Congress did not intend that successor trustees like Vikki and Crystal should be punished with personal estate tax liability for stepping in to responsibly manage the AEPLT after John Michael’s mismanagement—not for their own personal gain, but at the direction of Allen’s Will and at the request and under the supervision of the California Probate Court. This is especially so when Congress expressly provided the Government with other “options” “to protect its unsecured interest” in the AEPLT like requiring a surety bond or a special lien. Pet. App. 65a. (Ikuta, J., dissenting). The Government failed to use those options. Instead, to “compensate for [the Government’s] failures,” the Ninth Circuit has resorted to a novel interpretation of § 6324 that is in direct conflict with Supreme Court precedent. *Id.* at 66a.

B. The Ninth Circuit Declined to Apply the Rule of Taxpayer Lenity.

Having determined that § 6324(a)(2) was ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit should have invoked the rule of taxpayer

lenity. However, the Ninth Circuit refused to do so in direct conflict with this Court's precedent. *See* Pet. App. 44a-46a. This Court has held that “[i]n case of doubt, [statutes levying taxes] are construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the citizen.” *Gould v. Gould*, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917); *see also Ivan Allen Co. v. United States*, 422 U.S. 617, 626 (1975); *United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States*, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); *Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Fla.*, 284 U.S. 498, 508 (1932); *United States v. Updike*, 281 U.S. 489, 496 (1930); *United States v. Merriam*, 263 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1923). Circuit Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, and other courts routinely apply this rule. *United States v. Boyd*, 991 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e must strictly construe a ‘tax provision which imposes a penalty . . . ; [it] cannot be assessed unless the words of the provision plainly impose it.’”) (quoting *Bradley v. United States*, 817 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1987)); *Higley*, 69 F.2d at 162-163; *Englert*, 32 T.C. at 1014; *Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, at *13-*14.

According to the Ninth Circuit decision, the rule of taxpayer lenity only applies to tax provisions “akin to criminal statutes.” Pet. App. 45a. This alleged limitation, however, is not an accurate statement of the law. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this canon of construction applies to “taxing statute[s]” generally. *Fang Lin Ai v. United States*, 809 F.3d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)(citation omitted). This is especially true, where, as here, the Government seeks tax penalties on the unpaid estate taxes. Pet. App. 96a. The Ninth Circuit decision fails to apply the strict construction of § 6324(a)(2) against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer as mandated by binding precedent.

III. The Ninth Circuit Decision Conflicts With Sound Public Policy.

The Ninth Circuit decision violates sound public policy in at least two respects: (1) the Ninth Circuit improperly attempted to amend § 6324(a)(2) by judicial fiat to dramatically increase the Government’s tax enforcement powers and impose additional personal liability on recipients of trust property without Congressional involvement and consent; and (2) the Ninth Circuit improperly attempted to use the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bind the Government in future tax enforcement cases based on the Government’s representations in its briefing in this case. These efforts conflict with well-established precedent of this Court and circuit courts.

A. The Ninth Circuit Decision Improperly Attempts to Amend § 6324(a)(2) by Judicial Fiat.

Recognizing that its novel interpretation of the scope of § 6324(a)(2) could impose substantial and unanticipated personal liability on recipients of estate property, the Ninth Circuit sought to limit those consequences by announcing that personal liability will be “capped at the value of estate property in the living trust at the time of Allen Paulson’s death, and each defendants’ liability cannot exceed the value of the property at the time that they received or had it as trustees.” Pet. App. 49a. The Ninth Circuit decision created this new cap on personal liability for estate taxes out of whole cloth. It cites no authority—no statutory language, no tax regulation, no case law, no treatise—to support this extraordinary exercise in judicial law-making. This overreaching is

contrary to this Court's precedent. *See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors*, 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982); *Crooks v. Harrelson*, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). If Congress believed that the Tax Court and other federal courts' interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) is incorrect or produces unacceptable results, it could amend the statute at any time, as it has on several occasions in the past.

B. The Ninth Circuit Decision Conflicts with Binding Precedent as to the Application of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Against the Government.

The premise for the Ninth Circuit's creation of a new cap on personal liability for estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2) is its belief that the Government allegedly promised in its briefing and at oral argument that "estate tax liability cannot exceed the value of property received," and that it will not pursue recipients in this case for "more than the value of the property that the taxpayer received." Pet. App. 38a. According to the Ninth Circuit, application of the "doctrine of judicial estoppel" will safeguard against any unfair application while imposing personal liability. *Id.* at 38a-42a. It will also bind the Government to that limitation on recovery of unpaid estate taxes in future cases. *Id.* at 39a-41a.

As dissenting Judge Ikuta emphasized, however, the Majority's premise is deeply flawed. The "Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," *Heckler v. Cmty. Health. Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc.*, 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984), and it "may readily change its" position in a later case. Pet. App. 76a (Ikuta, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Ikuta properly

pointed out that the so-called Government representations are not binding because they are “merely a description of how the government has argued this case. It does not represent the government’s interpretation of § 6324(a) (2) or any promise regarding its future actions.” *Id.* at 74a. Further, as Judge Ikuta explained, the “ordinary principles of judicial estoppel” are “not applicable here,” and the Majority’s newly-announced limitation on personal tax liability would not be binding on the Government—which enjoys a special status as a litigant—in future tax collection cases. *Id.* at 75a-76a. In the absence of egregious misconduct on the part of the Government in the same case, see *United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank*, 630 F.3d 1139, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2011), federal courts have concluded that “public policy considerations allow the government to change its position in ways that might be inappropriate if merely a matter of private interest.” *New Edge Network, Inc. v. FCC*, 461 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Government remains free to adopt a different position on § 6324 “in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations.” Pet. App. 76a (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands as support for the erroneous proposition that the United States Government can be bound to its purported concession in its brief in future actions. This proposition raises serious constitutional concerns based on separation of powers. If “a court refuses to enforce the law on the basis of a previous representation from a government official, it renders the current executive unable to enforce the law and thus discharge its responsibilities under the Take Care Clause.” *United States v. Marine Shale Processors*, 81 F.3d 1329, 1348 (5th Cir. 1996); see also *United States*

v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984). Moreover, if the Ninth Circuit decision stands, the Government would be invited to engage in creative brief writing and attempt to use this new “doctrine strategically to achieve results Congress intended to prevent, thus delivering lawmaking power to the executive.” *Marine Shale Processors*, 81 F.3d at 1348. These conflicts with sound public policy need to be resolved to ensure uniform national enforcement of the tax laws.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Petition of Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN C. MALONEY, JR.
Counsel of Record
TRAFLET & FABIAN
264 South Street
Morristown, NJ 07960
(973) 631-6222
jmaloney@trafletfabian.com

Counsel for Petitioners

October 23, 2023

APPENDIX

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**APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED MAY 17, 2023**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-55197

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-02057-AJB-NLS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES D. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; VIKKI E. PAULSON,
INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E.
PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; CRYSTAL
CHRISTENSEN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS
STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE
OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST;
MADELEINE PICKENS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS TRUSTEE OF
THE MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; AND AS
TRUSTEE OF THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON
SEPARATE PROPERTY TRUST,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 21-55230

D.C. No. 3:15-cv-02057-AJB-NLS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN MICHAEL PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; JAMES D. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, MADELEINE PICKENS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON SEPARATE PROPERTY TRUST, DEFENDANTS, AND VIKKI E. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding.

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Argued and Submitted February 11, 2022
San Francisco, California

Filed May 17, 2023

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Sandra S. Ikuta, and
Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bade; Dissent by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY*

Tax

The panel reversed the district court's judgment in favor of defendants, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the government on its claims for estate taxes, and to conduct any further proceedings necessary to determine the amount of each defendant's liability for unpaid taxes.

The United States sued several heirs of Allen Paulson, alleging that they were trustees of Paulson's trust or received estate property as transferees or beneficiaries, and were thus personally liable for estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). The United States also alleged that two of the heirs, Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen, were liable for estate taxes under California state law. The district court ruled in favor of defendants on the Tax Code claims, and in favor of the United States on the state law claims.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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Allen Paulson died with an estate valued at nearly \$200 million, most of which was placed in a living trust. The estate was distributed among Paulson's heirs over the years. When the estate filed its tax return, it also paid a portion of its tax liability, and elected to pay the remaining balance in installments with a fifteen-year plan under 26 U.S.C. § 6166. After the estate missed some payments, the Internal Revenue Service terminated the § 6166 election and issued a notice of final determination under 26 U.S.C. § 7479. The IRS then recorded notices of federal tax liens against the estate. In the meantime, the various beneficiaries of the living trust settled their disputes, after which they claimed that the living trust had been "completely depleted."

The United States filed an action against the beneficiaries, seeking a judgment against the estate and living trust for the outstanding balance of the estate's tax liability. The United States also sought judgment against the individual defendants under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), 31 U.S.C. § 3713, and state law. The district court concluded that defendant Madeleine Pickens was not liable for the unpaid estate taxes as a beneficiary of the living trust, and that the remaining defendants were not liable for estate taxes as transferees or trustees because they were not in possession of estate property at the time of Allen Paulson's death.

The panel held that § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed in the statute who have or receive estate property, either on the date of the decedent's death or at any time thereafter (as opposed to only on the date of death), subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

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The panel next held that the defendants were within the categories of persons listed in § 6324(a) when they had or received estate property, and are thus liable for the unpaid estate taxes as trustees and beneficiaries. The panel further held that each defendant's liability cannot exceed the value of the estate property at the time of decedent's death, or the value of that property at the time they received or had it as trustees and beneficiaries. The panel did not reach the state law claims, because its conclusion on the federal tax claims resolved the matter.

Judge Ikuta dissented. Disagreeing with the majority's statutory interpretation, she explained that the taxpayers' reading of the statute is more plausible, avoids an illogical result (namely, that a person who receives estate property years after the estate is settled could be held personally liable for estate taxes that potentially exceed the current value of the property received), and is a better indication of Congress's intent to impose such personal liability only on the date of the decedent's death.

OPINION

BADE, Circuit Judge:

Allen Paulson died with an estate valued at nearly \$200 million, with most of his assets placed in a living trust. But years later more than \$10 million in estate taxes, interest, and penalties remained unpaid. The United States of America (the United States or the government) sued several of Paulson's heirs—John Michael Paulson, James D. Paulson, Vikki E. Paulson, Crystal Christensen, and Madeleine Pickens—alleging that they controlled the trust, as trustees, or received

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estate property, as transferees or beneficiaries, and thus are personally liable for the estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). The United States also alleged that Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen, as co-trustees of the living trust, were liable for unpaid estate taxes under section 19001 of the California Probate Code.

As relevant to this appeal, the district court granted in part Vikki Paulson's Crystal Christensen's, and Madeleine Pickens's motions to dismiss, concluding that they were not liable for the estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2) as trustees, transferees, or beneficiaries, and later ruled on several motions for summary judgment. Based on the reasoning in its order granting the motions to dismiss in part, the court ruled in favor of Madeleine Pickens and James Paulson on the United States' remaining claims under § 6324(a)(2), concluding that they were not personally liable for the estate taxes. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the United States on its claims under the California Probate Code. The United States appeals the rulings in favor of the defendants on the § 6324(a)(2) claims, and Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen cross-appeal the judgment holding them liable for the unpaid estate taxes under section 19001.¹ We have jurisdiction over these appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1. The district court concluded that John Michael Paulson was liable for the unpaid estate taxes as executor and trustee of the living trust, but concluded that he had successfully discharged his liability for the estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 2204. The United States does not dispute that finding on appeal. Therefore, only its claims against James Paulson, Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, and Madeleine Pickens are at issue.

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We hold that § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed in the statute who have or receive estate property, either on the date of the decedent's death or at any time thereafter, subject to the applicable statute of limitations. We further hold that the defendants were within the categories of persons listed in § 6324(a) when they had or received estate property, and thus are liable for the unpaid estate taxes as trustees and beneficiaries. Therefore, we reverse the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on the United States' claims under § 6324(a)(2), and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the government on these claims with any further proceedings necessary to determine the amount of each defendant's liability for the unpaid taxes. Because our conclusion on the federal tax claims arising from the Internal Revenue Code resolves this matter, we do not reach the parties' dispute over the interpretation of the California Probate Code.

I**A**

Allen Paulson died on July 19, 2000. He was survived by his third wife Madeleine Pickens, three sons from a prior marriage—Richard Paulson, James Paulson, and John Michael Paulson—and several grandchildren, including Crystal Christensen. Richard Paulson died after his father, and Vikki Paulson is Richard Paulson's widow. At the time of Allen Paulson's death, his gross estate was valued at \$193,434,344 for federal estate tax purposes. Nearly all his assets, which included real estate, stocks,

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bonds, cash, and receivables, were held in a living trust.² The living trust was revocable during Allen Paulson's lifetime and, according to its terms, the trust was to pay any estate taxes.

When Allen Paulson died, his son John Michael Paulson became a co-trustee of the living trust and was appointed co-executor by the probate court. In October 2001, John Michael Paulson became the sole executor of the estate, with a different co-trustee. That same month, he filed an estate tax return, or Form 706, with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). On October 23, 2001, the IRS received the estate's Form 706 estate tax return, which reported a total gross estate of \$187,729,626, a net taxable estate of \$9,234,172, and an estate tax liability of \$4,459,051. The estate paid \$706,296 with the return and elected to defer the remaining balance of \$3,752,755 to be paid in installments with a fifteen-year plan under 26 U.S.C. § 6166.³ In November 2001, the IRS assessed the reported estate tax liability of \$4,459,051.

The IRS audited the estate tax return and asserted a deficiency in the estate tax reported on the return, which

2. The only asset that was not held by the living trust was an ownership interest in a hotel and casino corporation, which is not relevant to these appeals.

3. Under § 6166, an executor may pay a portion of the estate taxes in installments when more than 35% of the estate's value consists of interest in a closely held business. 26 U.S.C. § 6166(a)(1), (3). This election is limited to the portion of the estate taxes attributable to the interest in a closely held business. *Id.* § 6166(a)(2). Section 6166 allows the executor to make interest payments for five years and then pay the taxes over ten years. *Id.* § 6166(a)(3), (f).

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the estate challenged in Tax Court. In December 2005, the Tax Court entered a stipulated decision and determined that the estate owed an additional \$6,669,477 in estate taxes. The IRS assessed the additional liability in January 2006, and the estate elected to pay this amount through the remaining § 6166 installments. John Michael Paulson, as executor, made interest installment payments until his removal as Trustee in 2009, and he timely made the first estate tax and interest payment in April 2007. He obtained a one-year extension, until April 2009, to make the 2008 tax and interest payment. But neither he nor anyone else made that payment or any of the subsequent installment payments.⁴

Meanwhile, various disputes arose between Madeleine Pickens and Allen Paulson's other heirs. In settlement of those disputes, Madeleine Pickens received assets that the government asserts were worth approximately \$19 million, including \$750,000 in cash, two residences and the personal property located at those residences, and an ownership interest in the Del Mar Country Club.⁵ Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen assert that the assets Madeleine Pickens received were worth over \$42 million. Madeleine Pickens does not state a value for the assets she

4. After the estate's default in 2009, the successor co-trustees of the living trust submitted two offers in compromise to the IRS, accompanied by non-refundable partial payments that the IRS applied to the estate taxes.

5. Allen Paulson's living trust included provisions listing these two residences as gifts to Madeleine (Paulson) Pickens, which she would receive if, among other conditions, she survived him by six months.

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received. In February 2003, John Michael Paulson and the co-trustee transferred these assets from the living trust to Madeleine Pickens, as trustee of her personal living trust. Between 2003 and 2006, John Michael Paulson distributed at least \$7,261,887 in cash from the living trust to other trust beneficiaries, including \$990,125 to Crystal Christensen.⁶

In March 2009, the probate court removed John Michael Paulson as trustee of the living trust for misconduct and appointed Vikki Paulson and James Paulson as co-trustees. The government asserts that, at that time, the trust contained assets worth more than \$13.7 million, which exceeded the estate tax liability. Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen claim that by this time the living trust was insolvent, with \$10.8 million in assets, but \$28.3 million in liabilities, including \$9.6 million in federal tax liability.

In May 2010, because of the missed installment payments, the IRS terminated the § 6166 election and issued a notice of final determination under 26 U.S.C. § 7479. The probate court removed James Paulson as co-trustee, and Vikki Paulson, as sole trustee of the living trust, challenged the IRS's termination of the § 6166

6. In his living trust, Allen Paulson bequeathed \$1.4 million to Crystal (Paulson) Christensen to be held in trust until she reached the age of 18, with provisions that allowed for the trustee's discretionary distributions of principal and set specific times (when Crystal Christensen turned 25, 30, and 35 years old) for mandatory disbursements and the termination of the trust.

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election in the Tax Court. In May 2011, the Tax Court sustained the IRS's termination of the estate's installment payment election.

In February 2011, the probate court appointed Crystal Christensen co-trustee of the living trust with Vikki Paulson. At that time, according to the government, the living trust held assets worth at least \$8.8 million. In June and July 2011, the IRS recorded notices of federal tax liens against the estate under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322, and 6323. In the meantime, between 2007 and 2013, various disputes arose between John Michael Paulson, Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, James Paulson, and others with interests in the living trust. In January 2013, they settled their disputes through an agreement in which John Michael Paulson received the living trust's ownership interest in a jet project, the estate's casino ownership interest, and certain tax losses in exchange for resigning as executor. Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen assert that, by the time of this agreement, the living trust was "completely depleted." The probate court adopted the settlement agreement.

B

In September 2015, the United States filed this action against John Michael Paulson, Madeleine Pickens, James Paulson, Vikki Paulson, and Crystal Christensen in their individual and representative capacities. The complaint sought a judgment against the estate and the living trust for the outstanding balance of the 2006 estate tax liability,

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which then exceeded \$10 million, as well as judgments against the individual defendants under § 6324(a)(2), 31 U.S.C. § 3713, and California law.

James Paulson, Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, and Madeleine Pickens filed motions to dismiss and argued that they were not personally liable for the estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2) as trustees, beneficiaries, or transferees of the living trust. The district court denied James Paulson's motion to dismiss, and partially granted and partially denied Madeleine Pickens's, Vikki Paulson's, and Crystal Christensen's motions to dismiss. The district court concluded that Madeleine Pickens was not liable for the unpaid estate taxes as a beneficiary of the living trust because she did not receive life insurance benefits.⁷ The district court further concluded that James Paulson,⁸ Vikki Paulson, and Crystal Christensen were not liable for the unpaid estate taxes as transferees or trustees because they were not in possession of estate property at the time of Allen Paulson's death.⁹

7. Madeleine Pickens also argued that she was not liable as trustee of her personal trust, and the district court granted summary judgment to her on this issue because she did not receive estate property until three years after Allen Paulson's death. The district court, however, did not determine whether Madeleine Pickens could be a "trustee," under § 6324(a)(2), based on her role as a trustee of her separate personal trust. The government does not argue on appeal that Madeleine Pickens is liable for the estate taxes in her role as trustee of her separate personal trust. Therefore, we do not address this issue.

8. James Paulson did not appeal the district court's orders.

9. Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen also argued that they were not liable under California law. After discovery, the district

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These appeals raise questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. *Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick*, 813 F.2d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 1987).

III

Section 2001 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on a decedent's taxable estate, which the executor is required to pay. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001(a), 2002. Section 6324, in turn, operates to protect the government's ability to collect estate and gift taxes. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a); *see also United States v. Vohland*, 675 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[Section] 6324 is structured to assure collection of the estate tax.”). To this end, the statute imposes a lien on the decedent's gross estate for the unpaid estate taxes in § 6324(a)(1) and imposes personal liability for such taxes on those who receive or have estate property in § 6324(a)(2).¹⁰ 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(1) and (2); *see also United States*

court granted summary judgment to the United States on its claims that Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen, as successor trustees of the living trust, were liable for the unpaid estate taxes under the California Probate Code. As previously stated, we do not address this issue of California law.

10. These statutory tools to guard against the risk of non-payment, while complementary, have some important differences. Section 6324(a)(1) imposes “a lien upon the gross estate of the decedent for 10 years from the date of death,” in the amount of the unpaid estate tax. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(1). Unlike the general tax lien of §§ 6322 and 6323, the estate tax lien arises before the tax is assessed and is valid against most third parties even if notice of the lien is not recorded. *See Detroit Bank v. United States*, 317 U.S. 329,

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v. Geniviva, 16 F.3d 522, 524 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that § 6324(a)(2) “affords the Government a separate remedy against the beneficiaries of an estate when the estate divests itself of the assets necessary to satisfy its tax obligations”).

The statutory provision at issue here, § 6324(a)(2), as stated in its title, imposes personal liability on “transferees and others” who receive or have property from an estate. The statute provides that:

If the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee (except the trustee of an employees’ trust which meets the requirements of section 401(a)), surviving tenant, person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, *who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death*, property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at the time of decedent’s death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.

336-37, 63 S. Ct. 297, 87 L. Ed. 304, 1943 C.B. 1126 (1943); *Vohland*, 675 F.2d at 1074-76. In contrast, § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes, on those listed in the statute, for ten years after assessment, 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1), and that collection period is tolled by a § 6166 election and other events. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6503(a)(1), (d); *see also id.* §§ 6213(a), 6331(k)(1).

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26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) (emphasis added). The question before us is whether the phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” modifies only the immediately preceding verb “has,” or if it also modifies the more remote verb, “receives.”

The United States argues the limiting phrase “on the date of decedent’s death” modifies only the immediately preceding verb “has,” and not the more remote verb “receives.” Therefore, in its view, the statute imposes personal liability on those listed in the statute who (1) receive estate property at any time on or after the date of the decedent’s death, or (2) have estate property on the date of the decedent’s death. Thus, it contends, § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes in this case on successor trustees and beneficiaries of the living trust, including those who have or received estate property *after* the date of decedent Allen Paulson’s death.

The defendants, in contrast, argue that the limiting phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” modifies both the immediately preceding verb “has,” and the more remote verb “receives.” Thus, under their interpretation, the statute imposes personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes only on those who receive or have property included in the gross estate on the date of the decedent’s death. But those who receive property from the estate at any point after the date of the decedent’s death have no personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes.

We conclude that the most natural reading of the statutory text, and other indicia of its meaning, supports

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the United States’ interpretation. Therefore, we hold that § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed in the statute who have or receive estate property, either on the date of the decedent’s death or at any time thereafter, subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

A

“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” *Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.*, 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Park ‘N Fly, Inc., v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.*, 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S. Ct. 658, 83 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1985)); *see also, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid*, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169, 209 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2021) (explaining that when interpreting a statute, “[w]e begin with the text.”); *United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.*, 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989) (“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”).

Here, the statutory text at issue states that a person (who fits within a category listed in the statute) “*who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate . . . shall be personally liable*” for the unpaid estate tax. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, in the disputed text

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the statute lists two verbs: “receives” and “has.” *Id.* These two verbs are in separate independent clauses, set off from each other by a comma and the conjunction “or.” *See id.* In addition, the first verb “receives” is set off from the limiting phrase (“on the date of the decedent’s death”) by a comma. A term or phrase “set aside by commas” and “separated . . . by [a] conjunctive word[.]” from a limiting clause “stands independent of the language that follows.” *Ron Pair Enters.*, 489 U.S. at 241.¹¹ Thus, the structure of § 6324(a)(2) supports the conclusion that “receives” stands independent of the language that follows, “on the date of the decedent’s death.” Therefore, this limiting phrase does not modify the remote verb “receives.” *See id.*

This reading of the statute is supported by the canon of statutory construction known as “the rule of the last antecedent.” The Supreme Court has long applied this “timeworn textual canon” to interpret “statutes that

11. In *Ron Pair Enterprises*, the Court considered whether § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), allowed the holder of an over-secured claim to recover, in addition to “interest on such claim,” fees, costs, or other charges. 489 U.S. at 241. The statute provided that “[t]here shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.” *Id.* (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)). The Court explained that “[t]he phrase ‘interest on such claim’ is set aside by commas, and . . . stands independent of the language that follows.” *Id.* Therefore, it is not “joined to the following clause so that the final ‘provided for under the agreement’ modifies it as well.” *Id.* at 242. The Court therefore concluded that “[b]y the plain language of the statute, the two types of recovery [(1) “interest on such claim,” and (2) “reasonable fees, costs or charges provided for under the agreement”] are distinct.” *Id.*

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include a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting clause,” *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347, 351, 136 S. Ct. 958, 194 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2016). The “rule of the last antecedent” provides that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”¹² *Id.* (alteration in original) (quoting *Barnhart v. Thomas*, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S. Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003)); *see also id.* (“[Q]ualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.” (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1532-33 (10th ed. 2014))). The rule of the last antecedent supports the conclusion that the limiting phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” modifies only the immediately preceding antecedent “has,” and not the more remote antecedent “receives.”

Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen, however, argue that we should apply the series-qualifier canon and conclude that the limiting phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” modifies both the immediately preceding

12. In *Lockhart*, the Court applied the rule of the last antecedent to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), which increases the sentences of defendants if they have “a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” 577 U.S. at 350-52 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)). The Court concluded that the limiting phrase “involving a minor or ward” modified only the immediately preceding crime in the list of offenses, “abusive sexual conduct,” and did not modify the other listed crimes, “aggravated sexual abuse,” or “abusive sexual conduct.” *Id.* at 349.

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verb “has,” and the more remote verb, “receives.” The series-qualifier canon provides that “[w]hen there is a straight-forward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’” *Facebook*, 141 S. Ct. at 1169 (alteration in original) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS* 147 (2012)).

In *Facebook*, the Court interpreted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and concluded that the series-qualifier canon suggested the most natural reading of the statute.¹³ 141 S. Ct. at 1169-70 & n.5. The Court focused on the statute’s syntax and punctuation, explaining that because the limiting phrase at issue (“using a random or sequential number generator”) immediately followed an integrated clause that contained the antecedents (“store or produce telephone numbers to be called”), and the limiting phrase was separated from the antecedents by a comma, the limiting phrase applied to all the antecedents, not just the immediately preceding one. *Id.* at 1170; *cf. United States v. Pritchett*, 470 F.2d 455, 459, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying rule of the last antecedent and explaining that if the limiting phrase were intended to apply to all categories of persons listed in the statute, the drafters would have included a comma “so as to separate it from the clause immediately preceding”). The Court also explained that applying the

13. The statute at issue in *Facebook*, § 227(a)(1), defined an “automatic telephone dialing system” as “equipment with the capacity both to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” 141 S. Ct. at 1167 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)).

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series-qualifier canon did not conflict with “the rule of the last antecedent,” which does not apply when a limiting phrase follows an integrated clause. *Facebook*, 141 S. Ct. at 1170.

Here, however, the limiting phrase in § 6324(a)(2), “on the date of the decedent’s death,” is *not* separated from both antecedents by a comma, and it does *not* follow an integrated clause that contains both antecedents. Instead, the limiting phrase is set off by commas *with* the immediate antecedent, “has,” from the rest of the sentence (“who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate”). 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). Thus, the punctuation of § 6324(a)(2) does not support a reading that applies the limiting phrase to both the immediate and remote antecedents.

Moreover, accepting the defendants’ interpretation would require us to read the statute as if it were punctuated differently—to essentially rewrite the statute. Specifically, we would either need to read the statute as if the two verbs “receives” and “has” appeared together in an integrated clause and were separated from the limiting phrase by a comma (i.e., a person who receives or has, on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate is liable for the unpaid estate taxes) or as if the statute included an additional comma that separated the limiting phrase from the antecedents (i.e., a person, who receives, or has, on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate is liable for the unpaid estate taxes). *Cf. In re Bateman*, 515 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (reading a provision in the bankruptcy code so that “[n]o punctuation needs to be added or deleted”

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But Congress did not structure the statute this way. *See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund*, 500 U.S. 72, 79-80, 111 S. Ct. 1700, 114 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1991) (explaining that Congress would have added a comma if it had intended a meaning other than the natural reading);¹⁴ *see also In re Sanders*, 551 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Congress no doubt could have worked around [the rule of the last antecedent] had it wished . . .”).

We therefore conclude that the rule of the last antecedent is the canon of interpretation that is most consistent with the text, structure, and punctuation of § 6324(a)(2), and therefore it is the appropriate tool to interpret the statute.

B

This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. As the Court has explained, canons of statutory interpretation are not absolute and can be “overcome by other indicia of

14. In *International Primate Protection League*, the Court construed 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and concluded that the statute’s punctuation supported the conclusion that the phrase “Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person acting under him,” did not permit agencies to remove civil suits from state to federal court. 500 U.S. at 79-80. As the Court explained, “[i]f the drafters of § 1442(a)(1) had intended the phrase ‘or any agency thereof’ to describe a separate category of entities endowed with removal power, they would have likely employed the comma consistently.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, the Court concluded that “[a]bsent the comma, the natural reading of the clause is that it permits removal by anyone who is an ‘officer’ either ‘of the United States’ or of one of its agencies.” *Id.*

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meaning.” *Lockhart*, 577 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted); *see also Facebook*, 141 S. Ct. at 1170 n.5 (“Linguistic canons are tools of statutory interpretation whose usefulness depends on the particular statutory text and context at issue.”). Here, however, applying the rule of the last antecedent results in an interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) that is supported by the statutory text and context, while applying the series-qualifier canon does not.

This is so because we are also bound by the canon that requires us to “strive to ‘giv[e] effect to each word and mak[e] every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” *R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles*, 29 F.4th 542, 553 (9th Cir. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting *Shelby v. Bartlett*, 391 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004)). The defendants’ narrow interpretation of § 6324(a)(2), which limits personal liability for unpaid estate taxes to those who have or receive estate property on the date of the decedent’s death only, violates this canon because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the very next clause of the statute.

That clause applies § 6324(a)(2) to “property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive.” These sections, in turn, attach personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes on the gross estate to assets that are *receivable*. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 2039(a) (incorporating “annuity or other payments receivable” into the gross estate); *id.* § 2041(a)(2) (incorporating property that a transferee may not receive by a power of appointment

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until after “notice” and the “expiration of a stated period”); *id.* § 2042 (incorporating life insurance proceeds “[t]o the extent of the amount receivable”). Thus, the statute clearly anticipates that at the time of the decedent’s death, the categories of persons listed in the statute may receive the expectation of the right to receive certain estate property. *Id.* § 6324(a)(2). In other words, they may have a “receivable interest” on the date of the decedent’s death but not actually receive property on that date. *See Receivable*, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “receivable” as “[a]waiting receipt of payment” or “[s]ubject to a call for payment”). Under the plain language of § 6324(a)(2), those who fit within the categories of persons listed in the statute are personally liable for the estate taxes on such property.

The statute also explicitly applies to those who *already have or possess* estate property on the date of the decedent’s death, such as a “surviving tenant” or a “person in possession of the property.” 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2); *see id.* (incorporating § 2040, which includes in the gross estate property that is held by the decedent and any other person “as joint tenants with the right of survivorship”); *see also United States v. Craft*, 535 U.S. 274, 280-81, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 152 L. Ed. 2d 437 (2002) (explaining that certain tenancies enjoy the “right of survivorship,” which is a “right of automatic inheritance” such that “[u]pon the death of one joint tenant, that tenant’s share in the property does not pass through will or the rules of intestate succession; rather, the remaining tenant or tenants automatically inherit it”); *Survivorship Tenancy*, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)

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(defining “survivorship tenancy” as “a tenancy in which the surviving tenant automatically acquires ownership of a deceased tenant’s share”).

Thus, the context and structure of the statute provide additional indicia of its meaning and further clarify that personal liability for the estate tax applies to those who receive estate property, on or after the date of the decedent’s death (i.e., through annuities, other receivable payments, powers of appointment, or insurance policies), and to those who have estate property on the date of the decedent’s death (e.g., through a survivorship tenancy).

Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen acknowledge that § 6324(a)(2)’s definition of the “gross estate” includes property that the categories of persons listed in the statute will receive *after* the date of the decedent’s death, for example property received through the power of appointment described in § 2041. But they argue that the phrase “on the date of the decedent’s death” must be read “to exclude certain assets that are part of the gross estate from the categories of assets that trigger personal liability.” Thus, even though the statute explicitly incorporates “sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive” to define the “property included in the gross estate,” 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), the defendants argue that we should nonetheless conclude that the receipt of such property does not subject the recipient to personal liability for unpaid estate taxes. They argue that because such property will not be received until after the date of the decedent’s death, the recipient “does not have ‘on the date of the decedent’s death’ an asset out of which that person can pay taxes, and so is not personally liable.” Thus, they conclude that

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“some assets included in the gross estate would not trigger liability under [§] 6324(a)(2).”

But the statute does not state that liability for unpaid estate taxes attaches only to those who can pay the taxes on the date of the decedent’s death. Instead, the statute imposes personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes based on the receipt or possession of property from the gross estate. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). And the tax code and regulations do not otherwise suggest that liability for estate taxes is related to the ability to pay the taxes on the date of the decedent’s death, but instead they provide for the collection of taxes after assessment and allow for extensions of time and installment payments. *See* 26 U.S.C. §§ 6161, 6166, 6502, and 26 C.F.R. § 20.6166A-3. Therefore, we find no support in the text of the statute for the defendants’ argument.

Madeleine Pickens, on the other hand, argues that “[§§] 2039 and 2042 do not bring within the gross estate insurance proceeds and annuity payments *received* on the date of death, but rather insurance payments and annuity payments *receivable* on the date of the decedent’s death.” Although she acknowledges that these payments are receivable at the decedent’s death and “may not actually be paid until some later point,” she maintains “[i]t is that receivable”—the receivable available at the decedent’s death—“that is brought within the gross estate by [§§] 2039 and 2042.” But the statute does not impose personal liability on those who “receive a receivable” on the date of the decedent’s death. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). Instead, the natural reading of the statute is that it defines the gross estate to include property that will be received after

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the date of the decedent's death, regardless of whether it is receivable on that date.

Madeleine Pickens also argues that the statute's incorporation of § 2041(a)(2), which brings within the gross estate property subject to a power of appointment that may not take effect until after the decedent's death, does not mean that the statute imposes liability on those who receive such property after the date of the decedent's death. This is so, she reasons, because § 2041(a)(2) states that such property shall be considered to exist on the date of the decedent's death. But she does not explain why personal liability under § 6324(a)(2) turns on whether property is deemed to exist on the date of the decedent's death.¹⁵ The statute nowhere includes this distinction. Instead, the statute explicitly applies to property that

15. Section 2041(a)(2) provides that the gross estate shall include "any property with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his death a general power of appointment." It further states that:

the power of appointment shall be considered to exist on the date of the decedent's death even though the exercise of the power is subject to a precedent giving of notice or even though the exercise of the power takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period after its exercise, whether or not on or before the date of the decedent's death notice has been given or the power has been exercised.

26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2). Thus, by its plain terms, this provision clarifies that property subject to a power of appointment is included in the gross estate, even if the power of appointment is exercised after the decedent's death.

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trustees, transferees, beneficiaries, and others listed in the statute have or receive. Property that exists on the date of the decedent's death, including property within the scope of § 2041(a)(1), may be received after the date of the decedent's death, and receiving such property subjects the recipient to personal liability for unpaid estate taxes.

Therefore, we conclude that the context and structure of § 6324(a)(2) provide additional indicia of its meaning—which supports the conclusion that the statute imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed the statute who (1) receive estate property on or after the date of the decedent's death, or (2) have estate property on the date of the decedents' death—and defendants have not refuted these indicia of the statute's meaning.

C

Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen also argue that applying the rule of the last antecedent to interpret the statute, as in the government's proposed "overly broad interpretation," would result in "two absurd situations." First, they argue that if § 6324(a)(2) is construed to impose personal liability on those listed in the statute who receive property from the gross estate after the date of the decedent's death, then the government could impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on purchasers of estate assets. They base this argument on the definition of a "transferee" as any person to whom a property interest is conveyed, which, in their view, includes "purchasers." Second, they argue that because the estate property is

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valued “at the time of the decedent’s death,” if the property later depreciates, those who receive estate property after the date of the decedent’s death could be personally liable for estate taxes that exceed the value of the property they received.

Although not expressly stated in their briefing, it appears these defendants are impliedly invoking the canon against absurdity. *See United States v. Middleton*, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a court should avoid an interpretation of a statute that would produce “an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended”) (quoting *Clinton v. City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 429, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 141 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1998)). The defendants, however, fail to address long-standing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit case law that strictly limits the circumstances in which the absurdity canon may apply. *See, e.g., Crooks v. Harrelson*, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S. Ct. 49, 75 L. Ed. 156, 1931-1 C.B. 469 (1930) (explaining that the absurdity doctrine is applied “only under rare and exceptional circumstances,” and that “the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense”); *see also id.* (explaining that the application of the absurdity doctrine “so nearly approaches the boundary between the exercise of the judicial power and that of the legislative power as to call rather for great caution and circumspection in order to avoid usurpation of the latter”).¹⁶

16. *See also Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice*, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 105 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143, U.S. 457, 459, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226 (1892)) (explaining that courts may invoke the absurdity canon only when statutory

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As the Court explained in *Crooks*, Congress may enact legislation that “turn[s] out to be mischievous, absurd, or otherwise objectionable. But in such case the remedy lies with the lawmaking authority, and not with the courts.” *Id.* (citations omitted); *see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.*, 458 U.S. 564, 571, 574-75, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (concluding that an interpretation of federal maritime statute that resulted in \$300,000 award to seaman for back wages penalty, when he had incurred only \$412 in unpaid wages, did not present an “exceptional case” that allowed court to apply the absurdity doctrine); *see also id.* at 576 (“The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we may not.”).

As we explain next, without even reaching the absurdity canon, the defendants’ first argument—suggesting tax liability could be applied to bona fide purchasers of estate assets—fails based on the plain language of § 6324(a)(2) and other provisions of the tax code. The second argument fails because, even considering the absurdity canon, the result that defendants posit—that estate property could depreciate and result in tax liability that exceeds the property’s value—does not meet the high bar for showing absurdity. *See United States v. Lopez*, 998 F.3d 431, 438-39 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “the

language leads to “patently absurd” results, such as shown by the “few examples of true absurdity . . . given in the *Holy Trinity* decision,” of prosecuting a sheriff for obstruction of the mail when he was executing a warrant to arrest a mail carrier for murder, or applying “a medieval law against drawing blood in the streets” to a physician treating “a man who had fallen down in a fit”).

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absurdity canon is ‘confined to situations where it is *quite impossible* that Congress could have intended the result’”) (quoting *In re Hokulani Square, Inc.*, 776 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015)).

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The defendants’ first argument fails because § 6324(a)(2) does not impose liability on “purchasers.” Instead, it imposes liability for the unpaid estate taxes on the following six categories of persons listed in the statute: a “spouse, transferee, trustee . . . , surviving tenant, person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise . . . of a power of appointment, or beneficiary.” 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). The tax code, in § 6324(a)(2) and elsewhere, distinguishes purchasers from others who receive estate property. *See id.* §§ 2037(a), 2038(a), (b), 6323(a), and 6324(a)(2), (3). Indeed, §§ 2037 and 2038 exempt from a decedent’s gross estate any property that was transferred to a bona fide purchaser for adequate and full consideration. *Id.* §§ 2037(a), 2038(a), (b). And § 6324(a)(2) provides that a transfer of estate property “to a purchaser or holder of a security interest” divests the transferred property of the special estate lien in § 6324(a)(1).¹⁷

17. We have previously explained, in the context of the special estate tax lien, that § 6324 “provides purchasers considerable, though not complete, protection.” *Vohland*, 675 F.2d at 1075 (footnote omitted). We further explained that:

Upon transfer of non-probate property to a purchaser, the property is divested of the lien, so that a purchaser of such property is fully protected. [26 U.S.C.] § 6324(a)(2). Property that was part of the ‘probate’

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Moreover, the tax code provides different definitions for “transferees” and “purchasers.” In § 6901, it defines a “transferee” as a “donee, heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee, and with respect to estate taxes, also includes any person who, under [§] 6324(a)(2), is personally liable for any part of such tax.” *Id.* § 6901(h). Notably, while this definition includes the categories of persons listed in § 6324(a)(2), it does not include a “purchaser.”

In § 6323, the tax code defines a “purchaser” as “a person who, for adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, acquires an interest (other than a lien or security interest) in property which is valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without actual notice.” 26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(6). This definition requires more than the mere transfer or receipt of property; it requires adequate and full consideration to support the purchase. Therefore, for purposes of the tax code, the definition of transferee does not include a purchaser and the defendants’ argument fails.¹⁸

estate, i.e., [§] 2033 property, is divested of the lien when it is transferred to a subsequent purchaser, but only if the estate’s executor has been discharged from personal liability pursuant to [§] 2204.

Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), (3)). Moreover, there are means for a purchaser of probate property to avoid risks of loss “either by establishing that the executor or administrator has been released under [§] 2204 or by securing a certificate of discharge of the lien under [§] 6325(c).” *Id.* at 1076 (citation omitted).

18. Moreover, defendants’ interpretation of a “transferee” who receives estate property after the date of the decedent’s death as

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The defendants' second argument also fails. The defendants correctly state that the statutory language imposes estate tax liability "to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property." *Id.* § 6324(a)(2). The modifier "at the time of the decedent's death" applies to "the extent of the value." *Id.* This language plainly means that tax liability is calculated based on the value of the estate property at the time of decedent's death. *Id.* As the government acknowledges, this provision favors the taxpayer by limiting liability for any unpaid estate taxes to the value of the property at the time of the decedent's death, even if the property increases in value after the decedent's death.¹⁹ *See id.* Thus, the statutory language anticipates, and allows, a potential windfall for a person who receives estate property that increases in value after the date of the decedent's death.

including a "purchaser" is not consistent with statute's purpose of ensuring the collection of taxes, *Vohland*, 675 F.2d at 1076, because the transfer of property from the gross estate to a purchaser for "adequate and full consideration in money," 26 U.S.C. § 6323, does not divest the estate "of the assets necessary to satisfy its tax obligations," *Geniviva*, 16 F.3d at 524.

19. In its briefing, the government stated that the "property is valued 'at the time of the decedent's death,'" and that "language *simply caps* potential liability under § 6324(a)(2) by preventing liability from exceeding the value of the non-probate property at the time of the decedent's death."

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The defendants, however, dispute that Congress could have also anticipated that estate property could depreciate after the date of the decedent's death and thus potentially result in tax liability for the recipient that exceeds the property's value.²⁰ The defendants argue that an interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) that would allow the government to impose personal liability for the estate taxes "for a greater amount of money than they ever held," would lead to "a nonsensical result."²¹ But "[t]o avoid absurdity, the plain text of Congress's statute need only produce 'rational' results, not 'wise' results." *Lopez*, 998 F.3d at 438 (citing *Hokulani Square*, 776 F.3d at 1088). Thus, a statute's text may lead to results that are "not wise," and that we may even consider "harsh and misguided," but a statute is not absurd if "it is at least rational." *Hokulani Square*, 776 F.3d at 1088 (rejecting

20. If, as the defendants suggest, estate property continued to depreciate after the transferee or other beneficiary accepted it, such that the tax liability eventually exceeded the value of the property received, that risk of loss would apply equally to those who receive estate property on the date of the decedent's death and to those who receive estate property after the date of the decedent's death. There is nothing about the risk of accepting property that may decline in value that would apply unfairly to those who receive such property after the date of the decedent's death.

21. The hypotheticals defendants assert to support their arguments are speculative and are not supported by the record. For example, they argue that the value of the estate assets here "almost certainly" declined because the estate included "uniquely depreciative horses in the Trust's possession." But this argument does not account for the living trust provisions mandating that "upon the [decedent's] death" the trustee "shall sell promptly the entire interest of the trust" in certain assets, including "all horses."

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the argument that bankruptcy code provision was absurd because whether trustee received a fee for his services or worked for free turned on trivialities). And “the bar for ‘rational’ is quite low.” *Lopez*, 998 F.3d at 438 (citing *Griffin*, 458 U.S. at 575-76).

This is not a situation where it is “quite impossible” that Congress could have intended the result. *See Lopez*, 998 F.3d at 438 (citation omitted). Here, Congress clearly could have anticipated that the value of estate property could change after the date of the decedent’s death—either by increasing or decreasing in value—and thus could have anticipated that the value of some estate assets could depreciate below the amount of the estate tax liability. Indeed, as discussed more fully below, Congress included several provisions in the tax code that mitigate the risk that a transferee’s, beneficiary’s, or other person’s tax liability could exceed the value of the property they received, including: 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (tax rate based on a percentage of the taxable estate),²² § 2002, 26 C.F.R. § 20.2002-1 (executor’s duty to pay the estate tax before distributing estate property and liability for failing to do so), § 2518 (disclaimer), and § 6502(a)(1) (statute of limitations).

And while it is “not our job to find reasons for what Congress has plainly done,” *Lopez*, 998 F.3d at 447 (M. Smith, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), Congress rationally could have

22. The taxable estate is determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate the deductions provided in Title 26, Part IV. 26 U.S.C. § 2051.

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concluded that such risk is acceptable or is effectively mitigated by other provisions of the tax code, and thus is outweighed by the benefit of ensuring the collection of estate taxes. This is not an irrational tax policy. Indeed, we have previously recognized that “[§] 6324 is structured to assure collection of the estate tax.” *Vohland*, 675 F.2d at 1076. Moreover, even if it were to conclude that such a policy is “odd,” or “not wise,” *Lopez*, 998 F.3d at 447 (M. Smith, J., concurring) (citation omitted), or simply unfair, we cannot rewrite the statute to advance a different policy, *id.* at 440 (majority opinion). *See also Hokulani Square*, 776 F.3d at 1088 (“The absurdity canon isn’t a license for us to disregard statutory text where it conflicts with our policy preferences . . .”). And if Congress determines that its tax policy leads to unintended or unfair results, it is for Congress, not the courts, to rewrite the tax code. *See Crooks*, 282 U.S. at 60; *Griffin*, 458 U.S. at 576. Therefore, we conclude that applying the rule of the last antecedent to § 6324(a)(2) does not result in an absurd interpretation of the statute.

b

But our conclusion—that this is not the “exceptional” case where we can invoke the absurdity canon to reject the interpretation of a statute that is most consistent with its text, structure, punctuation, and other indicia of meaning—does not mean that the defendants’ “the sky is falling”²³ arguments are based on anything other than remote hypotheticals. And even if the defendants

23. “Chicken Little,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary>, last visited May 10, 2023.

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could demonstrate that applying § 6324(a)(2) to those who receive estate property after the date of the decedent's death could result in what they characterize as an "absurd situation," that situation will not arise here.²⁴

As an initial matter, before those who receive estate property could be subjected to tax liability that exceeds the value of the property they received, all the following events, some of which are remote and unlikely, must occur.

First, the property must have depreciated after the date of the decedent's death to the point that it is worth less than the tax liability, which is calculated as a percentage of the amount of the taxable estate.²⁵ *See*

24. When Madeleine Pickens received assets from the estate, including two residences, personal property, and cash, the value of those assets exceeded the estate tax liability. Indeed, the government asserts that when Madeleine Pickens received this property it was worth \$19 million, and Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen assert it was worth \$42 million. Madeleine Pickens does not dispute these valuations. Crystal Christensen received a non-depreciating bequest of cash, and the trustee distributed \$990,125 to her. And even if Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen can establish that the estate's tax liability exceeded the value of the estate assets when they became trustees, they cannot establish that it is absurd or unfair to impose tax liability on successor trustees because, as the terms of the living trust make clear, trustees serve only if they are "willing."

25. For example, in this case, at the time of Allen Paulson's death, although his estate reported a gross taxable estate of \$187,729,626, his net taxable estate was reported at a substantially lower amount, \$9,234,172, and the tax liability was initially reported as \$4,459,051. After the IRS successfully asserted a deficiency, the Tax Court determined that the estate owed an additional \$6,669,477

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26 U.S.C. § 2001 (setting rate schedule of 18% to 40%, depending on the amount of the taxable estate).

Second, the executor must have failed to pay the estate tax before distributing estate property. *See* 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001(a), 2002; *id.* § 6324(a)(2) (imposing personal liability on transferee and others when “estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due”); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2002-1 (imposing personal liability on executor for distributing any portion of the estate before all estate tax is paid).

Third, the estate must have “divest[ed] itself of the assets necessary to satisfy its tax obligations,” *Geniviva*, 16 F.3d at 524, thus defeating the lien for estate taxes under that would apply under § 6324(a)(1).

Fourth, the statute of limitations must not have expired by the time the property is distributed or the government attempts collection. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1).

Fifth, a transferee, beneficiary, or other recipient of the estate property must not have disclaimed or refused the property. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 2518; 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518-2.²⁶

in estate taxes. Thus, the tax liability was a fraction of the gross taxable estate.

26. A disclaimer must be in writing, made within nine months of the transfer creating the interest or when the recipient reaches age 21, whichever is later, and before the transferee accepts any of the interest or its benefits. 26 U.S.C. § 2518(b). The regulations further explain that the nine-month period for making a disclaimer “generally is to be determined with reference to the transfer creating the interest in the disclaimant.” 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518-2(c)(3)(i). For

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Sixth, the government must successfully seek to impose tax liability on a transferee, beneficiary, or other recipient of estate property in an amount that exceeds the value of the property they received.

Focusing on the final factor—whether the government would later seek to impose tax liability that exceeds the value of the property received and would be successful in advancing that argument—we rely on the government’s avowals in its briefing and at oral argument that estate tax liability cannot exceed the value of the property received. Specifically, the government asserted in its briefing that the language in § 6324(a)(2) that the estate property is valued at the time of the decedent’s death, “does not expose a person to liability that exceeds the value of the property that he or she personally had or received.” The government further emphasized this point, explaining that: “[i]nstead, a person will be liable under § 6324(a)(2) only to the extent that he or she actually ‘receives’ or ‘has’ non-probate property, *viz.*, the person’s liability is capped at the value of the property had or received.”²⁷

transfers made by a decedent at death, the transfer creating the interest occurs on the date of the decedent’s death. *Id.*

27. To support its position, the government cites *United States v. Marshall*, 798 F.3d 296, 315 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that a donee’s personal liability for gift tax under § 6324(b) “is capped by the amount of the gift”). Although the language of these subsections of § 6324 differ, with subsection (a)(2) limiting personal liability for estate taxes “to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent’s death,” 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2), and subsection (b) limiting gift tax liability “to the extent of the value of such gift,” *id.* § 6324(b), estate and gift taxes “are in *pari materia* and must be construed together.”

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These representations, coupled with the doctrine of judicial estoppel, provide additional safeguards against the hypothetically unfair application of personal liability under § 6324(a)(2), which the defendants posit. Although the application of judicial estoppel is discretionary, it could be applied to bar the government from later arguing, in this case or a future case, that it can recover more than the value of the property that the taxpayer received.²⁸ See *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968 (2001) (explaining that judicial estoppel “is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The doctrine exists to “to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.”²⁹ *Id.* at 749-50 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44, 60 S. Ct. 51, 84 L. Ed. 20, 1939-2 C.B. 340 (1939); see also *Chambers v. Commissioner*, 87 T.C. 225, 231 (1986) (same). Thus, while the government’s citation to *Marshall* is not authoritative, it does provide persuasive support for the government’s position.

28. We have long recognized that “[t]he application of judicial estoppel is not limited to bar the assertion of inconsistent positions in the same litigation, but is also appropriate to bar litigants from making incompatible statements in two different cases.” *Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

29. Importantly, judicial estoppel differs significantly from other estoppel doctrines, such as equitable estoppel. See *Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB*, 911 F.2d 1214, 1219 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Although each of these doctrines deals with the preclusive effect of previous

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The Court has identified three non-exclusive factors that should “inform” a court’s decision whether to apply judicial estoppel: (1) “a party’s later position must be ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position”; (2) “the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create ‘the perception that either the first or the second court was misled’”; and (3) “the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” *Id.* at 750-51 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

legal actions, the similarity ends there.”). “Judicial estoppel exists to protect the *courts* from the perversion of judicial machinery through a party’s attempt to take advantage of both sides of a factual issue at different stages of the proceedings.” *Id.* at 1220 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In contrast, equitable estoppel serves to protect *litigants* from unscrupulous opponents who induce a litigant’s reliance on a position, then reverse themselves to argue that they win under the opposite scenario.” *Id.* (citation omitted). And while the Supreme Court has explained, in the context of equitable estoppel, that “it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant,” *Heckler v. Cmty. Health. Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc.*, 467 U.S. 51, 60, 104 S. Ct. 2218, 81 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1984), judicial estoppel may be applied to prevent the government from asserting inconsistent legal arguments, *United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank*, 630 F.3d 1139, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that judicial estoppel barred the government from arguing that defendant could not raise legal claims challenging forfeitability in ancillary proceedings, after earlier arguing that defendant could raise their arguments during ancillary proceedings).

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If these considerations were applied to the government’s representations here—that § 6324(a)(2) does not allow the government to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes in an amount that exceeds the value of the property received—judicial estoppel could be applied to prevent the government from taking a contrary position in later litigation. First, such a position would be contrary to the government’s position in this case. Second, the government has succeeded in persuading us to accept its position, and judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the impression that either we, or the later court, were misled. Third, allowing the government to take a contrary position in later litigation would unfairly prejudice the taxpayers in the subsequent litigation, who may have relied on the government’s position, and would also prejudice the second court. *See Risetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343*, 94 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the interests of the second court are uniquely implicated and threatened by the taking of an incompatible position”).

Moreover, there are cases that, while not directly addressing the issue before us now, include statements that lend support to the government’s argument that it does not seek to impose liability for estate taxes that exceed the value of the property received. *See Geniviva*, 16 F.3d at 523 (construing § 6324(a)(2) and noting that “[t]his section provides that if estate taxes are not paid when due, the beneficiaries are liable up to the amount received from the estate”); *Schuster v. Comm’r*, 312 F.2d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1962) (considering § 827(b), a predecessor statute that included the same language as § 6324(a)(2),

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and explaining that the statute imposed some limitations on a transferee's liability because "it requires that a deficiency be due from the estate, and that his [or her] liability therefor is limited to the value of the estate corpus which he [or she] received").

Finally, defendants have not identified, and our research has not uncovered, any case in which the government has attempted to impose personal liability for estate taxes that exceeded the value of the property received. The absence of any case law on this point supports the conclusion that this situation has never been litigated because the government has never taken this position, which in turn, supports the conclusion that it is unlikely that the government will attempt to assert this argument in future litigation.

Thus, we conclude that applying the rule of the last antecedent does not lead to absurd results, but instead results in the most natural reading of the statute, consistent with its structure and context.

D

The defendants also argue that to interpret the statute we must consider its purpose and intent. Madeleine Pickens argues that "the purpose of [§] 6324(a)(2) is to provide the Government with the same avenue to collect taxes from non-probate property that it has with respect to probate property." She reasons that just as probate property must "pass[] through the hands of the executor," the "beneficiaries of a decedent's trust can only take possession of trust property after it has passed

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through the hands of the trustee.” Thus, she concludes that the government’s interests “are fully protected when [§] 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability on a trustee of the decedent’s trust who distributes property to a trust beneficiary without first paying the tax.”

But nothing in the statutory text supports her argument that Congress’s purpose in enacting §6324(a)(2) was to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on those persons, “including trustees,” who “stand in the same position as the executor.” The statute does not impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes based on the existence or exercise of a fiduciary duty to the estate.³⁰ Instead, § 6324(a),(b) imposes personal liability, based on receipt or possession of property from the gross estate, on the categories of persons listed in the statute, and that list does not include executors or administrators. And while the list includes trustees, it also includes transferees, spouses, beneficiaries, and others who do not act as fiduciaries or administrators of the estate. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). We therefore find no basis to conclude that personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on non-probate property under § 6324(a)(2) is intended to mirror an executor’s liability for distributions of probate property.

Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen also argue that we should interpret the statute based on Congress’s intent. They baldly assert that “Congress did not intend

30. Indeed, other sections of the tax code and regulations address the collection of taxes from fiduciaries. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 6901 (providing methods of collection of taxes from transferees and fiduciaries); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2002-1 (explaining the liability of executors, administrators, and others).

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that individuals who had no control over estate property at the date of the decedent's death be held liable for unpaid estate taxes." This argument, like Madeleine Pickens' "purpose of the statute" argument, fails because it has no support in the statutory text. There is nothing in the statute that suggests that liability for unpaid estate taxes is based on the opportunity to ensure that taxes are paid at a particular time; instead, the statute imposes personal liability on those who receive or have estate property. § 6324(a)(2).

E

The defendants also argue that ambiguities in tax statutes must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the government. However, as the United States argues, the "modern validity" of the "taxpayer rule of lenity" is "questionable." See *Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States*, 320 U.S. 422, 429-30, 64 S. Ct. 227, 88 L. Ed. 143, 1944-1 C.B. 665 (1943) (resolving ambiguity in taxing statute in favor of the government); *Maloney v. Portland Assocs.*, 109 F.2d 124, 126 (9th Cir. 1940) ("[T]here is considerable doubt as to the present existence of the old rule to the effect that ambiguities in a taxing act are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer."); SCALIA & GARNER, *supra*, at 299-300, & nn.17-19 (explaining that the Court previously construed tax laws "strict[ly]" and in "case[s] of doubt . . . against the government," but the rule "can no longer be said to enjoy universal approval." (footnotes omitted)); see also *Fang Lin Ai v. United States*, 809 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[W]e do not mechanically resolve doubts in favor of the taxpayer but instead resort to the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.").

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Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen acknowledge that “the rule of lenity is sometimes called into question,” but they argue that the Ninth Circuit “still strictly construes tax provisions to resolve ambiguity in the taxpayer’s favor.” To support this broad assertion they cite our decision in *United States v. Boyd*, 991 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2021). But defendants’ arguments, if accepted, would require us to stretch *Boyd* beyond its language and reasoning—in *Boyd*, we did *not* state that the rule of lenity applies to all ambiguous “tax provisions” or that all such provisions must be strictly construed. *See id.* at 1085-86. Instead, our discussion was limited to “tax provision[s] which impose[] a *penalty*.” *Id.* at 1085 (emphasis added).

To be sure, we explained that “our circuit strictly construes tax penalty provisions independent of the rule of lenity.” *Id.* at 1085-86 (emphasis added). Thus, we treated tax provisions that apply penalties, but not all other tax provisions, as akin to criminal statutes to which “the rule of lenity ordinarily applies.” *Id.*; see also Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 296 (explaining that the rule of lenity reflects the idea that penal statutes must “mak[e] clear what *conduct* incurs the punishment” (citations omitted)). Indeed, in *Fang Lin Ai*, we considered provisions imposing taxes and rejected the argument that doubts about such statutes should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer; instead we explained that we construe taxing statutes by applying the ordinary rules of statutory construction. 809 F.3d at 506-07 (citations omitted).

But we need not decide the modern validity of the rule of lenity as applied to all tax provisions because that

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rule does not apply to the statute at issue here. That is because “[t]he rule ‘applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute.’” *Shular v. United States*, 140 S. Ct. 779, 787, 206 L. Ed. 2d 81 (2020) (quoting *United States v. Shabani*, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S. Ct. 382, 130 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1991)); see *id.* at 788 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Of course, when a reviewing court employs all of the traditional tools of construction, the court will almost always reach a conclusion about the best interpretation, thereby resolving any perceived ambiguity. That explains why the rule of lenity rarely comes into play.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As previously explained, after reviewing the text of § 6324(a)(2), applying the canons of interpretation, and considering other indicia of its meaning, we are not “left with an ambiguous statute,” see *Shular*, 140 S. Ct. at 787. Therefore, even if we were to conclude that the rule of lenity remains a valid tool to construe statutes imposing taxes, it would not apply here.

F

Finally, the defendants argue that we must accept their interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) because the government’s interpretation “has been rejected by every court that has ever considered it,” and that “every court addressing [§] 6324(a)(2)” agrees with them. But the defendants grossly overstate the weight of the authority that supposedly supports their sweeping statements. Indeed, the scant authority upon which the defendants rely consists of one decades-old tax court case interpreting a predecessor statute to § 6324(a)(2), *Englert v. Commissioner*, 32 T.C.

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1008 (1959),³¹ and one unpublished district court decision relying on *Englert* to interpret § 6324(a)(2), *United States v. Johnson*, No. CV 11-00087, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3924087 (D. Utah July 29, 2013). We are not persuaded by the reasoning of these cases.

In both cases, without any attempt to construe the statutes by applying the traditional tools—namely the canons of statutory interpretation—the courts concluded that because the statutory language could support different interpretations, the statutes must be deemed ambiguous, and thus “any doubt as to the meaning of the statutes” must be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor.³² *Englert*, 32 T.C. at 1016; see also *Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3924087, at *5 (“Where there is ambiguity as to the meaning of a tax statute, the court must resolve the issue in favor of the taxpayer.”). But, as discussed above, even if the rule of lenity validly applies to taxing statutes, it does so “only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left

31. In *Englert*, the tax court considered § 827(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942. 32 T.C. at 1012, 1017 n.1 & n.4.

32. Significantly, in the section of *Englert* finding § 827(b) ambiguous, the tax court misquoted the provision’s punctuation by omitting a comma. See 32 T.C. at 1015-16. The court quoted the statute as stating that liability applies to a person “who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death the property included in the gross estate . . .”, but the text actually states that liability applies to a person “who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate . . .” As discussed in Section III.A, changes in punctuation can change the meaning of the text.

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with an ambiguous statute.” Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the courts in Englert and Johnson made no attempt to “resolv[e] any perceived ambiguity,” see *id.* at 788 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), they erroneously concluded that they were required to construe the statutes at issue in the taxpayer’s favor. Therefore, we decline the defendants’ suggestion that we adopt the reasoning of these cases.

* * * *

After starting our analysis with the text of § 6324(a)(2), considering other indicia of its meaning including its structure and context, and applying the canons of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the statute imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed in the statute who (1) receive estate property on or after the date of the decedent’s death, or (2) have estate property on the date of the decedent’s death. Therefore, § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on trustees, transferees, beneficiaries, and others listed in the statute, who receive or have estate property on or after the date of the decedent’s death.

IV

Our holding that § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability on those listed in the statute, who have or receive estate property on or after the date of the decedent’s death, does not completely resolve this matter. We must determine whether the defendants fall within the categories of persons listed in the statute and are thus liable for the unpaid estate taxes.

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The government argues that the defendants are liable under the statute as trustees, transferees, and beneficiaries. Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen acknowledge that they are successor trustees, and James Paulson has not submitted a brief contesting the district court's finding that he was a successor trustee. Thus, these defendants do not dispute that, if § 6324(a)(2) applies to those who receive or have estate property after the date of the decedent's death, they are liable as "trustees" under § 6324(a)(2).

We therefore conclude that James Paulson, Vikki Paulson, and Crystal Christensen are liable, as trustees, for the unpaid estate taxes on property from the gross estate, held in the living trust, "to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property." 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). But, as previously discussed and as conceded by the government, see *supra* Section III.C.2.b, that liability is capped at the value of estate property in the living trust at the time of Allen Paulson's death, and each defendant's liability cannot exceed the value of the property at the time that they received or had it as trustees.

B

The government also argues that the ordinary meaning of "beneficiary" includes "trust beneficiaries" and therefore Crystal Christensen and Madeleine Pickens are liable as beneficiaries under § 6324(a)(2) for the unpaid

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estate taxes.³³ These defendants acknowledge that they are “trust beneficiaries,” but they argue that they are not “beneficiar[ies],” as that term is used in § 6324(a)(2). Instead, they argue that “beneficiary” in § 6324(a)(2) has a narrow meaning and applies only to life insurance beneficiaries.³⁴

Because the statute does not define “beneficiary,” “we look first to the word’s ordinary meaning.” See *Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States*, 563 U.S. 401, 407, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 179 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2011) (citing *Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.*, 557 U.S. 167, 175, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer*, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S. Ct. 788, 130 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1995) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning”). At this first step, we conclude that dictionary definitions support the government’s broad interpretation, rather than the defendants’ narrow interpretation limiting liability to insurance beneficiaries. See *Beneficiary*, *Black’s Law Dictionary* (11th ed. 2019) (defining “beneficiary” as “[s]omeone who is designated to

33. Because we conclude that Crystal Christensen and Madeleine Pickens are liable for the unpaid estate taxes as beneficiaries under § 6324(a)(2), we need not address whether they are also liable as “transferees,” as that term is used in the statute.

34. As we discuss later, *infra*, at n.36, Madeleine Pickens acknowledges that beneficiaries may also include beneficiaries of annuity payments.

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receive the advantages from an action or change; esp., one designated to benefit from an appointment, disposition, or assignment (as in a will, insurance policy, etc.), or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or instrument,” and “[s]omeone designated to receive money or property from a person who has died”); see also Beneficiary, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2018) (“One that receives a benefit” or “the recipient of funds, property, or other benefits, as from an insurance policy or trust”); Beneficiary, Webster’s New World College Dictionary (5th ed 2014) (“[A]nyone receiving benefit” or “a person named to receive the income or inheritance from a will, insurance policy, trust, etc. . . .”); Beneficiary, Webster’s New World Dictionary (4th ed. 2003) (“[A]nyone receiving or to receive benefits, as funds from a will or insurance policy”); Beneficiary, 2 Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“[O]ne who receives benefits or favours; a debtor to another’s bounty”). Therefore, we conclude that the ordinary meaning of “beneficiary” includes a “trust beneficiary.”

C

But we must also consider whether “there is any textual basis for adopting a narrower definition” of “beneficiary.” See Schindler, 63 U.S. at 409; see also Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 70 (“One should assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise. Sometimes there is reason to think otherwise, which ordinarily comes from context.” (emphasis in original)). The government argues that the text of § 6324(a)(2) does not indicate that “beneficiary”

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has a narrower meaning than its ordinary meaning. The defendants, however, argue that the context and structure of the statute support a narrower interpretation.

The defendants rely on two cases interpreting predecessor versions of the statute, *Higley v. Commissioner*, 69 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1934), and *Englert*, 32 T.C. 1008 (1959), and two cases applying the reasoning of these earlier cases to interpret § 6324(a)(2), *Garrett v. Commissioner*, T.C. Memo. 1994-70 (1994), and *Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3924087 (D. Utah 2013). As we explain next, we are not persuaded by these cases, or the defendants' arguments, that the structure or context of the statute support a narrow interpretation that overcomes the ordinary meaning of beneficiary.

We start with *Higley v. Commissioner*, in which the Eighth Circuit interpreted the word “beneficiary” in § 315(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926. 69 F.2d at 162. The text of this predecessor statute, however, differs significantly from the text of § 6324(a)(2), and so § 315(b)'s relevance to our analysis is limited. Section 315(b) provided:

If (1) the decedent makes a transfer, by trust or otherwise, of any property in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death . . . or (2) if insurance passes under a contract executed by the decedent in favor of a specific beneficiary, and if in either case the tax in respect thereto is not paid when due, then the transferee, trustee, or beneficiary shall be personally liable for such tax[.]

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Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (emphasis added)). As the court recognized in its analysis of the statute, § 315(b) expressly addressed two types of property dispositions: (1) “transfers,” including “trusts,” and (2) “insurance,” and imposed liability on the “transferee, trustee, or beneficiary.” Id. Indeed, the statute specifically referred to “insurance . . . in favor of a specific beneficiary.” Id. The court concluded that this structure meant that the word “trustee” was “employed in connection with trust only,” and the word “beneficiary” “applies only to insurance policy beneficiaries.” Id.

But this direct textual and structural correlation between (1) dispositions by “transfers” and “trusts” to the liability of a “transferee” or “trustee,” and (2) dispositions of “insurance . . . in favor of a specific beneficiary” to the liability of a “beneficiary,” is not present in § 6324(a)(2). We therefore conclude that the court’s analysis in *Higley*, based on the text and structure of § 315(b), does not support the defendants’ narrow interpretation of “beneficiary” in § 6324(a)(2).

We next consider *Englert v. Commissioner*, in which the Tax Court interpreted another predecessor statute, § 827(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942. 32 T.C. at 1012-13, 1015. The structure of this predecessor statute also differs from § 6324(a)(2). Section 879(b), in relevant part, provided:

If the tax herein imposed is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release

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of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross estate under section 811(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g), to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.

Id. at 1017, n.4 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 827(b)).

As the Tax Court noted, § 827(b) “names six classes of persons who, . . . may be personally liable for the unpaid tax.” Id. at 1012. These six classes—(1) spouse, (2) transferee, (3) trustee, (4) surviving tenant, (5) person in possession, and (6) beneficiary—correspond directly to, and in the same order as, the property included in the gross estate in §§ 811 (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g). Id. at 1012, 1016 (“In a single sentence of section 827(b) it is provided that there may be liable six classifications of persons who hold property includible in the estate under six specific subsections of section 811 of the Code.”).

The court stated its belief that Congress “studiously chose a classification applicable to each of such subsections and included them in section 827(b) in the same order as the related property interests appear in subsections (b) through (g), inclusive, of section 811.” Id. at 1016. Applying this reasoning, and as petitioner argued, the court concluded that a person liable under the statute as a beneficiary would be limited to the beneficiary of a life insurance policy under § 811(g). See id. at 1013, 1016.

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But § 6324(a)(2) does not include § 827(b)'s precise correspondence between categories of liable persons and types of property. As the defendants acknowledge, the statute now lists six categories of liable persons, but then incorporates nine categories of properties included in the gross estate. The defendants argue that these changes to the text and structure of the statute do not change the analysis, the differing statutory provisions are “substantially the same,” and the differences in the text should be considered “minor adjustments.” We are not persuaded by these arguments.

As an initial matter, in *Englert*, the tax court found compelling the direct correlation of the six categories of persons liable to the six categories of property included in the gross estate, and concluded it was the result of Congress’s “studious[] cho[ice.]” *Id.* at 1016. That direct correlation is not present in § 6324(a)(2) and we cannot simply brush aside the differences in the statute’s structure and text.³⁵ But even more importantly, § 6324(a)(2) differs substantively from its predecessor statutes by incorporating § 2039, which includes in the gross estate “an annuity of other payment receivable by any beneficiary,” thus explicitly applying the word “beneficiary” beyond life

35. Madeleine Pickens suggests that Congress was aware of *Englert* when it enacted § 6324(a)(2) and if it had intended to change the meaning of the text “it would have stated as much explicitly.” But *Englert* was decided in 1959, five years *after* Congress enacted § 6324(a)(2). See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6324, 68A stat. i, 780 (1954).

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insurance beneficiaries.³⁶ Therefore, the court’s reasoning in *Englert* does not provide a textual or structural basis for us to conclude that the word “beneficiary” in § 6324(a)(2) should be limited to beneficiaries of life insurance.

Despite the textual and structural differences between § 6324(a)(2) and its predecessor statutes, the defendants rely on two more recent cases, *Garrett* and *Johnson*, to argue that the reasoning of *Higley* and *Englert* “apply with equal force” to § 6324(a)(2). In *Garrett*, the court applied the reasoning of *Higley* and *Englert* to conclude that the word “beneficiary” in § 6324(a)(2) refers only to life insurance beneficiaries.³⁷ *Garrett*, T.C. Memo. 1994-70 at *12-*14. But the court did not provide any analysis of the text or structure of § 6324(a)(2), and instead concluded that it found “nothing in the current statutory language that would warrant a more expansive definition of ‘beneficiary’ or [a] departure from earlier precedent

36. Madeleine Pickens acknowledges that although “prior cases have held that the term ‘beneficiary’ in section 6324(a)(2) means *only* the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, the addition of section 2039 and its incorporation into section 6324(a)(2) likely means that a beneficiary of annuity payments would also be considered a ‘beneficiary’ under section 6324(a)(2).” She recognizes this is a “substantive” difference. But she suggests this is not important to our interpretation of the statute because “that question was not before the District Court, is not before this Court, and need not be decided in order to dispose of the appeal.” We disagree. This substantive difference between the statutes is highly relevant and important to their interpretation.

37. In *Johnson*, the court simply adopted the reasoning of *Garrett*, without any additional analysis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3924087, at *8; we therefore reject its conclusions for the same reasons we reject the reasoning of *Garrett*.

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under section 827(b).” Id. at *14. This conclusion is refuted by the substantive differences between the predecessor statutes, § 315(b) and § 827(b), and the current statute, § 6324(a)(2), including the current statute’s explicit expansion of the meaning of the word beneficiary through the incorporation of § 2039.

D

We must also apply the presumption of consistent usage that “a word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text.” Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 170; see also id. at 172 (“The presumption of consistent usage applies also when different sections of an act or code are at issue.”). In this case, we note that the use of the term “beneficiary,” in different sections of the tax code and in the regulations, supports the broader, ordinary meaning of the word.

First, the defendants argue that § 6324(a)(2), by incorporating § 2042, limits the word “beneficiary” to the beneficiaries of life insurance policies. However, as previously noted, § 6324(a)(2) also incorporates § 2039, which defines a “beneficiary” as one who receives “an annuity or other payment receivable . . . by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or agreement,” but explicitly excludes life insurance beneficiaries from that definition. 26 U.S.C. § 2039(a). Thus, by incorporating § 2039, the statute applies the term “beneficiary” beyond life insurance beneficiaries and thus its context and structure do not support the defendants’ limited interpretation.

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Second, the same is true for § 679, which is titled “Foreign trust having one of more United States beneficiaries.” 26 U.S.C. § 679. This section explains, outside the context of estate taxes, when a “United States person” will be liable for taxes on property transferred to a foreign trust. Throughout this section, the statute refers to trusts with a “United States beneficiary,” a “beneficiary of the trust,” a “United States beneficiary for any portion of the trust,” and when “making a distribution from the trust to, or for the benefit of, any person, such trust shall be treated as having a beneficiary who is a United States person.” *Id.* §§ 679(a)(1); (a)(3)(C), (b)(2), & (c). In this section, although the context differs from personal liability for estate taxes, the tax code does not limit a “beneficiary” to an insurance beneficiary.

Finally, the regulations addressing liability for estate taxes use the term “beneficiary” broadly to indicate those who receive distributions from the estate, or in other words, trust beneficiaries. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2002-1. This section of the regulations imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the executor (or administrator, or any person in actual or constructive possession of the decedent’s property), who pays a “debt” of the estate to any person before paying the debts due the United States. *Id.* The regulation explains that “the word debt includes a beneficiary’s distributive share of an estate.” *Id.* Thus, the regulation’s references to a “beneficiary’s distributive share of an estate,” supports the conclusion that the term beneficiary in the tax code, including § 6324(a)(2), applies to trust beneficiaries. We conclude therefore that the presumption of consistent usage supports applying the ordinary meaning of the word “beneficiary” in § 6324(a)(2).

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Finally, the defendants offer policy arguments to support their interpretation of the statute. Crystal Christensen argues that because trust beneficiaries have “no power to take estate property,” or “to distribute it,” they should not be liable for the estate taxes if a trustee mismanages the estate and distributes property before “ensuring the estate’s taxes [are] paid in full.” But the statute does not condition personal liability for the unpaid estate taxes on the power to take or distribute estate property. Instead, it imposes personal liability on categories of persons who receive or have estate property, and those categories include persons who do not have the power to take or distribute estate property.

Indeed, the defendants recognize that life insurance beneficiaries are “beneficiaries” under § 6324(a)(2), and life insurance beneficiaries, like trust beneficiaries, lack the power to take or distribute estate property. The same can be said for transferees, joint tenants, and spouses (who are not also the trustee or executor), yet the defendants do not suggest that these categories of persons listed in the statute are not liable for unpaid estate taxes. Thus, the plain text of the statute imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on those who receive or have estate property, without regard to their ability to take or distribute such property.

The defendants also argue that we should reject the government’s argument that § 6324(a)(2) employs the ordinary meaning of the word “beneficiary” because that interpretation would “render[] the term unlimited

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to the point of absurdity.” They suggest that adopting the government’s interpretation of beneficiary would leave no limits on liability. But the statute limits a beneficiary’s liability (1) to the types of property included in the decedent’s gross estate through §§ 2034-2042, see § 6324(a)(2), and (2) to the value of the property the beneficiary receives or has, see *supra* Section III.C.2.b.

* * * *

We conclude that the ordinary meaning of beneficiary, which includes trust beneficiaries, applies to § 6324(a)(2), and we are not persuaded that the structure or context of the statute, or policy considerations, require a narrower interpretation as the defendants argue. Moreover, applying the presumption of consistent usage further supports our conclusion that the term beneficiary in the tax code includes trust beneficiaries. Therefore, we conclude that Crystal Christensen and Madeleine Pickens are liable for the unpaid estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2) as beneficiaries. However, the liability of each of these defendants cannot exceed the value of the estate property at the time of decedent’s death, or the value of that property at the time they received it.

V

Because § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on the categories of persons listed in the statute who receive or have estate property, either on the date of the decedent’s death or at any time thereafter, subject to the applicable statute of limitations, and the

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defendants were within the categories of persons listed in the statute when they received or had estate property, we conclude that they are liable for the unpaid estate taxes as trustees and beneficiaries. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on the United States' claims under § 6324(a)(2), and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the government on these claims with any further proceedings necessary to determine the amount of each defendant's liability for the unpaid taxes.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

IKUTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Our only task in interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) is to determine congressional intent. Because the language of the statute is ambiguous, we must consider the "most logical meaning" of the statute. *United States v. One Sentinel Arms Striker-12 Shotgun Serial No. 001725*, 416 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2005) (*One Sentinel*) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The majority and the government effectively concede that their interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) is not logical because it would allow a person who receives estate property years after the estate is settled to be held personally liable for estate taxes that potentially exceed the current value of the property received. The taxpayers's reading of the statute, which also accords with the plain language of the text, is more logical: it would allow the government to impose personal

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liability for estate taxes only on a person who receives (or holds) estate property on the date of the decedent's death.

Rather than adopt a reasonable interpretation of the statute that is more likely to reflect congressional intent, the majority adopts a “hypertechnical reading” of statutory language that loses sight of the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury*, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 103 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1989) (citation omitted). In order to justify this approach, the majority and the government proffer a number of unpersuasive rationales. First, the government provides a non-responsive description of its litigating position: it states it “has consistently argued” that it would not impose liability greater than the value of the property received. The majority, in turn, suggests that the result of its interpretation is not likely to occur. But neither the government’s nor the majority’s assurances about the future (that individuals are unlikely to be held personally liable for estate taxes that potentially exceed the current value of the property received from a decedent’s estate) impacts the interpretation of the statute.

Because the taxpayers’s reading is more plausible and avoids the majority’s illogical result, it is a better indication of Congress’s intent. The inquiry should end there. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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When an individual dies, an estate tax lien automatically arises and attaches to the decedent's gross estate. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(1). Such a lien attaches for a period of ten years from the date of the decedent's death, and then automatically expires. *Id.* Although the estate tax lien expires after ten years, the executors of qualifying estates can elect to pay estate tax payments in installments over a period of fourteen years. 26 U.S.C. § 6166. As a result, the government's interest in the last installments is not fully secured by the ten-year tax lien under § 6324(a)(1). Addressing this issue, the tax code provides the government with various options to protect its interests beyond the ten-year § 6324(a)(1) period, including the option to require a surety bond pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6165, see 26 U.S.C. § 6166(k)(1), and the option to require a special lien pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6324A. See *United States v. Spoor*, 838 F.3d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting that a § 6324A lien is a means of requiring "full collateral" for a § 6166 deferral); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6166(k)(2).

In addition to a lien, § 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for estate taxes on individuals listed in the statute. A listed individual "who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the [decedent's] gross estate . . . shall be personally liable" for the unpaid estate tax up to "the extent of the value" of such property "at the time of the decedent's death." 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2). Like the substantially similar language in the predecessor statute, § 827(b) of the 1939 Internal

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Revenue Code,³⁸ this language imposes personal liability only on “the person who ‘on the date of the decedent’s death’ receives or holds the property of a transfer made in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death.” *Englert v. Commissioner*, 32 T.C. 1008, 1016 (1959); see also *Garrett v. Commissioner*, T.C. Memo 1994-70, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2214, at *14 (1994); *United States v. Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3924087, at *5 (D. Utah July 29, 2013). In this context, the words “receives” and “has” at the date of death refer to two different situations. The phrase “has on the date of decedent’s death” refers to a person who holds property transferred within three years before the decedent’s death, which is considered part of the decedent’s gross estate for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 2035(c)(1). The phrase “receives . . . on the date of decedent’s death,” refers to “property received by persons solely because of decedent’s death,” and “which was not in the possession of one of the persons . . . at the moment of decedent’s death, but who immediately received such property solely because of decedent’s death.” *Garrett*, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at *13 (citing *Englert*, 32 T.C. 1016). Thus,

38. Section 827(b) provided:

If the tax herein imposed is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, *who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death*, property included in the gross estate under section 811(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g), to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent’s death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.

26 U.S.C. § 827(b) (1939) (emphasis added).

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a taxpayer who becomes trustee of a trust on the date of decedent's death is "personally liable as a transferee for the estate tax because it was in possession of property includable in decedent's gross estate at the date of death." *Id.* at *14 (citing *Estate of Callahan v. Comm'r*, T.C. Memo 1981-357, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 362 (1981)). Although Congress amended § 6324 in 1966, it did not change the syntax of § 6324(a)(2). This indicates that Congress intended to keep the then-current judicial interpretation. See *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S. Ct. 866, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." (citations omitted)).

B

In this case, the estate elected to defer payments over fourteen years. But the government failed to use the options available to protect its unsecured interests in deferred payments. See *supra*, at 59. It also failed to hold Michael Paulson, the trustee of the decedent's trust on the date of the decedent's death, personally liable for the estate taxes due, *United States v. Paulson*, 445 F. Supp. 3d 824, 831 (S.D. Cal. 2020), even though such liability may extend after the expiration of the ten-year estate tax lien provided for in § 6324(a)(1). See, e.g., Internal Revenue Manual 5.5.8.3 (June 23, 2005) (stating that 26 U.S.C. § 6502 applies to assess personal liability under § 6324(a)(2)); 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (providing for ten-year period after assessment of taxes for collection); *Id.* § 6503(d) (tolling ten-year period when 26 U.S.C. § 6166 election

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is made).

To compensate for its failures to use the available statutory options to collect estate taxes, the government here adopted a novel reading of § 6324(a)(2). Although the accepted reading of this language (as noted in *Garrett*, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at *14) is that it imposes personal liability for estate taxes on any person who receives (or has) property on the decedent's date of death, the government for the first time reads this language as imposing liability on a person "who receives" property of the estate at any time, even years after the decedent's death. Under this interpretation, the government calculates the estate tax based on the value of property on the date of decedent's death, and then imposes personal liability for this tax on a person who receives the property years later. This means that the individual's tax liability may be completely disproportionate to the value of the property when the individual eventually receives it.

The majority justifies its adoption of the government's novel reading based on the lack of a comma after the word "has." The majority views the absence of a comma as triggering the doctrine of the last antecedent, a rule of statutory construction which states that "a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows." *Lockhart v. United States*, 577 U.S. 347, 351, 136 S. Ct. 958, 194 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2016) (citation omitted). But while "[p]unctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning," *Navajo Nation v. United States DOI*, 819 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 161-65 (2012)), it

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“can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning,” *Barnhart v. Thomas*, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S. Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003) (citation omitted). The “last antecedent principle is merely an interpretive presumption based on the grammatical rule against misplaced modifiers.” *Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., Inc.*, 585 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (10th Cir. 2009). “At the same time, though, we know that grammatical rules are bent and broken all the time,” and we should not rely solely on grammar in interpreting a text “when evident sense and meaning require a different construction.” *Id.* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Like other circuits, we have acknowledged that the last antecedent canon is inapplicable when it creates illogical results and the statute’s plain language gives rise to a more logical reading. See *One Sentinel*, 416 F.3d at 979. In *One Sentinel*, the government brought a civil forfeiture action against a Sentinel Arms Striker-12 shotgun on the ground that it was “a ‘destructive device’ possessed in violation of the National Firearms Act.” *Id.* at 978. The Act defined a destructive device as

any type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is *generally* recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes[.]

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Id. at 979 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(2)) (emphasis and alteration in original).

The claimant argued that “according to the doctrine of the last antecedent, the clause ‘which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes,’ modifies ‘shotgun shell,’ but not ‘shotgun.’” Id. In other words, due to the lack of a comma after “or shotgun shell” the doctrine of the last antecedent required the statute to be read as defining a destructive device as “any type of weapon . . . except a shotgun.” Id.

We rejected that argument because following the last antecedent doctrine would have created the illogical result that no shotgun could be a “destructive device.” Id. We explained that “the doctrine of the last antecedent must yield to the most logical meaning of a statute that emerges from its plain language and legislative history.” Id. at 979 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we declined to apply the last antecedent canon and interpreted the relevant clause as if an omitted comma after “shell” were included. Id.

The same principle applies here. The government and majority implicitly concede that the government’s reading of the statute potentially results in allowing the government to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on trust asset recipients in excess of the value of the assets received. This could occur under the government’s interpretation, for instance, if property of the estate had a high value at the time of the decedent’s death but decreased precipitously by the time it was received

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by a beneficiary. In such a case, the beneficiary would nevertheless be personally liable for the unpaid estate taxes based on the value of the property on the date of death, even if the property were worth mere cents on the dollar when received by the beneficiary. Congress could not have intended to make a person who receives property many years after a settlor's death personally liable for estate taxes that exceed the value of the property received.

The majority claims the taxpayers “are impliedly invoking the canon against absurdity,” and then refutes this strawman argument by pointing to the “high bar” for invoking this canon. But because the canon against absurdity applies only when a court departs from the plain meaning of a statute, see, e.g., *Lamie v. U.S. Tr.*, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S. Ct. 1023, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2004); *Taylor v. Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Programs*, 201 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000), it is not implicated here. The taxpayers do not ask the court to disregard the text of § 6324(a)(2). Rather, the taxpayers offer an interpretation of its text that is superior to the government's, in that it avoids an illogical reading based solely on the lack of a comma after the word “has.” See *Tovar v. Sessions*, 882 F.3d 895, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2018).

C

While the majority primarily focuses on the doctrine of the last antecedent to support its interpretation of § 6324(a)(2), it makes an additional textual argument. First, it correctly notes that the statute refers to a person who receives “property included in the gross estate under

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sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive.” Likewise, it correctly notes that §§ 2034 to 2042 refer to property such as annuities, life insurance proceeds, or property subject to a general power of appointment given to transferees listed in § 6324(a)(2). From these undisputed premises, the majority erroneously concludes that a transferee could not receive the sort of property described in §§ 2034 to 2042 on the date of the decedent’s death, and therefore “personal liability for the estate tax applies to those who receive estate property, on or after the date of the decedent’s death.”

But the taxable property in the decedent’s gross estate, which includes the interest in the annuity, insurance proceeds, or property subject to a power of appointment, can be transferred on the date of decedent’s death. Indeed, as a leading treatise explains, “[n]on-probate assets under Section 6324(a)(2) [the assets identified in §§ 2034 to 2042] are primarily those assets of the decedent, includable in the gross estate, that were transferred prior to death, or were held in such a way that ownership transferred automatically upon death.” William Elliott, *Federal Tax Collections, Liens & Levies*, at § 27:23 *Transferee Liability* (Dec. 2022). A taxpayer receives the interest in the property “immediately” on the date of death, and is liable for estate taxes on its value, even if the assets at issue are not distributed until later. Garrett, T.C.M. (CCH) at *13 (“Congress used the word ‘receives’ to take care of property solely because of decedent’s death such as insurance proceeds or property which was not in the possession of one of the persons described [in the predecessor to § 6324(a)] at the moment of decedent’s

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death, but who immediately received such property solely because of decedent's death." (citation omitted)). The transferees are personally liable to the extent of the value of their interest in these assets on the date of death. See Elliott, *supra* at § 27:23 Transferee Liability. And the present value of such interest is determined as of the date of death even if the actual annuity payments or insurance proceeds are not distributed until some later date. See Magill *v. Comm'r*, T.C. Memo 1982-148, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 859, at n.21 (1982), *aff'd sub nom. Berliant v. Commissioner*, 729 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a taxpayer's "liability under section 6324(a)(2) is measured by the value of the property at date of death," and so the taxpayers would normally be personally liable for the value of their interest in the annuity at the date of death, "rather than the lesser amount of the subsequent cash distributions"); see also Baptiste *v. Commissioner*, T.C. Memo 1992-198, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2649 (1992), *aff'd*, 29 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[P]etitioner is liable at law for the unpaid estate tax to the extent of the value, at the time of decedent's death, of petitioner's interest in the proceeds of insurance on decedent's life.").

D

As an alternative to its textual arguments, the majority attempts to defend its interpretation by predicting that its illogical results are unlikely to occur.³⁹ But the majority cites no support for its approach of interpreting statutes based on predictions regarding future events. Nor can it,

³⁹. Once again, the government does not raise this argument.

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because our job is merely to discern the most reasonable interpretation of the statute, which requires us to take into account its “most logical meaning.” *One Sentinel*, 416 F.3d at 979 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In any event, the majority’s assurances are unpersuasive, even on their own terms. First, the majority claims that the illogical result caused by the government’s interpretation can be avoided because an individual poised to receive trust assets “must not have disclaimed or refused [trust] property.” In other words, according to the majority, prospective recipients of trust assets are amply protected because they can simply refuse assets that will suffer too great a decrease in value.

The majority’s argument does not survive scrutiny. Federal disclaimer law applies in this context. See 26 U.S.C. § 2518 (disclaimers); Treasury Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(5); see also Borris Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, *Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts* ch. 121.7 Disclaimers, 1997 WL 440123, at 14 (July 2022). Under federal law, in order to make an effective disclaimer of an interest in property, a person must comply with strict requirements. 26 U.S.C. § 2518; Treasury Reg. § 25.2518-2. With some minor exceptions not applicable here, the person must make, in writing, “an irrevocable and unqualified” refusal to accept an interest in property, no later than nine months after the date of the decedent’s death regardless whether the person has received the property.⁴⁰ See Treasury Reg. § 25.2518-2(a)-(c); see also

40. There are two exceptions to this rule. A beneficiary who is

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id. § 25.2518-2(c)(3)(i) (“With respect to transfers made by a decedent at death or transfers that become irrevocable at death, the transfer creating the interest occurs on the date of the decedent’s death, even if an estate tax is not imposed on the transfer); see also *Barker v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co.*, 888 F. Supp. 1131, 1133-34 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (“Section 25.2518-2(c)(3) key[s] the disclaimer time (9 months) to run from the taxable transfer occurring at the date of death.” (cleaned up)). The person must make this disclaimer within the nine month period even if the person has only a contingent interest in the property. Treasury Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(3)(i) (“If the transfer is for the life of an income beneficiary with succeeding interests to other persons, both the life tenant and the other remaindermen, whether their interests are vested or contingent, must disclaim no later than 9 months after the original transfer creating an interest.”); see also *Breakiron v. Gudonis*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80888, 2010 WL 3191794, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 2010) (“Under Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518-2(c)(3)(i), . . . a disclaimer must be made within this nine-month ‘window’ even if the disclaimant’s interest in the disclaimed property is not then vested or is then contingent.” (cleaned up)). This requirement applies regardless whether the person had actual knowledge that such a transfer had been made. See *Bittker & Lokken*,

under 21 years of age has until nine months after his twenty-first birthday in which to make a qualified disclaimer of his interest in property. 26 C.F.R. § 25-2518-2(d)(3). And a person who receives the property as the result of another party disclaiming the property interest must disclaim the interest within nine months after the date of the transfer creating the interest in the preceding disclaimant. 26 C.F.R. § 25-2518-2(c)(3).

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at 7 (“The disclaimant’s knowledge of the interest or lack thereof is irrelevant, and the time thus can expire before the disclaimant even knows of the existence of the interest.”).

The majority fails to explain how a person would have the prescience to know within nine months from the date of decedent’s death that the value of the interest in property to be transferred to that person at some point in the future will dramatically decline many years later (assuming that person even knows of the existence of such an interest). Without this prescience, the person would not be able to disclaim such an asset within the required time frame. At bottom, a person’s right to disclaim an asset within nine months of decedent’s death does not avoid the result caused by the government’s and majority’s interpretation of the statute.

The majority also contends that it “rel[ies] on the government’s avowals in its briefing and at oral argument that estate tax liability cannot exceed the value of the property received.” According to the majority, this promise, coupled with “judicial estoppel, provides additional safeguards” against the unfair application of personal liability under §6324(a)(2). But the government’s actual statement on appeal— that it “has consistently argued in this case that liability under § 6324(a)(2) is limited to the lesser of the unpaid estate tax liability or the value of the non-probate property that the liable person had or received,”—is merely a description of how the government has argued this case. It does not represent the government’s interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) or any promise regarding its future actions.

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But even if the government had offered an authoritative interpretation, the majority misunderstands how the doctrine of judicial estoppel (which the government does not raise) would apply in this case. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that generally “prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968 (2001) (quoting *Pegram v. Herdrich*, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 147 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2000)). “Courts apply the doctrine where a party’s ‘later inconsistent position’ presents a ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations.’” *New Edge Network, Inc. v. FCC*, 461 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). The doctrine is “invoked by a court at its discretion” to “protect the integrity of the judicial process.” *Russell v. Rolfs*, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990).

Judicial estoppel is not applicable here. In future cases, a court would be bound only by the majority’s interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) as imposing estate tax liability on a person who receives property from the decedent’s estate, regardless when it is received. The majority rejected an interpretation of the statute that would prevent the imposition of estate tax liability that exceeded the value of the property received, and so should the government change its position to argue the statute allows that, the government’s “later inconsistent position [would] introduce[] no ‘risk of inconsistent court determinations.’” *New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted); see also *New Edge Network, Inc.*, 461 F.3d at 1114. Therefore, ordinary principles of judicial estoppel would not apply.

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But even if the government had provided (and the majority had adopted) an interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) limiting the government's ability to impose excessive estate tax liability, such an interpretation would still not be binding in future cases. "[I]t is well settled that the [g]overnment may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant" because public policy considerations allow the government to change its positions in ways private parties cannot. *Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc.*, 467 U.S. 51, 60-61, 104 S. Ct. 2218, 81 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1984). The government may readily change its interpretation of a statute; "it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better." *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009). Because the government is free to make changes "in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations." *Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.*, 545 U.S. 967, 981-82, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005) (citation omitted), we have held that judicial estoppel does not preclude a government agency from changing its interpretation of an ambiguous statute, see *New Edge Network*, 461 F.3d at 1114. Accordingly, principles of judicial estoppel would not avoid the illogical results caused by the government's (and majority's) interpretation of the statute.

Finally, instead of explaining why its statutory interpretation does not lead to a nonsensical result, the majority also argues that historically, the government has not "attempted to impose personal liability for estate taxes

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that exceeded the value of the property received.” Even if this were true, it indicates only that the government has managed up until now to use special liens or surety bonds to secure its interest, but does not establish that the government’s interpretation of § 6324(a)(2) is reasonable.

II

The majority has overemphasized a single canon of statutory construction—the rule of the last antecedent—to ignore that “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) (citing *Davis*, 489 U.S. at 809). Although the punctuation chosen by Congress is important, we must also give due regard to sense and meaning. As our sister circuit has explained, “while the rules of English grammar often afford a valuable starting point to understanding a speaker’s meaning, they are violated so often by so many of us that they can hardly be safely relied upon as the end point of any analysis of the parties’ plain meaning.” *Payless Shoesource, Inc.*, 585 F.3d at 1372. Our binding precedent requires this approach; we may not read a statute as defining a “destructive device” to include shotgun shells but not shotguns merely because of a misplaced comma. *One Sentinel*, 416 F.3d at 979. And the Tenth Circuit offers an example that speaks volumes: “Groucho Marx could joke in *Animal Crackers*, ‘One morning I shot an elephant in my pajamas. How he got into my pajamas I’ll never know,’ leaving his audience at once amused by the

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image of a pachyderm stealing into his night clothes and yet certain that Marx meant something very different.” Payless Shoesource, Inc., 585 F.3d at 1372. Because I would interpret the statute according to the most likely intent of Congress, rather than adopt the majority’s mechanical adherence to the rule of the last antecedent, I respectfully dissent.

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**APPENDIX B — FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
FILED MARCH 23, 2023**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No.: 15-cv-2057 AJB (NLS)

(Doc. No. 189)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN MICHAEL PAULSON, *et al.*,

Defendants.

March 21, 2020, Decided;
March 23, 2020, Filed

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(A)**

Presently before the Court is John Michael Paulson's (herein referred to as "Michael Paulson") summary judgment motion on one main point: whether he was discharged of his personal liability for the estate tax due to his capacity as trustee of the Living Trust under 26 U.S.C. § 2204. (*See generally* Doc. No. 189-1.) The United States

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opposes the motion and moves for a motion of findings and judgment on stipulated facts. (Doc. No. 191-1.) In Michael Paulson's response he does not object to a motion for judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 rather than a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court, therefore, will treat Michael Paulson's motion as a motion for judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On December 23, 1986, Mr. Allen E. Paulson established the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust (hereafter referred to as the "Living Trust"). (Doc. No. 188 at 2.) On January 28, 2000, it was amended and completely restated. (*Id.*)
2. Three subsequent amendments to the Living Trust were executed on March 21, 2000, June 6, 2000, and June 14, 2000. (*Id.* at 3.)
3. Article IV, Paragraphs A and B, of the Living Trust required the Living Trust to pay all estate taxes owed by the Estate of Mr. Allen E. Paulson. (*Id.*) Under California Probate Code Section 19001, the Living Trust was obligated to pay all claims of creditors of the Estate and expenses of administration of the Estate to the extent the Estate was inadequate to satisfy those claims. (*Id.*)
4. On March 21, 2000, Mr. Allen E. Paulson executed his Last Will and Testament. (*Id.*) 5. On June 6, 2000, Mr. Allen E. Paulson executed a First Codicil to his Last Will and Testament. (*Id.*)

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6. On July 19, 2000, Mr. Allen E. Paulson died. (*Id.*)

7. Mr. Allen E. Paulson's Will was filed with the Probate Court. (*Id.*) Michael Paulson and Edward White were appointed and served as Co-Executors of the Estate until Edward White's resignation effective October 8, 2001. (*Id.*) Thereafter, Michael Paulson served as a court appointed Executor until January 15, 2013 and ceased performing those duties as part of the 2013 Settlement Agreement with the Co-Trustees. (*Id.*) The Court determined that because there was no executor appointed by the probate court after Michael Paulson's attempted resignation in 2013, Michael Paulson is still the statutory executor, but not personally liable for any estate tax in that capacity. (*Id.* at 3-4.)

8. At the time of Mr. Allen E. Paulson's death, the Living Trust held all of Mr. Allen E. Paulson's assets except for 100% of the shares in the Gold River Hotel & Casino Corporation (hereafter "Gold River shares"), which were valued at \$0.¹ (*Id.* at 4.) The Living Trust's assets included real estate, stocks, bonds, cash, receivables and miscellaneous assets valued on the date of Mr. Allen E. Paulson's death at \$193,434,344. (*Id.*) According to Form 706, the deductions² totaled \$178,495,454. (*Id.*)

1. The IRS proposed to increase the value of Gold River shares on Schedule B to \$5,380,000 in its Notice of Deficiency. (*Id.*) This increase was later abandoned as part of the Tax Court decision with a corresponding decrease in the Schedule L deductible debts or expenses related to Gold River. (*Id.*)

2. These include items set forth in Schedules J and L (expenses incurred in administering property); Schedule K (debts, mortgages, and liens); and Schedule M (bequests to surviving spouse). (*Id.*)

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9. Following Mr. Allen E. Paulson's death, Michael Paulson and Edward White became co-trustees of the Living Trust until White's resignation effective October 8, 2001. (*Id.*)

10. On October 11, 2001, Nicholas V. Diaco, M.D. consented to act as co-trustee of the Living Trust with Michael Paulson. (*Id.*) Michael Paulson only served as trustee of the Living Trust until March 24, 2009, when he was removed. (*Id.*)

11. After an extension of time to file the return, on October 23, 2001, the IRS received the Estate's Form 706 Estate Tax Return. (*Id.* at 5.) The return was signed by Michael Paulson as Co-Executor. (*Id.*) The Estate paid \$706,296 concurrently with its filing of the Estate Tax Return. (*Id.*) The Estate elected to defer the payment of the balance of its estate taxes under Section 6166 of the Internal Revenue Code over the next 15 years. (*Id.*) Although the original amount of estate tax shown due by the Estate Tax Return has been paid, the additional assessment of estate tax made by the IRS in 2006 remains unpaid. (*Id.*)

12. At the same time he filed the Estate Tax Return with the IRS, Michael Paulson filed a cover letter with the Return and also filed a letter dated October 19, 2001 requesting a discharge under 26 U.S.C. § 2204. (*Id.*)

13. The entire Estate Tax Return was voluminous and consisted of several boxes of forms, schedules, and supporting attachments. (*Id.*) Schedule G of the Estate's tax return, Form 706 stated:

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The Allen E. Paulson Living Trust established by Declaration of Trust dated December 23, 1986, was amended and completely restated January 28, 2000. Amendments thereto were executed on March 21, 2000, June 6, 2000, and June 14, 2000. An Order Construing Trust and Determining Validity of Trust Provision was entered in Superior Court of California, San Diego County, in trust proceeding PN 24815 dated September 22, 2000. During Allen Paulson's lifetime, he served as Trustee. After his death, John Michael Paulson and Edward White served as Co-Trustees. Subsequently, Edward White resigned and Nicholas Diaco was appointed Successor Trustee to serve with John Michael Paulson Successor Trustee. The Trust's taxpayer identification number is [redacted]. A copy of the Amended and Restated Allen E. Paulson Living Trust, each of the three amendments, and the aforesaid court Order, are attached as Exhibit 35.

(Id. at 5-6.)

14. The IRS acknowledged receipt of the Section 2204 discharge request, but never responded to it. *(Id.* at 6.)

15. On October 19, 2001, letters and attachments were prepared for signature of Michael Paulson under the supervision of Jeffrey M. Loeb and at his direction by a paralegal employed by the law firm Loeb & Loeb LLP, and that he was authorized to act as the Estate's

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representative before the IRS, and to make written or oral presentations on behalf of the Estate pursuant to 26 CFR § 601.504(b)(2)(ii). (*Id.*)

16. The letter was prepared based upon a Loeb & Loeb form document, the purpose of which is to begin the nine-month period within which the IRS has to issue a notification of the estate tax due or suffer the consequence of losing the right to impose personal liability upon persons acting in any and all fiduciary roles at the time the letter is sent. (*Id.*) The reference to “fiduciaries” in the subject line of the letter reflects accurately this scope of the letter’s intended coverage. (*Id.*) The use of the term “Co-Executor” was meant to identify Michael Paulson’s title in a manner consistent with his title appearing on the federal estate tax return; it was not meant to limit the scope of the term “fiduciaries” appearing on the subject line of the letter. (*Id.*) It was Mr. Loeb’s belief that such a letter operates to discharge an executor/trustee such as Michael Paulson both in his capacity as a co-executor and as a trustee. (*Id.*) In such circumstances, it was not his practice to submit two separate discharge requests. (*Id.*)

17. Schedule G of the Estate’s tax return, Form 706, stated: “All assets reported on this return are assets of the above-described Allen E. Paulson Living Trust,” except for the Gold River shares, which were valued at \$0. (*Id.* at 7.)

18. Neither Edward White nor Nicholas Diaco ever signed any request seeking to invoke the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 2204 to request a discharge personal liability. (*Id.*)

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19. The IRS has not sought to hold either Edward White or Nicholas Diaco personally liable as past trustees of the Living Trust for any estate tax deficiency. (*Id.*)

20. On February 2, 2003, Michael Paulson entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release in his capacities as an individual, Executor of the Will of Allen E. Paulson, and a Co-Trustee of the Living Trust with Madeleine Pickens and others. (*Id.*) Michael Paulson signed this 2003 Settlement Agreement on behalf of three different persons/entities and signed in each of these three different capacities. (*Id.*) He signed “J. Michael Paulson” in his individual capacity, as a beneficiary. (*Id.*) He also signed in a different location, “J. Michael Paulson, Executor” for the Estate of Allen E. Paulson, and he again signed in a third location, “J. Michael Paulson, Co-Trustee” for the Living Trust. (*Id.*)

21. On December 2, 2005, as a result of an IRS audit and a challenge by Michael Paulson as Executor of the Estate, the Tax Court determined pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, that \$6,669,477 of additional estate tax owed by the Estate. (*Id.*) The Estate elected to pay this additional estate tax liability under the same fifteen-year installment period permitted by 26 U.S.C. § 6166. (*Id.*)

22. On January 30, 2006, the IRS assessed the \$6,669,477 of additional estate taxes due from the Estate. (*Id.* at 8.) These additional taxes were subject to being paid under the existing Section 6166 installment election. (*Id.*)

23. While Trustee of the Living Trust, Michael Paulson prepared a number of reports to the state court listing

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out assets sufficient to pay the taxes, including the final report dated February 2009, which listed \$50,035,577 in assets, just over \$19 million in assets if the Supersonic Jet project and the Rand receivable were not included. (*Id.*)

24. On March 24, 2009, the Probate Court removed Michael Paulson as Trustee of the Living Trust and appointed Vikki Paulson and James D. Paulson as Co-Trustees. (*Id.*)

25. At the time of Michael Paulson's removal as Trustee in March of 2009, there had been no default in the installment payments to the IRS. (*Id.*) However, the April 19, 2008 payment had not been made and was instead on a one-year extension to April 19, 2009. (*Id.*) At that time there were still sufficient assets to pay the Section 6166 installments over the remainder of the 15-year period. (*Id.*)

26. On May 7, 2010, in response to one or more missed installment payments, the IRS issued the Estate a Notice of Final Determination as provided in I.R.C. § 6166 has ceased to apply. (*Id.*) Such a notice was sent to the Co-Trustees. (*Id.*)

27. On April 16, 2012, before Michael Paulson resigned as part of the 2013 Settlement Agreement, and ceased performing duties as the Executor, Vikki E. Paulson and Crystal Christensen, Successor Co-Trustees of the Living Trust, filed a third petition in the United States Tax Court on behalf of the Estate seeking a review of the Estate's Collection Due Process rights. (*Id.*) At the time this petition was filed, Michael Paulson had no fiduciary

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role in connection with the Living Trust, which was required to pay all estate taxes owed by the Estate and was not involved in this petition. (*Id.* at 8-9.) This Tax Court petition was dismissed on April 18, 2013, for lack of jurisdiction because the petition had not been signed by Michael Paulson who was, at that time, the court appointed Executor of the Estate. (*Id.* at 9.)

28. From 2007 through 2013, several disputes arose between Michael Paulson, Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, James Paulson, and other interested parties in the Living Trust. (*Id.*) On January 15, 2013 these parties entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release that formalized resolution to these disputes (“2013 Settlement Agreement”). (*Id.*) Michael Paulson entered into the 2013 Settlement Agreement as an individual, as Executor of the Will of Allen E. Paulson, and as a beneficiary and major creditor of the Living Trust and signed the 2013 Settlement Agreement in all of these capacities. (*Id.*) He signed individually, as a beneficiary, and a major creditor of the Living Trust as “J. Michael Paulson”, and he signed “J. Michael Paulson, Executor” for the Estate of Allen E. Paulson. (*Id.*) Vikki E. Paulson and Crystal L. Christensen each signed as “Co-Trustees” for the Living Trust. (*Id.*) On June 3, 2013, the Probate Court adopted the 2013 Settlement Agreement as an order of the Court. (*Id.*)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff contends that though Michael Paulson was discharged from personal liability arising out of his

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position as Executor, he was not discharged from personal liability arising out of his role as Trustee of the Living Trust pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 2204. (Doc. No. 191-1 at 12.) However, Michael Paulson argues that he followed all of the required procedures to be discharged as both executor of the Estate and trustee of the Trust. (Doc. No. 189-1 at 6.)

Section 2204 states:

(a) General Rule.—If the executor makes written application to the Secretary for determination of the amount of the tax and discharge from personal liability therefor, the Secretary (as soon as possible, and in any event within 9 months after the making of such application, or, if the application is made before the return is filed, then within 9 months after the return is filed, but not after the expiration of the period prescribed for the assessment of the tax in section 6501) shall notify the executor of the amount of the tax. The executor, on payment of the amount of which he is notified . . . and on furnishing any bond with may be required for any amount . . . shall be discharged from personal liability for any deficiency in tax . . .

(B) Fiduciary other than the executor.—If a fiduciary other than the executor makes written application to the Secretary for determination of the amount of any estate tax for which the fiduciary may be personally liable, and for

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discharge from personal liability therefor, the Secretary upon the discharge of the executor from personal liability under subsection (a), or upon the expiration of 6 months after the making of such application by the fiduciary, if later, shall notify the fiduciary (1) of the amount of such tax for which it has been determined the fiduciary is liable, or (2) that it has been determined that the fiduciary is not liable for any such tax. Such application shall be accompanied by a copy of the instrument, if any, under which such fiduciary is acting, a description of the property held by the fiduciary, and such other information for purposes of carrying out the provisions of this section as the Secretary may require by regulations . . .

26 U.S.C. § 2204(a), (b).

The crux of the issue here is whether Michael Paulson followed the procedures outlined above to be discharged of personal liability arising out of his role as Trustee of the Living Trust. Plaintiff argues that Michael Paulson failed to follow these procedures.

Prior to 1970, Section 2204 was titled “Discharge of Executor from Personal Liability,” and in fact, only allowed for the executor to discharge their personal liability. United States Statutes at Large, Pub. L. No. 91-614, 84 Stat. 1836. In 1970, however, it was re-titled “by striking out ‘EXECUTOR’ in the heading of such section and inserting in lieu thereof ‘FIDUCIARY.’” *Id.*

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Subsection (b) was added to allow fiduciaries to apply for discharge of liability. It is not clear to the Court that the congressional intent by adding subsection (b) was that Congress recognized that there are instances where a fiduciary, such as a trustee, administering the trust continue to remain personally liable for tax even though the executor of the estate may have been discharged from personal liability as a result of filing of an application for discharge under Section 2204 as Plaintiff asserts in its opposition. (Doc. No. 191-1 at 14.) Accordingly, this argument regarding congressional intent is unpersuasive.

Plaintiff asserts that Michael Paulson did not submit any written application in his capacity as a fiduciary other than the executor. (Doc. No. 191-1 at 14.) Specifically, Plaintiff points to the following facts: Michael Paulson signed the letter as “J. Michael Paulson, Co-Executor of the Will of Allen E. Paulson, Deceased”; he did not sign the letter personally or in all capacities; and he requested nine months as described for executors under Section 2204(a) rather than the six-month time frame for fiduciaries. (*Id.* at 15-16.)

As Michael Paulson points out, in contrast to Plaintiff’s arguments that none of the procedures were followed, the letter sent to the IRS tells a different story. First, the title of the letter is “Request for discharge of fiduciaries from personal liability.” (Doc. No. 189-1 at 8.) The plural form of fiduciary may indicate that Michael Paulson sought to be discharged as a trustee and executor. Second, the letter enclosed (1) a copy of Federal Form 4768; (2) co-executor’s Section 6166 election for deferral of federal estate tax;

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and (3) co-executor's request for discharge from personal liability pursuant to I.R.C. Section 2204. (Doc. No. 172 at 21.) As to the request for discharge, the letter is not specific as to whether Michael Paulson was requesting discharge under parts (a) or (b) or both of Section 2204. (*Id.*) Further, requesting the longer time frame of nine months was likely appropriate as it encompassed both the time frame to be discharged as a fiduciary and as an executor.

26 U.S.C. § 2204 does not specify how Michael Paulson was to sign the letter. Plaintiff produces no case law to support its position that the way in which Michael Paulson signed the letter only exhibits that he signed it only as an executor. Michael Paulson argues that he signed using the term "Co-Executor" as a way to identify Michael Paulson's title in a manner consistent with his title appearing on the federal estate tax return. (Doc. No. 189-1 at 11.) Currently, there is no authority that requires specific format, form or wording to make an application for discharge. *See United States v. Johnson*, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1237 (D. Utah 2016) ("*Johnson II*"), *reversed on other grounds United States v. Johnson*, 920 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 2019). However, Plaintiff argues that Michael Paulson signed various documents in different capacities and sometimes would sign the same document multiple times in his differing capacities. (Doc. No. 191-1 at 19-21.) There is no such requirement, however, how to sign the letter nor is there a requirement that Michael Paulson was supposed to provide two letters to the IRS.

Plaintiff argues that *Johnson II* clearly treated the discharge provisions of Section 2204(a) and (b) separately.

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Id. at 1237. However, it is unclear how the district court in *Johnson II* treated those two provisions separately. The district court did not address Section 2204(b) and the defendants in that case were offered a special lien under Section 6324A, which is not at issue in the instant litigation. Accordingly, the Court find this argument unpersuasive.

Further, it is stipulated that

Mr. Loeb would testify that the letter was prepared based upon a Loeb & Loeb form document, the purpose of which is to begin the nine-month period within which the IRS has to issue a notification of the estate tax due or suffer the consequence of losing the right to impose personal liability upon persons acting in any and all fiduciary roles at the time the letter is sent . . . It was (and remains) his belief that such a letter operates to discharge an executor/trustee such as Michael Paulson both in his capacity as a co-executor and as a trustee.

(Doc. No. 188 ¶ 16.) However, Plaintiff argues that intent does not matter. (Doc. No. 191-1 at 18.) Plaintiff argues that the IRS cannot be expected to infer intent from a letter that does not mention the Living Trust. (*Id.* at 18-19.) Further, Plaintiff points to the fact that Mr. Loeb entitled the letter “Co-Executor’s Request for Discharge from Personal Liability Pursuant to I.R.C. Section 2204” and did not mention Michael Paulson’s capacity as a trustee. (*Id.* at 21.)

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However, the Living Trust, not the Estate, held all of the assets at the time of the letter. There was not a separate a tax return for the Living Trust. The Living Trust, therefore, was to make the payments on the tax obligations of the Estate. Further, the subject line of the letter read: “Request for discharge of fiduciaries from personal liability.” (Doc. No. 111-10 at 7.) Logically, the Court finds that Michael Paulson was seeking to discharge his personal liability as trustee of the Living Trust.

Further, the IRS never contacted Michael Paulson regarding any confusion over the letter. In fact, the IRS never responded to the letter. The IRS is “to notify the fiduciary (1) of the amount of such tax for which it has been determined the fiduciary is liable, or (2) that it has been determined that the fiduciary is not liable for any such tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 2204. If there was any confusion, Plaintiff argues that the IRS should have alerted the fiduciary that he remained liable for the full amount of “any estate tax for which the fiduciary may be personally liable.” The Court agrees. Plaintiff should not have waited twelve years to raise this issue in litigation.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court **ORDERS** Michael Paulson to be discharged of personal liability under 26 U.S.C. § 2204 as a trustee of the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust. The Clerk of the Court is **DIRECTED** to close the case accordingly.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2020

/s/ Anthony J. Battaglia
Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia
United States District Judge

**APPENDIX C — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2016**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN MICHAEL PAULSON, AS THE EXECUTOR
OR STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, AND INDIVIDUALLY;
JAMES D. PAULSON, AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; VIKKI
E. PAULSON, AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, AS TRUSTEE
OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST,
AND INDIVIDUALLY; CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN,
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST, AND
INDIVIDUALLY; MADELEINE PICKENS, AS
STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE ALLEN
E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST, AS TRUSTEE OF
THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON SEPARATE
PROPERTY TRUST, AND INDIVIDUALLY,

Defendants.

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September 6, 2016, Decided;
September 6, 2016, Filed

Case No.: 15cv2057 AJB (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MADELEINE PICKENS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 15);

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART VIKKI PAULSON AND CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 19);

(3) DENYING JAMES PAULSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 36);

(4) DENYING MADELEINE PICKENS' MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-CLAIM (Doc. No. 40); AND

(5) DENYING VIKKI PAULSON AND CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-CLAIM (Doc. No. 44)

The United States of America ("Plaintiff"), seeking to recover unpaid estate taxes, penalties, and interest, filed the above action on September 16, 2015. Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss the complaint filed by Defendants Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, Madeleine Pickens, and James Paulson. (Doc. No. 15, 19, and 36.) Also pending are motions to dismiss Defendant

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John Michael Paulson's cross-claim, (Doc. No. 38), filed by Defendants Vikki Paulson, Crystal Christensen, and Madeleine Pickens. (Doc. Nos. 40 and 50.)

For the reasons set forth below, Madeleine Pickens' motion to dismiss the complaint is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**; Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen's motion to dismiss is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**; and James Paulson's motion to dismiss is **DENIED**. Additionally, Madeleine Pickens' motion to dismiss John Michael Paulson's cross-claim is **DENIED**; and Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen's motion to dismiss the cross-claim is **DENIED**.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and construed as true for the limited purpose of resolving the pending motions. *See Moyo v. Gomez*, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994). On December 23, 1986, Allen Paulson ("Mr. Paulson") established the Allen E. Paulson Living Trust (hereafter referred to as "Living Trust"). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 9.) In 1988, Mr. Paulson entered into an antenuptial agreement with Madeleine Pickens ("Ms. Pickens") in anticipation of marriage. (*Id.* ¶ 10.) The agreement defined their respective separate property and established certain gifts for Ms. Pickens in the event of Mr. Paulson's death. (*Id.*) The Living Trust was subsequently amended and restated several times in early 2000. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) On July 19, 2000, Mr. Paulson died. (*Id.* ¶ 21.)

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The Living Trust provided Ms. Pickens with the power to elect between receiving property under the antenuptial agreement or under the Living Trust, but not under both. (*Id.* ¶¶ 10, 12-15.) The Living Trust also created a Marital Trust for Ms. Pickens' benefit. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13-15.) Under the terms of the Living Trust, the Marital Trust was to receive a residence and all personal property located at 14497 Emerald Lane in Rancho Sante Fe, California. (*Id.* ¶ 13.) The Living Trust also gave Ms. Pickens the right to receive a second residence located in Del Mar, California, as well as all household furnishings, furniture, and all insurance policies related to the Del Mar property. (*Id.* ¶ 14.) Finally, the Living Trust provided that the Marital Trust was to receive 25% of the residue of the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 15.) The Living Trust named Ms. Pickens, John Michael Paulson, and Edward White (or alternatively, Edward White and Nicholas Diaco), as the co-trustees of the Marital Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 16.)

At the time of Mr. Paulson's death, all of Mr. Paulson's assets were held by the Living Trust except for his shares in the Gold River Hotel & Casino Corporation. (*Id.* ¶ 24.) The Living Trust's assets, as reported at the time of Mr. Paulson's death included approximately \$24,764,500 in real estate; \$113,761,706 in stocks and bonds; \$23,664,644 in cash and receivables, and \$31,243,494 in miscellaneous assets. (*Id.*) Accordingly, the Estate's assets totaled approximately \$193,434,344 at the time of Mr. Paulson's death. (*Id.*)

John Michael Paulson ("Michael Paulson") is the son of Mr. Paulson, and served as the executor of the Estate

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of Allen E. Paulson (“Estate”) after Mr. Paulson’s death on July 19, 2000. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 54.) Nicholas Diaco consented to act as co-trustee of the Living Trust with Michael Paulson. (*Id.* ¶ 25.) In April 2001, the Estate filed a Form 4768 with the IRS, and requested an extension of time to file its Form 706 Estate tax return until October 19, 2001. (*Id.* ¶ 26.) Additionally, the Estate requested an extension of time to pay its taxes until April 19, 2002. (*Id.*) The IRS approved the Estate’s request for both extensions. (*Id.* ¶ 26.)

On October 23, 2001, the IRS received the Estate’s Form 706 Estate tax return, which was signed by Michael Paulson, as co-executor of the Estate. (*Id.* ¶ 27.) In completing the tax return, the Estate elected to use an alternate valuation date of January 19, 2001, under 26 U.S.C. § 2032(a). (*Id.*) The Estate reported a total gross estate of \$187,729,626, a net taxable estate of \$9,234,172, and an estate tax liability of \$4,459,051. (*Id.* ¶¶ 27-28.) On November 26, 2001, the IRS assessed the originally reported tax of \$4,459,051. (*Id.* ¶ 28.) The Estate elected to pay part of its taxes and defer the other portion under a fifteen-year payment plan pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6166 of the Internal Revenue Code.¹ (*Id.* ¶ 29.) Accordingly, the Estate paid \$706,296 as the amount unqualified for deferral under § 6166, leaving a deferred balance of \$3,752,755 to be paid under the installment election. (*Id.*) On November 15, 2001, the IRS selected the Estate tax return for examination. (*Id.* ¶ 31.)

1. 26 U.S.C. § 6166(a)(1) provides a deferral and payment plan for the value of the tax imposed by a closely held business on the adjusted gross estate, under 26 U.S.C. § 2001.

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While the Estate's tax return was under review, several personal disputes arose between Michael Paulson, Ms. Pickens, and the other beneficiaries of the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 32.) On February 2, 2003, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which the California Probate Court approved on March 14, 2003 ("2003 Settlement"). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 33); (Doc. No. 15-5.) Under the 2003 Settlement, Ms. Pickens forewent property under both the antenuptial agreement and the Living Trust, instead choosing to receive direct distributions from the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶¶ 33-34.) The 2003 Settlement resulted in Ms. Pickens receiving the Rancho Sante Fe residence, the Del Mar residence, and the stock in the Del Mar County Club, Inc. (*Id.* ¶ 33.) As approved by the Probate Court, these distributions were made directly to Ms. Pickens as trustee of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 35.) During 2004, Michael Paulson, acting as trustee of the Living Trust, distributed approximately \$5,921,887 in trust assets to various individuals. (*Id.* ¶ 36.)

On January 15, 2005, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to Michael Paulson as executor of the estate, which proposed a \$37,801,245 deficiency in the estate tax reported on the return. (*Id.* ¶ 38.) Michael Paulson petitioned the United States Tax Court challenging the additional estate tax proposed by the IRS. (*Id.* ¶ 39.) On December 2, 2005, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Tax Court determined that the Estate owed \$6,669,477 in additional estate taxes. (*Id.* ¶ 40.) The Estate elected to pay this additional tax amount under the same fifteen-year installment period permitted by 26 U.S.C. § 6166. (*Id.*)

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During 2006, Michael Paulson, acting as trustee of the Living Trust distributed an additional \$1,250,000 from the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 43.) In March 2009, the Probate Court removed Michael Paulson as trustee for misconduct. (*Id.* ¶ 44.) Vikki Paulson and James Paulson were appointed as co-trustees. (*Id.* ¶ 44.) In August 2011, Vikki Paulson and James Paulson reported that the Living Trust had assets worth \$13,738,727. (*Id.* ¶ 44.)

On May 7, 2010, in response to one or more missed installment payments, the IRS issued the Estate a notice of final determination stating that the extension of time for payment under § 6166 no longer applied to the Estate's tax obligations. (*Id.* ¶ 46.) On June 10, 2010, the Probate Court removed James Paulson as a co-trustee for breach of court orders. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Vikki remained as the sole trustee of the Living Trust. (*Id.*)

On August 5, 2010, the Estate filed a petition in United States Tax Court challenging the IRS's proposed termination of the Estate's § 6166 installment payment election. (*Id.* ¶ 47.) On February 28, 2011, Crystal Christensen ("Ms. Christensen") was appointed as co-trustee of the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 48.) At that time, the Living Trust held assets worth approximately \$8,802,034. (*Id.*) In May 2011, the Tax Court entered a stipulated decision sustaining the IRS's decision to terminate the Estate's installment payment election. (*Id.* ¶ 49.)

Between June 28, 2011, and July 7, 2011, the United States recorded notices of federal tax liens against the Estate in the property records of San Diego and Los

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Angeles Counties. (*Id.* ¶ 50.) On April 16, 2012, Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen, as successor co-trustees of the Living Trust filed a petition for review of the Estate's collection due process rights with the United States Tax Court. (*Id.* ¶ 51.) The Tax Court dismissed the petition on April 18, 2013, for lack of jurisdiction because Michael Paulson, who was the court-appointed executor at the time the petition was filed, had not signed the petition. (*Id.*)

From approximately 2007 through 2013, several disputes arose between Michael Paulson, Vikki Paulson, Ms. Christensen, James Paulson, and other interested parties in the Living Trust. (*Id.* ¶ 52.) The parties eventually settled the disputes, and on June 3, 2013, the California Superior Court formalized the settlement through issuance of an order and a general release ("2013 Settlement"). (*Id.*)

As part of the 2013 Settlement, Michael Paulson obtained the Living Trust's ownership interest in Supersonic Aerospace International, LLC, as well as its ownership interests in the Gold River Hotel & Casino Corporation and the Gold River Operation Corporation. (*Id.* ¶ 53.) Additionally, as part of the 2013 Settlement, Michael Paulson resigned as executor of the Estate, effective January 15, 2013. (*Id.* ¶ 54.)

As of July 10, 2015, the Estate had an unpaid estate tax liability of \$10,261,217. (*Id.* ¶ 55.) On September 16, 2016, the United States filed a complaint seeking judgment against the Estate for the unpaid estate taxes, penalties, and interest. (Doc. No. 1.) The United States

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seeks judgment against the defendants in either their representative or individual capacities, or both, for unpaid estate taxes. Several defendants named in the complaint have filed motions to dismiss. (*See* Doc. Nos. 13, 19, 36.) Michael Paulson filed an answer to the complaint, in addition to cross-claims for indemnification against Ms. Pickens, Vikki Paulson, and Ms. Christensen. (Doc. No. 38.) Ms. Pickens, Vikki Paulson, and Ms. Christensen then moved to dismiss the cross-claims. (Doc. Nos. 40, 44.) Following briefing on all pending motions, the Court determined the motions were suitable for determination on the papers.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. *See Navarro v. Block*, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "A court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim." *SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal.*, 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). However, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). In making this determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. *Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat'l League of Postmasters of U.S.*, 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept legal conclusions as true. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). It is also improper for a court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” *Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters*, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S. Ct. 897, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. A “motion to dismiss is not the appropriate procedural vehicle to test the merits of Plaintiff’s complaint.” *Walker v. City of Fresno*, No. 1:09cv1667, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86562, 2010 WL 3341861, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (citing *Navarro*, 250 F.3d at 732).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, the parties moving to dismiss the complaint attach numerous documents to their respective motions. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. Nos. 15-2-15-14; 19-2-19-7.) Only Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen formally request the Court take judicial notice of certain documents attached, (Doc. No. 19-2), although Ms. Pickens similarly argues consideration of the attached documents is appropriate. (*See* Doc. No. 25, n.3.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that consideration of documents extrinsic to the complaint is improper on a

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motion to dismiss, and converts a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 21 at 11-13; 27 at 15.) Plaintiff requests the Court permit a reasonable time for discovery prior to ruling on the present motion if the Court is inclined to consider the attached materials. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also contests whether the documents attached to Ms. Pickens, Vikki Paulson, and Ms. Christensen's motions are the most recent versions of, and amendments to, relevant Trust documents. (Doc. No. 21 at 11) (arguing Ms. Pickens failed to attach amendments to the Living Trust that are "critical to her status as trustee of the Marital Trust").

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of facts that can be "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); *Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc.*, 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); *Hohu v. Hatch*, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The court may take judicial notice of documents that are matters of public record. *See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman*, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting a district court may take "judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings" when determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim); *Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc.*, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ("Matters of public record are generally proper subjects of judicial notice.").

Judicial notice of the Probate Court documents is appropriate, as documents publicly available and not subject to reasonable dispute. *See In re Tower Park*

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Properties, LLC, 803 F.3d 450, 452 (9th Cir. 2015) (taking judicial notice of documents filed in probate court proceedings); *Gillette v. Wilson Sonsini Grp. Welfare Ben. Plan*, No. 3:14CV00222, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154675, 2014 WL 5511337, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 31, 2014) (taking judicial notice of various documents filed in probate court); *In re Tower Park Properties, LLC*, No. CV 13-1518, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101453, 2013 WL 3791462, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2013) (same). Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the Probate Court documents attached to the present motions to dismiss.² However, for the reasons detailed below, the Court declines to interpret or otherwise determine the applicability or validity of those documents in the context of a motion to dismiss. The remaining formal or informal requests for judicial notice are therefore **DENIED**.³

2. Documents properly the subject of judicial notice include Appendix C, the Estate's Tax Return dated October 19, 2001, (Doc. No. 15-4); Appendix E-1, the Grant Deed to the Del Mar Residence, (Doc. No. 15-6); Appendix E-2, the Grant Deed to the Rancho Sante Fe Residence; (Doc. No. 15-7); Appendix G, the IRS Tax Audit dated October 13, 2004, (Doc. No. 15-9); Appendix H, the tax court decision reflecting the stipulated additional tax liability in excess of six million dollars, (Doc. No. 15-10); Appendix I, the memorandum decision removing Michael Paulson as trustee, (Doc. No. 15-11); and Appendix L, the tax court order reflecting Michael's role as court appointed executor, (Doc. No. 15-14).

3. These documents include Appendix A, Amendment to and Complete Restatement of Declaration of Trust, Allen E. Paulson Living Trust, (Doc. No. 15-2); Appendix B, Amendment to Declaration of Trust, Allen E. Paulson Living Trust, (Doc. No. 15-3); Appendix D, the 2003 Settlement and Release to the extent the parties dispute the application and meaning of provisions contained therein, (Doc.

*Appendix C***B. Ms. Pickens' Motion to Dismiss**

Ms. Pickens asserts several grounds in support of dismissal, the majority of which are directed at the merits of Plaintiff's claims. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." *Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.*, 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 664.) Additionally, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. *Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. New*, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1985); *Usher v. City of Los Angeles*, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, "[t]he issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." *Usher*, 828 F.2d at 561 (citing *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)). Accordingly, challenges to whether a party may ultimately be held liable or whether Plaintiff will succeed in establishing liability under various theories of recovery are not appropriate at this stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, what Defendants cite to as "uncontested

No. 15-5); Appendix F, Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust, (Doc. No. 15-8); Appendix J, the 2013 Settlement Agreement to the extent the parties dispute the application and meaning of the provisions contained therein, (Doc. No. 15-12); and Appendix K, the stipulation and release reflecting the 2013 Settlement, (Doc. No. 15-13). Vikki Paulson and Crystal Christensen's request for judicial notice of the reporter's transcript of March 21, 2011, proceeding is similarly **DENIED**. The transcript supports the contention that Plaintiff delayed in seeking a tax lien against Defendants, but is otherwise irrelevant to resolution of the pending motions.

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facts” throughout their moving papers are not dispositive of Plaintiff’s claims. *Cf.*, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) *with* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. As noted below, the Court will refrain from adjudicating the merits of Plaintiff’s claims in resolving the pending motions.⁴

As a further preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s opposition to Ms. Pickens’ motion narrows the issues raised in the motion to dismiss. For example, Ms. Pickens argues that the Government’s claim as to tax assessed in November 2001 is time barred by the applicable ten-year statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 15 at 22-25.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that it is not seeking to collect any of the estate tax initially assessed in November 2001. (Doc. No. 21 at 31) (noting the complaint “makes no claim against any Defendant for th[e] original tax assessed on November 26, 2001”). Instead, Plaintiff acknowledges that the original tax and related interest were paid through previous partial payments made by the Estate and the Living Trust. (*Id.*) Plaintiff’s present claim stems from the additional estate tax assessed on January 30, 2006, in the amount of \$6,669,477. (*Id.*) Since the Plaintiff’s action is not based on the estate tax assessed in 2001, Ms. Pickens’ request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as untimely is **DENIED**.

4. Plaintiff concedes the scope of liability established is likely to decrease following discovery and resolution of factual disputes. (*See* Doc. No. 27 at 16) (noting the “United States does not care which of the Defendants is deemed to be the executor or administrator so long as someone appears in this case as a representative of the Estate of Allen E. Paulson so that a judgment can be sought and entered against the Estate”).

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Ms. Pickens also argues she is not personally liable for the estate tax under 31 U.S.C. § 3713. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 14.) In response, Plaintiff indicates it is not presently pursuing a claim against Ms. Pickens for personal liability under § 3713. Accordingly, to the extent the complaint can be read as stating a claim against Ms. Pickens under § 3713, that claim is **DISMISSED**.

Having addressed the correct scope of review in resolving the present motions, as well as those issues rendered moot through the parties' briefing, the Court now turns to Ms. Pickens' remaining arguments advanced in support of dismissal.

1. 26 U.S.C. § 2002

Ms. Pickens argues that she is not liable for estate tax under 26 U.S.C. § 2002 in her capacity as a "statutory executor" of Mr. Paulson's Estate because she was never appointed, and never served as the executor of the Estate. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 13.) As support for this position, Ms. Pickens notes that Michael Paulson was the court-appointed executor and the 2013 decision of the tax court rejected Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's claim that they were "executors" under § 2203. (*Id.*)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Michael Paulson was the court-appointed executor, but resigned from that position as of January 15, 2013. (Doc. No. 21 at 13); (*see also* Doc. No. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 53, 54) (noting that as part of the 2013 Settlement Michael Paulson resigned as executor of the estate, effective January 15, 2013).

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26 U.S.C. § 2001 imposes tax liability on the executor of an estate in that individual's representative capacity. Section 2203 defines the term "executor" as "the executor or administrator of the decedent, or, if there is no executor or administrator appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States, then any person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent."

Here, the complaint alleges that although Michael Paulson was once the court-appointed executor of the Estate, he resigned in 2013, with his resignation effective January 15, 2013. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 53, 54.) Additionally, the complaint alleges that Ms. Pickens currently possesses property that belonged to Mr. Paulson. (*Id.* ¶¶ 87-92.) Ms. Pickens' reliance on the 2013 tax court order noting that Michael Paulson was the court-appointed executor was based on Michael Paulson's status as the executor at the time the petition was filed.⁵ Following Michael Paulson's resignation, there was no court-appointed executor, thus making "any person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent" the "executor" for the purposes of imposing representative liability under § 2002.

In reply, Ms. Pickens argues the position advanced by Plaintiff would render every beneficiary of an estate the "statutory executor" when the appointed, qualified, and acting executor resigns. (Doc. No. 25 at 5.) Ms. Pickens also contends that Michael Paulson never resigned and that Plaintiff fails to allege that Michael Paulson resigned. (*Id.*)

5. Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen filed the petition on April 16, 2012, nearly eight months before Michael Paulson's January 2013, effective date of resignation. (*See* Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 51, 54.)

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Considering the allegations in the complaint, including that Michael Paulson resigned as the court-appointed executor, and that Ms. Pickens received property from Mr. Paulson's estate, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim under § 2002. Ms. Pickens' assertion that Michael Paulson never actually resigned as the court-appointed executor is contrary to the allegations in the complaint, which are entitled to a presumption of truth at this stage in the proceedings.⁶ Accordingly, Ms. Pickens' request that the § 2002 claim against her in her representative capacity as statutory executor be dismissed is **DENIED**.

2. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2)

Ms. Pickens next argues that she is not liable for estate tax under 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) as a trustee of the Marital Trust. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 15.) Ms. Pickens contends that it is undisputed that although she was nominated to serve as co-trustee of the Marital Trust, she never accepted that nomination. (*Id.*) Additionally, because Ms. Pickens chose to bypass the Marital Trust altogether, the Marital Trust was never funded. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Ms. Pickens asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against her in her capacity as the trustee of the Marital Trust. (*Id.*)

6. Presumably, Ms. Pickens takes issue with Michael Paulson's alleged failure to provide an accounting as required when a court-appointed executor resigns. (*See* Doc. No. 44-1 at 18) (Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's motion to dismiss arguing Michael Paulson's resignation was never completed because he failed to provide an accounting as required by California Probate Code section 10952). However, such challenges are more appropriately considered following the opportunity for discovery, and at a time when the Court is not required to assume the truth of Plaintiff's factual allegations.

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Plaintiff argues the complaint alleges that the Living Trust “names” Ms. Pickens as a co-trustee of the Marital Trust and that the version of the Living Trust attached to Ms. Pickens’ motion supports this contention. (Doc. No. 21 at 17-18.) Plaintiff also argues that the Living Trust does not require Ms. Pickens to formally accept her nomination as co-trustee of the Marital Trust. (*Id.*)

Although Plaintiff and Ms. Pickens dispute the terms of the Living Trust as related to the creation and designation of trustee(s) for the Marital Trust, as alleged in the complaint, the Marital Trust was never funded. Accordingly, it is unclear how Plaintiff can plausibly articulate a claim for relief against Ms. Pickens based on a role that she never assumed by virtue of the Marital Trust never being funded.⁷ Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Ms. Pickens based on her role as the trustee of the Marital Trust. Accordingly, that claim is **DISMISSED**.

Next, Ms. Pickens asserts that she is not liable under § 6324(a)(2) as a beneficiary of the Living Trust. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 16.) Ms. Pickens contends that governing law is well-settled, and trust beneficiaries are not liable for estate taxes under § 6324(a)(2). (Doc. No. 15 at 16.) In support of this position, Ms. Pickens cites cases finding that trust beneficiaries are not “transferees” or

7. The Court notes that the parties disagree about what was required of Ms. Pickens to become the trustee of the Marital Trust. However, because that Trust was never funded, the Court need not interpret her obligations under the Living Trust with respect to her role as trustee of the Marital Trust.

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“beneficiaries” as those terms are defined by § 6324(a)(2). (*Id.*) Plaintiff argues § 6324 encompasses beneficiaries of trusts that are included in the gross estate, and disagrees with the line of authority cited by Ms. Pickens. (Doc. No. 21 at 22-26.)

26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2) imputes personal liability for federal estate taxes to certain individuals who receive property from an estate at the time of a decedent’s death. Under § 6324(a)(2), “if the estate tax. . . is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee. . . person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, who receives, or has on the date of the decedent’s death, property included in the gross estate” is personally liable for the tax “to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent’s death, of such property[.]” To establish personal liability under § 6324, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the estate tax was not paid when due, and the person against whom liability is asserted is one described in the section. *See Garrett v. Comm’r*, T.C. Memo. 1994-70, 1994 WL 52379 at *12; *Groetzing v. Commissioner*, 69 T.C. 309, 316 (1977). Definitions for the enumerated categories are not provided in the statute, so federal courts have developed a body of federal law for analyzing liability under § 6324(a)(2). *United States v. Johnson*, Case 2:11cv00087, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3925078, at *5 (D. Utah, July 29, 2013) (quoting *Schuster v. C.I.R.*, 312 F.2d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1962)).

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The complaint alleges that Ms. Pickens is a either trustee or beneficiary. A trustee is understood to be the trustee of a trust, within the common use of the term. *Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3925078 at *5 (defining trustee as the person who received the estate's property and held legal title, control, or possession of such property). The term "beneficiary" within the meaning of § 6324, however, has been more narrowly construed to include only the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. *See* 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, [WL] at *8 (citing *Garrett v. Comm'r*, T.C. Memo. 1994-70, 1994 WL 52379 at *12-14 (examining the legislative history and case law of § 6324(a)(2) to conclude "beneficiary" identifies the beneficiary of a life insurance policy). Plaintiff disputes this definition, providing its own analysis of the statutory text (Doc. No. 21 at 23-26); (Doc. No. 27 at 31-32.)

Despite the arguments advanced by Plaintiff, the Court finds *Johnson* persuasive and declines to depart from the reasoning articulated therein. Although Plaintiff argues that *Johnson* is incorrectly decided and contrary to Congressional intent, there is little authority supporting Plaintiff's position. (*See* Doc. No. 21 at 24) (citing *United States v. Bevan*, Case No 07cv1944, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102939, 2008 WL 5179299 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008)). However, the position advanced by Ms. Pickens is consistent with other court's interpretations of a "beneficiary" under § 6324. *See Baptiste v. C.I.R.*, T.C. Memo 1992-198, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2649 (T.C. 1992), *aff'd*, 29 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994); *Schuster v. Commissioner*, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1962).

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The complaint does not allege that Ms. Pickens is a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, or any insurance policy, at the time of Mr. Paulson's death. The bare assertion of Ms. Pickens is a "beneficiary" is insufficient in light of authority defining who constitutes a beneficiary under § 6324. For these reasons, the arguments advanced by Plaintiff regarding statutory construction, numerical symmetry within the statute and congressional intent are unpersuasive. (*See* Doc. No. 21 at 24-26.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Ms. Pickens as a beneficiary under § 6324.

The same is true with respect to any allegation that Ms. Pickens is liable as a trustee under § 6324. (*Id.* at 24-25 n.8) (arguing that if Ms. Pickens is not a beneficiary of the trust, "the trustee will always be personally liable under Section 6324(a)(2) for the date of death value of the trust assets held on the date of the decedent's death or received later by such trustee"). To the extent Plaintiff argues Ms. Pickens is a trustee of the Living Trust, the complaint lacks plausible factual allegation to support such a theory. (*See* Doc. No. 15-1 at 16 n.13.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for liability against Ms. Pickens based on her role as a beneficiary or trustee of the Living Trust are **DISMISSED**.

Finally, with respect to alleged liability under § 6324(a)(2), Ms. Pickens argues that she is not liable as the trustee of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 20.) Ms. Pickens contends property from the Estate was transferred to her in her capacity as a creditor or beneficiary of the Madeleine Anne Paulson

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Separate Property Trust. (*Id.*) Thereafter, Ms. Pickens relies on the same arguments set forth above predicated on her contention that she is neither a “transferee” nor a “beneficiary” as those terms are defined by § 6324. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff argues that Ms. Pickens received assets that were transferred from the Living Trust to the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust. (Doc. No. 21 at 20.) As the trustee of that Trust, Plaintiff contends Ms. Pickens is liable in her individual capacity for the value of the transferred assets. (*Id.*)

The complaint clearly alleges that Ms. Pickens was the trustee of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust, and that she received assets from the Living Trust. (*See* Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 33-35.) This is sufficient to state a claim against Ms. Pickens based on her alleged role as the trustee of the Madeleine Anne Paulson Separate Property Trust. As such, Ms. Pickens request for dismissal of the § 6324(a)(2) claim based on her receipt of assets from the Living Trust as the trustee of her separate property trust is **DENIED**.

3. Indemnification

Ms. Pickens also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for indemnification, arguing that she is not liable to the Estate for any estate taxes based on the indemnification provision of the 2003 Settlement. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 21.) Additionally, Ms. Pickens argues that Plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary to the 2003 Settlement and Plaintiff’s claim for breach of that agreement necessarily fails. (*Id.* at

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21-22.) Plaintiff argues Ms. Pickens' interpretation of the 2003 Settlement is self-serving and insufficient to conclude, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff is not a third party beneficiary. (Doc. No. 21 at 27.) As support for its position, Plaintiff cites portions of the 2003 Settlement, under which Ms. Pickens is responsible for payment of estate taxes stemming from the distribution of assets to her from the Living Trust. (*Id.* at 28.)

As alleged in the complaint, and assumed as true for the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff has stated a claim for indemnification against Ms. Pickens, either directly under the 2003 Settlement or through a third-party beneficiary theory. The Court will not engage in the contractual interpretation and determination of the merits as urged by the parties. *See Gardner v. RSM&A Foreclosure Servs., LLC*, No. 12CV2666, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37263, 2013 WL 1129392, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013) ("It is inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage for this Court to interpret the parties' contract and evaluate the viability of Plaintiff's claims based on the terms of the contract."). For these reasons, Ms. Pickens' motion to dismiss the claims for indemnification in the complaint is **DENIED**.

4. Interest

Lastly, Ms. Pickens argues that she is not liable for prejudgment and post-judgment interest under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6901, 6601, and 6621. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 22.) This argument is predicated on Ms. Pickens' contention that she has no liability for estate tax under 26 U.S.C. §

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6324(a)(2). (*Id.*) Because the Court has not yet adjudicated whether Ms. Pickens is liable for the estate tax, it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for interest. Accordingly, Ms. Pickens' request to dismiss the claims for prejudgment and post-judgment interest is **DENIED**.

For the reasons detailed above, Ms. Pickens' motion to dismiss is **GRANTED** as to any purported claim under § 3713, as well as any claim under § 6324(a)(2) stemming from Ms. Pickens' role as trustee of the Marital Trust, as beneficiary of the Living Trust, or as transferee of the Living Trust. As to all other asserted grounds, the motion to dismiss is **DENIED**.

C. Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen assert several of the same arguments as Ms. Pickens in support of dismissal. (*See generally* Doc. No. 19-1.) Plaintiff similarly opposes dismissal. (Doc. No. 27.) To the extent the parties' arguments with respect to this motion mirror those presented above, they are incorporated by reference as if fully restated herein.

1. 26 U.S.C. § 2002

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen argue they were never "statutory executors" of the Estate and cannot be held liable under § 2002. (*See* Doc. No. 19-1 at 10-11.) Having already concluded the complaint sufficiently alleges Michael Paulson resigned as executor of the

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Estate, and for the reasons set forth more full above, this argument is rejected. Accordingly, Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's request to dismiss the § 2002 claim is **DENIED**.

2. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a)(2)

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen argue that they are not liable for estate taxes as either transferees or trustees because they did not have or receive any property of the Estate on the date of Mr. Paulson's death. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 13.) Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen similarly rely on *Johnson*, but focus on the requirement that a transferee or trustee be in possession of the Estate property or receive Estate property "on the date of the decedent's death." (*Id.* at 14.) Plaintiff argues the clear language of § 6324 does not require that a transferee receive property on the date of the decedent's death under the statute. (Doc. No. 27 at 24-25.)

The Court similarly finds *Johnson* and the reasoning set forth therein persuasive with respect to whether Plaintiff must allege that the transferee received property immediately upon the date of decedent's death. *See Johnson*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671, 2013 WL 3925078, at *5 ("Because section 6324(a)(2) may be interpreted in multiple ways, it is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the Heirs. The court concludes that in order for a person to be a transferee under section 6324(a)(2), the person must have or receive property from the gross estate immediately upon the date of decedent's death rather than at some point thereafter."); *see also*

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Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508, 52 S. Ct. 260, 76 L. Ed. 422, 1932 C.B. 370, 1932-1 C.B. 370 (1932) (noting that ambiguities as to the meaning of a tax statute are interpreted in favor of the taxpayer). The complaint does not allege that Vikki Paulson or Ms. Christensen were in possession of Estate property or received such property immediately after Ms. Paulson's death. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Vikki Paulson or Ms. Christensen as trustees or transferees under § 6324(a)(2). Accordingly, those claims are **DISMISSED**.

3. California Probate Code § 19001

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim predicated on California Probate Code section 19001. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 19.) In support of dismissal, Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen argue that § 19001(a) does not apply to estate taxes, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for liability for unpaid estate taxes incurred after a settlor's death. (*Id.* at 19-20.) Plaintiff argues that it has stated a claim because § 19001 includes "expenses of administration of the estate" as well as "all other proper charges against the trust estate, including taxes." (Doc. No. 27 at 21) (quoting Cal. Prob. C. § 19000(f), § 19001(b)). Lastly, Plaintiff cites California Probate Code Section 11420, which states the priority to be assigned to debts, claims, and costs of administration to argue the estate taxes owed are entitled to the highest preference in order of payment. (*Id.* at 22.)

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California Probate Code section 19001(a) states, “Upon the death of a settlor, the property of the deceased settlor . . . is subject to the claims of creditors of the deceased settlor’s probate estate and to the expenses of administration of the probate estate to the extent that the deceased settlor’s probate estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims and expenses.” The portion of statutory text relied upon by Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen, Section 19000(a)(2) defines a “claim” as “a demand for payment for . . . [l]iability for taxes incurred before the deceased settlor’s death, whether assessed before or after the deceased settlor’s death[.]”

Considering the cited statutory text and the allegations in the complaint, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim under § 19001. (*See* Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 18, 66.) Whether the estate tax constitutes an expense of administration, a debt, or a claim as encompassed by section 19001, can be appropriately determined when the Court is not bound by the allegations in the complaint. Therefore the request to dismiss the claims based on California Probate Code § 19001 is **DENIED**.

4. Third-Party Contractual Claims

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen lastly move to dismiss the claim that they are liable for breach of a third party contract. (Doc. No 19-1 at 20.) Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen contend the complaint alleges that they breached an unspecified third party contract, but lacks factual allegations to support that theory of liability. (*Id.*)

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Plaintiff's opposition clarifies that the third party beneficiary theory stems from Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's roles as the current trustees of the Living Trust. (Doc. No. 27 at 19.) Plaintiff cites the terms of the Living Trust, which obligate the trustees to pay all estate taxes owed by the Estate as support for its position. (*Id.*)

Considering the allegations in the complaint as a whole, including the allegations that Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen are the current co-trustees of the Living Trust, Plaintiff has stated a claim under a third party beneficiary theory. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is **DENIED** as to this claim.

D. James Paulson's Motion to Dismiss

Defendant James Paulson is proceeding pro se in this litigation, and has similarly moved to dismiss the complaint. (*See* Doc. No. 36.) James Paulson challenges the propriety of the deferred payment election pursuant to § 6166, as well as the timeliness of Plaintiff's actions to collect the estate taxes owed.⁸ (*Id.*) James Paulson also argues there is no evidence that he was ever the executor of the Estate. (*Id.* at 7.)

8. Whether the § 6166 election was proper is not appropriate for consideration in the instant context as it is not a challenge to the adequacy of the factual allegations in the complaint. Additionally to the extent James Paulson's motion challenges the truth of the factual allegations underlying Plaintiff's complaint, those arguments are premature for consideration in the instant context.

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Like the other defendants, the complaint asserts a claim against James Paulson in his representative capacity as a potential statutory executor of the Estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2203. In opposition to James Paulson’s motion, Plaintiff acknowledges that it “merely seeks to obtain a judgment against the Estate by naming its executor or administrator in a representative capacity” to “reduce the estate tax liability to a judgment under 26 U.S.C. § 7402, and to extend the statute of limitations for collection of that tax under 26 U.S.C. § 6502.” (Doc. No. 42 at 5) Plaintiff also acknowledges that the defendant deemed to be the actual executive or administrator is of little consequence, so long as someone appears in the case as a representative of the Estate. (*Id.* at 6.)

As with the other defendants, the Court finds there are sufficient facts alleged, when taken as true, to state a plausible claim for relief against James Paulson as the statutory executor of the Estate. In addition to alleging Michael Paulson resigned as the court-appointed executor, the complaint alleges James Paulson acted as a co-trustee of the Living Trust. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 44.) These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against James Paulson as a statutory executor.

Plaintiff also asserts a claim against James Paulson for personal liability under § 6324(a)(2), because he served as a co-trustee of the Living Trust and received assets that were included in the gross estate. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 73-77); (Doc. No. 42 at 7.)⁹ Upon review, the Court finds

9. James Paulson does not address this claim in his motion to dismiss, but Plaintiff addresses it in opposition. (*See* Doc. No. 42 at 10.)

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the claim for personal liability under § 6324(a)(2) based on James Paulson's role as a co-trustee of the Estate is sufficiently alleged.

For these reasons, James Paulson's motion to dismiss is **DENIED**.

E. Ms. Pickens' Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claim

Defendant Michael Paulson did not move to dismiss the claims asserted in the complaint, instead filing an answer and cross-claim. (Doc. No. 38.) Michael Paulson asserts he is entitled to indemnification from Ms. Pickens based on a provision in 2003 Settlement agreement. (*Id.* at 21.)¹⁰ Ms. Pickens has moved to dismiss the cross-claim citing various sections of the 2003 Settlement, arguing that any indemnification by Ms. Pickens relates only to estate tax payable because of distributions made pursuant to the 2003 Settlement. (Doc. No. 40-1 at 3.) Ms. Pickens contends that Michael Paulson's cross-claim fails to state a claim because there has been no estate tax liability assessed because of distributions made to Ms. Pickens, as all distributions qualified for the marital deduction. (*Id.* at 4.) In opposition, Michael Paulson urges the Court not to dismiss the cross-claim until liability for the estate taxes at issue has been determined.

The Court agrees that dismissal of Michael Paulson's cross-claim for indemnification would be premature at

10. Additionally, Michael Paulson asserts he is entitled to indemnity as trustee of the Living Trust and as co-executor of the Estate. (*Id.*)

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this stage. Additionally, the parties rely on different provisions of the 2003 Settlement agreement as support for their respective positions regarding indemnification. For example, Ms. Pickens relies on paragraph 21 of the 2003 Settlement, while Michael Paulson suggests indemnification is appropriate under paragraph 4.¹¹ In the limited context of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court declines to decide which provision governs. For these reasons, Ms. Pickens' motion to dismiss the cross-claim is **DENIED**.

F. Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claim

Michael Paulson similarly asserts a cross-claim against Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen for indemnification stemming from the 2013 Settlement. (Doc. No. 38 at 21.) In opposition, Michael Paulson similarly requests the Court decline to dismiss the claim for indemnification until liability has been established. (Doc. No. 51 at 5.)

Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen assert several grounds for dismissal, including that they are not executors of the Estate, that Michael Paulson released any claim for indemnification as part of the 2013 Settlement, and that the portion of the Settlement relied upon by Michael Paulson omits crucial language. (Doc. No. 44 at 7.) Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen also filed a second request for judicial notice with their motion to dismiss the

11. Michael Paulson alternatively argues paragraph 21 of the 2003 Settlement is ambiguous and cannot be interpreted as a matter of law to preclude his claim for indemnification.

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cross-claim and seek judicial notice of several documents pursuant to Rule 201 or the doctrine of incorporation by reference. (Doc. No. 44-2.) The arguments in support of dismissing Michael Paulson's claim for indemnification rely largely on testimony before the Probate Court regarding the 2013 Settlement and the terms of the agreement itself. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. No. 44-1 at 9-11.)

For many of the same reasons articulated above, the Court declines to dismiss Michael Paulson's claim for indemnification against Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen at this time. First, Michael Paulson objects to the request for judicial notice, arguing the documents are irrelevant in ruling on the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 51 at 6 n.4.) Michael Paulson also argues that the Probate Court transcript has been highly edited in an attempt to demonstrate that Michael Paulson knew he was releasing any claim for indemnification. (*Id.*) Although the Court could properly consider the transcript in its entirety, it declines to do so where the meaning and effect of 2013 Settlement agreement is disputed. As noted in opposition, "it is unclear whether any of the [Plaintiff's] claims against Michael Paulson arise out of the 2013 Settlement Agreement." (*Id.*) If liability is determined, then a claim for indemnification could possibly arise based on the facts alleged in the cross-claim. Dismissal of the claim when the underlying grounds for liability have not yet been adjudicated is premature.

Additionally, Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen rely on the argument that they are not statutory executors of the Estate in support of dismissal. As set forth above,

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the complaint states plausible grounds for finding they were executors of the Estate following Mr. Paulson's resignation. With respect to resignation, Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen now assert Michael Paulson never completed his resignation because he did not file an accounting or deliver the Estate to a successor personal representative. (Doc. No. 44-1 at 18.) Again, factual allegations contrary to those in the complaint and that are directed at the merits of a claim are not appropriate for consideration. For these reasons, the Court declines to dismiss Michael Paulson's cross-claim, and Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's motion is therefore **DENIED**. Because the Court will not consider the documents attached to the request for judicial notice to the extent suggested by the parties, the request for judicial notice is also **DENIED**.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Ms. Pickens' motion to dismiss the complaint, (Doc. No. 15), is **GRANTED** as to any claim under § 3713, and as to any claim based on her role as the trustee of the Marital Trust. The motion is **DENIED** on all other grounds.
2. Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's motion to dismiss the complaint, (Doc. No. 19), is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**. The request for judicial notice filed in connection with the motion to

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dismiss the complaint, (Doc. No. 19-2), is **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**.

3. James Paulson's motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 36), is **DENIED**.
4. Ms. Pickens' motion to dismiss the cross-claim, (Doc. No. 40), is **DENIED**.
5. Vikki Paulson and Ms. Christensen's motion to dismiss the cross-claim, (Doc. No. 44), is **DENIED**. The request for judicial notice filed with the motion to dismiss the cross-claim, (Doc. No. 44-2), is also **DENIED**.

If Plaintiff may plausibly allege additional facts to cure the deficiencies noted herein, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint only as to the dismissed claims within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. Defendants are otherwise ordered to file an answer to the complaint or cross-claim, as applicable, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order or within fourteen (14) days of an amended complaint being filed, whichever is later.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2016

/s/ Anthony J. Battaglia
Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia
United States District Judge

**APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FILED JULY 25, 2023**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-55197

D.C. No.
3:15-cv-02057-AJB-NLS
Southern District of California,
San Diego

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JAMES D. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; VIKKI E. PAULSON,
INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E.
PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; CRYSTAL
CHRISTENSEN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS
STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE
OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST;
MADELEINE PICKENS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS TRUSTEE OF
THE MARITAL TRUST CREATED UNDER THE
ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST; AND AS

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TRUSTEE OF THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON
SEPARATE PROPERTY TRUST,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-55230

D.C. No.
3:15-cv-02057-AJB-NLS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN MICHAEL PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND
AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E.
PAULSON; JAMES D. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY;
AND AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF ALLEN E. PAULSON, MADELEINE
PICKENS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS STATUTORY
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALLEN E.
PAULSON; AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARITAL
TRUST CREATED UNDER THE ALLEN E.
PAULSON LIVING TRUST; AND AS TRUSTEE OF
THE MADELEINE ANNE PAULSON SEPARATE
PROPERTY TRUST,

Defendants,

and

VIKKI E. PAULSON, INDIVIDUALLY; AND AS
STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE
OF THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST;
CRYSTAL CHRISTENSEN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND

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AS STATUTORY EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ALLEN E. PAULSON; AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF
THE ALLEN E. PAULSON LIVING TRUST,
Defendants-Appellants.

ORDER

Before: WARDLAW, IKUTA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Judges Wardlaw and Bade have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc filed by Appellees Crystal Christensen and Vikki E. Paulson and to deny the petition for rehearing en banc filed by Appellee Madeleine Pickens. Judge Ikuta voted to grant both petitions for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of both petitions for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petitions for rehearing en banc, Dkts 67 and 68, are denied.