

No. 22-58

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

TEXAS AND LOUISIANA

*ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT*

JOINT APPENDIX

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
*Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217*

JUDD EDWARD STONE II
*Solicitor General
Texas Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
Austin, TX 78711-2548
judd.stone@oag.texas.gov
(512) 936-1700*

*Counsel of Record
for Petitioners*

*Counsel of Record
for Respondents*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED: JULY 8, 2022
CERTIORARI GRANTED: JULY 21, 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
District court docket entries (6:21-cv-16).....	1
Court of appeals docket entries (22-40367)	62
First Amended Complaint (D. Ct. Doc. 109) (filed Oct. 22, 2021).....	72
Memorandum from Alejandro Mayorkas to Tae Johnson: Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30, 2021) (D. Ct. Doc. 122-1) (filed Nov. 12, 2021).....	110
Department of Homeland Security Memorandum: Significant Considerations in Developing Updated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30, 2021) (D. Ct. Doc. 122-7) (filed Nov. 12, 2021).....	121
Corrected Index for Certified Administrative Record for Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws (D. Ct. Doc. 145-1) (filed Jan. 5, 2022)	165
Memorandum from Doris Meissner to regional directors, district directors, chief patrol agents, and regional and district counsel: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000) (D. Ct. Doc. 146-3) (filed Jan. 5, 2022).....	189
Memorandum for Alejandro Mayorkas: Stakeholder Outreach in Furtherance of Department Civil Immigration Enforcement Guidance (Sept. 17, 2021) (D. Ct. Doc. 146-11) (filed Jan. 5, 2022)	213
Excerpt of Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Drew B. Tipton, Day 1 – Morning Session (Feb. 23, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 203) (filed Feb. 23, 2022)	222

II

Table of Contents—Continued:	Page
Excerpts of Transcript of Bench Trial Proceedings, Day 1 – Afternoon Session, Heard Before The Honorable Drew B. Tipton, United States District Judge (Feb. 23, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 210) (filed Feb. 28, 2022).....	251
Supplemental Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit C (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed March 2, 2022).....	266
Declaration of Bill E. Waybourn (Jan. 7, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed Mar. 2, 2022).....	270
Declaration of Rebecca Waltz (Jan. 6, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed Mar. 2, 2022).....	274
Declaration of Susan Bricker (Jan. 7, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed Mar. 2, 2022).....	277
Declaration of Leonardo R. Lopez (Jan. 3, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed Mar. 2, 2022).....	282
Declaration of Sean Grove (Apr. 26, 2021) (D. Ct. Doc. 217) (filed Mar. 2, 2022).....	286
District court memorandum opinion and order (D. Ct. Doc. 240) (filed June 10, 2022).....	289
District court final judgment (D. Ct. Doc. 241) (filed June 10, 2022)	404
Notice of appeal (D. Ct. Doc. 242) (filed June 13, 2022)	406
Declaration of Daniel Bible (June 13, 2022) (D. Ct. Doc. 244-1) (filed June 13, 2022).....	409
District court order denying stay (D. Ct. Doc. 248) (filed June 14, 2022)	446
Court of appeals denial of stay (filed July 6, 2022)	451
Supreme Court order granting certiorari (filed July 21, 2022)	487

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
(VICTORIA)

Docket No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR OFFICIAL
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; TRACY RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DEFENDANTS

DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
4/6/21	1	COMPLAINT against All De- fendants (Filing fee \$ 402 receipt number 0541-26228826) filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A— Jan. 20, 2021 Memo, # 2 Exhibit

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		B—Feb. 18, 2021 Memo, # 3 Exhibit C—Texas_DHS Agreement, # 4 Exhibit D—Louisiana_DHS Agreement, # 5 Civil Cover Sheet) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 04/06/2021)
		* * * * *
4/27/21	18	MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. Motion Docket Date 5/18/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 04/27/2021)
4/27/21	19	APPENDIX re: 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W)(Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 04/27/2021)
		* * * * *

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
5/11/21	25	BRIEF In Support re: 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Advocates for Victims of Illegal Alien Crime, filed. (Zimlong, Walter) (Entered: 05/11/2021) * * * * *
5/18/21	42	RESPONSE in Opposition to 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Proposed Order)(Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 05/18/2021) * * * * *
5/19/21	46	SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION of JASON CLARK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RE DE 45, 41

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		AND 18, filed. (legarza, 2) (Entered: 05/20/2021)
		* * * * *
5/24/21	48	MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION re: 47 Order on Motion for Leave to File, 39 MOTION for Leave to File File a Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by Immigration Reform Law Institute, filed. (fcarbia, 2) (Entered: 05/24/2021)
5/24/21	49	BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FIEL HOUSTON AND RAICES re: 44 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief, 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, 47 Order on Motion for Leave to File by FIEL Houston, Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, filed. (fcarbia, 2) (Entered: 05/24/2021)
		* * * * *

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
5/25/21	51	REPLY in Support of 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 05/25/2021) * * * * *
6/17/21	57	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re: 42 Response in Opposition to Motion,, by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit California v. Texas) (Knapp, Michael) (Entered: 06/17/2021) * * * * *
6/23/21	60	RESPONSE to 57 Notice (Other), of Supplemental Authority, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/23/2021)
6/24/21	61	NOTICE TO THE PARTIES The Court Orders Responses due by 6/28/2021. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified.

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		(Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 06/24/2021)
6/28/21	62	RESPONSE to 61 Order, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 06/28/2021)
6/28/21	63	ADVISORY by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 06/28/2021)
		* * * * *
6/30/21	65	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re: 42 Response in Opposition to Motion,, by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed.

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Arizona District Court Decision) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 06/30/2021)
7/1/21	66	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/01/2021)
7/2/21	67	RESPONSE to 66 Notice (Other), filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 07/02/2021)
7/2/21		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 7/2/2021. The parties agreed on the record that no additional discovery needs to take place prior to the resolution of the Preliminary Injunction. No party is requesting the Administrative Record to be filed prior to the res-

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		olution of the Preliminary Injunction. Parties will inform the Court as to whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate by the close of business Friday, July 9, 2021. Appearances: Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, William Thomas Thompson. (Digital # 10:02-10:17) (ERO: Jessie Hutchinson), filed. (Kellie Pappaioannou, 2) (Entered: 07/02/2021)
7/6/21	68	RESPONSE to 65 Notice (Other), of Supplemental Authority, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/06/2021)
7/9/21	69	ADVISORY by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 07/09/2021)
7/9/21	70	RESPONSE to Status Conference,, specifically the Court's

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Question about a Hearing, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/09/2021)
7/12/21	71	MOTION to Consolidate Lead Case No. 6:21-cv-00016 and Member Case No. 3:21-cv-00168, MOTION to Stay Pending Consideration of Next Steps (Motion Docket Date 8/2/2021.) by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 07/12/2021)
		* * * * *
7/15/21	73	RESPONSE in Opposition to 71 MOTION to Consolidate Lead Case No. 6:21-cv-00016 and Member Case No. 3:21-cv-00168 MOTION to Stay Pending Consideration of Next Steps, filed by Brad Coe. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Affidavit of Brad Coe, # 2 Coe Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Injunction) (Kobach, Kris) (Entered: 07/15/2021)
7/16/21	74	RESPONSE in Opposition to 71 MOTION to Consolidate Lead Case No. 6:21-cv-00016 and Member Case No. 3:21-cv-00168 MOTION to Stay Pending Consideration of Next Steps, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 07/16/2021)
7/26/21	75	ORDER Denying 71 Motion to Consolidate Cases; Denying as moot 72 Motion to Expedite. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 07/27/2021)
8/16/21	76	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2:21-cv-67 Memorandum Opinion and Order, # 2 Exhibit 1:18-cv-68 Memorandum and Order, # 3 Exhibit 1:18-cv-68 Order of Permanent Injunction) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 08/16/2021)
8/18/21	77	RESPONSE to 76 Notice (Other), , filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/18/2021)
8/18/21	78	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A—Arizona District Court Order, # 2 Exhibit B—Arizona Ninth Circuit Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/18/2021)
8/19/21	79	MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Granting 18 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 08/19/2021)

* * * * *

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
8/20/21	81	NOTICE OF APPEAL to US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re: 79 Preliminary Injunction by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/20/2021)
8/20/21	82	Opposed MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 9/10/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Peter Berg, # 2 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/20/2021)

* * * * *

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
8/22/21	85	RESPONSE in Opposition to 82 Opposed MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Homan Declaration, # 2 Exhibit B: Article on Detention) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 08/22/2021)
8/22/21	86	REPLY in Support of 82 Opposed MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/22/2021)
8/23/21	87	NOTICE of Supplemental Declaration re: 82 Opposed MOTION to Stay Preliminary Injunction by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Burke) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 08/23/2021)
		* * * * *
8/23/21	90	ORDER Granting in Part 82 Motion to Stay. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 08/23/2021)
		* * * * *
8/23/21	92	ORDER (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 08/24/2021)
8/23/21		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 8/23/2021. The Court heard argument on Defendants Emergency Motion to Stay 82. The Defendants originally misunderstood the reporting requirements in the August 19, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order 79 to be injunctive relief. The Court explained to the Parties that the reporting requirements are a case

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
8/24/21	93	<p>management tool to monitor compliance and to gather information that would be relevant and helpful for the Court in making a final determination at trial. The Court went through the four reporting requirements with the Parties one by one. The Defendants requested certain modifications to those reporting requirements that the Court will address by separate Order. The parties will confer and file any suggested revisions to these reporting requirements by September 1, 2021. The first report is continued until October 5, 2021. The Parties will confer and propose a schedule for discovery and trial. Appearances: Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, Patrick K Sweeten, William Thomas Thompson. (Digital # 9:00-9:53) (ERO: Nicole Tirado), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 08/24/2021)</p> <p>APPEAL TRANSCRIPT re Motion Hearing (Via Zoom) held on August 23, 2021 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Judicial Transcribers</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		of Texas, LLC. Ordering Party: Patrick K. Sweeten. This transcript relates to the following: 88 AO435 Transcript Request, 81 Notice of Appeal, 91 AO435 Transcript Request,. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/22/2021., filed. (mahenry,) (Entered: 08/24/2021)
		* * * * *
8/26/21	95	TRANSCRIPT re: Motion Hearing—AMENDED TRANSCRIPT (VIA ZOOM) held on August 23, 2021 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Judicial Transcribers of Texas, LLC. Ordering Party Patrick K. Sweeten Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/24/2021., filed. (mahenry,) (Entered: 08/26/2021)
		* * * * *
9/1/21	97	NOTICE of filing Joint Advisory re Questions Raised During 08/23/21 Hearing re: 92 Order by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 09/01/2021)
9/1/21	98	STATUS REPORT by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		<p>Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Rapp) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 09/01/2021)</p> <p>* * * * *</p>
9/8/21	99	<p>NOTICE of Service of Administrative Record by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Unredacted attachment of Administrative Record Certification, # 2 Unredacted attachment of Index to Administrative Record) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 09/08/2021)</p> <p>* * * * *</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
9/15/21	102	OPINION of USCA re: 81 Notice of Appeal; USCA No. 21-40618. We therefore GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the motion to stay the preliminary injunction. The injunction is STAYED pending appeal in all other respects including the reporting requirements, filed. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Letter) (Carrie Dickie, 6) Modified on 9/15/2021 (Carrie Dickie, 6). (Entered: 09/15/2021)
9/15/21	103	Opposed MOTION for Discovery by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. Motion Docket Date 10/6/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order) (Sweeten, Patrick) (Entered: 09/15/2021)
9/22/21	104	RESPONSE in Opposition to 103 Opposed MOTION for Discovery, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 09/22/2021)
9/29/21	105	REPLY in Support of 103 Opposed MOTION for Discovery, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 09/29/2021)
9/30/21	106	NOTICE of New Enforcement Priorities by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 09/30/2021)
		* * * * *
10/13/21		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 10/13/2021. Plaintiffs inform the Court that they intend to file an amended complaint by Friday October 22, 2021. The parties

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		<p>agree to confer on extending the Unites States answer date to the current complaint, which is due on October 28, 2021. The pending Motion for Discovery 103 is currently under advisement. Appearances: Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, Patrick K Sweeten, William Thomas Thompson, Ryan Daniel Walters. (Digital # 9:01-9:30) (ERO: Frenchie Carbia), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 10/13/2021)</p> <p>* * * * *</p>
10/22/21	109	<p>First AMENDED COMPLAINT against Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A—January 20 Memorandum, # 2 Exhibit B—February 18 Memorandum, # 3 Exhibit C—Texas</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Agreement, # 4 Exhibit D—Louisiana Agreement, # 5 Exhibit E—September 30 Memorandum) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 10/22/2021)
		* * * * *
10/22/21	111	MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. Motion Docket Date 11/12/2021. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 10/22/2021)
		* * * * *
10/25/21	115	APPENDIX re: 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit JANUARY 20 MEMORANDUM, # 2 Exhibit FEBRUARY 18 MEMORANDUM, # 3 Exhibit DECLARATION OF JASON CLARK, # 4 Exhibit DECLARATION OF JASON CLARK, # 5 Exhibit DECLARATION OF BILL E. WAYBOURN (TARRANT COUNTY

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		SHERIFF), # 6 Exhibit DECLARATION OF REBECCA WALTZ (TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE), # 7 Exhibit DECLARATION OF LISA KALAKANIS (TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION), # 8 Exhibit DECLARATION OF LEONARDO R. LOPEZ (TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY), # 9 Exhibit DECLARATION OF SEAN GROVE (TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT), # 10 Exhibit TEXAS AGREEMENT, # 11 Exhibit LOUISIANA AGREEMENT, # 12 Exhibit DECLARATION OF JONATHAN R. VINING (LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS), # 13 Exhibit LETTER FROM DHS TO TEXAS, # 14 Exhibit ICE FY2020 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, # 15 Exhibit ICE FY2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, # 16 Exhibit NEWS RELEASE: ICE ANNOUNCES CASE REVIEW PROCESS, #

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
10/25/21	116	<p>17 Exhibit ICE DETENTION DATA, FY2021 YTD, # 18 Exhibit ICE DETENTION DATA, FY2020, # 19 Exhibit ICE ANNUAL REPORT FY2020) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 10/25/2021)</p> <p>Second APPENDIX re: 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DOJ 2018 UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM, # 2 Exhibit CENSUS BUREAU TABLE: GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS, # 3 Exhibit THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN TEXAS: SOURCES OF GROWTH, # 4 Exhibit GONE TO TEXAS, # 5 Exhibit SEPTEMBER 30 MEMORANDUM) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 10/25/2021)</p>
11/4/21	117	<p>NOTICE of Administrative Record by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Administrative Record Certification, # 2 Administrative Record Index) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 11/04/2021)
		* * * * *
11/5/21	120	BRIEF of Immigration Reform Law Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 111 Plaintiff's MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by Immigration Reform Law Institute, filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 11/05/2021)
		* * * * *
11/12/21	122	RESPONSE in Opposition to 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		<p>Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A—New Guidance, # 2 Exhibit B—ICE Policy 10074.2, # 3 Exhibit C—Pekoske Memo, # 4 Exhibit D—Interim Guidance, # 5 Exhibit E—AART Data, # 6 Exhibit F—Berg Dec, # 7 Exhibit G Considerations Memo, # 8 Exhibit H—AR Index, # 9 Exhibit I Stakeholder Outreach (Sept. 17, 2021), # 10 Exhibit J—Listening Sessions, # 11 Exhibit K—Stakeholder Outreach April 6-9, # 12 Exhibit L—Stakeholder Outreach April 14-May 20, # 13 Exhibit M Decker Decl, # 14 Exhibit N—Burke Decl, # 15 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 11/12/2021)</p> <p>* * * * *</p>
11/15/21	124	<p>Order of USCA re: 81 Notice of Appeal; USCA No. 21-40618. IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave to file amicus brief for Amicus Curiae Advocates for Victims of Illegal Crime in support of</p>

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Appellee's opposition to injunction is GRANTED, filed. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter) (Carrie Dickie, 6) (Entered: 11/15/2021)
11/15/21	125	Order of USCA re: 81 Notice of Appeal; USCA No. 21-40618. IT IS ORDERED that the motion for leave to file amicus brief for Amicus Curiae Immigration Reform Law Institute in support of Appellees' rehearing en banc is GRANTED, filed. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter) (Carrie Dickie, 6) (Entered: 11/15/2021)
11/18/21	126	Order of USCA re: 81 Notice of Appeal; USCA No. 21-40618. IT IS ORDERED that the unopposed motion of FIEL Houston and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES) to file an amici curiae brief in support of Appellants is GRANTED, filed. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter) (Carrie Dickie, 6) (Entered: 11/18/2021)

* * * * *

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
11/19/21	128	REPLY in Support of 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Y—MPP Termination memo, # 2 Exhibit Z—MPP Termination explanation memo) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 11/19/2021)
		* * * * *
12/1/21	130	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re: 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 12/01/2021)
12/3/21	131	RESPONSE to 130 Notice (Other), , filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America.

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		(Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 12/03/2021)
		* * * * *
12/10/21	135	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 12/10/2021)
12/13/21	136	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 12/13/2021)
		* * * * *
12/20/21	139	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 12/20/2021)
12/23/21	140	ORDER Final Pretrial Conference set for January 31, 2022 at 01:00 PM in Courtroom 11A before Judge Drew B Tipton in Houston, Texas. Bench Trial set for February 1, 2022 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 11A before Judge Drew B Tipton in Houston, Texas. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 12/23/2021)
12/27/21	141	TRANSCRIPT re: Scheduling Conference (Via Zoom) held on December 7, 2021 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Transcriber Judicial Transcribers of Texas, LLC. Ordering Party Adam Kirschner Release of Transcript Restriction set for 3/28/2022., filed. (mahenry,) (Entered: 12/27/2021)
		* * * * *
1/5/22	145	NOTICE of Corrected AR Index re: 117 Notice (Other), by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Corrected AR Index) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)
1/5/22	146	NOTICE of AR Part 1 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
1/5/22	147	<p>AR Doc 1, # 2 AR Doc 2, # 3 AR Doc 3, # 4 AR Doc 4, # 5 AR Doc 5, # 6 AR Doc 6, # 7 AR Doc 7, # 8 AR Doc 8, # 9 AR Doc 9, # 10 AR Doc 10, # 11 AR Doc 11, # 12 AR Doc 12, # 13 AR Doc 13, # 14 AR Doc 14, # 15 AR Doc 15) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)</p> <p>NOTICE of AR Part 2 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 16 Part 1, # 2 AR Doc 16 Part 2, # 3 AR Doc 16 Part 3, # 4 AR Doc 16 Part 4, # 5 AR Doc 16 Part 5, # 6 AR Doc 16 Part 6, # 7 AR Doc 16 Part 7, # 8 AR Doc 16 Part 8, # 9 AR Doc 16 Part 9, # 10 AR Doc 16 Part 10, # 11 AR Doc 16 Part 11, # 12 AR Doc 16 Part 12, # 13 AR Doc 16 Part 13, # 14 AR Doc 16 Part 14, # 15 AR Doc 16 Part 15, # 16 AR Doc 16 Part 16, # 17 AR Doc 16 Part 17, # 18 AR Doc 16 Part 18, # 19 AR Doc 16</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
1/5/22	148	<p>Part 19, # 20 AR Doc 16 Part 20, # 21 AR Doc 16 Part 21, # 22 AR Doc 16 Part 22, # 23 AR Doc 16 Part 23, # 24 AR Doc 16 Part 24, # 25 AR Doc 16 Part 25) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)</p> <p>NOTICE of AR Part 3 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 17, # 2 AR Doc 18, # 3 AR Doc 19, # 4 AR Doc 20, # 5 AR Doc 21, # 6 AR Doc 22, # 7 AR Doc 23, # 8 AR Doc 24, # 9 AR Doc 25, # 10 AR Doc 26, # 11 AR Doc 27, # 12 AR Doc 28, # 13 AR Doc 29, # 14 AR Doc 30, # 15 AR Doc 31, # 16 AR Doc 32, # 17 AR Doc 33, # 18 AR Doc 34, # 19 AR Doc 35, # 20 AR Doc 36, # 21 AR Doc 37, # 22 AR Doc 38, # 23 AR Doc 39, # 24 AR Doc 40) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
1/5/22	149	NOTICE AR Part 4 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 41, # 2 AR Doc 42, # 3 AR Doc 43, # 4 AR Doc 44, # 5 AR Doc 45, # 6 AR Doc 46, # 7 AR Doc 47, # 8 AR Doc 48, # 9 AR Doc 49, # 10 AR Doc 50, # 11 AR Doc 51, # 12 AR Doc 52, # 13 AR Doc 53, # 14 AR Doc 54, # 15 AR Doc 55, # 16 AR Doc 56, # 17 AR Doc 57, # 18 AR Doc 58, # 19 AR Doc 59, # 20 AR Doc 60, # 21 AR Doc 61, # 22 AR Doc 62, # 23 AR Doc 63) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)
1/5/22	150	NOTICE AR Part 5 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
1/5/22	151	<p>Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 64 Part 1, # 2 AR Doc 64 Part 2, # 3 AR Doc 64 Part 3, # 4 AR Doc 65 Part 1, # 5 AR Doc 65 Part 2, # 6 AR Doc 66, # 7 AR Doc 67, # 8 AR Doc 68, # 9 AR Doc 69 Part 1, # 10 AR Doc 69 Part 2, # 11 AR Doc 69 Part 3, # 12 AR Doc 69 Part 4, # 13 AR Doc 69 Part 5, # 14 AR Doc 69 Part 6, # 15 AR Doc 69 Part 7, # 16 AR Doc 69 Part 8, # 17 AR Doc 69 Part 9, # 18 AR Doc 70) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)</p> <p>NOTICE AR Part 6 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 71, # 2 AR Doc 72, # 3 AR Doc 73, # 4 AR Doc 74, # 5 AR Doc 75, # 6 AR Doc 76, # 7 AR Doc 77, # 8 AR Doc 78, # 9 AR Doc 79, # 10 AR Doc 80, # 11 AR Doc 81, # 12 AR Doc 82, # 13</p>

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		AR Doc 83, # 14 AR Doc 84, # 15 AR Doc 85, # 16 AR Doc 86, # 17 AR Doc 87, # 18 AR Doc 88, # 19 AR Doc 89 Part 1, # 20 AR Doc 89 Part 2, # 21 AR Doc 90) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)
1/5/22	152	NOTICE of AR Part 7 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser- vices, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of Amer- ica, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 91, # 2 AR Doc 92, # 3 AR Doc 93, # 4 AR Doc 94 Part 1, # 5 AR Doc 94 Part 2, # 6 AR Doc 95 Part 1, # 7 AR Doc 95 Part 2, # 8 AR Doc 96 Part 1, # 9 AR Doc 96 Part 2, # 10 AR Doc 97 Part 1, # 11 AR Doc 97 Part 2, # 12 AR Doc 97 Part 3, # 13 AR Doc 97 Part 4, # 14 AR Doc 97 Part 5, # 15 AR Doc 97 Part 6, # 16 AR Doc 97 Part 7, # 17 AR Doc 97 Part 8, # 18 AR Doc 97 Part 9, # 19 AR Doc 97 Part 10, # 20 AR Doc 98 Part 1, # 21 AR Doc 98 Part 2, # 22 AR Doc 99, # 23 AR Doc 100)

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
1/5/22	153	(Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022) NOTICE of AR Part 8 by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser- vices, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of Amer- ica, filed. (Attachments: # 1 AR Doc 101, # 2 AR Doc 102, # 3 AR Doc 103, # 4 AR Doc 104, # 5 AR Doc 105, # 6 AR Doc 106, # 7 AR Doc 107 Part 1, # 8 AR Doc 107 Part 2, # 9 AR Doc 107 Part 3, # 10 AR Doc 107 Part 4, # 11 AR Doc 107 Part 5, # 12 AR Doc 107 Part 6, # 13 AR Doc 108 Part 1, # 14 AR Doc 108 Part 2, # 15 AR Doc 108 Part 3, # 16 AR Doc 109, # 17 AR Doc 110, # 18 AR Doc 111 Part 1, # 19 AR Doc 111 Part 2, # 20 AR Doc 111 Part 3, # 21 AR Doc 112, # 22 AR Doc 113, # 23 AR Doc 114, # 24 AR Doc 115, # 25 AR Doc 116, # 26 AR Doc 117 Part 1, # 27 AR Doc 117 Part 2, # 28 AR Doc 117 Part 3, # 29 AR Doc 117 Part 4, # 30 AR Doc 118, # 31 AR Doc 119, # 32

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		AR Doc 120) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/05/2022)
		* * * * *
1/11/22	156	Exhibit List by State of Texas (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/11/2022)
1/11/22	157	Witness List by State of Texas (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/11/2022)
1/11/22	158	Corrected Exhibit List by State of Texas(Walters, Ryan) (En- tered: 01/11/2022)
		* * * * *
1/20/22	161	Exhibit List by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States De- partment of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/20/2022)
1/20/22	162	Witness List by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/20/2022)
1/21/22	163	MOTION to Amend 158 Exhibit List, 157 Witness List by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/11/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A—Proposed amended witness list, # 3 Exhibit B—Proposed amended exhibit list, # 4 Exhibit C—Sample emails) (Walters, Ryan) Modified on 1/24/2022 to restrict Attachment #4 per filer's request. Redacted version to be filed (Carrie Dickie, 6). (Entered: 01/21/2022)
		* * * * *
1/24/22	166	REDACTION to 163 MOTION to Amend 158 Exhibit List, 157 Witness List by State of Texas, filed. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
1/24/22	167	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority re: 111 MOTION to Postpone the Effective Date of

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Agency Action, or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Texas v Biden) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
1/24/22	168	RESPONSE in Opposition to 163 MOTION to Amend 158 Exhibit List, 157 Witness List, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
1/24/22	169	MOTION In Limine re Certain Proposed Evidence and Proposed Testimony by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security,

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/14/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
1/24/22	170	MOTION to Exclude Declaration and Proposed Testimony of Tom Homan by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/14/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
1/24/22	171	Corrected MOTION to Exclude Declaration and Proposed Testimony of Tom Homan by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Security, United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/14/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 01/24/2022)
		* * * * *
1/25/22	173	REPLY in Support of 163 MOTION to Amend 158 Exhibit List, 157 Witness List, filed by State of Texas. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/25/2022)
1/25/22		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. MOTION HEARING held on 1/25/2022. The Court GRANTS 163 MOTION to Amend 158 Exhibit List, 157 Witness List and made findings on the record. Final Pretrial Conference reset for February 22, 2022 at 01:00 PM before Judge Drew B Tipton in Courtroom 11A in Houston, Texas. Bench Trial reset for February 23, 2022 at 09:00 AM before Judge Drew B Tipton in Courtroom 11 A in Houston, Texas. The parties will submit a proposed amended Scheduling Order. Appearances: Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu. (Digital # 1:32-2:11) (ERO:

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Genay Rogan), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 01/25/2022)
1/26/22	174	Amended Exhibit List by State of Texas (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 01/26/2022)
1/26/22	175	Amended Witness List by State of Texas (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 01/26/2022)
		* * * * *
1/31/22	177	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Order) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 01/31/2022)
2/1/22	178	RESPONSE to 167 Notice (Other), filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/01/2022)
		* * * * *
2/2/22	180	RESPONSE in Opposition to 169 MOTION In Limine re Certain

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
2/3/22	181	<p>Proposed Evidence and Proposed Testimony, 171 Corrected MOTION to Exclude Declaration and Proposed Testimony of Tom Homan, filed by State of Louisiana, State of Texas. (Olson, Leif) (Entered: 02/02/2022)</p> <p>ADVISORY by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/03/2022)</p>
2/11/22	183	<p>* * * * *</p> <p>Order of USCA; Judgment issued as mandate February 11, 2022 re: 81 Notice of Appeal; USCA No. 21-40618. IT IS ORDERED that Appellants' unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(b) is GRANTED, filed. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Letter) (Carrie Dickie, 6) (Entered: 02/11/2022)</p>

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
* * * * *		
2/15/22	186	ADVISORY by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/15/2022)
2/15/22	187	NOTICE re: 169 MOTION In Limine re Certain Proposed Evidence and Proposed Testimony by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/15/2022)
2/15/22	188	NOTICE re: 171 Corrected MOTION to Exclude Declaration and Proposed Testimony of Tom Homan by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller,

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/15/2022)
2/15/22	189	MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Extra Record Evidence re: 182 Notice of Setting/Resetting FORM - CV, by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/15/2022)
2/15/22	190	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 02/15/2022)
2/15/22	191	ADVISORY by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit MPP extra record opinion)(Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 02/15/2022)

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		* * * * *
2/17/22	193	Proposed Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/17/2022)
2/17/22	194	Proposed Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law by State of Louisiana, State of Texas (Olson, Leif) (Entered: 02/17/2022)
2/17/22		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 2/17/202. The Court heard argument on Defendants Motion in Limine 169 and Motion to Exclude 171 and provided guidance for approaching these issues at trial. The Court denied the Request to Redact Exhibits. The Court discussed with the Parties a procedure for addressing extra administrative record evidence in

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		post-trial submissions. Appearances: Kuntal Cholera, Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, Ryan Daniel Walters, Leif A. Olson, Eric Alan Hudson. (Digital # 11:05-1:17) (ERO: Frenchie Carbia), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 02/18/2022)
2/21/22	195	MOTION to Amend 161 Exhibit List, by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 3/14/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed-Transit Data, # 2 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/21/2022)
2/21/22	196	NOTICE of cert grant in Biden v. Texas by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/21/2022)
		* * * * *
2/22/22	198	Exhibit List by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 02/22/2022)
2/22/22		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE held on 2/22/2022 granting 195 MOTION to Amend 161 Exhibit List. Parties must file updated Exhibit Lists by the end of today. After discussions, the Court Orders the defendants to partially unredact Exhibit 3 "Transport Logs" and provide it to opposing counsel. Plaintiff's

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Exhibits A-C, D1-FF are admitted. Defendant's Exhibits 1-2 are admitted. Bench Trial set for 2/23/2022 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 11A before Judge Drew B Tipton. Appearances: Michael F Knapp, Kuntal Cholera, Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St. John, Ryan Daniel Walters, Leif A. Olson, Eric Alan Hudson. (Court Reporter: G. Dye), filed. (Shoshana Arnow, 4) (Entered: 02/22/2022)
2/22/22	199	Renewed Exhibit List by State of Louisiana, State of Texas (Olson, Leif) (Entered: 02/22/2022)
2/22/22	200	TRANSCRIPT re: Pretrial Conference held on February 22, 2022, before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Dye. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/23/2022., filed. (Dye, Gayle) (Entered: 02/22/2022)
		* * * * *
2/23/22	203	TRANSCRIPT re: Bench Trial —Day 1—Morning Session held on February 23, 2022, before

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
2/23/22	205	<p>Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Dye. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/24/2022., filed. (Dye, Gayle) (Entered: 02/23/2022)</p> <p>Certification of Trial Exhibits (Shoshana Arnow, 4) (Entered: 02/24/2022)</p>
2/23/22		<p>Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. First day of BENCH TRIAL held on 2/23/2022. The Rule is invoked as to witnesses. Opening statements heard. Plaintiff calls witnesses: #2 Jason Clark, #3 Robert Moore, #1. Thomas Homan. Defendants exhibit 3 is admitted over objection. Defendants exhibits 5 and 6 are admitted without objection. Defendant's oral daubert motion is denied. Plaintiffs rest. Defendants rest. The Parties certify exhibits admitted into the record. Closing Statements to be heard Thursday February 24, 2022 at 9:00 AM. Appearances: Michael F Knapp, Kuntal Cholera, Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, Ryan Daniel</p>

DOCKET		
DATE	NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Walters, Leif A. Olson, Eric Alan Hudson. (Digital # 10:02-12:00, 1:00-1:44, 1:50-3:11, 3:26-6:00) (Court Reporter: G. Dye, L. Smith), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 02/25/2022)
		* * * * *
2/24/22		Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Drew B Tipton. Second day of BENCH TRIAL held on 2/24/2022. The Court hears closing arguments. Parties are instructed to file proposed briefing schedules by Tuesday March 1, 2022. Appearances: Michael F Knapp, Kuntal Cholera, Brian C Rosen-Shaud, Adam David Kirschner, Daniel David Hu, Joseph Scott St John, Ryan Daniel Walters, Leif A. Olson, Eric Alan Hudson. (Digital # 9:10-11:00, 11:15-12:22, 1:45-3:28, 3:50-5:30)(Court Reporter: G. Dye, L. Smith), filed. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 02/25/2022)
2/24/22	213	Exhibit List by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Brittany Boniface, 6) (Entered: 03/01/2022)
2/25/22	207	TRANSCRIPT re: Bench Trial—Day 2—Morning Session held on February 24, 2022, before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Dye. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/26/2022., filed. (Dye, Gayle) (Entered: 02/25/2022)
		* * * * *
2/28/22	210	TRANSCRIPT re: Bench trial proceedings—afternoon session held on 2/23/2022 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Lanie Smith. Ordering Party Plaintiff and Defendant Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/31/2022., filed. (Lanie Smith,) (Entered: 02/28/2022)
2/28/22	211	TRANSCRIPT re: Bench trial proceedings—afternoon session held on 2/24/2022 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Transcriber Lanie Smith. Ordering Party Plaintiff and defendant Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/31/2022., filed. (Lanie Smith,) (Entered: 02/28/2022)
		* * * * *
3/1/2	214	ADVISORY by State of Louisiana, State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 03/01/2022)
3/2/22	215	TRANSCRIPT re: Status Conference (Via Zoom) held on February 17, 2022 before Judge Drew B Tipton. Court Reporter/Transcriber Judicial Transcribers of Texas, LLC. Ordering Party Tracey Urban Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/31/2022., filed. (mahenry,) (Entered: 03/02/2022)
3/2/22	216	Defendants Trial EXHIBITS re: 213 Exhibit List, by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 03/02/2022)
3/2/22	218	Plaintiffs Trial EXHIBITS A-J re: 199 Exhibit List by State of Louisiana, State of Texas # 1 Exhibit K-M) # 2 Exhibit N (1/3) # 3 Exhibit N (2/3)(4) Exhibit N (3/3) # 5 Exhibit O (1/3) # 6 Exhibit O (2/3) # 7 Exhibit O (3/3) # 8 Exhibit P) # 9 Exhibit Q-S) # 10 Exhibit T (1/2) # 11 Exhibit T (2/2) # 12 Exhibit U) # 13 Exhibit V (1/2) # 14 Exhibit V (2/2) # 15 Exhibit W-X) # 16 Exhibit Y-Z) (17) Exhibit AA-BB) # 18 Exhibit CC)# 19 Exhibit DD) # 20 Exhibit EE (1/3) # 21 Exhibit EE (2/3) # 22 Exhibit EE (3/3) # 23 Exhibit FF - FF 9) # 24 Exhibit FF 10- FF 21) # 25 Exhibit FF 22 (1/2) # 26 Exhibit FF 22 (2/2) (Entered: 03/02/2022)
3/2/22	218	ORDER (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 03/02/2022)
3/2/22	219	ORDER re: post-trial briefing (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton)

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Parties notified. (Carrie Dickie, 6) (Entered: 03/02/2022)
		* * * * *
3/11/22	221	NOTICE of FY21 ICE Report by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 03/11/2022)
3/18/22	222	Proposed Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 03/18/2022)
3/18/22	223	POST-TRIAL BRIEF by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S.

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 03/18/2022)
3/19/22	224	POST-TRIAL BRIEF by State of Louisiana, State of Texas (Olson, Leif) (Entered: 03/19/2022)
3/19/22	225	Proposed Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law by State of Louisiana, State of Texas (Olson, Leif) (Entered: 03/19/2022)
3/25/22	226	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by State of Texas, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 03/25/2022)
		* * * * *
3/31/22	229	RESPONSE to 226 Notice (Other) of Supplemental Authority, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 03/31/2022)
4/6/22	230	RESPONSE to 224 Post-Trial Brief, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 04/06/2022)
4/6/22	231	POST-TRIAL BRIEF (Responsive) by State of Louisiana, State of Texas (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 04/07/2022)
4/8/22	232	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A—Order of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals) (Knapp, Michael) (Entered: 04/08/2022)
		* * * * *
4/8/22	236	REPLY to 231 Post-Trial Brief, 223 Post-Trial Brief, , filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Knapp, Michael) (Entered: 04/08/2022)
4/13/22	237	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A—Sixth Circuit Decision Granting Stay of Preliminary Injunction)

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		(Knapp, Michael) (Entered: 04/13/2022)
4/21/22	238	RESPONSE to 237 Notice (Other), of Supplemental Authority, filed by State of Texas. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 04/21/2022)
4/22/22	239	Corrected RESPONSE to 237 Notice (Other), of Supplemental Authority, filed by State of Texas. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 04/22/2022)
6/10/22	240	MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 06/10/2022)
6/10/22	241	FINAL JUDGMENT. Case terminated on 6/10/2022. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 06/10/2022)
6/13/22	242	NOTICE OF APPEAL to US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re: 240 Memorandum and Opinion, 241 Final Judgment by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 06/13/2022)
		* * * * *
6/13/22	244	MOTION to Stay and Continue Administrative Stay by Tae Johnson, Alejandro Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America, filed. Motion Docket Date 7/5/2022. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Bible Declaration, # 2 Proposed Order) (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 06/13/2022)
6/13/22	245	RESPONSE in Opposition to 244 MOTION to Stay and Continue Administrative Stay, filed by State of Texas. (Walters, Ryan) (Entered: 06/13/2022)
6/14/22	246	REPLY to Opposition to Stay, filed by Tae Johnson, Alejandro

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		Mayorkas, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States of America. (Kirschner, Adam) (Entered: 06/14/2022)
		* * * * *
6/14/22	248	ORDER on 244 Motion to Stay. The Court Extends the administrative stay of the Final Judgment to June 24, 2022 the sole purpose of providing the Fifth Circuit sufficient time to decide whether an additional stay should be entered. The Court DENIES all other requested relief. (Signed by Judge Drew B Tipton) Parties notified. (Kellie Papaioannou, 2) (Entered: 06/14/2022)
		* * * * *
7/6/22	250	Order (Opinion) of USCA re: 242 Notice of Appeal,; USCA No. 22-40367. The Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is DENIED. (Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter) (ltesch, 6) (Entered: 07/07/2022)

DATE	DOCKET NUMBER	PROCEEDINGS
		* * * * *
7/28/22	251	The petition for a writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme Court has been granted (USCA No. 22-40367) (USSC No. 22-58), filed. (ltesch, 6) (Entered: 07/28/2022)
		* * * * *

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Case No. 22-40367

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;
TAE D. JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; TRACY RENAUD,
SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
6/13/22	US CIVIL CASE docketed. NOA filed by Appellants Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secre-

DATE PROCEEDINGS

tary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, DHS, ICE and USA [22-40367] (SDH)

* * * * *

6/14/22 OPPOSED MOTION for stay pending appeal, to extend the administrative stay pending a determination by the Solicitor General whether to seek relief from the Supreme Court [9870044-3]. Date of service: 06/14/2022 Response/Opposition due on 06/24/2022. [22-40367] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED—The original text prior to review appeared as follows: OPPOSED MOTION filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA for stay pending appeal [9870044-2] Ruling is requested by: 06/24/2022. Date of service: 06/14/2022 via email—Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Kirschner, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Sweeten, Walters; US mail—Attorney for Appellant: Kirschner [22-40367] (Sean Janda)

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
6/14/22	COURT DIRECTIVE ISSUED requesting a response to the motion for stay pending appeal and to extend the administrative stay pending a determination by the Solicitor General whether to seek relief from the Supreme Court 22-40367 to be filed no later than 12:00 noon, 06/22/2022. Response/Opposition due on 12:00 p.m., 06/22/2022. [22-40367] (CAG)
	* * * * *
6/22/22	RESPONSE/OPPOSITION [9875709-1] to the Motion for stay pending appeal filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller in 22-40367, Motion for extraordinary relief filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller in 22-40367 Response/Opposition deadline satisfied. Date of Service: 06/22/2022. [22-40367]

DATE PROCEEDINGS

REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED—The original text prior to review appeared as follows: RESPONSE/OPPOSITION filed by State of Texas and State of Louisiana [9875709-1] to the for stay pending appeal filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA , for extraordinary relief filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA Date of Service: 06/22/2022 via email—Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Sweeten, Walters, Wilson; US mail—Attorney for Appellant: Kirschner. [22-40367] (Benjamin D. Wilson)

* * * * *

6/22/22 AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FILED by
State of Alabama, State of Arizona, State of

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	Arkansas, State of Florida, State of Georgia, State of Indiana, State of Kansas, State of Kentucky, State of Mississippi, State of Missouri, State of Montana, State of Nebraska, State of Ohio, State of Oklahoma, State of South Carolina, State of West Virginia and State of Wyoming. Consent is Not Necessary as a Motion has been Granted. [22-40367] (RLL)
6/22/22	AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FILED by Immigration Reform Law Institute. Consent is Not Necessary as a Motion has been Granted. [22-40367] (RLL)
6/23/22	REPLY filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA [9876721-1] to the for stay pending appeal filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA , to the for extraordinary relief filed by Appellants

DATE PROCEEDINGS

DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA, to the filed by Appellees State of Texas and State of Louisiana. Date of Service: 06/23/2022 via email—Attorney for Amici Curiae: Crapo, Ensign; Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Stone, Sweeten, Walters, Wilson. [22-40367] (Sean Janda)

* * * * *

7/1/22 SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES
(FRAP 28j) FILED by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA Date of Service: 07/01/2022 via email—Attorney for Amici Curiae: Crapo, Ensign; Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Stone,

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	Sweeten, Walters, Wilson [22-40367] (Sean Janda)
7/5/22	<p>RESPONSE filed to the 28j Letter filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller in 22-40367 Date of Service: 07/05/2022 [22-40367] REVIEWED AND/OR EDITED—The original text prior to review appeared as follows: RESPONSE filed by Appellees State of Louisiana and State of Texas to the filed by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA Date of Service: 07/05/2022 via email— Attorney for Amici Curiae: Crapo, Ensign; Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Stone, Sweeten, Walters, Wilson; US mail— Attorney for Appellant: Kirschner [22-40367] (Benjamin D. Wilson)</p>

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
7/6/22	SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES (FRAP 28j) FILED by Appellants DHS, ICE, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection and USA Date of Service: 07/06/2022 via email —Attorney for Amici Curiae: Crapo, Ensign; Attorney for Appellants: Hu, Janda, Reuveni, Shih, Tenny; Attorney for Appellees: Hudson, Murrill, Stone, Sweeten, Walters, Wilson [22-40367] (Sean Janda)
7/6/22	NON DISPOSITIVE PUBLISHED OPINION FILED. Judge: EHJ, Judge: EBC, Judge: KDE.; denying motion for stay pending appeal filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller; denying motion to extend the administrative stay pending a determination by the Solicitor General whether to seek relief from the Supreme Court filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and

DATE PROCEEDINGS

Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller [22-40367] (NFD)

* * * * *

7/14/22 BRIEFING NOTICE ISSUED A/Pet's Brief Due on 08/23/2022 for Appellants Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Troy Miller, Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and United States of America. [22-40367] (LEF)

* * * * *

7/28/22 SUPREME COURT NOTICE that petition for writ of certiorari [9902740-2] was filed by Appellants Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Troy Miller, Ms. Tracy Renaud, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	United States Customs and Border Protection, DHS, ICE and USA on 07/08/2022. Supreme Court Number: 22-58. [22-40367] (SCV)
7/28/22	SUPREME COURT ORDER received granting petition for writ of certiorari filed by Appellants USA, DHS, ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Tracy Renaud, Mr. Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Mr. Troy Miller in 22-40367 on 07/21/2022. [9902752-1] [22-40367] (SCV)
7/28/22	BRIEFING SUSPENDED—pending Supreme Court decision in case 22-58. [22-40367] (ABT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR OFFICIAL
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; TRACY RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DEFENDANTS

Filed: Oct. 22, 2021

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

1. The Biden Administration is refusing to take custody of criminal aliens despite federal statutes requiring it to do so. Instead, Defendants have issued and implemented a series of unlawful agency memo-

randa that allow criminal aliens already convicted of felony offenses to roam free in the United States. Such aliens belong in federal custody, as Congress required.

2. When the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) incarcerates an alien already convicted of a felony criminal offense, it informs U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). If, pursuant to federal law, the alien should be removed from the United States when his sentence expires, ICE can send TDCJ a detainer request. Upon receiving such a request, TDCJ will hold an alien instead of releasing him into the community.

3. But since the inauguration, the Biden Administration has rescinded at least 150 detainer requests previously issued to TDCJ, and ICE has declined to take custody of dangerous criminal aliens that it had previously sought.

4. In Louisiana, an alien convicted of a felony criminal offense may be held in a State prison operated by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“LDPSC”) or may be held pursuant to an agreement with the State in a local Parish prison. Upon receiving an ICE detainer request, the LDPSC or the local Sheriff will hold an alien pending retrieval by ICE instead of releasing him into the community. The Federal Government also operates federal detention facilities in Louisiana, where federal detainees are held pending removal and thereafter deported. ICE also has a Field Office in New Orleans, Louisiana, where decisions are made and policies are implemented resulting in the failure to remove illegal aliens subject to mandatory removal. Upon information and belief, ICE is not remov-

ing individuals subject to mandatory deportation, causing individuals in facilities in Louisiana to be released in local communities in Louisiana.

5. That is indicative of a broader shift in federal policy that began on the first day of the Biden Administration and has resulted in a “crisis on the border.”¹ The detainer releases themselves are directly attributable to “interim guidance” issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) (the “January 20 Memorandum”) and ICE (the “February 18 Memorandum”) in memoranda issued earlier this year. As a result of those memoranda, ICE is now failing to issue detainer requests for other dangerous criminal aliens in Texas.

6. Federal law requires Defendants to take custody of many criminal aliens, including those with final orders of removal, those convicted of drug offenses, and those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. By refusing to take these criminal aliens into custody, Defendants have disregarded non-discretionary legal duties.

7. Defendants’ actions violate the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), binding agreements DHS negotiated with the State of Texas and the State of Louisiana (the “Agreements,” described *infra* at III.D.), and the United States Constitution.

¹ See, e.g., Steven Nelson, *Psaki says ‘crisis on the border’ after Biden officials rejected term*, N.Y. Post (March 18, 2021), available at <https://nypost.com/2021/03/18/psaki-says-crisis-on-the-border-afterbiden-officials-rejected-term/>.

8. DHS has now issued a third memorandum on this issue (the “September 30 Memorandum”). It suffers from the same legal infirmities as the Administration’s first two attempts and will have the same effect of reducing enforcement, including the issuance of detainers for criminal aliens who have committed aggravated felonies, crimes of moral turpitude, and drug crimes, as well as aliens with final orders of removal.

9. This Court can and should set aside the agency actions leading Defendants to violate federal law.

I. PARTIES

10. Plaintiff State of Texas is a sovereign State. *See* Tex. Const. art. I, § 1. Texas has the authority and responsibility to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

11. Plaintiff State of Louisiana is a sovereign State. *See* La. Const. Preamble; art. I, § 26. Louisiana has the authority and responsibility to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

12. Defendants are officials of the United States government, United States governmental agencies responsible for the issuance and implementation of the challenged memorandum, and the United States.

13. Defendant the United States of America is sued under 5 U.S.C. sections 702-703 and 28 U.S.C. section 1346.

14. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security. He administers the January 20 Memorandum and issued the September 30 Memorandum. He is sued in his official capacity only.

15. Defendant DHS implements the January 20 Memorandum and the September 30 Memorandum. DHS oversees Defendants U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and ICE.

16. Defendant Troy Miller is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP. He received the January 20 Memorandum and the September 30 Memorandum. He is sued in his official capacity only.

17. Defendant Tae Johnson is the Acting Director of ICE. He received the January 20 Memorandum and the September 30 Memorandum and issued the February 18 Memorandum. He is sued in his official capacity only.

18. Defendant Tracy Renaud is the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of USCIS. She received the January 20 Memorandum and the September 30 Memorandum. She is sued in her official capacity only.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

19. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1346, 1361 and 5 U.S.C. sections 702-703.

20. The Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief under 5 U.S.C. section 705, 5 U.S.C. section 706, 28 U.S.C. section 1361, and 28 U.S.C. sections 2201-2202.

21. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1391 because the State of Texas is a resident of this judicial district, and a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this District. Venue is also proper under Section VIII of the Texas Agreement. *See* Ex. C § VIII.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The January 20 Memorandum

22. On the first day of the Biden Administration, the acting Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum announcing three changes. *See* Ex. A (“January 20 Memorandum”). First, it called for a “Department-wide review of policies and practices concerning immigration enforcement.” *Id.* at 2. Second, it established “interim enforcement priorities.” *Id.* at 2-3. Third, it “direct[ed] an immediate pause on removals . . . for 100 days.” *Id.* at 3.

23. The January 20 Memorandum’s interim enforcement priorities “apply not only to the decision to issue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear, but also to a broad range of other [supposedly] discretionary enforcement decisions, including deciding . . . whom to detain or release.” *Id.* at 2.

24. Under the January 20 Memorandum, DHS lists its interim enforcement priorities as follows:

1. **National security.** Individuals who have engaged in or are suspected of terrorism or espionage, or whose apprehension, arrest and/or custody is otherwise necessary to protect the national security of the United States.
- 2 **Border security.** Individuals apprehended at the border or ports of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States on or after November 1, 2020, or who were not physically

present in the United States before November 1, 2020.

3. **Public safety.** Individuals incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails released on or after the issuance of this memorandum who have been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the time of conviction, and are determined to pose a threat to public safety.

Id. at 3.

25. The January 20 Memorandum did not prioritize detention of criminal aliens with final orders of removal, criminal aliens convicted of drug offenses, or criminal aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.

26. The January 20 Memorandum was issued without notice and comment under the APA.

27. The January 20 Memorandum did not consider any of the significant harms that Texas and Louisiana face as a result of DHS failing to detain criminal aliens subject to removal.

B. The February 18 Memorandum

28. On February 18, 2021, ICE issued a memorandum providing “interim guidance” on the interim enforcement priorities from the January 20 Memorandum. *See* Ex. B (the “February 18 Memorandum”).

29. The February 18 Memorandum provides that it “shall be applied to all civil immigration enforcement and removal decisions,” including “whether to issue a detainer,” “whether to assume custody of a noncitizen subject to a previously issued detainer,” and “whether

to detain or release from custody subject to conditions.” *Id.* at 3.

30. The February 18 Memorandum amended the January 20 Memorandum’s interim enforcement priorities in part, but it did not prioritize detention of criminal aliens with final orders of removal, criminal aliens convicted of drug offenses, or criminal aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. *Id.* at 1-2.

31. On its face, the February 18 Memorandum establishes a two-tier system. First, it establishes three “priority categories”: National Security, Border Security, and Public Safety (including aliens convicted of aggravated felonies). *Id.* at 4-5. Aliens in those categories are “presumed” to be proper subjects of enforcement action.

32. Second, aliens outside the “priority categories” are “presumed” not to be proper subjects of enforcement action. *Id.* at 3. According to the February 18 Memorandum, “[a] civil enforcement or removal action that does not meet the above criteria for presumed priority cases will require preapproval” from supervisors. *Id.* at 5. Thus, honoring any existing detainer or imposing a new one on a “non-priority” alien requires preapproval from the Field Office Director or Special Agent in Charge. *Id.* at 6.

33. The February 18 Memorandum was issued without notice and comment under the APA.

34. The February 18 Memorandum did not consider nor address any of the significant harms that Texas and Louisiana face as a result of ICE failing to detain removable illegal aliens.

C. The Application of the Two Memoranda

35. These two memoranda, as subsequently applied by Defendants, have led federal immigration authorities to rescind detainer requests relating to incarcerated criminal aliens, to not issue detainer requests even for individuals subject to mandatory removal, and to release individuals from federal detention facilities such as those located in Louisiana and Texas. As a consequence, dangerous criminal aliens are being released into local communities.

36. Contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), Defendants are refusing to take custody of aliens convicted of serious crimes. Congress specifically requires detention of aliens who commit drug offenses or crimes of moral turpitude. But despite that requirement, Defendants have rescinded detainer requests for aliens convicted of those offenses. As a result, many convicted criminal aliens have been released to society after their sentences, contrary to Congress's mandate that they be detained pending their removal from the United States. Of course, the States of Texas and Louisiana must do what they can to protect their citizens, so some of these criminal aliens have remained in state custody at the State's expense.

37. The February 18 Memorandum justifies the prioritization of aliens who have committed "aggravated felonies" as "track[ing] Congress's prioritization of aggravated felonies for immigration enforcement actions." Ex. B at 4 n.6.

38. Congress did prioritize aggravated felonies: it mandated detention of aliens who have committed such crimes. Section 1226(c) provides that "[t]he Attorney

General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2) . . . (A)(iii).” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). And Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) covers “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission.”

39. But “Congress’s prioritization” for detention is not limited to aggravated felonies. It similarly mandated detention for aliens convicted of many other categories of crimes. The very reason the February 18 Memorandum provides for prioritizing aggravated felonies also supports prioritizing drug offenses and crimes of moral turpitude. But without explanation, ICE excluded both of those categories from its list of priorities.

40. Section 1226(c)(1) refers to 8 USC § 1182(a)(2), which covers “any alien convicted of . . . a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.” *Id.* § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); *see also id.* § 1226(c)(1)(B) (citing *id.* § 1227(a)(2)(B)).

41. Despite this, Defendants have refused to take custody of numerous dangerous drug offenders. In the wake of the January 20 Memorandum and the February 18 Memorandum, ICE has rescinded detainer requests for at least 150 of criminal aliens in TDCJ custody. Many of them were convicted of drug offenses ranging from possession of various controlled substances (cocaine, methamphetamines, marijuana) to manufacture and delivery of them. Defendants are not simply ignoring low-level drug offenses related to personal use: at least six of the convictions for marijuana possession involved at least *fifty pounds* of the drug.

42. Section 1226(c) also requires Defendants to detain aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude. Section 1226(c)(1) refers to 8 USC § 1182(a)(2), which covers “any alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense).” *Id.* § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); *see also id.* § 1226(c)(1)(B) (citing *id.* § 1227(a)(2)(A)).

43. Crimes involving moral turpitude include evading arrest with a vehicle, failing to stop and render aid after being involved in an automobile accident, theft, and crimes in which fraud is an ingredient. But Defendants—despite the clear requirements of Section 1226(c)(1)—have refused to take custody of many aliens convicted of these crimes.

44. Under the January 20 Memorandum and the February 18 Memorandum, Defendants are also refusing to take aliens with final orders of removal into custody. By releasing detainer requests (or simply never issuing them) for aliens with final orders of removal, Defendants are violating a non-discretionary duty.

45. Instead, Section 1231(a)(2) provides that Defendants “shall detain” aliens “[d]uring the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). For aliens in criminal custody with final orders of removal that have not been stayed by a court, the removal period begins on “the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

46. Thus, Defendants are obligated to detain aliens with final orders of removal when they are released from custody. But instead of detaining criminal aliens with

final orders of removal, Defendants have *rescinded* detainer requests for at least 21 such aliens in custody of the TDCJ since the February 18 Memorandum.

47. Defendants' violation of Section 1231(a)(2) establishes a substantive violation of the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).

48. Defendants did not notify Texas or Louisiana that they were considering the changes set forth in the memoranda, nor did they consult with Texas or Louisiana about such changes. Defendants did not follow the procedures outlined in the Agreement with either State.

D. The September 30 Memorandum

49. On September 30, 2021, DHS issued yet another memorandum, this one titled "Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law." *See* Ex. E (the "September 30 Memorandum").

50. The September 30 Memorandum stated that it would take effect on November 29, 2021 and would on that date rescind the January 20 Memorandum and the February 18 Memorandum. *See* Ex. E at 6. However, the September 30 Memorandum mandates several categories of requirements for DHS and its component agencies to implement "before the effective date of this guidance." *Id.* at 6.

51. The September 30 Memorandum identified the same three priority enforcement categories found in the previous memoranda: threats to national security, threats to public safety, and threats to border security. Ex. E at 3-4. However, the September 30 Memorandum modified the February 18 Memorandum so that even priority category aliens cannot presumptively face enforcement actions.

52. The September 30 Memorandum places enormous practical burdens before any enforcement action can be undertaken, even in the priority category of threats to public safety:

The decision how to exercise prosecutorial discretion can be complicated and requires investigative work. Our personnel should not rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone. Rather, our personnel should, to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue.

Ex. E at 4. The same is true for the priority category of border security:

There could be other border security cases that present compelling facts that warrant enforcement action. In each case, there could be mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. Our personnel should evaluate the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly.

Id. at 4.

53. As with the previous two memoranda, the September 30 Memorandum omits (1) criminal aliens convicted of drug offenses; (2) criminal aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude; and (3) criminal aliens with final orders of removal as priorities. But it further omits an enforcement priority that the prior memoranda included: criminal aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Each of these categories is specifically addressed

by provisions contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, including 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), which states, “The Attorney General shall take into custody” aliens who meet specified conditions, including criminal aliens convicted of drug offenses, crimes involving moral turpitude, and aggravated felonies.

54. The September 30 Memorandum makes clear that a conviction for an aggravated felony would not in itself justify taking an enforcement action against an alien. It states that “[w]hether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety is not to be determined according to bright lines or categories.” Ex. E at 3. Instead, “mitigating factors that militate in favor of declining enforcement action” would have to be considered.” The September 30 Memorandum lists the following examples of such factors:

- advanced or tender age;
- lengthy presence in the United States;
- a mental condition that may have contributed to the criminal conduct, or a physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment;
- status as a victim of crime or victim, witness, or party in legal proceedings;
- the impact of removal on family in the United States, such as loss of provider or caregiver;
- whether the noncitizen may be eligible for humanitarian protection or other immigration relief;
- military or other public service of the noncitizen or their immediate family;

- time since an offense and evidence of rehabilitation;
- conviction was vacated or expunged.

Ex. E at 3-4. But even these “are not exhaustive.” *Id.* at. 4.

55. The September 30 Memorandum also lists a smaller number of aggravating factors that could be considered in cases where an alien was convicted of a crime:

- the gravity of the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed;
- the nature and degree of harm caused by the criminal offense;
- the sophistication of the criminal offense;
- use or threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon;
- a serious prior criminal record.

Ex. E at 3.

56. The September 30 Memorandum provides that “[t]he civil immigration enforcement guidance does not compel an action to be taken or not taken. Instead, the guidance leaves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the judgment of our personnel.” Ex. E at 5. However, as a practical matter, requiring an intensive investigation—discovering and evaluating a large number of factors not easily accessible through a quick database search—before undertaking routine enforcement action is not feasible to an officer on the street facing a need to make an immediate decision.

57. This practical effect on enforcement by field officers is magnified by the September 30 Memorandum's onerous review processes that ultimately involve the chain-of-command in every routine enforcement action:

To ensure the quality and integrity of our civil immigration enforcement actions, and to achieve consistency in the application of our judgments, the following measures are to be taken before the effective date of this guidance:

A. Training Extensive training materials and a continuous training program should be put in place to ensure the successful application of this guidance.

B. Process for Reviewing Effective Implementation A review process should be put in place to ensure the rigorous review of our personnel's enforcement decisions throughout the first ninety (90) days of implementation of this guidance. The review process should seek to achieve quality and consistency in decision-making across the entire agency and the Department. It should therefore involve the relevant chains of command. Longer-term review processes should be put in place following the initial 90-day period, drawing on the lessons learned. Assessment of implementation of this guidance should be continuous.

C. Data Collection We will need to collect detailed, precise, and comprehensive data as to every aspect of the enforcement actions we take pursuant to this guidance, both to ensure the quality and integrity of our work and to achieve accountability for it. Please work with the offices of the Chief Information Of-

ficer; Strategy, Policy, and Plans; Science and Technology; Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; and Privacy to determine the data that should be collected, the mechanisms to collect it, and how and to what extent it can be made public.

D. Case Review Process We will work to establish a fair and equitable case review process to afford noncitizens and their representatives the opportunity to obtain expeditious review of the enforcement actions taken. Discretion to determine the disposition of the case will remain exclusively with the Department.

Ex. E at 6. Combined with the following provision, the September 30 Memorandum sends a clear message to field agents that they do not actually have discretion to fully enforce the immigration laws and their actions will be scrutinized after the fact, leading to reduced enforcement on the front end:

We will meet regularly to review the data, discuss the results to date, and assess whether we are achieving our goals effectively. Our assessment will be informed by feedback we receive from our law enforcement, community, and other partners. This guidance is Department-wide. Agency leaders as to whom this guidance is relevant to their operations will implement this guidance accordingly.

Id. at 7.

58. Combined, these provisions of the September 30 Memorandum will have a similar effect as the February 18 Memorandum's preapproval process. It will result in a significant decrease in ICE enforcement actions. The September 30 Memorandum effectively instructs

ICE enforcement staff to forgo undertaking a large number of enforcement actions and will result in a significant increase in released detainees and the failure to issue detainees.

59. The September 30 Memorandum does not prioritize detention of criminal aliens with final orders of removal, criminal aliens convicted of drug offenses, criminal aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, or criminal aliens convicted of aggravated felonies.

60. The September 30 Memorandum was issued without notice and comment under the APA.

61. The September 30 Memorandum did not consider any of the significant harms that Texas and Louisiana face as a result of DHS failing to detain criminal aliens subject to removal.

E. The Agreements

62. Cooperation and coordination between federal and state officials are essential to the effective enforcement of federal immigration law.

63. To promote such cooperation and coordination, Texas and DHS entered into a mutually beneficial agreement, as did Louisiana and DHS. *See* Ex. C (the “Texas Agreement”); Ex. D (the “Louisiana Agreement”). The Texas Agreement establishes a binding and enforceable commitment between DHS and Texas. Ex. C § II. The Louisiana Agreement establishes a binding and enforceable commitment between DHS and Louisiana. Ex. D § II.

64. The Agreements also apply to several constituent agencies within DHS: ICE, CBP, and USCIS. *Id.* at 1 & n.1.

65. Generally, the Texas Agreement provides that “Texas will provide information and assistance to help DHS perform its border security, legal immigration, immigration enforcement, and national security missions in exchange for DHS’s commitment to consult Texas and consider its views before taking” certain administrative actions. Ex. C § II.

66. The Louisiana Agreement contains virtually identical language. *See* Ex. D § II.

67. For example, DHS must “[c]onsult with Texas before taking any action or making any decision that could reduce immigration enforcement” or “increase the number of removable or inadmissible aliens in the United States.” Ex. C § III.A.2. That “includes policies, practices, or procedures which have as their purpose or effect . . . “decreasing the number of or criteria for detention of removable or inadmissible aliens from the country.” Ex. C § III.A.2.d; *see also* Ex. D § III.A.2.d (same consultation requirement as to Louisiana).

68. To enable this consultation process, the Agreement requires DHS to “[p]rovide Texas with 180 days’ written notice . . . of any proposed action” subject to the consultation requirement. Ex. C § III.A.3. That gives Texas “an opportunity to consult and comment on the proposed action.” *Id.* After Texas submits its views, “DHS will in good faith consider Texas’s input and provide a detailed written explanation of the reasoning behind any decision to reject Texas’s input before taking any action” covered by the consultation requirement. *Id.*

69. Louisiana is likewise entitled to the same notice. *See* Ex. D § III.A.3.

70. Defendants did not provide Texas or Louisiana with notice of the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, or the September 30 Memorandum.

71. Defendants did not consult with Texas or Louisiana about the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, or the September 30 Memorandum.

72. Neither the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, nor the September 30 Memorandum considered the existence of, or the requirements of, the Agreements.

73. The Texas Agreement authorizes adjudication of disputes about the Agreement “in a United States District Court located in Texas.” Ex. C § VIII.

74. The Louisiana Agreement authorizes adjudication of disputes judicially if a resolution cannot be reached through “consultation and communication.” Ex. D § VIII. Defendants, however, have breached the Louisiana Agreement by failing to comply with its plain terms of notice and consultation, rendering any further requirement of consultation and communication futile. Moreover, Defendants’ conduct regarding the Texas Agreement also shows Defendants’ refusal to consult and renders any further communication and attempt to resolve the matter amicably a vain and useless act that would only delay resolution and cause Louisiana further irreparable harm.

75. To the extent DHS fails to comply with its obligations, the Agreements expressly provide for injunctive relief. It would “be impossible to measure in money

the damage that would be suffered if the parties fail[ed] to comply with” the Agreement. Ex. C § VI; Ex. D § VI. “[I]n the event of any such failure, an aggrieved party [would] be irreparably damaged and [would] not have an adequate remedy at law.” *Id.* “Any such party shall, therefore, be entitled (in addition to any other remedy to which it may be entitled in law or in equity) to injunctive relief, including specific performance, to enforce such obligations, and if any action should be brought in equity to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement, none of the parties hereto shall raise the defense that there is an adequate remedy at law.” *Id.*

76. The Agreements provide mechanisms by which they can be modified or terminated. *See* Ex. C §§ XIV-XV; Ex. D §§ XIV-XV. DHS purported to terminate the Texas Agreement “effective immediately” by letter on February 2, 2021, but it did not provide the requisite 180 days’ notice required for termination under the terms of the Agreement. Texas therefore treats DHS’s letter as notice of intent to terminate, which became effective after 180 days (*i.e.*, on August 1, 2021). The Texas Agreement remained binding up to that point. To the best of its knowledge, Louisiana has not received a similar termination letter; however, even if DHS sent one then, the Louisiana Agreement would remain binding until the requisite notice provisions provided therein are satisfied.

F. Defendants’ Actions Cause Texas Irreparable Injury

77. Defendants’ failure to detain criminal aliens as required by federal law significantly injures Texas.

78. Texas spends hundreds of millions of dollars per year providing services to illegal aliens. Those services include education services and healthcare, as well as many other social services broadly available in Texas.

79. By increasing the number of illegal aliens present in Texas, or in the care of TDCJ, the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum will necessarily increase these costs in multiple ways.

1. State Detention

80. Detaining criminal aliens imposes significant costs on Texas. These costs include the financial cost of detention, mandatory supervision, or parole, and the use of scarce state resources.

81. In 2019, Texas housed almost 9,000 undocumented criminal aliens. Texas's cost to do so was over 152 million dollars.

82. Those detention costs will increase as a result of Defendants' failure to detain criminal aliens as it increases the number of criminal aliens that Texas must detain.

83. Further, the sudden nature of the shift in Defendants' actions and policies exacerbates the harm to Texas.

2. Release

84. In addition, the release of criminal aliens into Texas communities imposes significant costs on Texas. These costs include the effects of crimes they commit while free, the cost of investigating and prosecuting those crimes, the costs of monitoring or supervising

criminal aliens, and the costs of social services criminal aliens utilize when not detained.

85. Defendants' failure to detain criminal aliens increases the number of criminal aliens that are released into Texas communities.

86. The sudden nature of the shift in Defendants' actions and policies exacerbates the harm to Texas.

3. Healthcare and Education Costs

87. The aliens Defendants are failing to detain are eligible for certain healthcare and educational programs in Texas.

88. The State funds multiple healthcare programs that cover illegal aliens. The provision of these services—utilized by illegal aliens—results in millions of dollars of expenditures per year. These services include the Emergency Medicaid program, the Texas Family Violence Program, and the Texas Children's Health Insurance Program.

89. The Emergency Medicaid program provides health coverage for low-income children, families, seniors and the disabled. Federal law requires Texas to include illegal aliens in its Emergency Medicaid program. The program costs the State tens of millions of dollars annually.

90. Additionally, the Texas Family Violence Program provides emergency shelter and supportive services to victims and their children in the State of Texas. Texas spends over a million dollars per year on the Texas Family Violence Program for services to illegal aliens.

91. Finally, the Texas's Children's Health Insurance Program offers low-cost health coverage for children from birth through age 18. Texas spends tens of millions of dollars each year on coverage for illegal aliens.

92. Further, Texas faces the costs of uncompensated care provided by state public hospital districts to illegal aliens which results in expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

93. Defendants' failure to detain criminal aliens increases their use of those programs and therefore increases the cost to the State of Texas.

94. Defendants' failure to detain criminal aliens reduces the likelihood that any particular criminal alien will be removed and reduces the number of criminal aliens who will be removed. It therefore causes an increase in the number of criminal aliens in Texas. A higher number of criminal aliens in Texas increases healthcare and education costs for the State of Texas.

95. Federal law requires Texas to include illegal aliens in some of these programs.

96. Some of the criminal aliens Defendants are obligated to detain were lawful aliens but became subject to mandatory detention and removal after committing certain crimes. Those aliens are eligible for a broader array of programs.

4. Education Costs

97. The failure of Defendants to follow federal law and detain criminal aliens also results in additional educational expenditures by the State of Texas. Aliens and the children of those aliens receive education benefits

from the State at significant taxpayer expense. Defendants' failure to detain criminal aliens increases education expenditures by the State of Texas each year for children of those aliens.

98. These imminent and irreparable harms have forced Texas to seek relief in this Court.

99. DHS has already acknowledged the effect that its decisions have on Texas. "Texas, like other States, is directly and concretely affected by changes to DHS rules and policies that have the effect of easing, relaxing, or limiting immigration enforcement. Such changes can impact Texas's law enforcement, housing, education, employment, commerce, and healthcare needs and budgets." Ex. C § II.

100. Indeed, DHS has specifically admitted that "an increase in releases from detention" and "relaxation of the standards for granting release from detention" would "result in concrete injuries to Texas." Ex. C § II.

101. Texas's interests fall within the zone of interests protected by federal immigration statutes and the APA. "The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States," which "bear[] many of the consequences of unlawful immigration." *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 397 (2012).

G. Defendants' Actions Cause Louisiana Irreparable Injury

102. Louisiana, like Texas, is harmed in the same manner and with the same harms outlined above regarding costs of detention, healthcare, and education, specif-

ically including but not limited to coverage in the Louisiana Children's Health Insurance Program ("LaCHIP"). Defendants' arbitrary and unlawful actions—if not set aside—will burden Louisiana with expending these and other funds on aggravated felons and other aliens subject to mandatory removal.

103. Louisiana is also faced with a specific harm due to the presence and imminent release of illegal aliens subject to mandatory removal being from detention facilities located in Louisiana, including in the Bossier Parish Medium Security Facility in Plain Dealing; Jackson Parish Correctional Center in Jonesboro; the LaSalle ICE Processing Center in Jena; the Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center in Pine Prairie; the Richwood Correctional Center in Monroe; the River Correctional Center in Ferriday; the South Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Basile; the federal Oakdale Detention Facility in Oakdale; the Natchitoches Parish Detention Center in Natchitoches; and the Winn Correctional Center in Winnfield.

104. Moreover, the first duty of any sovereign is protecting its citizens. But Louisiana and Texas have been placed at the arbitrary and capricious mercy of federal immigration officials with regard to alien detention and removal. *See Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). Louisiana and Texas have an overriding interest in federal officials executing their mandatory duty to remove criminal aliens. *Compare Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (recognizing that a State is entitled to "special solicitude" in seeking to enforce statutory provisions that implicate aspects of sovereignty), *with Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico*, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02 (1982) (recognizing sovereign

interests “in exercise of sovereign power over individuals” and “the maintenance and recognition of borders” and quasi-sovereign interest “in the well-being of [the State’s] populace”). That interest will be critically impaired if Defendants are permitted to continue refusing to remove criminal aliens, particularly if Defendants can do so without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act.

H. Related Litigation

105. On January 22, 2021, the State of Texas challenged the 100-day moratorium on removals established by Section C of the January 20 Memorandum. *See State of Texas v. United States*, No. 6:21-cv-3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2021).

106. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on January 26, 2021. *See Texas v. United States*, No. 6:21-cv-3, 2021 WL 247877 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021). It issued a preliminary injunction on February 23, 2021. *See Texas v. United States*, No. 6:21-cv-3, 2021 WL 723856 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021). As a result of these orders, Defendants have been prohibited from implementing the 100-day moratorium on removals.

107. The Court’s rulings from that case, including its reasoning about standing, reviewability, the meaning of Section 1231, irreparable injury, and injunctive relief, are highly relevant to this case.

IV. CLAIMS

COUNT I

Failure to Take Custody of Inadmissible or Deportable Illegal Aliens in Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)

108. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

109. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are agency actions reviewable under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).

110. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are unlawful because they violate 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section 1226(c) provides that

The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,

(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,

when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).

111. This mandatory duty to take criminal aliens into custody applies to those completing their sentences for crimes relating to controlled substances, those involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and others.

112. Section 1226(c) provides the only authorization for release from this mandatory detention:

The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).

113. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum unlawfully violate Defendants' non-discretionary duty to "take into custody any alien" who is inadmissible or deportable for the reasons contained in Section 1226(c).

114. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum violate the APA because they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law” and “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).

115. Section 1226(c) requires Defendants to take custody of the specified criminal aliens. By authorizing immigration enforcement officials to disregard their mandatory duties to take custody of criminal aliens, the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum all violate this provision.

116. By failing to take custody of criminal aliens, Defendants are unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying agency action. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(a).

COUNT II

Failure to Take Custody of Illegal Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal in Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)

117. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

118. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are agency actions reviewable under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).

119. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are unlawful because they violate the statutory requirement that Defendants “shall detain” aliens “[d]uring the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). For aliens in criminal custody with final orders of removal that have not been stayed by a court, the removal period begins on “the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

120. Defendants are violating a non-discretionary duty to take aliens with final orders of removal into custody, by releasing (or never issuing) detainer requests for aliens with final orders of removal.

121. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum preclude the agencies from complying with Section 1231(a)(2). They therefore violate the APA. They are both “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” and “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).

122. Section 1226(c) requires Defendants to take custody of the specified criminal aliens. By failing to take custody of criminal aliens, Defendants are unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying agency action. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706(a).

COUNT III

Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action

123. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

124. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are agency actions reviewable under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).

125. The APA prohibits agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

126. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum do not represent reasoned decisionmaking.

127. DHS has previously recognized the importance of removing illegal aliens subject to a final order of removal. *See, e.g.*, Ex. C § II. Indeed, it committed to “enforcing the immigration laws of the United States to prohibit the entry into, and promote the return or removal from, the United States of inadmissible and removable aliens.” *Id.* § III.A.1.a.

128. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum represent a sharp departure from previous policy on detainees. Because they do not sufficiently explain that sudden departure, the memoranda are arbitrary and capricious.

129. DHS and ICE ignored the harms that failing to detain removable aliens will cause. The memoranda did not analyze those costs. Failing to consider important costs of a new policy renders that policy arbitrary and capricious. *See Michigan v. EPA*, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (“[A]gency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the relevant factors.’”).

130. The memoranda also failed to analyze the requirements in the Agreements. They “entirely failed to consider [that] important aspect of the problem.” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983)).

131. The memoranda also failed to consider alternative approaches that would allow at least some additional mandatory detentions—of aliens convicted of drug offenses, crimes of moral turpitude, or aggravated felonies, or of aliens with final orders of removal—to continue. The Supreme Court recently held that a

DHS immigration action was arbitrary and capricious because it was issued “without any consideration whatsoever’ of a [more limited] policy.” *Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 140 S. Ct. at 1912 (quoting *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. at 51).

132. Even if there were some way to explain or justify the decisions of DHS and ICE, it would be irrelevant because the agencies did not provide any such explanation or justification in the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, or the September 30 Memorandum. *See SEC v. Chenery Corp.*, 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.”).

COUNT IV

Failure to Follow the Requirements of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking

133. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

134. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are agency actions reviewable under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).

135. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are substantive or legislative rules that required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553. They are not exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements as interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. *See id.* § 553(b)(A).

136. Because DHS and ICE failed to use notice-and-comment procedures, the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are invalid. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706.

COUNT V

Failure to Provide Notice to and Consult with Texas and Louisiana pursuant to the Agreements

137. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

138. Defendants issued the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum without following the notice and consultation requirements contained in the Agreements.

139. Because they do not comply with the terms of the Agreements, the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Agreement are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” and “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D).

140. As a result of the January 20 Memorandum and the February 18 Memorandum, Texas and Louisiana “will be irreparably damaged and will not have an adequate remedy at law,” and are therefore “entitled . . . to injunctive relief . . . to enforce [DHS’s] obligations” under the Agreements. Ex. C § VI; Ex. D § VI. As a result of the September 30 Memorandum, Louisiana is similarly harmed and entitled to injunctive relief under the Louisiana Agreement.

COUNT VI**Failure to Take Care that the Laws be
Faithfully Executed**

141. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

142. The Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

143. This constitutional limitation is binding on agencies and officers exercising executive power. *See* U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “[t]he executive Power” in the President).

144. The January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are unconstitutional because they direct executive officials not to enforce federal law regarding mandatory detention of certain aliens.

145. Unconstitutional agency action or inaction violates the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706.

146. This constitutional violation is also actionable independent of the APA. Federal courts have long exercised the power to enjoin federal officers from violating the Constitution. *See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2015) (discussing “a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England”).

V. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT

Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that the Court:

- a. Postpone the effective date of the September 30 Memorandum;

- b. Hold unlawful and set aside Section B (“Interim Civil Enforcement Guidelines”) of the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum;
- c. Declare that Section B of the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum are unlawful;
- d. Issue preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from enforcing or implementing Section B of the January 20 Memorandum, the February 18 Memorandum, and the September 30 Memorandum;
- e. Compel Defendants to take custody of criminal aliens as required by statute;
- f. Award Texas and Louisiana the costs of this action and reasonable attorney’s fees; and
- g. Award such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable and just.

Date: Oct. 22, 2021 Respectfully submitted.

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

JUDD E. STONE II
Solicitor General

PATRICK K. SWEETEN
Deputy Attorney General for Special Litigation
Attorney-in-Charge
Texas Bar No. 00798537
Southern District of Texas Bar No. 1829509

WILLIAM T. THOMPSON
Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Unit
Texas Bar No. 24088531
Southern District of Texas Bar No. 3053077

/s/ RYAN D. WALTERS
RYAN D. WALTERS
Special Counsel, Special Litigation Unit
Texas Bar No. 24105085
Southern District of Texas Bar No. 3369185

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SPECIAL LITIGATION UNIT
P.O. Box 12548 (MC-009)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 936-1414
Fax: (512) 936-0545
patrick.sweeten@oag.texas.gov
will.thompson@oag.texas.gov
ryan.walters@oag.texas.gov

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF TEXAS

JEFF LANDRY
LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ **ELIZABETH B. MURRILL**
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL
Solicitor General
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN
Deputy Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6766
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF LOUISIANA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically (via CM/ECF) on October 22, 2021, which automatically serves all counsel of record who are registered to receive notices in this case.

/s/ **RYAN D. WALTERS**
RYAN D. WALTERS

Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528



**Homeland
Security**

Sept. 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO:

Tae D. Johnson
Acting Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

CC:

Troy Miller
Acting Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Ur Jaddou
Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Robert Silvers
Under Secretary
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Lynn Parker Dupree
Chief Privacy Officer
Privacy Office

FROM:

Alejandro N. Mayorkas /s/ A N MAYORKAS
Secretary

SUBJECT:

Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law

This memorandum provides guidance for the apprehension and removal of noncitizens.

I am grateful to you, the other leaders of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and our frontline personnel for the candor and openness of the engagements we have had to help shape this guidance. Thank you especially for dedicating yourselves—all your talent and energy—to the noble law enforcement profession. In executing our solemn responsibility to enforce immigration law with honor and integrity, we can help achieve justice and realize our ideals as a Nation. Our colleagues on the front lines and throughout the organization make this possible at great personal sacrifice.

I. Foundational Principle: The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion

It is well established in the law that federal government officials have broad discretion to decide who should be subject to arrest, detainers, removal proceedings, and the execution of removal orders. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration arena is a deep-rooted tradition. The United States Supreme Court stated this clearly in 2012:

“A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.

Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”

In an opinion by Justice Scalia about twelve years earlier, the Supreme Court emphasized that enforcement discretion extends throughout the entire removal process, and at each stage of it the executive has the discretion to not pursue it.

It is estimated that there are more than 11 million undocumented or otherwise removable noncitizens in the United States. We do not have the resources to apprehend and seek the removal of every one of these noncitizens. Therefore, we need to exercise our discretion and determine whom to prioritize for immigration enforcement action.

In exercising our discretion, we are guided by the fact that the majority of undocumented noncitizens who could be subject to removal have been contributing members of our communities for years. They include individuals who work on the frontlines in the battle against COVID, lead our congregations of faith, teach our children, do back-breaking farm work to help deliver food to our table, and contribute in many other meaningful ways. Numerous times over the years, and presently, bipartisan groups of leaders have recognized these noncitizens’ contributions to state and local communities and have tried to pass legislation that would provide a path to citizenship or other lawful status for the approximately 11 million undocumented noncitizens.

The fact an individual is a removable noncitizen therefore should not alone be the basis of an enforcement action against them. We will use our discretion and focus

our enforcement resources in a more targeted way. Justice and our country's well-being require it.

By exercising our discretionary authority in a targeted way, we can focus our efforts on those who pose a threat to national security, public safety, and border security and thus threaten America's well-being. We do not lessen our commitment to enforce immigration law to the best of our ability. This is how we use the resources we have in a way that accomplishes our enforcement mission most effectively and justly.

II. Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities

We establish civil immigration enforcement priorities to most effectively achieve our goals with the resources we have. We will prioritize for apprehension and removal noncitizens who are a threat to our national security, public safety, and border security.

A. Threat to National Security

A noncitizen who engaged in or is suspected of terrorism or espionage, or terrorism-related or espionage-related activities, or who otherwise poses a danger to national security, is a priority for apprehension and removal.

B. Threat to Public Safety

A noncitizen who poses a current threat to public safety, typically because of serious criminal conduct, is a priority for apprehension and removal.

Whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety is not to be determined according to bright lines or categories. It instead requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.

There can be aggravating factors that militate in favor of enforcement action. Such factors can include, for example:

- the gravity of the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed;
- the nature and degree of harm caused by the criminal offense;
- the sophistication of the criminal offense;
- use or threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon;
- a serious prior criminal record.

Conversely, there can be mitigating factors that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. Such factors can include, for example:

- advanced or tender age;
- lengthy presence in the United States;
- a mental condition that may have contributed to the criminal conduct, or a physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment;
- status as a victim of crime or victim, witness, or party in legal proceedings;
- the impact of removal on family in the United States, such as loss of provider or caregiver;
- whether the noncitizen may be eligible for humanitarian protection or other immigration relief;
- military or other public service of the noncitizen or their immediate family;

- time since an offense and evidence of rehabilitation;
- conviction was vacated or expunged.

The above examples of aggravating and mitigating factors are not exhaustive. The circumstances under which an offense was committed could, for example, be an aggravating or mitigating factor depending on the facts. The broader public interest is also material in determining whether to take enforcement action. For example, a categorical determination that a domestic violence offense compels apprehension and removal could make victims of domestic violence more reluctant to report the offense conduct. The specific facts of a case should be determinative.

Again, our personnel must evaluate the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly. The overriding question is whether the noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety. Some of the factors relevant to making the determination are identified above.

The decision how to exercise prosecutorial discretion can be complicated and requires investigative work. Our personnel should not rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone. Rather, our personnel should, to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue. The gravity of an apprehension and removal on a noncitizen's life, and potentially the life of family members and the community, warrants the dedication of investigative and evaluative effort.

C. Threat to Border Security

A noncitizen who poses a threat to border security is a priority for apprehension and removal.

A noncitizen is a threat to border security if:

- (a) they are apprehended at the border or port of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States; or
- (b) they are apprehended in the United States after unlawfully entering after November 1, 2020.

There could be other border security cases that present compelling facts that warrant enforcement action. In each case, there could be mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. Our personnel should evaluate the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly.

III. Protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

We must exercise our discretionary authority in a way that protects civil rights and civil liberties. The integrity of our work and our Department depend on it. A noncitizen's race, religion, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, national origin, or political associations shall never be factors in deciding to take enforcement action. A noncitizen's exercise of their First Amendment rights also should never be a factor in deciding to take enforcement action. We must ensure that enforcement actions are not discriminatory and do not lead to inequitable outcomes.

This guidance does not prohibit consideration of one or more of the above-mentioned factors if they are directly relevant to status under immigration law or eligibility

for an immigration benefit. For example, religion or political beliefs are often directly relevant in asylum cases and need to be assessed in determining a case's merit.

State and local law enforcement agencies with which we work must respect individuals' civil rights and civil liberties as well.

IV. Guarding Against the Use of Immigration Enforcement as a Tool of Retaliation for the Assertion of Legal Rights

Our society benefits when individuals—citizens and noncitizens alike—assert their rights by participating in court proceedings or investigations by agencies enforcing our labor, housing, and other laws.

It is an unfortunate reality that unscrupulous employers exploit their employees' immigration status and vulnerability to removal by, for example, suppressing wages, maintaining unsafe working conditions, and quashing workplace rights and activities. Similarly, unscrupulous landlords exploit their tenants' immigration status and vulnerability to removal by, for example, charging inflated rental costs and failing to comply with housing ordinances and other relevant housing standards.

We must ensure our immigration enforcement authority is not used as an instrument of these and other unscrupulous practices. A noncitizen's exercise of workplace or tenant rights, or service as a witness in a labor or housing dispute, should be considered a mitigating factor in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

V. The Quality and Integrity of our Civil Immigration Enforcement Actions

The civil immigration enforcement guidance does not compel an action to be taken or not taken. Instead, the guidance leaves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the judgment of our personnel.

To ensure the quality and integrity of our civil immigration enforcement actions, and to achieve consistency in the application of our judgments, the following measures are to be taken before the effective date of this guidance:

A. Training

Extensive training materials and a continuous training program should be put in place to ensure the successful application of this guidance.

B. Process for Reviewing Effective Implementation

A review process should be put in place to ensure the rigorous review of our personnel's enforcement decisions throughout the first ninety (90) days of implementation of this guidance. The review process should seek to achieve quality and consistency in decision-making across the entire agency and the Department. It should therefore involve the relevant chains of command.

Longer-term review processes should be put in place following the initial 90-day period, drawing on the lessons learned. Assessment of implementation of this guidance should be continuous.

C. Data Collection

We will need to collect detailed, precise, and comprehensive data as to every aspect of the enforcement actions we take pursuant to this guidance, both to ensure the quality and integrity of our work and to achieve accountability for it.

Please work with the offices of the Chief Information Officer; Strategy, Policy, and Plans; Science and Technology; Civil Rights and Civil Liberties; and Privacy to determine the data that should be collected, the mechanisms to collect it, and how and to what extent it can be made public.

D. Case Review Process

We will work to establish a fair and equitable case review process to afford noncitizens and their representatives the opportunity to obtain expeditious review of the enforcement actions taken. Discretion to determine the disposition of the case will remain exclusively with the Department.

VI. Implementation of the Guidance

This guidance will become effective in sixty (60) days, on November 29, 2021. Upon the effective date, this guidance will serve to rescind (1) the January 20, 2021 *Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities* issued by then-Acting Secretary David Pekoske, and (2) the *Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities* issued by Acting ICE Director Tae D. Johnson.

We will meet regularly to review the data, discuss the results to date, and assess whether we are achieving our

goals effectively. Our assessment will be informed by feedback we receive from our law enforcement, community, and other partners.

This guidance is Department-wide. Agency leaders as to whom this guidance is relevant to their operations will implement this guidance accordingly.

VII. Statement of No Private Right Conferred

This guidance is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.



**Significant Considerations in Developing
Updated Guidelines for the Enforcement of
Civil Immigration Law**

Sept. 30, 2021

Introduction

On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051, *Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities*.¹ The Executive Order established that the policy of the Biden-Harris Administration is to “protect national and border security, address the humanitarian challenges at the southern border, and ensure public health and safety.” The Executive Order also committed to adhering to “due process of law as we safeguard the dignity and well-being of all families and communities.” In order to better align with these values and priorities, the Executive Order revoked Executive Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, promulgated on January 25, 2017, and called for a “reset” of the “policies and practices for enforcing civil immigration laws.”²

¹ Exec. Order 13993, *Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities*, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021) available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/25/2021-01768/revision-of-civil-immigration-enforcement-policies-and-priorities>.

² *Id.*

Also on January 20, 2021, then-Acting Secretary David Pekoske issued a memorandum (the “Pekoske Memorandum”) calling for a comprehensive review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (the “Department” or “DHS”) immigration enforcement policies and priorities and establishing civil immigration enforcement guidelines.³ By its terms, the Pekoske Memorandum contemplated issuance of revised policies following such a review. On February 18, 2021, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Acting Director Tae Johnson issued interim guidance (the “Johnson Memorandum”) to all ICE employees in support of the interim priorities contained in the Pekoske Memorandum and making certain approved revisions.⁴

The Pekoske and Johnson Memoranda have been challenged in four different lawsuits, two of which were dismissed by district courts on the grounds that the memoranda are not subject to judicial review and one of which remains pending in the Southern District of Texas.⁵ In the fourth suit brought by the states of Texas and Louisiana, a federal judge in the Southern District of Texas on August 19, 2021, issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department from enforce-

³ Memorandum from David Pekoske Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., *Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities* (Jan. 20, 2021).

⁴ Memorandum from Tae Johnson, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, *Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities* (Feb. 18, 2021).

⁵ *Arizona v. Dept. of Homeland Sec.*, Case No. 21-cv-186 (D. Ariz.); *Florida v. United States*, Case No. 21-cv-541 (M.D. Fla.); *Coe v. Biden*, Case No. 21-cv-168 (SD. Tex.).

ing and implementing the enforcement guidelines contained in both memoranda. *Texas v. United States*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 3683913 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2021). On September 15, 2021, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the district court’s injunction in most respects while the government’s appeal is pending but left the injunction in place insofar as it “prevents DHS and ICE officials from relying on the memos to refuse to detain aliens described in [8 U.S.C. §] 1226(c)(1) against whom detainers have been lodged or aliens who fall under section 1231(a)(1)(A) because they have been ordered removed.” *Texas v. United States*, --- F.4th ---, 2021 WL 4188102, *7 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2021).

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the “deep-rooted tradition of enforcement discretion when it comes to decisions that occur before detention, such as who should be subject to arrest, detainers, and removal proceedings,” *id.* at *6, and reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s holding that law enforcement discretion extends throughout the removal process, including to the discretionary decision of whether to “abandon the endeavor.” *Id.* at *4 (citing *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471,483 (1999)).

Over the past seven months, the Secretary and Department personnel have held numerous engagements with internal and external stakeholders and have closely monitored the implementation of the Pecoske and Johnson Memoranda. The Secretary’s *Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law*, issued today on September 30, 2021, reflect the information collected throughout this period as well as the Secretary’s own experience as a career public servant, including 12 years as a federal prosecutor, three years of which as the

United States Attorney for the Central District of California, and more than 7 years as Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. This document contains a summary of the considerations informing the guidelines being issued today.

Prosecutorial and Enforcement Discretion in the Immigration Context

History of Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities

“A principal feature” of the Nation’s immigration laws “is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). This discretion derives not only from the U.S. Constitution, which vests enforcement authority in the Executive Branch, but also from the immigration laws themselves. *See, e.g.*, 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (expressly directing the Secretary to “[e]stablish national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”).

For over a century, the Executive has exercised discretion to prioritize which noncitizens to arrest, detain, or remove. For example, as far back as 1909, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), which then handled many of the immigration-enforcement functions now handled by DHS, had a prosecutorial-discretion policy directing that officers generally would not have good cause to initiate proceedings to cancel a fraudulent or illegally procured naturalization certificate “unless some substantial results are to be achieved thereby in

the way of betterment of the citizenship of the country.”⁶ And in 1976, the INS General Counsel issued a legal opinion providing broader policy guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.⁷

In 2000, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a memorandum to senior INS officials on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion (the “Meissner Memorandum”).⁸ The Meissner Memorandum adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach to immigration enforcement that was guided by a non-exhaustive list of both positive and negative factors (*e.g.*, immigration status, length of residence in the United States, criminal history, current or future eligibility for relief from removal).⁹ The memorandum expressly provided that “service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement process” and that it is “appropriate and expected that the INS will exercise [prosecutorial discretion] authority in appropriate cases.”¹⁰ It also directed officers to “take into account the principles described [in the memorandum] in order to promote the efficient and effective enforcement of the immigration

⁶ *Department of Justice Circular Letter Number 107*, dated Sept. 20, 1909.

⁷ See Sam Bernsen, INS General Counsel, *Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion* (July 15, 1976).

⁸ Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, *Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion* (Nov. 17, 2000).

⁹ *Id.* at 7-8.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 5-7.

laws and the interests of justice.”¹¹ Ultimately, determinations were committed to “the exercise of judgment by the responsible officer” who was “encouraged,” but not required, to seek supervisor input in “questionable cases.”¹²

The Meissner Memorandum provided the primary guidance for immigration officers’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion for nearly a decade.¹³ In June 2010, ICE Director John Morton issued a memorandum to all ICE employees (the “Morton Memorandum”) identifying categories of individuals who should be prioritized for enforcement, with the highest priority being noncitizens who pose a danger to national security or public safety (including individuals convicted of crimes, with a particular emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders, as well as those who otherwise pose a serious risk to public safety), and the secondary priorities being recent illegal entrants and individuals with prior orders of removal.¹⁴ With respect to prioritizing the removal of individuals with criminal convictions, the national security and public safety priority identified three priority levels: (1) aggravated felons and noncitizens with multiple felonies; (2) noncitizens with a single felony or three

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.* at 5, 9, 11.

¹³ In 2005, the ICE Principal Legal Advisor issued a memorandum providing guidance for when ICE attorneys within the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor could join in or file motions to dismiss proceedings without prejudice in immigration court to permit noncitizens to request adjustment of status before USCIS.

¹⁴ Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Dir., *Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens* (Jun 30, 2010), 1-2.

or more misdemeanors; and (3) noncitizens with a misdemeanor conviction.¹⁵

In June 2011, Director Morton issued a second memorandum on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that eschewed the priorities-based approach in his earlier memorandum and instead followed the same basic structure as the Meissner Memorandum: vesting line officers with broad discretion and instructing them to consider the totality of the circumstances, guided by a long list of positive and negative equities.¹⁶ This memorandum also included a second list of positive and negative factors requiring “particular care.”¹⁷

In 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued a memorandum (the “Jeh Johnson Memorandum”) that exercised discretion at the policymaking level of the Secretary and additionally vested significant authority in the hands of field office leadership to direct exercises of prosecutorial discretion.¹⁸ The Jeh Johnson Memorandum established three priority categories:

1. Threats to national security, border security, and public safety;
2. Misdemeanants and new immigration violators; and

¹⁵ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁶ Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Dir., *Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens* (June 17, 2011).

¹⁷ *Id.* at 5.

¹⁸ Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., *Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants* (Nov. 20, 2014).

3. Other immigration violations.

With respect to individuals who fell within these priority categories, the memorandum encouraged the exercise of prosecutorial discretion based on a “totality of the circumstances” approach guided by an enumerated list of considerations.¹⁹ The Jeh Johnson Memorandum further specified that immigration officers may pursue removal of individuals outside the established priorities where, “in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, removing such [a noncitizen] would serve an important federal interest.”²⁰ This requirement echoes language provided in the Meissner Memorandum, which referenced the Principles of Federal Prosecution governing the conduct of U.S. Attorneys to explain that “[a]s a general matter, INS officers may decline to prosecute a legally sufficient immigration case if the Federal immigration enforcement interest that would be served by prosecution is not substantial.”²¹ The Jeh Johnson Memorandum excluded from the priority categories: (1) individuals with one or two misdemeanor convictions, with the exception of those described as “significant misdemeanors” based on the nature of the offense and length of time the individual was sentenced to serve in custody; and (2) individuals with prior orders of removal entered before 2014.²²

¹⁹ *Id.* at 5-6.

²⁰ Jeh Johnson Memorandum at 5.

²¹ Meissner Memorandum at 5

²² *Id.* at 3-4.

At the beginning of the last Administration, President Trump issued Executive Order 13768, *Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States*,²³ which purported to diverge from the longstanding use of prioritization schemes to guide the exercise of enforcement discretion. Contrary to prior guidance, Executive Order 13768 stated that, with limited exceptions, “[i]t is the policy of the executive branch to . . . ensure the faithful execution of the immigration laws . . . against *all removable aliens*,” and specifically directed “agencies to employ all lawful means to ensure the faithful execution of the immigration laws . . . against *all removable aliens*.”²⁴ Insofar as the Executive Order established enforcement priorities, it identified large categories of people subject to inadmissibility and deportability grounds, as well as an expansive list of characteristics that effectively described all removable noncitizens. The same “enforcement priorities” were contained in an implementation memorandum issued on February 20, 2017, by Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly (the “Kelly Memorandum”), which officially rescinded the Jeh Johnson Memorandum.²⁵

In short, the prior Administration did away with notable features of enforcement priorities memoranda from the prior two decades, including: (1) tiered priority groups; (2) positive and negative factors guiding discretionary

²³ Exec. Order 13768, *Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States*, 59 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).

²⁴ *Id.* (emphases added).

²⁵ Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., *Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest* (Feb. 20, 2017).

deviations from the priorities; (3) distinctions among different criminal convictions and records based on seriousness and similar considerations; (4) the general focus on individuals convicted of crimes, as opposed to those merely charged with crimes or who may have “committed acts which constitute a chargeable criminal offense;”²⁶ and (5) some degree of supervisory review of exercises of prosecutorial discretion. At the same time, however, the prior Administration did not actually initiate or pursue removal proceedings against all removable noncitizens, arrest or detain all potentially detainable noncitizens, or remove all noncitizens with final orders of removal—nor could the Administration have done so, in light of available resources. Instead, the prior Administration effectively delegated prioritization decisions to individual line agents, without necessary training or guidance to steer the exercise of this discretion, raising the potential for contradictory and unfair enforcement of the immigration laws across the system and undermining the Executive’s ability to focus resources on a systemwide level on pursuing enforcement against the noncitizens who pose the greatest threats to safety and security.

Resource Limitations Necessitating Enforcement Priorities

The need to make smart and strategic choices about how to utilize the limited resources provided by Congress is a common theme in many of the Department’s prosecutorial discretion and enforcement priorities guidelines

²⁶ *Id.* at 2.

across administrations.²⁷ DHS has insufficient resources to conduct immigration enforcement against *all* of the more than 11 million undocumented or otherwise removable noncitizens estimated to be in the country today or to efficiently and effectively remove the more than one million noncitizens who already have final orders of removal. Further, immigration enforcement often touches upon foreign affairs, which must be taken into account in certain enforcement contexts. This consideration is especially salient in the context of executing removal orders, where there is a need to work with foreign coun-

²⁷ Meissner Memorandum at 4 (“Like all law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite resources, and it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations. The INS historically has responded to this limitation by setting priorities in order to achieve a variety of goals.”); Morton Memorandum at 1 (“In light of the large number of administrative violations the agency is charged with addressing and the limited enforcement resources the agency has available, ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal resources to ensure that the removals the agency does conduct promote the agency’s highest enforcement priorities, namely national security, public safety, and border security.”); Jeh Johnson Memorandum at 2 (“Due to limited resources, DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons illegally in the United States. As is true of virtually every other law enforcement agency, DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the law. And, in the exercise of that discretion, DHS can and should develop smart enforcement priorities, and ensure that use of its limited resources is devoted to the pursuit of those priorities.”); Kelly Memorandum at 2 (“The Director of ICE, the Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of USCIS may, as they determine is appropriate, issue further guidance to allocate appropriate resources to prioritize enforcement activities within these categories—for example, by prioritizing enforcement activities against removable aliens who are convicted felons or who are involved in gang activity or drug trafficking.”).

tries to accept the return of individuals ordered removed. Foreign-affairs concerns often necessitate expending significant resources when trying to remove certain noncitizens who pose serious threats to public safety and national security. But while prioritization is a long-standing practice in immigration and law enforcement, the resource constraints DHS and its components face in the civil immigration enforcement context have increased dramatically over the years. As a result, the need for thoughtful enforcement priorities that effectively focus the Department's resources on the cases most important to the national interest is especially vital today.

In recent years, the United States has faced a significant, ongoing enforcement and humanitarian challenge at the border. Even before this, the government agencies involved in immigration enforcement, including ICE, CBP, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice, were faced with significant resource challenges. For example, while the number of removal proceedings pending in immigration court grew from 262,757 cases in 2010 to 1,328,413 at the end of the third quarter in fiscal year 2021—an increase of more than 400% in a little over a decade—the annual number of case completions has remained largely flat.²⁸ Much of the growth in the immigration court backlog took place over the course of the last Administration, when the Department operated un-

²⁸ Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics Pending Cases, New Cases, and Total Completions available at www.justice.gov/eoir/workload-and-adjudication-statistics.

der that Administration's stated policy that all removable noncitizens should be removed. Between the end of Fiscal Year 2016 and the end of Fiscal Year 2020, the number of pending cases increased from 521,526 to 1,260,039.²⁹

ICE, too, faces significant resource challenges for myriad reasons. At present, ICE's approximately 6,500 Enforcement and Removal Operations officers manage a docket of more than 3 million noncitizens either in removal proceedings or subject to orders of removal. Beyond funding constraints, ICE's detention capacity is currently limited by pending litigation and COVID-19 considerations. In total, ICE has sufficient appropriations to fund approximately 34,000 detention beds; in light of those additional constraints, however, ICE presently has the ability to detain approximately 26,800 noncitizens at any given time—less than 1% of the number in removal proceedings or subject to orders of removal.

The ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), which is responsible for representing DHS in removal proceedings, is similarly resource-constrained, further illustrating the need for resource prioritization in enforcement. Although the immigration court docket has grown dramatically in the last decade (as discussed above), OPLA has not received sufficient additional appropriations to grow with that docket. Consequently, OPLA currently has hundreds fewer attorneys than it would need to adequately support the workload associated with the current number of pending removal proceedings. As a result, OPLA faces serious constraints

²⁹ *Id.*

on its ability to meaningfully prepare for all cases set for hearings or even attend every such hearing.

These challenges and limitations, particularly in light of the lack of meaningful prioritization during the previous Administration that contributed to the significant growth in both ICE and EOIR's caseloads, make it impossible for OPLA to effectively manage its work without thoughtful prioritization policies and the exercise of discretion.

These severe constraints underscore the importance of exercising enforcement discretion in a manner that focuses the agency's efforts on those noncitizens who pose the greatest threat to national security, public safety, and border security. These prioritization decisions should also be informed by the values of the enforcement agency and the Nation. In remarks delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys more than 80 years ago, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson said:

Nothing better can come out of this meeting of law enforcement officers than a rededication to the spirit of fair play and decency that should animate the federal prosecutor. Your positions are of such independence and importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done.³⁰

On his first day in office, President Biden affirmed that "advancing equity, civil rights, racial justice, and equal

³⁰ Robert H. Jackson, *The Federal Prosecutor*, 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 18, 18-19 (1940).

opportunity is the responsibility of the whole of our Government.”³¹ In the immigration enforcement context, scholars and professors have observed that prosecutorial discretion guidelines are essential to advancing this Administration’s stated commitment to “advancing equity for all, including people of color and others who have been historically underserved, marginalized, and adversely affected by persistent poverty and inequality.”³²

The use of prosecutorial discretion to advance the interests of justice is built upon years of precedent. As mentioned above, the Meissner Memorandum in 2000 instructed that “[s]ervice officers are not only authorized by law but expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement process” and directed that “officers *must* take into account the principles described [in the memorandum] in order to promote the efficient and effective enforcement of the immigration laws *and the interests of justice*.”³³ As mentioned above, the Jeh Johnson Memorandum in 2014 authorized enforcement outside the established priorities where, “in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, removing such [a noncitizen] would serve an important federal interest.”³⁴ The Meissner Memo 14 years earlier referenced the Principles of Federal Prosecution governing the conduct of U.S. Attorneys to explain that

³¹ Exec. Order 13985, *Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government* (Jan. 20, 2021).

³² *Id.*

³³ Meissner Memorandum at 1 (emphasis added).

³⁴ Jeh Johnson Memorandum at 5.

“[a]s a general matter, INS officers may decline to prosecute a legally sufficient immigration case if the Federal immigration enforcement interest that would be served by prosecution is not substantial.”³⁵

More recently, ICE Principal Legal Advisor John Trasviña issued guidance to trial attorneys aptly explaining that

Prosecutorial discretion is an indispensable feature of any functioning legal system. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, where appropriate, can preserve limited government resources, achieve just and fair outcomes in individual cases, and advance the Department’s mission of administering and enforcing the immigration laws of the United States in a smart and sensible way that promotes public confidence.³⁶

Moreover, the Board of Immigration Appeals explained in an en banc decision that “[i]mmigration enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the government wins when justice is done.”³⁷

These sentiments are also reflected in recommendations on prosecutorial discretion advanced by NGO advocates

³⁵ Meissner Memorandum at 5.

³⁶ Memorandum from John Trasviña, ICE Principal Legal Advisor, *Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities* (May 27, 2021).

³⁷ *Matter of S-M-J-*, 21 I&N Dec. 722,727 (BIA 1997) (en banc).

for noncitizens. For example, the We Are Home Campaign³⁸ has encouraged the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to ensure that the interests of justice are met for people exercising workplace rights or serving as witnesses in labor disputes; people engaged in civil, faith, housing, First Amendment, and other human rights activities; and victims and witnesses in civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings, among others. Advocates argue that strict application of our immigration laws without considerations such as these risks perverse outcomes, unjust results, and diminished confidence in the rule of law.

The Biden-Harris Administration's Approach to Immigration-Enforcement Priorities

Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities

In line with historical practice and in full recognition of the resource constraints that require the use of civil immigration enforcement priorities to guide the workforce, on January 20, 2021, Acting Secretary David Pekoske issued a memorandum, *Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities*. The Pekoske Memorandum called for a comprehensive review of enforcement policies and priorities and immediately rescinded and superseded several prior policies, including a February 20, 2017, memorandum establishing the Department's previous enforcement priorities, as well as various implementing memoranda issued by components. The memorandum

³⁸ We Are Home Campaign, *Recommendations for the Use of Prosecutorial Discretion* (June 16, 2021).

additionally established and defined three Department-wide priorities:

1. **National security.** Individuals who have engaged in or are suspected of terrorism or espionage, or whose apprehension, arrest and/or custody is otherwise necessary to protect the national security of the United States.
2. **Border security.** Individuals apprehended at the border or ports of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States on or after November 1, 2020, or who were not physically present in the United States before November 1, 2020.
3. **Public safety.** Individuals incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails released on or after the issuance of this memorandum who have been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the time of conviction, and are determined to pose a threat to public safety.³⁹

Although the memorandum directed that resources be allocated to address these enumerated priorities, it specified that “nothing in this memorandum prohibits the apprehension or detention of individuals unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities herein,” and explicitly disclaimed any notion that the

³⁹ *Id.* at 2. The Pekoske Memorandum additionally announced a 100-day pause on certain removals that was enjoined.

guidelines and priorities may be relied upon to create any enforceable right or benefit.⁴⁰

On February 18, 2021, Acting ICE Director Tae Johnson issued a memorandum that both supported the interim priorities laid out in the Pekoske Memorandum and modified them in certain respects. Importantly, the Johnson Memorandum made clear that at-large enforcement actions of presumed-priority individuals could be taken without prior approval,⁴¹ and that individuals who are not presumed priorities may nevertheless be subject to apprehension and removal—under some circumstances, even in the absence of prior approval—if they pose a threat to public safety. The Johnson Memorandum directed ICE field offices to collect data on enforcement and removal actions, both to promote compliance with the guidance and consistency across geographic areas of responsibility, and to inform the development of new Departmental enforcement guidance. Some of the findings from that data are discussed further below.

Litigation Challenging Immigration Enforcement Guidance in the Pekoske and Johnson Memoranda

The immigration enforcement guidance contained in the Pekoske and Johnson Memoranda have been challenged in four separate lawsuits.⁴² One suit, which was filed by

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 3-4.

⁴¹ The Johnson Memorandum expanded the category of presumed public safety threats to include certain individuals who are qualifying members of criminal gangs or transnational criminal organizations.

⁴² See *Arizona, et al. v. United States, et al.*, No. 2:21-cv-186 (D. Ariz.); *Coe, et al. v. Eiden, et al.*, No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.);

Texas and Louisiana, contends that the memoranda run afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because they violate the Department's duty to detain certain individuals pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2), are arbitrary and capricious, and are agency rules that must be adopted following notice and comment. Other lawsuits filed by Florida, Arizona, and Montana, and various local governments and an association of ICE officers raise similar claims focusing on a variety of detention provisions, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), and 1231(a)(1).

On August 19, 2021, a federal district court issued an opinion ruling in favor of Texas and Louisiana on their APA claims and preliminarily enjoining the Department from enforcing and implementing Section B of the Pecoske Memorandum and the operative part of the Johnson Memorandum, which provide guidance on the implementation of the Department's civil immigration enforcement and removal priorities. On September 15, 2021, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals largely stayed the district court injunction pending appeal in an opinion that reaffirmed the "broad discretion" entrusted to immigration officials-including with respect to "who should face enforcement action in the first place," *Texas*, 2021 WL 4188102 at *3 (quoting *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 396)-that was, with limited exceptions, left unencumbered by the detention authorities found at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). The court's decision was grounded in the fact that policies such as these that are entrusted to agency discretion by law are generally nonreviewable under the APA And district courts in the Florida and

Florida v. United States, et al., No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fla.); *Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.*, 6:21- cv-00016 (S.D. Tex.).

Arizona and Montana lawsuits similarly concluded that the States' claims were unreviewable because the prioritization of enforcement actions is committed to agency discretion by law.

In arguing that the adoption of the Pekoske and Johnson Memoranda violated the APA because they were arbitrary and capricious and ignored statutory mandates, the plaintiffs in these suits have focused on a series of concerns that they alleged the Department failed to consider when crafting the policies. The district court that enjoined the memoranda similarly pointed to a number of these considerations in its analysis. These concerns ranged from the adequacy of the Department's consideration of whether the memoranda would enhance public safety and appropriately address the risk of recidivism by noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses; the costs that states would allegedly bear as a result of enforcement decisions made in reliance on the memoranda (e.g., costs related to additional incarceration, post-release supervision, and education, health care, and social services); how deciding not to detain certain individuals during the pendency of removal proceedings could affect future removal efforts, adding costs tied to delays and increasing the rate of abscondment; and how the priorities would interact with various statutory enforcement and detention mandates.

Listening Sessions to Help Evaluate Interim Priorities and Develop Updated Guidance

Throughout the past year, Department officials engaged in multiple discussions with leadership from ICE, USCIS, and CBP, as well as ICE personnel in the multiple field locations. Department officials also met with external stakeholders, including law enforcement groups, state

and local government representatives, and non-governmental entities, including immigrant advocacy organizations. These conversations helped the Department evaluate its interim immigration enforcement and removal priorities and properly understand and consider the various interests of both internal and external stakeholders, thereby ensuring that the Department's development of new priorities was informed by all of the relevant evidence and interests.

Over the course of four listening sessions with representatives from the National Sheriffs' Association, the Southwest Border Sheriffs' Coalition, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and others, participants talked about the types of criminal offenses that pose threats to public safety and should be prioritized by ICE. Many suggested replacing the "aggravated felony" language in the interim priorities. Some suggested a list that was untethered to the definition of "aggravated felony" and could include sexual assault crimes, crimes against children, gang and drug activities, violent crimes, and property crimes for repeat offenders. Several participants recommended that the recency of the offense should also be a factor.

Internal engagements similarly revealed interest from some ICE personnel to have greater discretion to arrest a wider range of individuals. Some appeared to understand the "presumed priority" categories in the interim enforcement guidance as restrictive mandates rather than presumptions that can be overcome. Other personnel expressed a desire for more specificity—for instance, by defining "border security" using parameters

that are clearly identifiable (e.g. “entered the United States within two years”).

Conversely, NGO advocates for noncitizens, representatives of state and local governments, and other stakeholders observed that under the existing framework, individuals falling outside the presumed priority categories are frequently arrested and removed. The resulting uncertainty, created by the possibility of enforcement outside of the presumed priorities, meant that individuals were fearful. Many warned that such fear can chill victim participation in law enforcement investigations and deter noncitizens from COVID-19 testing and vaccination. Some of these stakeholders also expressed concern that DHS personnel are determining individuals to be “public safety” threats based on single interactions with the criminal justice system, sometimes many years ago, without additional derogatory information or further assessment.

Finally, representatives of immigrant workers and labor unions observed that employers in certain industries sometimes seek to leverage immigration-enforcement actions (or the threat of them) to quash worker organizing or to dissuade workers from asserting their rights. These views were echoed by some mayors and police chiefs, who expressed concerns that ICE’s enforcement activities and reputation may deter victims and witnesses from contacting public safety authorities. These groups suggested that ICE could ameliorate this problem by engaging in better public communication, curtailing certain enforcement practices, or a combination of both.

Discussion of Key Considerations

Public Safety Considerations

Public safety has long been a central focus of DHS (and, previously, INS), and it has been a key feature of multiple past guidance memoranda on enforcement priorities. Under the Pekoske Memorandum, the public safety threat category includes “individuals incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails released on or after the issuance of this memorandum who have been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony,’ as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the time of conviction, and are determined to pose a threat to public safety.” The Johnson Memorandum expands that presumed priority category to apply more generally to noncitizens who pose a threat to public safety and who have been convicted of an aggravated felony, convicted of an offense involving participation with a criminal street gang, or who have certified specified ties to criminal street gangs or transnational criminal organizations. The Johnson Memorandum additionally clarifies that, generally with prior approval, any noncitizen who poses a threat to public safety may be deemed an enforcement priority even if they do not fall within the categories of individuals presumed to be such a priority, and specifies a variety of relevant factors to be considered, including “the nature and recency of the noncitizen’s convictions, the type and length of sentence imposed, [and] whether the enforcement action is otherwise an appropriate use of ICE’s limited resources.”

In the Department's engagements with internal and external stakeholders, including with the ICE workforce, concerns were raised about whether the focus on individuals convicted of "aggravated felonies" was both over- and under-inclusive. The aggravated felony definition can be challenging to administer in many instances; its various elements are subject to evolving definition by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the federal courts. Moreover, the "aggravated felony" category is an imperfect proxy for severity of offense. On the one hand, aggravated felonies may include certain crimes unlikely to be indicative of a public safety threat, such as certain drug possession offenses or filing a false tax return. On the other hand, certain offenses more likely to support a public safety threat finding-including, for example, certain murder and sex offenses-may not qualify as aggravated felonies based on the specific way in which a particular criminal statute is worded. In designing a new public safety enforcement priority category, the Department considered these concerns and chose to place greater emphasis on the totality of the facts and circumstances that inform whether an individual poses a current threat to public safety-typically because of serious criminal conduct-including by looking at key aggravating factors related to the individual's criminal offense and history as well as various mitigating factors.

The approach taken in the guidelines to public safety threats also addresses a central concern raised by the Texas district court in its ruling that the Pecoske and Johnson Memoranda were unlawfully arbitrary and capricious because they chose to focus enforcement efforts on "merely *some* criminal illegal aliens-those with aggravated felonies and criminal gang affiliations." *Texas*,

2021 WL 3683913 at *47. The district court stated that the Department ignored a supposed “well-established concept that *all* criminal illegal aliens or ‘deportable aliens pose high risks of recidivism.’” *Id.* (citing *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510,518 (2003)). The updated guidance addresses the district court’s concern by calling for a context-specific consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, the seriousness of an individual’s criminal record, the length of time since the offense, and evidence of rehabilitation. These factors are to be weighed in each case to assess whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety, including through a meaningful risk of recidivism.

There is no question that enhancing public safety is an appropriate priority for the Department. In fact, it is an imperative, given the Department’s mission. Executive Order 13993 directed DHS to issue enforcement guidance, in alignment with the Administration’s policy to “protect national and border security, . . . and ensure public health and safety.” This aim is furthered by a prioritization scheme that directs civil immigration enforcement resources towards apprehending and removing those individuals who are likely to present the greatest risks to public safety: individuals who are convicted of particularly grave offenses that cause significant harm, individuals who commit an offense while using or threatening to use a firearm or other dangerous weapon, individuals who have a serious prior criminal record, and individuals who, in light of their actions and circumstances, are unlikely to rehabilitate. While it is impossible to predict with certainty in each case whether a particular individual will re-offend, the Department has exercised its expert judgment and experience to identify those factors that make an offender particularly

more likely or less likely to recidivate. And the Department's judgments regarding these factors are further supported by evidence developed by the United States Sentencing Commission, which demonstrates that reconviction rates drop off significantly for individuals who are crime-free for 5 years post-release, those sentenced to 6 months or less of imprisonment, and those who were 40 or older when released.⁴³

In working to achieve its public safety goal, the Department has frequently made distinctions between individuals based on the nature of their convictions and conduct. This approach is further supported by the academic literature, which points to a negative relationship between immigration and crime (i.e., that as immigration increases, crime rates decrease).⁴⁴ These findings are further bolstered by micro-level research that generally finds lower criminal involvement by foreign-born individuals, relative to their native-born counterparts.⁴⁵ The Texas district court's reference to the "well-established" propensity for certain removable noncitizens to recidivate does not appear to be grounded

⁴³ United States Sentencing Commission, *Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview*, (Mar. 2016) Table 2 Figure 10 Figure 6, respectively, available at <https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/recidivism-overview.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Graham C. Ousey and Charis E. Kubrin, *Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue*, Annual Review of Criminology, <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092026>.

⁴⁵ Jacob Stowell and Stephanie DiPietro, *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration in the United States Crimes By and Against Immigrants*, The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration, 2014.

in empirical data, at least in part because legal status is not generally collected by law enforcement agencies. Where status information has been made available—including in the state of Texas itself—the evidence indicates that undocumented noncitizens are *less* likely to recidivate.⁴⁶

Additionally, it is a mistake to assume that the threat that an individual poses to public safety can be reduced to simply the question of whether the individual is likely to recidivate. Not all offenses present the same risk to public safety. As a result, while an individual with a substance abuse addiction may be highly likely to recidivate and be convicted again for a simple controlled substance offense, that individual may pose a smaller risk to public safety than an individual who has committed a recent violent assault. Law enforcement decisions such as these require consideration of the totality of circumstances, looking at the individual facts presented and both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and weighing all of those facts and circumstances in light of agency officials' informed judgment and experience.

Deconfliction Considerations

The Department has long recognized that civil immigration enforcement activity may have adverse effects on the enforcement of other laws. Law enforcement officials may have difficulty engaging noncitizen victims and witnesses in criminal investigations, if such victims and

⁴⁶ Michael T. Light et al., Comparing crime rates between undocumented immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born US citizens in Texas, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, (Dec. 12, 2020), available at <https://www.pnas.org/content/117/51/32340>.

witnesses are potentially subject to removal. Likewise, efforts of agencies enforcing our labor laws may be frustrated if noncitizen workers are disinclined to report violations of wage, workplace safety and other standards. It does not serve the public interest when these rights go unvindicated, or when crimes go unprosecuted. The Department has, over the years, adopted some policies to address elements of these challenges, some applicable to certain contexts, and some to specific components of the Department. In 2011 the Department entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Labor to ensure that the Departments work together to ensure that their respective civil worksite enforcement activities do not conflict.⁴⁷ Consistent with those concerns, the Department believes it is important that the guidelines being issued today convey clearly to various stakeholders, including the public generally and agencies that conduct investigations, that a particular noncitizen's use of, or cooperation with, civil and criminal enforcement authorities will generally be considered a mitigating factor in connection with enforcement decisions (even though such a mitigating factor may be outweighed by aggravating factors based on the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case).

Impact on States

The State-plaintiffs in several of the lawsuits alleged that the Department failed to consider the additional costs that States would incur as a result of the Pecoske

⁴⁷ Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites, Dec. 7 2011 available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/DHS-DOL-MOU_4.19.18.pdf.

and Johnson Memoranda and failed to consider whether the States had any reliance interests on the previous Administration's prioritization scheme. For instance, Texas alleged that it would incur additional criminal incarceration costs due to the Department's change in enforcement priorities because some noncitizens who would otherwise have been detained will now be released and may commit new criminal violations. *Texas*, 2021 WL 3683913 at* 12. Texas additionally asserted that because some noncitizens are released from detention and, as a result, are less likely to be removed from the country, the state would bear additional healthcare costs such as those provided through Emergency Medicaid, the Texas Family Violence Program, and the Texas Children's Health Insurance Program, as well as additional educational costs for educating the children of such noncitizens. Louisiana alleged that it would incur similar costs. In its order enjoining the implementation and enforcement of the memoranda, the federal district court concluded that "the Memoranda bear no thought or indication as to whether the new prioritization scheme minimizes and limits state costs due to crime." *Id.* at *50.

In the Department's considered judgment, none of the asserted negative effects on States-either in the form of costs or the form of undermining reliance interests-from adopting a prioritization scheme outweighs the benefits of the scheme. As an initial matter, any immigration policy may have indirect, downstream impacts on a significant number of actors-including, potentially, State governments, businesses, and individual citizens-and the Department, regardless of Administration, cannot provide an exhaustive analysis of all of these potential impacts every time it adopts a change in immigration

policy. The Department endeavors to consider the predictable (and measurable) impacts that its policies may have on those most directly affected by those policies.

Further, an assessment of any potential impacts on State governments is uniquely difficult to conclude with certainty. As the Department explained recently in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, it is challenging to measure the overall fiscal effects of enforcement priorities guidance on state and local governments.⁴⁸ This is in large part due to those governments' budgetary control, and the reality that any fiscal consequences are driven by policy decisions that state and local governments are themselves making. The 2017 National Academy of Sciences report canvassed studies of the fiscal impacts of immigration as a whole, and described such analysis as extremely challenging and dependent on a range of assumptions.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals* 86 Fed. Reg. 53 736, 53,801-02 (Sept. 28, 2021).

⁴⁹ See NAS *The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration* (2017), 28 available at <https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration> (“[E]stimating the fiscal impacts of immigration is a complex calculation that depends to a significant degree on what the questions of interest are, how they are framed, and what assumptions are built into the accounting exercise. The first-order net fiscal impact of immigration is the difference between the various tax contributions immigrants make to public finances and the government expenditures on public benefits and services they receive. The foreign-born are a diverse population, and the way in which they affect government finances is sensitive to their demographic and skill characteristics, their role in labor and

In addition, while second-order effects also clearly occur, analysis of such effects similarly presents methodological and empirical challenges. For example, as with the native-born population, the age structure of the noncitizen demographic plays a major role in assessing any fiscal impacts. Children and young adults contribute less to society in terms of taxes and draw more in benefits by using public education, for example. As people age and start participating in the labor market they become net contributors to public finances; those in post-retirement again could become net users of public benefit programs. Compared to the native-born population, noncitizens also can differ in their characteristics in terms of skills, education levels, income levels, number of dependents in the family, the places they choose to live, etc., and any combination of these factors could have varying downstream fiscal impacts. As noted above, local and state economic conditions and laws that govern public finances and availability of public benefits also vary and can influence the fiscal impacts of immigration.

Based on the information presented in the 2017 NAS report, DHS has approached the question of state and local fiscal impacts as follows. First, it is clear that the fiscal impacts of proposed policies to state and local governments would vary based on a range of factors, such as the demographic characteristics of the affected population within a particular jurisdiction at a particular time (or over a particular period of time). In addition, fiscal effects would vary significantly depending on local

other markets, and the rules regulating accessibility and use of government-financed programs.”).

economic conditions and the local rules governing eligibility for public benefits, detention costs, and other laws and practices. These costs to states and localities will be highly location-specific and are, therefore, difficult to quantify.

Second, in the Department's experience and judgment, there is good reason to believe that any effects from implementation of priorities guidance are unlikely to be significant, and could have a net positive effect. Under no circumstance—including under a framework that effectively sets no enforcement priorities—will DHS be able to arrest, detain, or remove more than a fraction of the overall removable population. Without a dramatic change in the level of resources, most noncitizens who are removable will likely remain in the country. This is, of course, not a new phenomenon. According to 2018 estimates by the Migration Policy Institute, approximately three-in-five undocumented noncitizens in the United States had lived in the country for at least 10 years.⁵⁰ Additionally, as the Department heard from multiple stakeholder engagements, including with law enforcement partners and local government officials, a civil immigration enforcement framework that lacks clear priorities is likely to increase fear and sow mistrust between noncitizens and government. Such an environment can breed “hesitancy in accessing services,

⁵⁰ Migration Policy Institute, *Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States* available at <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US>.

relief, and even vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.”⁵¹ Likewise, states and localities benefit from civil immigration enforcement policies that are more likely to lead to the arrest and removal of individuals who are threats to public safety.

Finally, even if the Department’s guidelines for the enforcement of civil immigration laws have indirect fiscal impacts on states, that is no different from countless other policy decisions that Federal agencies make every day, including decisions by other law enforcement entities regarding where to focus their limited enforcement resources. Enforcement decisions made by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the Environmental Protection Agency can have profound fiscal impacts on states and localities, but those actions are nevertheless pursued when they advance the important mission of those Federal agencies. For the Department of Homeland Security to achieve its critical mission, it similarly must set sensible priorities for the enforcement of the Nation’s civil immigration laws and to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Similarly, with respect to reliance interests, the Department has considered whether any States or other third parties may have valid reliance interests invested in the previous Administration’s priorities scheme or in the scheme developed by the interim guidance. In the Department’s view, no such reasonable reliance interests exist, both because the Department is unaware of any

⁵¹ E-mail from Nora Preciado, Director, Immigrant Affairs to Kamal Essaheb Counselor to the Secretary, DHS (Sept. 23, 2021, 05:42) (on file with author).

State that has materially changed its position to its detriment as a result of those previous policies and because any such change by any party would be unreasonable in light of the long history of the Executive's use of evolving enforcement priority schemes in this area. In addition, to the extent that any marginal reliance interests do exist, the Department believes that the benefits of the prioritization scheme outweigh those interests.⁵²

In short, while any set of priorities may result in some indirect fiscal effects on state and local governments (both positive and negative), such effects are extremely difficult to quantify fully, are highly localized, and would vary based on a range of factors, including policy choices made by such governments and outside our control. Moreover, they would be a necessary consequence of the Department carrying out its congressionally mandated duties in service to the national interest. The Department further believes that previous prioritization schemes have not engendered any reasonable or substantial reliance interests. Therefore, the Department has determined that, even in light of the potential for such indirect fiscal effects or the theoretical possibility of reliance interests, the enforcement priorities articulated by the Department are an appropriate exercise of the Department's discretion.

⁵² The Department is aware that several states purported to enter into "agreements" with the Department at the end of the previous Administration. As the Department has explained in litigation, those documents were void ab initio and unenforceable. Any reliance on those documents is therefore unreasonable. To the extent those documents were ever valid the Department has since terminated them.

Resource Considerations

Resource considerations have long justified the necessary application of enforcement policies and priorities. Nevertheless, the *Texas* district court in its injunction expressed skepticism over the Department's reference to resource limitations in the Johnson Memorandum, noting that the Government produced no evidence that "the resources it previously used for enforcement of the deprioritized categories are now being allocated to boost enforcement of the prioritized categories." *Texas*, 2021 WL 3683913 at *17. Rather, the Court cited anecdotal evidence presented by the States that, according to the Court, suggested that the Johnson Memorandum only resulted in a drop in enforcement actions against certain categories of noncitizens, but not a corresponding increase in enforcement actions against other categories of noncitizens.

Based upon data collected between the issuance of the Johnson Memorandum on February 18 and August 31, 2021, the interim priorities focus on public safety, national security and border security proved to be effective in channeling ICE officers' and agents' efforts toward cases these priorities. For instance, as the Johnson Memorandum defined the "public safety" category to include, in part, noncitizens convicted of aggravated felony offenses, ICE during this period arrested 6,046 individuals with such convictions compared to just 3,575 in the same period in 2020. Similarly, consistent with the Johnson Memorandum's border security prioritization of any noncitizen who entered the United States "on or after November 1, 2020" or who "was not physically present" in the United States before that date, ICE allocated enforcement resources to the southwest border

to assist CBP in transporting, processing, transferring, and removing recently-arrived migrants, particularly through June, July, and August of 2021. These facts show that the guidance to the field matters; resource allocation shifted to focus on what the guidance required.

More generally, the Texas district court questioned whether the enforcement prioritization scheme would actually increase costs by delaying deportations of individuals who may not be deemed a priority, thereby increasing their incentives to file frivolous and time-consuming appeals and to ultimately abscond. This criticism is based on the misconception that if the Department did not prioritize its enforcement efforts—or if it prioritized enforcement in some different way—a significantly greater number of people could be arrested, detained, moved through removal proceedings, and processed for removal. But that is false. Resource limitations make that an impossibility, as has been the case since the Department was formed (and before that as well). Moreover, such an approach ignores the reality that the Department’s overall safety and security mission is not best served by simply pursuing the greatest overall number of enforcement actions but is rather best advanced by directing resources to prioritize enforcement against those noncitizens who most threaten the safety and security of the Nation.

Relationship Between Enforcement Priorities and Statutory Mandates

Implicit in the notion of prosecutorial discretion is the idea that discretion only may be exercised within the bounds of the law. As discussed above, courts have long recognized that immigration officials possess broad discretion over immigration enforcement, including “whether

to pursue removal at all.” *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 396. These concerns are “greatly magnified in the deportation context.” *Crane v. Johnson*, 783 F.3d 244, 247 n.6 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has never required law enforcement officers to bring charges against an individual or group of individuals. *See Texas v. United States*, --- F.4th ---, 2021 WL 4188102, *4 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2021). In recent challenges to the Department’s interim immigration enforcement and removal priorities, litigants have argued that various detention provisions within the INA constrain the Department’s discretionary authority and even create affirmative duties to arrest, detain, and seek to remove broad categories of noncitizens. But the fact that many INA provisions state that the Executive Branch “shall” take certain actions does not eliminate the Department’s discretion. To the contrary, longstanding Supreme Court precedent “hold[s] that the use of ‘shall’ . . . does not limit prosecutorial discretion.” *See Texas*, 2021 WL 4188102, at *5 (listing cases). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected such an argument, explaining that although the two detention states at issue in the case before it—8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231—contained the word “shall,” it ultimately concluded that provisions “override the deep-rooted tradition of enforcement discretion when it comes to decisions that occur before detention, such as who should be subject to arrest, detainers, and removal proceedings.” *Id* at *6.

The Executive Branch has also long recognized this discretion. For example, the 2000 Meissner Memorandum explicitly contrasted the “specific limitation on releasing certain criminal aliens in” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) with the general direction “that the INS ‘shall’ remove

removable aliens” to illustrate how Congress can effectively limit agency discretion by statute.⁵³ But recognizing that even the limitation on release authority contained in § 1226(c)(2) did not override the agency’s general prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to pursue removal of an individual or to abandon the endeavor entirely, that memorandum reaffirmed the authority of immigration officers—even with respect to noncitizens who would be subject to mandatory detention under a provision like § 1226(c)(2)—to cancel a Notice to Appear prior to filing with the immigration court or move for dismissal in immigration court.⁵⁴ That same principle would apply to the decision to cancel a detainer and choose not to pursue removal of such an individual in the first place. The Jeh Johnson Memorandum similarly recognized that although mandatory detention provisions may limit the authority of immigration officers to release individuals who would generally not be priorities for detention (e.g., noncitizens “who are known to be suffering from serious physical or mental illness, who are disabled, elderly, pregnant, or nursing, who demonstrate that they are primary caretakers of children or an infirm person, or whose detention is otherwise not in the public interest”), field office directors could consult with local ICE attorneys for guidance when confronted with such cases.⁵⁵

Having said that, the Department does recognize that certain provisions within the INA place constraints on its authority to release noncitizens from ICE custody

⁵³ Meissner Memorandum at 3.

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 6.

⁵⁵ Jeh Johnson Memorandum at 5.

while the Department is pursuing their removal or during the statutory removal period. For instance, once ICE arrests a noncitizen who is subject to the custody provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), that noncitizen generally must remain in custody during the pendency of removal proceedings unless otherwise eligible for release pursuant to § 1226(c)(2), or as required to comply with a court order. Likewise, all noncitizens in ICE custody who are subject to the mandatory custody provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) those who have been found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) or deportable under § 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B)—must remain detained for the duration of the removal period unless release is required to comply with a court order. The Department’s updated *Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law* are fully consistent with these constraints and do not purport to override them.

Consideration of Alternative Approaches

The Department’s focus on national security, public safety, and border security remains unchanged. The numerous stakeholder engagements, internal discussions, and reviews of policies, protocols, and priorities make clear that these are and should remain the overriding Departmental priorities.

The new guidelines however will mark a significant shift in how those priorities are operationalized. Specifically, they—reflecting lessons learned from numerous engagements and internal reviews—reject a categorical approach to the definition of public safety threat. They will reject as both under- and over-inclusive the interim guidelines’ focus on whether an individual was convicted of an “aggravated offense” under immigration law, or an

offense for which an element was active participation in a criminal street gang. In its place, the new guidelines will require the workforce to engage in an assessment of each individual case and make a case-by-case assessment as to whether the individual poses a public safety threat, guided by a consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.

More specifically, the guidelines will provide general direction that a noncitizen found to pose a current threat to public safety—typically because of serious criminal conduct—is a priority for apprehension and removal. But the specific determination as to who presents a public safety threat is delegated to the field, which is instructed and empowered to make individualized decisions based on a case-by-case analysis and taking into consideration aggravating factors—such as the gravity of the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed, the nature and degree of harm of the offense, the sophistication of the criminal offense, the use or threatened use of a firearm or dangerous weapon, and a serious prior criminal record, and mitigating factors—including advance or tender age, lengthy presence in the United States, impact of removal on family in the United States, and other relevant considerations. Bottom line: these factors should be used to ensure that officer and agents are focusing on actual threats, rather than making on pre-conceived determinations of the nature or a threat. Meanwhile, the grandmothers, clergy, teachers, and farmworkers who have lived and worked in the United States, contributing to the country without causing harm, should not be a priority based solely on the fact that they are removable.

The Department also recognizes that implementation will require significant training, guidance, and effective review of decisions. But it reflects a determination that officers and agents need the discretion to make case-by-case determinations to identify who poses a threat. Any catch-all definition or bright-line rule runs the risk of being both over- and under-inclusive.

The guidelines also will differ from the interim priorities by dispensing with the pre-approval process in the exercise of this discretion. This decision was based largely on feedback from members of the workforce, who sought additional flexibility in the exercise of their judgment. The guidelines will be coupled with extensive and continuous training program on the new guidelines, the creation of short- and long-term processes to review enforcement decisions to achieve quality and consistency, and comprehensive data collection and analysis. Each of these will be critical to ensuring that discretion is being exercised consistent with the guidelines and in furtherance of the Department's highest priorities. Importantly, implementation won't begin until 60 days after issuance to ensure that there is time to do this training—and do it well. The first 90 days will also be subject to particularly rigorous review, to allow for adjustments as needed, so as to ensure that discretion is exercised as intended—to focus on those who pose a threat to national security, public safety, and border security.

But at its core, the priorities reflect a determination that officers and agents need the discretion to make case-by-case determinations to identify who poses a threat. Conversely, they are guided by a determination that the many noncitizens that have been contributing members

of our communities for years—including teachers, clergy, farmworkers, and nannies—generally should not be an enforcement priority.

In adopting this approach, the Department also considered several alternatives, including a so-called “checklist” approach, in which officers’ and agents’ discretion would have been more tightly controlled by strict lists of what types of actions to pursue. The so-called checklist approach has the advantage of predictability; it relies least on officers’ and agents’ discretionary decisionmaking, and it most strictly predetermines which noncitizens will be subject to an enforcement action. However, this approach has the disadvantage of foreclosing a nuanced, individualized assessment of each noncitizen’s aggravating and mitigating attributes, and therefore risks overinclusive and underinclusive decisionmaking, which yield unjust or unwise outcomes.

Another alternative approach that was considered was the delineation of certain categories for which no discretion should be exercised (i.e., where enforcement actions are mandated). The legal claims hinge in part on the theory that Congress commanded that certain individuals be arrested, detained, and removed. For the reasons discussed above, it is the Department’s position that its enforcement discretion is not circumscribed by the enactment of these provisions. That said, the Department could adopt such a requirement as a matter of policy. But the Department has concluded that doing so would be counterproductive. It would undermine the Department’s ability to effectively prioritize its limited resources to focus on the particular noncitizens who pose the greatest threat to safety and security. For in-

stance, were the Department to choose to pursue removal of all individuals encountered who would, upon being taken into custody, be subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), the Department's detention capacity would quickly be exhausted. The same is true with respect to those whose detention would be mandatory during the removal period and those subject to various detention authorities in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Without a set of priorities to guide the exercise of enforcement discretion, where legally permissible, the Department would have little to no control over how its resources were being spent and would be unable to achieve its highest national security, public safety, and border security priorities.

After much consideration and deliberation, the Department has chosen a path that couples priorities with discretion, training and oversight. This approach is founded in a steadfast focus on national security, public safety and border security, coupled with a steadfast commitment to the interest of justice and individualized assessment of threat.

**Corrected Index for Certified Administrative
Record for Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil
Immigration Laws**

1.	<i>Significant Considerations in Developing Updated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30, 2021)</i>	AR_DHSP_00000001
2.	Sam Bernsen, <i>INS General Counsel, Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion</i> (July 15, 1976)	AR_DHSP_00000022
3.	Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, INS, <i>Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion</i> (Nov. 17, 2000)	AR_DHSP_00000030
4.	Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Dir., <i>Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens</i> (Jun 30, 2010, as updated March 2, 2011)	AR_DHSP_00000043
5.	Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Dir., <i>Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil</i>	AR_DHSP_00000047

	<i>Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens</i> (June 17, 2011)	
6.	Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., <i>Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants</i> (Nov. 20, 2014)	AR_DHSP_00000053
7.	Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., <i>Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest</i> (Feb. 20, 2017)	AR_DHSP_00000059
8.	Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec'y of Homeland Sec., <i>Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities</i> (Jan. 20, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00000065
9.	Memorandum from Tae Johnson, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't, <i>Interim</i>	AR_DHSP_00000070

	<i>Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities</i> (Feb. 18, 2021)	
10.	Memorandum from John Trasviña, ICE Principal Legal Advisor, <i>Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities</i> (May 27, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00000077
11.	Memorandum regarding Stakeholder Outreach in Furtherance of Department Civil Immigration Enforcement Guidance (Sept. 17, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00000090
12.	Memorandum from Camilla Wamsley, Principal Policy Advisor, <i>Listening Sessions for Final Priorities</i>	AR_DHSP_00000095
13.	Memorandum regarding DHS Enforcement Priorities Stakeholder Outreach April 6-9, 2021	AR_DHSP_00000097
14.	Memorandum regarding DHS Enforcement Priorities Stakeholder	AR_DHSP_00000102

	Outreach April 14-May 20, 2021	
15.	Memorandum regarding Conclusions Drawn from "AART" Data (Sept. 24, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00000108
16.	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Data Reports	AR_DHSP_00000112
17.	Memorandum regarding Conclusions Drawn From Implementation of the OPLA PD memo	AR_DHSP_00002240
18.	Memorandum from Tae Johnson, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't, <i>Review of Policies, Procedures, and Resources Available to Victims of Crime</i> (July 30, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002241
19.	Letter from James Comer, U.S. Rep., and Jim Jordan, U.S. Rep., to Tae Johnson, Acting Dir. of U.S. Immigr. And Customs Enf't (Feb. 17, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002243
20.	Letter from Alix Desulme, Chairman, Haitian-American Elected Officials Network, to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of	AR_DHSP_00002247

	Homeland Sec. (Feb. 23, 2021)	
21.	Letter from Southern Poverty Law Center, et al., to Michael W. Meade, District Dir., U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't (Feb. 4, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002248
22.	Letter from Southern Poverty Law Center, et al., to Thomas Files, District Dir., U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't (Feb. 4, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002252
23.	Letter from Dan Bishop, U.S. Rep., et al., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 11, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002256
24.	Letter from Kwame Raoul, Att'y Gen. of State of Ill., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (May 28, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002258
25.	Letter from Andy Biggs, U.S. Rep., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (July 6, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002261
26.	Letter from Ben Johnson, Dir., Am. Immigr.	AR_DHSP_00002264

	Lawyers Ass'n, et al. to Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (July 31, 2021)	
27.	Letter from Ron DeSantis, Gov. of Fla., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 26, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002270
28.	Letter from Pat Fallon, U.S. Rep., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 26, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002275
29.	Letter from Mike Thompson, U.S. Rep., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (Mar. 3, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002277
30.	Letter from Rick Scott, U.S. Senator, Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 19, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002279
31.	Letter from Kevin J. Rambosk, Sheriff, Collier County, Fla. To Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (Feb. 3, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002281
32.	Letter from ACLU of Neb., et al., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas,	AR_DHSP_00002285

	Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 16, 2021)	
33.	Letter from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, U.S. Rep., et al. to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (May 14, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002290
34.	Memorandum from Peter Markowitz, <i>History and Analysis of Post-1996 Immigration Enforcement Agency Guidance</i> (June 4, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002294
35.	Memorandum from ACLU regarding Suggested Changes to Priorities	AR_DHSP_00002304
36.	Letter from ACLU of N. Cal., et al., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (June 28, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002306
37.	Memorandum from Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-Based Violence, et al., regarding Evaluating Public Safety in the Context of Immigration Enforcement and Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault	AR_DHSP_00002317

38.	Letter from Cory A. Booker, U.S. Senator, et al., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (April 15, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002321
39.	Email from Nora A. Preciado, Dir. Imm. Affairs, Cities for Action, to Kamal Essaheb, Coun. to Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (Sept. 23, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002324
40.	Memorandum from We Are Home Campaign Recommendations, <i>Recommendations for the use of Prosecutorial Discretion</i> (June 16, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002330
41.	Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, et al., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (Aug. 24, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002345
42.	Email from Leslye E. Orloff, Dir., Nat'l Imm. Women's Advoc. Project, to Royce Murray, Coun. to Sec'y of Homeland Sec., et al. (May 20, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002354

43.	Letter from Imm. Alliance for Justice and Equity, et al. to Joseph R. Biden, President (Mar. 10, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002434
44.	Letter from Tiffany Anderson, Co-Chair, Kan. Governor's Comm'n on Racial Equity and Justice, and Shannon Portillo, Co-Chair, Kan. Governor's Comm'n on Racial Equity and Justice, to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 29, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002437
45.	Letter from Jim Mulhern, President, Nat'l Milk Producers Fed'n, to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 25, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002439
46.	Letter from Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n, et al., to John Trasviña, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't (July 19, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002441
47.	Executive Order 13768, <i>Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States</i> , 82	AR_DHSP_00002450

	Fed. Reg. 8799 (January 30, 2017)	
48.	Executive Order 13985, <i>Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government</i> , 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 25, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002455
49.	Executive Order 13993, Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 25, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002460
50.	Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites (Dec. 7, 2011)	AR_DHSP_00002462
51.	Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, New Cases, and Total Completions, available at www.justice.gov/eoir/workload-and-adjudication-statistics .	AR_DHSP_00002467

52.	Graham C. Ousey & Charis E. Kubrin, <i>Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue</i> , <i>Ann. Rev. of Criminology</i> , 63-84 (2018)	AR_DHSP_00002469
53.	Am. Immigr. Council, <i>Resources: Immigrants' impact on public safety and states</i>	AR_DHSP_00002470
54.	Alana Rosenberg, et al., <i>Comparing Black and White Drug Offenders: Implications for Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice and Re-entry Policy and Programming</i> , 47(1) <i>J. Drug Issues</i> 132 (2017)	AR_DHSP_00002478
55.	Michael T. Light, et al., <i>Comparing crime rates between undocumented immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born US citizens in Texas</i> , <i>Proceedings of the Nat'l Acad. of Sciences of the USA</i> (Dec. 12, 2020)	AR_DHSP_00002494
56.	John R. Lott, Jr., <i>Undocumented immigrants, U.S. Citizens</i> ,	AR_DHSP_00002502

	<i>and Convicted Criminals in Arizona</i> (Feb. 18, 2018)	
57.	Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, <i>The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration</i> (2017).	AR_DHSP_00002557
58.	U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, <i>Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview</i> (Mar. 2016)	AR_DHSP_00002558
59.	Elizabeth Hinton, et al., <i>An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System</i> (May 2018)	AR_DHSP_00002619
60.	Robert H. Jackson, <i>The Federal Prosecutor</i> , 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 18, 18-19 (1940)	AR_DHSP_00002639
61.	<i>Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals</i> , 86 Fed. Reg. 53736 (Sept. 28, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00002642
62.	Jacob Stowell and Stephanie DiPietro, <i>Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration in the United States Crimes</i>	AR_DHSP_00002723

	<i>By and Against Immigrants</i> , The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration, 2014.	
63.	Migration Policy Institute, <i>Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States</i> , available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorizedimmigrant-population/state/US .	AR_DHSP_00002724
64.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Amended Complaint (Mar. 8, 2021) (ECF Nos. 12-12-1)	AR_DHSP_00002730
65.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (Mar. 12, 2021) (ECF Nos. 13, 13-1, 17)	AR_DHSP_00002863
66.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary	AR_DHSP_00002951

	Inj. (Mar. 26, 2021) (ECF No. 26)	
67.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Reply (Apr. 2, 2021) (ECF No. 38)	AR_DHSP_00002985
68.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (May 6, 2021) (ECF Nos. 59-59-1)	AR_DHSP_00003024
69.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Suppl. Brief (May 7, 2021) (ECF No. 64-64-5)	AR_DHSP_00003069
70.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Defs.' Suppl. Brief (May 13, 2021) (ECF No. 69-69-1)	AR_DHSP_00003704
71.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to	AR_DHSP_00003745

	Dismiss (May 13, 2021) (ECF No. 70-70-1)	
72.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Suppl. (May 19, 2021) (ECF No. 79-79-1)	AR_DHSP_00003782
73.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Def's.' Suppl. (May 21, 2021) (ECF No. 80-80- 2)	AR_DHSP_00003817
74.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Or- der Granting Defs.; Mot. to Dismiss and Denying Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (June 30, 2021) (ECF No. 91)	AR_DHSP_00003869
75.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Mot. for Reconsidera- tion (July 2, 2021) (ECF No. 96)	AR_DHSP_00003890
76.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-	AR_DHSP_00003896

	cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n (July 16, 2021) (ECF No. 107)	
77.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Pls.' Reply (July 23, 2021) (ECF No. 108)	AR_DHSP_00003904
78.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 2:21-cv-00186 (D. Ariz.), Order Denying Pls.' Mot. For Reconsideration (Aug. 12, 2021) (ECF No. 113).	AR_DHSP_00003912
79.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellants' Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal (July 15, 2021) (Dkt. No. 10)	AR_DHSP_00003917
80.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellees' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. (July 23, 2021) (Dkt. No. 13)	AR_DHSP_00003952

81.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Order on Jurisdiction (July 27, 2021) (Dkt. No. 18)	AR_DHSP_00003978
82.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellants' Resp. to Court Order (July 27, 2021) (Dkt. 19)	AR_DHSP_00003980
83.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellees' Resp. to Court Order (July 29, 2021) (Dkt. 21)	AR_DHSP_00003982
84.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Order Denying Appellants' Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal (July 30, 2021) (Dkt. 22)	AR_DHSP_00003984
85.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appel-	AR_DHSP_00003985

	lants' Mot. for Reconsideration (Aug. 13, 2021) (Dkt. 23)	
86.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Order Denying Appellants' Mot. For Reconsideration (Aug. 19, 2021) (Dkt. 24)	AR_DHSP_00004000
87.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellees' Resp. (Aug. 25, 2021) (Dkt 27)	AR_DHSP_00004001
88.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellants' Reply (Sept. 1, 2021) (Dkt. 31)	AR_DHSP_00004035
89.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Appellants' Brief (Sept. 1, 2021) (Dkt. 32)	AR_DHSP_00004050
90.	<i>Arizona, et al. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, et al.</i> , No. 21-16118 (9th Cir.), Order	AR_DHSP_00004180

	Denying Renewed Mot. (Sept. 3, 2021) (Dkt. 36)	
91.	<i>Sheriff Brad Coe, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden Jr., et al.</i> , No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.) Complaint (July 1, 2021) (ECF No. 1)	AR_DHSP_00004182
92.	<i>Sheriff Brad Coe, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden Jr., et al.</i> , No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.) Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (July 8, 2021) (ECF No. 7-7-2)	AR_DHSP_00004215
93.	<i>Sheriff Brad Coe, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden Jr., et al.</i> , No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.) Am. Complaint (July 15, 2021) (ECF No. 17)	AR_DHSP_00004263
94.	<i>Sheriff Brad Coe, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden Jr., et al.</i> , No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.) Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (Aug. 12, 2021) (ECF No. 33-33-3)	AR_DHSP_00004298
95.	<i>Sheriff Brad Coe, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden Jr., et al.</i> , No. 3:21-cv-168 (S.D. Tex.) Pls.' Reply	AR_DHSP_00004398

	(Aug. 23, 2021) (ECF No. 40-40-2)	
96.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Complaint (Mar. 8, 2021) (ECF No. 1, 1-3-1-8)	AR_DHSP_00004462
97.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (Mar. 9, 2021) (ECF No. 4-4-18)	AR_DHSP_00004548
98.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (Mar. 23, 2021) (ECF No. 23-23-4)	AR_DHSP_00004976
99.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Pl.'s Notice of Supplemental Exhibits (Apr. 5, 2021) (ECF No. 29-29-2)	AR_DHSP_00005040
100.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Pl.'s Mot. to Amend (Apr. 29, 2021) (ECF No. 34-34-2)	AR_DHSP_00005065
101.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-	AR_DHSP_00005154

	cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend (May 10, 2021) (ECF No. 36-36-1)	
102.	<i>Florida v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 8:21-cv-541 (M.D. Fl.), Order Denying Pl.'s Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (May 18, 2021) (ECF No. 38)	AR_DHSP_00005164
103.	<i>Florida, v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-11715 (11th Cir.), Appellant's Brief (June 14, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00005187
104.	<i>Florida, v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-11715 (11th Cir.), Appellees' Brief (July 12, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00005246
105.	<i>Florida, v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-11715 (11th Cir.), Appellant's Reply (Aug. 2, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00005316
106.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Complaint (Apr. 6, 2021) (ECF No. 1)	AR_DHSP_00005353
107.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary	AR_DHSP_00005383

	Inj. (April 27, 2021) (ECF Nos. 18-19-23)	
108.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (May 18, 2021) (ECF No. 42-42-7)	AR_DHSP_00005685
109.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Declaration of Jason Clark (May 18, 2021) (ECF No. 46)	AR_DHSP_00005811
110.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Pls.' Reply (May 25, 2021) (ECF No. 51)	AR_DHSP_00005822
111.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Order Granting Pls.' Mot. for Preliminary Inj. (Aug. 18, 2021) (ECF No. 79)	AR_DHSP_00005859
112.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Defs.' Mot. for Stay (Aug. 20, 2021) (ECF No. 82-82-1)	AR_DHSP_00006019
113.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Pls.'	AR_DHSP_00006041

	Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Stay (Aug. 22, 2021) (ECF No. 85-85-2)	
114.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Defs.' Reply (Aug. 22, 2021) (ECF No. 86)	AR_DHSP_00006065
115.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Declaration of Monica Burke (Aug. 23, 2021) (ECF No. 87-87-1)	AR_DHSP_00006071
116.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 6:21-cv-16 (S.D. Tex.), Order Granting-in-part Defs.' Mot. for Stay (Aug. 23, 2021) (ECF No. 90)	AR_DHSP_00006078
117.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-40618 (5th Cir.) Appellants' Mot. for Stay (Aug. 23, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00006082
118.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-40618 (5th Cir.) Appellees' Opp'n to Mot. for Stay (Aug. 30, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00006310
119.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-	AR_DHSP_00006336

	40618 (5th Cir.) Appellants' Reply (Sept. 1, 2021)	
120.	<i>Texas, et al. v. United States, et al.</i> , No. 21-40618 (5th Cir.) Order Granting-in-part and Denying-in-part Mot. for Stay (Sept. 15, 2021)	AR_DHSP_00006351



U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
HQOPP 50/4

Office of the Commissioner *425 I Street NW*
Washington, DC 20536
NOV 17 2000

MEMORANDUM TO REGIONAL DIRECTORS
DISTRICT DIRECTORS
CHIEF PATROL AGENTS
REGIONAL AND DISTRICT
COUNSEL

FROM: Doris Meissner
/s/ DORIS MEISSNER
Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service

SUBJECT: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion

Since the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which limited the authority of immigration judges to provide relief from removal in many cases, there has been increased attention to the scope and exercise of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS or the Service) prosecutorial discretion. This memorandum describes the principles with which INS exercises prosecutorial discretion and the process to be followed in making and monitoring discretionary

decisions. Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the enforcement process—from planning investigations to enforcing final orders—subject to their chains of command and to the particular responsibilities and authority applicable to their specific position. In exercising this discretion, officers must take into account the principles described below in order to promote the efficient and effective enforcement of the immigration laws and the interests of justice.

More specific guidance geared to exercising discretion in particular program areas already exists in some instances,¹ and other program-specific guidance will follow separately. However, INS officers should continue to exercise their prosecutorial discretion in appropriate cases during the period before more specific program guidance is issued.

¹ For example, standards and procedures for placing an alien in deferred action status are provided in the Standard Operating Procedures for Enforcement Officers: Arrest, Detention, Processing, and Removal (Standard Operating Procedures), Part X. This memorandum is intended to provide general principles, and does not replace any previous specific guidance provided about particular INS actions, such as “Supplemental Guidelines on the Use of Cooperating Individuals and Confidential Informants Following the Enactment of IIRIRA,” dated December 29, 1997. This memorandum is not intended to address every situation in which the exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be appropriate. If INS personnel in the exercise of their duties recognize apparent conflict between any of their specific policy requirements and these general guidelines, they are encouraged to bring the matter to their supervisor’s attention, and any conflict between policies should be raised through the appropriate chain of command for resolution.

A statement of principles concerning discretion Serves a number of important purposes. As described in the “Principles of Federal Prosecution,”² part of the U.S. Attorneys’ manual, such principles provide convenient reference points for the process of making prosecutorial decisions; facilitate the task of training new officers in the discharge of their duties; contribute to more effective management of the Government’s limited prosecutorial resources by promoting greater consistency among the prosecutorial activities of different offices and between their activities and the INS’ law enforcement priorities; make possible better coordination of investigative and prosecutorial activity by enhancing the understanding between the investigative and prosecutorial components; and inform the public of the careful process by which prosecutorial decisions are made.

Legal and Policy Background

“Prosecutorial discretion” is the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law to decide whether to enforce, or not to enforce, the law against someone. The INS, like other law enforcement agencies, has prosecutorial discretion and exercises it every day. In the immigration context, the term applies not only to the decision to issue, serve, or file a Notice to Appear (NTA),

² For this discussion, and much else in this memorandum, we have relied heavily upon the Principles of Federal Prosecution, chapter 9-27.000 in the U.S. Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual (Oct. 1997). There are significant differences, of course, between the role of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices in the criminal justice system, and INS responsibilities to enforce the immigration laws, but the general approach to prosecutorial discretion stated in this memorandum reflects that taken by the Principles of Federal Prosecution.

but also to a broad range of other discretionary enforcement decisions, including among others: Focusing investigative resources on particular offenses or conduct; deciding whom to stop, question, and arrest; maintaining an alien in custody; seeking expedited removal or other forms of removal by means other than a removal proceeding; settling or dismissing a proceeding; granting deferred action or staying a final order; agreeing to voluntary departure, withdrawal of an application for admission, or other action in lieu of removing the alien; pursuing an appeal; and executing a removal order.

The “favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion” means a discretionary decision not to assert the full scope of the INS’ enforcement authority as permitted under the law. Such decisions will take different forms, depending on the status of a particular matter, but include decisions such as not issuing an NTA (discussed in more detail below under “Initiating Proceedings”), not detaining an alien placed in proceedings (where discretion remains despite mandatory detention requirements), and approving deferred action.

Courts recognize that prosecutorial discretion applies in the civil, administrative arena just as it does in criminal law. Moreover, the Supreme Court “has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recently reaffirmed that the concept of prosecutorial discretion applies to INS enforcement activities, such as whether to place an individual in deportation proceedings. INA section 242(g);

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). The “discretion” in prosecutorial discretion means that prosecutorial decisions are not subject to judicial review or reversal, except in extremely narrow circumstances. Consequently, it is a powerful tool that must be used responsibly.

As a law enforcement agency, the INS generally has prosecutorial discretion within its area of law enforcement responsibility unless that discretion has been clearly limited by statute in a way that goes beyond standard terminology. For example, a statute directing that the INS “shall” remove removable aliens would not be construed by itself to limit prosecutorial discretion, but the specific limitation on releasing certain criminal aliens in section 236(c)(2) of the INA evidences a specific congressional intention to limit discretion not to detain certain criminal aliens in removal proceedings that would otherwise exist. Personnel who are unsure whether the INS has discretion to take a particular action should consult their supervisor and legal counsel to the extent necessary.

It is important to recognize not only what prosecutorial discretion is, but also what it is not. The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion applies to law enforcement decisions whether, and to what extent, to exercise the coercive power of the Government over liberty or property, as authorized by law in cases when individuals have violated the law. Prosecutorial discretion does not apply to affirmative acts of approval, or grants of benefits, under a statute or other applicable law that provides requirements for determining when the approval should be given. For example, the INS has prosecutorial discretion not to place a removable alien in proceedings,

but it does not have prosecutorial discretion to approve a naturalization application by an alien who is ineligible for that benefit under the INA

This distinction is not always an easy, bright-line rule to apply. In many cases, INS decisionmaking involves both a prosecutorial decision to take or not to take enforcement action, such as placing an alien in removal proceedings, and a decision whether or not the alien is substantively eligible for a benefit under the INA. In many cases, benefit decisions involve the exercise of significant discretion which in some cases is not judicially reviewable, but which is not prosecutorial discretion.

Prosecutorial discretion can extend only up to the substantive and jurisdictional limits of the law. It can never justify an action that is illegal under the substantive law pertaining to the conduct, or one that while legal in other contexts, is not within the authority of the agency or officer taking it. Prosecutorial discretion to take an enforcement action does not modify or waive any legal requirements that apply to the action itself. For example, an enforcement decision to focus on certain types of immigration violators for arrest and removal does not mean that the INS may arrest any person without probable cause to do so for an offense within its jurisdiction. Service officers who are in doubt whether a particular action complies with applicable constitutional, statutory, or case law requirements should consult with their supervisor and obtain advice from the district or sector counsel or representative of the Office of General Counsel to the extent necessary.

Finally, exercising prosecutorial discretion does not lessen the INS' commitment to enforce the immigration laws to the best of our ability. It is not an invitation to

violate or ignore the law. Rather, it is a means to use the resources we have in a way that best accomplishes our mission of administering and enforcing the immigration laws of the United States.

Principles of Prosecutorial Discretion

Like all law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite resources, and it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations. The INS historically has responded to this limitation by setting priorities in order to achieve a variety of goals. These goals include protecting public safety, promoting the integrity of the legal immigration system, and deterring violations of the immigration law.

It is an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion to give priority to investigating, charging, and prosecuting those immigration violations that will have the greatest impact on achieving these goals. The INS has used this principle in the design and execution of its border enforcement strategy, its refocus on criminal smuggling networks, and its concentration on fixing benefit-granting processes to prevent fraud. An agency's focus on maximizing its impact under appropriate principles, rather than devoting resources to cases that will do less to advance these overall interests, is a crucial element in effective law enforcement management.

The Principles of Federal Prosecution governing the conduct of U.S. Attorneys use the concept of a "substantial Federal interest." A U.S. Attorney may properly decline a prosecution if "*no substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution.*" This principle provides a useful frame of reference for the INS, although applying it presents challenges that differ from those

facing a U.S. Attorney. In particular, as immigration is an exclusively Federal responsibility, the option of an adequate alternative remedy under state law is not available. In an immigration case, the interest at stake will always be Federal. Therefore, we must place particular emphasis on the element of substantiality. How important is the Federal interest in the case, as compared to other cases and priorities? That is the overriding question, and answering it requires examining a number of factors that may differ according to the stage of the case.

As a general matter, INS officers may decline to prosecute a legally sufficient immigration case if the Federal immigration enforcement interest that would be served by prosecution is not substantial.³ Except as may be provided specifically in other policy statements or directives, the responsibility for exercising prosecutorial discretion in this manner rests with the District Director (DD) or Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) based on his or her common sense and sound judgment.⁴ The DD or CPA should obtain legal advice from the District or Sector Counsel to the extent that such advice may be necessary and appropriate to ensure the sound and lawful

³ In some cases even a substantial immigration enforcement interest in prosecuting a case could be outweighed by other interests, such as the foreign policy of the United States. Decisions that require weighing such other interests should be made at the level of responsibility within the INS or the Department of Justice that is appropriate in light of the circumstances and interests involved.

⁴ This general reference to DDs and CPAs is not intended to exclude from coverage by this memorandum other INS personnel, such as Service Center directors, who may be called upon to exercise prosecutorial discretion and do not report to DDs or CPAs, or to change any INS chains of command.

exercise of discretion, particularly with respect to cases pending before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).⁵ The DD's or CPA's authority may be delegated to the extent necessary and proper, except that decisions not to place a removable alien in removal proceedings, or decisions to move to terminate a proceeding which in the opinion of the District or Sector Counsel is legally sufficient, may not be delegated to an officer who is not authorized under 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 to issue an NTA. A DD's or CPA's exercise of prosecutorial discretion will not normally be reviewed by Regional or Headquarters authority. However, DDs and CPAs remain subject to their chains of command and may be supervised as necessary in their exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Investigations

Priorities for deploying investigative resources are discussed in other documents, such as the interior enforcement strategy, and will not be discussed in detail in this memorandum. These previously identified priorities include identifying and removing criminal and terrorist aliens, deterring and dismantling alien smuggling, minimizing benefit fraud and document abuse, responding to community complaints about illegal immigration and building partnerships to solve local problems, and blocking and removing employers' access to undocu-

⁵ Exercising prosecutorial discretion with respect to cases pending before EOIR involves procedures set forth at 8 CFR 239.2 and 8 CFR Part 3, such as obtaining the court's approval of a motion to terminate proceedings.

mented workers. Even within these broad priority areas, however, the Service must make decisions about how best to expend its resources.

Managers should plan and design operations to maximize the likelihood that serious offenders will be identified. Supervisors should ensure that front-line investigators understand that it is not mandatory to issue an NTA in every case where they have reason to believe that an alien is removable, and agents should be encouraged to bring questionable cases to a supervisor's attention. Operational planning for investigations should include consideration of appropriate procedures for supervisory and legal review of individual NTA issuing decisions. Careful design of enforcement operations is a key element in the INS' exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Managers should consider not simply whether a particular effort is legally supportable, but whether it best advances the INS' goals, compared with other possible uses of those resources. As a general matter, investigations that are specifically focused to identify aliens who represent a high priority for removal should be favored over investigations which, by their nature, will identify a broader variety of removable aliens. Even an operation that is designed based on high-priority criteria, however may still identify individual aliens who warrant a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.⁶

⁶ For example, operations in county jails are designed to identify and remove criminal aliens, a high priority for the Service. Nonetheless, an investigator working at a county jail and his or her supervisor should still consider whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be appropriate in individual cases.

Initiating and Pursuing Proceedings

Aliens who are subject to removal may come to the Service's attention in a variety of ways. For example, some aliens are identified as a result of INS investigations, while others are identified when they apply for immigration benefits or seek admission at a port-of-entry. While the context in which the INS encounters an alien may, as a practical matter, affect the Service's options, it does not change the underlying principle that the INS has discretion and should exercise that discretion appropriately given the circumstances of the case.

Even when an immigration officer has reason to believe that an alien is removable and that there is sufficient evidence to obtain a final order of removal, it may be appropriate to decline to proceed with that case. This is true even when an alien is removable based on his or her criminal history and when the alien—if served with an NTA—would be subject to mandatory detention. The INS may exercise its discretion throughout the enforcement process. Thus, the INS can choose whether to issue an NTA, whether to cancel an NTA prior to filing with the immigration court or move for dismissal in immigration court (under 8 CFR 239.2), whether to detain (for those aliens not subject to mandatory detention), whether to offer an alternative to removal such as voluntary departure or withdrawal of an application for admission, and whether to stay an order of deportation.

The decision to exercise any of these options or other alternatives in a particular case requires an individualized determination, based on the facts and the law. As a general matter, it is better to exercise favorable dis-

cretion as early in the process as possible, once the relevant facts have been determined, in order to conserve the Service's resources and in recognition of the alien's interest in avoiding unnecessary legal proceedings. However, there is often a conflict between making decisions as soon as possible, and making them based on evaluating as many relevant, credible facts as possible. Developing an extensive factual record prior to making a charging decision may itself consume INS resources in a way that negates any saving from forgoing a removal proceeding.

Generally, adjudicators may have a better opportunity to develop a credible factual record at an earlier stage than investigative or other enforcement personnel. It is simply not practicable to require officers at the arrest stage to develop a full investigative record on the equities of each case (particularly since the alien file may not yet be available to the charging office), and this memorandum does not require such an analysis. Rather, what is needed is knowledge that the INS is not legally required to institute proceedings in every case, openness to that possibility in appropriate cases, development of facts relevant to the factors discussed below to the extent that it is reasonably possible to do so under the circumstances and in the timeframe that decisions must be made, and implementation of any decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion.

There is no precise formula for identifying which cases warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. Factors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion include, but are not limited to, the following:

- ∞ Immigration status: Lawful permanent residents generally warrant greater consideration. However, other removable aliens may also warrant the favorable exercise of discretion, depending on all the relevant circumstances.
- ∞ Length of residence in the United States: The longer an alien has lived in the United States, particularly in legal status, the more this factor may be considered a positive equity.
- ∞ Criminal history: Officers should take into account the nature and severity of any criminal conduct, as well as the time elapsed since the offense occurred and evidence of rehabilitation. It is appropriate to take into account the actual sentence or fine that was imposed, as an indicator of the seriousness attributed to the conduct by the court. Other factors relevant to assessing criminal history include the alien's age at the time the crime was committed and whether or not he or she is a repeat offender.
- ∞ Humanitarian concerns: Relevant humanitarian concerns include, but are not limited to, family ties in the United States; medical conditions affecting the alien or the alien's family; the fact that an alien entered the United States at a very young age; ties to one's home country (e.g., whether the alien speaks the language or has relatives in the home country); extreme youth or advanced age; and home country conditions.
- ∞ Immigration history: Aliens without a past history of violating the immigration laws (particularly violations such as reentering after removal, failing to appear at hearing, or resisting arrest that show

heightened disregard for the legal process) warrant favorable consideration to a greater extent than those with such a history. The seriousness of any such violations should also be taken into account.

- ∞ Likelihood of ultimately removing the alien: Whether a removal proceeding would have a reasonable likelihood of ultimately achieving its intended effect, in light of the case circumstances such as the alien's nationality, is a factor that should be considered.
- ∞ Likelihood of achieving enforcement goal by other means: In many cases, the alien's departure from the United States may be achieved more expeditiously and economically by means other than removal, such as voluntary return, withdrawal of an application for admission, or voluntary departure.
- ∞ Whether the alien is eligible or is likely to become eligible for other relief: Although not determinative on its own, it is relevant to consider whether there is a legal avenue for the alien to regularize his or her status if not removed from the United States. The fact that the Service cannot confer complete or permanent relief, however, does not mean that discretion should not be exercised favorably if warranted by other factors.
- ∞ Effect of action on future admissibility: The effect an action such as removal may have on an alien can vary—for example, a time-limited as opposed to an indefinite bar to future admissibility—and these effects may be considered.
- ∞ Current or past cooperation with law enforcement authorities: Current or past cooperation with the

INS or other law enforcement authorities, such as the U.S. Attorneys, the Department of Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among others, weighs in favor of discretion.

- ∞ Honorable U.S. military service: Military service with an honorable discharge should be considered as a favorable factor. See Standard Operating Procedures Part V.D.8 (issuing an NTA against current or former member of armed forces requires advance approval of Regional Director).
- ∞ Community attention: Expressions of opinion, in favor of or in opposition to removal, may be considered, particularly for relevant facts or perspectives on the case that may not have been known to or considered by the INS. Public opinion or publicity (including media or congressional attention) should not, however, be used to justify a decision that cannot be supported on other grounds. Public and professional responsibility will sometimes require the choice of an unpopular course.
- ∞ Resources available to the INS: As in planning operations, the resources available to the INS to take enforcement action in the case, compared with other uses of the resources to fulfill national or regional priorities, are an appropriate factor to consider, but it should not be determinative. For example, when prosecutorial discretion should be favorably exercised under these factors in a particular case, that decision should prevail even if there is detention space available.

Obviously, not all of the factors will be applicable to every case, and in any particular case one factor may deserve more weight than it might in another case. There may be other factors, not on the list above, that are appropriate to consider. The decision should be based on the totality of the circumstances, not on any one factor considered in isolation. General guidance such as this cannot provide a “bright line” test that may easily be applied to determine the “right” answer in every case. In many cases, minds reasonably can differ, different factors may point in different directions, and there is no clearly “right” answer. Choosing a course of action in difficult cases must be an exercise of judgment by the responsible officer based on his or her experience, good sense, and consideration of the relevant factors to the best of his or her ability.

There are factors that may not be considered. Impermissible factors include:

- ∞ An individual’s race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs;⁷

⁷ This general guidance on factors that should not be relied upon in making a decision whether to enforce the law against an individual is not intended to prohibit their consideration to the extent they are directly relevant to an alien’s status under the immigration laws or eligibility for a benefit. For example, religion and political beliefs are often directly relevant in asylum cases and need to be assessed as part of a prosecutorial determination regarding the strength of the case, but it would be improper for an INS officer to treat aliens differently based on his personal opinion about a religion or belief. Political activities may be relevant to a ground of removal on national security or terrorism grounds. An alien’s nationality often directly affects his or her eligibility for adjustment or other relief: the like-

- ∞ The officer's own personal feelings regarding the individual; or
- ∞ The possible effect of the decision on the officer's own professional or personal circumstances.

In many cases, the procedural posture of the case, and the state of the factual record, will affect the ability of the INS to use prosecutorial discretion. For example, since the INS cannot admit an inadmissible alien to the United States unless a waiver is available, in many cases the INS' options are more limited in the admission context at a port-of-entry than in the deportation context.

Similarly, the INS may consider the range of options and information likely to be available at a later time. For example, an officer called upon to make a charging decision may reasonably determine that he or she does not have a sufficient, credible factual record upon which to base a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to put the alien in proceedings, that the record cannot be developed in the timeframe in which the decision must be made, that a more informed prosecutorial decision likely could be made at a later time during the course of proceedings, and that if the alien is not served with an NTA now, it will be difficult or impossible to do so later.

Such decisions must be made, however, with due regard for the principles of these guidelines, and in light of the other factors discussed here. For example, if

likelihood that he or she can be removed, or the availability of prosecutorial options such as voluntary return. And may be considered to the extent these concerns are pertinent.

there is no relief available to the alien in a removal proceeding and the alien is subject to mandatory detention if placed in proceedings, that situation suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, if appropriate, would be more useful to the INS if done sooner rather than later. It would be improper for an officer to assume that someone else at some later time will always be able to make a more informed decision, and therefore never to consider exercising discretion.

Factors relevant to exercising prosecutorial discretion may come to the Service's attention in various ways. For example, aliens may make requests to the INS to exercise prosecutorial discretion by declining to pursue removal proceedings. Alternatively, there may be cases in which an alien asks to be put in proceedings (for example, to pursue a remedy such as cancellation of removal that may only be available in that forum). In either case, the INS may consider the request, but the fact that it is made should not determine the outcome, and the prosecutorial decision should be based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, the fact that an alien has not requested prosecutorial discretion should not influence the analysis of the case. Whether, and to what extent, any request should be considered is also a matter of discretion. Although INS officers should be open to new facts and arguments, attempts to exploit prosecutorial discretion as a delay tactic, as a means merely to revisit matters that have been thoroughly considered and decided, or for other improper tactical reasons should be rejected. There is no legal right to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and (as stated at the close of this memorandum) this memorandum creates no right or obligation enforceable at law by any alien or any other party.

Process for Decisions

Identification of Suitable Cases

No single process of exercising discretion will fit the multiple contexts in which the need to exercise discretion may arise. Although this guidance is designed to promote consistency in the application of the immigration laws, it is not intended to produce rigid uniformity among INS officers in all areas of the country at the expense of the fair administration of the law. Different offices face different conditions and have different requirements. Service managers and supervisors, including DDs and CPAs, and Regional, District, and Sector Counsel must develop mechanisms appropriate to the various contexts and priorities, keeping in mind that it is better to exercise discretion as early in process as possible once the factual record has been identified.⁸ In particular, in cases where it is clear that no statutory relief will be available at the immigration hearing and where detention will be mandatory, it best conserves the Service's resources to make a decision early.

Enforcement and benefits personnel at all levels should understand that prosecutorial discretion exists and that it is appropriate and expected that the INS will exercise this authority in appropriate cases. DDs, CPAs, and other supervisory officials (such as District and Sector Counsels) should encourage their personnel to bring potentially suitable cases for the favorable exercise of discretion to their attention for appropriate

⁸ DDs, CPAs, and other INS personnel should also be open, however, to possible reconsideration of decisions (either for or against the exercise of discretion) based upon further development of the facts.

resolution. To assist in exercising their authority, DDs and CPAs may wish to convene a group to provide advice on difficult cases that have been identified as potential candidates for prosecutorial discretion.

It is also appropriate for DDs and CPAs to develop a list of “triggers” to help their personnel identify cases at an early stage that may be suitable for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. These cases should then be reviewed at a supervisory level where a decision can be made as to whether to proceed in the ordinary course of business, to develop additional facts, or to recommend a favorable exercise of discretion. Such triggers could include the following facts (whether proven or alleged):

- Lawful permanent residents;
- Aliens with a serious health condition;
- Juveniles;
- Elderly aliens;
- Adopted children of U.S. citizens;
- U.S. military veterans;
- Aliens with lengthy presence in United States (*i.e.*, 10 years or more); or
- Aliens present in the United States since childhood.

Since workloads and the type of removable aliens encountered may vary significantly both within and between INS offices, this list of possible trigger factors for supervisory review is intended neither to be comprehensive nor mandatory in all situations. Nor is it intended to suggest that the presence or absence of “trigger” facts should itself determine whether prosecutorial discretion should be exercised, as compared to review of all the relevant factors as discussed elsewhere in these guidelines. Rather, development of trigger criteria is intended solely as a suggested means of facilitating

identification of potential cases that may be suitable for prosecutorial review as early as possible in the process.

Documenting Decisions

When a DD or CPA decides to exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably, that decision should be clearly documented in the alien file, including the specific decision taken and its factual and legal basis. DDs and CPAs may also document decisions based on a specific set of facts not to exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably, but this is not required by this guidance.

The alien should also be informed in writing of a decision to exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably, such as not placing him or her in removal proceedings or not pursuing a case. This normally should be done by letter to the alien and/or his or her attorney of record, briefly stating the decision made and its consequences. It is not necessary to recite the facts of the case or the INS' evaluation of the facts in such letters. Although the specifics of the letter will vary depending on the circumstances of the case and the action taken, it must make it clear to the alien that exercising prosecutorial discretion does not confer any immigration status, ability to travel to the United States (unless the alien applies for and receives advance parole), immunity from future removal proceedings, or any enforceable right or benefit upon the alien. If, however, there is a potential benefit that is linked to the action (for example, the availability of employment authorization for beneficiaries of deferred action), it is appropriate to identify it.

The obligation to notify an individual is limited to situations in which a specific, identifiable decision to refrain from action is taken in a situation in which the alien

normally would expect enforcement action to proceed. For example, it is not necessary to notify aliens that the INS has refrained from focusing investigative resources on them, but a specific decision not to proceed with removal proceedings against an alien who has come into INS custody should be communicated to the alien in writing. This guideline is not intended to replace existing standard procedures or forms for deferred action, voluntary return, voluntary departure, or other currently existing and standardized processes involving prosecutorial discretion.

Future Impact

An issue of particular complexity is the future effect of prosecutorial discretion decisions in later encounters with the alien. Unlike the criminal context, in which statutes of limitation and venue requirements often preclude one U.S. Attorney's office from prosecuting an offense that another office has declined, immigration violations are continuing offenses that, as a general principle of immigration law, continue to make an alien legally removable regardless of a decision not to pursue removal on a previous occasion. An alien may come to the attention of the INS in the future through seeking admission or in other ways. An INS office should abide by a favorable prosecutorial decision taken by another office as a matter of INS policy, absent new facts or changed circumstances. However, if a removal proceeding is transferred from one INS district to another, the district assuming responsibility for the case is not bound by the charging district's decision to proceed with an NTA, if the facts and circumstances at a later stage suggest that a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate.

Service offices should review alien files for information on previous exercises of prosecutorial discretion at the earliest opportunity that is practicable and reasonable and take any such information into account. In particular, the office encountering the alien must carefully assess to what extent the relevant facts and circumstances are the same or have changed either procedurally or substantively (either with respect to later developments, or more detailed knowledge of past circumstances) from the basis for the original exercise of discretion. A decision by an INS office to take enforcement action against the subject of a previous documented exercise of favorable prosecutorial discretion should be memorialized with a memorandum to the file explaining the basis for the decision, unless the charging documents on their face show a material difference in facts and circumstances (such as a different ground of deportability).

Legal Liability and Enforceability

The question of liability may arise in the implementation of this memorandum. Some INS personnel have expressed concerns that, if they exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably, they may become subject to suit and personal liability for the possible consequences of that decision. We cannot promise INS officers that they will never be sued. However, we can assure our employees that Federal law shields INS employees who act in reasonable reliance upon properly promulgated agency guidance within the agency's legal authority—such as this memorandum—from personal legal liability for those actions.

The principles set forth in this memorandum, and internal office procedures adopted hereto, are intended

solely for the guidance of INS personnel in performing their duties. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.

Training and Implementation

Training on the implementation of this memorandum for DDs, CPAs, and Regional, District, and Sector Counsel will be conducted at the regional level. This training will include discussion of accountability and periodic feedback on implementation issues. In addition, following these regional sessions, separate training on prosecutorial discretion will be conducted at the district level for other staff, to be designated. The regions will report to the Office of Field Operations when this training has been completed.



**U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement**

Sept. 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland
Security

SUBJECT: Stakeholder Outreach in
Furtherance of Department
Civil Immigration Enforce-
ment Guidance

This memorandum summarizes a series of “listening sessions” with, and written recommendations from, internal and external stakeholders on the topic of department-wide civil immigration enforcement guidance.

We have conducted outreach with, among others:

- ICE Field Office Directors and Special Agents in Charge
- ICE ERO headquarters leadership
- Senior leadership of USCIS and CBP
- National Sheriffs’ Association
- Southwest Border Sheriffs’ Coalition
- American Constitution Society
- National Immigrant Justice Center
- American Civil Liberties Union
- American Immigration Council
- International Refugee Assistance Project

- National Association of Police Organizations
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
- Major Cities Chiefs Association
- U.S. Conference of Mayors
- National Association of Counties
- National Council of State Legislators
- National Association of Attorneys General
- National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators
- National Governors Association
- Department of Justice
- Law Enforcement Immigration Task Force
- Alliance for Immigrant Survivors
- Public Defenders Association
- Mothers Against Drunk Driving
- Public Defender Coalition for Immigrant Justice
- Members of the National Qualified Representative Program
- Representatives of the AAPI community, including the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center and Asian-Americans Advancing Justice
- Advocates for victim/survivors of domestic violence
- Black immigrant leaders
- Law Enforcement Action Partnership
- Advocates for Victims of Illegal Alien Crime (AVIAC)

Among many other groups, you have personally met with:

- ICE personnel in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, San Antonio, and Philadelphia
- All ICE Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Assistant Directors, on multiple occasions
- Members of the academic community
- Leaders from prominent Immigrant advocacy organizations, such as Make the Road NY, CASA, and the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA),
- Domestic violence advocates and specialists

The sessions have yielded wide-ranging discussion, but some common themes have emerged:

- The “aggravated felony” definition is difficult to apply and yields inconsistent results. Some say it is overinclusive; others say it is underinclusive.
- There is a general recognition that the current “border security” category must be revisited because it depends on a static date (Nov. 1, 2020).
- ICE Field Office Directors generally, but not universally, argue for the ability to arrest and remove a wider range of noncitizens.
- CBP personnel argue in favor of using categorized negative factors (i.e., “national security,” “border security,” and “public safety”) to help organize their missions.

- CBP personnel express a desire for clear guidance on how to address cases on which ICE and CBP may differ in their interpretation of whether they fall within the guidance.
- CBP personnel express the need to define “border security” using parameters that are clearly identifiable—whether through time frames (e.g. “within two years”), or other metrics.
- USCIS personnel express a desire to retain flexibility to issue notices of appearance consistent with USCIS’s mission to promote due process of noncitizens’ immigration requests through immigration courts.
- Some USCIS employees argue in favor of specifying immigration fraud as a priority.
- Some ICE personnel appear to regard the “presumed priority” categories as restrictive mandates rather than presumptions that can be overcome. They argue for broader discretion to make arrests.
- Some ICE personnel see their role as nondiscretionary—to arrest any noncitizen, deferring questions of relief to lawyers and judges downstream.
- Mayors, police chiefs, and advocates describe what might be called “the 911 problem.” In short, they express the concern that ICE’s enforcement activities and reputation may deter victims and witnesses from contacting local emergency and public safety authorities. These groups suggest that ICE could ameliorate this effect by engaging in better public communication, by curtailing enforcement practices, or a combination.

- Sheriffs argue that ICE should expand enforcement, particularly along the border. One suggestion is that ICE implement a kind of arrest quota.
- There is a general recognition that the current guidance does not effectively prompt assessment of mitigating factors. Below is a list of mitigating factors. The factors in bold are the weightiest and most often cited.
 - o **Lawful permanent residents**
 - o **Long term residents**
 - o **People who arrived in the U.S. as a minor**
 - o **Primary caretakers and breadwinners**
 - o **Availability of affirmative pathways for relief, such as pending applications for lawful status or relief from removal (including DACA)**
 - o **“Stale” removal grounds, such as criminal conduct that occurred more than 10 years ago or when the individual was of young age**
 - o **Vulnerable populations, particularly victims of violence or a history of trauma**
 - o **Military service**
 - o **The exercise of civil, labor, or other rights**
 - o **Victims or witnesses to law enforcement, labor agency, or other government investigations**
 - o **Pardons, clemency, and expungements**
 - o Public service, other than military
 - o Essential workers
 - o Effect of action on future admissibility
 - o Community engagement
 - o Demonstrable rehabilitative measures
 - o Bonds granted in pending criminal cases

- Advocates argue that the “presumed priority” categories have calcified into mandates. They suggest incorporating “presumed non-priority” categories or “safe harbors,” or some other protection-oriented safeguards, for balance.
- Advocates argue that ICE officers misuse the guidance’s catch-all language as a “priority four” or a “blank check” to implement broad, de facto priority categories that differ by field office. Advocates claim that, as part of this pattern, ICE officers categorize a person as a public safety risk based on any interaction with the criminal justice system, no matter how minor.
- Advocates express concern that the border security category is used to penalize those who seek asylum. The current definition also may not adequately account for earlier periods of stay, and strong ties to the U.S., for those who are reentering after November 1, 2020.
- Advocates note that the immigration system lags behind the criminal justice system in reforms related to controlled substance convictions.
- Advocates say that methods for identifying an individual’s gang affiliation are marked by racial bias. Gang databases, they argue, are unreliable.
- Advocates are concerned about the risk of overbroad application of “national security” priorities.
- Advocates point to what they see as the low rate of reversal of negative decisions by ICE senior review officials (approximately 20%), the absence of

any institutionalized mechanism to effectively escalate release requests, and lack of transparency in the decision making, as weaknesses.

There are also a series of “hard questions” that repeatedly arise, although there is no clear consensus on how to address them. These include:

- How can we avoid importing the biases of local policing into the civil immigration enforcement system? How do we ensure that our own enforcement actions do not lead to discriminatory outcomes?
- In domestic violence cases, how can we avoid chilling victims and witnesses from coming forward?
- In domestic violence cases, how can we account for convictions (and allegations) that arise from self-defense?
- How should we treat DUIs, particularly aged DUIs?
- How should we treat charges that are pending? How should we treat past arrests that did not result in a conviction? How should we weigh conduct described in a police report?
- What is the right level of deference to pending process in the immigration system, such as pending USCIS petitions, motions to reopen, and petitions for review?
- Should the exercise of 1st Amendment rights count as a “positive factor”?
- Should “community support” be a positive factor?

- Should there be retroactive relief for those affected by previous policies, i.e., dismissal of cases or return of previously removed individuals?
- Should there be additional accountability mechanisms for officers who do not follow the guidance?
- Should there be a “repeat low-level criminal” category?
- Should the fact of a prior removal make someone a priority?
- How should we treat prior convictions under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and 1326(a)?
- How do we address the different approaches of DHS component agencies, with CBP examining through the lens of admissibility and ICE examining through the lens of deportability?
- How should we treat convictions stemming from conduct appurtenant to status (unlawful work, document fraud, driving without a licenses, etc.)?
- How does the “border security” priority intersect with the right to seek asylum and other forms of humanitarian relief at the border?

These sessions have also shed light on some “anterior” or “foundational” questions—that is, questions that must be answered before the drafting process begins:

- Should we use a “category” framework? Should we use a more laissez-faire framework of guiding principles with illustrative examples? Should we use something else—and if so, what?
- If use a more laissez-faire “principles” framework, how can we ensure the workforce applies those

principles as attended? How do we assure the quality of supervisors' decision-making?

- Should the memo's scope include "special topics" like sensitive locations?
- Should the memo's scope include an appellate process, e.g., an "independent advisory panel" or "justice review board"?
- Should there be presumed non-priority categories or safe harbors?
- Is the current public safety definition overinclusive or underinclusive?
- If not "aggravated felony," then what?
- How should we redefine "border security"?
- How should we define and appropriately weight different mitigating factors and ensure they are considered?
- What metrics will we use to assess the success of the guidance's implementation?

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. V-21-CV-16

STATE OF TEXAS AND STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Feb. 22, 2022
10:03 a.m.
Houston, Texas

**TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DREW B. TIPTON
Day 1—MORNING SESSION**

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF STATE OF TEXAS:

Mr. Eric Alan Hudson
Mr. Ryan Daniel Walters
Mr. Leif A. Olson
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548
MC-009
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
512.936.2266
512.936.2714
512.707.9401

FAX: 512.457.4410
eric.hudson@oag.texas.gov
ryan.walters@oag.texas.gov
Leif.Olson@oag.texas.gov

FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA:

Mr. Joseph Scott St. John
Ms. Elisabeth Daigle
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802
225.485.2458
221.753.2857
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
daigle3@ag.louisiana.gov

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

Mr. Adam David Kirschner
United States Department of Justice, Civil Division
PO Box 883
20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Room 7126
Washington, DC 20044
202.353.0265
FAX: 202.616.8470
adam.kirschner@usdoj.gov

Mr. Brian C. Rosen-Shaud
Mr. Kuntal Cholera
Mr. Michael F. Knapp
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
1100 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
202.305.7666

202.305.4357
202.514.2071
brian.c.rosen-shaud@usdoj.gov
kuntal.cholera@usdoj.gov
michael.f.knapp@usdoj.gov

Mr. Daniel Hu
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
1000 Louisiana
Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002
713.567.9518
FAX: 713.718.3303
daniel.hu@usdoj.gov

ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. Tom Jawetz
Office of the Department of Homeland Security
General Counsel

Mr. Gilbert Ledbetter

* * * * *

[1-63]

MR. HUDSON: Shoshana, if I could get you to go ahead and put the presentation on for me.

THE CASE MANAGER: It should be on that HDMI.

MR. HUDSON: For some reason, it's not popping up just yet.

THE CASE MANAGER: Refresh.

MR. HUDSON: There we go. That's it right there.

THE COURT: Is that your screen?

MR. HUDSON: It is, your Honor.

Let me see if I can bring this over.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q Now, Mr. Clark, just a little bit of housekeeping for the Court.

A Yes, sir.

Q We submitted and pre-admitted what is now marked as Exhibit C which is the supplemental records that were comprised of C1 and C2. So, the record that is up on the screen right now for the purposes of the Court is going to be marked currently on our exhibit list as just Exhibit C.

Now, Mr. Clark, do you see what's up on the screen right there?

A Yes, sir. And I've got a screen in front of me.

Q Okay. What exactly is this exhibit?

A That is the exhibit that myself and the deputy chief of staff, Karen Hall, compiled.

[1-64]

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Karen?

THE WITNESS: Hall, H-a-l-l.

That is a listing of individuals who have had their detainer rescinded from January 20th of '21 through February 15th of 2022.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q Okay. Now, we see that captured up at the top of the screen here, right—

A Yes, sir.

Q —where it says, “Inmates Scheduled for Release with ICE Detainers Dropped”?

A Yes, sir.

Q So the record is clear, is “dropped” the same thing as rescinded—

A It is.

Q —in TDCJ parlance?

A Yes, sir.

Q Let’s talk a little bit about this. So, I understand that this is a document dated from January 20, ‘21, through February 15th of 2022, right?

A Correct.

Q Why did you use that timeframe to capture information?

A Well, in January and actually February 5th—and I know we’ll get to this—is when we began to receive information that detainers were being dropped. So, we went back to the [1-65] beginning of when the guidance was issued all the way through February 15th which we felt like was a clean cutoff date just before we came here.

Q So the Court is aware of what this document shows, what I want to do now is I want to walk you through the document. I’m going to have you explain what these columns are.

A Okay.

Q And then, we're going to talk about the information a little bit.

Are you okay with that?

A Yes, sir.

Q All right. So, can you explain to the Court what those first two columns are based on the information in the top blue row.

A Sure. So, on the left-hand side, the TDCJ number, that is a numerical number that's unique to each inmate that comes into TDCJ. You can think of it similar as a Social Security number that identifies that person.

Q Obviously, the name is self-explanatory. But can you explain to the Court what is meant by "Scheduled Release Date."

A "Scheduled Release Date" is the information that we have within our system that that person is scheduled to leave our custody on that date.

Q Now, the next column includes "Scheduled Release Type." And it looks like we have a few different ones here. Can you [1-66] explain to the Court what the different release types are.

A Sure. So, a discharge, that means that that person, essentially, completed their sentence. So, they did day for day; and they're done.

Parole supervision means that that person did a percentage of their sentence based on statute and then is up for parole consideration by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles which is a separate entity from TDCJ.

And if approved, that person would be released and continue to serve their sentence in the community to finish.

Also, there's mandatory supervision. Mandatory supervision looks very similar to parole once that person has been released, meaning they would see a parole officer. What's a little bit different is how—the releasing mechanism. So, mandatory supervision means the person's flat time, so the time that they have actually done in prison plus their good time, meaning the time that they're awarded for good behavior, attending classes, et cetera.

When you equal those two together and it equals their sentence, they're eligible for release from TDCJ.

Q Well, that takes us through three. But I also see we have something on there called Retzlaff.

Do you see that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you explain to the Court what mandatory Retzlaff means.

[1-67]

A Sure. It's a subset of mandatory supervision, and Retzlaff goes back to a 2004 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case where Thomas Retzlaff filed a writ of habeas corpus. He felt like his due process was being violated. He was coming up for mandatory supervision. Didn't have the ability to send in favorable information to the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

And so, ultimately, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that you have to have sufficient notice to present information to the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

What that practically means is that you'll have individuals that may be doing a small amount of time, relatively small, in the county be awarded a significant amount of time for their time spent in the county.

And by the time they come to the TDCJ, they're already eligible for release. And so, the Board of Pardons and Paroles did not have the ability to notify them; and they would subsequently be automatically released on their release date.

Q Now, we also see another column next to that called the "ICE Detainer Dropped Date."

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Now, can you explain to the Court what that means.

A That is the date in which TDCJ received—that's the date in which the detainer was actually dropped by ICE.

Q Let me ask you this: I know the date on this looks like [1-68] January 20 through February of this year, right?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you go back and look at any time periods to look at how many detainers were commonly dropped in the years preceding January of '21?

A We did. We went back to 2017; and in any given year from 2017 through 2020, there was no more than a dozen detainers that would have been dropped during that time for specific reasons.

Q What are the specific reasons that you understood detainers were dropped prior to January of '21?

A Sure. So, prior to January of '21, the rationale for reasons that detainees would be dropped would be, for instance, some new information that came to light, that that person may, in fact, be a US citizen; that that person has significant medical issues, that there would be a continuity-of-care issue transferring them into ICE custody. They wouldn't be able to take care of them.

The person may be a juvenile or they may come from a country that they could not be repatriated. So, those would be the—where you would see ICE detainees being dropped.

Q Now, in your experience overseeing the immigration liaison and as chief of staff of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, prior to January of '21, did you see any reason related to prioritization or discretion being given as the reason why a detainee was dropped prior to January of '21?

[1-69]

A No, sir.

Q Now, we'll get back to the chart here in just a moment. But I understood you to say that roughly 12 detainees were dropped a year prior to January of '21 going back to 2017? Is that right?

A Yeah. That would be the most.

Q How many detainees were dropped in 2021?

A When you go back and look at the totality of January 20th of 2021 through February 15th of 2022, there was 170 detainees dropped; and ICE replaced them or took custody of 29. So, 141 individuals who had their ICE detainees dropped.

Q So, if I'm doing my math correctly, that's roughly 12 times the amount that you'd ever seen in prior years?

A Yes.

Q Let's go back to the chart here.

Can you explain to the Court what the offense line demonstrates.

A That's just a short description of what the person was convicted of and their sentence.

Q Now, some of this looks like shorthand. Can you explain, for instance, what POSSCS means.

A Sure. That would be possession of a controlled substance.

Q And what kind of offense is that?

A That is a felony offense.

Q Okay. Does it relate to drugs?

[1-70]

A It does.

Q Okay.

A I believe it's—the PG1 includes a number of different drugs to include, I believe, cocaine, fentanyl, other drugs.

Q And so, for instance, on Mr. Sanchez, we see that his detainer was dropped on February 1 of '21 despite having a felony conviction for possession of what sounds like some type of opiate; is that right?

A Yeah. It's a drug charge, yes, sir.

Q Now, if we go down, we see some other offenses.

THE COURT: Can I ask something real quick?

How did you know that that was an opiate? Or can you tell?

THE WITNESS: I went and looked to see what PG1—

THE COURT: Okay. You can't tell from this chart?

THE WITNESS: No, no.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I interrupted.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q Let's go through some of the other offenses that we have on here. Can you identify for the Court some of the other offenses that are listed in the offense line here.

A Sure. So, manufacturing/delivering of a controlled substance; impersonating a public servant; possession of marijuana between 50 and 2,000 pounds; stalking; theft of property. It just goes on and on. Evading arrest with a— [1-71] detention with a motor vehicle.

Q Also, I see we have fraud on there. Is that right?

A Yeah. Fraudulent use and possession of identifying information.

Q To your knowledge, the list that you put together here, does this include anyone who had a detainer dropped on account of having a single offense charged of drug possession?

A No, sir.

Q Let's go ahead and see if we can finish up this chart; and then, we'll talk a little bit more about the specifics.

A Okay.

Q So, can you explain to the Court what an NCIC code is.

A It's a National Crimes Information Center code. It's grouping by the FBI, essentially, a grouping of criminal offenses.

Q And what does the statute line show us?

A The statute is going to be the state offense in which that person was convicted. So, it could be a—in the penal code, health and safety or transportation code. Numerical number that's tied to that.

Q Now, I see a numerical number tied to it; and respectfully, when I look at the penal code, I've never seen these codes before. Can you explain to the Court what these codes mean.

A Again, they're specific to the offense in which that person was arrested.

[1-72]

Q Is that a coding mechanism for TDCJ?

A We do have that ability to look at the offenses and find the statute that's tied to it and the NCIC code.

Q Now, the next line there is "Sentence." What does that mean?

A That's simply the amount of sentence that was given to that individual. So, if you don't see MO next to it, that means years.

Q So, for instance, the first line would be a two-year sentence?

A Yes, sir.

Q And if we go down several lines, we see 23. So, that would be a 23-year sentence?

A Yes, sir.

Q Next line is "County," right?

A County of conviction.

Q And so, these aren't all from the same county, right?

A No. They're spread throughout the state.

Q And as we see, we've got—what was the number again, hundred and—

A 141.

Q All right. Would it be fair to say that those 141 offenders who have had their detainers dropped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are from counties across the State of Texas?

[1-73]

A That is accurate, yes.

Q Lastly, we have "Notes: Status as of February 15 of 2022."

Can you explain to the Court what that shows.

A Sure. That was us trying to articulate kind of what that status of that person is. So, if you see the very top line, BPP, that stands for the Board of Pardons and Paroles. "Continued Release," meaning that person continued to release out; and in fact, they were released on February 20th of 2021.

Q Now, we'll get into this in a few minutes. But have any people who have been convicted of offenses that are

felony convictions been released without a detainer after the detainer has been rescinded?

A No, sir.

Q Let me see if I can ask that a different way.

A Okay.

Q Have inmates been released who, otherwise, would have been taken into custody by ICE had the detainer not been rescinded?

A I'm sorry, could you ask that again.

Q Sure. I'll come at it a different way.

This is a list of people who have had their detainers rescinded; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Have any people on your list been released after having the detainer been—being rescinded?

A Meaning have they been released after having their detainer [1-74] rescinded? Yes.

Q What's the number on that?

A So, again, if you go back to the 141, 95 individuals have been released on parole supervision or mandatory; 27 individuals completed their sentence; and then, the remainder are incarcerated.

Q Now, so the Court is clear, are you aware of the reason given for the rescissions for the people that are on this list?

A We—early on, I'll tell you that absolutely we were aware of the reasons for them being rescinded.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding of why these—why these inmates were having their detainers rescinded?

A Sure. That there was new guidance that had been issued and that they were following that new guidance.

Q Well, let's talk about that for just a moment.

A Okay.

Q Biden Administration didn't come into office until January 20 of '21; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q When did you first learn that guidance was going to be issued concerning detainers on inmates in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice?

A It was late January in which Robert Moore, again, the gentleman that I supervise, came to me to say that he had—

MR. ROSEN-SHAUD: Objection, your Honor. The witness [1-75] appears to give an answer that relies on hearsay.

MR. HUDSON: First, your Honor, we're offering it for the effect on the listener, not for the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: The objection is overruled on that basis.

THE COURT REPORTER: Can you move the mike over?

THE COURT: Yeah. When you stand up, you get away from the mike; and she needs to be able to hear you.

MR. KIRSCHNER: I forgot my papers.

THE COURT: That's all right.

We're all awake now.

MR. KIRSCHNER: Sorry.

MR. HUDSON: Yeah, no worries.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q You were saying Mr. Moore told you?

A Yes, sir. So, the—

THE COURT: Can you reask the question. I forgot what he was telling him.

MR. HUDSON: Sure, your Honor.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q Could you describe for the Court how you first became aware that the Biden Administration intended to issue new guidance once they came into office about detainers that impacted inmates in TDCJ.

A Sure. So, it was the end of January in which Mr. Moore [1-76] came to me to indicate that he had heard from the local ICE office that there was going to be a change in direction on how detainers were placed and whether they were kept.

Mr. Moore didn't have any specifics other than he was told that changes were coming.

Q Did changes, in fact, come?

A They did.

Q What changes came?

A So, fast-forward to February 5th of 2021, TDCJ was made aware of seven detainees that were being dropped that day; and we also were made aware of four others that had been dropped from February 1st through the 5th. So, 11 detainees we became aware of that day, February 5th.

Q Now, remind the Court of how many detainees on average were being dropped prior to January of 2021.

A No more than a dozen.

Q So, in a matter of a couple of weeks, we went from none to 11?

A Correct.

Q And that married up with the average for the preceding years that you had been the chief of staff at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did that raise any concerns for you or for TDCJ?

A It absolutely did.

[1-77]

Q What concerns did it raise?

A So, when looking at the individuals who were being—having their detainees dropped, I was alarmed by the charges that they had and whether those persons were going to be released back into the public.

Q What kind of charges did the inmates in TDCJ have who were having their detainees dropped on account of this new guidance from the Biden Administration?

A Sure. Possession of a controlled substance, sexual assault of a child between 14 and 17 years of age.

Q They dropped a detainer on somebody who committed sexual assault on a child?

A They did.

Q Did you do anything about that?

A I did. I was alarmed. And so, I contacted the Houston office field director to find out what was going on.

Q Who was the field director at the time that you contacted?

A At the time, it was Danny Bible.

Q And what did Mr. Bible tell you what's happening?

A He said that they were carrying out directives of new guidance, and I asked him how does this guidance parlay into this? And he didn't have a good answer.

Q What was his answer?

A "It's coming from above, and we're just following the orders."

[1-78]

Q So, your understanding from Mr. Bible was that the new guidance required him to drop a detainer on somebody who sexually assaulted a child?

A He is the—asked that I wait for a minute, and he was going to contact his superiors to find out what could—what more could be done. But it was alarming.

Q After that incident, did this gentleman end up—did the sex offender end up getting picked up?

A He did after much communication with Mr. Bible and with the ICE office. Ultimately, they did come pick him up.

Q Now, prior to the interaction with Mr. Bible related to this sex offender, had you ever had to make a personal plea to ICE to get them to come pick somebody up who had a detainer?

A No.

Q And again, you attribute that to the new guidance, right?

A I do. Absent my intervention, he would have been free.

Q Now, you've heard argument this morning—you've been in the courtroom—that there's been additional guidance that's come out of the Biden Administration February 18, September 30 effective on November 29.

Are you familiar with those guidance documents?

A I am, yeah.

Q In your experience overseeing Mr. Moore, the immigration liaison office, and your role as chief of staff for TDCJ, have you noticed any difference in how these various guidance [1-79] documents are being interpreted by ICE?

A No. From the January to the February to the September to November, no. And in fact, I've reached out to ICE to ask, specifically, give me a matrix. Let me understand what a federal aggravated felony is so I can have an understanding and could not get any information from them.

Q So, despite your requests, ICE hasn't given you any information on how this is actually playing out in practice?

A No.

Q Well, if we go back to Exhibit C up on the screen, can you remind the Court how many people have actually had their detainers dropped?

A 141.

Q So, in practice—what we see is about 12 times the average prior is how it's playing out in practice, right?

A Yes.

Q And that's for crimes like stalking?

A Correct.

Q And crimes like possession of drugs?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, I want to ask you: You're not here today to tell the Court that ICE has just stopped picking up people altogether from TDCJ, right?

A Correct.

Q In fact, is ICE still coming and picking people up who have [1-80] detainers on them?

A They do. Between January of '21 through January of '22, approximately 13 to 1400 individuals have been picked up by ICE.

Q But still, the numbers for people who have had their detainers dropped, that's gone up astronomically?

A Yes.

Q Do you see any connection between one and the other?

A I don't.

Q Now, in addition to the crimes, are you familiar with the final order of removal?

A I am.

Q Could you explain to the Court what a final order of removal is.

A Again, that's—through that information sharing, we would see in our screens that a person would have a final order of removal which we believe is that that person is taken into custody of ICE and then deported back to their home country.

Q Now, if I look at this chart that you put together, do you know if there are any inmates on this chart who had a final order of removal who had their detainer removed?

A Yes. There was 22.

Q Any in particular?

A I'll just bring your attention to Ruben Deleon which would be probably towards the end.

You can go left for me, I can see.

[1-81]

Yeah. Ruben Deleon.

Near the bottom.

Yep.

That would then post November 29th.

Q Okay. So, after November 29, 2021, after the latest guidance was issued by the Biden Administration, Mr. Deleon who had a final order of removal had his detainer dropped by ICE; is that right?

A That's right.

Q Has Mr. Deleon been released from custody?

A He has. He—a few days before his scheduled release is when we were notified that the detainer was being dropped. That detainer goes back to 2017, and the final order goes back to 2017.

Q Did ICE give you any reason why it was dropped?

A No.

Q Can you describe for the Court what Mr. Deleon was convicted of having done.

A Mr. Deleon in 2016 was found driving a vehicle that crashed into an innocent person causing significant injuries to that individual who had to be life-flighted out. There was alcohol that was involved.

Ultimately, he was convicted of intoxicated assault with a vehicle, serious bodily injury, and given five years in prison. And he—he did every day of it.

[1-82]

Q Do you have any idea where Mr. Deleon is now?

A I do not. He discharged his sentence, and I—we don't know where he's at.

Q Now, we've talked a lot this morning about detainees that have been removed, both on people who have been convicted of aggravated felonies and people with final orders of removal.

Have you noticed, considering your experience with detainers and immigration issues with TDCJ, anyone who has not received a detainer in the first instance that you can attribute to the guidance from the Biden Administration?

A I can simply say that we've seen during this same timeframe, between January of '21 through February, approximately 150 individuals who have not had a detainer to place that we show are illegal; and of those, 61 have already been released.

Q Have you identified any known gang members who have been released because they had their detainers dropped and were discharged from TDCJ custody?

A I have.

Q Can you tell the Court about that.

A Sure. An example of that would be Guillermo Torres. I'm not sure if you can find him on the list. But Mr. Torres in 2015 was found carrying 137 pounds of marijuana across the border, was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana between 50 and 2,000 pounds.

[1-83]

Mr. Torres was actually given probation for that offense. And you fast-forward two years, in 2017 Mr. Torres was found again transporting marijuana; and he was charged between 5 and 50 pounds. And so, they revoked his probation and sent him to prison.

He is a suspected gang member of the Mexical Street Gang which has ties to the drug cartel.

Q Does he currently have a detainer on him?

A No. That detainer was dropped, and Mr. Torres was released. And at this point, we don't know where he's at. There's a warrant out for his arrest.

Q Well, how did you come to find out that he had a warrant out for his arrest?

A Because we issued it. He's not complying with his parole supervision. And in fact, when you go back and look at the 95 individuals who have been released out on parole supervision, 17 have already failed to comply with their parole supervision. Four have committed new criminal offenses.

Q Have you identified any known sex offenders who have been released after having had their detainers released?

A Yes. We talked about Jose Lara-Lopez.

Q Could you describe for the Court what Mr. Lopez-Lara did.

A He was an individual that in 2019 was arrested and sentenced to two years in TDCJ for sexual assault of a child between 14 and 17. He was 39 at the time. The victim was 16. [1-84] And his rationale for doing it was he was helping her because she was homeless.

Q How did you find out about the rationale?

A Again, we interview all the inmates coming in; and that was part of his interview record.

I have more sex offenders if you'd like for me to—

Q Please describe them for the Court.

A Sure. Juan Marroquin (phonetic spelling). He was an individual that in 2002 was arrested and charged

with indecency with a child. Had molested a three year old. Was given probation. Didn't comply with that probation. Subsequently, came to TDCJ on a two-year charge for indecency with a child.

He was in February getting ready to complete his sentence; and again, a few days before, we're notified that the detainer is being dropped. And again, I had to intervene and call Mr. Bible to ask why is this person not being deported.

Q What did Mr. Bible tell you was the reason that his detainer was dropped?

A It was very similar to Jose Lara-Lopez. "Let me check on it. I'll get back to you."

Q Did Mr. Bible describe to you any role that the guidance played in the decision to drop the detainer?

A He, again, reiterated that this was the new guidance that was coming down.

[1-85]

Q Now, remind the Court, this is February of '22, right?

A This is February of '21.

Q '21?

A Yes, sir.

Q And so, again, have you seen any distinction in the way that the guidance is being treated, as a practical matter, between February and November of 2021?

A No. You go back to November 29th through February 15th, we've had 15 individuals who have had their

detainers dropped; and it's just—I cannot make any—any distinction between those.

Q Thank you.

A And—

MR. KIRSCHNER: If I can have just a moment to check my notes, your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q One last issue I want to make sure that the Court is aware of because I believe it comes up in Exhibit C.

Are you familiar with the withdrawing of vote process by the Board of Pardons and Paroles?

A Am I familiar with the voting process of the Board of Pardons and Paroles?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

[1-86]

Q Could you explain that to the Court.

A So, the Board of Pardons and Paroles gets information about an individual in inmate records, a significant amount of those records. Also included in there is detainer information, whether that person has a detainer; and the board looks at the totality of that inmate record and makes decisions on whether that person should be released or not.

Q Okay. If the Board of Pardons and Paroles decides that they're not going to release somebody—how much does it cost per day to house someone at TDCJ?

A Sure. It's \$69—a little over \$69 per inmate per day.

Q Now, in your experience, have you noticed any practice or habit of the Board of Pardons and Paroles concerning whether they release people who have detainers issued on them by Immigration and Customs Enforcement?

A Whether the board is releasing people?

Q Whether the board is voting to put people on parole on account of their having a detainer?

A Sure. The board considers that information and can vote that person to be released on parole but, knowing that there's a detainer, would move that individual from our custody into ICE custody.

Q Has TDCJ had to reach out to the Board of Pardons and Paroles to address rescinded detainers?

A Our communication would be, because the agency is the [1-87] agency of record for the inmate records, if there is something that has changed. So, for instance, if a detainer had been dropped, then TDCJ is going to let the board know that there's been a change in information that they considered originally.

Q Is that an added cost and burden on TDCJ to make sure that correct information is timely supplied to the board?

A It is.

Q One last question: If you had a circumstance where the board withdrew their decision to release someone because a detainer had been rescinded and the

person stayed longer in TDCJ, would that add cost to TDCJ?

A Sure. If that person remains incarcerated, then that's a continued cost; and then, of course, we've had individuals now that have been arrested for new crimes. Potentially, they may be coming back to TDCJ such as Ruben Abzona.

Q Explain to the Court who Ruben—

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Ruben?

THE WITNESS: Ruben Abzona. A-b-z-o-n-a, I believe.

BY MR. HUDSON:

Q And who is Ruben Abzona?

A Mr. Abzona was an individual—I'm not sure if you can pull him up. But he was convicted of possession of marijuana between 50 and 2,000 pounds. Mr. Abzona was sentenced to prison time within TDCJ. I believe four years for that incident in 2016.

[1-88]

The same day that he's scheduled for release on parole, detainer is being dropped. So, Mr. Abzona is released on parole supervision. This is in February of '21. Fast-forward to January of '22, Mr. Abzona is arrested for smuggling. He's found in the border region and has had several individuals in his vehicle in which police believe that he's transporting them for money.

Q Okay. So the Court is clear, what you're saying is Mr. Abzona had his detainer dropped, he was released from TDCJ; and ultimately, the next time TDCJ heard

about him, he was getting picked up for human smuggling?

A That's correct.

MR. HUDSON: Tender the witness, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Before we—

We're going to break for lunch. It's, obviously, noon.

Before we move on, I was going to ask one quick question to make sure I understood what you said. Are you aware of circumstances where the Board of Pardons and Paroles has made a decision to parole someone, afterwards checked with ICE, found out that they would not be detained or deported, and then made the decision to pull the parole back?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Both ways, your Honor. So, they've made decisions to withdraw their vote and keep that person incarcerated; and they've made decisions to continue * * *

* * * * *

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-CV-00016

STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

Feb. 23, 2022
Houston, Texas

**TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
DAY 1—AFTERNOON SESSION
HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF STATE OF TEXAS:

Mr. Ryan Daniel Walters
Mr. Eric Alan Hudson
Mr. Leif A. Olson
Office of the Attorney General of Texas
Special Counsel Unit
P.O. Box 12548 MC-009
Austin, Tx 787112-2548

FOR THE PLAINTIFF STATE OF LOUISIANA:

Mr. Joseph Scott St. John
Ms. Elisabeth Daigle
Louisiana Department of Justice
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

FOR THE DEFENDANTS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.:

Mr. Adam David Kirschner
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
P. O. Box 883
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Room 7126
Washington, DC 20044

Mr. Brian C. Rosen-Shaud
Mr. Kuntal Cholera
Mr. Michael F. Knapp
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
Federal Programs Branch
1100 L St. NW
Washington, DC 20530

Mr. Daniel David Hu
U.S. Attorney's Office
1000 Louisiana Street
Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002

ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. Gilbert Ledbetter

* * * * *

[96]

A. When I left, there was approximately 6,000 officers.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. I don't really know the number of support staff.

Q. Does the term "detention capacity" mean anything to you? I know you answered a few questions on direct about the average detention population, but does the term "detention capacity" mean anything to you?

A. Yeah.

Q. And what's your understanding of that term?

A. Each facility has a number of beds that they can fill until they get to capacity level.

Q. Understood. And is another term for this bed space?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it fair to say that it's not just physical beds, that when you're detaining a noncitizen a number of resources are involved beyond just a physical bed? Would that be correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And would that involve medical screening and personnel who administer the medical screening?

A. Yes.

Q. Would that include food and clothing and other provisions?

A. Yes.

Q. Would it also include just building space and having sufficient guards to administer those buildings?

[97]

A. Yes.

Q. Can ERO detain people once it's hit its maximum detention capacity?

A. If they want to, they can increase capacity.

Q. Can they increase it to infinity, or is there a point beyond which they can't go any further?

A. I'm sure there's a point; but as I explained earlier, I don't think we've ever studied the issue.

Q. And at a given time—so let's assume, for example, that ERO has X number of designated family beds. Does that term mean something to you? “Designated family beds”?

A. Yes.

Q. “Family unit arrests,” does that term mean something to you?

A. I didn't hear that, sir.

Q. So I asked first whether the term “designated family beds” means—you understand that term, and you said yes.

And then I asked: What about the term “family unit arrests”? Does that term mean something to you?

A. Yes.

Q. If ERO at a given time has X number of designated family beds and has Y family unit arrests and its family

unit arrests exceeds the number of family-designated beds, does that mean that ERO simply cannot apprehend a certain number of family units that are arrested?

[98]

A. Yes, because family beds are a whole different animal. You're talking—family beds require certain medical, certain facilities. They're a lot more in depth in setting up a family facility than a regular detention facility; so, yes, it requires a lot to detain a family.

Q. But it also requires a number of resources to detain an individual, as we just discussed, correct, Mr. Homan?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you spoke a little bit about reprogramming and I believe you confirmed that there's obviously a limit beyond which we can't reprogram and I know you testified that no study has been done; but is it fair to say can we agree that there is still some maximum? Detention capacity, I mean.

A. No, I don't think I agree with that. I don't think we ever tested the maximum. What we reprogrammed is what we requested, and we got the money to do that. I don't think we ever hit, you know, a number that—when we reprogram we ask we need this much money to buy this many beds and that's what we get, so I don't know if there has been a ceiling on that.

Q. Let me rephrase. I think that was just—that was my fault.

We don't know that there—that we can reprogram beyond a certain amount, right? We don't know if we can hit a hundred thousand. That's just something no

one's looked into, not even during the Trump Administration, correct?

[99]

A. Correct.

Q. Now, in reprogramming, am I correct that when we reprogram funds, we take money from one portion of ICE and then maybe reprogram it to perhaps increase our detention capacity but that's not necessarily money that's just lying around, right? We would be taking it from another use; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And am I correct that as a result that money, which was perhaps initially put towards another use, can no longer be dedicated to that other use, maybe to another operation, another mission? Is that correct?

A. Repeat that.

Q. Sure. Let's suppose we take money from Use A. We move it to Use B and Use B is increasing detention capacity. That money is no longer with Use A. So as a result in reprogramming, am I correct that somebody from DHS would have to make a decision of I don't want to dedicate it towards this use. I do want to dedicate it towards increasing detention capacity? Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, we spoke a little bit about the resources involved in detaining a noncitizen. Am I correct that a number of resources are involved for every step of the process and removal all the way from identifying a removable noncitizen to apprehending that noncitizen to processing that noncitizen, [100] et cetera, all the way

up to removal? A number of resources are required at each step. Would that be correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So let's take the example of a custodial pickup. I think you had mentioned that that is sometimes when someone goes from ICE to execute a detainer perhaps and goes to a facility, a jail. A number of agents would then have to be dispatched to go pick up that noncitizen. Would that be correct?

A. In a custodial setting?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. So how do the noncitizens come into ICE's custody?

A. In the custodial setting it's generally—first of all, it's operated for efficiency, because if you're LA County jail, you can—one agent can process 20 people a shift, right? Then the ICE bus will come and pick them up, by van pick them up.

However, if you go out into the field to arrest somebody, you've got to take a team with you because you're not in a custodial setting so you've got to take more than one person for officer safety reasons.

Q. Understood. So—well, is it always the case that noncitizens are picked up in groups of 20 by bus or maybe are there situations where let's say there's a prison in Wyoming releasing a noncitizen where you would just send maybe fewer [101] agents to pick up one noncitizen?

A. That is correct.

Q. So that does happen?

A. Yes.

Q. And oftentimes would agents potentially have to drive over a hundred miles or many miles to a facility if there isn't a closer ICE facility to the prison at which a noncitizen is being released?

A. Yes. That's the reason for the 48-hour detainer.

Q. And you spoke a little bit about at-large apprehensions. Just to make sure for my next few questions that we share the understanding, an at-large apprehension would be where it's not a custodial setting. Somebody can perhaps just be in the neighborhood, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you mentioned that more resources would be needed for that, so could it be a team of agents sometimes deployed to apprehend maybe just one noncitizen?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you say that's a number of resources dedicated for just one citizen?

A. Pardon me?

Q. Would you say that that means that ICE would often have to deploy a number of resources, maybe multiple people just to pick up one noncitizen out in society?

[102]

A. For a criminal alien, yes.

Q. And then once the noncitizen is apprehended, she or he must be processed, correct? You know, paperwork has to be filed, maybe sometimes proceedings before an immigration judge, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that process can sometimes take a good amount of time, correct?

A. Sometimes, depending on the case.

Q. When you were last at ICE, is it correct that immigration judges had a backlog of about one million cases and that the average case took about 700 days?

A. The backlog was—I agree about the million. The—I don't know the average length. It depends on what—where the Court is. New York City has a longer backlog than Houston, Texas. I mean, it depends on where you're at.

Q. I just meant the average. If we take the—

A. I don't know what the average is.

Q. You were asked about a book you wrote, *Defend the Border & Save Lives*, correct? Did that come out in March of 2020? I certainly don't mean to make this a memory test.

A. That's a memory test. I don't know.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. That's probably about right. I don't know.

Q. That's perfectly fine, Mr. Homan.

[103]

MR. CHOLERA: Your Honor, may I please approach the witness?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. CHOLERA: I'll make it easier for you, Mr. Homan. I will be asking you a few questions.

MR. HUDSON: Do you mind if I ask what you handed to Mr. Homan up there?

MR. CHOLERA: A copy of his book.

MR. HUDSON: Do you have a copy for me?

MR. CHOLERA: We have some pages that we will be introducing; but once we do that, I'm happy to hand you a copy of that.

MR. HUDSON: Do you mind if I take a look at them before he asks questions about them?

MR. CHOLERA: The book?

MR. HUDSON: Any of it. It looks like it's pretty intense over there.

MR. CHOLERA: I'm not handing them all right now, Mr. Hudson. When I do so, I'm more than happy to—

THE COURT: All right. Let's direct your issues to the Court.

So typically before you show something to the witness, you need to give it to the opposing counsel to inspect it.

MR. CHOLERA: Okay.

[104]

THE COURT: Let him see that. And if you are going to question him about it, then he needs to have a copy of it. So that's the general practice.

MR. CHOLERA: Understood. Well, should I take the book back, then, and give it to him?

THE COURT: Please.

MR. CHOLERA: Absolutely. How about this? I will hand this to Mr. Hudson and I will go and ask other questions and I'll return to this once you've had a chance to verify that that is indeed Mr. Homan's book.

BY MR. CHOLERA:

Q. So Mr. Homan, I was asking you a few questions about the resources involved at various stages of the process. I believe that's where we left off.

To your recollection, when you were last with DHS in 2018, what was the estimated number of removable noncitizens within the United States? Would 11 to 12 million sound right?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were last at DHS, did DHS have the resources to immediately apprehend and remove all 11 to 12 million of those removable noncitizens?

A. No.

Q. Can you speak up?

A. No.

* * * * *

[126]

MR. CHOLERA: —of that statutory provision.

With your permission, Your Honor, may I please approach Mr. Homan?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CHOLERA: I will take this big one off your plate.

THE WITNESS: You want this one, too?

MR. CHOLERA: Yes, sure.

BY MR. CHOLERA:

Q. So, Mr. Homan, let's start at the top of this where it says the A subpoint: "Detention, release and removal of aliens ordered removed."

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Under that is the Number 1, "removal period." Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And then there's a capital A, which says: "In general, except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days, in this section referred to as The Removal Period."

Did I read that correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if we go to the bottom, it says: "Number 2, Detention."

[127]

At the bottom of Page 1. I apologize. It says: "Number 2, Detention."

A. Yes.

Q. And then it says: "During the removal period, the attorney general shall detain the alien."

Did I read that correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were at DHS, do you recall the average number of noncitizens with final orders of removal in, say, 2015 or 2016?

A. No, not off the top of my head.

Q. Would roughly 900,000 sound about right to you?

A. I think—the last number I was aware of approximately 700,000 immigration fugitives at large in the United States. These are people who have final orders that did not leave the nation—did not leave the country as ordered. I'm familiar with that number. 900,000, I'm not familiar with.

Q. Would it shock you to hear that the number was roughly 900,000?

A. No.

Q. Did ICE ever have 900,000 detention beds?

A. No.

Q. So is it fair to say that you cannot state sitting here that when you were at DHS, DHS ever detained all noncitizens with final orders of removal?

A. Correct.

* * * * *

[157]

* * * * *

A. No.

Q. Was there a similar initiative with respect to everyone who's committed a crime of moral turpitude?

A. Operation Safe Neighborhoods. We ran that operation several years in a row. Operation Safe Neighborhoods looked for those convicted of criminal offenses, public safety threats.

Q. I just meant analogous to what you did in Operation Matador, which I understood from your testimony to be a special initiative with the focus on—

A. Operation Safe Neighborhoods was a special initiative we ran almost every year. We'd run it once a year or twice a year, and that was focused solely on at-large illegal aliens with criminal convictions.

Q. Suppose there were no centralized guidance documents. Would individual officers still exercise discretion and prioritize based on their own prioritization schemes?

A. I missed the first part of the question. I'm sorry.

Q. Sure. Let's suppose there were no centralized guidance documents issued from the head of DHS or the head of ICE. Let's suppose there was no instruction to prioritize X over Y. Based on your experience, would individual agents on the ground still exercise discretion to prioritize, but this time prioritize not based on a centralized prioritization framework, [158] but maybe a prioritization framework that they discern on their own, that they create on their own?

A. I think most would, but there's some that wouldn't.

Q. How would you suspect the average agent would go about prioritizing?

A. I mean, when you get leads, from the—whether it's from an NFOP, which is the fugitive operations center in Burlington, Vermont, when there's at-large—people

have been released from criminal—from county jails because they either didn't honor a detainer or the jail the didn't take our detainers or—again, when we get information off of NCIC bounce off the HSI databases, it goes to a center in Burlington, Vermont. They do a deep dive into various computer systems, and they'll develop target lists. The target lists will go to the field offices. Agents would generally pick the most serious offenders first. I mean, I would.

Like I said, prioritization is always important in a law enforcement agency. I think—in the last decade I think the prioritization has been pretty good based on the numbers, but most officers want to arrest the bad guy, those who are a public safety threat.

Q. So do you know how many noncitizens with criminal charges there are in the United States?

A. No.

* * * * *

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; TRACY
RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: Mar. 2, 2022

**SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT 1
TO PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL EXHIBIT C**

Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Inmates Scheduled for Release with ICE Detainers Dropped
January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022

TDCJ#	Name	Scheduled Release Date	Scheduled Release Type	ICE Detainer Dropped Date	Age	Offense	NCIC Code	Statute	Sentence	County	Notes: Status as of February 15, 2022
02326548	Sanchez,Javier	2/1/2021	Parole	2/1/2021	20	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	2	Tarrant	BPP continued release. Released 02/20/21.
02323228	Sanchezvelazquez,Jose Manuel	2/1/2021	Parole	2/1/2021	43	TAMPER W/GOVERN RCD LIC/SEAL FRAUD/HARM IAT	26990170	037100	2	Tarrant	BPP continued release. Released 03/17/21.
02282083	Morales,Luis	2/1/2021	Parole	2/1/2021	29	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	3	Brazos	BPP revoked requiring programming. Released 10/06/2021
02275151	Molina,Gustavo Ivan	2/1/2021	Parole	2/1/2021	29	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	6	Hopkins	BPP continued release. Released 03/10/21.
02331045	Ortegar Garcia,Victor Hugo	2/5/2021	Parole	2/5/2021	22	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	2	Tarrant	BPP continued release. Released 04/23/2021.
02330312	Vasquez, Alfonso	2/5/2021	Discharge	2/5/2021	42	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED W/CHILD UNDER 15 YOA	54040028	049045	1	Cameron	Discharged 02/08/21
02323820	Escalona Gonzalez, Aurelio	2/5/2021	Parole	2/5/2021	41	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	4	Harris	BPP continued release. Released 03/03/21. Violated Supv. Warrant Issued.
02170431	Rocha,Juan Antonio	2/5/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/5/2021	44	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	5	Hidalgo	BPP continued release - Released 02/08/21
02054184	Leon-Haros,Hector	2/5/2021	Parole	2/5/2021	58	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=400G	35990005	481112	23	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 1/27/2022. Pending Release
02333549	Sanchez, Ulises Jesus	2/8/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	2/8/2021	27	IMPERSONATE PUBLIC SERVANT	26040034	037110	2	McLennan	Released 02/22/21
02332578	Abonza, Ruben Chavez	2/8/2021	Parole	2/8/2021	31	POSS MARIJ >50LBS<=2,000LBS	35620012	481121	4	Starr	BPP continued release. Released 03/15/21.
02328012	Avellaneda,Jorge Costilla	2/9/2021	Parole	2/8/2021	41	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	2	Rockwall	BPP continued release - Released 02/24/21
02236400	Tovar,Rigoberto Tovar	2/8/2021	Parole	2/8/2021	41	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	10	Smith	BPP continued release. Released 02/26/21.
02122323	Amador,Feliciano Rosas	2/8/2021	Discharge	2/8/2021	42	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED 3RD OR MORE	54040011	049090	4	Hidalgo	Discharged 02/08/21
02332991	Chawda, Harshil	2/10/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	2/9/2021	28	STALKING	13160014	042072	2	Dallas	Released 02/24/21. Warrant Issued 04/07/21.
02292222	Serban,Tezaur	2/11/2021	Parole	2/9/2021	18	FRAUD USE/POSS IDENTIFYING INFO # ITEMS 10<50	26040044	032510	5	Llano	BPP continued release - Released 02/20/21
02283081	Monsivaiz, Josue	2/13/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/9/2021	27	EVADING ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release - Released 02/25/21.
02333502	Rodriguez-Silva, Jose Arturo	2/12/2021	Discharge	2/10/2021	35	DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED W/CHILD UNDER 15 YOA	54040028	049045	10mo	Harris	Discharged 02/12/21
02309215	Vallejasmendoza,Alfredo	2/12/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/11/2021	46	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	3	Tarrant	BPP continued release. Released 02/26/21.
02217441	Camarillo,Luis Miguel Val	2/12/2021	Discharge	2/11/2021	27	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=1G<4G	35990002	481112	2	Hidalgo	Discharged 02/12/21
02107171	Mendoza-Corza,Lorenzo	2/12/2021	Parole	2/11/2021	39	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=400G	35990005	481112	15	Rockwall	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 2/15/2022. Pending Release
02253434	Cardenas, Marco Antonio Saldana	2/23/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/23/2021	22	POSS MARIJ >50LBS<=2,000LBS	35620012	481121	4	Cameron	Approved for Release 12/21/21. Released 01/6/2022.
02223664	Medellin,Francisco Orozco	2/24/2021	Parole	2/23/2021	40	POSS CS PG 1 >=400G	35990018	481115	14	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02118936	Silva, Fernando Garcia	2/23/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/23/2021	33	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990003	481112	10	Montgomery	BPP continued release. Released 03/04/21. Warrant Issued.
01003963	Araus, Rogerto Gonzales	2/22/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/23/2021	48	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990003	481113	23	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 1/24/2022. Released 02/08/2022.
02334586	Mainsah, Charles	2/27/2021	Discharge	2/27/2021	52	THEFT PROP >=\$2,500<\$30K	23990194	031030	1	Denton	Discharged 02/26/21
02334348	Flores, Mauricio Uribe	3/12/2021	Discharge	2/24/2021	42	POSS CS PG 1 <1G	35990014	481115	6 mo	Dallas	Discharged 03/12/21
02324180	Leon, Juan	3/6/2021	Discharge	2/24/2021	31	POSS CS PG 1 <1G	35990014	481115	6 mo	Tarrant	Discharged 03/05/21
02279171	Rodriguez, Cesar	2/22/2021	Parole	2/24/2021	48	DWI	54040011	049090	5	Tarrant	BPP continued release - Released 03/04/21
02274451	Palacios, Saul	2/25/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/24/2021	28	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	2	Bexar	BPP continued release - Released 02/25/21
02225214	Mercado, Miguel	2/25/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/24/2021	56	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	6	Deaf Smith	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 1/17/2022. Released 01/31/2022.
02333087	Nunez, Eduardo	2/26/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	2/25/2021	26	POSS CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990016	481115	2	Denton	Released 04/27/2021
02294491	Macias, Miguel	3/1/2021	Parole	2/25/2021	25	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=4G<200G	35990003	481112	7	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02256049	Rodriguez, Eduardo	3/1/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/25/2021	23	POSS MARIJ	35620012	481121	6	Cameron	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 1/24/2022. Released 02/08/2022.
02334842	Rivas, Angel Omar Gudino	3/4/2021	Discharge	2/26/2021	19	POSS C/S PG1 <1G (LIO)	35990014	481115	6 mo	Hidalgo	Discharged 03/04/21
02332619	Ortiz, Enrique Arreola	3/1/2021	Parole	2/26/2021	39	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Hidalgo	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 1/14/2022. Released 01/31/2022.
02332448	Cervantes, Jose	3/18/2021	Discharge	2/26/2021	38	UNAUTH USE OF VEHICLE	24110003	031070	6 mo	Navarro	Discharged 03/18/21
02330592	Ocampo, Mayco	3/1/2021	Parole	2/26/2021	22	EVADING ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	4	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 10/06/2021. Released 12/06/2021.
02330185	Torres-Cruz, Rodolfo	3/1/2021	Parole	2/26/2021	34	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Caldwell	BPP continued release. Released 03/09/21.
02327603	Gonzalez, Juan Marcario	3/1/2021	Parole	2/26/2021	41	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Williamson	BPP continued release. Released 03/15/21
02326067	Velasquez, Antonio Mejia	3/18/2021	Discharge	2/26/2021	40	FRAUD USE/POSS IDENTIFYING INFO	26040042	032510	1.5	Deaf Smith	Discharged 03/18/21
02323649	Rodriguez, Martin	3/1/2021	Parole	2/26/2021	42	DWI	54040011	049090	3	Washington	Released 07/02/2021. Violated Supv. Warrant Issued.
02294614	Mendoza, Alejandro Pacheco	3/1/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	2/26/2021	28	INTOXICATION ASSLT W/VEHICLE SBI	54040032	049070	2	Dallas	BPP continued release. Released 03/26/21.
02327154	Bretado-Longoria, Jose	3/2/2021	Parole	3/1/2021	29	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Kaufman	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02322459	Cabrera Cruz, Domingo	3/3/2021	Parole	3/1/2021	21	FORGE GOVERN FINANCIAL INSTR	25890002	032210	2	Dallas	BPP continued release. Released 03/24/21
02313461	Drljaca, Damir	3/2/2021	Parole	3/1/2021	59	DWI	54040011	049090	3	Galveston	BPP continued release - Released 3/02/21
02304825	Aguirre, Jose	3/2/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	3/1/2021	43	DWI	54040011	049090	4	Ector	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 01/04/2022. Released 01/18/2022.
02293401	Mendoza-Camacho, J	3/2/2021	Parole	3/1/2021	43	MAN DEL CS PG 1 >=200G <400G	35990004	481112	10	Harris	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 01/31/2022. Pending Release.
02200842	Canseco, Edson	3/3/2021	Parole	3/1/2021	24	POSS CS COCAINE 400G/M	35990018	481115	10	Hays	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02330406	Jassoaleman, Albaro	3/4/2021	Parole	3/3/2021	41	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Dallas	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02330228	Hernandez, Christian	3/5/2021	Parole	3/3/2021	20	POSS MARIJ 50-2000LBS	35620012	481121	2	Hidalgo	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02294991	Enriquez, Eloy Cano	3/4/2021	Parole	3/4/2021	39	DWI	54040011	049090	4	Bexar	BPP continued release. Released 04/27/2021.
02331036	Marquez, Javier Chavarria	3/8/2021	Parole	3/5/2021	35	POSS CONT SUB 4-200G COCAINE	35990016	481115	3	Tarrant	BPP continued release. Released 04/12/2021.
02270170	Pacheco, Humberto	3/12/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	3/5/2021	27	TAMP W/PHYS EVID	040002	037090	3	Bell	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02205361	Perez, Alberto	3/10/2021	Parole	3/5/2021	33	MANUF CS 400G METH	90005	481112	15	Dallas	Vote withdrawn by the BPP

Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Inmates Scheduled for Release with ICE Detainers Dropped
January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022

TDCJ#	Name	Scheduled Release Date	Scheduled Release Type	ICE Detainer Dropped Date	Age	Offense	NCIC Code	Statute	Sentence	County	Notes: Status as of February 15, 2022
02138381	Cardenas-Montoya, Christian	3/12/2021	Parole	3/9/2021	26	ACCIDENT INVOLVING DEATH	54010008	550021	12	Houston	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02303333	Aleman, Uriel Solorio	3/11/2021	Parole	3/10/2021	36	POSS CONT SUB 400G OR MORE	35990018	481115	10	Harris	Approved for Release 10/29/21. Released 11/24/21. Warrant Issued
02336404	Caniz, Julio Casar Tax	3/15/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	3/12/2021	41	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Harris	Released 03/15/21
02328392	Gonzalez, Adrian Santiago	3/15/2021	Parole	3/15/2021	36	POSS MARIJ 50LBS-2,000LBS	35620012	481121	2	Hidalgo	Vote withdrawn by the BPP. Approved for Release 05/20/2021. Released 07/01/2021.
02287499	Garcia, Alvarez Yasser	3/29/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	3/25/2021	37	POSS CS METH 1-4G	35990015	481115	2	Wichita	BPP continued release. Released 04/26/2021
02336018	Espinoza,Yulissa Pineda	3/29/2021	Discharge	3/29/2021	23	CREDIT/DEBIT CARD ABUSE	26050014	032310	6 mo	Hidalgo	Discharged 03/29/2021
02331275	Salas, Gregorio	3/31/2021	Parole	3/30/2021	36	CRUEL NON-LIVESTOCK ANIMAL	72010001	042092	4	McLennan	BPP revoked requiring programming. Released 12/21/2021
02327823	Guerra-Escobar,Selvin Josue	4/1/2021	Parole	3/30/2021	19	EVADING ARREST	48010020	038040	2	Bailey	BPP continued release. Released 05/05/2021.
02222067	Ribera, Noe	4/9/2021	Parole	4/2/2021	22	POSS CONT SUBS PG1 200-400G	35990017	481115	10	Montgomery	BPP revoked requiring programming. Released 02/09/2022.
02338388	Velasquez, Rodrigo	4/9/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	4/5/2021	33	PROHIB SUB/ITM IN CORR FAC	73990677	038110	2	Midland	Released 04/19/2021
02335938	Pedres, Luis	4/6/2021	Discharge	4/5/2021	25	ATT TAKE WPN FROM OFFICER	52030022	015010	7 mo	Hidalgo	Discharged 04/06/2021
02329708	Rivas, Maria	4/26/2021	Discharge	4/6/2021	50	POSS CS	35990014	481115	9 mo	Midland	Discharged 04/26/2021
02216201	Torres, Guillermo Guadalupe Gon	4/20/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	4/12/2021	25	POSS MARIHUANA 50-2,000LBS	35620012	481121	5	Cameron	BPP contined release. Released 04/20/2021. Violated Supv. Warrant Issued.
02332307	Cruz-Moreno, Abisai Roberto	5/3/2021	Parole	4/15/2021	25	FAIL STOP/RENDER AID MOVG	54010007	550021	2	Bexar	BPP continued release. Released 06/10/2021
02336452	Vasquez-Vasquez, Nery Matias	5/5/2021	Discharge	4/21/2021	24	DWI W/CHILD UNDER 15 YO	54040028	049045	8 mo	Harris	Discharged 05/05/2021
02257161	Pecina Salazar, Carlos Eluit	5/14/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	5/12/2021	21	POSS OF MARIJUANA	35620012	481121	4	Cameron	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02344381	Martinez, Christian	5/24/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	5/24/2021	24	POSS OF CONT SUB 4-200G	35990016	481115	2	Hidalgo	Released 05/24/2021. Violated Supv. Warrant Issued.
02326133	De La Sancha-Diaz, Ranulfo	6/1/2021	Parole	5/24/2021	49	POSS CONT SUB 4-200G	35990016	481115	4	Harris	BPP continued release. Released 07/28/2021.
02345104	Huerta, Juan Manuel	6/2/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	6/2/2021	21	EVAD ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	Released 07/19/2021. Warrant Issued
02334836	Garza, Ruben	6/4/2021	Discharge	6/4/2021	37	BURG BLDG	22990001	030020	1	Hidalgo	Discharged 06/04/2021
02345947	Eyoun-Alsoud, Gais	6/10/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	6/9/2021	31	BAIL JUMP AND FTA	50150004	038100	3	Harris	Released 11/01/2021. Warrant Issued
02346297	Sanchez, Luis	6/21/2021	Discharge	6/21/2021	28	ATT EVADE ARREST/DETN W/VEHC	48010020	015010	9 mo	Collin	Discharged 06/21/2021
02286080	Agurica-Melendez, Bryan	6/28/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	6/24/2021	25	EVADING ARREST W/VEH	48010020	038040	5	Guadalupe	BPP continued release. Released 10/01/2021
02348345	Naveed, Roshan-Uddin	7/1/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	6/29/2021	19	EVADING ARREST/TAMP FAB PHYS EVID	48010020	038040	2	Denton	Released 10/12/2021.
02345104	Huerta, Juan Manuel	6/30/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	6/29/2021	21	EVAD ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	Released 07/19/2021. Warrant Issued
02346454	Villafan, Martin	7/2/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	6/30/2021	45	ACCIDENT INVOLVE SBI	54010009	550021	2	Denton	Released 08/11/2021
02350014	Ramirez, Jeronimo	7/20/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	7/6/2021	18	POSS CONT SUB PG1 4-200G L/I	35990016	481115	3	Hidalgo	Released 07/20/2021
02299278	Mendez-Mejia, Pedro	7/20/2021	Discharge	7/6/2021	30	EVADING ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Montgomery	Discharged 07/20/2021
02288321	Deleon, Exal	7/26/2021	Discharge	7/6/2021	27	EVADING ARR/DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	Discharged 07/26/2021
02349610	Carrillo, Aaron	7/19/2021	Parole	7/15/2021	27	POSS CONT SUB PG1 4-200G	35990016	481115	2	El Paso	BPP continued release. Released 07/30/2021.
02092247	Nogueranavas, Tony	7/16/2021	Parole	7/15/2021	35	ENGAGE ORG CRIM ACT/FRAUD US	73991005	071020	10	Tarrant	Released 07/16/2021 to a felony detainer.
02349064	Folarin, Nueez Abdul	Not scheduled		7/22/2021	37	POSS CONT SUB PG1 4-200G	35990016	481115	3	Bexar	Pending Parole Review
02354549	Rosas-Castillo, Miguel	8/20/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	8/3/2021	21	FAIL-STOP AND RENDER AID-MOV	54010007	550021	2	Bexar	Released 08/20/2021. Warrant Issued
02353650	Hernandez, Miguel	8/18/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	8/3/2021	35	POSS CONT SUBS PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	5	Bexar	Released 08/18/2021
02335928	Chavez, Oscar	8/6/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	8/5/2021	31	PROH SUB IN CORR FAC	73990677	038110	2	Hill	Released 08/20/2021
02354440	Hernandez, Victory	8/6/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	8/6/2021	32	MAN/DEL CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990002	481112	2	Hidalgo	Released 08/20/2021
02323572	Cantu-Tolentino, Roberto	8/24/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	8/16/2021	29	POSS CONT SUB PG2 4-400G	35990021	481116	3	Fort Bend	BPP continued release. Released 08/24/2021
02336935	Olla-Rodriguez, Luis	8/30/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	8/27/2021	34	DWI SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE	54040011	049090	2	Montgomery	BPP continued release. Released 09/02/2021
02316612	Sandoval, Carlos	8/30/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	8/27/2021	38	EVADING ARREST/DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 09/02/2021. Warrant Issued
02355366	Orta, Jesus	9/2/2021	Discharge	8/31/2021	42	POSS CS PG1 <1G LIO	35990014	481115	6 mo	Hidalgo	Discharged 09/02/2021
02332482	Santos-Murcia, Jose Jeremia	9/1/2021	Parole	8/31/2021	21	EVADING ARREST/DETN W/VEHICL	48010020	038040	3	Parmer	Released 01/21/2022.
02352871	Mendoza, Alejandro	9/2/2021	Parole	9/1/2021	20	POSS CONT SUBS WID	35990002	481112	2	Denton	Released 09/27/2021
02190674	Deleon Pu, Carlos	9/3/2021	Parole	9/2/2021	25	INTOX ASLT W/VEH SBI	54040032	049070	5	Harris	BPP revoked requiring programming. Release pending.
02311675	Duarte, Roberto Carlos	9/7/2021	Parole	9/3/2021	44	DWI	54040011	049090	4	Grayson	BPP continued release. Released 09/27/2021
02300586	Patlanvazquez, Ezequiel	9/8/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	9/7/2021	27	FAILURE TO STOP/RENDER AID	54010009	550021	3	Dallas	BPP continued release. Released 09/08/2021
02356301	Argueta-Guerra, Juan	9/17/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/10/2021	26	EVADING ARREST/DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	3	Harris	Released 09/24/2021
02352557	Jauregui, Diego	9/17/2021	Parole	9/10/2021	35	EVADE ARR DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 12/01/2021
02355133	Alcala, Eric Villarreal	9/5/2021	Parole	9/14/2021	31	POSS CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 11/10/2021
02354229	Bueno, Amando	9/15/2021	Discharge	9/15/2021	23	DWI W/CHILD UNDER 15 YO	54040028	049045	9 mo	Hidalgo	Discharged 09/15/2021
02335096	Herrera, Leonicio	9/21/2021	Parole	9/17/2021	51	POSS PG1 METH 1-4G	35990015	481115	4	Grayson	Released 09/21/2021
01640730	Comacho, Rolando	9/17/2021	Discharge	9/17/2021	37	INTOX MANSLAUGHTER W/VEH	13990025	049080	12	Harris	Discharged 09/17/2021
02318907	Ramirez-Mateo, Miguel	9/23/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	9/21/2021	34	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Bexar	Released 09/23/2021
02358264	Nieto Osorio, Julio	9/23/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/22/2021	34	FSRA ACC INVOLV DEATH	54010008	550021	2	Harris	Released 09/23/2021
02358000	Estrada, Israel	9/23/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/22/2021	20	POSS CONT SUB PG1 4-200G	990016	481115	2	Harris	Released 09/23/2021. Warrant Issued
02356000	Zepeda, Ivan B	9/23/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/22/2021	29	EVADING ARREST DET W/VEH	10020	038040	2	Hidalgo	Released 09/23/2021

168
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Inmates Scheduled for Release with ICE Detainers Dropped
January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022

TDCJ#	Name	Scheduled Release Date	Scheduled Release Type	ICE Detainer Dropped Date	Age	Offense	NCIC Code	Statute	Sentence	County	Notes: Status as of February 15, 2022
02359072	Gonzalez, Enrique	9/24/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/23/2021	24	EVADING ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hunt	Released 09/24/2021. Warrant Issued
02359856	Ramirez, Gerardo	9/29/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	9/27/2021	35	EVAD ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Comanche	Released 09/29/2021
02359524	Martinez, Alberto Mendoza	9/28/2021	Parole	9/27/2021	50	DWI	54040011	049090	2	Harris	BPP continued release. Released 12/06/2021
02349296	Orea-Gaspariano, Brullill	11/10/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	9/27/2021	44	CRUELTY NON-LIVESTOCK ANIM	72010001	042092	2	Montgomery	BPP continued release. Released 11/10/2021
02315227	Guzman, Nicholas Erasmo	9/28/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	9/27/2021	34	POSS MARIJ 50-2,000 LBS	35620012	481121	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 09/28/2021. Violated Supv. Warrant Issued.
02356275	Hernandez, Jose	10/4/2021	Parole	10/1/2021	41	POSS CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	2	Rockwall	BPP continued release. Released 11/12/2021
02343207	Garcia, Ramiro	10/4/2021	Parole	10/1/2021	28	POSS CONT SUB WID & TAMP W/PHYS EVID	35990002	481112	3	Ellis	BPP continued release. Released 11/22/2021. Warrant Issued.
02346745	Hernandez, Santiago	10/7/2021	Parole	10/5/2021	37	ACCIDENT INVOLVING INJURY & INTOX ASLT W/VEH SBI	54010007	550021	3	Dallas	BPP continued release. Released 11/18/2021
02360146	Aguilar, Cornelio	10/14/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	10/7/2021	53	FORGERY	25890002	032210	2	McLennan	Released 10/14/2021. Warrant Issued
02355765	Barcenas, Benito	10/12/2021	Parole	10/11/2021	54	DWI THIRD	54040011	049090	2	Harris	BPP continued release. Released 10/12/2021
02338804	Marines, Nelson	10/12/2021	Parole	10/11/2021	25	POSS CONT SUB PG1 200-400G	35990017	481115	5	Harris	BPP continued release. Released 11/05/2021
02306539	Luna, Diego	10/17/2021	Discharge	10/14/2021	21	EVAD ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Hidalgo	Discharged 10/15/2021
02344370	Garcia, Jose	10/27/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	10/28/2021	18	SMUGGLING OF PERSONS	64110001	020050	2	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 10/28/2021
02364338	Sanchez-Rodriguez, Pedro	11/5/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	11/2/2021	21	POSS CONT SUB	35990015	481115	3	Potter	Released 11/05/2021
02268189	Reyes, Carlos	11/18/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	11/16/2021	26	EVAD ARR DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	5	Hidalgo	BPP continued release. Released 11/18/2021
02138168	Garcia, Eduardo	11/17/2021	Discharge	11/16/2021	26	TAMP W/PHYSICAL EVIDENCE	48040003	037090	4	Smith	Discharged 11/17/2021
02318743	Vasquez, Carlos	11/30/2021	Mandatory - Discretionary	11/29/2021	30	POSS CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	3	Smith	BPP continued release. Released 11/30/2021
02305182	Thar, Nay	1/10/2022	Discharge	11/30/2021	23	POSS PROH SUB CORR FACILITY	73990677	038110	2	Moore	Discharged 01/10/2022
02349573	Cervantes,Vasquez, Guadalupe	12/7/2021	Parole	12/3/2021	28	POSS CONT SUBS	35990016	481115	3	Denton	BPP continued release. Released 12/22/2021. Warrant Issued.
02347059	Salas, Maria	12/7/2021	Parole	12/3/2021	54	FORGERY	25890002	032210	5	Taylor	BPP continued release. Released 01/24/2022
02323148	Bonilla Garcia, Jose Alen	1/20/2022	Discharge	12/6/2021	26	INTOXICATED ASLT W/VEH SBI	54040032	049070	2	Harris	Discharged 01/20/2022
02370424	Fuerte Padilla, Heriberto	12/20/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	12/16/2021	37	ACCIDENT INVOLVE DEATH	54010008	550021	2	Harris	Released 12/20/2021
02368854	Perez-Palacios, Odorico	12/30/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	12/16/2021	27	EVAD ARR DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Kimble	Released 12/30/2021
02353942	Castro-Velasquez, Bryan Antonio	1/4/2022	Parole	12/16/2021	22	EVADING ARR/DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	LaSalle	Vote withdrawn by the BPP
02353758	Vasquez, Jose Daniel Godoy	1/6/2022	Parole	12/16/2021	32	POSS CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	4	Kendall	Pending reconsideration by the BPP.
02319907	Gomez, Venancio	12/28/2021	Parole	12/21/2021	37	EVADING W/VEH	48010020	038040	5	Deaf Smith	BPP continued release. Pending Release
02130215	Deleon, Ruben	12/25/2021	Discharge	12/21/2021	29	INTOXICATION ASLT W/VEH SBI	54040032	049070	5	Hidalgo	Discharged 12/23/2021
02372188	Oliva, Angel	12/30/2021	Mandatory - Retzlaff	12/29/2021	23	ENGAGING IN ORG CRIM ACT	73990714	071020	2	Shelby	Released 12/30/2021
02365067	Ballesteros, Marissa	1/16/2022	Discharge	1/14/2022	56	POSS CS PG1<1G	35990014	481115	9mo	Smith	Discharged 01/14/2022
02320442	Moran-Martinez, Bryan	2/3/2022	Mandatory - Discretionary	1/26/2022	24	EVAD ARREST DET W/VEH	48010020	038040	2	Collin	BPP continued release. Released 02/03/2022
02317148	Torres, Ernesto	2/11/2022	Parole	1/26/2022	64	POSS CONT SUB PG1 1-4G	35990015	481115	6	Anderson	BPP continued release. Pending Release



**TARRANT COUNTY
OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF**

Bill E. Waybourn
Sheriff
817/884-3098
Fax 817/212-6987

PLAZA BUILDING
200 TAYLOR STREET
SEVENTH FLOOR
FORT WORTH, TEXAS 76196

DECLARATION OF BILL E. WAYBOURN

I, Bill Waybourn, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, testify that:

1. I make this declaration based on my own personal and professional knowledge, as well as the information available to me in my positions in public service.
2. I currently serve as the Sheriff of Tarrant County, Texas. I have been in that position since 2017 and have been a law enforcement professional since 1981.
3. In 1981, I began working for Dalworthington Gardens Police Department. I was promoted to Chief of Police in 1984. After leading the transition to combine the police and fire services of Dalworthington Gardens, I became the Chief of Public Safety in 1988. I was Chief of Dalworthington Gardens for

31 years before being elected Sheriff of Tarrant County.

4. As Sheriff of Tarrant County, I am responsible for enforcing the criminal laws of Texas to keep the peace within the county and operating the county jail.
5. In addition, the Sheriff of Tarrant County has been deputized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enforce federal immigration law, pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement executed under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 287(g) allows DHS and law enforcement agencies to make agreements that require the state and local officers to receive training and work under the supervision of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE provides the officers with authorization to identify, process, and detain undocumented aliens they encounter during their routine booking process. Fingerprint data taken at county jail bookings are sent to ICE, which can request that jails hold those who are arrested on suspicion of crimes for up to 48 hours, giving its agents time to decide whether to take the person into federal custody and pursue deportation.
6. Tarrant County on average has around 246 inmates in custody who have immigration detainers, costing the county an estimated \$3,644,442 annually. As of now (January 2022) we have 145 such inmates in our jails out of a total population in custody of 3,855.
7. The 145 inmates in custody with immigration detainers at this time have 246 charges of violations of state law pending among them. This includes 1

charge for abandoning a child, 3 charges for accident involving damage, 3 charges for accident involving death, 2 charges for accident involving injury, 1 charge for aggravated assault on a public servant, 26 charges for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 2 charges for aggravated kidnaping with bodily injury-sexual abuse, 8 charges for aggravated sexual assault of a child, 4 charges for aggravated sexual assault, 16 charges for aggravated robbery, 10 charges for assault of a family member, 3 charges for assault bodily injury of a family member, 1 charge for assault bodily injury, 1 charge for assault on a peace officer or judge, 1 charge for attempt to take weapon from officer, 1 charge for attempted murder, 7 charges for murder, 4 charges for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit a felony, 7 charges for burglary of a habitation, 1 charge for Burglary of a building, 3 charges for continued violence against a family member, 1 charge for criminal mischief, 2 charges for delivery manufacture controlled substance, 19 charges for driving while intoxicated, 1 charge for engaging in organized crime, 2 charges for evading arrest, 1 charge for failure to ID, 8 charges for indecency with a child-sexual contact, 5 charges for indecency-fondling, 2 charges for injury to a child/elderly/disabled, 1 charge for interfering with an emergency call, 3 charges for intoxicated assault with a vehicle causing serious bodily injury, 4 charges for intoxication manslaughter, 1 charge for manufacture controlled substance, 2 charges for online solicitation of a minor, 10 charges for possession of a controlled substance, 4 charges for possession of marihuana, 3 charges for possession of child pornography, 1

charge for prohibited substance/item in a correctional facility, 2 charges for resisting arrest, 37 charges for sexual abuse of a child under 14, 11 charges for sexual abuse of a child under 17, 1 charge for sexual performance child/employed, 1 charge for stalking, 1 charge for tampering with governmental record, 1 charge for tampering with oil/gas rigs, 1 charge for tampering with a witness, 3 charges for trafficking of a child, 2 charges for trafficking of a person, 2 charges for unauthorized use of a vehicle, 2 charges for unlawful possessions of a firearm by a felon, 1 charge for unlawful carrying of a weapon, 2 charges for unlawful restraint, 2 charges for violating a bond/protective order.

8. In January of 2022, my office examined the recidivism rates for the inmates in custody at a given time. We did this by examining the criminal history files of every inmate in custody with an immigration detainer at this point in time. We found the recidivism rate (indicated by prior jail time) of approximately 90% for that population as opposed to 69% in October of 2021.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on Jan. 7, 2022

/s/ BILL E. WAYBOURN
BILL E. WAYBOURN
Sheriff
Tarrant County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

DECLARATION OF REBECCA WALTZ

My name is Rebecca Waltz, and I am over the age of 18 and fully competent in all respects to make this declaration. I have personal knowledge and expertise of the matters herein stated.

1. I am the Budget Director for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) is the state agency responsible for the care, custody, and rehabilitation of persons convicted of a criminal offense in the state of Texas.

2. I have been employed with TDCJ since June 2004, and I have served in my current position since January 2020. Prior to that, I served as TDCJ's Deputy Budget Director from December 2017 to December 2019, a Senior Budget Analyst from October 2007 to November 2017, and a Junior Budget Analyst from September 2004 to September 2007.

3. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administers the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) in conjunction with the U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SCAAP provides federal payments to states and localities that incurred correctional officer salary costs for incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens with at least one felony or two misdemeanor convictions for violations of state or local law, and incarcerated for at least 4 consecutive days during the reporting period.

4. As a part of my employment with TDCJ, I am responsible for compiling the data to be included in TDCJ's application for federal reimbursement to the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. These data sets include the number of correctional officers and their salary expenditures (correctional officer is defined as a person whose primary employment responsibility is to maintain custody of individuals held in custody in a correctional facility) for the reporting period, information regarding maximum bed counts and inmate days, and information about the eligible inmates—(1) whom the agency incarcerated for at least four consecutive days during the reporting period; and (2) who the agency knows were undocumented criminal aliens, or reasonably and in good faith believes were undocumented criminal aliens.

5. TDCJ has sought reimbursement from the federal government through SCAAP since 1998.

6. For the most recently completed SCAAP application (reporting period of July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019), TDCJ reported data for 8,893 eligible inmates and a total of 2,385,559 days. An estimate of the cost of incarceration for these inmates can be calculated by multiplying the systemwide cost per day per inmate for

Fiscal Year 2020 (\$69.27) as reported by the Texas Legislative Budget Board by the number of days. For example ($\$69.27 \times 2,385,559 \text{ days} = \$165,247,672$).

7 SCAAP awards have not been distributed yet for this application period.

8. It is my belief that to the extent the number of aliens in TDCJ custody increases, TDCJ's unreimbursed expenses will increase as well.

9. TDCJ incurs costs of housing, supervising, and providing health care to individuals whose detainers are canceled by federal immigration authorities. When those individuals are on parole or mandatory supervision, TDCJ incurs costs. Keeping detainees in TDCJ custody, or adding them to parole or mandatory supervision, who could have otherwise been detained and/or removed by federal immigration authorities, imposes greater burdens on the system. An estimate of the cost of parole or mandatory supervision for these inmates can be calculated by multiplying the average cost per inmate for active parole supervision for Fiscal Year 2020 (\$4.64) as reported by the Texas Legislative Budget Board by the number of days. For example ($\$4.64 \times 2,385,559 \text{ days} = \$11,068,994$).

10. All of the facts and information contained within this declaration are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 6th day of Jan. 2022.

/s/ REBECCA WALTZ
REBECCA WALTZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

DECLARATION OF SUSAN BRICKER

1. My name is Susan Bricker. I am an adult and competent to testify. The information and opinions contained in this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge, my review of the relevant documents, and my knowledge, skills, training, and experience.

2. I am currently the manager (Manager V) of the Health Program Outcomes and Epidemiology Team (“HPOE”) within the Office of Data, Analytics and Performance (“DAP”) (the office formerly known as the Center for Analytics and Decision Support-CADS) at the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”).

3. A true and correct copy of my current curriculum vitae is attached to this declaration as Exhibit 1, and it sets out the details of my education, qualifications, and my work experience. I graduated from Emory University in May of 2001 with a master’s degree in the science of epidemiology. Except for a brief eight-month period in 2014 when I worked in the private sector, I’ve been employed at HHSC since 2007. In that time, I have

worked as an Epidemiologist II (2007-2012), Research Specialist V (2012-Jan. 2014), a Research Specialist V (Sept. 2014-Apr. 2018), a Program Specialist VII (May 2018-May 2021), and Manager V (June 2021-current). The HPOE Team conducts and/or coordinates legislative and HHS-directed research on health care utilization, demographic trends, and enrollment patterns for the state's health care and human service programs.

4. In 2007, as part of the 2008-2009 General Appropriations Act, the Texas Legislature required HHSC to report the cost of services and benefits provided by HHSC to undocumented immigrants in the State of Texas. This report, also known as the Rider 59 Report, was first completed by HHSC in 2008. Due to numerous requests for more recent information following the issuance of the 2008 report, the Rider 59 Report was updated in 2010, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2021. The Rider 59 Report completed in 2021 covered state fiscal year (SFY) 2019.

5. HHSC provides three principal categories of services and benefits to undocumented immigrants in Texas: (i) Texas Emergency Medicaid; (ii) the Texas Family Violence Program (FVP); and (iii) Texas Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Perinatal Coverage. Undocumented immigrants also receive uncompensated medical care from public hospitals in the State.

6. Emergency Medicaid is a federally required program jointly funded by the federal government and the states. The program provides Medicaid coverage, limited to emergency medical conditions including childbirth and labor, to undocumented immigrants living in the United States. Because HHSC Medicaid claims

data do not conclusively identify an individual's residency status, the portion of Emergency Medicaid payments attributable to undocumented immigrants must be estimated. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a document that explains the methodology HHSC utilized to obtain the estimates provided in this declaration. It is the same methodology relied upon by HHSC for preparing internal estimates and for preparation of the Rider 59 Report. The total estimated cost to the State for the provision of Emergency Medicaid services to undocumented immigrants residing in Texas was approximately \$80 million in SFY 2007, \$62 million in SFY 2009, \$71 million in SFY 2011, \$90 million in SFY 2013, \$73 million in SFY 2015, and \$85 million in SFY 2017; the estimate in SFY 2019 was \$80 million.

7. The Family Violence Program contracts with non-profit agencies across the State to provide essential services to family violence victims, including undocumented immigrants, in three categories: shelter centers, non-residential centers, and Special Nonresidential Projects. Because the FVP does not ask individuals about their residency status, the portion of the FVP's expenditures attributable to undocumented immigrants must be estimated. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a document that explains the methodology HHSC utilized to obtain the estimates provided in this declaration. It is the same methodology relied upon by HHSC for preparing internal estimates and for preparation of the Rider 59 Report. The total estimated cost to the State for the provision of direct FVP services to undocumented immigrants residing in Texas was \$1.2 million in SFY 2007, \$1.3 million in SFY 2009, \$1.3 million in SFY 2011, \$1.4 million in SFY 2013, \$1.0 million in SFY 2015, and \$1.2

million in SFY 2017; the estimate for SFY 2019 is \$1.0 million.

8. Texas CHIP Perinatal Coverage provides prenatal care to certain low-income women who do not otherwise qualify for Medicaid. There is no way to definitively report the number of undocumented immigrants served by CHIP Perinatal Coverage because the program does not require citizenship documentation. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a document that explains the methodology HHSC utilized to obtain the estimates provided in this declaration. It is the same methodology relied upon by HHSC for preparing internal estimates and for preparation of the Rider 59 Report. CHIP Perinatal Coverage expenditures were not included in HHSC's original Rider 59 Report because a full year of program data was not available when the report was prepared. The total estimated cost to the State for CHIP Perinatal Coverage to undocumented immigrants residing in Texas was \$33 million in SPY 2009, \$35 million in SPY 2011, and \$38 million in SPY 2013, \$30 million in SPY 2015, and \$30 million in SPY 2017; the estimate for SPY 2019 is \$6 million.

9. In the 2008 and 2010 versions of the Rider 59 Report, HHSC also provided estimates of the amount of uncompensated medical care provided by state public hospital district facilities to undocumented immigrants. In these reports, HHSC estimated that the State's public hospital district facilities incurred approximately \$596.8 million in uncompensated care for undocumented immigrants in SPY 2006 and \$716.8 million in SPY 2008. HHSC has not provided any estimates of uncompensated care for undocumented immigrants in more recent versions of the Rider 59 Report.

10. Although all of these numbers are estimated costs for the respective programs, it is a certainty that each of these programs has some positive cost to the State of Texas due to utilization by undocumented immigrants.

11. DAP can produce an updated report on the cost of services and benefits provided by HHSC to undocumented immigrants in the State of Texas. Because of other DAP workload, including ongoing reporting on the impacts of COVID-19 on Texas's vulnerable populations and demands associated with other litigation, and because the necessary data is not considered complete until eight months after the end of the fiscal year, we estimate that the report will be ready in December 2022.

12. All of the facts and information contained within this declaration are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 7th day of Jan. 2022.

Susan Bricker Digitally signed by Susan Bricker
Date: 2022.01.07 14:32:52
-06'00'

SUSAN BRICKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

DECLARATION OF LEONARDO R. LOPEZ

My name is Leonardo R. Lopez, and I am over the age of 18 and fully competent in all respects to make this declaration. I have personal knowledge and expertise of the matters herein stated.

1. I am the Associate Commissioner for School Finance/Chief School Finance Officer at the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”). I have worked for TEA in this capacity since June 2016, having previously served as the Executive Director of Finance for the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) for four years. Prior to my time at AISD, I served for ten years in a variety of roles for TEA, including six years as the Foundation School Program Operations Manager for the TEA’s State Funding Division.

2. In my current position, I oversee TEA’s school finance operations, including the administration of the Foundation School Program and analysis and processing of financial data. My responsibilities also include representing TEA in legislative hearings and school finance-related litigation.

3. TEA estimates that the average funding entitlement for fiscal year 2022 will be \$9,211 per student in attendance for an entire school year. If a student qualifies for the additional Bilingual and Compensatory Education weighted funding (for which most, if not all, UAC presumably would qualify), it would cost the State \$11,500 to educate each student in attendance for the entire school year.

4. TEA has not received any information directly from the federal government regarding the precise number of unaccompanied children (“UAC”) in Texas. However, I am aware that data from the U.S. Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Office of Refugee Resettlement (accessed on December 30, 2021 at 11:43 p.m. CST at <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/grantfunding/unaccompanied-children-released-sponsors-state>) (attached as Exhibit 1), indicates that in Texas, 3,272 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2014 through September 2015; 6,550 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2015 through September 2016; 5,391 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2016 through September 2017; 4,136 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2017 through September 2018; 9,900 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2018 through September 2019; 2,336 UAC were released to sponsors during the 12-month period covering October 2019 through September 2020; and 15,341 UAC were released during the 12-month period covering October 2020 through September 2021. If each of these children is educated in the Texas public school system and qualifies for Bilingual and Compensatory Education

weighted funding (such that the State's annual cost to educate each student for fiscal years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 would be roughly \$9,573, \$9,639, \$9,841, \$10,330, \$11,323, \$11,536, and \$11,500 respectively), the annual costs to educate these groups of children for fiscal years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 would be approximately \$31.32 million, \$63.13 million, \$53.05 million, \$42.73 million, \$112.10 million, \$26.95 million, and \$176.42 million, respectively.

5. School formula funding is comprised of state and local funds. The state funding is initially based on projections made by each school district at the end of the previous biennium. Districts often experience increases in their student enrollment from year to year, and the State plans for an increase of approximately 36,000 students in enrollment growth across Texas each year.

6. The Foundation School Program serves as the primary funding mechanism for providing state aid to public schools in Texas. Any additional UAC enrolled in Texas public schools would increase the State's cost of the Foundation School Program over what would otherwise have been spent.

7. Based on my knowledge and expertise regarding school finance issues impacting the State of Texas, I anticipate that the total costs to the State of providing public education to UAC will rise in the future to the extent that the number of UAC enrolled in the State's public school system increases.

8. All of the facts and information contained within this declaration are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 3rd day of Jan. 2022.

/s/ LEONARDO R. LOPEZ
LEONARDO R. LOPEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civ. Action No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

DECLARATION OF SEAN GROVE

1. My name is Sean Grove, and I am the Chief of Staff at the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (“TJJD”). I am over the age of 18 and fully competent in all respects to make this declaration.
2. I have experience working in county-level criminal justice agencies and working with the Office of the Governor on criminal justice issues. I have a Bachelor of Arts degrees in criminal justice and history from Kansas Wesleyan University as well as a law degree form Texas A&M University School of Law in Fort Worth.
3. I make this declaration on the basis of my own personal and professional knowledge and experience, as well as information available to me in my position at TJJD.
4. TJJD is charged with taking custody of juvenile offenders who have committed the most serious of-

fenses. Every juvenile committed to TJJD's custody since 2007 has committed a felony-level offense.

5. Many of the juvenile offenders that TJJD releases attend Texas public schools after being released. TJJD employs Reentry Educational Liaisons at each secure facility to, among other things, help ensure that juveniles released from TJJD custody reenter local school communities.
6. In the past, ICE has sent detainer requests to TJJD regarding non-citizen juveniles in TJJD custody. TJJD has honored those detainer requests.
7. As Chapter 25, Texas Education Code, requires a child to attend school and as *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), prohibits denying undocumented children of illegal immigrants the right to attend public school, to the extent ICE does not take custody of non-citizen juveniles set to be released from TJJD custody, it is my understanding that those non-citizen juveniles who have not already received their General Educational Development or high school diploma attend Texas public schools after being released.
8. For example, in 2021, a non-citizen juvenile was committed to TJJD custody for committing aggravated robbery in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 29.03. As of the date of this declaration, ICE has not issued a detainer request for that non-citizen juvenile. If ICE does not take custody of that juvenile before he is released from TJJD custody, I would expect that juvenile to attend a Texas public school as required by Chapter 25 and *Plyler*.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 26th day of Apr., 2021.

/s/ SEAN GROVE
SEAN GROVE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00016

THE STATE OF TEXAS AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
PLAINTIFFS

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; TRACY
RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: June 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is the culmination of a series of challenges to immigration-related memoranda issued within the Department of Homeland Security. The legal issues are varied and complicated. But the core of the dispute

is whether the Executive Branch may require its officials to act in a manner that conflicts with a statutory mandate imposed by Congress. It may not.

This past September, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security issued a rule—self-styled as a memorandum—governing civil immigration enforcement. The States of Texas and Louisiana say this memorandum conflicts with detention mandates under federal law. The Federal Government, in response, tries to reconcile the apparent contradiction between its memorandum and federal law. The Federal Government’s explanations fall short.

Lawmaking is vested by the People in Congress. Congress has long used its legislative power to craft immigration law which will ultimately be enforced by the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch’s *statutorily* authorized discretion on civil immigration enforcement has historically ebbed and flowed. In the 1990s, Congress reigned in the Executive Branch’s discretion by mandating detention of criminal aliens⁹ or aliens with final orders of removal. The wisdom of the statute passed by Congress and signed into law by the President has no bearing here. The passions of the present sometimes conflict with the views of the past. But the law remains unless it is repealed or replaced. And the

⁹ “Criminal alien” is the term used by Congress in the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); *see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n.2, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 n.2, 210 L. Ed. 2d 656 (2021) (discussing detention of “certain criminal aliens” under Section 1226(c)). When used in this opinion, the Court refers to criminal aliens as those who have committed the offenses articulated in the statute.

two statutes at issue in this case are still the law of the land.

That brings us to the relevant immigration statutes. This case is not about aliens in general, or even aliens who are in the United States illegally. Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) of Title 8 of the United States Code state that the Executive Branch “shall” detain aliens convicted of specific types of crimes or who have final orders of removal. The Federal Government acknowledges that *some* immigration statutes mandate detention. But it disputes that Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) are among those statutes. In support, the Federal Government offers an implausible construction of federal law that flies in the face of the limitations imposed by Congress. It also invokes discretion and prioritization in an effort to evade meaningful judicial review.

True, the Executive Branch has case-by-case discretion to abandon immigration enforcement as to a particular individual. This case, however, does not involve individualized decisionmaking. Instead, this case is about a rule that binds Department of Homeland Security officials in a generalized, prospective manner—all in contravention of Congress’s detention mandate.

It is also true that the Executive Branch may prioritize its resources. But it must do so within the bounds set by Congress. Whatever the outer limits of its authority, the Executive Branch does not have the authority to change the law.

Using the words “discretion” and “prioritization,” the Executive Branch claims the authority to suspend statutory mandates. The law does not sanction this approach. Accepting the Executive Branch’s position would

have profound consequences for the separation of powers.

It is worth repeating that the Federal Government agrees that certain immigration statutes contain mandatory detention provisions. The question, then, is whether the statutes here are mandatory. The answer is yes: Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate detention. All of this matters because the Administrative Procedure Act compels federal courts to set aside agency rules that are contrary to law, are arbitrary and capricious, or failed to observe the requisite procedure. After a trial on the merits, the States have shown that the Secretary's memorandum is all three. For the reasons that follow, the Court vacates the memorandum.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Court understands that some may find the terms “alien” and “illegal alien” offensive, and the Court's intent is certainly not to offend. These terms are used in this opinion because they are contained in the statutes as well as official government documents quoted by the Supreme Court in a seminal immigration case. *See Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 397, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2012). Moreover, “alien” and “immigrant” are different and defined statutory terms. *Compare* 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) *with Id.* § 1101(a)(15). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit explained why “illegal alien” is a preferable (and not pejorative) term in a case like this:

The usual and preferable term in [American English] is *illegal alien*. The other forms have arisen as needless euphemisms, and should be avoided as near-gobbledygook. The problem with *undocumented* is that it is intended to mean, by those who use it in this phrase, “not having the requisite documents to enter or stay in the country legally.” But the word strongly suggests “unaccounted for” to those unfamiliar with this quasi-legal jargon, and it may therefore obscure the meaning.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds that the following facts have been established by a preponderance of the evidence.¹¹

A. THE PARTIES

1. The States of Texas and Louisiana are the plaintiffs in this case.

2. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). He issued and currently administers the memorandum titled *Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law* (the “Final Memorandum”). (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 2-8).

3. Defendant DHS implemented the Final Memorandum, which became effective on November 29, 2021. (*Id.* at 7).

More than one writer has argued in favor of *undocumented alien* . . . [to] avoid[] the implication that one’s unauthorized presence in the United States is a crime. . . . Moreover, it is wrong to equate illegality with criminality, since many illegal acts are not criminal. *Illegal alien* is not an opprobrious epithet: it describes one present in a country in violation of the immigration laws (hence “illegal”).

Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 148 n.14 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bryan A. Garner, *Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage* 912 (Oxford 3d ed. 2011)); *see also* Matthew R. Salzwedel, *The Lawyer’s Struggle to Write*, 16 *Scribes Journal of Legal Writing* 69, 76 (2015) (“[I]llegal alien has going for it both history and well-documented, generally accepted use.”).

¹¹ The Court consolidated the hearing on the States’ Motion to Postpone the Effective Date of Agency Action or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction with the trial on the merits in this case. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).

4. DHS oversees Defendants United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

5. Defendant Troy Miller is the Deputy Commissioner of CBP.

6. Defendant Tae Johnson is the Acting Director of ICE.

7. Defendant Tracy Renaud is currently employed by USCIS and has worked in various capacities, including as the Acting Director of USCIS.

B. THE RELEVANT STATUTES

8. Certain statutes are at issue in this case. The first is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Paragraph 1 of that subsection states:

(1) Custody

The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,

(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an

offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,

when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1).

9. Paragraph 2 of that subsection states:

(2) Release

The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of Title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).

10. This case also implicates 8 U.S.C. § 1231. The relevant portions of that statute state:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal period”).

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

Id. § 1231(a)(2).

C. CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES

11. Enforcement of U.S. immigration law by United States executive branch agencies such as USCIS, CBP, ICE, and DHS (“Immigration Enforcement Authorities”) is also at issue in this case.

12. In light of resource constraints, Immigration Enforcement Authorities must decide how to focus their immigration enforcement actions. This is done regardless of whether there is express agency-wide guidance or not.¹² (Dkt. No. 146-2 at 1); (Dkt. No. 146-3 at 4); (Dkt. No. 146-7 at 2).

¹² Throughout this opinion, all docket-entry cites are to the ECF-imposed “Page ID.”

13. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has never apprehended and removed all removable aliens.

14. As of August 2021, the Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) division of ICE had approximately 34,000 detention beds nationwide. (Dkt. No. 153-21 at 15).

15. At these resource levels, it would be impossible to detain all aliens covered in Section 1226(c) or Section 1231(a)(2) at one time. (Dkt. No. 153-21 at 14-16).

16. Despite this, DHS has requested a dramatic reduction in detention bed capacity.¹³ Most recently, DHS’s 2023 budget request asks for a reduction to 25,000 detention beds. This amounts to a requested reduction of 26% over the course of the two years of the current administration. DHS’s 2023 budget request also seeks to eliminate funding for family detention beds.

17. ICE has also persistently underutilized its existing resources since 2021. For example, an April 2022 Office of Inspector General Report regarding one of ICE’s outside contractors found that “none of the [contractor’s] facilities used more than half of the number of beds ICE paid for under its contract. For example, usage ranged from an average of 21 percent at one hotel in

¹³ *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Budget Overview*, Department of Homeland Security at p. 19, 29, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20Enforcement_Remediated.pdf (last visited June 9, 2022); *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Budget Overview*, Department of Homeland Security at p. 17, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/u.s._immigration_and_customs_enforcement.pdf (last visited June 9, 2022).

El Paso to an average of 45 percent at one hotel in Phoenix. As a result, ICE spent \$16.98 million[] for unused beds at the hotels between April and June 2021.”¹⁴

18. DHS’s detention capacity is elastic. That is, DHS can reallocate resources based on existing needs. (Dkt. No. 153-10 at 6); (Dkt. No. 210 at 89, 92-93).

19. For example, from Fiscal Year 2019-present, ICE had an average daily population by month that peaked at 55,238 in August 2019 and reached a low of 14,084 in February 2021. The April 2022 average daily population was 19,176.¹⁵

20. Shifting resources is not without cost. For example, reallocating resources to the border may come at the expense of interior enforcement, and vice-versa. (Dkt. No. 153-10 at 6); (Dkt. No. 210 at 176, 178).

21. There is also velocity to DHS’s detention capacity. (Dkt. No. 210 at 200-01). That is, DHS’s detention capacity is not just a function of the number of “beds” DHS possesses, but also how quickly it removes aliens. For example, from fiscal year 2019-present, the ICE average length of stay by month peaked at 91.5

¹⁴ *ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols and Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels*, Office of Inspector General at p. 6, <https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-04/OIG-22-37-Apr22.pdf> (last visited June 9, 2022).

¹⁵ *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 9, 2022) (download Detention FY 2022 YTD (Detention FY22 tab, line 76); FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 2021 YTD tab, line 76); FY 2020 Detention Statistics (Detention EOFY2020 tab, line 59); and FY 2019 Detention Statistics (Detention FY19 tab, line 59)).

days in September 2020 and reached a low of 21.1 days in September 2021. The April 2022 average length of stay was 23.8 days.¹⁶

22. As referenced in paragraphs 19 and 21 above, 55,238 total beds coupled with an average length of stay of 21.1 days equates to a total annual detention capacity of approximately 955,539 individuals. In contrast, 14,084 total beds coupled with an average length of stay of 91.5 days equates to a total annual detention capacity of approximately 56,182 individuals. This demonstrates that DHS's discretionary decisions have significant aggregate consequences.

23. Also relevant is the process by which DHS takes custody of aliens with criminal convictions, which often happens through the use of a "detainer."

24. A detainer is an administrative notice from DHS to a Federal, state, or local law enforcement agency. A detainer informs the law enforcement agency that DHS intends to take custody of a removable alien detained by the jurisdiction upon their release. A detainer asks the law enforcement agency to (1) notify DHS of the alien's release date and (2) hold the alien for up to 48 hours, so that DHS can take custody. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.

¹⁶ *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 9, 2022) (download Detention FY 2022 YTD (Detention FY22 tab, line 93); FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 2021 YTD tab, line 93); FY 2020 Detention Statistics (Detention EOFY2020 tab, line 76); and FY 2019 Detention Statistics (Detention FY19 tab, line 75)).

25. In Texas, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) administratively interviews every inmate at intake. If an inmate indicates that either his citizenship or place of birth is not the United States, TDCJ enters that information into its database and sends a packet on the inmate to ICE. The packet includes the inmate’s fingerprints, biography, and family history. TDCJ regularly sends and updates the packets. ICE relies on these packets to determine whether a detainer should be issued. (Dkt. No. 210 at 54-55).

D. DHS OFFICIALS ISSUED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDA

1. The January Memorandum

26. On January 20, 2021, then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security David Pekoske issued a memorandum titled *Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities* (the “January Memorandum”). By its own terms, it took effect on February 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 146-8).

27. The January Memorandum announced substantial changes to the enforcement of the Nation’s immigration laws. (*Id.*).

28. The January Memorandum identified three enforcement priorities: national security, border security, and public safety. (*Id.* at 2).

29. The January Memorandum defined the national security priority as pertaining to those “[i]ndividuals who have engaged in or are suspected of terrorism or espionage, or whose apprehension, arrest and/or custody is otherwise necessary to protect the national security of the United States.” (*Id.* at 2).

30. The January Memorandum defined the border security priority as pertaining to those “[i]ndividuals apprehended at the border or ports of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States on or after November 1, 2020, or who were not physically present in the United States before November 1, 2020.” (*Id.* at 2).

31. Finally, the January Memorandum defined the public safety priority as pertaining to those “[i]ndividuals incarcerated within federal, state, and local prisons and jails released on or after the issuance of this memorandum who have been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony,’ as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at the time of conviction, and are determined to pose a threat to public safety.” (*Id.* at 2).

32. The January Memorandum did not instruct officers to prioritize aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude,¹⁷ aliens convicted of drug offenses,¹⁸ aliens convicted of multiple offenses with an aggregate sentence of confinement of five years or more,¹⁹ aliens who are traffickers of controlled substances,²⁰ aliens who participate in the commercialized sex industry,²¹ aliens who served in foreign governments and committed “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,”²² aliens

¹⁷ See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).

¹⁸ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

¹⁹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).

²⁰ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

²¹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).

²² See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(G).

who participate in the human trafficking industry,²³ aliens who engage in money laundering,²⁴ aliens convicted of certain firearms offenses,²⁵ and aliens with final orders of removal.²⁶

33. The January Memorandum further stated that its “guidelines and priorities are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” (Dkt. No. 146-8 at 4).

34. The January Memorandum called on the Acting Director of ICE to “issue operational guidance on the implementation of” the priority framework. (*Id.* at 3).

35. The January Memorandum stated that it did not “prohibit[] the apprehension or detention of individuals unlawfully in the United States who are not identified as priorities” in the memorandum. (*Id.*).

36. The January Memorandum was not issued following notice-and-comment procedures. (Dkt. No. 211 at 69).

2. The February Memorandum

37. As required by the January Memorandum, on February 18, 2021, Acting ICE Director Tae Johnson issued a memorandum titled *Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities* (the “February Memorandum”). (Dkt. No. 146-9).

²³ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H).

²⁴ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I).

²⁵ See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).

²⁶ See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

38. The February Memorandum noted that it provided only “interim guidance” and would “remain in effect until Secretary Mayorkas issue[d] new enforcement guidelines.” (*Id.* at 1).

39. The February Memorandum acknowledged that the January 20 Memorandum “established interim civil immigration enforcement priorities,” and it restated those priority categories: national security, border security, and public safety. (*Id.* at 2, 4-5).

40. The February Memorandum defined the national security priority as pertaining to those aliens who have engaged in, or are suspected of engaging, in terrorism or espionage. (*Id.* at 4).

41. The February Memorandum defined the border security priority as pertaining to those aliens “apprehended at the border or a port of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States on or after November 1, 2020” or who were “not physically present in the United States before November 1, 2020.” (*Id.* at 4).

42. Finally, the February Memorandum defined the public safety priority as pertaining to those aliens who “pose[] a threat to public safety” and have been “convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’” or are involved with criminal gangs. (*Id.* at 4-5).

43. The February Memorandum did not instruct officers to prioritize aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude,²⁷ aliens convicted of drug offenses,²⁸ aliens

²⁷ See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).

²⁸ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

convicted of multiple offenses with an aggregate sentence of confinement of five years or more,²⁹ aliens who are traffickers of controlled substances,³⁰ aliens who participate in the commercialized sex industry,³¹ aliens who served in foreign governments and committed “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,”³² aliens who participate in the human trafficking industry,³³ aliens who engage in money laundering,³⁴ aliens convicted of certain firearms offenses,³⁵ and aliens with final orders of removal.³⁶

44. The February Memorandum stated that it would generally not require “[o]fficers and agents . . . [to] obtain preapproval for enforcement or removal actions” against those who fall within the three “presumed priority” categories. But it generally required “preapproval” for enforcement actions, which includes detention, against other criminal aliens. The February Memorandum noted, “[i]f preapproval is impractical, an officer or agent should conduct the enforcement action” and then seek approval within 24 hours. (Dkt. No. 146-9 at 5-6).

45. The approval rate for “other priority” enforcement actions varied by ICE field office. Several offices approved more than 99% of all requests. The lowest approval rates were in the New York (82%) and Denver

²⁹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).

³⁰ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

³¹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).

³² See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(G).

³³ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H).

³⁴ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I).

³⁵ See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).

³⁶ See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

(89%) field offices. The median approval rate was 98%. (Dkt. No. 146-15 at 1, 3).

46. However, under the February Memorandum, many ICE offices had a practice of pre-vetting cases so that officers obtained informal approval from their supervisors before they formally submitted an approval request. This made the approval rate for non-priority cases appear deceptively high. (*Id.* at 3).

47. This practice artificially inflated the approval rate for “other priority” enforcement actions. It is unlikely that officers would seek preapproval for an enforcement action, let alone take an enforcement action, that did not survive this informal pre-vetting process. (*Id.*); (Dkt. No. 210 at 79-80).

48. To “ensure compliance” and “consistency” across the country and to allow for an assessment of the effectiveness of the priority framework, the February Memorandum required field offices to “collect data on the nature and type of enforcement and removal actions they perform.” (Dkt. No. 146-9 at 5).

49. The February Memorandum stated that it did “not require or prohibit the arrest, detention, or removal of any noncitizen” and that “officers and agents are expected to exercise their discretion thoughtfully, consistent with ICE’s important national security, border security, and public safety mission.” (*Id.* at 3).

50. The February Memorandum further stated that its “guidelines and priorities are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” (*Id.* at 7).

51. The February Memorandum was not issued following notice-and-comment procedures. (Dkt. No. 211 at 69).

3. The Final Memorandum

52. On September 30, 2021, Secretary Mayorkas issued the Final Memorandum from DHS. (Dkt. No. 109-5).

53. Secretary Mayorkas provided that the Final Memorandum would become effective on November 29, 2021, and that, upon its effective date, the Final Memorandum would “serve to rescind” the January and February Memoranda. (*Id.* at 7).

54. In developing the Final Memorandum, Secretary Mayorkas and DHS received input from certain individuals and groups. (Dkt. No. 145-1).

55. Secretary Mayorkas and DHS considered issues raised in litigation and the views of members of Congress and state and local officials. *See, e.g.*, (Dkt. No. 148-9); (Dkt. No. 148-8); (Dkt. No. 148-15); (Dkt. No. 150-1).

56. The Final Memorandum by its terms sets out “guidance for the apprehension and removal of noncitizens.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 2). The Final Memorandum expressly applies to detainees. (*Id.* at 3).

57. The Final Memorandum identifies the same three priority enforcement categories as the previous two memoranda: national security, border security, and public safety. *Compare (Id.* at 4-5) *with* (Dkt. No. 146-8 at 2) *and* (Dkt. No. 146-9 at 4-5).

58. Unlike the February Memorandum, the Final Memorandum’s priorities are not presumptively subject

to enforcement action. *Compare* (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 4-5) *with* (Dkt. No. 146-9 at 4-5).

59. For example, under the “border security” priority, the Final Memorandum admonishes “there could be mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances that militate in favor of declining enforcement action. [DHS] personnel should evaluate the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 5).

60. Unlike the February Memorandum, the Final Memorandum’s “public safety” priority no longer presumptively subjects aliens convicted of aggravated felonies to enforcement action, including detention. *Compare* (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 4-5) *with* (Dkt. No. 146-9 at 4-5).

61. DHS’s explanation for removing the “aggravated felony” category is that it was “both over- and under-inclusive,” is “an imperfect proxy for severity of offense,” and because the “aggravated felony definition can be challenging to administer in many instances[.]” (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 12).

62. The statute, however, specifically provides that the Defendants (“the Government”) “shall take into custody any alien” that has committed an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

63. Under the “public safety” priority, the Final Memorandum instructs DHS personnel that enforcement, including detention, “is not to be determined according to bright lines or categories.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 4-5).

64. The Final Memorandum “requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” It states, DHS “personnel should not

rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone,” when deciding to enforce the law. Rather, they “should, to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the [alien’s] conduct at issue.” (*Id.*).

65. As with the January and February Memoranda, the Final Memorandum does not instruct officers to prioritize aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude,³⁷ aliens convicted of drug offenses,³⁸ aliens convicted of multiple offenses with an aggregate sentence of confinement of five years or more,³⁹ aliens who are traffickers of controlled substances,⁴⁰ aliens who participate in the commercialized sex industry,⁴¹ aliens who served in foreign governments and committed “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,”⁴² aliens who participate in the human trafficking industry,⁴³ aliens who engage in money laundering,⁴⁴ aliens convicted of certain firearms offenses,⁴⁵ and aliens with final orders of removal.⁴⁶

³⁷ See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).

³⁸ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

³⁹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).

⁴⁰ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

⁴¹ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).

⁴² See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(G).

⁴³ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H).

⁴⁴ See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(I).

⁴⁵ See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).

⁴⁶ See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

66. The Final Memorandum states that a “review process should be put in place to ensure the rigorous review of our personnel’s enforcement decisions” and “should seek to achieve quality and consistency in decision-making across the entire agency and the Department.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 7).

67. The Final Memorandum also states that DHS “will work to establish a fair and equitable case review process to afford noncitizens and their representatives the opportunity to obtain expeditious review of the enforcement actions taken.” (*Id.*). That case review process has been implemented. This “ICE Case Review (ICR)” process allows aliens to challenge enforcement actions taken against them if they believe they do not meet the Final Memorandum’s priorities.⁴⁷ The ICR process allows aliens to request further review of their initial determination by “a Senior Reviewing Official, who, where appropriate, will communicate the ultimate resolution” with the requesting alien.⁴⁸ The ICR process states that cases “involving individuals detained in ICE custody or pending imminent removal will be prioritized” and permits legal counsel to undertake the ICR process on behalf of aliens.⁴⁹

68. The Final Memorandum further states that it “does not compel an action to be taken or not taken” and “is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon

⁴⁷ *ICE Case Review*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/ICEcasereview> (last visited June 9, 2022).

⁴⁸ *ICE Announces Case Review Process*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-case-review-process> (last visited June 9, 2022).

⁴⁹ *ICE Case Review*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/ICEcasereview> (last visited June 9, 2022).

to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 6, 8).

69. The Final Memorandum was issued contemporaneously with another document titled *Significant Considerations in Developing Updated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law* (the “Considerations Memo”), in which DHS summarized the key aspects informing the Final Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 146-1).

70. In the Considerations Memo, DHS included a section on potential alternative approaches to the Final Memorandum. (*Id.* at 19-21).

71. DHS has coupled the Final Memorandum “with [an] extensive and continuous training program on the new guidelines, the creation of short- and long-term processes to review enforcement decisions to achieve quality and consistency, and comprehensive data collection and analysis.” (*Id.* at 20).

72. DHS’s Activity Analysis and Reporting Tool (“AART”) is used to collect data on whether enforcement actions adhere to the Final Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 4). The AART requires agents to report which of the three priority categories from the Final Memorandum applies to an enforcement action. (*Id.* at 8). Agents may only choose from the three categories when logging an enforcement action.

73. Agents must also certify that they “considered all relevant case specific information” available at the time of the enforcement action. The submissions are reviewed by the agent’s supervisors to verify that “all

necessary information has been provided.” (*Id.* at 12-13).

74. The Final Memorandum was not issued following notice-and-comment procedures. (Dkt. No. 211 at 69).

E. THE FINAL MEMORANDUM INCREASES THE NUMBER OF CRIMINAL ALIENS AND ALIENS WITH FINAL ORDERS OF REMOVAL RELEASED INTO TEXAS, LOUISIANA AND THE UNITED STATES

75. In Texas, from fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2020, detainers were rescinded for various reasons such as discovering that the individual was a U.S. citizen, medical complications, or an inability to be repatriated. (Dkt. No. 203 at 68-69); (Dkt. No. 210 at 37).

76. However, no more than a dozen detainers were dropped per year during that time period. (Dkt. No. 203 at 68-69).

77. Before February 2021, TDCJ did not track daily the number of detainers that ICE dropped because there was no need. Before February 2021, ICE dropped so few detainers that the number could be tracked on a periodic basis. (Dkt. No. 210 at 42).

78. Because of the increase in dropped detainers, TDCJ is currently updating its inmate-tracking system to indicate whether criminal alien inmates have had detainers dropped—or never issued in the first place—due to the Final Memorandum. (*Id.* at 46-47).

79. From January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022, ICE rescinded detainers on 170 criminal aliens in TDCJ facilities. It later reissued the detainer or took custody of 29 of those inmates. (Dkt. No. 203 at 69); (Dkt. No. 217 at 19-23).

80. ICE took custody of some aliens with rescinded detainers because TDCJ raised questions about the cancellation of their detainers. (Dkt. No. 210 at 8, 51).

81. Of the 141 criminal aliens whose detainers remained rescinded, 55 were serving a sentence for a drug offense. These were serious drug offenses; none were for a single offense involving possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana for one's own use. (Dkt. No. 217 at 19-23).

82. Of the 141 criminal aliens whose detainers remained rescinded, 95 were released on parole supervision. (Dkt. No. 203 at 83). At the time this case was tried, 17 of those 95 had failed to comply with their parole supervision and four had committed new criminal offenses. At least one remains at large in Texas with a warrant for his arrest. (*Id.*).

83. In the months since the Final Memorandum became effective, ICE has continued to rescind detainers placed on criminal aliens in TDCJ custody because of the Final Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 217 at 23); (Dkt. No. 210 at 45); (Dkt. No. 203 at 85); *see also* (Dkt. No. 217-23).

84. From November 29, 2021 to February 15, 2022, ICE rescinded detainers for at least 15 aliens detained within Texas facilities. (Dkt. No. 217 at 23). At least one of those aliens was subject to a final order of removal from the United States, but because of the dropped detainer, he was released into the public rather than ICE's custody. (Dkt. No. 203 at 80-81); (Dkt. No. 217 at 23).

85. Between approximately March to April 2021, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

had at least four criminal aliens who were either (1) subject to detainers that were canceled; or (2) released to ICE custody only to later be returned to Louisiana. (Dkt. No. 217-1 at 13-15). These four individuals were thereafter placed on “supervised release” or “supervision by probation and parole.” (*Id.*).

86. One of those was convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles and sexual battery. His detainer was rescinded, and he was released subject to supervised release. (*Id.* at 13-14).

87. Two others, one convicted of possessing Fentanyl and the other of aggravated second-degree battery, were released to ICE but almost immediately returned for supervised release rather than removed. (*Id.* at 14).

88. A fourth, convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm, was released to ICE but later returned to Louisiana’s custody for supervised release. (*Id.* at 15).


89. The number of convicted criminal aliens in ICE custody per day has dropped dramatically in the months since the January Memorandum was issued and has continued through today under the subsequent Memoranda. There has been little variation in custody numbers since the January Memorandum was issued.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 7, 2022) (download Detention FY 2022 YTD (Detention FY22 tab, line 73); FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 2021 YTD tab, line 73); FY 2020 Detention Statistics (Detention EOFY2020 tab, line 56); and FY 2019 Detention Statistics (Detention FY19 tab, line 57)).

90. There has been little practical difference between ICE's detention of aliens with criminal convictions under the February Memorandum and under the Final Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 203 at 85); (Dkt. No. 210 at 40).

91. The average daily number of aliens with pending criminal charges in ICE custody has also dropped in the months since the Final Memorandum was issued.⁵¹

92. A similar pattern exists with respect to convicted criminal aliens in CBP custody.⁵²



⁵¹ *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 7, 2022) (download Detention FY 2022 YTD (Detention FY22 tab, line 74); FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 2021 YTD tab, line 74)).


⁵² *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 7, 2022) (download Detention FY 2022 YTD (Detention FY22 tab, line 69); FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 2021 YTD tab, line 69)).

93. Even as COVID-19 conditions have improved, detentions of aliens with criminal convictions have remained considerably lower than prior years.

94. As the detention data indicate, officers do not have discretion to go outside the enforcement priorities. The data are not consistent with officers having the ability to disregard the admonitions in the Memoranda. Instead, they demonstrate that officers are expected to only take an enforcement action within much narrower circumstances.

95. The same decline is also evident in removals carried out by ICE, since DHS was created:⁵³

⁵³ *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 7, 2022) (download FY 2021 Detention Statistics (Detention FY 21 YTD tab, line 29) (for fiscal year 2021); FY 2020 Detention Statistics (Detention EOFY2020 tab, line 29) (for fiscal year 2020)); (Dkt. No. 153-10 at 22) (for fiscal years 2017-2019); *FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/remove/removal-statistics/2016> (last visited June 7, 2022) (for fiscal years 2008-2016); *FY2003 - 2016 Removal by AOR Stats*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/immigration_statistics/Removals-AOR-FY2003-2016.xlsx (last visited June 7, 2022) (for fiscal years 2003-2007).



96. These removal numbers—over three-fold below the removals carried out at the height of the pandemic—make clear that the Final Memorandum is dramatically impacting civil immigration enforcement and are a further indication that agents consider the Memoranda to contain mandatory directives that limit the discretion that was available to them in years’ past.

97. The Final Memorandum subjects every enforcement action to review for compliance with its priorities and terms. (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 7-8); (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 12-13). DHS personnel are required to consider the priorities and other factors outlined in the Final Memorandum and are precluded from relying on a conviction, no matter how serious, or the result of a database search alone before taking an enforcement action. (Dkt. No.

109-5 at 5, 7-8); (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 8, 12); (Dkt. No. 217-26 at 8-15, 18).

98. Based on the dramatic decrease in detentions of aliens with criminal convictions, the Final Memorandum and its priorities—particularly when viewed in light of the previous Memoranda and how they were implemented and enforced by DHS supervisors—are perceived by many ICE officers and agents as substantially limiting if not eliminating their discretion to make detention decisions. (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 7-8); (Dkt. No. 210 at 46, 163); *see supra* (F.F. No. 89); (F.F. Nos. 91-93); (F.F. No. 95).

99. The result is that an ostensibly permissive Final Memorandum is effectively mandatory at the most important level: the agents and officers who are tasked with enforcing the law.

100. The Memoranda have resulted in ICE officers rescinding detainers and declining to take aliens into custody who are covered by the statutes. (Dkt. No. 203 at 68-69, 73-74); (Dkt. No. 210 at 37-39, 80, 84-85, 87, 161); (Dkt. No. 217 at 19-23).

101. The Final Memorandum has led to the rescission of detainers, which has at least in part contributed to fewer criminal aliens being detained by ICE. (Dkt. No. 217 at 23); (Dkt. No. 210 at 45); (Dkt. No. 203 at 85); *see supra* (F.F. No. 89); (F.F. Nos. 91-93); (F.F. No. 95). It has also led to the release of aliens with final orders of removal. (Dkt. No. 203 at 80-81); (Dkt. No. 217 at 23).

102. The Final Memorandum increases the number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens with final orders of removal released into the United States.

F. INCREASED NUMBERS OF CRIMINAL ALIENS LEAD TO INCREASED STATE COSTS

1. Costs of Incarcerating Criminal Aliens

103. The average cost to TDCJ for incarcerating an inmate who qualifies for reimbursement under the federal government's State Criminal Alien Assistance Program ("SCAAP") was \$62.34 per day for the period of July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018. (Dkt. No. 115-6 at 3). During that period, TDCJ incarcerated 8,951 eligible inmates for a total of 2,439,110 days. (*Id.*). The total estimated cost of incarcerating these inmates for that period was \$152,054,117. (*Id.* at 3-4). Of that amount, the SCAAP program reimbursed only \$14,657,739. (*Id.*). Thus, the estimated net cost to the State of Texas was approximately \$56.33 per person per day.

104. For the most recently completed period, July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019, TDCJ incarcerated 8,893 eligible inmates for a total of 2,385,559 days at an estimated total cost of \$165,247,672. The average per-inmate, per-day cost of incarceration for those inmates was \$69.27. As of January 2022, SCAAP had not reimbursed any of that amount. (Dkt. No. 217 at 112 ¶¶ 6-7).

105. When ICE rescinds a detainer for an inmate in TDCJ custody, the Board of Pardons and Paroles considers that new information and has revoked parole for aliens who were previously approved for parole, leading to continued custody in TDCJ. (Dkt. No. 203 at 85-89); (Dkt. No. 217 at 19-23).

106. As the number of aliens in TDCJ custody increases, the net cost to the State of Texas of detaining those aliens increases. (Dkt. No. 217 at 112 ¶ 8).

107. TDCJ also incurs costs to keep aliens in custody or add them to parole or mandatory supervision programs when those aliens are not detained or removed by federal immigration authorities. For Fiscal Year 2020, the average per-day cost of these programs for each inmate not detained or removed is \$4.64, which would total \$11,068,994. (*Id.* at 113 ¶ 9).

108. Louisiana incurs costs to supervise aliens not detained by ICE while they are on supervised release. (Dkt. No. 217-1 at 15).

2. Recidivism of Criminal Aliens

109. A 2018 study from the United States Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that state offenders generally recidivate at a 44% level within the first year following release, 68% within the first three, 79% within the first six, and 83% within the first nine. The same study shows that during the nine-year period following release, there were on average five arrests per released prisoner. (Dkt. No. 217-10 at 2).

110. Tarrant County, Texas averages 246 inmates with immigration detainers at any given time. The Tarrant County Sheriff estimates the average cost of jailing those inmates to be \$3,644,442 per year. (Dkt. No. 217 at 107).

111. As of January 7, 2022, Tarrant County had 145 of these inmates out of a total population in custody of 3,855. (*Id.* at 107-08).

112. The 145 immigration-detainer inmates had 246 pending charges among them. They included, among other crimes, seven charges for murder, twenty-six charges for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and eight charges for aggravated sexual assault of a child. (*Id.*).

113. The Tarrant County Sheriff's Office examined the recidivism rates for inmates with immigration detainers by examining the criminal-history files of every such inmate jailed as of that date. In January 2022, it found a recidivism rate (indicated by prior jail time) of roughly 90% for that population, compared to 69% in October 2021. (*Id.* at 108).

114. DHS itself found that “[o]f the 123,128 ERO administrative arrests in FY 2019 with criminal convictions or pending criminal charges, the criminal history for this group represented 489,063 total criminal convictions and pending charges as of the date of arrest,” which equates to “an average of *four* criminal arrests/convictions *per alien*, highlighting the recidivist nature of the aliens that ICE arrests.” (Dkt. No. 153-10 at 15) (emphases added).

3. Education Provided to Criminal Aliens

115. The estimated average per-student, per-year funding entitlement for a student in Texas public schools in Fiscal Year 2022 will be \$9,211. For a student who qualifies for English as a second language weighted funding, that amount is \$11,500. (Dkt. No. 217 at 140).

116. While Texas does not have information on the total number of school-aged aliens attending public schools in the State, there is data for a subset of those children. (*Id.*).

117. Data from the U.S. Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement shows how many unaccompanied children were released to sponsors in Texas during annual October-September periods. Most unaccompanied children detained by the Government and released to sponsors in Texas qualify for English as a second language weighted funding. (*Id.*).

118. For each of those children educated in the Texas public school system the fiscal year following release to a sponsor and who qualified for English as a second language weighted funding, the State and local governments would incur millions of dollars in costs. Since fiscal year 2015, those costs have been as high as \$176.42 million per year and as low as \$26.95 million per year. (*Id.* at 140-41).

119. The total costs to Texas of providing public education to alien children will rise as the number of such children increases. (Dkt. No. 217 at 141).

120. The Texas Juvenile Justice Department (“TJJD”) has custody of juvenile offenders who have committed felony-level offenses. When those juveniles are released, they attend public schools. (*Id.* at 155).

121. ICE previously sent detainees to TJJD for juvenile aliens. However, as of April 26, 2021, at least one alien juvenile in TJJD custody for committing aggravated robbery was not issued a detainer. That juvenile will attend a Texas public school upon release. (*Id.* at 155-56).

122. Some aliens with criminal convictions who are not detained by ICE because of the Final Memorandum will cause the Texas public school system to incur additional costs.

4. Healthcare Provided to Criminal Aliens

123. The Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) provides three principal categories of services and benefits to aliens in Texas: (i) Texas Emergency Medicaid; (ii) the Texas Family Violence Program; and (iii) Texas Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) Perinatal Coverage. Aliens also receive uncompensated medical care from public hospitals in the State. (*Id.* at 118).

124. The Emergency Medicaid program is a federally required program jointly funded by the federal government and the states. It provides Medicaid coverage to aliens living in the United States. (*Id.*).

125. Because HHSC Medicaid claims data do not conclusively identify an individual’s residency status, HHSC must estimate the portion of Emergency Medicaid payments attributable to aliens. (*Id.*).

126. The Family Violence Program contracts with non-profit agencies across Texas to provide essential services to family violence victims, including aliens, in three categories: shelter centers, non-residential centers, and Special Nonresidential Projects. The Family Violence Program does not ask individuals about their residency status, so HHSC estimates the portion of Family Violence Program expenditures attributable to aliens. (*Id.* at 119).

127. Texas CHIP Perinatal Coverage provides perinatal care to certain low-income women who do not otherwise qualify for Medicaid. HHSC cannot definitively report the number of aliens served by CHIP Perinatal Coverage because the program does not require citizenship documentation. (*Id.*).

128. The following chart shows HHSC's estimates of the total cost to Texas to furnish coverage under each program to undocumented aliens.

State Fiscal Year	Emergency Medicaid	Family Violence	CHIP Perinatal
2009	\$62 million	\$1.3 million	\$33 million
2011	\$71 million	\$1.3 million	\$35 million
2013	\$90 million	\$1.4 million	\$38 million
2015	\$73 million	\$1.0 million	\$30 million
2017	\$85 million	\$1.2 million	\$30 million
2019	\$80 million	\$1.0 million	\$6 million

(*Id.* at 118-20).

129. HHSC has in the past estimated the amount of uncompensated medical care provided by state public hospital districts to aliens. HHSC estimated that those districts incurred approximately \$596.8 million in uncompensated care for aliens in State Fiscal Year 2006 and \$716.8 million in State Fiscal Year 2008. (*Id.* at 120).

130. Some criminal aliens who are not detained by ICE because of the Final Memorandum will require these services, causing Texas to incur costs.

G. THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE STATES AND DHS

131. On January 8, 2021, an official in DHS, Ken Cuccinelli, signed agreements with the States of Texas and Louisiana. (Dkt. No. 153-8 at 43-52, 53-56); (Dkt. No. 153-9 at 1-6).

132. These agreements sought to provide individual states with 180-days’ written notice before DHS took “any action or [made] any decision that could reduce immigration enforcement, increase the number of removable or inadmissible aliens in the United States, or increase immigration benefits or eligibility for benefits for removable or inadmissible aliens.” (Dkt. No. 153-8 at 46); *see also* (*id.* at 56).

133. In letters dated February 2, 2021, signed by Acting DHS Secretary Pecoske and addressed to Texas and Louisiana, DHS stated that the agreements were unenforceable and non-binding. (Dkt. No. 153-14 at 19-20, 22-23). In addition, in each of those letters, Acting Secretary Pecoske stated that, “[n]otwithstanding that the Document is void, not binding, and unenforceable—and preserving all rights, authorities, remedies, and defenses under the law—this letter also provides notice . . . that DHS, CBP, ICE and USCIS rescinds, withdraws, and terminates the Document, effective immediately.” (*Id.*).

134. Each of those agreements had a clause stating that termination of those agreements would take effect “180 days after the written termination request was submitted or upon a date agreed upon by all parties, whichever is earlier.” (Dkt. No. 153-8 at 50); (Dkt. No. 153-9 at 4).

135. Texas’s purported agreement with DHS was terminated as of August 1, 2021. (Dkt. No. 109 at 20).

II. STANDING

The Court now turns to the legal analysis. To bring a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing. The Supreme Court has distilled the standing doctrine

into an “irreducible constitutional minimum” whereby a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that it suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,” (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338-39, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016). Both Texas and Louisiana maintain that they have standing, but only one state need have standing to proceed to the merits. *Texas v. Biden*, 20 F.4th 928, 969 (5th Cir. 2021) (hereinafter *Texas MPP*), *cert. granted*, 142 S. Ct. 1098, 212 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2022). Since there was a final trial on the merits, the States must prove standing by a preponderance of the evidence. *Id.* The wealth of evidence at trial was as to Texas’s claims, so the Court considers Texas’s case for standing.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Relevant to this controversy, the Court is mindful that the States are not typical litigants, especially for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction in this context. *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007). The Court holds that the States are entitled to “special solicitude” in their quest to establish standing. *Id.* at 520, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55. This is not an alternative, state-specific track for them to prove standing, but rather lowers the burden for them to establish constitutional standing when the conditions for special solicitude are met. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 970.

Special solicitude has two requirements. First, the State must have a procedural right to challenge the action in question. *Id.* at 969. Second, the challenged action must affect one of the State’s quasi-sovereign interests—that is, one of the “formerly sovereign prerogatives that are now lodged in the Federal Government.” *Id.* (cleaned up). The first element is satisfied because the APA affords Texas a procedural right to challenge DHS’s rules. *See Texas v. United States*, 809 F.3d 134, 152 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing 5 U.S.C.

A. INJURY IN FACT

Texas’s first task is to establish an injury in fact. The Final Memorandum harms Texas in two ways: financially and as *parens patriae*. As to its finances, Texas has suffered a concrete and particularized, actual injury. (F.F. Nos. 103-30). Texas has also suffered concrete and particularized, actual injuries to its interests as *parens patriae*.⁵⁵ Texas possesses a quasi-

§ 702) (hereinafter *Texas DAPA*); see also *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 970. The second element is satisfied because at least two of Texas’s quasi-sovereign interests are implicated here: Texas’s interest in being free from “substantial pressure” from the federal government to change its laws, and Texas’s interest in the enforcement of immigration law—the power to regulate immigration being a sovereign prerogative that Texas wholly ceded to the Government when it joined the Union. *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 152-54; see also *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 970; see generally *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 394-98, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-500. Indeed, special solicitude is especially apt in this case because of the States’ inability to legislate on their own behalf in this area. *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 152-53; see *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 394-98, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-500.

Since the States are entitled to special solicitude, at a minimum, this makes it easier for them to establish the imminence and redressability components of standing. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 970. The Court holds that the States have established standing without the need for special solicitude. But lest any doubt remain, special solicitude certainly pushes them over the line.

⁵⁵ As discussed at length in this Court’s memorandum opinion and order granting a preliminary injunction, *Texas v. United States*, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351, 376-80 (S.D. Tex. 2021), *parens patriae* standing results from the existence of an injury to a “quasi-sovereign” interest. There are “two general categories” in which a quasi-sovereign interest may fall. *Id.* at 377. First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents. *Id.* Second, a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system. *Id.*

sovereign interest in protecting its citizens from the criminal activity of aliens subject to mandatory detention under federal law. *Texas v. United States*, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351, 378-79 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (collecting cases) (hereinafter *Texas II*). And, at trial, Texas showed that aliens who are subject to mandatory detention, but that ICE declined to detain, have already committed, and are committing, more crimes in Texas. (F.F. No. 82); (F.F. Nos. 109-14).

These harms are to legally protected interests under both the traditional and *parens patriae* inquiries. See *Texas v. United States*, 809 F.3d 134, 155-56 (5th Cir. 2015) (hereinafter *Texas DAPA*); see also *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 969-72. And they are substantial. (F.F. Nos. 103-04); (F.F. No. 107); (F.F. No. 118); (F.F. Nos. 128-29).

B. TRACEABILITY

Texas also established a “fairly traceable link” between its injuries and the Government’s action. For instance, when ICE rescinds a detainer for an inmate in TDCJ custody, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles considers that new information and has revoked parole for aliens who were previously approved for parole. (F.F. No. 105). This has led to aliens remaining in TDCJ custody longer than they otherwise would, which imposes additional costs on the State of Texas. (F.F. No. 107). It has also caused, and continues to cause, increases in the number of criminal aliens and aliens with final orders of removal released into Texas. (F.F. No. 79); (F.F. Nos. 83-85); (F.F. No. 89); (F.F. Nos. 91-92); (F.F. No. 95); (F.F. Nos. 100-02). It has caused, and continues to cause, increases in Texas’s expendi-

tures on public services such as healthcare and education. (F.F. No. 118); (F.F. No. 128). When the Government declines to detain aliens subject to mandatory detention, either the States must pay to continue to detain them or they are released into the States. (F.F. No. 105); (F.F. No. 107). Upon release, some have consumed, and will continue to consume, social services that the States are required to provide. (F.F. No. 122); (F.F. No. 130). In addition, some have recidivated, and others will recidivate. (F.F. No. 82); (F.F. Nos. 109-14). *Cf. Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 160; *see Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 972. “The causal chain is easy to see.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 972.

Here, there is no need to rely on appeals to human nature—that third parties “will likely react in predictable ways”—in response to the action of the Government, thereby causing a traceable harm to Texas. *See Dep’t of Com. v. New York*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566, 204 L. Ed. 2d 978 (2019). At trial, the States proved by a preponderance of the evidence that aliens with criminal convictions *have* reacted in specific ways that harm Texas.

C. REDRESSABILITY

Last, the Court can redress the States’ injuries. The APA empowers the Court to “set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The Court finds that the Final Memorandum has led to more criminal aliens and aliens with final orders of removal being released into Texas and Louisiana. (F.F. Nos. 79-80); (F.F. Nos. 82-85); (F.F. No. 90-92); (F.F. No. 95); (F.F. No. 102). So va-

catur of the Final Memorandum would directly contribute to the decrease in the number of criminal aliens in the States' prisons and the number of aliens who are subject to a final order of removal being released into the States. This would decrease the financial injury and *parens patriae* injury that the States are suffering. Indeed, detention of aliens with criminal convictions was substantially higher before DHS issued the series of memoranda in 2021. (F.F. No. 92).

* * *

The Court holds that the States have standing.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ With the exception of the Sixth Circuit's stay opinion, *Arizona v. Biden*, 31 F.4th 469, 474-77 (6th Cir. 2022), every court to have considered challenges to the Final Memorandum and its predecessor memoranda has found standing. *Arizona v. Biden*, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2022 WL 839672, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2022); *Texas II*, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 373-85; *Arizona v. DHS*, 2021 WL 2787930, at *8 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2021); *Florida v. United States*, 540 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1156 (M.D. Fla. 2021), *vacated as moot*, No. 21-11715, 2021 WL 5910702 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (per curiam).

Importantly, the Sixth Circuit noted that it did not have evidence that there was a connection between the decrease in enforcement actions and the Final Memorandum. *Arizona*, 31 F.4th at 475. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no evidence that removing the Final Memorandum would result in DHS "arresting more people, detaining more people, or removing more people." *Arizona*, 31 F.4th at 475. In this case, the States' theory of injury is based on the Final Memorandum causing increased numbers of *criminal* aliens within their borders, and as shown above, the Final Memorandum has caused ICE to detain fewer criminal aliens. (F.F. No. 79); (F.F. Nos. 82-85); (F.F. No. 90); (F.F. No. 92); (F.F. No. 95); (F.F. No. 102).

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Court must determine whether the States' claims are judicially reviewable before turning to the merits. There are four inquiries: final agency action, statutory bars to judicial review, committed to agency discretion, and zone of interests. The Court addresses each in turn.

A. FINAL AGENCY ACTION

To be subject to judicial review under the APA, the Final Memorandum must be “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court[.]” *See* 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Fifth Circuit considers this determination “a jurisdictional prerequisite of judicial review.” *Louisiana v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 834 F.3d 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2016). “The Supreme Court has long taken a pragmatic approach to finality, viewing the APA’s finality requirement as flexible.” *Texas v. EEOC*, 933 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). To constitute final agency action, two conditions must be satisfied. *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1168-69, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997). “First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” *Id.* (citations and quotations omitted). Second, “the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” *Id.* (quotations omitted). The Parties do not dispute that the Final Memorandum marks the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, (Dkt. No. 122 at 36 n.10), and the Court agrees. *See Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168.

It is the second condition that is in dispute. The Fifth Circuit has held that an agency guidance document produces legal consequences or determines rights and obligations when the document binds the agency and its staff to a legal position. *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441-42; *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948-49. A guidance document binds the agency and its staff when the document “either appears on its face to be binding or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.” *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441 (cleaned up); *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948. “[M]andatory language” in an agency’s guidance document alone can be sufficient to render it binding. *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441-42. Likewise, “where agency action withdraws an entity’s previously-held discretion,” that action is binding. *Id.* at 442 (citation omitted); see *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948.

The Final Memorandum is final agency action. First, the Final Memorandum is facially binding on DHS personnel. Second, the Considerations Memorandum and other related evidence of DHS’s internal practices demonstrate that the Final Memorandum is being applied in a way that makes it binding. Third, detention data also demonstrate that the Final Memorandum is being applied in a way that makes it binding. Finally, the Final Memorandum creates legal rights for aliens subject to enforcement action.

1. **Facially Binding**

The Final Memorandum facially binds DHS personnel using mandatory language. The Final Memorandum states that DHS “personnel *must* evaluate the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly” and that “[w]hether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public

safety *is not to be determined* according to bright lines or categories, [but by] an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 4-5) (emphases added). It also states that “[t]he fact an individual is a removable noncitizen [] *should not* alone be the basis of an enforcement action against them” and that DHS “personnel *should not* rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone.”⁵⁷ (*Id.* at 3, 5) (emphases added). Additionally, it states that a “review process should be put in place to ensure the rigorous review of our personnel’s enforcement decisions” and it “should seek to achieve quality and consistency in decision-making across the

⁵⁷ The Government argues that directing agents not to rely on the fact of conviction alone does not actually change anything because agents must still “engage in a categorical or modified categorical analysis” to determine whether a state-court conviction is covered by Section 1226(c), even absent any agency guidance. (Dkt. No. 223 at 12-13). But to detain someone under these statutes, agents only need “reason to believe” that the state-court conviction falls within the statutory categories—certainty is not required. *Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and for Custody Redeterminations by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,444 (May 19, 1998)), *abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez*, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 830, 200 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2018); *Jennings*, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 836 (“Detention during [immigration] proceedings gives immigration officials time to determine an alien’s status without running the risk of the alien’s either absconding or engaging in criminal activity before a final decision can be made.”). In addition, if that officer is mistaken, an alien can request a hearing to challenge the detention. *See Matter of Joseph*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). There are also constitutional limits on detention. *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2503, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001).

entire agency and the Department.” (*Id.* at 7). Last, the Final Memorandum “is Department-wide” and states that “[a]gency leaders as to whom this guidance is relevant to their operations will implement this guidance accordingly.” (*Id.* at 8). This mandatory language makes the Final Memorandum facially binding. *Cf. EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 443 (approving the holding in *Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA*, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“a guidance document requiring agency staff to use a multi-factor analysis in deciding whether a regulated entity’s activity complied with governing law was a final agency action”)).

This mandatory language is not diluted by other lines from the Final Memorandum, which state that it “does not compel an action to be taken or not taken” and leaves the exercise of discretion “to the judgment of our personnel.”⁵⁸ (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 6). The Final Memorandum’s inclusion of these select statements does not subvert the mandatory language throughout the document requiring agents to consider and apply certain priorities and factors and precluding them from relying on the fact of conviction alone. *Cf. Texas v. United States*, 549 F. Supp. 3d 572, 600 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“The DACA Memorandum itself also includes mandatory language that contradicts its purported conferral of discretion.”).

⁵⁸ The end of the Final Memorandum also states that this “guidance is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 8). But this kind of boilerplate language is given little weight in the final agency action analysis. *See Appalachian Power Co.*, 208 F.3d at 1023.

The Final Memorandum facially binds DHS staff by using mandatory language to impose requirements on agency personnel. This satisfies the second *Bennett* prong. 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168; *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 949; *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 442-43.

Further, because the Final Memorandum requires consideration and application of additional priorities and factors and precludes reliance on a conviction alone—requirements that would not exist in the Final Memorandum’s absence—it binds the agency by “withdraw[ing] [agents’] previously-held discretion[.]” See *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 442. As explained in greater detail below, Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate detention for certain categories of aliens. See *infra* III.C.1. Prior to the Final Memorandum, agents could detain an alien with a criminal conviction listed in Section 1226(c) based on the simple fact of that conviction alone. Or they could detain an alien based on the simple fact of a final order of removal. Now they must consider the personal history of each covered alien and their family members for aggravating and mitigating circumstances before taking any enforcement action, including detention. (Dkt. No. 217-26 at 12, 18). If an officer determines that the *only* factor supporting detention is that the alien is covered by the mandatory provisions of Section 1226(c) or Section 1231(a)(2), the officer may not detain the alien. This imposes additional requirements on DHS personnel that would not otherwise exist and is a separate reason that the Final Memorandum satisfies the second *Bennett* prong.⁵⁹ *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at

⁵⁹ The Government also disputes that the Final Memorandum requires agents to consider its priorities and factors before taking an

951 (“The Termination Decision . . . created legal consequences by stripping preexisting discretion from DHS’s own staff.”); *see Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168; *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 442-43.

2. Binding Based on Related Evidence

Other evidence further supports the conclusion that the Final Memorandum is being applied in a way that binds DHS personnel. *See EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441; *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948. The Considerations Memorandum states that “the new guidelines will *require* the workforce to engage in an assessment of each individual case and make a case-by-case assessment as to whether the individual poses a public safety threat, guided by a consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.” (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 19) (emphasis added).

Additional insight comes from the Quick Reference Guide to ICE’s Activity Analysis and Reporting Tool—the database in which it tracks enforcement actions. (Dkt. No. 217-18). When an agent takes an enforcement action (including issuing a detainer), the agent must report which of the three Final Memorandum priority categories applies. (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 8). The

enforcement action. The Government relies on a statistic that, under the February Memorandum, over 90% of requests to take an enforcement action outside of the three priorities were approved. (Dkt. No. 122 at 19); (Dkt. No. 223 at 14-15). This demonstrates, in the Government’s view, that the priorities were not binding on DHS personnel. But the same document reporting the 90% statistic also notes that many ICE offices have a practice of pre-vetting cases before they are submitted for approval, which deceptively inflates the percentage. (F.F. Nos. 46-47). Additionally, under the Final Memorandum, the option to report an enforcement action outside the Final Memorandum’s priority categories no longer exists. (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 8).

Guide requires agents to categorize an enforcement action as falling under one of the priorities in the Final Memorandum—it only includes radio buttons for the three priority categories and contains the disclaimer “**Other** Priority is no longer an option.” (*Id.*) (emphasis in original). When the “Public Safety” category is selected, agents must then select from a list each aggravating factor that applies.⁶⁰ (*Id.* at 9). Before submitting the information, the agent must certify that he or she has read and complied with the directive to “consider[] all relevant case specific information” available at the time of the enforcement action “which may include but is not limited to the nature and degree of harm to any victim(s), the significance and the sophistication of the offense, the length of the resulting sentence, and the duration of time that has elapsed since the offense and or release.” (*Id.* at 12). Submissions are reviewed by the agent’s supervisors “for review and confirmation” that “all necessary information has been provided.” (*Id.* at 4, 13).

Furthermore, the mandatory “ICE Academy” training webinar on the Final Memorandum for DHS personnel reiterates that agents should apply the Final Memorandum’s priorities and factors in decision-tree fashion. (Dkt. No. 217-26 at 18). The training webinar details the inquiries officers are expected to make. (Dkt. No.

⁶⁰ The agent must consider whether the individual was convicted of an aggravated felony; charged with an aggravated felony; convicted of a felony; charged with a felony; convicted of multiple misdemeanors; charged with multiple misdemeanors; is a known or suspected gang member; or if the police report indicates “particularly heinous or dangerous behavior not reflected in charges or convictions”; or “other.” (Dkt. No. 217-18 at 9). If “other” is selected, a narrative description is required. (*Id.*).

217-16). For instance, before an ICE officer takes an enforcement action under the “Threats to Public Safety” priority category, the officer should examine the following aggravating factors:

Gravity of the offense of conviction and the sentence imposed; Nature and degree of harm caused by the criminal offense: [] both societal harm caused by a violent offense and other harms (e.g., victim impact, exploitation of vulnerable individuals); Sophistication of the criminal offense; Use, or threatened use, of a firearm or dangerous weapon; [and] a serious prior criminal record.

(*Id.* at 55). The ICE officer should also examine the following mitigating factors:

Advanced or tender age; Lengthy presence in the United States; A mental condition that may have contributed to the criminal conduct, or a physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment; Status as a victim of crime or victim, witness, or party in legal proceedings; Impact of removal on family in the United States, such as loss of provider or caregiver; Whether the noncitizen may be eligible for humanitarian protection or other immigration relief; Military or other public service of the noncitizen or their immediate family; Time since an offense and evidence of rehabilitation; [and whether the] [c]onviction was vacated or expunged.

(*Id.* at 57). The officer is then instructed that consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances includes:

- Reviewing “the noncitizen’s record and any specific aggravating factors.” (*Id.* at 61).

- Completing and understanding “the profile of the individual by identifying mitigating factors as well.” (*Id.*).
- Reviewing “the noncitizen’s entire known criminal and administrative record, and other investigative information, before making a decision” and directing questions to “their colleagues [as to] how they might handle the case.” (*Id.*).
- Conducting “an investigation to identify the aggravating and mitigating factors that might be present and inform the assessment of the individual.” (*Id.*).
- Potentially going “beyond the contents of the record” and pursuing “interviews of individuals with relevant information,” especially where “the noncitizen is not represented by counsel.” (*Id.*).
- Noting that the “record could include a range of official and unofficial documents with relevant information.” (*Id.*).

The Considerations Memorandum, the Quick Reference Guide to ICE’s Activity Analysis and Reporting Tool, and the “ICE Academy” training webinar all demonstrate that the Final Memorandum is being applied in a way that is binding on DHS personnel. *See EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441-42; *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948-49. The result is that an ostensibly permissive Final Memorandum is effectively mandatory at the most important level: the agents and officers who are tasked with enforcing the law. (F.F. No. 99).

3. Binding Based on Detention Data

Data on ICE's detention practices for aliens with criminal convictions further demonstrate that the Final Memorandum is being applied by the agency in a way that makes it binding. *See EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441; *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948. DHS has detained significantly fewer aliens with criminal convictions or pending criminal charges since the January Memorandum was issued. (F.F. No. 92). This same pattern continued unabated through the issuance of the Final Memorandum and has continued since. (*Id.*). Further, the States' witnesses testified that since the Final Memorandum was implemented, DHS has continued to rescind detainers, and DHS officials attribute those rescissions to the Final Memorandum. (F.F. No. 83); (F.F. No. 100).

4. Creates Rights or Obligations

In addition to being binding on DHS and its employees, the Final Memorandum also confers rights on aliens subject to enforcement and is therefore an agency action "by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow." *See Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168. The Final Memorandum states that DHS will "work to establish a fair and equitable case review process to afford noncitizens and their representatives the opportunity to obtain expeditious review of the enforcement actions taken." (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 7). That case review process has been implemented, and it allows aliens to challenge an enforcement action if they believe it does not comply with the Final Memorandum. (F.F. No. 67).

Not only does this process demonstrate that the Government's characterization of the Final Memorandum as mere "guidance" is categorically false, it also shows that the Final Memorandum provides a new basis on which aliens may avoid being subject to the enforcement of immigration law. This creates new "rights or obligations," and it provides an additional basis on which the Court finds that the Final Memorandum is final agency action. *See Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1168.

* * *

In sum, the Final Memorandum is final agency action. It is facially binding on DHS and its staff because it uses mandatory language that requires DHS personnel to consider and apply certain priorities and factors before taking enforcement action, and it expressly disallows reliance on the fact of conviction alone, which removes agents' previously held discretion. *See EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441-42, 445; *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948. It is also being applied in a way that makes it binding on DHS and its staff. *See EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441; *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 948. And it creates rights or obligations by providing a basis on which aliens can challenge enforcement actions that they believe are inconsistent with the Final Memorandum's priorities. *See Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. at 1169. Accordingly, it is an action "by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow," and it satisfies the second *Ben-*

nett prong. *Id.* Because the Final Memorandum satisfies both *Bennett* prongs, the Court holds that it is final agency action under the APA.⁶¹

B. STATUTORY BARS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Under the APA, an action may not proceed when another statute precludes judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). The Government contends that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1226(e), and 1231(h) bar review. (Dkt. No. 122 at 37-41). None do.

As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit has already concluded that “the entirety of the text and structure of § 1252 indicates that it operates only on denials of relief for individual aliens.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 977; *see id.* at n.11; *see also J.E.F.M. v. Lynch*, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2016). A closer review of subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9), which the Government cites, confirms that neither provision bars review.

First, Section 1252(a)(5) provides that federal courts of appeal have exclusive jurisdiction for any petition for review “filed . . . in accordance with” Section 1252 itself. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). In plain language: an individual who has an order of removal affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals may appeal that decision directly to a federal circuit court. *See Martinez v. Napolitano*, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012); *see also* 8

⁶¹ Additionally, the Court holds that the Final Memorandum is a legislative rule. *See infra* IV.C. Because legislative rules are necessarily final agency action, this holding is an alternative basis for the Court’s conclusion that the Final Memorandum is final agency action. *See Cal. Cmty. Against Toxics v. EPA*, 934 F.3d 627, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 2019); *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441.

U.S.C. § 1252(d). The States are not challenging an order of removal or petitioning for judicial review of one. Section 1252(a)(5) is therefore inapplicable. *Texas v. United States*, 524 F. Supp. 3d 598, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (hereinafter *Texas I*).

The same is true of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Section 1252(b)(9) provides:

Judicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). This means that an individual subject to an order of removal must consolidate judicial review of his or her immigration proceedings into one action. *I.N.S. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 313-14, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2286-87, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001); *see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 499, 119 S. Ct. 936, 951, 142 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring). Again, the States are not challenging a final order of removal, nor are they challenging any aspect of a removal proceeding that an individual has undergone. So, Section 1252(b)(9) is likewise inapplicable. *Texas I*, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 640-41; *see also Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California*, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907, 207 L. Ed. 2d 353 (2020) (“§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which removability will be determined.” (cleaned up)).

Next, the Government contends that Section 1226(e) bars the States' claims as they relate to Section 1226(c). Section 1226(e) provides:

The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). The Supreme Court has found that Subsection (e)'s limitation "applies only to discretionary decisions about the application of § 1226 to particular cases." *Nielsen v. Preap*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 954, 962, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2019) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Section 1226(e), therefore, "does not block lawsuits over the extent of the Government's detention authority under the statutory framework as a whole." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted); see *Parra v. Perryman*, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1999); see also *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003); *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 830, 839-41, 200 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2018). Further, Subsection (e) does not prevent plaintiffs from questioning the meaning of Section 1226(c). *Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 961-62.

Here, the States' claims against the Government "dispute the extent of the statutory authority that the Government claims." See *id.* at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 962. In effect, "the general extent of the Government's authority under § 1226(c) is precisely the issue here." See *id.*; see also *Jennings*, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at

841. Section 1226(e) does not bar review. *Texas II*, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 387-88.

Finally, the Government argues that Section 1231(h) bars any claim pertaining to Section 1231(a)(2). Section 1231(h) provides in full:

Nothing in this section shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(h). This Court, after conducting an extensive analysis, previously held that Section 1231(h) does not bar the States from challenging a rule under the APA that is purportedly contrary to Section 1231. *Texas I*, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 633-39; *see also Texas II*, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 386-87. The Government merely reurges its previously rejected arguments. The Court is not persuaded.

As a last resort, the Government argues that review is barred because there is a detailed scheme for claims pertaining to the INA. Yet each of the limiting provisions that the Government cites is within a statutory section that deals with judicial review of an individualized decision in a suit brought by an alien him or herself. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231, 1252. None of these provisions bar review. *Texas I*, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 641-42.

* * *

The Court holds that there are no statutory bars to review.

C. COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION

The APA embodies a “basic presumption of judicial review.” *Lincoln v. Vigil*, 508 U.S. 182, 190, 113 S. Ct.

2024, 2030, 124 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1993) (citation omitted). An agency action, however, is not reviewable if it “is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This exception to judicial review is narrow and confined “to those *rare* administrative decisions traditionally left to agency discretion.” *Regents*, ___ U.S. at, ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The exception is also limited to “those *rare* circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” *Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 361, 370, 202 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2018) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the agency action is not committed to discretion by law. To understand why, the Court begins with the applicable statutes.

1. **Mandatory Duties under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2)**

The two relevant statutes are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). Under Section 1226(c), “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody” certain aliens when “released” from state or local custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Likewise, Section 1231(a)(2) provides: “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Statutory interpretation, precedent, and more demonstrate that Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) impose mandatory duties to detain.

a. Statutory Interpretation

Words matter, so the Court begins by examining the text of the statute. *Artis v. Dist. of Columbia*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 594, 603, 199 L. Ed. 2d 473 (2018). A court gives those words their ordinary meaning when they are not defined. *Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.*, 566 U.S. 560, 566, 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002, 182 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2012). The words have “meaning only in context.” *Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson*, 545 U.S. 409, 415, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2449, 162 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2005). And “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” *Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc.*, 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417, 168 L. Ed. 2d 112 (2007). Finally, “policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text.” *Patel v. Garland*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2022).

To begin, Section 1226 governs the apprehension and detention of aliens.⁶² Section 1226(a) provides as follows: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien *may* be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). The statute continues on:

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General—

⁶² “Section 1226 applies before an alien proceeds through the removal proceedings and obtains a decision; § 1231 applies after.” *Guzman Chavez*, ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 2290; *see also Texas I*, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 611-17 (detailing the immigration removal process).

- (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
- (2) may release the alien on—
 - (A) bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
 - (B) conditional parole; but
- (3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an “employment authorized” endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

Id. (emphasis added). Put simply, Section 1226(a) provides the default rule: the Executive Branch has general discretion to detain aliens. But there are limits to that discretion, as evidenced by the language “except as provided in subsection (c).” Section 1226(c) thus cabins the general grant of discretion under Section 1226(a). *Preap*, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. at 966.

Section 1226(c), titled “Detention of criminal aliens,” lists those limitations to the general discretion to detain:

The Attorney General *shall* take into custody any alien who—

- (A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
- (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,

when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (emphases added). Section 1226(c)(2) continues on to list circumstances in which aliens described under Section 1226(c)(1) may be released: the Attorney General “may” release aliens described in Subsection (c)(1) “only if” certain circumstances are present. *Id.* § 1226(c)(2).

The contrast between “may” under Section 1226(a) and “shall” under Section 1226(c) is important. “The word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.” *Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1320, 206 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2020) (citation omitted). The word “may,” by contrast, “customarily connotes discretion,” particularly where “may” is juxtaposed with “shall.” *Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 543 U.S. 335, 346, 125 S. Ct. 694, 703, 160 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2005). Also note that Section 1226(c)(1) includes a temporal requirement: “when the alien is released.” The temporal requirement provides a trigger for when discretion must yield to a mandate.

For Section 1226(c)(2) to have any meaning, Section 1226(c)(1) must be a mandate: the Attorney General must detain aliens when released from state or local custody, and these aliens may then be released from detention *only if* certain situations call for it. If Subsection (c)(1) is not interpreted in this way, then Subsection (c)(2) loses its significance. It would be superfluous for Congress to state the only circumstances in which certain aliens may be released—per Subsection (c)(2)—if the Government was meant to initially have the discretion to decide which criminal aliens to detain in the first place. The Government could free itself from a requirement to detain merely by *choosing* not to detain in the first place. *Cf. Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 970. Reading a mandatory detention statute as actually meaning that the Government “has to detain” only when it “decides to detain” makes the statute inoperative. A mandate that the Government can ignore at its own discretion is no mandate at all.

Now Section 1231. Section 1231(a)(2) also contains the word “shall”:

During the removal period, the Attorney General *shall* detain the alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (emphasis added). Like Section 1226, Section 1231 contains a temporal requirement: during the removal period. The “removal period” is defined as a period of 90 days when an alien is ordered re-

moved. *Id.* § 1231(a)(1)-(2). The statute further provides that the removal period “shall” be extended beyond 90 days if certain circumstances arise, and the alien “may” remain in detention during that extended period. *Id.* § 1231(a)(1)(C). It would be odd to read “shall detain” during the removal period as providing discretion when the statute also specifies discretion to detain—“may remain in detention”—*after* the initial 90-day removal period. *See id.* There would be no need to confer discretion to detain after the 90-day removal period expires if discretion was already built into this language—“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”

All of this makes even more sense considering that a court should interpret a “statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme[.]” *Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1301, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) (quotations and citations omitted). Section 1225, a companion statute to Section 1226, includes the same “may” versus “shall” juxtaposition and imposes a mandatory duty. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 993-96. “Shall” under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2), then, also mandates detention.

The Government offers a different reading. In the Government’s view, “shall” in both statutes means “may.”⁶³ This makes little sense. Section 1226(a) provides discretion to detain aliens. Section 1226(c), by

⁶³ At no point has the Government invoked *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). Therefore, the Court does not pass “*Chevron* Step Zero.” *See generally* Cass R. Sunstein, *Chevron Step Zero*, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187 (2006). The Government could have argued that “shall” is ambiguous and that the Court should defer to the Government’s

contrast, lists certain criminal aliens that “shall” be detained. A similar structure exists in Section 1231(a)(2). Section 1231(a)(2) mandates detention during the removal period. It also *prohibits* the release of certain individuals if DHS *actually* detains those individuals. None of these limitations in the statute would make sense if they were discretionary. The Government’s reading would invite the Court to erase the limitations under the INA, all in violation of “the cardinal principle of interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” *Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890, 204 L. Ed. 2d 165 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). The Government’s interpretation would mean that it “can take the powers given to it by Congress” but “ignor[e] the limits Congress placed on those powers”—a dangerous result. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 997. Congress could have drafted a statute that gives general authority to detain. But it was more specific. And deliberately so.

The Government does not dispute that Congress *can* mandate detention. In fact, the Government concedes that Congress *has* limited discretion by using the phrase

interpretation. The Government may have declined to pursue this route because it has interpreted Section 1226(c) as mandatory for decades. See Brief for Petitioners, *Albence v. Guzman Chavez*, 2020 WL 4938065, at *5; Reply Brief for Petitioners, *Albence v. Guzman Chavez*, 2020 WL 3124376, at *7; Oral Argument, *Nielsen v. Preap*, 2018 WL 4922082, at *9; Brief for Petitioners, *Reno v. Ma*, 2000 WL 1784982, at *26-28; *Matter of Garvin-Noble*, 21 I. & N. Dec. 672, 678 (BIA 1997). It has also argued that other INA provisions impose mandates. Brief for Petitioners, *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 2016 WL 5404637, at *16-17 (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)).

“only if” under Section 1226(c) and “under no circumstance” under Section 1231(a)(2). This language, so the Government reasons, is sufficiently clear to demonstrate a congressional mandate. (Dkt. No. 211 at 103-04); (Dkt. No. 223 at 23).

But what about “shall”? Section 1226, for example, does not include the same language “under no circumstance.” Section 1226, instead, contrasts “may” with “shall.” If “may” provides discretion and “shall” also provides discretion, the entire statutory scheme becomes redundant at best or nonsensical at worst. Moreover, Section 1226(c)(1) would be superfluous. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2125, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001). Congress would not have enacted Section 1226(c) to be discretionary because Section 1226(a) already is. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “it would be very strange for Congress to forbid the release of aliens who need not be arrested in the first place.” *Preap*, ____ U.S. at ____, 139 S. Ct. at 970.

The Government’s contention that the “only if” clause in Section 1226(c) and the “under no circumstance” clause in Section 1231(a)(2) are mandatory, but the “shall” clauses are not, is untenable. Of course, “only if” and “under no circumstance” are different words than “shall,” just as “shall” and “may” are different words. But the may-versus-shall distinction is not important just because they are different words; it is important because they are commonly used as antonyms. Thus, their juxtaposition in the statutes accentuates their different meanings. Unlike “shall” and “may,” “shall” and “only if” or “under no circumstance” are commonly used as synonyms—even complements. And

they are used as complements here. *See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*, 568 U.S. 519, 540, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1364, 185 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2013) (“We are not aware . . . of any canon of interpretation that forbids interpreting different words used in different parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing.”). Indeed, federal courts remain mindful that “respect for Congress’s prerogatives as policymaker means carefully attending to the words it chose rather than replacing them with others of our own.” *Murphy v. Smith*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 784, 788, 200 L. Ed. 2d 75 (2018); *see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S. 302, ___, 328, ___ 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2014) (“Agencies are not free to adopt unreasonable interpretations of statutory provisions and then edit other statutory provisions to mitigate the unreasonableness.” (cleaned up)).

b. Precedent

Lest any doubt remain, the Supreme Court has interpreted both Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) as mandatory. In *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, the Supreme Court noted “detention is mandatory” during an alien’s removal period, as prescribed by Section 1231(a)(2). ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2281, 210 L. Ed. 2d 656 (2021). And under Section 1226(c), “detention is mandatory and release is permitted in very limited circumstances” for “certain criminal aliens and aliens who have connections to terrorism.” *Id.* at ___ n.2, 141 S. Ct. at 2280 n.2. Other Supreme Court cases read the statutes similarly. *Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 959 (Section 1226(c)); *Jennings*, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (Section 1226(c)); *Zadvydas v. Davis*,

533 U.S. 678, 683, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2495, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001) (Section 1231(a)(2)); *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 1716 (Section 1226(c)).

The Government nevertheless argues that this precedent does not control because those cases did not address whether DHS, through a “rule” under the APA, has discretion to detain under those statutes. This distinction is unpersuasive.

Guzman Chavez, for example, considered whether certain aliens could be released on bond while petitioning for relief from removal. There, the Supreme Court analyzed Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). It held that Section 1231 applied to these aliens because they had effectively been ordered removed through the reinstatement of their previous orders of removal. *Guzman Chavez*, ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 2287-91.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court compared Section 1226, which applies to the arrest and detention of an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” with Section 1231, which applies to an alien ordered removed. *Id.* at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 2280-81. The Supreme Court noted that “DHS,” under Section 1226(a), “may arrest and detain the alien” pending that alien’s removal decision. *Id.* Such an alien “may generally apply for release on bond or conditional parole.” *Id.* Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated “there is one exception” to this general rule: for certain criminal aliens, “detention is mandatory” under Section 1226(c). *Id.* at ___ n.2, 141 S. Ct. at 2280 n.2. Like Section 1226(c), the Supreme Court stated detention under Section 1231 is “mandatory” precisely because of Section 1231(a)(2). *Id.* at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 2281. As this analysis of the

statutes makes clear, interpreting Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) was essential to the holding in *Guzman Chavez*. Because the reasoning was essential to the holding, it is binding. *Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1129, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). This is unsurprising. Other circuits have agreed that the INA mandates detention. *See, e.g., Sylvain v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.*, 714 F.3d 150, 152, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2013).

c. Castle Rock

The Government reads the statutes differently in light of *Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*. There, the Supreme Court explained “the presence of seemingly mandatory legislative commands” like “shall” do not automatically impose a mandate against law enforcement. *Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2805-06, 162 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2005). Instead, a mandate is found when there is “some stronger indication” from the legislature. *Id.* at 761, 125 S. Ct. at 2806. *Castle Rock*, however, is distinguishable. In *Castle Rock*, the question presented was “whether an individual who has obtained a state-law restraining order has a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police enforce the restraining order when they have probable cause to believe it has been violated.” *Id.* at 750-51, 125 S. Ct. at 2800. This case, by contrast, involves a “contrary to law” claim under the APA against a federal agency that promulgated a rule. *See Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 982-83. In addition, “*Castle Rock* is relevant only where an official makes a non-enforcement decision.” *Id.* at 997. That is, *Castle Rock* applies to individual decisions. *Castle Rock* is irrelevant when DHS engages in “misenforcement” or

suspension of the INA by issuing a rule under the APA, as it has done here.

And even if *Castle Rock* does apply, the Court finds that there *is* “some stronger indication” that Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) impose a mandate. First, Congress included a grace period in the INA to provide time for the agency to make the change from a discretionary to a mandatory detention regime. Second, the context surrounding the enactment of Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) shows that they are mandatory.

i. Transition Period Custody Rules

In 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). *Matter of Garvin-Noble*, 21 I. & N. Dec. 672, 674 (BIA 1997). Included in the IIRIRA are the Transition Period Custody Rules. *Id.* at 675. Enacted alongside the 1996 amendments to federal immigration law, the Transition Period Custody Rules demonstrate that Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate detention. *Compare* Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 303(a) *with id.* § 303(b)(3).

The Transition Rules were “designed to give the Attorney General a 1-year grace period, which [could] be extended for an additional year, during which mandatory detention of criminal aliens [under Section 1226(c)] would not be the general rule.” *Matter of Garvin-Noble*, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 675. Congress included the Transition Rules because it knew that it could be difficult for the Attorney General (who oversaw the enforcement of immigration law before the creation of DHS) to immediately comply with its detention mandate. *See Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 969; *Matter of*

Garvin-Noble, 21 I & N Dec. at 681 (“While practical constraints temporarily necessitated some flexibility, Congress, in keeping with prior concerns, enacted the transition rules with some restrictions on the release of criminal aliens pending removal, such as keeping those aliens dangerous to the community in detention.”).

The Transition Rules themselves are found in Section 303(b)(3) of Public Law No. 104-208. Section 303(b)(2) contains the provision that allows the Attorney General to opt-in to the Transition Rules:

If the Attorney General, not later than 10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [i.e., September 30, 1996], notifies in writing [Congress] that there is *insufficient detention space* and [] *personnel* available to carry out section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)], [] the [Transition Period Custody Rules] shall be in effect for a 1-year period beginning on the date of such notification, instead of [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].

Pub. Law. No. 104-208 § 303(b)(2) (emphases added). The Attorney General took advantage of the Transition Rules within the opt-in period. *Matter of Garvin-Noble*, 21 I & N Dec. at 674. But the Transition Rules had a maximum two-year lifespan. *Id.* at 675; Pub. Law. No. 104-208 § 303(b)(2). After invoking the Transition Rules for the full two-year period, INS asked Congress to extend the grace period further, but Congress refused. *INS Issues Detention Guidelines After Expiration of TPCR*, 75 No. 42 Interpreter Releases 1508, 1508 (Westlaw Nov. 2, 1998). Thus, as the INS recognized, the mandate under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 became the law of the land in October 1998. *See id.*; *see also Saysana*

v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 10 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009); *Galvez v. Lewis*, 56 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Va. 1999).

Two salient points about the Transition Rules. First, Congress contemplated the precise situation the Government complains of in this case: a lack of resources and personnel. Accordingly, Congress gave the Executive Branch a grace period as it transitioned to mandatory detention. But a grace period is not a license to permanently disregard the law. Congress expected that after two years, the Executive Branch would comply. *Matter of Garvin-Noble*, 21 I & N Dec. at 681; see also *Matter of Valdez-Valdez*, 21 I. & N. Dec. 703, 719 (BIA 1997). Indeed, the INS requested an extension of the grace period in the Transition Rules and Congress rejected that request. The Transition Rules demonstrate, and the Constitution demands, that when it is difficult for the Executive Branch to comply with Congress's instructions, the proper course is to ask for more support or for the law to be changed. *Cf. Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 21, 31, 135 S. Ct. 1136, 1144, 191 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2015) ("If the task . . . is 'Sisyphean,' . . . it is a Sisyphean task that the statute imposes.").

And on this point about insufficient resources and limited detention capacity, the Court finds that the Government has not acted in good faith. Throughout this case, the Government has trumpeted the fact that it does not have enough resources to detain those aliens it is required by law to detain. The Government blames Congress for this deficiency. At the same time, however, the Government has submitted two budget requests in which it asks Congress *to cut* those very resources and capacity by 26%. (F.F. No. 16). Additionally, the

Government has persistently underutilized existing detention facilities. (F.F. No. 17). To say that this is incongruous is to say the least.

Second, the Government’s position “flouts the interpretive canon against surplusage—the idea that every word and every provision is to be given effect and that none should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” *See Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 969 (cleaned up). As we have seen, the Government’s reading violates this canon because it renders the word “shall” meaningless. *See supra* III.C.1.a. Now we see that the Government’s reading doubly violates the canon, because it also makes the Transition Rules surplusage. The Transition Rules were an intricate and thoughtful statutory regime that governed the detention of aliens in this country for the two years that they were in effect. Pub. Law. No. 104-208 § 303(b). The Government’s reading is incorrect.

- ii. IIRIRA was passed, in part, to take away the Government’s general discretion in this context

The context of the IIRIRA amendments to the INA is a separate reason that *Castle Rock*’s call for “some stronger indication” is met here. To the extent that *Castle Rock* applies, the Supreme Court recognized that when the word “shall” is used in a statute and applied to law enforcement, there must be “some stronger indication” from the legislature that it is a mandate. *Castle Rock*, 545 U.S. at 761, 125 S. Ct. at 2806. The word “shall” alone might not be sufficient. In this case, however, one of the specific reasons that the statutes in

question were amended was to take away the Government's discretion in this context. It is difficult to envision a stronger indication.

Section 1226(c) was enacted “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 518, 123 S. Ct. at 1714. The failure “to remove deportable criminal aliens” resulted in overpopulated prisons, monetary costs, and increased crime. *Id.* at 518-20, 123 S. Ct. at 1714-15. Crucially, “Congress also had before it evidence that one of the major causes of the INS’ failure to remove deportable criminal aliens *was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens* during their deportation proceedings.” *Id.* at 519, 123 S. Ct. at 1715 (emphasis added). Before Section 1226(c) was enacted, the Attorney General had broad discretion on whether to detain aliens in this context. *Id.* Later, *and in response to these concerns*, Congress amended the law to *require* the Attorney General to detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens who committed the most serious crimes, pending a determination of their removability. *Id.* at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 1716. In the Court’s view, this is direct evidence of the stronger indication envisioned by *Castle Rock*.

Like Section 1226(c), Section 1231(a)(2) was enacted against the same backdrop. As the Supreme Court noted, “protecting the community from dangerous aliens” is a “statutory purpose” of that section. *Zadvydas*, 533 U.S. at 697, 121 S. Ct. at 2502. What is more, Section 1231 “is part of a statute that has as its basic purpose effectuating an alien’s removal.” *Id.* Section 1231(a)(2)’s mandatory nature is made more evident because it applies *after* an alien has proceeded through the

removal proceedings and obtained a decision. *See Guzman Chavez*, ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 2290.

The Court holds that “shall” under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) unambiguously means “must.”

2. Whether Congress Can Mandate Detention

Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate detention. But *can* Congress require the Executive to detain? Yes, it can. “It is undisputed that Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain certain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal.”⁶⁴ *Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 973 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

That Congress can mandate detention makes sense when considering the broader scheme of immigration law. The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the power of naturalization is exclusively vested in Congress. *Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac*, 2 Wheat. 259, 269, 4 L. Ed. 234 (1817). Congress’s exclusive power extends “to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here[.]” *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S. Ct. 737, 743, 98 L. Ed. 911 (1954). “[P]lenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established.” *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70, 92 S. Ct. 2576, 2585, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1972). Congress, exercising its authority vested by the Consti-

⁶⁴ Indeed, even the Government concedes that Congress *can* mandate detention but argues that Congress did not in Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). (Dkt. No. 211 at 103-04); (Dkt. No. 223 at 23).

tution, long ago enacted federal statutes governing immigration. In 1996, Congress charted a new course by amending federal immigration law. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 518-21, 123 S. Ct. at 1714-16. Before, Congress provided the Executive Branch with broad general directives regarding the detention of aliens. But in 1996, to address perceived harms, Congress withdrew that discretion.

Congress had the authority to reign in this discretion. An administrative agency like DHS is a creature of statute. As such, it possesses “only the authority that Congress has provided.” *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab.*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 661, 665, 211 L. Ed. 2d 448 (2022) (per curiam). In the APA context, “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” *See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C.*, 476 U.S. 355, 374, 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1901, 90 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1986). Indeed, Congress may limit agency discretion by putting restrictions in the operative statutes. *Lincoln*, 508 U.S. at 193, 113 S. Ct. at 2032. As such, DHS “may not exercise its authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.” *See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. at 125, 120 S. Ct. at 1297 (internal quotations omitted). Congress may give, and Congress may take away. *See Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co. v. United States*, 882 F.3d 1088, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In 1996, Congress did just that. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 518-21, 123 S. Ct. at 1714-16. Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) do not leave any room for agency discretion when the duty to detain is triggered.

For similar reasons, certain portions of the Final Memorandum do not fall under the Secretary of Homeland Security’s general grant of authority to establish “national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.” *See* 6 U.S.C. § 202(5). However broad the Secretary’s authority in setting enforcement policies and priorities may be, it must be read in conjunction with statutory limits. *Regents*, ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1925 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Government reads those limits out of the law and instead renders “shall” as a suggestion simply because Congress also delegated authority to enforce the law. DHS, however, does not have “unreviewable and unilateral discretion to ignore statutory limits imposed by Congress and to remake entire titles of the United States Code to suit the preferences of the executive branch.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1004.

3. **Heckler v. Chaney**

The Government also argues that the Final Memorandum is committed to agency discretion under *Heckler v. Chaney*. Federal courts generally presume that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action” is committed to agency discretion by law. *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985). This presumption does not apply “to agency actions that qualify as rules under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 985. All parties in this case have agreed, as does the Court, that the Final Memorandum is undisputedly a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). (Dkt. No. 211 at 114). The Court therefore

holds that the Final Memorandum is not committed to agency discretion under *Heckler*.⁶⁵

4. **The Government’s Reliance on “Prosecutorial Discretion”**

An overarching theme of the Government’s argument in this case is that it has “prosecutorial discretion” to make these decisions, and this precludes judicial review. Some courts have observed that prosecutorial discretion stems from Article II of the Constitution. *In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller*, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2006); *In re Aiken County*, 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., writing for himself). The precise scope of prosecutorial discretion is unclear.⁶⁶ See, e.g., Kimberly L. Wehle, “Law and” the OLC’s Article II Immunity Memos, 32 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 32-36 (2021). Whatever its contours, prosecutorial discretion “does not encompass the discretion not to follow a law imposing a mandate or prohibition on the Executive Branch.” *In re Aiken County*, 725 F.3d at 266 (Kavanaugh, J., writing for himself). In one

⁶⁵ In *Texas MPP*, the Fifth Circuit concluded: “Even if *Heckler* could apply in theory, the statute’s text would rebut it in actuality.” 20 F.4th at 988. So too here. The substantive statutes have provided parameters within which DHS must enforce the law. *Heckler*, 470 U.S. at 832-33, 105 S. Ct. at 1656.

⁶⁶ Courts have recognized that prosecutorial discretion includes whom to prosecute, when to charge, what charges to bring, whether to dismiss charges, and plea bargaining. *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279, 312, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1778, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987); *United States v. Batchelder*, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979); *United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V.*, 818 F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016); *Newman v. United States*, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

scholar's words: "It is well settled, after all, that in interbranch constitutional relations, the executive power—whatever its inherent bounds—comes to an end in a clear Congressional command." Daniel E. Walters, *Symmetry's Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American Administrative Law*, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 455, 502 (2020); see also *id.* at 500-03. The Government agrees that Congress can mandate detention of certain aliens under the INA, (Dkt. No. 211 at 103-04); (Dkt. No. 223 at 23), a point it would never have conceded if it believed this encroached upon the Executive's Article II authority. Cf. *Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 973 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Otherwise, the Government would argue that any detention mandate is an unconstitutional infringement on executive power. Cf. *Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton*, 566 U.S. 189, 196, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428, 182 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2012). The Government does not so argue.⁶⁷

This discussion about prosecutorial discretion in the abstract falls by the wayside after recognizing the Final Memorandum is a "rule" that is subject to judicial review under the APA; it is not an exercise of prosecutorial

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that "Congress can explicitly or implicitly cabin executive enforcement discretion, reducing it to the constitutional minimum (*Youngstown* Category 3)." Louis W. Fisher, *Executive Enforcement Discretion and the Separation of Powers: a Case Study on the Constitutionality of DACA and DAPA*, 120 W. Va. L. Rev. 131, 138 (2017). *Youngstown* Category 3 is as follows: "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38, 72 S. Ct. 863, 871, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

discretion on a case-by-case basis. Individualized decisions to abandon law enforcement are outside the reach of judicial review: a litigant cannot demand that DHS enforce the law against a particular person. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 982. In contrast, a “rule” that is contrary to law is subject to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The States here are challenging a generalized and prospective policy in the form of a “rule” under the APA. Generally invoking prosecutorial discretion does not shield this rule from judicial review.

To hold otherwise would elevate form over substance. Under *Heckler v. Chaney*, rules under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) are not “committed to agency discretion.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 985. This is because “the English Bill of Rights, followed by the Constitution, explicitly forbade the executive from nullifying whole statutes by refusing to enforce them on a *generalized* and *prospective* basis.” *Id.* at 983 (emphasis in original). This is also because “the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have consistently read *Heckler* as sheltering one-off nonenforcement decisions rather than decisions to suspend entire statutes.” *Id.* As such, “*Heckler*’s progeny never has allowed the executive to affirmatively enact prospective, class-wide rules without judicial review.”⁶⁸ *Id.* It would be odd to hold that the Final Memorandum is committed to agency discretion simply because it incants prosecutorial discretion when, in fact, the Final Memorandum is a prospective, class-wide rule under 5

⁶⁸ “If judicial involvement is based on a statutory violation by the executive, review promotes rather than undermines the separation of powers, for it helps to prevent the executive branch from ignoring congressional directives.” Cass R. Sunstein, *Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney*, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 670 (1985).

U.S.C. § 551(4). The Government seeks the benefit of generally invoking prosecutorial discretion without adequately explaining how the concept squarely applies to rules under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Court remains unpersuaded.

* * *

In sum, the statutory scheme provides bright-line rules as to the timing and identity of certain aliens who must be detained. The States are challenging the Government’s compliance with that statutory scheme via a rule under the APA. The Court holds that the agency action is not committed to agency discretion.

D. ZONE OF INTERESTS

Congress, through the APA, has provided a cause of action for those seeking redress against the federal government for violations of other federal laws. *See* 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706. But Congress has limited the availability of an APA cause of action to those who allege an injury that is “arguably” within the “zone of interests” for which the statutes exist to protect. *Collins v. Mnuchin*, 938 F.3d 553, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2019), *aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Collins v. Yellen*, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 210 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2021).

The zone of interests test is not “especially demanding.” *Id.* at 574. Indeed, “the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff[.]” *Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118, 130, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014). The zone of interests test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be

assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.” *Collins*, 938 F.3d at 574 (internal quotations omitted). Importantly, the relevant statute in whose zone of interests the plaintiff’s injury must reside “is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question,” but, rather, “by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” *Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 175-77, 117 S. Ct. at 1167. In other words, a court must review those “substantive provisions” of law that the plaintiff relies on for “the gravamen” of its complaint. *Id.* at 175, 117 S. Ct. at 1167.

The Government solely argues that the States do not fall within the zone of interests because no entity can enforce Section 1231 in light of subsection (h). (Dkt. No. 122 at 40-42). As an initial matter, the States’ injuries are within the zone of interests of Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) based on the Court’s discussion of *Demore* and other Supreme Court precedent regarding the development and purpose of those statutes. The statutes were enacted to protect and benefit the states, citizens, and legal immigrants. Indeed, the INA was enacted for this exact purpose. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 163 & n.80. As such, the injuries the States suffer due to the Final Memorandum fall within the relevant statutes’ zone of interests. *See id.* at 163. Moreover, as the Court explained, the Government is mistaken that Section 1231(h) bars relief. *See supra* III.B. Thus, the sole argument that the Government offers fails.

The Court holds that the States’ injuries fall within the zone of interests of Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2).

IV. CLAIMS

A. CONTRARY TO LAW (COUNTS I AND II)

Because shall means must, the Government generally must detain aliens subject to Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) at specific points in time: when released from custody under Section 1226(c) and during the removal period under Section 1231(a)(2). The Court now considers whether the Final Memorandum is contrary to law.

By its terms, the Final Memorandum provides “Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law.” (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 2). It begins by discussing prosecutorial discretion. (*Id.* at 3). The Final Memorandum then acknowledges that DHS does “not have the resources to apprehend and seek the removal of every” removable noncitizen. (*Id.*). Thus, DHS must “determine whom to prioritize for immigration enforcement action.” (*Id.*). These priorities do not discuss mandatory detention obligations. Instead, they focus on three categories that have distinct definitions under the Final Memorandum: national security, public safety, and border security. (*Id.* at 3-5). The Final Memorandum states, “[t]he fact an individual is a removable noncitizen therefore should not alone be the basis of an enforcement action against them.” (*Id.* at 3). It continues: “We will prioritize for apprehension and removal noncitizens who are a threat to our national security, public safety, and border security.” (*Id.* at 4).

The Final Memorandum defines “public safety” as follows: “A noncitizen who poses a current threat to public safety, typically because of serious criminal conduct, is a priority for apprehension and removal.”

(Id.). But it clarifies that “a current threat to public safety is not to be determined according to bright lines or categories. It instead requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances.” *(Id.)*. The Final Memorandum continues on by listing “aggravating factors that militate in favor of enforcement action” and “mitigating factors that militate in favor of declining enforcement action.” *(Id.)*. Later, it instructs personnel that they “must evaluate the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly.” *(Id.* at 5). Whatever that discretion looks like, however, “personnel should not rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone.” *(Id.)*. “Rather, [DHS] personnel should, to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue.” *(Id.)*.

The Final Memorandum flatly contradicts the detention mandates under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). It replaces those statutes by conferring discretion to independently decide who will be detained and when—if ever. And it clearly provides that a conviction alone cannot be the basis for placing an alien in removal proceedings. This plainly contradicts the language of the statutes and removes the discretion of agents and officers. The result? Agents and officers do not have the discretion they once had because of the Final Memorandum. The Final Memorandum supplants Congress’s clear commands with an extra-statutory balancing scheme of aggravating and mitigating factors that agency personnel must apply. At times, agents and officers on the

ground are forced to make quick decisions as they encounter individuals, and this scheme ties their hands and changes the standard under which they make decisions on whom to detain and when. Recall that the statutes prescribe the timing of detention: “when the alien is released,” per Section 1226(c), or “during the removal period,” per Section 1231(a)(2). The release language clarifies when the duty to detain is triggered and who is covered. *See Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 969. The Final Memorandum displaces that statutory language in favor of current policy considerations.

Consider that, under the Final Memorandum, an officer who has reason to believe that an alien was convicted of one of the serious crimes implicated by Section 1226(c) can no longer detain him upon release on that basis alone. Rather, that officer must first undertake extensive research and analysis of a variety of factors before detention. So too for aliens with final orders of removal under Section 1231(a)(2). Perhaps most problematic is that an officer cannot “rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone.” *See* (Dkt. No. 109-5 at 5). Yet that is precisely what Section 1226(c) demands: the mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens who are convicted of certain crimes. The Final Memorandum says otherwise; staff can no longer follow the statute’s categorical command. This flips the presumption of detention on its head by starting from the premise that an official should *not* enforce the law. In doing so, the Government has assumed a discretionary power that Congress has explicitly foreclosed. All of this matters because the statutes contain mandates and are not generally applicable laws. *Cf. Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U.S. 199, 230-31, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 1072, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1974). Simply put, the Final

Memorandum is contrary to Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2).

The practical implications of finding the Final Memorandum contrary to law do not alter the Court’s decisionmaking. “It would be dangero[us] in the extreme, to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.” *Sturges v. Crowninshield*, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819) (opinion for the Court by Marshall, C.J.). Courts must not avoid their obligation to say what the law is simply because the results of that decision may pose practical difficulties. *See, e.g., McGirt v. Oklahoma*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2482, 207 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2020). Moreover, Congress—not the judiciary or the executive—amends the Nation’s laws under such circumstances. *See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.*, 534 U.S. 438, 462, 122 S. Ct. 941, 956, 151 L. Ed. 2d 908 (2002).

To be sure, DHS has limited resources.⁶⁹ Thus, it “may adopt policies to prioritize its expenditures *within the bounds established by Congress*.” *Util. Air Regul. Grp.*, 573 U.S. at 327, 134 S. Ct. at 2446 (emphasis in original). But DHS may not “modify unambiguous requirements imposed by a federal statute.” *Id.* The

⁶⁹ DHS chiefly relies on enforcement discretion, not resource constraints, to justify the Final Memorandum. In fact, as noted above, DHS requested that Congress appropriate funding for 26% fewer beds as compared to August 2021—not more. (F.F. No. 16). In effect, the Government is making it harder to comply with the statutory mandate it complains it doesn’t have the resources to comply with. It then asks this Court to re-fashion the law to accommodate that behavior.

Final Memorandum does not simply prioritize DHS's expenditures within the bounds of the statutes. Instead, and stated plainly, DHS has substituted its own categories for those mandated by Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). For instance, Section 1226(c)(1)(B) mandates that the Attorney General take into custody any alien who has committed an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). But in its Considerations Memorandum, DHS explained that it removed the category of "aggravated felonies" from the Final Memorandum because it found the category "both over- and under-inclusive." (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 12). But that is not its decision to make. The language included in the statutes was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and signed into law by the President after extensive investigation, hearings, review, and negotiations—DHS is not free to cavalierly toss that aside. DHS further found that the "aggravated felony definition can be challenging to administer in many instances; its various elements are subject to evolving definition by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the federal courts" and also that "the 'aggravated felony' category is an imperfect proxy for severity of offense." (*Id.*).

That does not just prioritize the statutory categories; it alters them. To conclude otherwise would allow resource constraints to displace statutory mandates—an impermissible result. *See In re Aiken*, 725 F.3d at 260-61. The inability to fully comply is not a license to ignore the boundaries imposed by law. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stated, an agency has no "power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice." *Util. Air Regul. Grp.*, 573 U.S. at 327, 134 S. Ct. at 2446. None of this should come as a surprise.

Prior administrations have made clear that their priorities do not displace “mandatory detention.” (Dkt. No. 146-4 at 3); (Dkt. No. 146-6 at 5).

In sum, DHS “went well beyond the bounds of its statutory authority.” *Util. Air Regul. Grp.*, 573 U.S. at 326, 134 S. Ct. at 2445 (internal quotations omitted). A plea to prioritization and discretion cannot alter this reality.

* * *

The Court holds that the Final Memorandum is contrary to law under the APA. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the States on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 26-30).

B. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (COUNT III)

The APA directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158, 209 L. Ed. 2d 287 (2021). This standard is “deferential.” *Id.* The Court must “not substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency.” *Id.* But the Court must also ensure “that the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the decision.” *Id.*

Agency action is arbitrary and capricious

if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2866-67, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983). Indeed, the agency action must rise or fall on the reasons the agency gave when it acted,⁷⁰ see *Regents*, ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1909, and the Court must not consider *post hoc* rationalizations. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 50, 103 S. Ct. at 2870. But arbitrary and capricious review “is not toothless.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 989 (citation omitted). “In

⁷⁰ Known as the “record rule,” evaluation of an agency’s actions are generally confined to the administrative record alone. *Medina Cnty. Envir. Action Ass'n v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 602 F.3d 687, 706 (5th Cir. 2010). For good reason. Absent this rule, “there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening.” *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 519, 555, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1217, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978). While there are exceptions to the record rule, see *Medina*, 602 F.3d at 706, supplementation of the administrative record is only allowed in “unusual circumstances.” *Id.* The Parties have disputed the need for extra-record evidence. See, e.g., (Dkt. No. 189) (Government’s brief in opposition); (Dkt. No. 191) (States’ brief in favor). They agree that the record rule does not apply to issues such as standing or remedies. (Dkt. No. 189 at 8); (Dkt. No. 191 at 5). The Court has not based its review of the States’ arbitrary and capricious claim on any evidence outside the administrative record, except where evidence is judicially noticeable.

fact, after *Regents*, it has serious bite.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

DHS points the Court to the Considerations Memorandum to supplement its reasoning in the Final Memorandum despite not referencing it in the Final Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 146-1). A review of the Considerations Memorandum reveals that there was important information that DHS did not consider.

1. **Recidivism and Abscondment**

Congress’s concerns about the high rates of abscondment and recidivism among criminal aliens and aliens with final orders of removal animated the passage of IIRIRA. DHS’s failure to consider recidivism and abscondment are some of the reasons why the Court enjoined the February Memorandum. The Court has gone to great pains to make clear that only a subset of aliens is implicated by the statutes at issue in this litigation: those covered by Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). Those, in turn, are aliens who have been convicted of or are implicated in serious crime and aliens who have received a final order of removal. Notwithstanding, the Considerations Memorandum reveals that DHS still did not substantively consider recidivism and abscondment for these classes of aliens. The Considerations Memorandum relies on studies about criminality among all aliens, not to studies about aliens who have already been convicted of a serious crime.⁷¹ (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 13).

⁷¹ The Considerations Memorandum references three sources. First, it maintains “academic literature [] points to a negative relationship between immigration and crime.” (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 13). Second, it asserts “[t]hese findings are further bolstered by micro-level research that generally finds lower criminal involvement by

The studies cited may indeed be correct, but DHS's analysis misunderstands its obligation.

The only study that was both cited *and* included in the record examines crime rates among U.S. citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants. (Dkt. No. 149-15). But the study does not examine recidivism at all, let alone examine recidivism specifically among aliens—again, both legal and illegal—who have already been convicted of one of the serious crimes for which Congress imposed mandatory detention upon DHS. Nor does DHS assert that the criminality of *aliens in general* has a connection to recidivism and abscondment rates of *aliens who have already been convicted of crimes*. This decision, accordingly, is not an examination of “the relevant data” and is not a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *See Dep't of Com.*, ____ U.S. at ____, 139 S. Ct. at 2569 (citation omitted).

The best case for DHS's reasoning would be the inference that because aliens commit less crimes, they recidivate at lower rates. But this inference, without more, is improper because the data include *all* aliens, not just criminal aliens covered by the statute. In fact,

foreign-born individuals, relative to their native-born counterparts.” (*Id.*). Last, it concludes “[w]here status information has been made available—including in the state of Texas itself—the evidence indicates that undocumented noncitizens are *less* likely to recidivate.” (*Id.*) (emphasis in the original).

As a separate matter, neither of the first two sources are actually included in the administrative record. *See* (Dkt. No. 149-12); (Dkt. No. 149-22). Moreover, the Considerations Memorandum blanket-cites both, frustrating meaningful review.

DHS has already found that criminal aliens recidivate and abscond at alarmingly high rates. As recently as 2019, DHS found:

Of the 123,128 ERO administrative arrests in FY 2019 with criminal convictions or pending criminal charges, the criminal history for this group represented 489,063 total criminal convictions and pending charges as of the date of arrest, which equates to *an average of four criminal arrests/convictions per alien*, highlighting the recidivist nature of the aliens that ICE arrests.

(Dkt. No. 153-10 at 15) (emphasis added). Equally relevant are DHS’s findings about abscondment in the same report. DHS noted that aliens who were permitted to participate in its “alternatives to detention” program absconded at a rate of 26.9% for families and 12.3% for non-family unit participants.⁷² (*Id.* at 14). This was one of the primary reasons Congress *mandated* detention in this circumstance. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 519-20, 123 S. Ct. at 1715-16. Given that aliens are only enrolled in the alternatives to detention program after

⁷² ICE’s website describes the alternatives to detention program as follows: “On a case by case basis, local ICE ERO Deportation Officers determine the type and manner of monitoring that is appropriate for each participant, including the specific type of technology—global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices, telephonic reporting (TR), or a smartphone application (SmartLINK)—and case management levels, which include frequency of office or home visits.” *Detention Management*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, <https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management> (last visited June 8, 2022).

they have been “thoroughly vetted” and ICE determines they are *unlikely* to abscond,⁷³ and the abscondment rate was still that high, the onus was on DHS to carefully consider abscondment in the Final Memorandum.

When an agency changes course, it should “ordinarily” “display awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515-16, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009). DHS does neither and fails to offer “a reasoned explanation” “for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were endangered by the prior policy.” *See id.* at 516, 129 S. Ct. at 1811. DHS was required to consider criminal alien recidivism and abscondment *and* to show its work. It either failed or refused to do so. This was arbitrary and capricious. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 991 (“DHS nonetheless failed to discuss *any* of its prior factual findings—much less explain why they were wrong. That failure provides another basis for our conclusion that the [decision] was arbitrary and capricious.” (emphasis in original)).

⁷³ “Adults age 18 and over may be eligible for participation in ATD but must be thoroughly vetted by ERO officers, who review an alien’s criminal, immigration, and supervision history, family and/or community ties, status as a caregiver or provider, and humanitarian or medical considerations when making enrollment determinations in order to determine whether a candidate is likely to comply with the terms of the program.” (Dkt. No. 153-10 at 14).

2. Costs to the States and Reliance Interests

“When an agency changes course it must be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 990 (cleaned up). But DHS does not demonstrate that it actually considered the costs its decision imposes on the States, nor their reliance interests on mandatory detention. “That alone is fatal.” *Id.* at 989.

The Final Memorandum itself has no discussion of the harms to the States that may be implicated by its directives. DHS purports to address those concerns in the Considerations Memorandum. (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 14-17). But DHS only pays lip service to the States’ concerns. DHS undersells the States’ interests as being concerned with “indirect” and “downstream” effects, in contrast to the “predictable (and measurable) impacts” that DHS “endeavors to consider.” (*Id.* at 14). In place of a good-faith attempt to measure costs and benefits, DHS points the Court to a single study and argues that it is *difficult* to measure the fiscal cost of its policy—therefore, DHS doesn’t have to. (*Id.* at 15). Further, DHS conjectures “there is good reason to believe that any effects from implementation of priorities guidance are unlikely to be significant, and could have a net positive effect,” (*id.*), such as increasing compliance with U.S. labor laws by encouraging illegal immigrants to come forward with violations, (*id.* at 14) (“It does not serve the public interest when [worker] rights go unvindicated or when crimes go unprosecuted.”), or decreasing COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among illegal immigrants, (*id.* at 16).

The same goes for reliance interests. In the section of the Considerations Memorandum devoted to reliance interests, DHS writes that it “has considered” reliance interests, but that “no such reasonable reliance interests exist” because DHS “is unaware of any State that has materially changed its position to its detriment” in reliance and because “any such change by any party would be unreasonable[.]” (*Id.*). Further, as with costs imposed on the States, DHS maintains that it is “extremely difficult to quantify” the reliance interests of the States. Therefore, DHS does not have to. (*Id.*). This cannot be true. Litigation (in which DHS is a party) has demonstrated that there are quantifiable reliance interests. *See, e.g., Texas v. Biden*, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 848-49 (N.D. Tex. 2021), *aff’d*, *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 928, *cert. granted*, 142 S. Ct. 1098, 212 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2022). Moreover, the contention that DHS had no obligation to consider the States’ reliance interests “is squarely foreclosed by *Regents*.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 990 (citation omitted).

Thus, DHS’s cursory acknowledgement of various concerns violates a foundational principle of administrative law: “[s]tating that a factor was considered . . . is not a substitute for considering it.” *Getty v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.*, 805 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986); *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 993 (“As an overarching matter, the June 1 Memorandum sometimes baldly asserted that DHS considered this or that factor—in lieu of showing its work and actually considering the factor on paper. . . . [T]o the extent they rely on substituting DHS’s *assertions about explanations* with *explanations* themselves, we reject those arguments with redoubled vigor.” (emphasis in origi-

nal)). Here, DHS did not meet its obligation to consider reliance interests by simply citing to one study that asserts that measuring the fiscal effects of a policy is just too difficult. *See* (Dkt. No. 146-1 at 14-16); *cf. Dep't of Com.*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2576 (“Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise. If judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.”).

In light of *Regents*, DHS had a duty to consider the reliance interests of the States *and* to show its work. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 990 (“[A]gencies must consider reliance interests, and [the] failure to do so is arbitrary and capricious.”). It failed to do so.

* * *

The Court holds that the Final Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the States on Count IV of the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 30-32).

C. NOTICE AND COMMENT (COUNT IV)

The last APA claim raised by the States is that the Final Memorandum had to undergo the notice and comment requirements of the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA’s notice and comment requirements apply to “substantive” or “legislative” rules, but the APA makes exceptions for certain categories of “non-legislative” rules, to which the notice and comment requirements do not apply. *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 170-71; *Dep't. of Lab. v. Kast Metals Corp.*, 744 F.2d 1145, 1152 (5th Cir. 1984). “[I]f a rule is ‘substantive,’ the exemption is inapplicable, and the full panoply of notice-and-comment requirements must be adhered to scrupulously.”

Texas DAPA, 809 F.3d at 171. Importantly, “the APA’s notice and comment exemptions must be narrowly construed.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

The Government does not dispute that the Final Memorandum is an APA rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), nor does it claim to have complied with the APA’s notice and comment requirements. Rather, the Government contends that the Final Memorandum is not a legislative rule, invoking two of the exceptions to the notice and comment requirement. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). First, the Government claims the Final Memorandum is a general statement of policy. Alternatively, it claims the Final Memorandum is a rule of agency procedure, or “procedural rule.”

1. General Statement of Policy

A general statement of policy advises “the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” *Lincoln*, 508 U.S. at 197, 113 S. Ct. at 2034 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit distinguishes general statements of policy from legislative rules using two criteria: “whether the rule (1) imposes any rights and obligations and (2) genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion.” *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171 (cleaned up). Courts should note that there “is some overlap in the analysis of those prongs” and also be “mindful but suspicious of the agency’s own characterization” of its action. *Id.* (citations omitted). But most importantly, the Court should focus “primarily on whether the rule has binding effect on agency discretion or severely restricts it.” *Id.* (citation omitted). “An agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears on its face to be

binding, or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

That should sound familiar. As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit also uses this inquiry to determine whether an agency action is final. *See supra* III.A. The Court has already determined that the Final Memorandum is facially binding and being applied by DHS in a way that makes it binding in its final agency action analysis above. *See supra* III.A. Recall that the Final Memorandum binds DHS personnel to consider and apply certain priorities and factors and forecloses reliance on the fact of conviction or a database search alone when taking enforcement action. *See generally* (Dkt. No. 109-5). DHS personnel do not have discretion to ignore the Final Memorandum’s priority categories, and but for the Final Memorandum, DHS personnel would have discretion to take enforcement action based on the fact of conviction alone without considering additional factors and priorities. Put simply, the Final Memorandum is both facially binding and applied in a way that demonstrates it is binding. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171. Furthermore, the Final Memorandum imposes rights and obligations by allowing aliens to challenge enforcement actions taken against them if they believe they do not fall within the Final Memorandum’s priorities. (F.F. No. 67).⁷⁴

⁷⁴ The Court recognizes that this is extra-record evidence. The Government contends that extra-record evidence cannot be considered for the States’ APA merits claims, including their notice and comment claim. (Dkt. No. 189 at 8). But the Court concludes that consideration of extra-record evidence for the States’ notice and comment claim is proper. First, the Fifth Circuit’s tests for determining whether an agency rule is covered by the APA’s exceptions to

This is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's holding in *Texas DAPA*. 809 F.3d at 171-76. There, the Fifth Circuit held that the DAPA Memo did not "genuinely leave the agency and its employees free to exercise discretion." *Id.* at 176. This holding was based on the Fifth Circuit's determination that even though the DAPA Memo purportedly conferred discretion on DHS personnel, that "discretionary language was pretextual." *Id.* at 171-76. Similarly here, the ostensibly discretionary language in the Final Memorandum does not change the effect. As explained above, *see supra* III.A., the smattering of discretionary language in the Final Memorandum is inconsistent with the mandatory language throughout the document, making clear that the priorities and factors are not optional. This makes the Final Memorandum binding on DHS personnel. Because the Final Memorandum has a binding effect on agency discretion and severely restricts it, the exception

the notice and comment requirements make evaluation of the rule's effects necessary. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171 (explaining that whether a rule is a general statement of policy turns on whether it "has binding effect"); *Id.* at 176 (whether a rule is procedural turns on whether it has a "substantial impact"). Thus, the rule against extra-record evidence cannot apply. Alternatively, the third *Medina* exception allows for consideration of extra-record evidence when "the agency failed to explain administrative action so as to frustrate judicial review." *Medina Cnty.*, 602 F.3d at 706. Because consideration of the effects of the Final Memorandum is necessary to determine whether the Final Memorandum is a general statement of policy or a procedural rule, *see Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171-76, excluding that evidence would "frustrate judicial review"; thus, it is admissible under the third *Medina* exception. *See Medina Cnty.*, 602 F.3d at 706.

to the APA's notice and comment requirement for general statements of policy does not apply. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171.

2. Procedural Rule

Even if an agency rule is binding and therefore not a general statement of policy, it can still be exempt from the notice and comment requirement “if it is one ‘of agency organization, procedure, or practice.’” *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 176 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)). In the Fifth Circuit, this exception is governed by the “substantial impact test.” *Id.*; *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson*, 22 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). This test “is the primary means by which [the court] look[s] beyond the label ‘procedural’ to determine whether a rule is of the type Congress thought appropriate for public participation.” *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 176 (citation omitted). Under this test, an agency rule is actually legislative and not procedural when it “has a *substantial* impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the members or the products of that industry[.]” *Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 22 F.3d at 620 (emphasis in original). To determine if an agency rule has a substantial impact on the regulated industry, the Court asks whether the agency rule “modifies substantive rights and interests.” *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 176. “An agency rule that modifies substantive rights and interests can only be nominally procedural, and the exemption for such rules of agency procedure cannot apply.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

In *Texas DAPA*, the Fifth Circuit applied the substantial impact test to DHS's DAPA Memo, which conferred “lawful presence” on a particular class of illegal aliens. *Id.* The Fifth Circuit held that the DAPA

Memo had a substantial impact because, by granting lawful presence to the covered class of illegal aliens, the DAPA Memo forced Texas “to choose between spending millions of dollars to subsidize driver’s licenses and amending its statutes.” *Id.* Accordingly, the DAPA Memo was not a procedural rule. *Id.*

In *Phillips Petroleum Co.*, the Fifth Circuit applied the substantial impact test to an action by the Department of Interior. 22 F.3d at 618. That action created “new criteria for valuing natural gas liquid products” used to calculate royalties owed to the government by oil and gas lessees. *Id.* Instead of calculating values using “the range of the various types of prices prescribed in the governing regulation,” the Department’s action directed its personnel to rely on only “one type of price, the spot market price.” *Id.* The Fifth Circuit held that the action was not a procedural rule because, even though it “plainly relate[d] to the internal practices” of the agency, the action had “a substantial impact on those regulated in the industry.” *Id.* at 620. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the action “narrowly restricts the discretion of [agency] officials in determining the value of” natural gas liquid products and, consequently, it “dramatically affects the royalty values of all oil and gas leases.” *Id.* at 620-21. The Fifth Circuit also noted that the valuation criteria in the agency action required the use of different criteria than what the governing regulation required. *Id.*

The Final Memorandum also modifies substantive rights and interests such that it has a substantial impact. It modifies the substantive rights and interests of criminal aliens as demonstrated by the significant decrease

in ICE's detention of aliens with criminal convictions under the Final Memorandum and its precursors. (F.F. No. 92); (F.F. No. 102). The Final Memorandum's impact on criminal aliens' rights and interests is further manifest by the fact that the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles has revoked parole for some aliens with criminal convictions whom ICE does not detain, leading to continued custody in the Texas criminal justice system. (F.F. No. 105). Plus, as has been discussed, the Final Memorandum modifies aliens' substantive rights and interests by giving them the right to challenge enforcement actions taken against them by invoking their nonpriority status. (F.F. No. 67). And just as the DAPA Memo forced Texas to "choose between spending millions of dollars to subsidize driver's licenses and amending its statutes," *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 176, the Final Memorandum has forced the States to incur significant costs to the tune of millions of dollars. (F.F. Nos. 103-04); (F.F. No. 107); (F.F. No. 118); (F.F. Nos. 128-29). Additionally, just as in *Phillips Petroleum Co.*, the Final Memorandum "narrowly restricts the discretion of [agency] officials" (as has been discussed at length) and similarly deviates from the requirements of Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). See *Phillips Petroleum Co.*, 22 F.3d at 620-21. Because the Final Memorandum satisfies the substantial impact test, it is not a procedural rule.

* * *

The Final Memorandum is neither a general statement of policy nor a procedural rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). It is a legislative rule. This holding is consistent with some of the central purposes of notice of comment, including "to subject agency decisionmaking

to public input and to obligate the agency to consider and respond to the material comments and concerns that are voiced,” and “to ensure the parties develop a record for judicial review.” *See, e.g., Make the Road New York v. Wolf*, 962 F.3d 612, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court holds that the Final Memorandum was required to comply with the APA’s notice and comment provisions. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171. Thus, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the States on Count IV of the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 32).

D. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE STATES AND GOVERNMENT (COUNT V)

Louisiana raises an additional claim based on its January 8, 2021 agreement with DHS.⁷⁵ Louisiana claims that DHS violated the terms of the agreement by failing to consult Louisiana and consider its views before issuing the Final Memorandum. *See* (Dkt. No. 153-8 at 56); (Dkt. No. 153-9 at 1). It appears that Louisiana’s claim is not one for breach-of-contract,⁷⁶ rather, Louisiana contends the Government’s failure to comply with the terms of the agreement is an additional basis on which

⁷⁵ Texas concedes that its nearly identical agreement with DHS was terminated before the Final Memorandum was issued. (Dkt. No. 109 at ¶ 76); (Dkt. No. 231 at 11).

⁷⁶ Louisiana states that it is not seeking monetary damages or “specific performance to affirmatively require DHS to provide notice and follow the procedures in the Agreement. Rather, it seeks the standard remedies for unlawful agency action, holding unlawful and setting aside the challenged memoranda.” (Dkt. No. 231 at 15); *see also* (Dkt. No. 109 at ¶ 139). Because Louisiana’s claim is an APA claim, not a breach of contract claim, the Court does not address the Parties’ arguments concerning the Tucker Act and sovereign immunity. *See* (Dkt. No. 223 at 31-33); (Dkt. No. 231 at 14-15).

the Court should find the Final Memorandum arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law under the APA. Louisiana's claim turns on whether the agreement is valid, and Louisiana has failed to show that it is.

This agreement is a new phenomenon. Despite Louisiana's assurances that this agreement takes nothing away from the federal government's authority, Louisiana understates the magnitude of what it asks the Court to find. Establishing the Nation's immigration laws is a power of Congress, and enforcing those laws is a power vested in the Executive Branch. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 396-97, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. Louisiana would have the Court hold that an outgoing DHS official from a lame-duck administration can significantly constrain the incoming administration by giving individual states an enforceable right to weigh in before the incoming administration makes changes. Such a holding would have profound constitutional implications. Louisiana has provided insufficient support for its claim to an enforceable right of such consequence.

First, Louisiana points to statutes that direct DHS to develop processes for receiving input from states and empower DHS to perform acts necessary to carrying out its responsibilities. See 6 U.S.C. § 361(b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). To be sure, these statutes authorize DHS to *seek* Louisiana's input. But they do not permit DHS to *surrender* power to Louisiana by subjecting itself to an enforceable consultation requirement. In the Court's view, reading these statutes as authorizing this type of surrender of authority is a bridge too far. See *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n*, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S. Ct. 903, 909-10, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2001) ("Congress

. . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).

The caselaw Louisiana relies on is not sufficient to support its position. Louisiana cites three cases for the proposition that agencies can choose to commit themselves to “more rigorous” procedures such as a consultation requirement with Louisiana and that such a commitment is enforceable in court. Two of Louisiana’s cases stand for, at most, the proposition that agencies must follow their own internal procedures. *See Morton*, 415 U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. at 1074; *Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice*, 461 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Neither addresses the question of whether an agency may subject its decision-making to consultation with an outside party.

Louisiana’s strongest case is *Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus*, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979). There, the Court held that an action taken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs violated the APA because it did not to comply with the Bureau’s internal requirement of consulting the Tribe before making Bureau employment decisions. *Id.* at 721. But the DHS agreement requiring consultation with Louisiana before making nearly *any* immigration enforcement decision, *see* (Dkt. No. 153-8 at 54-56); (Dkt. No. 153-9 at 1-6), is on a completely different scale than the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ internal policy of consulting the tribes before making its own employment decisions. *See Andrus*, 603 F.3d at 717-18. This is particularly true given the Bureau’s longstanding preference for hiring tribal members—a

preference expressly authorized by Congress and unan-
imously approved by the Supreme Court. *See Morton*
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S. Ct. 2474, 41 L. Ed. 2d 290
(1974).

DHS's alleged failure to comply with this agreement
cannot provide a basis for finding that the Final Memo-
randum violated the APA. *Cf. Biodiversity Assocs. v.*
Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The exec-
utive branch does not have authority to contract away
the enumerated constitutional powers of Congress or its
own successors[.]"). In reaching this conclusion, the
Court does not downplay Louisiana's considerable inter-
est in the enforcement of immigration law, but that inter-
est cannot circumvent the fact that the Constitution
vests the enactment and enforcement of immigration
law in the federal government. *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at
394, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 ("The Government of the United
States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens."); *Chy v. Freeman*,
92 U.S. 275, 280, 23 L. Ed. 550 (1875) ("The passage of
laws which concern the admission of citizens and sub-
jects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Con-
gress, and not to the States. . . . [T]he responsibil-
ity for the character of those regulations, and for the
manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national
government."). But despite Louisiana's important in-
terest, immigration law remains a federal prerogative.
Cf. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 ("Arizona
may have understandable frustrations with the prob-
lems caused by illegal immigration while that process
continues, but the State may not pursue policies that un-
dermine federal law.").

The Court holds that DHS’s alleged failure to comply with the agreement cannot provide a basis for finding that the Final Memorandum violated the APA. Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the Government on Count V of the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 32-33).

E. TAKE CARE CLAUSE (COUNT VI)

The States assert a claim under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. *See* U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). A federal court normally does not reach a constitutional question if it can dispose of the case on another ground. *Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 193, 205, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513, 174 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009); *United States v. Johnson*, 956 F.3d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 2020). Indeed, courts “ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” *Matal v. Tam*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755, 198 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2017) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the Court will not reach Count VI of the Amended Complaint raising the States’ Take Care Clause claim in this case. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 33-34); *Texas*, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 622; *see also Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 146 n.3.

V. REMEDY

The States ask the Court to hold unlawful and set aside the Final Memorandum, issue a permanent injunction, and award declaratory relief.

A. HOLD UNLAWFUL AND SET ASIDE

The States ask the Court to vacate the Final Memorandum in its entirety. Under the APA, a court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is

contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or without observance of procedure. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “Agency action” includes a “rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Again, it is undisputed that the Final Memorandum is a “rule” under the APA. Thus, the Court must decide to what extent it will set aside the Final Memorandum.

Under existing precedent, there are two options when awarding relief under Section 706(2): remand with vacatur or remand without vacatur. The default approach is to remand the agency action *with* vacatur. *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1000; *Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius*, 746 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This is especially true when there is a procedural violation. *See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler*, 955 F.3d 68, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Remand with vacatur “restores the status quo before the invalid rule took effect,” leaving the agency free to consider the problem anew. *Env’tl. Def. v. Leavitt*, 329 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2004).

Unlike remand with vacatur, remand *without* vacatur leaves the rule in place during remand. *Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe*, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013). For this reason, “remand without vacatur creates a risk that an agency may drag its feet and keep in place an unlawful agency rule.” *EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A.*, 795 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Remand without vacatur is “generally appropriate when there is at least a serious possibility that the agency will be able to substantiate its decision given an opportunity to do so.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1000 (citation omitted). It is an “exceptional remedy.” *Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n v. Schultz*, 962 F.3d 510, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

1. Remand with Vacatur

When deciding whether to remand *with* vacatur, a federal court considers two factors. First, “the seriousness of the deficiencies of the action, that is, how likely it is the agency will be able to justify its decision on remand.” *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1000. Second, “the disruptive consequences of vacatur.” *Id.* “A strong showing of one factor may obviate the need to find a similar showing of the other.” *Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.*, 934 F.3d 649, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Regarding the first factor, the Final Memorandum is deficient in more than one way: it is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and failed to observe procedure. *See Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1000. DHS knew of these failings when it issued the Final Memorandum. For almost a year and a half, the Government has litigated three separate memoranda but has failed to cure fundamental defects in its civil immigration enforcement priorities. Each of this Court’s opinions placed the Government on notice about the problems with its decisionmaking. “And it still failed to correct them.” *See id.* Moreover, any post-remand memorandum may constitute “an impermissible *post hoc* rationalization under *Regents.*” *See id.* at 1001. This factor alone warrants remand with vacatur.

Regarding the second factor, vacatur is disruptive to the extent that DHS will no longer have nationwide immigration enforcement guidance. But “disruptive consequences matter only insofar as the agency may be able to rehabilitate its rationale.” *Long Island Power Auth. v. FERC*, 27 F.4th 705, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). It is doubtful that an agency can

offer a post-hoc rationalization following remand when the rule itself is arbitrary and capricious. *See Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1000-01.

Nonetheless, the second factor does not warrant remand without vacatur either. The disruption to DHS is largely the “uncertainty that typically attends vacatur of any rule.” *See Wheeler*, 955 F.3d at 85. To be sure, the most compelling argument is that DHS has already trained its agents on the Final Memorandum. But that training is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of federal law. For over a year, DHS has not treated “shall” as mandatory under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). And that interpretation has resulted in irreparable harm to the States. *Cf. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp*, 719 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[V]acatur is appropriate in order to prevent significant harm resulting from keeping the agency’s decision in place.”). In any event, DHS has shown the ability to refine its immigration enforcement priorities in response to litigation over the last year. DHS can, for example, draw upon its prior immigration enforcement priorities that contemplate mandatory detention.⁷⁷

In sum, the “limited circumstances” in which remand without vacatur is the proper remedy do not apply here. *See Am. Great Lakes Ports Ass’n*, 962 F.3d at 518. Any

⁷⁷ DHS is, of course, free to either craft a memorandum that is not subject to review under the APA or cure the fundamental defects in a subsequent memorandum that is subject to review. Indeed, not all self-styled “guidance” is subject to judicial review. *See, e.g., Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 986-87. And of course, DHS is not required to issue a new memorandum. This opinion should not be construed as ordering DHS to act. The only remedy is vacatur of the Final Memorandum.

disruption does not outweigh the seriousness of DHS's fundamental error. Accordingly, the Court takes the normal approach and remands with vacatur.

Further, vacatur applies to the entire Final Memorandum. Recall that the Final Memorandum is only self-styled as such. As the Government openly acknowledges, it is really a rule under the APA. (Dkt. No. 211 at 114). Section 706 governs the "scope of review" of agency action. A federal court "shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action" that is unlawful. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). "Agency action" includes "the whole or part of an agency rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (13). Thus, the APA contemplates wholesale vacatur of entire rules.

While the Government urges the Court to limit relief, it makes no compelling argument regarding how the Court can practically vacate and remand portions of this rule rather than the entire rule. *See Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab.*, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 2018). Unlike some agency rules, which may include a severability provision or "sensibly be given independent life," *Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Shalala*, 12 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the Final Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious, contains language that is contrary to law throughout the document, is being applied in a way that violates federal statutes, and failed to observe procedure. Consequently, the Final Memorandum is not like other cases in which partial vacatur was appropriate because the rules "were plainly divisible."⁷⁸ *Cf. Am.*

⁷⁸ The Final Memorandum could not, for instance, be vacated only as to detentions. This is because vacatur requires actual revocation of the agency's rule or portions of it. Leaving an agency rule in

Waterways Operators v. Wheeler, 507 F. Supp. 3d 47, 78 (D.D.C. 2020). There is no workable path to afford the States meaningful relief other than setting aside the complete Final Memorandum. *Cf. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.*, 361 U.S. 288, 291-92, 80 S. Ct. 332, 335, 4 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1960).

2. Scope of Relief

Next, the scope of relief. When a federal court vacates a rule, relief is not limited to prohibiting the rule's application to the named plaintiffs. *Nat'l Min. Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998). This means that, by necessity, vacating a rule applies universally. *Harmon v. Thornburgh*, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989); *see also Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 985, 1000-01. The APA itself "contemplates nationwide relief from invalid agency action." *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n.28, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2412 n.28, 207 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Courts across the country interpret the APA the same way. *See, e.g., Make the Rd. New York v. McAleenan*, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 66-72 (D.D.C. 2019) (Jackson, J.) (explaining that limited relief under Section 706 is inconsistent with text and precedent, would not work in practice, and reflects "a spirit of defiance of judicial authority"), *rev'd and remanded on other grounds*, 962 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020); *New York v. Dep't of Com.*, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds*, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 204 L. Ed. 2d 978 (2019).

place but limiting its application would be enjoining its enforcement, not vacatur.

Here, the Government makes little effort at proposing an alternative path forward other than citing cases that discuss crafting injunctive relief—an entirely different exercise because this is not an injunction. *See Pennsylvania v. President United States*, 930 F.3d 543, 575-76 (3d Cir. 2019), *rev'd and remanded on other grounds*, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 207 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2020). Simply put, the contention that vacatur should be limited to the States of Texas and Louisiana is in conflict with the overwhelming weight of authority. *O.A. v. Trump*, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 153-54 (D.D.C. 2019) (collecting cases); *see also* Mila Sohoni, *The Power to Vacate A Rule*, 88 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1121 (2020).

Universal relief when setting aside an agency action under the APA is only magnified in the immigration context. Universal relief can be appropriate to ensure uniformity in immigration policies as prescribed by federal law. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 187-88; *see also Trump v. Hawaii*, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n.13, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2446 n.13, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The Final Memorandum governs immigration, which is designed to be uniform across the Nation. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1). Moreover, the States are irreparably harmed when aliens with certain criminal convictions or aliens with final orders of removal inevitably move to Texas and Louisiana after those aliens are released, have detainers rescinded, or are otherwise not detained under the Final Memorandum. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 188; (Dkt. No. 217-12 at 5-6); (Dkt. No. 217-13 at 7); (Dkt. No. 217-15 at 2); (Dkt. No. 203 at 82).

None of this is to say that universal relief is appropriate in all cases. Unlike normal cases, in which

courts determine whether the *application* of a law to the named plaintiffs is lawful, the APA tasks courts with determining whether the rule *itself* is lawful. As such, the standard debate about nationwide or universal relief under Article III is not directly implicated here; “the Court is vacating an agency action pursuant to the APA, as opposed to enjoining it as a violation of the Constitution or other applicable law.” *NAACP v. Trump*, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 474 n.13 (D.D.C. 2018).

* * *

The Court holds unlawful and sets aside the Final Memorandum.⁷⁹

B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The States also request a permanent injunction. If vacatur is sufficient to address the injury, it is improper to also issue an injunction. *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 165-66, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2010). The only justification that the States offer for granting relief other than vacatur is that vacatur does not order the Government to detain under Sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). (Dkt. No. 109 at 34); (Dkt. No. 231 at 16). The purported source for the

⁷⁹ The Court is mindful that the Supreme Court recently requested supplemental briefing on, among other issues, “Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) imposes any jurisdictional or remedial limitations on the entry of injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706.” *Biden v. Texas*, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___, No. 21-954, 2022 WL 1299971, at *1 (May 2, 2022). Section 1252(f) does not apply here because, among other reasons, the Court vacates a rule. *Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. Trump*, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25, 60 (D.D.C. 2020); see also *Texas MPP*, 20 F.4th at 1003-04; *Preap*, ___ U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 962; *Texas I*, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 641.

Court's authority to order detentions is 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). (Dkt. No. 111 at 39).

Under Section 706, a “reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). A court can grant relief under Section 706(1) “only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a *discrete* agency action that it is *required to take*.” *Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All.*, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64, 124 S. Ct. 2373, 2379, 159 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2004) (emphases in original). As such, Section 706(a) precludes a broad programmatic attack. *Id.* at 63, 124 S. Ct. at 2379-80. The APA is designed “to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to resolve.” *Id.* at 66, 124 S. Ct. at 2381. Moreover,

If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be empowered, as well, to determine whether compliance was achieved—which would mean that it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management.

Id. at 66-67, 124 S. Ct. at 2381. The Court declines that approach.

The States spend less than a page of briefing in support of their request for a positive injunction and do not grapple with *Norton*. In addition, district courts routinely decline to issue an injunction after vacating a rule

while also leaving the door open for additional relief if future events require it. *See, e.g., Franciscan All., Inc. v. Azar*, 414 F. Supp. 3d 928, 946 (N.D. Tex. 2019). The Court sees no reason to depart from this well-reasoned approach.⁸⁰ The Court denies the request to issue injunctive relief.

C. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

The States also request a declaratory judgment. (Dkt. No. 224 at 22-23, 30). The States, however, do not explain how vacatur does not award them complete relief. *See Monsanto Co.*, 561 U.S. at 165-66, 130 S. Ct. at 2761. The Court has already held unlawful and set aside the Final Memorandum. The Court denies this request for relief.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the States have proven Counts I, II, III, and IV by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court finds that the States have not proven Count V by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court declines to reach Count VI. The Court **VACATES** the Final Memorandum as arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and failing to observe procedure under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court **DENIES** all other requested relief. The Court will enter a final judgment, including a seven-day administrative stay, by separate order.

⁸⁰ The Government urges the Court to limit any relief to remand without vacatur or, in the alternative, remand with vacatur.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on June 10, 2022.

/s/ DREW B. TIPTON
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 6:21-CV-00016

THE STATE OF TEXAS AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
PLAINTIFFS

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; TRACY
RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: June 10, 2022

FINAL JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memo-
randum Opinion and Order issued under Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on this date, it is
hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Final Judgment is entered in favor for the Plaintiffs on Counts I, II, III, and IV in the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 26-32).

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Final Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants on Count V in the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 32-33).

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Court does not reach Count VI in the Amended Complaint. *See* (Dkt. No. 109 at 33-34).

The Court **DECLARES UNLAWFUL and VACATES**, in its entirety, the Secretary of Homeland Security's September 30, 2021 memorandum titled *Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law*. (Dkt. No. 109-5). The Court **REMANDS** this matter to the Secretary of Homeland Security for further consideration. The Court **DENIES** all other requested relief.

The Court **STAYS** the effect of this Final Judgment for seven days from the date of entry to allow the Defendants to seek relief at the appellate level.

It is **SO ORDERED**.

Signed on June 10, 2022.

/s/ DREW B. TIPTON
DREW B. TIPTON
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

No. 6:21-cv-00016

STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFFS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Filed: June 13, 2022

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit this Court's Final Judgment of June 10, 2022, ECF No. 241, as well as all associated opinions and orders.

Dated: June 13, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

BRIGHAM J. BOWEN
Assistant Branch Director

/s/ ADAM D. KIRSCHNER
ADAM D. KIRSCHNER
Attorney-in-charge
IL Bar. No. 6286601

Senior Trial Counsel
BRIAN C. ROSEN-SHAUD
ME Bar No. 006018
MICHAEL F. KNAPP
CA Bar No. 314104
KUNTAL CHOLERA
DC Bar No. 1031523
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
Tel: (202) 353-9265
Fax: (202) 616-8460
Email: Adam.Kirschner@usdoj.gov
Brian.C.Rosen-Shaud@usdoj.gov
Michael.F.Knapp@usdoj.gov
Kuntal.Cholera@usdoj.gov

Mailing Address:

Post Office Box 883
Washington, D.C. 20044

Courier Address

1100 L Street NW, Room 11020
Washington, D.C. 20005

EREZ REUVENI
CA Bar No. 264124
Assistant Director
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
202-307-4293 (telephone)
Email: Erez.R.Reuveni@usdoj.gov

Counsel for Defendants

DANIEL DAVID HU
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
State Bar No. 10131415
S.D. I.D. 7959
Southern District of Texas
1000 Louisiana, Suite 2300 Houston, TX 77002
Tel: (713) 567-9000
Fax: (713) 718-3300
Daniel.Hu@usdoj.gov

Local Counsel

DECLARATION OF DANIEL BIBLE

I, Daniel Bible, declare the following under 28 U.S.C. § 1746:

I. Personal Background

1. I am currently employed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) as the Deputy Executive Associate Director. I have held this position since February 14, 2022, in an acting capacity, and formally accepted the position on May 8, 2022. As Deputy Executive Associate Director, I oversee the mission of ERO's eight headquarters divisions: Enforcement, Removal, Non-Detained Management, Custody Management, Field Operations, ICE Health Service Corps, Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis, and Operations Support.
2. Prior to this position, I served as the Acting Assistant Director for Field Operations beginning on January 16, 2022. In this capacity, I was responsible for the oversight, direction, and coordination of immigration enforcement activities, programs, and initiatives carried out by ERO's 25 Field Offices, including 208 sub-offices and other locations with an ERO presence. I further managed ERO Headquarters components, including Domestic Operations and Special Operations.
3. I have been employed with ICE and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) since 1998, when I was hired as an Immigration

Agent in Huntsville, Texas. From 2001 to 2006, I served as a Deportation Officer in Oakdale, Louisiana. In 2006, I was promoted to the position of Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer (SDDO) in San Francisco, California. During my tenure as SDDO, I was responsible for supervisory oversight of two fugitive operations teams, the non-detained section, and the alternatives to detention (ATD) section. In 2009, I was promoted to the position of Assistant Field Office Director (AFOD) for the Washington Field Office. During my tenure as AFOD, I had supervisory oversight of SDDOs in charge of the criminal apprehensions program; the 287(g) program; the Field Office's command center; the office currently titled the ERO criminal prosecutions unit; and two fugitive operations teams. In 2012, I was promoted to the position of Deputy Field Office Director (DFOD) for the New York Field Office. From June 2015 to June 2016, I served as the Field Office Director (FOD) in the Salt Lake City Field Office. From June 2016 to June 2020, I served as FOD in the San Antonio Field Office. From June 2020 until January 16, 2022, I served as FOD for the Houston Field Office. I am a member of the Senior Executive Service, and I report directly to ERO Executive Associate Director Corey Price.

4. This declaration is based on my personal knowledge and experience as a law enforcement officer and information provided to me in my official capacity.

II. Overview of ERO

5. Following enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ICE was created from elements of several legacy agencies, including INS and the U.S. Customs Service. ICE is the principal investigative arm of DHS, and its primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the enforcement of criminal and civil federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. Within ICE, ERO oversees programs and conducts operations to identify and apprehend removable noncitizens, to detain these individuals when necessary, and to remove noncitizens with final orders of removal from the United States. ERO manages and oversees all aspects of the removal process within ICE, including domestic transportation, detention, alternatives to detention programs, bond management, supervised release, and removal to more than 170 countries around the world. As part of the removal process, ERO manages a non-detained docket of more than 4 million cases, which includes noncitizens currently in removal proceedings and those who have already received removal orders and are pending physical removal from the United States.
6. ERO employs approximately 6,000 immigration officers nationwide, including executive leadership, the supervisory chain of command, and all field officers. ICE's other law enforcement component, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), employs approximately 6,000 Special Agents,

who are both customs officers and immigration officers. HSI's mission is to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist, transnational, and other criminal organizations that threaten or seek to exploit the customs and immigration laws of the United States. HSI is responsible for federal criminal investigations into the illegal cross-border movement of people, goods, money, technology, and other contraband into, out of, and throughout the United States. HIS Special Agents are thus limited in their ability to engage in civil immigration enforcement.¹

7. ERO's detention network is similarly limited and has been increasingly populated by individuals apprehended at or near the Southwest Border while seeking to enter the United States. In April of this calendar year alone, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended a total of more than 233,000 individuals seeking to cross the Southwest Border. *See* <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics> (last visited June 12, 2022). Even with more than 96,000 of those individuals expelled pursuant to

¹ Indeed, the House Report incorporated into the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, expresses the intent of Congress to prohibit HSI's "engagement in civil immigration enforcement activities without probable cause that an individual who is the subject of enforcement action has committed a criminal offense not solely related to immigration status." H.R. Rep. No. 117-87, at 5 (2021); *see* Joint Explanatory Statement on Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2022, available at <https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20220307/BILLS-117RCP35-JES-DIVISION-F.pdf>.

the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Title 42 authorities, over 137,000 were processed under Title 8 of the U.S. Code. Nearly 111,000 Title 8 cases were apprehended in March; 73,000 in February; 75,000 in January; 97,000 in December 2021; 84,000 in November 2021; and 70,000 in October 2021. Given these numbers and the Department's important border security mission, ERO's detention population is increasingly occupied by recent border crossers apprehended by CBP and processed pursuant to Title 8 of the U.S. Code. As of June 4, 2022, nearly 84% of the 226,458 noncitizens booked into ICE custody since October 1, 2021, were apprehended by CBP. By comparison, approximately 65% of the 2,316,845 noncitizens booked into ICE custody between FY14-FY19 were apprehended by CBP.

8. While some individuals encountered by CBP may be processed entirely within CBP's short-term custody settings, such as some of those who are processed for expulsion pursuant to the CDC's Title 42 authorities and some of those processed for expedited removal, most noncitizens processed for immigration proceedings under Title 8 authorities, including most processed for expedited removal, are held in ICE custody. Additionally, some of those processed for expulsion pursuant to Title 42 must be transferred to ICE custody. ICE is responsible for and manages DHS's longer-term immigration detention operations, including for those originally apprehended by CBP.

III. Guidance for Immigration Enforcement and Removal Actions

9. On September 30, 2021, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas issued Department-wide civil immigration enforcement guidance in a memorandum titled Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Mayorkas Memorandum). The guidance took effect November 29, 2021. The Mayorkas Memorandum calls for the prioritization of DHS's limited law enforcement resources on the apprehension and removal of noncitizens who are a threat to national security, public safety, and border security.
10. The Mayorkas Memorandum provides that whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety is not to be determined based on bright-line rules or categories. Instead, application of the public safety priority requires an assessment of the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and, to the extent possible, review of administrative and criminal records and other investigative information. The Mayorkas Memorandum provides that, when evaluating whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety, aggravating or mitigating factors may militate in favor of taking or declining to take enforcement actions.
11. The Mayorkas Memorandum also identifies noncitizens who pose a threat to border security and prioritizes their apprehension and removal. Per the guidance, a noncitizen poses a threat to border security who is apprehended: (1) at the

border or port of entry while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States, or (2) in the United States after unlawfully entering after November 1, 2020. The guidance acknowledges that other border security cases may present compelling facts that warrant enforcement action. The guidance further provides that mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances may militate in favor of declining to take enforcement action in border security cases.

12. Unlike prior civil immigration enforcement prioritization memoranda, including the interim memoranda issued on January 20, 2021, by then-Acting Secretary David Pekoske, and on February 18, 2021, by Acting ICE Director Tae D. Johnson, the Mayorkas Memorandum does not provide guidance pertaining to detention and release determinations. Rather, the Mayorkas Memorandum provides guidance for the apprehension and removal of noncitizens.
13. Additionally, even where prior enforcement guidance memoranda have addressed detention and release, ICE has interpreted and applied such guidance consistent with its longstanding understanding of statutory requirements, case law, and court orders. Specifically, ICE recognizes that except for the specific circumstances described in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2), and where required to comply with court orders, the agency does not have discretion to release from custody a noncitizen described in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), if such noncitizen is in DHS custody and removal

proceedings are pending against them. Similarly, ICE recognizes that except where required to comply with court orders, the agency does not have discretion during the removal period to release from custody a detained noncitizen who falls within the removability grounds contained in the second sentence of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).

14. Upon issuance of the Mayorkas Memorandum, ERO conducted extensive targeted and continuous training for personnel on the implementation of the guidance, equipping the workforce with the foundational knowledge to implement the Mayorkas Memorandum and apply a thorough analysis of each case based on the totality of the facts and circumstances, to include a holistic assessment of both the aggravating and mitigating factors present in each case. ICE delivered training through the Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS), ERO Supervisory Training, Review of Effective Analysis and Decision (READ) Sessions, and leadership town halls. Foundational and supervisory training took more than four months to develop and deliver to ICE staff resulting in the training of more than thirteen thousand officers, agents, and support personnel. To date, ERO has held more than five thousand READ sessions, real-time continuous learning driven through scenario-based discussions. Over 90 hand-selected Field Trainers lead the training delivery of this effort. ERO implemented multiple feedback surveys at various iterations which allows field staff to ask questions and share feedback on the

various trainings and process improvements in place. Contract support alone was approximately \$5 million.

15. ERO also established a process by which a supervisory official reviews discretionary decisions in order to ensure continuity, completeness, and accuracy in the application of departmental priorities. This process is accomplished through reporting by the local field offices in the Activity Analysis Reporting Tool (AART). Officers and agents are required to submit public safety cases through AART for supervisory review and include the selection of aggravating and mitigating factors that were considered by the official in deciding to take an enforcement action. The supervisory official reviews and confirm submissions within the public safety enforcement priority for completeness and accuracy. This kind of supervisory review is not new. ICE has utilized a review process since February 22, 2021, before the Mayorkas Memorandum was issued.

IV. Irreparable Harm from Vacatur

16. As a result of the court's vacatur of the enforcement guidance, DHS must either operate without guidance that affords any prioritization, or issue new guidance that reflects the district court's interpretations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2), even though DHS lacks the capacity to detain all noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under those statutes, and even if others pose a greater public safety threat. This will divert resources for public safety, national

security, and border security missions, in ways that will make the nation less safe. It will create inconsistency among the workforce. And it is simply not feasible to implement what the court has suggested.

Impossibility of Complying with the Mandatory Detention Provisions in the Manner the Court Suggests

Detainers

17. In order to facilitate the transfer of custody of a noncitizen from a federal, State, or local law enforcement agency (LEA) to ICE, ICE officers frequently utilize detainers. Detainers alert such LEAs of ICE's interest in taking custody of noncitizens in their custody for whom ICE possesses probable cause of removability. ICE detainers are nonbinding requests by ICE for the receiving LEA to both: (1) notify ICE as early as practicable, at least 48 hours, if possible, before a removable noncitizen is released from criminal custody; and (2) maintain custody of the noncitizen for a period not to exceed 48 hours beyond the time the noncitizen would otherwise have been released to allow ICE to assume custody. All detainers are accompanied by either a warrant of arrest (Form I-200) or a warrant of removal (Form I-205), issued upon a determination by an immigration officer as to probable cause of removability. *See* ICE Policy No. 10074.2: Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers, available at <https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/10074-2.pdf>. Detainers do not serve to transfer custody to ICE. Rather, an ICE officer must

appear at the LEA's facility and make an arrest following notification by the LEA.

18. ERO has identified nearly 500 institutions that do not honor detainers, impacting almost all of ERO's 25 field offices. ERO has identified nearly 140 institutions that accept detainers only in a limited fashion, such as providing advance notification prior to release but not adequate hold time to allow ERO to assume custody. For instance, in some areas of the country, it may take an ERO officer two hours or more to travel from the local office to the jail facility holding the noncitizen, yet the LEA that owns and operates the facility may only provide 15 minutes' notice prior to release. If the mandatory custody provisions of § 1226(c) were interpreted as applying prior to ICE taking custody, in those instances in which the agency does not receive sufficient advance and official notice prior to a release, the agency would, for these reasons, face significant difficulty in complying through no fault of its own.
19. Prohibiting ICE immigration officers from consulting the Secretary's enforcement guidance regarding the prioritization of national security, public safety, and border security threats when making decisions about whether to take custody over a particular noncitizen being released from federal, state, or local criminal custody also may lead to inconsistent enforcement decisions in field offices around the country. A lack of consistency and predictability can lead to further confusion among the workforce, undermine the

agency's ability to project a coherent message to law enforcement partners across the country as well as the public, and subvert efforts to pursue sensible enforcement priorities.

1226(c)

20. Historically, DHS has, as an operational matter, generally determined whether the mandatory custody provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) apply *after* a noncitizen is arrested and booked into ICE custody. ERO's operations would be severely impacted if, applying the court's interpretation of § 1226(c), ICE were to make determinations of whether noncitizens in federal, State, or local criminal custody are subject to § 1226(c) mandatory detention—even before the noncitizens are booked into ICE custody thereby triggering applicability of that statute.
21. The immigration laws generally provide the agency with a period of 48 hours from the time when ICE effectuates an arrest of a noncitizen, including from a federal, State, or local custodial setting, to make a custody determination. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). During the custody determination process, ICE assesses whether the noncitizen should be detained or released, and if released, whether any conditions of release should be imposed. It is subsequent to taking custody, generally during that custody determination process, that an ICE officer must consider whether an individual in ICE custody is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and its restrictions on release.

22. As an initial matter, DHS is not, and has never been, aware of all noncitizens in the United States who are described in one of the categories of mandatory detention under § 1226(c). Additionally, an officer's determination whether an individual is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) can be a complicated inquiry that may entail additional investigation and analysis, including, but not limited to, obtaining additional documents (*e.g.*, the record of conviction, charging instrument, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, jury instructions, or any explicit factual finding by the trial judge). Due to the legal complexity of assessing certain grounds of removability based on state convictions, officers also routinely have to consult with agency counsel before a custody decision can be made. In addition, it is my experience that case law in this area can often change and a state conviction that would render a noncitizen subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) at the time the detainer was placed may no longer subject a noncitizen to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) when ICE is notified of release, or vice versa. I also understand that variations in case law are such that a conviction may give rise to grounds of removability (and potentially trigger 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)) in one jurisdiction but not in another. Because these complexities require case-by-case review and local coordination, ICE often does not know whether a noncitizen would be covered by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) prior to ICE taking custody and conducting the relevant review. Moreover, the applicable charge(s) of re-

movability in a given case may not readily identify the noncitizen as being subject to mandatory custody. For example, if a noncitizen who is in removal proceedings as a non-criminal visa overstayer is arrested and convicted for a removable offense listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D), that ground does not need to be formally charged as the basis of removal in order to trigger mandatory detention. *See Matter of Kottliar*, 24 I&N Dec. 124, 126-27 (BIA 2007). And, because, in most cases, a criminal charge alone (as opposed to a conviction) will not generally trigger 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), noncitizens with pending criminal charges may shift from being subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to § 1226(c) upon being convicted. Accordingly, even information in ICE databases regarding charges of removability lodged in a given case would not necessarily indicate whether § 1226(c) applies.

23. Further, ERO may not be aware of a noncitizen's criminality at the time a Notice to Appear (NTA) is issued by another DHS component, making any requirement that ERO arrest any noncitizen potentially subject to § 1226(c) impossible. For example, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may issue an NTA to a removable noncitizen after adjudicating and denying an application over which it has jurisdiction, such as an asylum application or an application for adjustment of status. ERO is not generally notified when USCIS issues an NTA, and an NTA issued by USCIS may not charge criminal grounds of removability in all cases in which they are applicable.

24. In addition, it is my experience that while individuals subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) are not eligible for release on bond, they are eligible for what is referred to as a “*Joseph* hearing” in which an immigration judge will determine whether the individual is “properly included” in the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D); *Matter of Joseph*, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). If ICE were required to arrest every noncitizen who *may* be subject to § 1226(c) detention, without any prioritization based on public safety of national security threat, this would have cascading impacts not only on ERO, but also on ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), whose attorneys must appear at all of these hearings, and the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, which must provide an immigration judge to consider the evidence and render a decision. Such resources are limited. An increased workload in this area could negatively effect and slow down other priority immigration proceedings, hindering DHS efforts to secure final orders of removal, including those related to individuals who present egregious national security or public safety risks. It would also sharply curtail any progress being made to reduce the backlog in the immigration court system.
25. If ICE were to arrest all noncitizens who have removal proceedings pending and who could possibly be subject to restrictions on release from custody upon arrest would be extraordinarily burdensome—and likely impossible—for ERO

to achieve compliance. As of June 5, 2022, there were nearly 327,000 noncitizens in pending removal proceedings on ERO's non-detained docket with either criminal convictions or pending criminal charges.

26. If, applying the court's interpretation of § 1226(c), DHS were to make a § 1226(c) determination for all noncitizens who are in removal proceedings—including noncitizens who are not currently detained by ICE—it would impose insurmountable burdens on ERO, which would have to shift considerable resources to make those complicated determinations and then conduct at-large arrest operations.
27. At-large arrests of removable noncitizens are resource intensive and, like any law enforcement operation, can pose a danger to ICE officers, the noncitizen at issue, and members of the public. At-large arrests of removable noncitizens generally require at least two officers to be present for officer safety reasons, and arrests at a residence usually require five or more officers. During an at-large arrest, the target may be armed; the officers have no physical control over the location; and there is always the potential for disruption of the enforcement action by the target's family members, associates of the target, or members of the community. Moreover, a team of ICE officers must engage in time-consuming work (e.g., database searches, visits to addresses(es) associated with the target, deconfliction with the activities of other law enforcement

agencies, and surveillance), in order to locate each at-large noncitizen.

28. In my experience, which has spanned 24 years and five presidential administrations, the agency has never, to my knowledge, enforced § 1226(c) as mandating the arrest of any individuals. To the contrary, I have always understood it to prohibit the release of those who have been arrested and taken into ICE custody.

Section 1231

29. As of June 5, 2022, there were 5,013 noncitizens with final orders of removal in ICE custody. Nearly 1.2 million noncitizens with final orders of removal remain non-detained. Many of these individuals likely were never detained during removal proceedings or were released from custody at some point in accordance with the discretionary authority vested in ICE immigration officers by statute or pursuant to orders by immigration judges or federal courts.
30. DHS has historically understood § 1231(a)(2) as authorizing the detention of noncitizens during the removal period, and prohibiting the release during the removal period only of those noncitizens who are already detained and have been found inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2) or (a)(3)(B) or deportable under § 1227(a)(2) or (a)(4)(B). Accordingly, ICE has long exercised its discretionary authority to release some detained noncitizens during the removal period who have not been found inadmissible or deportable based on the specific grounds referenced in § 1231(a)(2).

31. If ICE was required to maintain custody of every detained noncitizen during the removal period and not simply those that the statute says the agency shall release “under no circumstance,” ICE would not have sufficient detention resources to implement the order while carrying out its broader mission priorities effectively.
32. ICE is appropriated for limited bed space and simply lacks capacity to continue to detain each detained noncitizen during the removal period. ICE must balance competing detention priorities, including individuals apprehended while attempting to enter the United States and individuals subject to § 1226(c) custody or who otherwise pose national security or public safety risks, when allocating detention space.
33. Additionally, implementation of such a requirement would significantly alter ICE operations in support of its mission. Detention during the removal period is intended to facilitate removal. Factors beyond ICE’s control may limit—or frustrate entirely—its ability to remove a noncitizen during the removal period. For example, many receiving countries have lingering COVID-related border closures and pre-removal testing and/or vaccination requirements that can complicate removal operations. This is further exacerbated in receiving countries that were already reluctant or uncooperative prior to the pandemic. Several countries do not issue travel documents for their citizens, or only do so on a very limited basis. Limited direct and transit flight routes pose further complications.

Natural disasters and armed conflict can further prevent removal during the removal period. In just one recent example, the situation in Ukraine significantly complicated potential removals of Ukrainian nationals. Absent special circumstances justifying continued detention, and as is constitutionally required, ICE generally releases a noncitizen who is subject to a final order of removal after expiration of the removal period when there is no significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed, or to a third country, in the reasonably foreseeable future. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). When it is clear that this is going to be the case, ICE often releases such noncitizens during the removal period, so long as it not constrained by the “under no circumstance” limitation in the statute. If ICE were required to maintain custody of all noncitizens throughout the removal period, without regard to the distinct treatment that the statute provides in the second, “under no circumstance,” sentence, it would require ICE to detain individuals whom it anticipates will be released after expiration of the removal period because there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, needlessly wasting limited detention resources.

34. If ICE had to maintain custody of every detained noncitizen during the removal period, that requirement would also bar the release of noncitizens who have been granted withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) or the Convention Against Torture (CAT) regulations. While a

grant of withholding of removal only limits repatriation to certain countries, removal to third countries is rare. Yet, noncitizens granted withholding of removal are subject to § 1231 detention. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(3). There would be no operational reason to continue to detain noncitizens for 90 days who have established a clear probability of persecution on account of a protected ground or torture in the country of removal but who lack a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

35. Enforcement actions against and continued detention of the entire population covered by §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) would require ICE bedspace, personnel, and other resources that simply do not exist. Prior to March 15, 2022, ICE was funding for 34,000 beds. That number included 2,500 family unit beds. The budget that went into effect March 15, 2022, does not include funding for 2,500 family unit beds. This reduced ICE's total available bed space from 34,000 to 31,500. The number of adult beds did not change. ICE's access to its full inventory of bedspace is limited, however, due to various court orders limiting the intake of noncitizen detainees, an increase in detention facility contract terminations, and detention facility contract modifications. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has also had a significant impact. It has led to cohorting and quarantine requirements for facilities, as well as social distancing within facilities, which often results in unusable beds.

Damaging Costs to National Security and Public Safety

36. Due to this finite number of detention beds, to meet the Department's important mission, ERO must prioritize its detention resources to facilitate the detention of certain noncitizens, including those who are convicted criminals, public safety threats, and/or recent border entrants. As of June 5, 2022, the currently detained population of 24,700 noncitizens constitutes more than 92% of the approximately 26,800 currently available beds. If, applying the court's interpretation of §§ 1226(c) and § 1231(a)(2), ICE had to conduct enforcement actions against all noncitizens potentially subject to § 1226(c) or § 1231(a)(2), it would be impossible for ICE to prioritize the use of its finite detention resources to carry out its public safety, national security, and border security mission in a fair, consistent, and effective manner. Specifically, following the court's interpretation of those statutes could result in the release from federal, state, and local criminal custody of noncitizens ICE would otherwise deem priorities for removal, given their public safety, national security or border security threat.
37. Enforcement actions against the entire population described in the Court's order—that is, all noncitizens being released from federal, state, and local criminal custody pending removal proceedings that ICE has determined to be subject to § 1226(c)(1), and noncitizens in the removal

period who are in ICE custody and for whom detention has long been understood not to be mandatory under § 1231(a)(2)—would require ICE bedspace, personnel, and other resources that simply do not exist and would detract from the agency’s ability to meet other pressing operational needs, including those pertaining to supporting the Department’s broader public safety and border security mission.

38. If, in an enforcement scheme that takes the court’s reasoning into account, ICE had to pursue enforcement beyond those who the Department already recognizes cannot be released from detention pending removal proceedings while in ICE custody would require the arrest and detention of—and thus require expenditure of DHS’s limited detention space on—noncitizens who do not constitute public safety threats, limiting the space available for those who do pose such threats. Notably, not all cases meeting the definition for mandatory custody constitute public safety threats. For example, a lawful permanent resident convicted many years ago of certain drug possession offenses or of filing a false tax return can count as an aggravated felon for purposes of § 1226(c) detention. Conversely, some noncitizens who do pose a current threat to public safety, such as those convicted of certain sex offenses, are not covered by the § 1226(c) detention provision. Likewise, noncitizens who are recently and credibly accused of serious crimes like murder, but who are not convicted, may pose a more serious public safety threat than noncitizens who may have

been convicted decades ago for a nonviolent tax offense even though the mandatory custody provisions would apply in the case of the tax offense and not the accused murder.

39. As a result, by vacating the Department's central guidance for ICE immigration officers on the enforcement of civil immigration laws when deciding whether to take certain noncitizens into custody, release other noncitizens from detention, or execute certain removal orders, the court's order would make it difficult for ICE to effectively prioritize the use of its finite resources to carry out its public safety, national security, and border security mission in a fair, consistent, and effective manner, making the community less safe. Specifically, an enforcement scheme that applies the court's reasoning would likely result in the inability of ICE to take into custody and detain some noncitizens ICE has deemed priorities for removal, including recent border crossers, individuals charged but not convicted of serious public safety offenses, and sex offenders like those targeted for enforcement in operations like Operation SOAR (Sex Offender Arrest and Removal), a coordinated effort to arrest and remove noncitizens convicted of egregious offenses against persons that might not subject an individual to § 1226(c) custody. Once a noncitizen described in § 1226(c) is taken into custody, officers expressly lack discretion to release that person while proceedings are pending, even if that person does not pose a threat to national security, public safety, or border security. Without clearly established guidelines optimizing

agency resources, the already limited bedspace could become encumbered by lower-priority individuals, impeding ICE's ability to target high-priority individuals for enforcement. Although local needs and demands are pertinent considerations, they must all work together in an efficient manner. In order for the nation's immigration enforcement apparatus to operate in a holistic manner that optimizes agency resources while carrying out ICE's congressional mandate to enforce the nation's immigration laws, there needs to be some form of central coordination.

40. If ICE were required to arrest, take into custody, and detain all known noncitizens described in § 1226(c) or § 1231(a)(2), it would completely overwhelm ICE's current capacity and more significantly curtail ERO's ability to protect communities from public safety threats or support DHS's broader border security mission. Given the limited detention capacity described above, detaining such individuals would take up beds that might otherwise be used to hold individuals who present a greater danger to the community or flight risk than those described in § 1226(c) or in the second sentence of § 1231(a)(2). For example, a noncitizen with two petty theft offenses could be subject to detention under § 1226(c) or § 1231(a)(2), but a noncitizen with a serious DUI conviction or with pending charges for sex offenses or other violent felonies may not.
41. The implementation of the enforcement priorities has assisted ERO in re-deploying assets to meet the current threat and reality. Through

effective prioritization of resources, ERO is better able to adjust in real time to pressing operational needs. For example, ERO re-tasked several field operations teams to assist CBP in responding to state and local requests for assistance in the Rio Grande Valley, Del Rio, and Tucson areas to address increasing activity along the Southwest Border. Additionally, in recent months, ERO has continuously deployed approximately 300 officers to the Southwest Border to support CBP operations, for a total of 2,475 ERO personnel deployed during Fiscal Years 2021 and 2022. These deployments are expected to continue for the foreseeable future and may even increase depending on operational demands at the border. Officers and staff deployed from their normal duty stations to assist with border operations are generally unavailable to make arrests, manage detention, or effectuate removals in the interior. The support ERO provides at the Southwest Border includes, but is not limited to: transporting; processing; enrollment in ATD; removals; bedspace management of those taken into custody, including those subject to expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1); and transfers of those taken into custody. This flexibility has enabled ERO to address border security, consistent with the Mayorkas Memorandum, by focusing its resources on targeting noncitizens who recently unlawfully entered the United States, while also targeting serious criminal elements operating in the United States. It also has freed up bed space needed to support certain

Title 42 expulsions and expedited removal. If the Memorandum were vacated and the court's order were to go into effect, ICE's ability to support these key enforcement priorities would be significantly constrained.

42. While the agency continues to direct resources to the border, it is all the more critical that ICE be able to prioritize its finite law enforcement resources on its public safety mission and targeted enforcement operations to locate and arrest national security and public safety threats. A shift in resources to detain those subject to §§ 1226(c)(1) or 1231(a)(2) also limits resources available to detain recent border-crossers, who, for lack of detention resources, will likely be released.
43. Taking away the ability of ICE immigration officers to consult the prioritization guidance of the Mayorkas Memorandum when making discretionary enforcement decisions—or that restricts their discretionary authority entirely in certain respects—will lead to disparate prioritization across the country and a lack of consistency in enforcement actions. This could result in an undesirable shift in enforcement away from those who present the greatest risk to public safety and undermine public confidence in the nation's immigration enforcement efforts. Further, an attempt to take enforcement actions indiscriminately among this population, instead of against certain prioritized noncitizens, would not be an efficient or reasonable use of ICE's limited resources and would likely prevent ICE

from effectively focusing on those noncitizens who pose the greatest and most imminent threat to public safety.

44. The Mayorkas Memorandum appropriately focuses agency resources on enforcement actions against the most serious offenders in ways that better protect public safety and national security. As DHS collectively addressed the surge of migrants seeking to cross the Southwest Border, ICE shifted resources to the border consistent with the Mayorkas Memorandum, which prioritizes border security. As noted above, the number of CBP apprehensions along the border continues to increase, with processing under both Title 42 and Title 8 continuing at historic levels. ICE has been providing meaningful support in this effort. Among other things, ICE has taken on the role of completing processing of more than 300,000 cases involving noncitizens apprehended by CBP. ICE also transports individuals from the border to ICE detention centers throughout the country, conducts removal and expulsion flights, enrolls others in ATD, liaises with local government officials, collects DNA of noncitizens, and updates ERO software with risk classification assessments including mitigating and aggravating factors, among other duties. Due to this shift in resources, ICE has had fewer resources available to devote to interior enforcement. With respect to interior enforcement actions, the Mayorkas Memorandum has enabled ICE to appropriately prioritize its limited resources to ensure that the actions ICE has taken are focused on

the most serious public safety threats. Despite having to transfer resources to the Southwest Border, ICE has been able to use the Mayorkas Memorandum to ensure that important public safety goals were being met. In the first 180 Days of implementation of the Mayorkas Memorandum, ERO's percentage of enforcement actions involving noncitizens convicted or pending conviction of a felony (including aggravated felonies), Sex Offenses (Including Involving Assault or Commercialized Sex), and National Security Offenses was 14.9% higher than the same time frame in Fiscal Year 2020. Also in that period, the percentage of enforcement actions involving non-citizens convicted or pending conviction of Assault, Dangerous Drugs, Homicide, Robbery, Sex Offenses, Sexual Assault, and Weapon Offenses was 17.1% higher than the same time frame in Fiscal Year 2020.

Curtailment of Statutorily Authorized Discretion

45. An enforcement scheme that follows the court's reasoning also would undermine, if not effectively eliminate, the Secretary's statutory responsibility to "[e]stablish[] national immigration enforcement . . . priorities" consistent with 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) in a manner that the Secretary deems the best use of the agency's resources to support its missions. The former INS, one of DHS's predecessor agencies, exercised prosecutorial discretion and had policies guiding such exercise since as early as 1909, and continuing in every Administration, including af-

ter the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, to maximize use of scarce agency resources, to protect the United States from national security threats, and to protect our citizens and communities from harm. *See Department of Justice Circular Letter Number 107*, dated September 20, 1909, dealing with the institution of proceedings to cancel naturalization; *see also, e.g., Sam Bernsen, INS General Counsel, Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion* (July 15, 1976).

Inconsistent Application

46. Implementation of an enforcement scheme consistent with the district court's order will likely result in inconsistent application among the ERO workforce, which, as discussed above, has been extensively trained to apply the Mayorkas Memorandum. Without such a rubric, the workforce would be left with no uniform guidance regarding certain enforcement decisions. This will likely lead to lack of consistency across enforcement actions, and is a vast deviation from ICE's prior exercise of discretion.
47. Notably, the Mayorkas Memorandum does not mandate any outcomes. Rather, it is framed in a way to empower officers to focus resources on individuals who present the most, actual threats. As implemented by ERO, the guidance promotes thoughtful deliberation by officers who have been trained to consider individual facts and circumstances prior to taking an enforcement action. Without a framework in place, there would

still remain a large divergence between the number of noncitizens subject to detention under §§ 1226(c)(1) or 1231(a)(2) and available bed space. The Mayorkas Memorandum provides a mechanism for prioritizing amongst limited detention resources—focusing on the most significant public safety, national security, and border security threats. Without the Mayorkas Memorandum, officers will be left without a rubric to guide their decisions. One likely outcome is a first-come, first-served approach in which officers pursue enforcement action against anyone who falls within §§ 1226(c)(1) or 1231(a)(2), until bed space is full. The absence of a rubric could also result in a situation in which officers across the country are pursuing enforcement actions differently. Either of these situations risks significantly undermining public security and national security, as well as efforts to secure the border, by filling up bed space with noncitizens whose detention doesn't meet these goals, resulting in inefficient utilization of limited resources without adequately protecting public safety.

48. Reliance on the Mayorkas Memorandum provides consistency in enforcement. In its absence, there is likely to be inconsistency in how those entrusted with making determinations regarding enforcement of a noncitizen's final order of removal, resulting in possible inequitable outcomes. Notably, § 1231(c)(2) provides that the Secretary may stay the removal of a noncitizen if immediate removal is not "practicable or

proper.” The Secretary has delegated that authority to certain ICE officials. DHS has long considered its stay authority discretionary and exercised its authority to stay noncitizen’s removal following case-by-case evaluation, consistent with the statutory standard, since before the Mayorkas Memorandum took effect. Notably, many of the factors militating in favor of declining to enforce a removal order under the Mayorkas Memorandum were also considered as part of DHS’s discretionary decision-making before the memorandum took effect. Thus, for those individuals that fall within § 1231(a) but for which removal has been determined is not “practicable or proper,” ICE has historically not detained them during the removal period. The Court’s interpretation of § 1231(a) seems to suggest that this approach may no longer be valid. If that were the case, ICE would be required to devote bedspace for 90 days to individuals it has no intention of removing, needlessly devoting resources to individuals that do not pose a threat and that ICE knows will be re-released to the community in a matter of months. This will inject considerable inconsistency and waste into the stay adjudication process.

49. Any potential policy or operational confusion due to vacatur could additionally harm ICE’s relationship with state and local stakeholders. In particular, ICE must cultivate relationships with numerous state and local partners. To interact with state, tribal, and local jurisdictions, the Department needs to be able to articulate and defend its priorities. Operating without an

overarching plan could irreparably harm ICE's relationships with key partners.

Ripple Effects and Resource Limitations

50. The vacatur of the Mayorkas Memorandum would have ripple and costly effects beyond ERO. For instance, OPLA, which represents ERO and all other DHS components in removal proceedings before the immigration courts, is facing crippling resource constraints that make prioritization essential. The number of cases pending before the immigration courts has more than doubled just since the end of Fiscal Year 2018, and the number of immigration judges has increased by more than 50 percent during that time. OPLA resource levels have not kept pace with this growth in docket size and the immigration bench, resulting in a deficit of several hundred OPLA attorney positions needed to litigate the administrative proceedings of noncitizens subject to removal under the many grounds of removability established by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including those who are subject to § 1226(c). *See* DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Budget Overview—Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, at ICE-O&S-36 (explaining DHS's request for 341 additional OPLA positions in FY 2023 budget).²

² Available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20Enforcement_Remediated.pdf; *see also* DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Budget Overview—Fiscal Year 2022 Congressional Justification,

51. Outside the context of immigration court, ERO relies heavily upon OPLA for legal advice and prudential counsel in performing our mission (including whether noncitizens are removable from the United States and under what authority they may be arrested and detained), and I have observed how these resource constraints have limited OPLA's availability to provide such services to ERO officers.
52. One way that OPLA has endeavored to address these resource challenges has been by building consideration of the priorities set forth in the Mayorkas Memorandum into its litigation practice before the immigration courts and Board of Immigration Appeals. *See* Memorandum from Kerry E. Doyle, Principal Legal Advisor, *Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion* (Apr. 3, 2022).³ Already, OPLA has been able to remove thousands of nonpriority cases from the dockets by exercising prosecutorial discretion informed by the Mayorkas Memorandum. OPLA has also invested its time in conducting town hall meetings with stakeholders nationwide and updating ICE's public-facing website with

at ICE-O&S-22 (elaborating on OPLA resource shortfall and requesting additional attorney positions in FY 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/u.s._immigration_and_customs_enforcement.pdf.

³ Available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-enforcement_guidanceApr2022.pdf.

Frequently Asked Questions and a Quick Reference Card to explain how it applies the Mayorkas Memorandum in representing DHS before the immigration courts.

53. In addition to further straining OPLA resources, I believe that vacating the Mayorkas Memorandum could lead to a lack of clarity among the public, including noncitizens and their legal representatives, who will be unclear how to request or receive consideration for prosecutorial discretion from the Agency's attorneys.

V. Re-programming funds/Detention Capacity

54. As an initial matter, reprogramming or transferring funds would not address the significant obstacles to identifying additional appropriate detention space. Over the past month, ERO has been working to identify additional beds and I am familiar with the many challenges associated with this effort. Finding and contracting for additional detention beds is a complicated process that requires several months per facility. First, ICE must identify available facilities. Second, ICE must conduct multiple pre-occupancy inspections to ensure the facility is suitable for civil immigration detainees. Third, ICE negotiates with the detention provider and awards the contract that must be funded.
55. This process is complicated by the fact that detention providers are facing challenges in hiring appropriate staff, especially medical staff, and once staff are identified, ICE needs several

weeks to ensure that they have appropriate clearances.

56. Notably, some facilities have terminated their contracts with ICE over the past two years. Further, civil immigration detention requires a heightened standard of care, and Congress has regularly required DHS to monitor facilities and discontinue agreements under certain circumstances. Available facilities are also impacted by state laws prohibiting ICE detention. Further, ICE detention space has been limited by ongoing litigation that constrains ICE from using some of its detention capacity.
57. Based on the funding and operational challenges, I believe that ICE cannot readily add sufficient bedspace to accommodate the orders of magnitude of additional noncitizens that would need to be detained in order to comply with the court's order and also support its other interior enforcement and border security missions.
58. ICE has used ATD to increase the flexibility with which it addresses these and other challenges. ATD is not a form of detention; rather it is a flight mitigation tool ICE applies as a condition of release for certain noncitizens. Although ATD can take many forms, the most typical is placing the noncitizen on a form of electronic monitoring, with regular check ins. ICE's use of this technology is to promote an efficient and cost-effective way to ensure compliance with conditions of release for non-dangerous individuals. First, it frees detention space

for those who pose a danger to the community, whether or not they fall under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2). Second, it eliminates the need to unnecessarily expend detention resources—transport, housing, COVID quarantine protocols—on unnecessarily detained non-violent individuals. Congressional appropriation for ATD for fiscal year 2021 was \$440.1 million. This reflects the fact that enrollment in ATD continues to increase. As of June 9, 2022, the ATD program had more than 270,000 enrolled participants, more than five times the approximately 53,000 participants in 2015. Program savings for utilizing ATD is also significant. The program cost per participant is under \$5.00 per day. By comparison, the average daily bed rate for detained individuals is approximately \$142 per day.

59. As reflected in its proposed budget request for Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23), the Administration is seeking to focus ICE's priorities on the gravest threats to the community and border security. This is being accomplished by focusing detention on those who truly pose a danger to the community, as well as supporting the border mission, and by reallocating funds to focus on ATD and transportation. Although the funding sought by the administration for bed space has decreased, the funding request for ATD has increased.
60. ICE is also playing an increasing role in border security. Since early 2021, ICE has found that it can best relieve impacted CBP stations by (1) enrolling migrants released by CBP in ATD and

(2) using air and ground transportation resources to move migrants from impacted CBP stations to other places where they can be processed. In contrast to any suggestions that such funds are fungible, any significant reprogramming or transferring of funds from these valuable programs would also damage other important DHS priorities and programs. This could include funds appropriated to support important programs like Fugitive Operations and the Transportation and Removal program could be jeopardized by reallocation of funds without regard to the department's overall mission. ICE's budget is very constrained. In a climate where it is politically difficult for Congress to increase the topline funding for ICE, any increase in ICE programs like ATD and Transportation have required requisite decreases in other ICE programs like detention.

61. I declare, under penalty of perjury under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that this declaration is based on my personal knowledge, as well as the information provided to me by other employees of the Department of Homeland Security.

Signed on this 13th day of June, 2022.
DANIEL A
BIBLE

Digitally signed by DANIEL
A BIBLE
Date: 2022.06.13 14:09:23
-04'00'

Daniel Bible
Deputy Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-00016

THE STATE OF TEXAS AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
PLAINTIFFS

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION; TAE JOHNSON, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; TRACY
RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEFENDANTS

Filed: June 14, 2022

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Government's Emer-
gency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Continued
Administrative Stay. (Dkt. No. 244). On June 10, 2022

the Court entered a seven day administrative stay to allow the Government to seek further relief at the appellate level. (Dkt. No. 240 at 96); (Dkt. No. 241). The Government filed a Notice Appeal on June 13, 2022.

The Court has reviewed the Government's Motion, the States' Response, (Dkt. No. 245), and the Government's Reply, (Dkt. No. 246). The Court finds that the Government offers no new arguments related to this Court's entry of a stay, with one exception: the Supreme Court's decision yesterday in *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, which discusses 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the Court is of the opinion that *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez* offers no basis for extending the stay or altering the Court's decision on the merits. Even so, the Court will **EXTEND** the administrative stay an additional seven days to June 24, 2022, so that the Fifth Circuit may have sufficient time to consider any emergency relief sought by the Government.

DISCUSSION

The Government argues that Section 1251(f)(1) constitutes a jurisdictional bar in this case, as it did in *Aleman Gonzalez*. See (Dkt. No. 244 at 3-4) (citing *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, 596 U.S. ____, No. 20-322, slip op. at 5 (2022)). The Government further argues that *Aleman Gonzalez's* reasoning as to injunctions applies equally to vacatur of a rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, relying on Section 1252(f)(1)'s limit on lower courts' jurisdiction to "enjoin or restrain the operation of" the covered provisions of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). The States respond that *Aleman Gonzalez* only applies to injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 245 at 2-4).

Section 1252(f) is titled “Limit on injunctive relief.”¹ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f). In *Aleman Gonzalez*, the Supreme Court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) “strips lower courts of jurisdiction or authority to *enjoin* or *restrain* the operation of the relevant statutory provisions.” *Aleman Gonzalez*, No. 20-322, slip op. at 4 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). After analyzing the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that lower courts are prohibited “from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.” *Id.* at 5. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court in *Aleman Gonzalez* held that Section 1252(f) deprived the district courts of jurisdiction to award class-wide injunctive relief. *Id.* at 1, 11.

The Court concludes *Aleman Gonzalez* is inapplicable for at least three main reasons. First, *Aleman Gonzalez* does not apply to this case because this Court did not enter an injunction. *See id.* at 7 n.2. Instead, the only relief granted was vacatur of the rule. (Dkt. No. 240 at 91 n.69, 94, 96). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted the distinction between vacatur and injunctive relief, describing vacatur as “a less drastic remedy”

¹ Section 1252(f)(1) provides in full:

Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.

than “the additional and extraordinary relief” of an injunction. *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 165-66, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761, 177 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2010). And *Aleman Gonzalez* did not disturb the Supreme Court’s prior holding that Section 1252(f) “[b]y its plain terms, and even by its title, . . . is nothing more or less than a limit on *injunctive* relief.” *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 481, 119 S. Ct. 936, 942, 142 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1999) (emphasis added); see also *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851, 200 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2018) (“Section 1252(f)(1) thus prohibits federal courts from granting classwide *injunctive* relief[.]” (cleaned up) (emphasis added)).

Second, vacatur of the Final Memorandum in this case is not implicated by the Supreme Court’s holding or reasoning in *Aleman Gonzalez* because vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act does not “enjoin or restrain the operation of” Sections 1226 or 1231. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). In fact, the Court preemptively explained this distinction in its Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Dkt. No. 240 at 94 n.71) (citing *Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coal. v. Trump*, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25, 60 (D.D.C. 2020)).

Finally, reading *Aleman Gonzalez* as the Government does is not only an incorrect interpretation of that case, but it would likely insulate virtually every rule related to the INA from judicial review. Such a result is inconsistent with the Fifth Circuit’s explicit rejection of the Government’s claimed authority to have “unreviewable and unilateral discretion to ignore statutory limits imposed by Congress and to remake entire titles of the

United States Code to suit the preferences of the executive branch.” *Texas v. Biden*, 20 F.4th 928, 1004 (5th Cir. 2021), *cert. granted*, 142 S. Ct. 1098, 212 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2022).

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court hereby **EXTENDS** the administrative stay of the Final Judgment, (Dkt. No. 241), an additional seven days to June 24, 2022, for the sole purpose of providing the Fifth Circuit sufficient time to decide whether an additional stay should be entered. The Court **DENIES** all other requested relief.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on June 14, 2022.

/s/ DREW B. TIPTON
DREW B. TIPTON
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-40367

STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; TROY MILLER, SENIOR
OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNITED
STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; TAE
JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; TRACY RENAUD, SENIOR OFFICIAL
PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
U.S. CITIZENSHIP IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed: July 6, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:21-CV-16

Before: JONES, CLEMENT, and ENGELHARDT, *Circuit
Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

Before the court is the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") request to stay the district court's vacatur of a new immigration rule that radically reduces the federal government's detention of those who are statutorily required to be removed post-haste. The district court determined that the rule conflicts with federal statutes, is arbitrary and capricious, and that its promulgation was procedurally invalid. We are inclined to agree. Because DHS fails to make a strong showing of likelihood of success on appeal, the motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED. We distinguish this case from a recent decision by the Sixth Circuit, authorizing a stay pending appeal, based on differing precedent and the benefit of a complete trial record.

BACKGROUND

Federal immigration law provides that the Attorney General "shall take into custody," "shall detain," and "shall remove" aliens convicted of certain enumerated crimes and aliens who have become subject to final orders of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1), 1231(a)(2), 1231(a)(1)(A). Under the current Presidential Administration, to "implement" these provisions, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has outlined new immigration "guidance for the apprehension and removal of noncitizens" in a series of memoranda. The first memorandum was circulated in January 2021, when then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security David Pekoske purported to "announce[] substantial changes to the enforcement of the Nation's immigration laws," including the establishment of certain enforcement priorities. The approved enforcement priorities entailed national security, public safety, and border security.

What made this memorandum controversial was that each of these categories was narrowly defined to address certain threats but exclude others enumerated in the federal statutes. For example, DHS required Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents to prioritize the enforcement of aliens who committed aggravated felonies, but not other deportable aliens with final orders of removal or who trafficked controlled substances, participated in the commercialized sex industry, trafficked humans, were convicted of certain firearm offenses, among others. Effective enforcement in this context would mean that ICE agents could apprehend aliens with certain criminal convictions or aliens who have final removal orders and detain them for speedy processing toward removal. But the first memorandum basically ignored the legal requirement of detention, and therefore the likelihood of removal, for those not “prioritized.”

In February, Acting ICE Director Tae Johnson issued a second memorandum, reiterating the same three narrowly-focused categories. That memorandum added a requirement that enforcement agents obtain “preapproval” from their superior offices for any enforcement action against criminal aliens that did not fall within the three priorities. Both the January and February memoranda were labelled interim measures and were intended to guide immigration officials “until Secretary Mayorkas issues new enforcement guidelines.”

On September 30, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas issued a third and final memorandum (“Final Memo”). Notably, it is agreed that the Final Memo is an agency rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Final

Memo “serve[d] to rescind the January and February Memoranda.” It rearticulated the same three enforcement priorities, but, unlike the prior memos, it did not “presumptively subject [the priorities] to enforcement action.” Instead, before ICE officers may arrest and detain aliens as a threat to public safety, they are now required to conduct “an assessment of the individual and the totality of facts and circumstances,” including various aggravating or mitigating factors. Immigration enforcement personnel are prohibited from “rely[ing] on the fact of conviction . . . alone,” no matter how serious. Similarly, enforcement personnel “should evaluate the totality of the facts and circumstances” before determining whether an alien who is otherwise a threat to border security ought to be subject to enforcement.

Not only did the Final Memo engrave these three priorities into immigration enforcement, but it also specified procedures to ensure agency-wide compliance. Specifically, the Final Memo required “[e]xtensive” and “continuous” training, and the implementation of a “rigorous review” process of all enforcement decisions. According to the memo, DHS would also “need to collect detailed, precise, and comprehensive data as to every aspect of the enforcement actions [] take[n] pursuant to th[e] guidance, both to ensure the quality and integrity of [the] work and to achieve accountability for it.” Notably, the Final Memo establishes a “fair and equitable case review process to afford noncitizens and their representatives the opportunity to obtain expeditious review of the enforcement actions taken.” In other words, according to the Final Memo, those whom the law designates as aliens are granted an entirely new av-

enue of redress in the event they are removed or detained in a manner that conflicts with the guidance. The Final Memo was circulated along with a second memo titled “Significant Considerations in Developing Updated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law” (“Considerations Memo”), which summarized the key aspects of the Final Memo. The Considerations Memo further purported to provide insight into DHS’s reasoning for issuing the Final Memo.

The district court found that these regulatory actions, culminating in the Final Memo, have had measurable effects on immigration enforcement. This is particularly true in Texas, where, from 2017 to 2020 (*i.e.*, before any of the memoranda were issued) ICE agents rescinded no more than a dozen criminal detainers annually. Yet the district court found that from January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022, detainers for 170 criminal aliens were rescinded in Texas.¹ At least seventeen of those aliens failed to comply with their parole conditions, four have committed new crimes, and at least one remains at large in Texas with a warrant out for his arrest.² At least fifteen of the detainers were rescinded after the Final Memo became effective. One alien who was initially subject to a final order of removal was instead released to the public in Texas after his detainer was rescinded. The marked increase in rescinded detainers of criminal aliens has led the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) to update its

¹ Detainers were reissued for 29 of these criminal aliens.

² Similarly, one of the criminal aliens in Louisiana was convicted of indecent behavior with juveniles and sexual battery, yet his detainer was rescinded, and he was released subject to supervised release.

inmate-tracking system to record any rescinded detainees, a feature that was previously unnecessary due to the infrequency at which this occurred. According to data from 2019, DHS previously acknowledged that criminal aliens recidivated at an average rate of four criminal arrests/convictions per alien.

Texas and Louisiana filed suit, challenging the legality of the Final Memo on the basis that it is contrary to federal law, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally invalid.³ The States argued that DHS's issuance of the Final Memo conflicts with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a), both of which provide that the Attorney General “shall” detain or remove an alien who committed certain crimes or who is subject to an order of removal, respectively. Because the Final Memo prohibits these statutorily mandated detentions and removals absent a thorough “review [of] the entire criminal and administrative record” in order to ascertain the “totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue,” the States contended that the rule cannot stand, and they thus

³ The States initially filed suit against the January and February Memos, before the Final Memo was even issued. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of both memos. *Texas v. United States*, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351 (S.D. Tex. 2021). A panel of this court initially stayed the injunction, *Texas v. United States*, 14 F.4th 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2021), but the *en banc* court voted to vacate that decision. *Texas v. United States*, 24 F.4th 407, 408 (5th Cir. 2021) (*en banc*). During these appellate proceedings, the Final Memo was issued, thus “rescind[ing] the January and February Memoranda.” Accordingly, at DHS’s request, this court dismissed the appeal. *Texas v. United States*, No. 21-40618, 2022 WL 517281, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2022). The States then amended their complaint to challenge the Final Memo.

sought injunctive relief. The district court consolidated the preliminary injunction motion with a two-day bench trial. In an exhaustive opinion, the court agreed with the States' positions on all three issues and vacated the Final Memo. He stayed the effect of the vacatur briefly to allow DHS to seek appellate review. Defendants expeditiously moved this court to stay the vacatur order pending appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When asked to consider whether to grant a stay, this court determines “(1) whether the applicant has made a strong showing of likelihood to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of a stay will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.” *Thomas v. Bryant*, 919 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2019). DHS's burden is a substantial one, as a stay is “an extraordinary remedy” and it is “an equitable one committed to this court's discretion.” *Id.* The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions *de novo*. *Coe v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C.*, 695 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

DHS defends its rule and challenges the district court's decision by invoking a plethora of theories. Based on the following discussion, it is likely that the district court's opinion evinces no reversible error of fact or law, nor any abuse of discretion. We begin with DHS's multiple justiciability challenges before proceeding to the merits.

I. Standing

DHS contends that the States lack standing to challenge the Final Memo because any purported injury is speculative, unsupported by the evidence, not fairly traceable to the Final Memo, and not redressable in federal court. We disagree.

The States must establish by a preponderance of the evidence “an injury that is ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.’” *Texas v. United States*, 809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015) (“*Texas DAPA*”) (quoting *Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)). It is only necessary that one state have standing, so we, like the district court, analyze Texas’s standing. *Massachusetts v. E.P.A.*, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007). Notably, “[s]tates are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” *Id.* at 518, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. And here, Texas is entitled to “special solicitude,”⁴ which means imminence and redressability are easier to establish here than usual.

⁴ To be entitled to “special solicitude,” (1) the State must have a procedural right to challenge the action in question, and (2) the challenged action must affect one of the State’s quasi-sovereign interests. *Massachusetts v. E.P.A.*, 549 U.S. 497, 517-19, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-54 (2007). Texas satisfies the first requirement by asserting a procedural right under the APA to challenge the legality of agency action. *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 151. Regarding the second prong, Texas seeks to defend its quasi-sovereign “interest in the enforcement of immigration law.” DHS challenges the conclusion that such an interest entitles Texas to special solicitude, contending that the state’s purported interests amount to no more than the vindication of “policy disagreements.” This is not so. States “bear[] many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.” *Arizona v. United*

A. *Injury*

Texas’s injuries as a result of the Final Memo are difficult to deny, specifically its financial injury and harm as *parens patriae*. *First*, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the Final Memo shifted the cost of incarcerating or paroling certain criminal aliens from DHS to Texas. Specifically, the TDCJ incurs costs to keep aliens in custody or add them to parole or mandatory supervision programs when those aliens are not detained or removed by federal immigration authorities. The district court found that, for Fiscal Year 2020, the cost of these programs for inmates not detained or removed was \$11,068,994. Additionally, the Tarrant County Sheriff estimated that the average cost of jailing inmates with immigration detainers amounted to \$3,644,442 per year. DHS does not contest these findings.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the state incurs substantial costs associated with criminal recidivism, the rate of which is significant among the illegal alien population according to evidence presented in the

States, 567 U.S. 387, 397, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). And “[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States.” *Id.* at 397-98, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. “When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives,” *Massachusetts*, 549 U.S. at 519, 127 S. Ct. at 1454, such as the right to control immigration policy and enforcement. “These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government,” and such forfeited rights are precisely the quasi-sovereign rights that entitle a state to special solicitude. *Id.* at 519-20. See also *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez*, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S. Ct. 3260, 3269 (1982) (“[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in general.”).

district court. The district court found that, as of January 2022, Tarrant County housed 145 inmates with immigration detainers and that, based on the criminal-history of these inmates, the recidivism rate was 90% for that population. In October 2021, the recidivism rate for the inmates with immigration detainers was 69%. Furthermore, DHS conceded that historical data demonstrated that criminal aliens recidivated at an average rate of *four criminal arrests/convictions per alien*. Again, DHS does not meaningfully dispute these findings or the conclusion that recidivism is a serious problem among the criminal alien population.


Third, the district court further found Texas has actually absorbed, or at least will imminently absorb, the costs of providing public education and state-sponsored healthcare to aliens who would otherwise have been removed pursuant to federal statutory law. And “an increase in the number of aliens in Texas, many of whom” will create costs for the States, is sufficient to establish standing. *Texas v. Biden*, 10 F.4th 538, 547 (5th Cir. 2021). This court recognized that Texas suffers constitutional injury where an increase in the number of aliens would cause the state to incur significant costs in issuing additional driver’s licenses. *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 155-56. Similar logic extends to Texas’s obligation to subsidize these additional aliens’ healthcare and education costs.

DHS raises a number of conclusory challenges to some of these fact findings, none of which come close to sustaining “clear error.” It first asserts that the Final Memo does not compel a decrease in enforcement, but rather merely encourages prioritized enforcement against the most dangerous aliens. Underlying this

claim is the assumption that the Final Memo only reconfigured the agency's priorities due to its scarce resources⁵ without implicating enforcement levels. But the uncontroverted detainer data plainly contradict this assertion. DHS does not explain why the average daily number of criminal aliens in the United States' custody dropped following the January Memo, and continues decreasing into 2022 under the Final Memo, let alone successfully show that the district court's findings on this matter were clearly erroneous.⁶

⁵ The district court found that DHS's reliance on the excuse of "insufficient resources and limited detention capacity" was not in good faith. While complaining that Congress has not provided sufficient resources to detain aliens as required by law, DHS simultaneously submitted "two budget requests [for 2023] in which it ask[ed] Congress to cut [its] resources and capacity by 26%." Additionally, since 2021, DHS has "persistently underutilized existing detention facilities." We further note the oddity that DHS emphasizes "limited resources" as its main defense of a rule that increases the complexity of its purportedly already-overwhelmed agents' jobs. For example, the Final Memo instructs that, before pursuing enforcement, personnel should, "to the fullest extent possible, obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative record and other investigative information to learn of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the conduct at issue." But prior to the Final Memo, personnel could simply rely on an order of removal or a qualifying criminal conviction. As the district court observed, DHS is "in effect . . . making it harder to comply with the statutory mandate it complains it doesn't have the resources to comply with."

⁶ DHS complains that the district court "ignor[ed] data from ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection [] that confirms that the government has devoted significant enforcement resources to such border enforcement," referencing various statistics showing an increase in arrests and expulsions year-over-year. It also cites testimony from one of its employees claiming that, in the first 180 days of implementation of the Final Memo, the percentage of enforcement



Rather, the data show that the Final Memo “increases the number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens with final orders of removal released into the United States,” and Texas has shown by a preponderance of the

actions involving noncitizens increased as compared to the same time frame in fiscal year 2020. But any increase is less likely explained by the diligent enforcement efforts of this administration and more likely explained by the unprecedented surge of illegal aliens pouring over the border in record numbers. *See* Amicus Curiae Brief of Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming at 2-3. Given that the number of encounters with illegal border-crossers is ten times what it was in April 2020, *see id.*, an increase in arrests and expulsions is far from impressive, especially if amici are correct that roughly three-fourths of the illegal aliens that cross the border go undetected by DHS entirely. *Id.* at 5. Nevertheless, for purposes of standing, the inquiry is whether the Final Memo caused Texas to have to incur additional financial, law enforcement, and welfare costs, not whether there were generally more enforcement actions year-over-year in the midst of a historic immigration crisis.

evidence that the cost of that reality has fallen on it and will continue to do so.⁷

B. *Traceability*

Nor does this case present a traceability problem. The district court found that, when ICE rescinds a detainer for a criminal inmate in TDCJ custody, those rescissions directly caused the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to revoke parole for certain aliens who were previously approved for parole and, accordingly, those criminal aliens remain in Texas's custody. For others, the district court found that the detainer rescissions caused an increase in the number of criminal aliens and aliens with final orders of removal to be released into Texas. Consequently, some immigrants who, according to the statutes, are required to be detained and deported will certainly seek healthcare services from the State as well as educational services. Thus, Texas is left with few alternatives regarding what to do with these "de-prioritized" aliens otherwise subject to mandatory detention—continue to incarcerate those with criminal convictions, or supervise them rigorously, or provide state-sponsored healthcare and educational services to the releasees. Texas has sufficiently established that these harms are presently or imminently traceable to the Final Memo.

⁷ DHS also baldly asserts that the district court's reliance on the "general statistics in the record" constituted "unwarranted speculation." It counters that the guidance merely focuses resources on the aliens who pose the greatest threat. But such conclusory assertions mean little in light of the evidence illustrating a concerning decline in overall enforcement, and DHS fails to counter or discredit any of those statistics other than by expressing its general disagreement.

C. *Redressability*

Similarly unavailing is DHS's contention that Texas's injuries are not redressable because "resource limitations preclude DHS from enforcing the INA against all noncitizens." The district court's vacatur does not need to operate on all aliens in Texas who are eligible for speedy removal. A court order need only alleviate some of the state's asserted harms. *Sanchez v. R.G.L.*, 761 F.3d 495, 506 (5th Cir. 2014) ("When establishing redressability, a plaintiff need only show that a favorable ruling could potentially lessen its injury; it need not definitively demonstrate that a victory would completely remedy the harm." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Texas's costs would be eased if DHS stopped rescinding detainers pursuant to the Final Memo, and thus vacating the Final Memo would naturally redress Texas's harm to a meaningful degree.

II. *Reviewability*

DHS next articulates several theories that purport to deprive the federal courts of the power to adjudicate the merits. *First*, it suggests, for the first time on appeal, that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) deprives the district court of jurisdiction to vacate the guidance. *Second*, it contends that the Final Memo does not constitute final agency action, thus rendering it unreviewable by the federal courts. *Third*, it asserts that the Final Memo represents decisions that are committed to DHS's discretion by law. *Finally*, it suggests that the States fall outside of the INA's "zone of interests." Each point is likely to fail.

A. *Section 1252(f)(1)*

Section 1252(f)(1) strips the federal courts (other than the Supreme Court) of jurisdiction to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” §§ 1221-1232 of the INA. The Supreme Court recently clarified that § 1252(f)(1) “generally prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.” *Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez*, No. 20-322, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 13, 2022). There, the Court interpreted § 1252(f)(1) to prevent a class of aliens who were detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) from obtaining class wide injunctive relief. *Id.* at 2, 4. The Court held that the ordinary meaning of the statute “bars the class-wide relief” sought. *Id.* at 4. DHS suggests that this holding applies “with equal force to vacatur,” because such a vacatur “prohibits” DHS from implementing the Final Memo and *de facto* “enjoin[s] or restrain[s]” the agency’s enforcement decisions.

But DHS reads too much into the *Aleman Gonzalez* opinion. There are meaningful differences between an injunction, which is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy,” and vacatur, which is “a less drastic remedy.” *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 165, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2761 (2010). The Supreme Court has indicated that § 1252(f) is to be interpreted relatively narrowly. Indeed, the Court described § 1252(f) as “nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.” *Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 481, 119 S. Ct 936, 942 (1999). And again, in a recent opinion, the Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment and additionally noted that the title of the

provision—“Limit on injunctive relief”—clarified the “narrowness of its scope.” See *Biden v. Texas*, No. 21-954, slip op. at *9, 12 (U.S. June 30, 2022) (“*Texas MPP*”). Extending *Aleman Gonzalez* to vacatur is particularly dubious in light of the Court’s caveats.

Additionally, a vacatur does nothing but re-establish the status quo absent the unlawful agency action. Apart from the constitutional or statutory basis on which the court invalidated an agency action, vacatur neither compels nor restrains further agency decision-making. We decline to extend *Aleman Gonzalez* to such judicial orders, especially when doing so would be contrary to the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”⁸ *Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.*, 141 S. Ct. 691, 698 (2021). DHS is unlikely to demonstrate that this provision strips federal court jurisdiction to vacate unlawful agency action.

B. Final Agency Action

Judicial review is available for “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. “The Supreme Court has long taken a pragmatic approach to finality, viewing the APA’s finality requirement as flexible.” *Texas v. EEOC*, 933 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be “final,” (1) the action must “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and “it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature;” additionally, (2) it must “be one by which rights

⁸ Not to mention the fact that the Supreme Court has previously affirmed the vacatur of DHS’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020).

or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1168-69 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). DHS does not dispute that its Final Memo was the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” only that the memo entailed no legal consequences and created no rights or obligations.

Agency action satisfies the second requirement of *Bennett* “if it either appears on its face to be binding or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.” *EEOC*, 933 F.3d at 441. Importantly here, the withdrawal of previously articulated discretion is an action that “alters the legal regime, binds the entity, and thus qualifies as final agency action.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a “withdrawal of discretion distinguishes a policy statement—which leaves the agency the discretion and the authority to change its position in any specific case and does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm—from a final agency action.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

DHS asserts that the guidance in no way binds enforcement agents and their superiors, but “simply ensures that discretion is exercised in an informed way.” As the district court explained, the record plainly belies that assertion.

First, ICE officers previously possessed the discretion to arrest and detain aliens on the basis of a qualifying conviction or a final order of removal alone, subject to mandatory statutory dictates. But the Final Memo withdraws this discretion completely by *prohibiting* them to rely solely on a statutorily qualifying conviction or removal order. It asserts: “The fact an individual

is a removable noncitizen therefore should not alone be the basis of an enforcement action against them;” and DHS “personnel should not rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a database search alone.” This withdrawal of discretion is reinforced by compulsory language used throughout the Final Memo (*i.e.*, “Again, our personnel *must* evaluate the individual and the totality of the facts and circumstances and exercise their judgment accordingly;” “Whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety *is not to be determined* according to bright lines or categories;” “Agency leaders as to whom this guidance is relevant to their operations *will* implement this guidance accordingly.”).

Second, the Final Memo implements various mechanisms to *ensure* compliance, including “[e]xtensive training materials and a continuous training program” in order to “ensure the successful application of this guidance.” Additionally, all enforcement decisions are subject to “rigorous review” during the first ninety days of implementation in order “to achieve quality and consistency in decision-making across the entire agency.” After the ninety days, “[l]onger-term review processes should be put in place . . . drawing on lessons learned,” and “[a]ssessment of implementation of this guidance *should be continuous*.” Accordingly, not only will ICE agents be subject to “extensive” training on this guidance, but they will also have superiors looking over their shoulders to ensure their compliance. Moreover, the Final Memo now mandates the collection of “detailed, precise, and comprehensive data as to every aspect of the enforcement actions [] take[n] pursuant to th[e] guidance, both to ensure the quality and integrity of [the] work and to achieve accountability for it.”

Third, other evidence confirms the Final Memo's binding effect on immigration enforcement. The Considerations Memo, circulated contemporaneously with the Final Memo, asserted that "the new guidelines will *require* the workforce to engage in an assessment of each individual case and make a case-by-case assessment as to whether the individual poses a public safety threat, guided by a consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors." When agents take an enforcement action, they must report it in a database and select which of the three priorities characterizes their actions. The database makes clear that, besides the three priority categories, "*Other*" Priority is no longer an option." Agents must also certify that they have faithfully considered "all relevant case specific information" as instructed by the Final Memo before submitting their information. Thus, an enforcement agent has no conscientious way to avoid the prioritization and special procedures required by the Final Memo.

DHS's insistence that agency-wide discretion remains intact as it was before the Final Memo is untenable. We have no difficulty determining that the Final Memo was a final agency action under § 704.

C. Committed to Agency Discretion

Agency action is not subject to judicial review if it "is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court has "read th[is] exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly, restricting it to 'those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.'" *Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018) (quoting *Lincoln v.*

Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2030-31 (1993)). Seeking to squeeze the Final Memo within this narrow exception, DHS contends that these are agency enforcement decisions, which are “generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).

In the first place, it is unlikely that *Heckler*’s approval of prosecutorial discretion applies to agency rules.⁹ But even if it did, it would not insulate this rule. The Court in *Heckler* expressly distinguished its holding from cases involving the present circumstances. It emphasized:

Nor do we have a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has consciously and expressly adopted a *general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities*. Although we express no opinion on whether such decisions would be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), we note that in those situations the statute conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions were not “committed to agency discretion.”

470 U.S. at 833 n.4, 105 S. Ct. at 1656 n.4 (emphasis added). The Final Memo does not represent a one-off enforcement decision, but rather a calculated, agency-

⁹ See *Texas v. Biden*, 20 F.4th 928, 978-85 (5th Cir. 2021), *as revised* (Dec. 21, 2021), *rev’d on other grounds*, No. 21-954, slip op. at *9, 12 (U.S. June 30, 2022). Notably, DHS did not argue to the Supreme Court that *Heckler* barred judicial consideration of the rule revoking the previous Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy. Yet it is hard to distinguish these two cases from that standpoint.

wide rule limiting ICE officials' abilities to enforce statutory law. As will be indicated below, DHS's interpretation of the governing statutes seems obviously inconsistent with their meaning as a matter of linguistics, text, and context. This rule gives every indication of being "a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities." *Id.* Accordingly, *Heckler* does not save the Final Memo from judicial scrutiny.

But even in the unlikely event that *Heckler* bears on this rule, the Court emphasized in its opinion that any enforcement discretion was not absolute. Rather, "the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." *Heckler*, 470 U.S. at 832-33, 105 S. Ct. at 1656. This makes sense. Congress defines the scope of the agency's discretion, and the Executive is not able to use its discretion in order to thwart the boundaries of its authority. As further explained below, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a) are such substantive statutes that curb agency discretion as it pertains to this particular rule. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018) ("Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a)."). For both these reasons, DHS is unlikely to succeed on this point.

D. *Zone of Interests*

Congress has provided a cause of action under the APA for parties whose alleged injury was "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated." *Collins v. Mnuchin*, 938 F.3d 553, 574 (5th Cir. 2019), *aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part*

sub nom. Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this requirement is not “especially demanding” and “the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted).

DHS contends that the States do not fall within the zone of interests covered by §§ 1226(c) or 1231(a). But this final justiciability argument is also foreclosed by precedent. This court holds that “[t]he interests the states seek to protect fall within the zone of interests of the INA,” and two criminal immigration statutes fall squarely within that interest. *Id.* at 163. The States will have no trouble clearing this low bar on appeal.

III. Legality of Agency Action

DHS’s three defenses of the Final Memo on its merits are also likely to fail on final appellate consideration. We address each in turn.

A. *Contrary to Law*

A primary point of contention here is whether the Final Memo conflicts with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a) by rendering optional what the statutes make mandatory. Significantly, these provisions are distinguishable from 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), construed in *Texas MPP*, which governs aliens apprehended at the U.S. border who claim asylum relief. The relevant provisions here do not utilize discretionary language, unlike the main provision in *Texas MPP*, § 1225(b)(2)(C). Additionally,

unlike Section 1225(b), the instant provisions relate to the expedited removal of a small subset of aliens who have been in the United States and fall into two categories: (1) those who, having been convicted of certain enumerated criminal offenses, are removable; and (2) those who, at the conclusion of immigration proceedings, have become subject to final removal orders. Accordingly, we determine that the Court’s statutory analysis in *Texas MPP* does not foreclose the question presented to this court with respect to §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a).

We begin with the plain language and structure of the statutes. Section 1226(c) provides: “The Attorney General *shall* take into custody any alien who” committed certain delineated crimes¹⁰ “when the alien is released” from state or local custody. § 1226(c)(1) (emphasis added). There is one, and only one, qualification to this mandatory provision, which authorizes discretionary release of such an alien “only if” three things are true—such release is “necessary to provide protection” for a witness or cooperator; *and* the alien proves he will pose no danger to persons or property and will appear for proceedings; *and* the release procedures must take

¹⁰ These crimes include aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, aliens convicted of drug offenses, aliens convicted of multiple offenses with an aggregate sentence of confinement of five years or more, aliens who are traffickers of controlled substances, aliens convicted of an aggravated felony, aliens who participate in the commercialized sex industry, aliens who engaged in terrorist activity, aliens who served in foreign governments and committed “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” aliens who participate in the human trafficking industry, aliens who engage in money laundering, and aliens convicted of certain firearms offenses. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), (a)(3)(B), 1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(A)-(D).

into account the severity of the alien’s offense.¹¹ To effectuate § 1226(c)’s arrest and detention mandate, Congress also provided that the Attorney General *shall* devise and implement a system to identify and track criminal aliens in local, state, and federal custody. § 1226(d) (emphasis added).

Consequently, as the Supreme Court explained, “Section 1226(c) mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens—including those convicted of an aggravated felony.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517-18, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 (2003). In *Demore*, the Court thoroughly explained that § 1226(c) was enacted to redress multiple problems attendant to flight and recidivism because the previous law entitled criminal aliens to individualized bond or detention hearings, which led to a high rate of releases. *Id.* at 518-20, 123 S. Ct. at 1714-16. Congress was “concern[ed] that, even with individualized screening, releasing deportable criminal aliens on bond

¹¹ The provision states:

The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) *only if* the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien.

§ 1226(c)(2) (emphasis added).

would lead to an unacceptable rate of flight.” *Id.* at 520, 123 S. Ct. at 1716. But, evidencing the sharply different enforcement concerns between non-criminal aliens and criminal aliens, Congress provided more discretion as it pertains to non-criminal aliens. Section 1226(a), which applies to aliens “[e]xcept as provided in [§ 1226(c)],” states that the Attorney General “*may* continue to detain the arrested alien,” or “*may* release the alien on” bond or conditional parole. § 1226(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

Closely related to § 1226(c) is § 1231(a), which provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General *shall* remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” § 1231(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Further, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General *shall* detain the alien. *Under no circumstance* during the removal period *shall* the Attorney General release an alien who has” been convicted of enumerated crimes.¹² § 1231(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Under basic principles of statutory construction, different words are accorded their “ordinary” meaning and the text of a statute must be construed as a whole.¹³ Nowhere do these principles make more sense than in

¹² These include a crime of moral turpitude, a drug offense, drug trafficking, human trafficking, multiple offenses with an aggregate sentence of confinement of five years or more, prostitution, an aggravated felony, high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint, failure to register as a sex offender, certain firearm offenses, crimes of domestic violence, crimes against children, or who has engaged in terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), (a)(3)(B), 1226(c), 1227(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), 1231(a)(2).

¹³ ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS* § 24, p. 167 (2012).

the juxtapositions of “shall” with “may” in the two provisions at issue here. In fact, the Court has firmly warned that these terms should be afforded different meanings, especially where both are used in the same statute. See, e.g., *Texas MPP*, slip op. at *13-15 (holding that the “unambiguous, express term ‘may’” does not mean “shall” and it was error for the lower court to hold otherwise); *Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t*, 543 U.S. 335, 346, 125 S. Ct. 694, 703 (2005) (noting that it is error to read these two words synonymously when both are used in the same statute). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted both of these statutes to require mandatory detention.¹⁴ *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280-81 & n.2 (2021) (“During the removal period, detention is mandatory” under § 1231(a)(2), and “[f]or certain criminal aliens and aliens who have connections to terrorism, detention is mandatory” under § 1226(c)); *Nielsen v. Preap*, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2019) (referring to § 1226(c) as a “mandatory-detention requirement”); *Jennings*, 138 S. Ct. at 846 (noting that § 1226(c) “mandates detention”); *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 683, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (2001) (“After entry of a final removal order and during the 90-day removal period, however, aliens must be held in custody” under § 1231(a)(2)); *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 517-18, 123 S. Ct. at 1714 (2003) (“Section 1226(c) mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens.”).

¹⁴ DHS tries to distinguish these cases as involving individual aliens seeking relief. This makes no sense. A straightforward statutory dictate does not modulate from mandatory to permissive based on the particulars of the given case.

The parallel treatment of mandatory and precatory terms indicates conscious choices by Congress. DHS does not dispute that “shall” typically represents mandatory language and that “may” “*clearly* connotes” discretion. *Texas MPP*, slip op. at 13 (quoting *Opati v. Republic of Sudan*, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1603 (2020)). See also *Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States*, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1320 (2020) (“Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”). Nevertheless, citing *Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005), DHS contends that there must be clear legislative intent, beyond the word “shall,” that the legislature intended to overcome the agency’s established discretion. Specifically, DHS argues that *Castle Rock*’s holding that “[t]he deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion” may trump “seemingly mandatory legislative commands” overcomes the plain meaning of the term “shall” in the instant provisions. *Id.* at 761, 125 S. Ct. 2796.

But *Castle Rock* does not apply here for at least two reasons. *First*, *Castle Rock* is distinguishable on its facts. There, the Court determined that the plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order by the state police for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 545 U.S. at 755, 125 S. Ct. at 2803. Colorado law did not make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory, irrespective of the use of the term “shall,” and thus there was no general entitlement to enforcement of such restraining orders. *Id.* at 760-68, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-2809. It is a far stretch of this precedent to extend it from individualized decisions made by police officers to agency-wide decisions made by DHS. It is even more of a

stretch when, as just explained, the statutory language seems incontrovertibly mandatory. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never applied *Castle Rock* to federal agency action, and Fifth Circuit precedent has only applied it to federal agency action where a statutory scheme expressly rendered the agency action discretionary.¹⁵

Second, the limitless principle of law that DHS would have us draw from *Castle Rock* is untenable and wholly unsupported. DHS effectively seeks a reading of *Castle Rock* that would insulate agency action that in any way relates to enforcement duties, despite the plain language of the INA. Nothing in *Castle Rock* compels that conclusion. The ruling there was based, not on a police department-wide policy of not enforcing restraining orders, but rather an individualized instance of non-enforcement. The Final Memo, however, is much more than a singular nonenforcement decision. It is an agency-wide mandate that strips from ICE agents their once-held discretion and subjects all enforcement decisions to strict oversight in express derogation of the governing statutes. *Castle Rock* does not compel us to ignore the plain text of the INA for such agency action. DHS is not likely to succeed on this crucial point.

We are additionally disturbed by certain aspects of the Considerations Memo, which purports to summarize and provide context to the Final Memo. In more ways than one, the Considerations Memo compels officials to comply with the Final Memo by utilizing prosecutorial

¹⁵ *Ridgely v. FEMA*, 512 F.3d 727, 735-36 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the statutes and regulations governing Federal Emergency Management Agency did not create a property interest in enforcement where “mandatory language is wholly absent”).

discretion in a manner that violates statutory law. For example, it provides that the guidelines “are essential to advancing this Administration’s stated commitment to advancing equity for all, including people of color and others who have been historically underserved, marginalized, and adversely affected by persistent poverty and inequality.” DHS’s replacement of Congress’s statutory mandates with concerns of equity and race is extra-legal, considering that such policy concerns are plainly outside the bounds of the power conferred by the INA. Similarly, the Considerations Memo explains that, in identifying those who are a threat to public safety, DHS “chose to place greater emphasis on the totality of the facts and circumstances” instead of identifying this group categorically. But DHS simply lacks the authority to make that choice when the statutes plainly *mandate* such categorical treatment. This is especially troubling in light of the fact that Congress attempted to prohibit such individualized consideration when it enacted § 1226(c) because the previous policy led to unacceptably high rates of criminal alien flight. *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 518-20, 123 S. Ct. at 1714-16. Thus, the Consideration Memo further confirms what the Final Memo says for itself—that it represents a disingenuous attempt on behalf of DHS to claim it acts within the bounds of federal law while practically disregarding that law.

B. *Arbitrary & Capricious*

Courts are compelled to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action[s]” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). While a reviewing court must not “substitute” its “own policy for that of the agency” and

must apply this standard deferentially, the agency action must still “be reasonable and reasonably explained.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). This court “must set aside any action premised on reasoning that fails to account for relevant factors or evinces a clear error of judgment.” *Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. HHS*, 985 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Arbitrary and capricious review “is not toothless.” *Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. EPA*, 920 F.3d 999, 1013 (5th Cir. 2019). “In fact, after *Regents*, it has serious bite.” *Wages & White Lion Invs., LLC v. FDA*, 16 F.4th 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 2021). “[A]n agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself,” not reasons developed post hoc. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 50, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2870 (1983).

DHS contends that the Considerations Memo expresses the basis for the Final Memo and is intended to supplement it. Upon examining the Considerations Memo, the district court found that DHS failed to adequately consider the high chances of recidivism and absconding within the relevant class of aliens as well as the costs or reliance interests of the States. On the other hand, DHS argues that the Considerations Memo sufficiently addresses these factors to satisfy the arbitrary/capricious standard.

The Considerations Memo states that the “public safety” factors “are to be weighed in each case to assess whether a noncitizen poses a current threat to public safety, *including through a meaningful risk of recidivism.*” DHS contends that this illustrates that the agency considered recidivism, and it was not required to

support its position with “empirical or statistical studies.” *Prometheus*, 141 S. Ct. at 1160. But that is beside the point. The district court did not hold that the agency failed to consider recidivism *at all*. To the contrary, the court concluded that DHS failed to consider recidivism among the relevant population at issue in this case—“aliens who have been convicted of or are implicated in serious crime and aliens who have received a final order of removal.” Those are the aliens covered by § 1226(c)¹⁶ or § 1231(a)(2). While the Considerations Memo generally relies on studies about criminality among *all* aliens, those studies did not account for potentially higher rates of recidivism among those “who have already been convicted of a serious crime.”

DHS does not assert that general alien criminality can substitute for data concerning the subset of convicted aliens. In fact, in 2019, DHS itself acknowledged that criminal aliens recidivate and abscond at higher rates:

Of the 123,128 ERO administrative arrests in FY 2019 with criminal convictions or pending criminal charges, the criminal history for this group represented 489,063 total criminal convictions and pending charges as of the date of arrest, *which equates to an average of four criminal arrests/convictions per alien*, highlighting the recidivist nature of the aliens that ICE arrests.

¹⁶ In fact, Congress was especially concerned with the serious harms repeat criminal aliens may cause if not detained when it passed § 1226(c). *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 518-20 (2003).

Yet this actual differential between the general population and the serious previous offender population receives no mention in the Considerations Memo. And it undoubtedly should have, because repeat illegal alien offenders inflict considerable damage on innocent American citizens. On this record, DHS is unlikely to succeed in demonstrating that it considered “the relevant data” and drew a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S. Ct. at 2866 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We next address the costs of this rule to the States and their reliance interests. “When an agency changes course, as DHS did here, it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (quoting *Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 579 U.S. 211, 212, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016)). Failure to do so is fatal. DHS contends that a multi-page section in the Considerations Memo analyzing the “Impact on States” demonstrates that it adequately considered these interests before circulating the Final Memo. The district court found, however, that this analysis merely paid “lip service to the States’ concerns.”

We are troubled by DHS’s dismissive analysis, which dots “i’s” and crosses “t’s” without actually saying anything. For example, DHS minimizes the influence of its policy on the States as maybe having some “downstream impacts.” The Considerations Memo then states that it “cannot provide an exhaustive analysis of all of these potential impacts every time it adopts a change in immigration policy.” Rather, it claims that

any such “assessment” would be “uniquely difficult to conclude with certainty,” so it simply does not bother. Yet, after explicitly declining to quantify or at least reasonably describe the costs of this policy to the States, the agency audaciously concludes that “any effects from implementation of priorities guidance are unlikely to be significant, and could have a net positive effect.”

As to the States’ reliance interests, the Considerations Memo flatly concludes that “no such reasonable reliance interests exist.” In a single paragraph citing no evidence, DHS concluded that the States, including Texas as a 900-mile border state, has *no reliance interests* in the enforcement of federal criminal immigration law according to the governing statutes.¹⁷ This omission is more inexcusable since the States have consistently asserted their reliance interests in the context of this litigation, which has been ongoing simultaneously with DHS’s promulgation of the Final Memo and the Considerations Memo. “Stating that a factor was considered . . . is not a substitute for considering it.” *Getty v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.*, 805 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Rather, courts “must make a searching and careful inquiry to determine if [the agency] actually *did* consider it.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). At this point, DHS has not shown a likelihood that it adequately considered the relevant costs to the States or their reliance interests in the pre-existing enforcement policy.

C. *Procedural Invalidity*

Under the APA, rules must be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking unless they fall within one of the

¹⁷ But see *supra* note 4.

APA's exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). Such exceptions "must be narrowly construed." *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). DHS contends that its rule does not need to be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking because it qualifies as a general statement of policy, which merely "advise[s] the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." *Lincoln v. Vigil*, 508 U.S. 182, 197, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a rule is merely a "policy statement," we evaluate two criteria: "whether the rule (1) imposes any rights and obligations and (2) genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion." *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted). "While mindful but suspicious of the agency's own characterization, we focus primarily on whether the rule has binding effect on agency discretion or severely restricts it." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

As described above, the Final Memo overwhelmingly satisfies both criteria. Both the language found within and the mechanisms of implementing it establish that it is indeed binding, thus removing DHS personnel's discretion to stray from the guidance or take enforcement action against an alien on the basis of a conviction alone. For the same reasons articulated *supra* Section II.B, the Final Memo is much more substantive than a general statement of policy and, as such, it had to undergo notice and comment procedures. Because it did not, DHS is unlikely to be successful in establishing that the Final Memo need not have been subject to notice and comments before its promulgation.

IV. Remaining Stay Factors

DHS's case on the merits is sufficiently weak to justify denying a stay on that basis alone. But we briefly note our skepticism about DHS's allegations of "confusion" and the potential "waste" of "resources" that would result from our allowing the vacatur go into effect. Despite the administrative inconvenience caused by this litigation, DHS has no "interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action." *League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby*, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016). "To the contrary, there is a substantial public interest 'in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.'" *Id.* (quoting *Washington v. Reno*, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, "there is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders, and that interest may be heightened by circumstances such as a particularly dangerous alien." *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1753 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Because the prevention of agency abuse overcomes other factors, none of those counsel in favor of granting DHS's stay.¹⁸

V. *Arizona v. Biden*

That this decision departs from the Sixth Circuit's recent opinion in *Arizona v. Biden* is readily explicable.

¹⁸ We further reject DHS's contention that the nationwide vacatur is overbroad. In the context of immigration law, broad relief is appropriate to ensure uniformity and consistency in enforcement. Furthermore, "[t]here is a substantial likelihood that a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because [criminal aliens not subject to enforcement] would be free to move among states." *Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 188.

In that case, the states of Arizona, Montana, and Ohio brought a nearly identical challenge to the Final Memo and DHS sought a stay of the district court’s nationwide preliminary injunction. *Arizona v. Biden*, 31 F.4th 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2022). The Sixth Circuit ruled differently on several dispositive issues, but our differences result from two factors.

Unlike the Sixth Circuit, this court has developed precedent that predetermines many of our conclusions. *See Texas DAPA*, 809 F.3d at 134. As to issues raised by DHS that are not foreclosed by circuit precedent, we disagree with our sister circuit’s legal conclusions for the reasons articulated above. Importantly, the Sixth Circuit found the factual record before it insufficient to support the states’ standing. *Arizona*, 31 F.4th at 481-82 (“The States do not suggest that the agency had to calculate the costs of its Guidance on States, and the States themselves have not offered any concrete evidence of the Guidance’s fiscal effects on each of them.”). This court’s appellate consideration, in contrast, has been significantly assisted by the district court’s fulsome fact-findings based on a comprehensively tried case. Facts pertinent to standing and to the administrative issues raised by DHS are not wanting in the record before us.

Until there is a contrary ruling from the Supreme Court, we adhere to our precedent and the facts found by the district court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for a stay pending appeal is DENIED.

(ORDER LIST: 597 U.S.)

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2022

CERTIORARI GRANTED

22-58 UNITED STATES, ET AL. V. TEXAS, ET AL.
(22A17)

The application for stay presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. The Solicitor General suggested that the Court may want to construe the application as a petition for certiorari before judgment. Doing so, the petition is granted. The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: 1. Whether the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law; 2. Whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. §1231(a), or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure Act; and 3. Whether 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the Guidelines under 5 U.S.C. §706(2).

The case will be set for argument in the first week of the December 2022 argument session.

Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson would grant the application for stay.