

No. _____

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

RAMON HUESO,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SARAH M. KONSKY
Counsel of Record
DAVID A. STRAUSS
JENNER & BLOCK
SUPREME COURT
AND APPELLATE CLINIC
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
773-702-9611
konsky@uchicago.edu

CATHRYN ARMISTEAD
ARMISTEAD LAW GROUP
222 Second Ave. South
Suite 1700
Nashville, TN 37201

MATTHEW S. HELLMAN
SARAH J. CLARK
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 2255 of 28 U.S.C., which authorizes post-conviction relief for federal prisoners, generally requires post-conviction motions be brought within a year of the judgment and prohibits second or successive claims for relief in most circumstances. But § 2255(e) includes a savings clause that allows a prisoner whose claim is otherwise barred to petition for a writ of habeas corpus if the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.

In this case, after petitioner Ramon Hueso’s first § 2255 motion, a change in circuit law made it clear that Mr. Hueso had been wrongly subjected to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence. The Sixth Circuit—explicitly disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit—nonetheless denied Mr. Hueso’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that a change in circuit law cannot support relief under the savings clause.

The question presented is whether, notwithstanding the savings clause of § 2255(e), an individual serving a wrongfully enhanced sentence is barred from obtaining relief, solely because the wrongfulness of the sentence was established retroactively by a court of appeals decision.

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

Hueso v. Barnhart, No. 18-6299, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judgment entered January 9, 2020.

Hueso v. Barnhart, C/A No. 6:18-176-DCR, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Judgment entered November 26, 2018.

Hueso v. Sepanek, C/A No. 13-19-HRW, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Judgment entered August 6, 2013.

United States v. Hueso, No. 10-30017, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judgment entered March 14, 2011.

United States v. Hueso, C/A No. 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB, U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. Judgment entered February 17, 2010.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED	i
LIST OF PROCEEDINGS	ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI	1
OPINIONS BELOW	1
JURISDICTION	1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED	1
INTRODUCTION	3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	5
A. Mr. Hueso Was Subject to a Twenty-Year Mandatory Minimum Sentence Even Though He Had Faced a Maximum Sentence of Only Six Months for the Underlying “Felony” Drug Offenses.	5
B. The Governing Law Changed to Sharply Reduce the Mandatory Minimum.	7
C. Post-Conviction Proceedings.....	7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION.....	11
I. The Circuits Are Openly Split on the Question Presented.....	11
A. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits Would Entertain Mr. Hueso’s Petition.	12
B. The Circuits That Would Deny Relief Disagree Among Themselves.....	14

II. Federal Judges, and the Government Itself, Have Recognized the Need for This Court’s Intervention.16

 A. Court of Appeals Judges Have Called for This Court’s Review.17

 B. The Government Has Repeatedly Recognized the Appropriateness of This Court’s Review.19

III. This Case Provides an Excellent Vehicle for Resolving This Recurring Question.20

IV. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Is Erroneous.....21

CONCLUSION25

Appendix A

Hueso v. Barnhart, 948 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2020)..... 1a

Appendix B

Hueso v. Barnhart, Civ. A. No. 6: 18-176-DCR, 2018 WL 6172513 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 26, 2018)..... 66a

Appendix C

 Amended Judgment, *United States v. Hueso*, Case No. 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB (D. Alaska Feb. 17, 2010)..... 79a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

<i>Alaimalo v. United States</i> , 645 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2011)	13
<i>Allen v. Ives</i> , 950 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2020).....	13
<i>Beason v. Marske</i> , 926 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2019)	13
<i>Bradford v. Tamez (In re Bradford)</i> , 660 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2011).....	14
<i>Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder</i> , 560 U.S. 563 (2010)	8
<i>Chazen v. Marske</i> , 938 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2019)	13
<i>Davis v. United States</i> , 417 U.S. 333 (1974)	21, 22
<i>Hill v. Masters</i> , 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016)	9
<i>McCarthan v. Directory of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.</i> , 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017)	15, 16, 20
<i>Montgomery v. Louisiana</i> , 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).....	22
<i>Prost v. Anderson</i> , 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011).....	15
<i>United States v. Rosales</i> , 516 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2008)	6
<i>United States v. Simmons</i> , 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)	8
<i>United States v. Sineneng-Smith</i> , 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).....	16
<i>United States v. Valencia-Mendoza</i> , 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019).....	4, 7, 23
<i>United States v. Wheeler</i> , 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), <i>cert. denied</i> , 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).....	12, 20, 23

United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892 (4th Cir. 2018) 18, 19

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980)..... 23

Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019) 18

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2241..... 4

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)..... 2

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)..... 4

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)..... 1, 3, 4, 22

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)..... 4

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)..... 2, 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i) (2002) 6

Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013 (2004) 6

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Brief for Respondent in Opposition, *McCarthan v. Collins*, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 4947338..... 19

Brief for the United States in Opposition, *Higgs v. Wilson*, 140 S. Ct. 934 (2020) (No. 19-401), 2019 WL 6910416..... 19

Brief for the United States in Opposition, *Jones v. Underwood*, 140 S. Ct. 859 (2020) (No. 18-9495) .. 19, 20

Brief for the United States in Opposition, *Walker v. English*, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020) (No. 19-52), 2019 WL 4750035..... 19, 20

Jennifer L. Case, <i>Kaleidoscopic Chaos: Understanding the Circuit Courts' Various Interpretations of § 2255's Savings Clause</i> , 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1 (2014).....	17, 20
Brandon Hasbrouck, <i>Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause</i> , 28 U.S.C. § 2255(E), 108 Geo. L.J. 287 (2019).....	17, 20
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, <i>United States v. Wheeler</i> , 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 18-420), 2018 WL 4846931.....	3, 19, 20, 21

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ramon Hueso petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Sixth Circuit (Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 948 F.3d 324. The order of the district court (Pet. App. 66a) denying petitioner's § 2241 petition for habeas corpus is not reported in the Federal Supplement but is available at 2018 WL 6172513. Petitioner's judgment of conviction is included in the Appendix (Pet. App. 79a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on January 9, 2020. On March 19, 2020 the Court extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including June 8, 2020. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) provides:

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—

- (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
- (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides:

Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents an important and recurring question about the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), which permits a federal prisoner to seek a writ of habeas corpus when the § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” A change in the law established that petitioner was wrongly subjected to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence, but petitioner had no remedy under § 2255. The Sixth Circuit nonetheless refused to entertain his petition for a writ of habeas corpus—while explicitly recognizing that an identically situated individual to petitioner “could pursue in the Fourth Circuit the habeas claim that [petitioner] may not raise in the Sixth.” Pet. App 33a. The government itself has acknowledged this “entrenched conflict” on what it recognized as an “issue of great significance” in a petition seeking review of a Fourth Circuit decision. Pet. Writ Cert., *United States v. Wheeler*, 2018 WL 4846931, at *13, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (“*Wheeler* Pet.”).

The Court denied that petition, but it did so at a time when it was plausible that the split might resolve itself. Instead, the division of authority has only gotten worse, as courts of appeals have taken a variety of inconsistent positions on the interpretation of § 2255(e). In fact, court of appeals judges have repeatedly called for this Court’s review.

This case illustrates the grave problems with this split. Petitioner Ramon Hueso is serving a twenty-year sentence for conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine. His minimum sentence was doubled from ten years to twenty because the sentencing court

treated two prior Washington State convictions for simple possession as felony drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Mr. Hueso had faced a maximum sentence of six months for those convictions under the state sentencing guidelines. At the time of Mr. Hueso's sentencing, binding Ninth Circuit precedent counted a prior conviction as a felony if the statutory maximum exceeded one year, even if the defendant's actual sentence could not exceed a year under applicable sentencing guidelines. But nine years later, the Ninth Circuit reversed course. In *United States v. Valencia-Mendoza*, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that a felony was defined by the sentencing guidelines, not the statutory maximum. *Id.* at 1219-24. In light of this correction, Mr. Hueso's prior convictions should never have counted as prior drug felonies.

At issue in this case is whether Mr. Hueso is barred from seeking relief from his wrongly enhanced sentence, even though his sentencing circuit has corrected the erroneous statutory interpretation that gave rise to that sentence. Section 2255 allows every federal prisoner to file one § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction or sentence in the court of conviction, as Mr. Hueso did in 2011. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (f). A prisoner may file a second or successive § 2255 motion only under severely limited circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). But the statute also provides, in § 2255(e), that when it "appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention," a prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

The circuits are severely split on when § 2255(e)—referred to as the “savings clause”—applies. The Fourth Circuit, along with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, holds that when the sentencing circuit retroactively changes its interpretation of the statute controlling a prisoner’s sentence after he has filed his first § 2255 motion, he may file a § 2241 petition by way of the § 2255(e) savings clause. But the Sixth Circuit held in this case that a circuit court decision can never trigger the savings clause. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits likewise hold that a change in circuit law can never serve as a basis for seeking relief under the savings clause, although they disagree among themselves about when the savings clause does apply.

The dissenting judge below described the consequences of this disarray as “Kafkaesque.” Pet. App. 63a (Moore, J., dissenting). Because § 2241 petitions are filed in the district in which the petitioner is confined, whether an individual can obtain relief—or instead will continue to be imprisoned for, potentially, decades—depends entirely on the government’s decision on where to incarcerate him. Only the Court’s intervention can cure this injury to the rule of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Mr. Hueso Was Subject to a Twenty-Year Mandatory Minimum Sentence Even Though He Had Faced a Maximum Sentence of Only Six Months for the Underlying “Felony” Drug Offenses.

Mr. Hueso’s federal sentence was doubled because of a prior state crime for which he served forty days. In

2006, Mr. Hueso pled guilty to two counts of simple possession of illegal drugs in violation of Washington law. App'x Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus, *Hueso v. Barnhart*, Case No. 6:18-cv-00176-DCR (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2018), ECF No. 1-2. Under state sentencing guidelines at the time, a defendant with Mr. Hueso's characteristics faced a maximum penalty of six months. *Id.* But under the state possession statute, violators with certain other characteristics could face up to five years. *See* Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013 (2004); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i) (2002). The state court sentenced Mr. Hueso to serve a total of forty days—well under his six-month maximum.

Three years later, a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska convicted Mr. Hueso of conspiracy to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). Jury Verdicts, *United States v. Hueso*, C/A No. 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB (D. Alaska Oct. 7, 2009), ECF No. 35. The minimum sentence for that offense was ten years—but if the defendant had previously been convicted of a “felony drug offense,” it doubled to twenty.

The government sought that enhanced penalty, relying on Mr. Hueso's 2006 Washington state convictions. The district court agreed and sentenced Mr. Hueso to twenty years. Pet. App. 81a. At the time, controlling Ninth Circuit precedent held that state convictions constituted felony drug offenses whenever the statutory maximum sentence exceeded one year, even if “the maximum sentence available under the state sentencing guidelines” did not. *United States v. Rosales*, 516 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2008). Applying that rule, the

court determined that Mr. Hueso's two prior convictions constituted felony drug convictions, thus triggering the twenty-year mandatory minimum.

Mr. Hueso appealed his conviction and sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. *United States v. Hueso*, 420 F. App'x 776 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. The Governing Law Changed to Sharply Reduce the Mandatory Minimum.

In 2019, the Ninth Circuit overruled *Rosales* and held that a state court conviction was not a predicate felony for sentencing purposes when the maximum term faced by the defendant under state sentencing guidelines was less than one year. *Valencia-Mendoza*, 912 F.3d at 1219-24. Notably, the defendant in *Valencia-Mendoza* had been convicted in 2007 of violating the same Washington State statute as Mr. Hueso and had been sentenced under the same terms. *Id.* at 1216-17 (describing defendant's violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013 and sentencing under § 9.94A.505).

If Mr. Hueso's case were to come before the Ninth Circuit today, *Valencia-Mendoza* would unquestionably mandate that his Washington State convictions not qualify as predicate drug felonies. He thus would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of only ten years, not twenty years.

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

First § 2255 Motion. In 2011, Mr. Hueso filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Am. Mot. Vacate, *United States v. Hueso*, No. 3:09-cr-00048-RRB-1 (D. Alaska June 7, 2011), ECF No. 95. The

motion was denied, and the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. *United States v. Hueso*, No. 11-35855, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16488 (9th Cir. May 15, 2013).

First § 2241 Petition. In 2013, Mr. Hueso—then confined in Ashland, Kentucky—filed a *pro se* petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus, *Hueso v. Sepanek*, No. 0:13-cv-00019 (E.D. Ky. Feb 13, 2013), ECF No. 1. Challenging his enhanced sentence, Mr. Hueso cited this Court’s decision in *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), which held that a prior state-law misdemeanor conviction for which the defendant could have been prosecuted for a federal felony was not an “aggravated felony” for purposes of denying protection from removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. *Id.* at 566. Mr. Hueso also cited the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent decision in *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), which held that the test for a felony drug offense is whether the maximum penalties faced by the specific defendant under the state’s sentencing guidelines exceed one year, without reference to the statutory maximum penalties a hypothetical defendant could face. *Id.* at 243-50.

The district court denied Mr. Hueso’s petition. *Hueso v. Sepanek*, Civ. A. No. 13-19-HRW, 2013 WL 4017117, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2013). At the time, controlling precedent in the Sixth Circuit held that § 2255(e) could not be used to challenge sentencing. *Id.* at *5 (citing *Hayes v. Holland*, 473 F. App’x 501, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2012)). Finding that the claims based on *Carachuri-Rosendo* were not claims of actual innocence, the court

held that Mr. Hueso could not file a § 2241 petition under the savings clause. *Id.* at *5-6.

Current § 2241 Petition. Mr. Hueso filed his current petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 8, 2018. *Hueso v. Barnhart*, Civ. A. No. 6:18-176-DCR (E.D. Ky. 2018), ECF No. 1. Among other arguments, he asserted that his prior convictions did not qualify as felony drug offenses for purposes of enhancing his sentence in light of *Carachuri-Rosendo* and *Simmons*.

Between Mr. Hueso's first § 2241 petition and his current petition, the applicable law of the Sixth Circuit changed. In *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016), the court held that a prisoner could use a § 2241 petition to challenge the application of a sentence enhancement. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit ruled that requiring a prisoner to serve an enhanced sentence “is a miscarriage of justice” if the prisoner “lacks the predicate felonies to justify” that sentence. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 600. The district court nevertheless denied relief to Mr. Hueso. Reading *Hill* narrowly, the court held that Mr. Hueso's claims did not qualify for use of § 2255(e). Pet. App. 71a-72a.

Acknowledging that it was creating a split with the Fourth Circuit, a divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed on the ground that Mr. Hueso could not invoke § 2255(e). Pet. App. 2a-3a. The majority recognized that *Valencia-Mendoza* had changed the substantive law of the Ninth Circuit. But the panel majority held that Mr. Hueso was not eligible to file a § 2241 petition because “his cited cases do not render a § 2255 motion ‘inadequate or ineffective’ within the meaning of § 2255(e).” Pet. App. 16a. The majority specifically held that circuit court decisions cannot, as a matter of law, establish

inadequacy for purposes of the § 2255(e) savings clause. *Id.*

Judge Moore dissented. Pet. App. 34a-65a. Under this Court's precedents, Judge Moore explained, "[n]onconstitutional claims that could not have been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" *Id.* at 44a-45a (quoting *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976)). Thus, the test for when a prisoner can invoke the savings clause must be whether he, "relying on a new, retroactive decision, can demonstrate an 'error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.'" Pet. App. 45a-46a (quoting *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595).

Accordingly, Judge Moore said, there is no reason why a circuit court decision like *Valencia-Mendoza* cannot trigger the savings clause of § 2255(e) when it reveals a fundamental defect in a conviction or sentence. Judge Moore added that, contrary to the majority's arguments, allowing a change in circuit court law to trigger the § 2255(e) savings clause does not create any choice-of-law problem. Rather, in this case, all the Sixth Circuit had to do was to apply a clear rule from the Ninth Circuit case. "The Ninth Circuit ha[d] *unambiguously overruled* its own precedent." Pet. App. 61a. All that was left was "applying this controlling precedent to Hueso's straightforward claim, and sending him back to the Ninth Circuit for resentencing—which is undisputedly how the Ninth Circuit would treat his claim if he were able to file a § 2255 motion there." *Id.*

Finally, Judge Moore explained that the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Valencia-Mendoza* was a "new, retroactive decision" which rendered the application of the sentencing enhancement in Mr. Hueso's case "a miscarriage of justice." Pet. App. 46a, 54a. She reasoned that *Valencia-Mendoza* (1) could not have been invoked in the initial § 2255 proceeding (because the Ninth Circuit did not decide the case until 2019), and (2) was a retroactive decision under Ninth Circuit law. Pet. App. 54a, 58a. As a result, Judge Moore concluded, a faithful application of both the Sixth Circuit's own precedents and this Court's decisions all required allowing Mr. Hueso's current § 2241 petition to proceed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Circuits Are Openly Split on the Question Presented.

Review is merited because of the deep and entrenched split on the circumstances under which § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the merits of a prisoner's detention. Mr. Hueso's petition would be entertained in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. It was denied in the Sixth Circuit, and it would be denied for different reasons in the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. In effect, Mr. Hueso was denied relief because the government decided to incarcerate him in the Sixth Circuit, rather than either sending him to the Fourth or Seventh Circuit or keeping him where he was originally sentenced, in the Ninth Circuit.

**A. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
Would Entertain Mr. Hueso's Petition.**

Mr. Hueso's § 2241 petition would be allowed to proceed in at least three circuits.

The Fourth Circuit allows challenges to a prisoner's sentence to go forward under § 2255(e) when that challenge is based on a new, retroactive circuit court change in statutory interpretation. *United States v. Wheeler*, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019). In that case, Wheeler filed a § 2241 petition claiming that the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in *Simmons*—handed down after Wheeler filed his § 2255 petition—rendered his sentence illegal because the North Carolina convictions on which his minimum sentence was based no longer qualified as predicate felonies. *Id.* at 420-21. The Fourth Circuit held that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when (1) the sentence was legal at the time of sentencing, according to settled circuit or Supreme Court law; (2) that settled law changed after the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 petition and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner cannot meet § 2255(h)(2)'s requirements for successive petitions; and (4) because of the change in law, “the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.” *Id.* at 429. The Fourth Circuit granted Wheeler's petition, noting that when a prisoner's sentence “never should have been subject to an increase in the first place, the error is grave.” *Id.* at 430.

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit allows an individual to invoke the savings clause to challenge a sentence based

on a circuit court decision changing the interpretation of a statute. *See Beason v. Marske*, 926 F.3d 932, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that *United States v. Spencer*, 739 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2014), authorized relief under § 2241) In fact, in *Beason*, as the Seventh Circuit noted, the government “conceded below—and does not argue to the contrary on appeal—that a circuit court statutory interpretation case” can be the basis for invoking the savings clause. *Id.* at 935. The court explicitly accepted the government’s concession: “Under [the Seventh C]ircuit’s law, . . . a prisoner with a second or successive statutory claim can secure relief based on a court of appeals case.” *Chazen v. Marske*, 938 F.3d 851, 864 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); *see id.* at 864 n.3 (noting that *Chazen* was such a case).

The Ninth Circuit also interprets § 2255(e) to allow habeas petitions like Mr. Hueso’s to proceed. Under long-standing Ninth Circuit law, the savings clause permits a § 2241 petition based on circuit court changes in statutory interpretation when the petitioner raises a claim of “actual innocence.” *See, e.g., Alaimalo v. United States*, 645 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2011). More recently, the Ninth Circuit squarely held that claims of “actual innocence” include claims that a prisoner’s sentence was enhanced based on an invalid predicate. That is, when a prisoner argues that his prior conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime, he claims “that he is thus actually innocent of the mandatory sentencing enhancement.” *Allen v. Ives*, 950 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2020).

That is exactly what Mr. Hueso claims. Because under Ninth Circuit case law his Washington convictions

are not qualifying predicate convictions, his § 2241 petition would be treated by the Ninth Circuit as an actual innocence claim. That claim is based in a new circuit court decision of statutory interpretation. Thus, if the government had incarcerated Mr. Hueso in the circuit in which he was convicted and sentenced, he would have prevailed in the court of appeals.

B. The Circuits That Would Deny Relief Disagree Among Themselves.

The Sixth Circuit and three others would deny Mr. Hueso's petition. Even among these four circuits, however, there is a sharp and intractable disagreement as to the reasons for that denial and whether other prisoners may be granted relief.

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits hold that there are some circumstances in which a prisoner may obtain relief under the savings clause of § 2255(e) despite having previously filed a first § 2255 motion and not qualifying for a second or successive motion under § 2255(h). In the Fifth Circuit, prisoners may use the savings clause to bring actual innocence claims, but a challenge to a sentencing enhancement is not considered an actual innocence claim. *Bradford v. Tamez (In re Bradford)*, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing *Kinder v. Purdy*, 222 F.3d 209, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2000)). By contrast, the Sixth Circuit does allow challenges to sentencing under the savings clause. It instead denied Mr. Hueso's petition on the grounds that "*circuit* decisions cannot, as a matter of law, establish § 2255's inadequacy." Pet. App. 16a.

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 2255 is never rendered inadequate or ineffective by a change in law after a defendant’s conviction and sentence are final. In *Prost v. Anderson*, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.), the Tenth Circuit held that changes in the law after a prisoner has filed his first § 2255 motion are irrelevant to the adequacy of § 2255. So long as the prisoner could have argued—on appeal or in his initial § 2255 motion—that the precedent controlling his case was incorrect, § 2255 provided an adequate opportunity to test the legality of his detention. *Prost*, 636 F.3d at 584. The Eleventh Circuit has since joined the Tenth Circuit’s approach. See *McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.*, 851 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2017) (“We join the Tenth Circuit . . . and hold that a change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention[.]’” (internal citations omitted)).

The explicit disagreement between the court below and the Fourth Circuit is, therefore, symptomatic of pervasive confusion among the lower courts about the interpretation of § 2255(e). Moreover, it is now clear, as it may not have been when the Court denied review in *Wheeler*, that neither the explicit conflict between the Sixth and Fourth Circuits, nor the more general disagreement among the courts of appeals, will be resolved without this Court’s intervention. When the Court denied certiorari in *Wheeler*, the Eleventh Circuit had recently gone out of its way to join the Tenth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of the savings

clause.¹ But since *Wheeler*, it has become clear that there is no trend toward the courts of appeals' harmonizing their views. In that time, both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have reaffirmed, or possibly even expanded, their respective interpretations of the savings clause, which clash sharply with the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as with the court below.

II. Federal Judges, and the Government Itself, Have Recognized the Need for This Court's Intervention.

This circuit split is especially problematic. Most important, it concerns whether an individual may remain in prison for years, potentially even for decades, because of a concededly incorrect interpretation of the law.

Beyond that, ordinarily when there is a disagreement among state courts or courts of appeals, the litigants' rights are determined in a jurisdiction to which they have some connection. They have chosen to live there or to do business there. But because a § 2241 petition must be brought in the district in which an individual is confined, the resolution of the issue presented by this case will depend entirely on where the

¹ The Eleventh Circuit granted the prisoner's petition for rehearing en banc in order to overrule circuit precedent that was more favorable to the prisoner. In fact, because the government at the time did not disagree with circuit precedent, the court appointed an amicus curiae to argue for the position that the en banc majority eventually adopted. See *Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.*, 851 F.3d at 1081; cf. *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020).

Bureau of Prisons has decided to incarcerate the prisoner. That is a circumstance over which the prisoner's adversary has complete control. The arbitrariness of this state of affairs is vividly illustrated in this case: The federal district courthouse in London, Kentucky, where Mr. Hueso's motion was originally denied, is 57 miles by car from Virginia; had the government chosen to confine Mr. Hueso on the other side of that border, a district court in the Fourth Circuit would have granted his petition under *Wheeler*.

Unsurprisingly, judges on both sides of the circuit split have identified this issue as one that this Court should resolve. Even the government has repeatedly acknowledged that the split is important. And commentators agree that, at this point, the courts of appeals will not resolve this split on their own. See Jennifer L. Case, *Kaleidoscopic Chaos: Understanding the Circuit Court's Various Interpretations of § 2255's Savings Clause*, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2014); Brandon Hasbrouck, *Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause*, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(E), 108 Geo. L.J. 287, 293 (2019).

A. Court of Appeals Judges Have Called for This Court's Review.

Court of appeals judges have repeatedly called attention to the importance of this question and asked for this Court's guidance on the scope of available relief. Judge Moore, writing against the background of the Ninth Circuit's willingness to entertain § 2241 petitions like Mr. Hueso's, highlighted the harsh result of the panel majority's opinion:

The majority today withholds relief from Hueso—whose legal arguments have now been undisputedly accepted by the Ninth Circuit, where he would be resentenced under a new rule that would cut his mandatory minimum in half and could result in his immediate release from prison—because, nearly a decade ago, he did not argue to the Ninth Circuit that its standing interpretation of the law was incorrect.

Pet. App. 63a.

Judge Thapar of the Sixth Circuit—who favors the Tenth Circuit’s approach over his own court’s—also called for this Court to step in, noting that “sooner may be better than later” because the “circuits are already split” and the “rift is unlikely to close on its own.” *Wright v. Spaulding*, 939 F.3d 695, 710 (6th Cir. 2019). He emphasized that “so long as [the split] lasts, the vagaries of the prison lottery will dictate how much post-conviction review a prisoner gets,” because, for example, a “federal inmate in Tennessee can bring claims” under the savings clause “that would be thrown out were he assigned to neighboring Alabama.” *Id.* As a result, he said, “[l]ike cases are not treated alike” under the status quo. *Id.*

Judges from other circuits have joined the calls for Supreme Court intervention. Dissenting from the Fourth Circuit’s denial of rehearing in *Wheeler*, Judge Agee urged that questions regarding the scope of the savings clause are of “significant national importance and are best considered by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible date.” *United States v. Wheeler*, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018). The action of this Court,

he said, could “resolve the conflict separating the circuit[s] . . . nationwide” so that “federal courts, Congress, the Bar, and the public will have the benefit of clear guidance and consistent results in this important area of law.” *Id.* at 894.

B. The Government Has Repeatedly Recognized the Appropriateness of This Court’s Review.

The government has also recognized that this issue calls for this Court’s review—even after the government changed its position and adopted the narrow Tenth and Eleventh Circuit approach as its own. *See, e.g.*, BIO, *McCarthan v. Collins*, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 4947338, at *25 (“[G]iven the significance of the issue . . . this Court’s review would be warranted in an appropriate case.”). In opposing petitions for certiorari, the government consistently has limited itself to arguments that particular cases offer poor vehicles for the resolution of this question. *See, e.g.*, BIO, *Walker v. English*, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020) (No. 19-52), 2019 WL 4750035, at *14 (“[N]otwithstanding that circuit conflict and its importance . . .”); *accord* BIO, *Higgs v. Wilson*, 140 S. Ct. 934 (2020) (No. 19-401), 2019 WL 6910416; BIO, *Jones v. Underwood*, 140 S. Ct. 859 (2020) (No. 18-9495).

In asking for this Court’s review in *Wheeler*, the government highlighted how the disarray among the circuits harms its own interest in uniform sentencing, calling this “an issue of great significance.” *Wheeler* Pet. *13. As the government specifically explained, “[t]he disparate treatment of identical claims is particularly problematic because habeas petitions are filed in a prisoner’s district of confinement.” *Id.* at 25. This means that “the cognizability of the same prisoner’s claim may

depend on where he is housed by the Bureau of Prisons and may change if the prisoner is transferred.” *Id.*²

III. This Case Provides an Excellent Vehicle for Resolving This Recurring Question.

This case presents a far better vehicle for review than other cases that have been brought to the Court, particularly in light of the calls for intervention from all sides, the growing disagreement among the circuits, and the gravity of the injustices created by that disagreement. While the Court has denied certiorari in cases where significant mootness and waiver issues were present, none exist here.

Unlike in *Wheeler*, there is no risk of this case becoming moot. Mr. Hueso is only halfway into his twenty-year sentence. In addition, the question of the meaning of § 2255(e) was fully briefed below. *Contra* BIO, *Walker*, 2019 WL 4750035, at *18 (noting that “the government . . . never filed even an appearance, much less a brief, in either the district court or the court of appeals”); *accord* BIO 25, *Jones*, No. 18-9495. And throughout the proceedings below, the parties have remained fully adverse on the question of whether Mr. Hueso’s petition could proceed. *Compare Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 422-23 (noting the government’s “about-face” on the issue); *McCarthan*, 851 F.3d at 1081 (“Because both McCarthan and the Warden argued that the *Wofford* test or some version of it is correct, we appointed . . . *amicus curiae* to argue that our precedents erroneously

² See also Case, *Kaleidoscopic Chaos*, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. at 15; Hasbrouck, *Saving Justice*, 108 Geo. L.J. at 293.

interpreted the saving clause.”). Moreover, the decision below expressly turned on the question presented. In short, the issue in this case is live and fully developed for this Court’s resolution. “Given the need for timely resolution of the issue, the Court should grant certiorari in this case and address it now.” *Wheeler* Pet. *29.

IV. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Is Erroneous.

The court below repeatedly claimed that its position was faithful to the text of § 2255. But the savings clause of § 2255(e) is part of that text. Despite making significant changes to § 2255, Congress has never repealed the savings clause. And the court below, like other courts of appeals that would reject Mr. Hueso’s petition, utterly failed to give coherent content to the savings clause. The manifest difficulty courts have had in interpreting that textual provision does not justify them in effectively disregarding it, or interpreting it in a way that draws arbitrary distinctions between similarly situated petitioners.

Section 2255 was adopted against a set of background principles that, before its enactment, allowed federal prisoners to seek post-conviction relief under § 2241. When enacted, the Court explained, § 2255 “was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus” under § 2241. *Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). That case, like this one, involved a claim for collateral relief based on a court of appeals’ changed interpretation of a federal statute. In that context, the Court identified as a key inquiry whether a “claimed error of law was ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a

complete miscarriage of justice.” *Id.* at 346 (quoting *Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).

The court below emphasized that Congress has since modified and limited § 2255 in various ways. But Congress has never repealed the savings clause, demonstrating Congress’ continued understanding that the § 2255 remedy will sometimes be an “inadequate or ineffective” means of “test[ing] the legality of [an individual’s] detention.” *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

Specifically, the savings clause presupposes that there are cases in which, even though a court has *properly* “den[ied] . . . relief” to a “prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief” under § 2255, the “legality of [the prisoner’s] detention” remains at issue and must be resolved by a habeas court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The evident desire of the panel majority below to make the savings clause, as nearly as possible, a dead letter—a desire implemented by some other courts of appeals—is flatly inconsistent with the consistent congressional understanding reflected in the text.

Congress must be presumed to be aware of the principle that this Court identified as foundational in cases like this—that habeas corpus is available to correct fundamental defects that result in a miscarriage of justice. That principle also enables courts to avoid the constitutional problem that would be presented by continuing a detention unauthorized by law: “[a] conviction or sentence imposed in violation of a substantive rule is . . . contrary to law and, as a result, void.” *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016). And in addition to improperly restricting individual liberty, a court that refuses to recognize and

remedy its erroneous reading of a statute defining crimes or setting punishments is effectively doubling down on its arrogation of legislative powers. *Whalen v. United States*, 445 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1980); *see also Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 430-31 (citing *Hicks v. Oklahoma*, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); *United States v. Tucker*, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)). That is why at least three courts of appeals have recognized that the savings clause must be available when there is a fundamental defect in an individual's conviction or sentence.

The approach taken by those courts of appeals, which would have entertained Mr. Hueso's habeas corpus petition, also avoids significant anomalies. Unless the savings clause permits relief for new statutory claims, an individual may remain confined even once it is clear that his acts did not constitute a crime—or, as in Mr. Hueso's case, that his sentence is based on an erroneous view of the law. And unless the savings clause extends to the decisions of courts of appeals, relief will be unavailable in an especially compelling class of cases—those in which the courts of appeals have reached a consensus on the correct interpretation of a statute, such that this Court does not have to intervene. That is, in fact, exactly what happened here. The Ninth Circuit decision on which Mr. Hueso relied, *Valencia-Mendoza*, reflects the views of all the other courts of appeals that have considered the issue. 912 F.3d at 1223-24 (citing *United States v. Brooks*, 751 F.3d 1204, 1209-13 (10th Cir. 2014); *United States v. Haltiwanger*, 637 F.3d 881, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). It is perverse that

general agreement that the law favors Mr. Hueso on this point should effectively preclude relief.

Mr. Hueso's sentencing court imposed the twenty-year term of imprisonment that it believed, at the time, was the mandatory minimum. It is now undisputed that the mandatory minimum, in a case identical to Mr. Hueso's, is ten years. Mr. Hueso's claim is that this is a "fundamental defect" that requires that his sentence be reconsidered. The court below acknowledged that his claim would succeed in another circuit; the courts of appeals are unable to settle on an interpretation of the savings clause of § 2255(e); and the availability of relief to individuals in Mr. Hueso's position depends on the wholly irrelevant circumstance of where the government chooses to confine them. Review by this Court is therefore warranted.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

SARAH M. KONSKY
Counsel of Record

DAVID A. STRAUSS
JENNER & BLOCK
SUPREME COURT
AND APPELLATE CLINIC
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
773-702-9611
konsky@uchicago.edu

CATHRYN ARMISTEAD
ARMISTEAD
LAW GROUP
222 Second Ave. South
Suite 1700
Nashville, TN 37201

MATTHEW S. HELLMAN
SARAH J. CLARK
JENNER &
BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave., NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001

June 8, 2020

APPENDIX

Appendix A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RAMON HUESO, <i>Petitioner-Appellant,</i>	}	No. 18-6299
<i>v.</i>		
J.A. BARNHART, Warden, <i>Respondent-Appellee.</i>		

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.
No. 6:18-cv-00176—Danny C. Reeves, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: January 9, 2020

Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY,
Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Cathryn R. Armistead, ARMISTEAD
LAW GROUP, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for
Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Kyle M. Melloan,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

MURPHY, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which KETHLEDGE, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 23–43), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Since the founding, Congress has adjusted and readjusted the important balance between an individual’s interest in correcting a wrongful conviction and society’s interest in stopping perpetual attacks on final criminal judgments. In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress adjusted this balance again, this time by placing greater weight on the finality of completed cases. This law generally gives federal prisoners just one chance to overturn a final criminal judgment—by alleging any and all errors in a single motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The law permits a second § 2255 motion only if prisoners show new evidence of their innocence or a new rule of *constitutional* law from the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2). Since 1996, therefore, prisoners have not been able to file a second § 2255 motion based on a new rule of *statutory* law from the Supreme Court.

Unable to invoke new statutory decisions in a second § 2255 motion, prisoners have turned to a different vehicle: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. But they have faced a different obstacle: § 2255 has long barred federal prisoners from seeking habeas relief unless they show that § 2255’s remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their]

detention.” *Id.* § 2255(e). Courts disagree over when (if ever) § 2255(h)’s limits on second § 2255 motions—when combined with a new statutory decision issued after the denial of a first motion—render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” so as to permit a second round of litigation under § 2241. Compare *McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.*, 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), with *Brown v. Caraway*, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013). Our court has joined those that have made the broadest inroads into the 1996 limits in § 2255(h). Unlike some courts, for example, we allow new habeas petitions even if a later Supreme Court decision affects only a prisoner’s sentence, not just the prisoner’s conviction. *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016).

Ramon Hueso asks us to go further still. He argues that prisoners barred from filing a second § 2255 motion may seek habeas relief under § 2241 based on new decisions from the *circuit courts*, not just the *Supreme Court*. Although the Fourth Circuit has blessed an identical request, *United States v. Wheeler*, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), we must respectfully decline. Among our reasons: Congress allowed prisoners to file a second § 2255 motion only if the Supreme Court adopts a new rule of constitutional law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). We would write this limit out of the statute if we held that new rules from the circuit courts (whether of statutory or constitutional law) could render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and trigger the right to a second round of litigation under § 2241. We thus affirm the denial of Hueso’s habeas petition.

I.

The Supreme Court long ago recognized that “the power to award the writ [of habeas corpus] by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law,” not common law. *Ex parte Bollman*, 8 U.S. 75, 94 (1807). This case concerns the relationship between two of those written laws: 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255. The history of these laws—both before and after Congress’s 1996 changes—puts this case’s complicated statutory question in its proper context.

A.

Section 2241, which allows courts to grant “[w]rits of habeas corpus,” dates to the Judiciary Act of 1789. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); *McCleskey v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467, 477–78 (1991). The Supreme Court initially interpreted this statute, like the common-law writ, not to apply to prisoners who had been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction. *Ex parte Watkins*, 28 U.S. 193, 202–03 (1830). But the Court gradually expanded its interpretation of the habeas statute to permit more and more “collateral” attacks on final criminal judgments. *See McCleskey*, 499 U.S. at 478–79.

This expansion caused two practical problems. For one, courts could issue writs only “within their respective jurisdictions,” so prisoners filed habeas petitions in the court with jurisdiction over the prison detaining them. *See Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 446–47 (2004). This rule channeled the growing number of petitions into the few courts with jurisdiction over prisons, compelling those courts to review cases from faraway locations. *United States v. Hayman*, 342 U.S.

205, 213–14, 214 n.18 (1952). For another, “res judicata” did not apply to common-law petitions. *McCleskey*, 499 U.S. at 479. Courts thus read the habeas statute as allowing prisoners to file multiple requests. *Id.* This reading “stimulated the filing of unmeritorious successive petitions,” which were submitted “with the hope, perhaps, of reaching the ear of a different judge[.]” Louis E. Goodman, *Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus*, 7 F.R.D. 313, 315 (1948).

In 1948, Congress passed legislation with remedies tailored to each of these two problems. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 964–68 (1948).

First Remedy: The 1948 law eliminated the need for courts to review distant judgments by creating a new cause of action in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 62 Stat. at 967–68. Section 2255 afforded prisoners the same rights granted by the habeas statute (now moved to § 2241), but in a “more convenient forum”: the sentencing court, not the court of confinement. *Hayman*, 342 U.S. at 219. To ensure that prisoners would use this new remedy, § 2255 directed courts not to entertain a habeas petition under § 2241 if a prisoner had not filed (or had unsuccessfully filed) a § 2255 motion. 62 Stat. at 968; *see, e.g., Broadus-Bey v. Diamond*, 264 F.2d 242, 242–43 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).

That said, § 2255’s ban on habeas filings came with an exception that we have come to call its “saving” or “savings” clause (now in § 2255(e)). This clause clarified that prisoners could not file habeas petitions under § 2241 “unless it also appears that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” 62 Stat. at 968. Before

1996, courts read this clause as “allow[ing] resort to § 2241 sparingly.” *Prost v. Anderson*, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011); *cf. Cohen v. United States*, 593 F.2d 766, 770–71, 771 n.12 (6th Cir. 1979). For example, a prisoner’s “lack of success” on the merits in a § 2255 proceeding did not show § 2255’s inadequacy. *E.g., Litterio v. Parker*, 369 F.2d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam).

Second Remedy: The 1948 law also limited multiple collateral filings. A (now-superseded) sentence in § 2255 said that a “sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive [§ 2255] motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” 62 Stat. at 967. And a new § 2244 adopted similar language for habeas petitions. *Id.* at 965–66. The Supreme Court read these two provisions to codify the limits on multiple filings that courts had been developing in common-law fashion before 1948. *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1963). By the 1990s, these judicially developed limits—which the Court described as a “qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata”—allowed courts to dismiss successive petitions (those raising the same issues decided in a prior petition) or abusive petitions (those raising new issues that could have been asserted in a prior petition). *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 318–19, 318 n.34 (1995).

Because the 1948 statute allowed courts to exercise discretion when enforcing its limits on multiple filings, courts developed various exceptions to these limits. By the 1990s, prisoners could file a second collateral challenge raising a new claim if they showed “cause” for the delay in asserting the claim and “prejudice” from the

alleged error. *See McCleskey*, 499 U.S. at 493–94; *United States v. Flores*, 981 F.2d 231, 234–35, 234 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993). They also could file a second collateral challenge if they made “a proper showing of actual innocence.” *See Herrera v. Collins*, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 (1993). Changes in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a criminal statute implicated both of these judicial exceptions. *See United States v. Richards*, 5 F.3d 1369, 1370–72 (10th Cir. 1993). A new interpretation that was “novel” could prove cause. *Reed v. Ross*, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). And a new interpretation that limited a statute’s scope could show that a prisoner was innocent of the offense under the statute’s narrowed reach. *Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998).

B.

In 1996, Congress replaced these judicially developed limits on multiple § 2255 motions with a categorical limit (now in § 2255(h)) that generally prohibits second § 2255 motions. *See* Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220. Yet Congress adopted two statutory exceptions to this new statutory limit that codified narrower versions of the prior judicially developed exceptions. A new change-in-law exception allows a second motion based only on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). And a new actual-innocence exception allows a second motion based only on “newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense[.]” *Id.* § 2255(h)(1).

This case mixes a rule that Congress revised with one it left alone. Start with the revision: Congress did not include changes in statutory interpretation as a ground for a second § 2255 motion. Section 2255(h) instead requires either a new constitutional rule by the Supreme Court or new evidence of innocence. Now for what remained: Congress did not touch § 2255(e)’s text allowing a habeas petition under § 2241 if § 2255’s “remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.” Putting the two together, prisoners have argued that Congress—in imposing § 2255(h)’s new limits—meant to impliedly keep the old exception for changes in statutory interpretation by rendering § 2255 inadequate under § 2255(e) when those changes occur. Under this view, prisoners may seek relief based on a new statutory interpretation, but they now must do so with a § 2241 petition (not a § 2255 motion) in their court of confinement (not their sentencing court).

Circuit courts fall along a spectrum in addressing this argument. Some reject it outright because Congress did not include a statutory-changes exception in § 2255(h). *E.g.*, *Prost*, 636 F.3d at 585–86. Many others hold that § 2255(h)’s limits render § 2255 inadequate in “unusual” situations. *In re Dorsainvil*, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). These courts permit new habeas petitions if prisoners show both that a Supreme Court decision adopting a new statutory interpretation proves their “actual innocence,” and that they “had no earlier opportunity” to assert that new interpretation in their

initial § 2255 motion. *Id.* at 251–52; *Triestman v. United States*, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997). Still others allow § 2241 petitions for new statutory cases that affect a prisoner’s sentence, even if the case does not prove the prisoner’s innocence of the offense. *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 427–28; *Brown v. Caraway*, 719 F.3d 583, 586–88 (7th Cir. 2013).

Since 1996, our court has moved from near one end of this spectrum to the other. Early cases reserved whether § 2255(h)’s limits on successive filings could render § 2255 inadequate even if a new statutory decision proved a prisoner’s innocence. *Charles v. Chandler*, 180 F.3d 753, 756–58 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Eventually, though, we found that § 2255(h)’s limits could render § 2255 inadequate if the Supreme Court changed its interpretation of an offense and prisoners lacked a reasonable opportunity to advocate for that interpretation in their initial § 2255 motion. *See Wright v. Spaulding*, 939 F.3d 695, 702–03 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing *Martin v. Perez*, 319 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2003)). We cautioned that this rule applied only when prisoners made “a claim of actual innocence,” *Bannerman v. Snyder*, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003), not when they merely “challenge[d] their sentences,” *United States v. Peterman*, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001). That actual-innocence limit gave way in 2016. In *Hill*, we held that a new Supreme Court decision as to sentencing could render § 2255(h)’s limits inadequate (and permit a habeas petition) if the decision showed a sentencing error that was “sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.” 836 F.3d at 595. Yet *Hill* still requires prisoners to show that

their first § 2255 motion did not give them a “reasonable opportunity” to advocate for the interpretation that the Supreme Court later accepted. *Wright*, 939 F.3d at 705.

C.

In this case, Ramon Hueso asks us to take a step beyond *Hill* by further contracting § 2255(h)’s limits on second motions and expanding § 2255(e)’s allowance for habeas petitions.

Hueso’s Criminal Case & § 2255 Motion. In October 2009, a district court in Alaska convicted Hueso of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute illegal drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a). The default sentencing range for Hueso’s offense fell between 10 years and life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). If, however, Hueso had “a prior conviction for a felony drug offense,” his mandatory-minimum sentence jumped from 10 years to 20 years. *Id.* Federal law defines “felony drug offense” as “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to” certain controlled substances. *Id.* § 802(44).

At Hueso’s January 2010 sentencing, the government asked for the 20-year mandatory minimum because the State of Washington had twice convicted Hueso of possessing illegal drugs. Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013(1) (2004). Under the state statute, these offenses carried a maximum penalty of five years, which exceeded the one-year requirement in the federal definition of felony drug offense. *See id.* § 69.50.4013(2)

(2004); *id.* § 9A.20.021(1)(c) (2004). Under the state sentencing guidelines, however, Hueso faced a maximum six-month term. *Id.* § 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i) (2002); 2002 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 290, § 8 (S.S.H.B. 2338) (West). And he in fact received concurrent 40-day sentences. When the district court sentenced Hueso, Ninth Circuit precedent held that state convictions like Hueso's were felony drug offenses so long as "the state's statutory maximum sentence" exceeded one year, even if "the maximum sentence available under the state sentencing guidelines" did not. *United States v. Rosales*, 516 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2008). Hueso did not contest this point, and the district court sentenced him to the longer 20-year mandatory minimum. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. *United States v. Hueso*, 420 F. App'x 776, 776 (9th Cir. 2011).

Hueso moved to vacate his sentence under § 2255 in the Alaska court that sentenced him. He again did not challenge his 20-year mandatory-minimum sentence. The court denied his motion, and the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. *United States v. Hueso*, No. 11-35855, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16488 (9th Cir. May 15, 2013).

Hueso's § 2241 Petitions. In 2013, Hueso filed his first habeas petition under § 2241 in the Eastern District of Kentucky, the district in which he is confined. This petition challenged his 20-year sentence on the ground that his state convictions were not "felony drug offenses" and that his mandatory minimum should have been 10 years, not 20 years. Hueso relied on two statutory decisions. The first was *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). That case asked whether a

lawful permanent resident who had pleaded no contest to a state’s misdemeanor drug-possession offense (after having pleaded guilty to an earlier drug-possession offense) had “been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’” under the immigration laws. *Id.* at 566–70. Those laws define “aggravated felony,” among other ways, as incorporating the felonies in the Controlled Substances Act (or state equivalents). *Id.* at 567. That act, in turn, allows the government to treat drug possession as a federal “felony” if a defendant has a prior possession conviction. *Id.* at 567–68. The government argued that Carachuri-Rosendo’s misdemeanor offense was an “aggravated felony” because he had a prior possession conviction and could have been charged with a federal felony. The Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not cover those whose conduct “hypothetically” “could have received felony treatment under federal law.” *Id.* at 576.

The second (more relevant) decision came after the Supreme Court remanded a circuit case interpreting “felony drug offense” for reconsideration in light of *Carachuri-Rosendo*. *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit had read “felony drug offense” to cover a state crime with a statutory maximum exceeding one year, even if the defendant could not have been sentenced to more than a year under the sentencing guidelines. *Id.* at 241. But a divided en banc court relied on *Carachuri-Rosendo* to overrule its precedent. *Id.* *Simmons* held that courts must focus on the maximum penalties that a specific defendant faces (under the sentencing guidelines), not the maximum

penalties that any defendant could face (under the statutory maximum). *See id.* at 243–50.

The district court denied Hueso’s first habeas petition. Because of our then-existing cases interpreting § 2255(e) in 2013, Hueso could not challenge sentencing errors in a habeas petition. *Hueso v. Sepanek*, No. 13-cv-19, 2013 WL 4017117, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2013).

In 2018, after our *Hill* decision expanded our interpretation of § 2255(e), Hueso filed a second habeas petition in the Eastern District of Kentucky. He again relied on *Carachuri-Rosendo* and *Simmons*. The district court again denied relief. It held (procedurally) that Hueso may not file a habeas petition to challenge this alleged sentencing error even after *Hill* and (substantively) that Hueso’s state convictions still qualified as felony drug offenses under Ninth Circuit precedent.

A new Ninth Circuit case from 2019 has since undercut the substantive portion of the district court’s opinion. *United States v. Valencia-Mendoza*, 912 F.3d 1215, 1219–24 (9th Cir. 2019). When considering a definition of “felony” like the definition of “felony drug offense,” *Valencia-Mendoza* agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s *Simmons* decision and overruled earlier Ninth Circuit cases as irreconcilable with *Carachuri-Rosendo*. *Id.* *Valencia-Mendoza* held that courts “must consider both a crime’s statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is ‘punishable’” by a term exceeding a year. *Id.* at 1224 (emphasis omitted).

II.

Hueso challenges his 20-year minimum sentence based on the Supreme Court’s *Carachuri-Rosendo* decision, the Fourth Circuit’s *Simmons* decision, and the Ninth Circuit’s *Valencia-Mendoza* decision. Understandably so. *Simmons* and *Valencia-Mendoza* both cite *Carachuri-Rosendo* to hold that statutory definitions like the definition of “felony drug offense” require courts to consider the maximum prison term that a specific defendant may receive under a state’s sentencing guidelines. But Hueso has already litigated one § 2255 motion, and Hueso’s cited cases do not permit him to file a second § 2255 motion because they do not contain new evidence of innocence or new constitutional rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2). Hueso instead argues that these cases make § 2255’s remedy “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of § 2255(e), which, he says, allows him to pursue this sentencing claim in a § 2241 habeas petition.

At the outset, we clarify what we do and do not decide. We do not opine on the merits of Hueso’s claim that his state convictions are not “felony drug offenses.” “[D]iverse viewpoints” exist on this “difficult question.” See *United States v. Recinos-Hernandez*, 772 F. App’x 115, 117 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); *Simmons*, 649 F.3d at 250–58 (Agee, J., dissenting).

We likewise do not opine on whether Hueso’s sentencing challenge alleges the type of statutory error that can be asserted on collateral review at all (even in a timely filed first § 2255 motion). The Supreme Court has held that, unlike constitutional or jurisdictional errors, statutory errors do “not provide a basis for collateral

attack unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” *United States v. Addonizio*, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting *Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). The circuit courts have reached different conclusions about the types of sentencing errors that rise to this fundamental-defect level. See *Snider v. United States*, 908 F.3d 183, 192 n.5 (6th Cir. 2018). All agree that prisoners may challenge statutory errors resulting in a sentence that “was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see, e.g., *Snider*, 908 F.3d at 189. And we have held that the relevant “law” includes the once-mandatory sentencing guidelines, which “had the force and effect of law.” *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 599 (citation omitted). We thus allowed a prisoner to challenge an unlawful career-offender enhancement that resulted in a sentence (300 months) exceeding the mandatory guidelines range that would apply without the enhancement (235 to 293 months). *Id.* at 593, 599. Yet we have since held that this logic does not extend to the now-advisory guidelines. *Bullard v. United States*, 937 F.3d 654, 658–61 (6th Cir. 2019). Here, Hueso was sentenced under the advisory guidelines. And while he argues that his mandatory-minimum sentence was wrongly increased, his 20-year sentence still fell below what would have been the maximum allowed by law (life imprisonment) even without the challenged enhancement. This type of challenge to a mandatory-minimum enhancement thus may or may not be cognizable in a properly filed first motion under § 2255. We need not decide this issue.

Rather, we decide only that Hueso cannot pursue this type of claim in habeas under § 2241 because his cited cases do not render a § 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of § 2255(e). We reach that result for two reasons. His two *circuit* decisions cannot, as a matter of law, establish § 2255’s inadequacy. And his lone *Supreme Court* decision issued when his direct appeal was pending, so he could have cited it in the ordinary course.

A.

We have adopted a “reasonable-opportunity standard” for prisoners seeking to prove § 2255’s inadequacy under § 2255(e). *Wright*, 939 F.3d at 703. Under this standard, prisoners must show “that binding adverse precedent (or some greater obstacle) left [them] with ‘no reasonable opportunity’ to” assert their legal claim on the front end—in their initial § 2255 motion. *Id.* (quoting *In re Davenport*, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998)). But we have yet to identify the kind of statutory changes required on the back end—when § 2255(h) bars another motion. Does a new statutory decision from a circuit court suffice to show § 2255’s inadequacy?

Our cases suggest not. They have all involved a new Supreme Court decision. In *Hill*, we “reiterate[d]” that we “addresse[d] only a narrow subset of § 2241 petitions”—those involving a “a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court[.]” 836 F.3d at 599–600. And our “actual-innocence” cases likewise have all been “based upon Supreme Court decisions announcing new rules of statutory construction unavailable for attack under section 2255.” *Hayes v. Holland*, 473 F. App’x 501, 501–

02 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); *see, e.g., Harrington v. Ormond*, 900 F.3d 246, 248–50 (6th Cir. 2018); *Wooten v. Cauley*, 677 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2012); *Martin*, 319 F.3d at 804–05. We now turn the facts of our prior cases into a holding. In addition to whatever else our reasonable-opportunity standard demands, it requires a Supreme Court decision that adopts a new interpretation of a statute after the completion of the initial § 2255 proceedings. This requirement follows both from § 2255’s text and structure and from the backdrop against which Congress enacted § 2255(h)’s limits in 1996.

1. *Text and Structure*

In recent decades, the Supreme Court has insisted that statutory interpretation depends on statutory text. *E.g., Ross v. Blake*, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). Its approach “calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 167 (2012); *Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).

Following these instructions, we begin with § 2255(e)’s language:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has

denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Under this text, prisoners who have had a § 2255 motion “denied” must show that the statute’s remedy (that is, its “means” for seeking relief) is inadequate or ineffective (that is, “insufficient” or “incapable”) to test (that is, “try”) a legal challenge to their detention. *See, e.g., Bouvier’s Law Dictionary* (1934) (“remedy”); *Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary* 1254, 1271 (2d. ed. 1934) (“inadequate” and “ineffective”); 11 *Oxford English Dictionary* 220 (1st ed. 1933) (“test”). Notably, this statutory language does not give courts license to ask whether they consider § 2255 to be inadequate or ineffective in the abstract. Rather, “the inadequacy or ineffectiveness must relate specifically to a procedural deficiency in ‘test(ing) the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.’” *Cain v. Markley*, 347 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1965). So § 2255(e) asks only whether § 2255’s motion is sufficient to assert a claim on the merits; it does not guarantee “success” on the merits. *Litterio*, 369 F.2d at 396.

This plain language readily explains why, as a general matter, § 2255(h)’s limits on successive motions do not render § 2255’s remedy inadequate or ineffective under § 2255(e). As all courts agree, the initial § 2255 motion provides a sufficient means to test a prisoner’s claims even though § 2255(h)’s limits bar the prisoner from succeeding on any later-filed claims. *See Hill*, 836 F.3d at 594; *Davenport*, 147 F.3d at 608; *Dorsainvil*, 119 F.3d at 251.

This plain language might also suggest the answer to the question presented here: Should an initial § 2255 motion be considered “inadequate or ineffective” under § 2255(e) if the precedent existing at the time of that motion bars a prisoner from succeeding on a claim? The answer is “no” according to those courts that distinguish between testing a claim and succeeding on a claim. *See Prost*, 636 F.3d at 590; *McCarthan*, 851 F.3d at 1085–95. Mistaken precedent may prove that the “*circuit law* is inadequate,” but it does nothing to prove that “the § 2255 remedial vehicle is inadequate or ineffective to the task of *testing* the argument.” *Prost*, 636 F.3d at 590.

Our court, by contrast, has followed a less textual path. We have shaped and reshaped our standards interpreting the phrase “inadequate or ineffective” as if we had the authority to decide this question in common-law fashion. We first required a “showing of ‘actual innocence.’” *Martin*, 319 F.3d at 804. We then molded that requirement into a multi-part test. *Wooten*, 677 F.3d at 307–08. We then adopted different tests for different claims. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 594–95.

Yet we do not read our cases as jettisoning § 2255’s text altogether. “[S]uch a casual disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation” would put us on a collision course with the Supreme Court’s teaching that “a court’s proper starting point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.” *Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media*, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019). This view of our cases would also render Congress’s 1996 limits on successive filings superfluous. Before then, courts had been engaging in precisely that sort of common-law development of the limits on

multiple filings. *Cf. McCleskey*, 499 U.S. at 489. But Congress toppled this judicial framework with § 2255(h). Section 2255(e) should not be read as impliedly resurrecting it—in the court of confinement rather than the sentencing court, no less. That view of our cases would undermine both Congress’s 1996 law and its 1948 law.

We instead implement our “reasonable-opportunity standard” in a manner that best reconciles it with § 2255’s text and structure as a whole. When assessed from that view, our standard must require a new Supreme Court decision after the initial § 2255 motion. The Supreme Court has explained that the “[i]nterpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach”—as we have interpreted the phrase “inadequate or ineffective” to be—“is not confined to a single sentence when the text of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning.” *Star Athletica*, 137 S. Ct. at 1010 (quoting *Maracich v. Spears*, 570 U.S. 48, 65 (2013)). Here, for example, no reasonable interpreter would say that § 2255(f)’s one-year statute of limitations makes § 2255’s remedy “inadequate or ineffective” whenever a prisoner blows that deadline. That reading would obliterate this statute of limitations because prisoners could always bypass the time limit for filing a § 2255 motion by substituting a § 2241 petition in its place. *Wooten*, 677 F.3d at 307. And “there can be no justification for needlessly rendering [these two provisions] in conflict if they can be interpreted harmoniously.” Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 180.

This harmonious-reading rule compels the conclusion that § 2255’s remedy cannot be viewed as “inadequate or

ineffective” unless a prisoner identifies a new Supreme Court decision. Without that rule, we would interpret § 2255(e) to abolish two other limits in § 2255. To begin with, § 2255(h)(2) tells courts that new *constitutional* rules must come from “the Supreme Court” for those rules to authorize another round of § 2255 litigation. But if we held that new *statutory* rules from the circuit courts sufficed to render § 2255’s remedy “inadequate or ineffective,” prisoners could assert new statutory claims (under § 2241) more easily than they could assert new constitutional claims (under § 2255(h)(2)). That reading generates an “odd” dichotomy. *Chazen v. Marske*, 938 F.3d 851, 864 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., concurring). Indeed, whatever the phrase “inadequate or ineffective” means, it cannot be read to distinguish statutory claims from constitutional claims. So if new statutory rules from the circuit courts could trigger § 2255(e) because prisoners cannot vindicate the new rules under § 2255, new constitutional rules from the circuit courts likewise would have to trigger § 2255(e) because prisoners also could not vindicate them under § 2255. But that interpretation altogether erases § 2255(h)(2)’s requirement of a new Supreme Court decision for successive litigation.

In addition, § 2255(f) postpones the start date for the running of its one-year time limit for first § 2255 motions if prisoners rely on new statutory rights, not just new constitutional rights. *See Jamieson v. United States*, 692 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); *Prost*, 636 F.3d at 585–86. The statute does so by tying the running of this limitations period to “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,

if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). So a *circuit* change in interpretation (unlike a *Supreme Court* change) does not trigger the delayed start date for initial § 2255 motions. Rather, § 2255(f) treats § 2255 motions as untimely when they are based on circuit cases that arise one year after a final judgment (the default start date for the limitations period). If, however, we allowed prisoners to use those same circuit cases to proceed through the habeas backdoor—which has no statute of limitations, *see Wooten*, 677 F.3d at 306—then the “Supreme Court” limit in § 2255(f)(3) is no limit at all. Under this view, prisoners who could not satisfy that Supreme Court requirement could simply file a § 2241 petition instead.

In sum, we must read our standards in a way that harmonizes § 2255(e) with § 2255(f)(3) and § 2255(h)(2). This view of the section as a whole shows that later circuit decisions do not suffice to prove that an initial § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test a claim.

2. *Statutory History*

Apart from § 2255’s text and structure, we must read the current § 2255 against the backdrop of its “*statutory* history—the statutes repealed or amended by the statute under consideration.” Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 256; *see, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, 169 U.S. 649, 653–54 (1898). This statutory history, unlike legislative history, itself reflects the constitutional bicameralism and presentment process and thus is vastly more difficult to manipulate than legislative history. *Cf. Scalia & Garner, supra*, at 256. For two

reasons, this historical look confirms that Congress’s 1996 limits on successive motions in § 2255(h) cannot render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” without, at the least, a new Supreme Court precedent.

Reason One: Pre-1996 Limits. As noted, courts had been imposing judicially developed limits on multiple filings before Congress adopted § 2255(h)’s statutory limits. *See Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 318 & n.34. And, as far as we are aware, no court found that those judicial limits rendered § 2255 inadequate when they precluded new filings—even though § 2255(e)’s language dates back to 1948. *Cf. Richards*, 5 F.3d at 1370–72. The “cause” exception to those limits is instructive here because it adopted a test similar to our “reasonable-opportunity standard.” *Wright*, 939 F.3d at 703. This exception allowed prisoners to file another collateral challenge only if a new claim had not been “reasonably available” in prior challenges. *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). If, before 1996, a claim was considered “reasonably available” under these cause rules (and so barred by the judicial limits on successive filings), *id.*, it would make little sense to find today that a prisoner lacked a “reasonable opportunity” to assert that claim under § 2255(e). We should not read Congress’s addition of § 2255(h)—which *strengthened* the limits on successive motions—as paradoxically *relaxing* those limits by expanding the meaning of § 2255(e)’s words.

And notably, when prisoners sought to establish “cause” with a new precedent, the Supreme Court’s cases suggested that nothing but a new Supreme Court precedent would do. The new precedent must have departed so dramatically from prior cases that it could

be said to have created a new claim that had not been previously “available.” *Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986). The Court “identified several circumstances in which a new rule representing a clear break with the past” might satisfy this test. 1 Brian R. Means, *Postconviction Remedies* § 24:15, at 891–92 (2019). Each circumstance contemplated a new Supreme Court decision: The Court might “explicitly overrule one of its precedents”; it might “overturn a longstanding and widespread practice” that had been adopted by “a near-unanimous body of lower court authority”; or it might “disapprove of a practice the Court arguably had sanctioned in prior cases.” *Id.* (discussing *Ross*, 468 U.S. at 17–18). If, by contrast, a circuit’s decisions precluded a claim—that is, if the claim was “unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time,” *Engle v. Isaac*, 456 U.S. 107, 130 n.35 (1982) (citation omitted)—the prisoner could not establish “cause” for failing to raise the claim from that fact alone. *See Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 623–24. Yet if we now held that this same circuit precedent could show § 2255’s inadequacy under § 2255(e) (and allow a prisoner to pursue a habeas claim under § 2241), our conclusion would have rendered meaningless these preexisting “cause” requirements.

Indeed, we would upend more than just the preexisting limits governing successive filings (which have now been superseded by § 2255(h)). The Supreme Court’s “cause” rules continue to apply outside the context of successive petitions. If, for example, a prisoner fails to raise a claim on direct appeal that the prisoner seeks to litigate in a § 2255 motion, courts will consider the claim procedurally defaulted unless the

prisoner shows cause and prejudice (or actual innocence). *E.g.*, *United States v. Frady*, 456 U.S. 152, 166–68 (1982). Because changes in circuit precedent do not generally suffice to show cause, *see, e.g.*, *Damon v. United States*, 732 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2013), those same changes should not suffice to show that § 2255 is inadequate.

Reason Two: Choice-of-Law Problems. The problems that Congress sought to fix in 1948 confirm the need for a new Supreme Court decision. By placing a prisoner’s collateral challenge in the same court that sentenced the prisoner, § 2255 ended “the unseemly spectacle of federal district courts trying the regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordinate jurisdiction.” John J. Parker, *Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus*, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172–73 (1949). The rule that only a later Supreme Court decision may trigger § 2255(e)’s authorization for new habeas filings at least lessens the potential friction between the sentencing court (which hears the § 2255 motion) and the court of confinement (which hears the § 2241 petition). Any new decision from the Supreme Court binds both courts. So when considering a § 2241 petition relying on that new decision, the court of confinement need not “grade” the opinions of the sentencing circuit. Its marching orders will have come from the Supreme Court.

If we held that circuit decisions could prove § 2255’s inadequacy, by contrast, the statute would retain some of the “difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts” before 1948. *Hayman*, 342 U.S. at 219. Prisoners often may be sentenced within one circuit (whose law would apply to

a § 2255 motion), but confined in another (whose law would apply to a § 2241 petition). What happens if the circuit precedent in the court of confinement is more favorable to the prisoner's claim than the circuit precedent in the sentencing court? Even before 1996, prisoners suggested that the sentencing court's less favorable caselaw rendered a § 2255 motion inadequate and allowed resort to habeas in the court of confinement. If true, some courts reasoned, "a prisoner would have the right in every instance to retest the legality of his detention" "because of a possible application of different legal principles by the court confronted with a habeas corpus petition and the court which has already ruled on a section 2255 motion[.]" *Cain*, 347 F.2d at 410. That is, a rule allowing circuit decisions to trigger § 2255(e) would give prisoners the right to "shop around the country in the hope of receiving a more favorable ruling." *Early v. Lamanna*, No. 98-3892, 1999 WL 435156, at *5 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999); 3 Charles A. Wright & Sarah N. Welling, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 623, at 648 & n.26 (4th ed. 2011).

At the least, this rule would trigger a difficult "choice-of-law question." *Chazen*, 938 F.3d at 864 (Barrett, J., concurring). When a court of confinement hears a claim in a § 2241 petition, should it apply its precedent or the circuit precedent from the sentencing court? On the one hand, a rule following the sentencing court's law "ensures that the law that prevails in the judicial circuit of any federal prisoner's conviction, or a substantially similar law, is the law that will be applied to the prisoner's § 2241 petition seeking vacation of a conviction." *Id.* at 865 (citation omitted). It also

eliminates the arbitrary nature of tying the law that governs a § 2241 petition to the location in which the prisoner happens to be detained. *Id.* On the other hand, a rule following the court of confinement’s law comports with the background norm that each court should apply its own precedent on the meaning of federal law. *E.g.*, *AER Advisors, Inc. v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC*, 921 F.3d 282, 288 n.5 (1st Cir. 2019). As then-Judge Ginsburg said, “because there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law, the attempt to ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations simultaneously is inherently self-contradictory.” *In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983*, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987). And while Congress could order a departure from that default principle, it did not do so in 1948. It fixed the problem of one circuit assessing another’s work by changing the venue, not the choice-of-law rules.

This case features all of these problems. Hueso was sentenced in Alaska, so Ninth Circuit precedent governed his direct appeal and § 2255 proceedings. He also relies heavily on the Fourth Circuit’s *Simmons* decision, even though he was not convicted there and is not confined there. Yet he is now imprisoned in Kentucky, so Sixth Circuit precedent would normally govern. But our cases point in opposite directions on the merits of Hueso’s sentencing claim. *Compare United States v. Rockymore*, 909 F.3d 167, 170–71 (6th Cir. 2018), *with United States v. Montgomery*, 893 F.3d 935, 940–41 (6th Cir. 2018). And what if we were to disagree with *Simmons* and *Valencia-Mendoza*? Reasonable minds might conclude that the Supreme Court’s reading

of “an unrelated, civil statutory scheme[]” in *Carachuri-Rosendo* “offers [no] clear direction” in this context. *Simmons*, 649 F.3d at 250 (Duncan, J., dissenting); see *id.* at 250–58 (Agee, J., dissenting). A requirement that the new interpretation spring from the Supreme Court, with its power to impose a uniform interpretation among the circuits, avoids these inter-circuit feuds—the same type of feuds that Congress sought to eliminate in 1948.

3. *Competing Views*

Neither the Fourth Circuit’s decision in *Wheeler* nor the dissent in this case persuades us to take a different view. The Fourth Circuit found “no need to read [§ 2255(e)’s] savings clause as dependent only on a change in Supreme Court law” because its text (unlike § 2255(h)(2)’s text) does not identify a new Supreme Court case as a prerequisite for § 2255 to be considered “inadequate or ineffective.” *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 428–29. True enough. But we still must decide what § 2255(e)’s general “inadequate or ineffective” language means. Even if our precedent requires us to overlook that this general phrase is connected to the words “to test,” we still should interpret the phrase in the way that best comports with the rest of § 2255. See *Star Athletica*, 137 S. Ct. at 1010. And § 2255(h)(2) requires a new Supreme Court decision before triggering the right to a second or successive § 2255 motion. We would read this limit right out of the statute if we held that the limit also rendered § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” under § 2255(e) so as to permit the filing of a § 2241 petition instead.

The Fourth Circuit, by comparison, thought that § 2255(h)(2)’s requirement of a new Supreme Court

decision “cut[] the other way.” *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 428. It said: “Congress could have made savings clause relief dependent *only* on changes in Supreme Court constitutional law by using the identical language in § 2255(e), but it did not.” *Id.* at 428–29. The court thus replaced the harmonious-reading canon with a “discordant-reading” canon. Under its logic, Congress also could have made savings clause relief dependent only on a federal prisoner’s compliance with § 2255(f)’s time limits. Does its failure to do so mean that courts may hold that those time limits render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” under § 2255(e)? We think not. Courts should read § 2255(e)’s general “inadequate or ineffective” phrase in a manner that harmonizes it with the rest of § 2255, not in a manner that creates conflicts in the statutory scheme. For centuries, courts have recognized that “[i]f any section [of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of the other.” Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 167 (quoting 1 Edward Coke, *The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or a Commentary upon Littleton* § 728, at 381a (1628; 14th ed. 1791)). The Fourth Circuit failed to do so.

The Fourth Circuit also said that § 2255(e) applies to those who have already been “denied” relief under § 2255, so Congress meant for it to cover “those prisoners filing a successive § 2255 motion.” *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 429. We do not dispute that § 2255(e)’s language covers those who have had one § 2255 motion denied if they show that § 2255’s remedy is inadequate

or ineffective. But we fail to see how that fact favors the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that they may rely on new *circuit* cases over our conclusion that they must rely on new *Supreme Court* cases.

To its credit, the dissent in this case does confront our concern that interpreting § 2255(e)’s “inadequate or ineffective” language to include statutory changes from the circuit courts would treat the limits in § 2255(f)(3) and (h)(2) as a nullity. The dissent says those limits would bar most untimely or successive § 2255 motions (and so would not be superfluous) because only a narrow subset of circuit changes would trigger § 2255(e): those showing statutory errors that are “sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.” Dissent at 30 (quoting *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595). This response confirms the textual problem with the dissent’s view. As noted, the Supreme Court has long held that a statutory error “does not provide a basis for collateral attack”—whether under § 2241, § 2254, or § 2255—“unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” *Addonizio*, 442 U.S. at 186 (quoting *Hill*, 368 U.S. at 428); see *Reed v. Farley*, 512 U.S. 339, 353–55 (1994). Well before Congress’s 1996 amendments, a federal prisoner needed to satisfy this fundamental-defect requirement when raising statutory errors in collateral attacks. After those amendments, a prisoner still must satisfy this fundamental-defect element even if the prisoner files a timely first-in-time § 2255 motion. If satisfying that preexisting mandate also automatically overcomes Congress’s second-or-successive limits in § 2255(h) or its time limits in

§ 2255(f), those limits do no additional work. We refuse to read the limits out of the statute in this way.

Again to its credit, the dissent recognizes the incongruity of allowing a prisoner to raise a successive statutory claim based on a new circuit decision under § 2241 when the prisoner must rely on a new Supreme Court decision to raise a successive constitutional claim under § 2255(h)(2). Dissent at 31–32. The dissent reconciles this oddity not by requiring new Supreme Court decisions for both statutory and constitutional claims (as we do), but by suggesting that even new constitutional circuit decisions can render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” under § 2255(e). We are not aware of any other opinion that has suggested that a new constitutional decision by a circuit court could render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective and trigger another round of litigation under § 2241. Yet, as the dissent rightly notes, that is the logical implication of *Wheeler*’s holding, despite § 2255(h)(2)’s plain text requiring “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” for successive litigation under § 2255. For this reason, too, we think that our reading best implements § 2255’s text and structure.

In sum, Hueso must identify a new Supreme Court decision to show that § 2255’s remedy is inadequate or ineffective. He thus may not rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Valencia-Mendoza* or the Fourth Circuit’s decision in *Simmons* as the basis for his habeas claim.

B.

That leaves Hueso with one Supreme Court precedent—*Carachuri-Rosendo*—in support of his view that § 2255’s remedy is inadequate to test his sentencing claim. His reliance on this case fails for a timing reason: The Supreme Court decided *Carachuri-Rosendo* in June 2010. *See* 560 U.S. at 563. *Carachuri-Rosendo* thus issued well before Hueso filed his § 2255 motion in June 2011. Indeed, Hueso could have cited *Carachuri-Rosendo* on the direct appeal in his criminal case, which was decided in March 2011. *See Hueso*, 420 F. App’x at 776. Because Hueso faced no “obstacle” to citing this Supreme Court decision in support of his sentencing claim in earlier proceedings, he had a “reasonable opportunity” to rely on the decision. *Wright*, 939 F.3d at 703 (citation omitted). This decision thus does not establish his initial § 2255 motion’s inadequacy.

In response, Hueso argues that he could not have relied on *Carachuri-Rosendo* on direct appeal or in his initial § 2255 motion because of the then-existing Ninth Circuit precedent that foreclosed his claim. Yet the “*new legal arguments*,” *see Wright*, 939 F.3d at 705, that *Carachuri-Rosendo* generated included the argument that later won in the Ninth Circuit—that this new decision overruled prior circuit precedent interpreting terms like “felony drug offense,” *see Valencia-Mendoza*, 912 F.3d at 1219. Indeed, if Hueso had timely raised his claim, the Ninth Circuit may well have found that its earlier decisions conflicted with this “higher intervening authority” in his case, not in *Valencia-Mendoza*’s case. *Id.*

* * *

Disagreements among the circuit courts often create the potential for the unequal treatment of similarly situated parties. Here, Gerald Wheeler could pursue in the Fourth Circuit the habeas claim that Ramon Hueso may not raise in the Sixth. A federal prisoner's ability to seek habeas relief under § 2241 should not depend on where the executive branch opts to confine him. But a circuit conflict would exist over the meaning of § 2255(e) no matter how we resolved Hueso's case. And we must follow the approach that stays true to the text and structure of § 2255, not one that implements our own personal views of justice and fairness. We affirm.

DISSENT

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. In 2009, Ramon Hueso was convicted in the District of Alaska of one count of unlawfully and knowingly conspiring with another to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing actual methamphetamine. *See Hueso v. Barnhart*, No. 6:18-176, 2018 WL 6172513, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 26, 2018). Hueso had been convicted twice before of drug offenses in the State of Washington, so he was subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 20 years. *Id.* Had Hueso been convicted in Alaska of the same federal offense and with the same criminal record in 2019, however, his mandatory-minimum sentence would have been 10 years. This discrepancy is the result of the Ninth Circuit changing its law on how to determine whether a prior offense is a “felony drug offense.” *See United States v. Valencia-Mendoza*, 912 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2019). Hueso, who is now incarcerated within this circuit, seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If he were collaterally attacking his sentence for the first time, he would almost certainly prevail based on the intervening change in law. The only reason he will remain in prison for another decade is because he has already sought habeas relief once, and did not prevail the first time. He should not be foreclosed from seeking such relief, and therefore I dissent.

I.

A jury convicted Hueso of one count of unlawfully and knowingly conspiring with another to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing actual methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). *Hueso*, 2018 WL 6172513, at *2. Because the government gave notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 that Hueso had two prior felony drug convictions, he was subject to the enhanced penalties of § 841(b)(1)(A): namely, the then-applicable 20-year mandatory minimum. *Id.*

Whether one of Hueso's prior drug convictions was properly categorized as a "felony drug offense" is at the heart of this case. "A 'felony drug offense' is defined as 'an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of . . . a State . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs.'" *United States v. Rosales*, 516 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(44)). The statutory maximum under Washington law for both of Hueso's prior drug convictions was five years. *Hueso*, 2018 WL 6172513, at *5. Under Ninth Circuit law at the time of Hueso's federal conviction, "[t]o determine whether a state 'felony drug offense' is punishable by more than one year," a court would "look to the state's statutory maximum sentence and not the maximum sentence available under the state sentencing guidelines." *Rosales*, 516 F.3d at 758. Thus, Hueso's prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses, and he was subject to the enhanced federal mandatory minimum.

But Hueso was not actually subject to imprisonment for a year or longer for either of his prior Washington convictions. R. 1-2 (Pet. App'x at 2) (Page ID #30); *see* Appellant Br. at 17–18. The maximum sentence under Washington's sentencing guidelines to which Hueso was subject was six months. R. 1-2 (Pet. App'x at 2) (Page ID #30); *see* Appellant Br. at 17–18. At the time of Hueso's federal conviction, *Rosales* was the law of the Ninth Circuit, and so the statutory maximum—as opposed to the maximum under the sentencing guidelines—controlled. The law of the Ninth Circuit has since changed. In 2019, the Ninth Circuit held in *United States v. Valencia-Mendoza* that “courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements *and* sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is ‘punishable’ by a certain term of imprisonment.” 912 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2019). Except in certain circumstances that existed neither in *Valencia-Mendoza* nor in this case, Washington's sentencing guidelines are binding, and therefore it is the prescribed guidelines range—not the statutory maximum—that must be considered when determining whether a prior conviction was a felony offense. This is the basis of Hueso's § 2241 petition.

A challenge to the validity of a federal conviction or sentence is generally brought as a motion pursuant to § 2255, whereas a petition concerning the manner or execution of a sentence is appropriate under § 2241. *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2016). A prisoner's ability to access § 2255 relief is limited, however, when the movant is filing a “second or successive” motion. Such a motion is barred unless it “(1) contains newly discovered evidence that ‘would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty,' or (2) is based on 'a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.'" *Id.* (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)). Yet § 2255 has an escape valve of sorts, which is known as the savings clause. This clause allows some prisoners to file their claims under § 2241, free from § 2255's restrictions on second or successive motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

The savings clause says:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

Id.

Until 2016, this court allowed prisoners to use the savings clause to challenge their convictions only when they identified retroactively applicable changes in statutory law that established their innocence. *See United States v. Peterman*, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001). That changed, however, with *Hill*. *Hill* established that, in some limited circumstances, a prisoner can use the savings clause to bring a § 2241 petition to challenge a sentence, even though the prisoner is not asserting that they should not have been

convicted of the underlying crime. In *Hill*, the prisoner was sentenced under the pre-*United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), mandatory guidelines and received a sentencing enhancement as a career offender. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 592–94. After Hill’s conviction, direct appeal, and first § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court issued *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), which directed the lower courts to use the categorical approach when the statute at issue consists of a single set of elements that define the crime “more broadly than the generic offense.” *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 261. The Fourth Circuit—the jurisdiction in which Hill was convicted and sentenced—applied *Descamps* to Hill’s crime of conviction and determined that it was not a violent felony. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. Thus, if Hill had been convicted and sentenced post-*Descamps*, he would not have been subject to the mandatory career-offender sentencing enhancement. But because *Descamps* dealt with statutory interpretation rather than constitutional rights, Hill could not have brought a second motion under § 2255. This court held that Hill had access to relief through the savings clause and was able to file a § 2241 petition. The circumstances in which a prisoner could proceed as Hill did require (1) a case of statutory interpretation, (2) that is retroactively applicable and “could not have been invoked in [the] original petition,” and (3) an error “sufficiently grave to be ‘deemed a miscarriage of justice,’ or, put another way, a ‘fundamental defect’ corrigible in a habeas corpus proceeding.” *Id.* at 598 (quoting *Brown v. Caraway*, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013)). The question before us here is whether the “case of statutory interpretation”

may come from a circuit court, rather than the Supreme Court.

II.

Before delving into this question, the majority states at the outset of its opinion that it will not opine on “whether Hueso’s sentencing challenge alleges the type of statutory error that can be asserted on collateral review at all,” given that “his 20-year sentence . . . fell below what would have been the maximum allowed by law (life imprisonment) even without the challenged enhancement.” Maj. Op. at 10. Indeed, there is no need for further opinion on whether such a challenge is cognizable, because we have already held that it is. In *Hill*, we considered “whether § 2241 may also support a challenge to a misapplied enhancement resulting in a sentence that does not exceed the statutory maximum,” and held that it could. 836 F.3d at 596–97. Specifically, we held that because *Hill* was sentenced under the mandatory sentencing guidelines pre-*Booker*, he could collaterally attack his sentence even though it was lower than the statutory maximum. 836 F.3d at 599 (“Serving a sentence imposed under mandatory guidelines (subsequently lowered by retroactive Supreme Court precedent) shares similarities with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory maximum. Both sentences are beyond what is called for by law, and both raise a fundamental fairness issue.”) (citation omitted). Like *Hill*, Hueso was sentenced pursuant to a mandatory framework that did not allow the district court to exercise discretion in varying downward, resulting in a sentence that is “beyond what is called for by law”; in *Hill*’s case, this framework was a mandatory sentencing

range, and in Hueso’s case, it was a mandatory minimum. Although the sentencing courts in these cases “*might* have imposed [] sentence[s] equally as harsh as th[ose] mandated by [law],” to deny a claim based on this “frail conjecture” would constitute an “arbitrary disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty.” *Hicks v. Oklahoma*, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980).

On this point, the majority cites *Bullard v. United States*, 937 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2019), perhaps in an attempt to find some ambiguity in *Hill*’s holding. *Bullard*, however, only further highlights the problem *Hill* identified with forcing prisoners to bear sentences that are no longer mandatory. In *Bullard*, the prisoner argued that “the district court misclassified him as a career offender, which resulted in a higher recommended sentence.” 937 F.3d at 657. Yet *Bullard* was sentenced pursuant to the post-*Booker*, *advisory* guidelines, unlike *Hill*, whom we permitted to mount a collateral attack on his sentence because it was rendered pursuant to the pre-*Booker*, *mandatory* guidelines. The panel made clear in *Bullard* that the advisory nature of the guidelines was central to its decision: “[A] misapplication-of-an-advisory-guidelines-range claim is . . . not cognizable under § 2255.” *Id.* at 660 (quoting *Snider v. United States*, 908 F.3d 183, 191 (6th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1573 (2019)). The problem the panel had with *Bullard*’s claim was not that his resulting sentence would still be within the statutory maximum. *See id.* at 658. Rather, the panel rejected his collateral attack on the guidelines range because that range was not binding on the sentencing court.

Here, by contrast, the district court was *required* to sentence Hueso to no less than 20 years in prison—a doubling of his mandatory minimum, constraining the district court’s discretion, as it made very clear at sentencing. *See* AK R. 84 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 11–12, 14) (“And so, you know, tough as it is, you know, it’s not—I didn’t write law, I just have to impose the law. . . . None of us wrote the law, . . . [a]nd somewhere along the line, the legislature, I guess, in its war on drugs decided that if you’re going to do it once and then do it again, not learn from your mistakes, then they’re going to treat you seriously. . . . [a]nd so that’s why we—that’s why the sentence, although tough, is deemed reasonable by those who set . . . the sentence.”). Reading *Bullard* consistently with our precedent in *Hill*, it is clear that we permit collateral attacks to mandatory sentences when the sentence has become no longer mandatory, even if the resulting sentence is within the statutory maximum. *See United States v. Wheeler*, 886 F.3d 415, 434 (4th Cir. 2018). To the extent the majority implies that collateral attacks may be unavailable to any prisoners whose sentences fall within their statutory ranges, our binding precedent in *Hill* states otherwise.

III.

Turning to the merits, the majority raises textual, doctrinal, and prudential reasons for rejecting Hueso’s § 2241 petition, none of which are convincing. I consider each in turn.

A.

The majority’s professed adherence to plain-language review falls short, as it ignores the simple fact

that the savings clause in § 2255(e) does not contain the textual limitations placed on second or successive motions in § 2255(h). Whereas the savings clause permits recourse to § 2241 when a remedy by § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective,” § 2255(h) identifies only two specific scenarios in which successive § 2255 motions are permitted. As we recognized in *Hill*, this represents an unmistakable difference between these two provisions: “A § 2241 petition is not subject to the general rule against second or successive motions in the absence of newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law.” 836 F.3d at 594. And as the Supreme Court has emphasized, such differences must mean something. “Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). In this vein, “Congress could have made savings clause relief dependent *only* on changes in Supreme Court constitutional law by using the identical language in [the savings clause], but it did not.” *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 428–29. I would presume that the clear textual differences between § 2255(h) and § 2255(e) are not the result of legislative inadvertence.

Indeed, we have already held that § 2241 covers some territory that § 2255 does not. *Compare Wooten v. Cauley*, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding, in part, that a petitioner may use a § 2241 petition based on “the existence of a new interpretation of statutory law”), *with* 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (no exception for new

interpretations of statutory law). *See also United States v. Barrett*, 178 F.3d 34, 51 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he § 2255 savings clause . . . must mean something.”). The majority expends great effort in suggesting alternative routes that previous panels of this court could have taken in construing the text of the savings clause,¹ but fails to acknowledge that our interpretation of “inadequate or ineffective”—as meaning something other than what the two exceptions in § 2255(h) provide—is well established.

Accepting the premise that the savings clause stands for something, the majority contends further that if we allowed a prisoner to access the savings clause based on an intervening circuit court decision, we would “abolish” the requirement of § 2255(h)(2) that a successive motion be based on a new rule of constitutional law from the Supreme Court. Why? Because “prisoners could assert new statutory claims (under § 2241) more easily than they could assert new constitutional claims (under § 2255(h)(2)).” Maj. Op. at 14.

¹ Throughout its opinion, the majority suggests that, were it not bound by this court’s precedent, it would constrict the availability of habeas corpus even more radically than it does today. For example, through a gossamer distinction between “relief” and “remedy,” *see Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas*, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 488 & n.336 (2018), the majority would apparently adopt the interpretation of § 2255(e) offered in *Prost v. Anderson*, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.), which would bar § 2241 relief for prisoners convicted of acts that had become no longer criminal, prisoners whose sentences exceeded the statutory maximum, and prisoners whose convictions or sentences violated their constitutional rights.

The majority has it backwards. Throughout the opinion, it fails to acknowledge that the savings clause of § 2255(e)—the *only* way for a federal prisoner to seek successive review of his sentence based on a change in statutory law—is extremely narrow and does not create an “easier” path for relief compared to § 2255(h). A brief overview of 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s structure explains why. In the first subsection, § 2255(a), the statute provides four circumstances in which a prisoner may attack a sentence: 1) when “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,” 2) when the sentencing court “was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,” 3) when “the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” and 4) when the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In construing this statute, the Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between those § 2255 claims that assert “constitutional or jurisdictional” errors and those that do not. *Snider v. United States*, 908 F.3d 183, 189 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing *Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1573 (2019). Claims of *constitutional* error need not demonstrate a “complete miscarriage of justice” to be cognizable under § 2255. *Id.* Thus, even if a prisoner is filing his second, third, or fourth § 2255 motion, he may overcome the statute’s general bar on such iterative motions if he invokes “a new rule of constitutional law” made retroactive by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).

Claims in the latter category—such as those raising statutory claims, like Hueso’s—are subject to a more onerous standard. “[N]onconstitutional claims that

could not have been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976) (quoting *Davis*, 417 U.S. at 346). The same is true of second or successive statutory claims brought via the savings clause, under which a prisoner seeking to challenge his sentence must demonstrate an “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.” *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595 (citing *Brown v. Caraway*, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013), and *Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 713 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013)). Yet the majority repeatedly ignores just how narrow § 2255(e)’s supplementary path to relief is. Arguing that Hueso’s interpretation of the savings clause would “write th[e] [§ 2255(h)(2)] limit out of the statute,” Maj. Op. at 2, the majority fails to acknowledge our well-established precedent that “the § 2255 remedy is not considered inadequate or ineffective simply because § 2255 relief has already been denied, or because the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing relief under § 2255, or because the petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or successive motion to vacate.” *Charles v. Chandler*, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Thus, when the majority asks, “Does a new statutory decision from a circuit court suffice to show § 2255’s inadequacy?,” Maj. Op. at 11, it is asking the wrong question. I agree with the majority that the answer to its question is no, as does Hueso.² Only when

² The majority erects and tears down the same straw man in its invocation of § 2255(f)’s one-year statute of limitations. “[N]o

a prisoner, relying on a new, retroactive decision, can demonstrate an “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect” does the savings clause become available. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. Thus, allowing a prisoner to raise an intervening circuit court decision via § 2241 does not allow him to utilize statutory law “more easily” than constitutional law, given this onerous requirement imposed on statutory claims.

The majority suggests that this interpretation would allow a showing of fundamental defect to “automatically overcome[] Congress’s second-or-successive limits in § 2255(h) or its time limits in § 2255(f).” Maj. Op. at 20. This cannot be the case, the majority continues, because a federal prisoner filing his *first* § 2255 motion based on a statutory error must show fundamental defect, and there must be some difference between what is required to file a first and a second or successive motion. Again, the majority tells only half of the story. Even when a federal prisoner can demonstrate that a statutory error in his conviction or sentence constituted fundamental defect, savings-clause relief will be unavailable unless that prisoner can demonstrate “a case of statutory interpretation . . . that is retroactive and could not have

reasonable interpreter,” the majority states, “would say that § 2255(f)’s one-year statute of limitations makes § 2255’s remedy ‘inadequate or ineffective’ whenever a prisoner blows that deadline.” Maj. Op. at 14. Again, I agree. Time and again we have held that more is required of a prisoner seeking access to the savings clause. A showing of a missed deadline would not satisfy *Hill*’s requirement of “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.” *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595.

been invoked in the initial § 2255 motion.” *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. Only by ignoring the other requirements of accessing savings-clause relief, as clarified in *Hill*, can the majority characterize the interpretation of § 2255 offered here as “read[ing] the limits out of the statute.” Maj. Op. at 20.

Still, one might wonder why an intervening circuit court construction of *statutory* law—if creating a “fundamental defect” in a petitioner’s sentence—could afford relief under § 2241, while an intervening circuit court construction of *constitutional* law could not. I agree with the majority that such a reading would fail to harmonize § 2255 with § 2241. Instead, I would permit intervening circuit court decisions of constitutional law—again, only if triggering a “fundamental defect” in a petitioner’s sentence—to make savings clause relief available. This reading would not render § 2255(h)(2) moot in any sense. After all, in the post-AEDPA landscape, a prisoner can file successive § 2255 motions so long as he demonstrates a new Supreme Court rule of constitutional law, even without a showing of error constituting a “complete miscarriage of justice.” *See Davis*, 417 U.S. at 346; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). *See also United States v. Mikalajunas*, 186 F.3d 490, 495–96 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he scope of review of non-constitutional error is more limited than that of constitutional error; a nonconstitutional error does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless it involves ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,’ or is ‘inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.’”) (citations omitted). Yet if the petitioner seeks to rely on a *circuit* court decision of

constitutional law, he would need to make a showing of “fundamental defect” under § 2241, as discussed above. This reading would avoid 1) creating an “odd state of affairs” in which a prisoner with a second or successive statutory claim could secure relief based on an intervening circuit court case, while a prisoner with a second or successive constitutional claim could not, *Chazen v. Marske*, 938 F.3d 851, 864 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., concurring), and 2) rendering § 2255(h)(2) superfluous, because the only instances in which intervening circuit court decisions of constitutional law would suffice for savings-clause purposes would be those involving “error[s] sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.” *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. Not only is there “no need to read the savings clause as dependent only on a change in Supreme Court law,” *Wheeler*, 886 F.3d at 428, but, in order to harmonize § 2255(h) with § 2241, there is an obligation to permit savings-clause relief for statutory and constitutional claims alike.

IV.

The majority next attempts to justify its holding by reference to our precedent, beginning with a discussion of our past rejection of § 2241 petitions that did not raise claims of actual innocence. The relevance of this discussion is unclear, as this case is about something different: Whether an intervening change in circuit law may render a § 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective.” Historical overview of *this* question confirms that we have never limited use of the savings clause to situations in which Supreme Court law has changed. In fact, in analyzing whether a prisoner may access the savings

clause, we have explicitly considered whether the prisoner has demonstrated an intervening change in circuit law.

A.

In none of the cases cited by the majority have we limited use of the savings clause to situations involving intervening Supreme Court decision that postdate a prisoner’s initial § 2255 motion. The majority describes our recent decision in *Wright v. Spaulding*, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019), as stating that our earlier decision in *Martin v. Perez*, 319 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2003), included this limitation. *See* Maj. Op. at 6. In *Wright*, a panel of this circuit stated that *Martin* limited successive habeas petitions to situations in which a prisoner’s argument “had been blocked by binding precedent until a new Supreme Court case cleared the path.” 939 F.3d at 702 (citing *Martin*, 319 F.3d at 805). In *Martin*, however, we never stated that it “mattered,” *Wright*, 939 F.3d at 702 (discussing *Martin*), whether the intervening change in law came from the Supreme Court or a circuit court. Nothing in *Martin* addresses the issue we face here: Whether the distinction between Supreme Court and circuit court caselaw makes a difference.³ Nor did we limit the savings clause in this way in *United States v. Peterman*, 249 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2001), another case cited by the majority in its historical overview.

³ As *Wright*’s lesson on the definition of a holding should illuminate, *see* 939 F.3d at 700–02, there is a difference between a) holding that, in an individual case, a new Supreme Court decision has reopened the door to collateral relief and b) holding that *only* new Supreme Court decisions can reopen this door.

Peterman rejected three prisoners' § 2241 petitions "because [they] ha[d] not shown *an intervening change in the law* that establishe[d] their actual innocence." *Id.* at 462 (emphasis added).⁴ Absent in this formulation is any reference to—let alone a requirement of—an intervening change in *Supreme Court* law. Nor is there any such requirement in *Bannerman v. Snyder*, 325 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2003), another case cited by the majority in its doctrinal review.

Finally, our decision in *Hill* did not limit all savings-clause claims to situations involving intervening changes in Supreme Court law. In *Hill*, we did state that a petitioner could access the savings clause "when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement." 836 F.3d at 600. Yet "we reiterate[d] that our decision addresses only a narrow subset of § 2241 petitions," *id.* at 599, and here Hueso brings a different type of claim from the one brought by *Hill*. In fact, we stated more generally in *Hill*:

When seeking to petition under § 2241 based on a misapplied sentence, the petitioner must show (1) *a case* of statutory interpretation, (2) that is retroactive and could not have been invoked in the initial § 2255 motion, and (3) that the misapplied sentence presents an error

⁴ We have, of course, eliminated the actual-innocence requirement since deciding *Peterman*, as the majority acknowledges. Maj. Op. at 6.

sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of justice or a fundamental defect.

Id. at 595 (emphasis added). This enunciation of our standard clearly does not limit all uses of § 2241 to cases involving “a Supreme Court case of statutory interpretation”; had we intended such a limit, we would have said so.

The majority’s reliance on other precedent interpreting “cause” for failing to raise arguments earlier is similarly unavailing. The majority argues that before Congress codified limits on successive § 2255 motions in AEDPA, “the Supreme Court’s cases suggested that nothing but a new Supreme Court precedent” would establish “cause” for a new motion. *Maj. Op.* at 16. Specifically, the majority states:

If . . . a circuit’s decisions precluded a claim—that is, if the claim was “unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time,” *Engle v. Isaac*, 456 U.S. 107, 130 n.5 (1982) (citation omitted)—the prisoner could not establish “cause” for failing to raise the claim from this fact alone. *See Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 623–24.

Id. This statement overreaches. First, neither the Supreme Court in *Engle v. Isaac* nor the Ninth Circuit in the omitted citation above (a dissenting opinion by Judge Poole in *Myers v. State of Wash.*, 646 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1981)) were discussing the preclusive effect of a circuit court’s decisions. The Supreme Court in *Engle* was explaining that a habeas petitioner under § 2254 “may not bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim,” because

“[e]ven a state court that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is valid.” *Engle*, 456 U.S. at 130. Federal circuit courts, by contrast, are unable to alter course upon their own reflection. *See, e.g.*, 6th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Published panel opinions are binding on later panels. A published opinion is overruled only by the court en banc.”). Similarly, Judge Poole in *Myers* was describing his unwillingness to allow § 2254 petitioners to bypass the *state* courts: “[U]nless the objection was truly so far ahead of its time that its conception would have been visionary, I think that the state trial court is entitled to an opportunity to consider it before it may provide the basis for reversal on federal habeas.” *Myers v. State of Wash.*, 646 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1981) (Poole, J., dissenting), *cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Washington v. Myers*, 456 U.S. 921 (1982). Neither of these opinions dealt with adverse circuit precedent, and neither is binding on this court.

Second, although the Supreme Court in *Bousley v. United States* did reject a § 2255 petition despite settled, adverse circuit precedent foreclosing the prisoner from raising an argument earlier, it did so in the context of procedural default on a direct appeal, not in the context of a successive § 2255 motion. *See* 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Its treatment of adverse circuit precedent is not binding on our court’s interpretation of the savings clause, as Judge Posner explained in *In re Davenport*, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998). In that case, notwithstanding the *Bousley* decision a month prior, the Seventh Circuit permitted a prisoner to file a successive § 2255 motion because settled adverse circuit precedent

would have rendered an earlier argument futile. *Id.* at 611 (“The trial judge, bound by our pre-*Bailey* cases, would not listen to [the prisoner]; *stare decisis* would make us unwilling (in all likelihood) to listen to him.”).⁵

In fact, published caselaw in this circuit has supported consideration of intervening circuit law as a basis for accessing the savings clause. We have held that when a prisoner seeks access to § 2241 via the savings clause because a change in law meant the prisoner was actually innocent, that change in law did not have to come from the Supreme Court; a change in circuit law was sufficient. *See Phillips v. United States*, 734 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying a petition based on actual innocence because “[n]either this Circuit nor the Supreme Court has issued any ‘new decisions interpreting . . .’ the criminal offense” at issue); *see also Haque v. Warden*, 665 F. App’x 390, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2016) (considering an intervening circuit case but declining to grant a § 2241 petition because the case did not create a “new rule of statutory interpretation”). There is no meaningful distinction between the claims in these cases and Hueso’s claim. Thus, the majority’s statement that our savings-clause cases have “all involved a new Supreme Court decision,” Maj. Op. at 11,

⁵ Nor has the *Bousley* decision stopped the federal government from repeatedly arguing to the Supreme Court and to this court that the savings clause provides relief when controlling circuit precedent foreclosed a legal claim at the time of sentencing. *See, e.g.*, U.S. Br. in Opp. at 9, 11–13, *Dority v. Roy*, No. 10-8286 (May 16, 2011); Corrected Br. for the Respondent Warden at 45, *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5188).

ignores the fact that we have explicitly considered new circuit court decisions in the savings-clause analysis.

B.

Because the majority believes that the savings clause does not permit petitions like Hueso's, it does not reach the questions of whether *Valencia-Mendoza*—the Ninth Circuit case on which Hueso relies for his savings-clause argument—1) “could not have been invoked in the initial § 2255 motion” and 2) was a retroactive decision. *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. I would reach both of these questions and hold that Hueso has satisfied this portion of the *Hill* test.

1.

On the question of whether earlier invocation of the decision was possible, the majority is correct that *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), on which *Valencia-Mendoza* was based in part, was issued before Hueso filed his § 2255 motion—indeed, it was issued during the pendency of his direct appeal. But it is the later-decided *Valencia-Mendoza*, not *Carachuri-Rosendo*, that abrogated “binding adverse precedent” and “clear[ed] a path” for Hueso's habeas petition. *Wright v. Spaulding*, 939 F.3d 695, 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2019). After all, *Carachuri-Rosendo* did not deal with the definition of a felony offense, or with federal drug laws at all. It was an immigration case, interpreting a different statutory term in a different context.

Moreover, the fact that *Carachuri-Rosendo* was a building block for the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Valencia-Mendoza* does not undermine Hueso's argument that he could not have raised the Ninth Circuit

case earlier. On this point, the doctrinal chronology leading up to this case is important, and similar to that of *Hill*, in which the petitioner was permitted to use the savings clause after an intervening decision despite the existence of supportive, Supreme Court precedent at the time he filed his first § 2255 motion. At first blush, *Hill* may appear dissimilar; after all, the relevant new cases that Hill relied upon in his § 2241 petition—*Descamps* and *United States v. Royal*, 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2013)—were decided after Hill filed his direct appeal and § 2255 motion, so Hill clearly could not have invoked them earlier. Yet the *Descamps* decision was based on Supreme Court caselaw that predated Hill’s conviction. See *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 260 (citing *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). The Court said in *Descamps* that its “caselaw . . . all but resolves this case” and that the *Descamps* decision was merely applying that caselaw in “the only way we have ever allowed.” *Id.* at 260, 263. Thus, at least some of the building blocks of *Descamps* were available to Hill in his direct appeal and earlier § 2255 motion, yet he was not foreclosed from filing a § 2241 petition based on *Descamps*. If we bar Hueso’s petition because at least one of the building blocks of *Valencia-Mendoza* was available to him at the time of his direct appeal, then Hill’s petition ought to have been barred as well.

There is a further complication, however. A panel of this circuit recently opined that “[a]t no point did the *Hill* panel consider and consciously decide whether Hill’s claim had previously been unavailable. . . . There was no ‘application of the judicial mind’ to that question, so there was no ‘decision’ about it.” *Wright*, 939 F.3d at

704.⁶ In other words, *Wright* says that the foregoing discussion of *Hill*—specifically related to Hill’s ability to rely on *Descamps* despite an earlier opportunity to raise its foundational cases as a basis for relief—is not the *holding* of *Hill*. I am not so convinced. Although the government in *Hill* conceded that the petitioner could not have invoked his claim any earlier, *see* Corrected Br. for the Respondent Warden at 38, 43, *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5188), and the panel in *Hill* did not offer independent analysis on this issue, *see Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595–96, the fact remains that the parties could not stipulate their way around § 2255(e)’s requirement that in order to file a § 2241 petition, a § 2255 motion must have been deemed “inadequate or ineffective.” If *Descamps* had been published a year before Hill filed his § 2241 petition and the government had erroneously conceded that Hill could not have raised it earlier, we surely would not have granted Hill relief based on the parties’ flawed stipulation of law.

In any event, whether or not *Hill*’s acceptance of the parties’ agreement that Hill could not have raised his claim earlier qualifies as a holding, the fact that we

⁶ As an initial matter, *Wright*’s discussion of *Hill* is itself dicta per the framework *Wright* sets forth for determining which parts of judicial opinions are binding: It is not “clear that the [*Wright*] court intended to rest the judgment” on its conclusion that *Hill* lacked a holding on the petitioner’s prior opportunity to invoke a new case. 939 F.3d at 701. The opinion did conclude that “*Hill* held nothing inconsistent with the reasonable-opportunity standard,” *id.* at 703, but it did not “actively appl[y] the conclusion to the case in front of it,” *id.* at 701. There is no further discussion of *Hill* or what its lack of discussion on “reasonable opportunity” meant for *Wright* in his habeas petition.

permitted this claim despite existing Supreme Court caselaw that Hill could have theoretically raised earlier is highly significant in Hueso’s case, which raises precisely the same issue. Here, existing Supreme Court caselaw—namely *Carachuri-Rosendo*—supported Hueso’s argument that his prior convictions did not qualify as felony drug offenses, but adverse circuit precedent—*United States v. Rios-Beltran*, 361 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2004), and *United States v. Murillo*, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005)—directly foreclosed this argument when he first litigated a § 2255 motion. As in *Hill*, it was not until the circuit court explicitly abrogated its old rule that Hueso could reasonably be expected to raise the claim. In *Wright*, by contrast, we concluded that the petitioner—who argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Mathis* constituted intervening law, which he could not have raised earlier—did not “need *Mathis* to clear a path through erroneous Fourth Circuit precedent.” 939 F.3d at 706. We concluded that Wright identified only one binding circuit case on point that, in fact, was *consistent* with *Mathis*—far from the “binding adverse precedent” Wright needed to show that he had “no reasonable opportunity” to make his winning argument earlier. *Id.* at 703, 706 n.8. In this case, on the other hand, the now-overruled Ninth Circuit cases cited by Hueso unambiguously foreclosed the “*new legal arguments*” he raises in his § 2241 petition. *Id.* at 705. *See, e.g., Rios-Beltran*, 361 F.3d at 1208 (“The actual sentence imposed on an individual for a prior conviction . . . is not the relevant inquiry. We look to the maximum penalty allowed by law in determining whether a prior conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under state law for purposes of § 2L1.2.”). This

case is closer to *Hill*, in which controlling circuit precedent foreclosed relief.

2.

Because the majority rejects Hueso’s argument that *Valencia-Mendoza*’s alteration of the “felony offense” definition allows him to use the savings clause in § 2255(e), it also does not reach the question of whether *Valencia-Mendoza* applies retroactively. See *Hill*, 836 F.3d at 595. “New *substantive* rules generally apply retroactively,” *Schriro v. Summerlin*, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004), whereas “rules of criminal procedure” generally do not, *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). A new rule is substantive “if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” *Schriro*, 542 U.S. at 353. “Such rules apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of “an act that the law does not make criminal” or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.’” *Id.* at 352 (quoting *Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (citation omitted)).

The question here is whether *Valencia-Mendoza*, in applying *Carachuri-Rosendo* to the case before it, has retroactive application. I would hold that it does, following the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in *Miller v. United States*, 735 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2013). In *Miller*, the Fourth Circuit confronted the same issue we face here, examining whether a prior circuit case—*United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)—applied retroactively. As the Ninth Circuit did in *Valencia-Mendoza*, the Fourth Circuit had applied *Carachuri-Rosendo* in *Simmons* to determine whether a petitioner’s earlier state conviction was for an

offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Like Hueso, Simmons had received a doubling of his mandatory-minimum sentence—from five to ten years, in Simmons’s case—under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), because existing precedent required the sentencing court to determine whether Simmons’s prior conviction was punishable by a prison term exceeding one year by referencing “the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history.” *Id.* at 241 (quoting *United States v. Harp*, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005)). For the same reasons discussed in *Valencia-Mendoza*, the en banc court in *Simmons* reversed circuit precedent and held that under *Carachuri-Rosendo*, a prior conviction under North Carolina law was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment only if the defendant’s conviction, based on individualized offense characteristics and criminal history, permitted such a sentence. *Id.* at 244.

Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit held in *Miller* that a prisoner could benefit retroactively from the *Simmons* decision because *Simmons* “applied *Carachuri* to create a new substantive rule,” even if the Supreme Court’s decision in *Carachuri-Rosendo* itself did not create a new substantive rule. *Miller*, 735 F.3d at 145. Specifically, the *Miller* court held that “*Simmons* requires the court to look at how much prison time the defendant was exposed to given his own criminal history at the time he was sentenced and any aggravating factors that were actually alleged against him,” and in doing so “altered ‘the class of persons that the law punishes.’” *Id.* at 146 (quoting *Schriro*, 542 U.S. at 353).

Unlike a procedural rule, the new rule in *Simmons* did not “merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of [an] invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.” *Id.* at 145 (quoting *Schriro*, 542 U.S. at 352).

Simmons did for the prisoner there precisely what *Valencia-Mendoza* does for Hueso here: It removed him from the “class of persons” on whom the law imposed double the mandatory-minimum sentence to which he would have otherwise been subject. A decision that “narrow[s] the scope of a criminal statute,” *Schriro*, 542 U.S. at 352, by eliminating certain individuals, like Hueso, from the ambit of a mandatory-minimum sentencing enhancement qualifies as a new substantive rule, whether or not the resulting sentence could have theoretically been imposed by the sentencing court. As a case in point, *Valencia-Mendoza* afforded relief to a prisoner who had incorrectly received a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, despite the fact that his resulting prison sentence—twenty-four months—was still within the statutory maximum set by 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The new rule from *Valencia-Mendoza* thus significantly shrunk the class of persons who are to be punished as prior felony offenders, and should have retroactive application.

V.

Finally, the majority raises prudential concerns with an interpretation of the savings clause that would allow a prisoner like Hueso to seek resentencing based on an update in the law of the circuit where he was sentenced. First, the majority argues that its rule “at least lessens the potential friction between the sentencing court . . .

and the court of confinement.” Maj. Op. at 17. A rule taking its “marching orders” from the Supreme Court, the majority says, avoids a system in which courts of confinement “grade’ the opinions of the sentencing circuit.” *Id.* This misunderstands the dynamic of claims like Hueso’s. For us to grant Hueso relief under § 2241 would not involve any complex interpretation or “grading” of Ninth Circuit precedent. The Ninth Circuit has *unambiguously overruled* its own precedent; we are simply tasked with applying this controlling precedent to Hueso’s straightforward claim, and sending him back to the Ninth Circuit for resentencing—which is undisputedly how the Ninth Circuit would treat his claim if he were able to file a § 2255 motion there. Even when the relied-upon intervening circuit law is less clear than a case like *Valencia-Mendoza*, there will be no greater intercircuit friction than in cases involving a prisoner asking the court of confinement to interpret intervening Supreme Court law as striking down binding law of the sentencing circuit. Yet we have allowed such claims—which may involve far more scrutiny by our circuit on other circuits—for years.⁷ See *Martin v. Perez*, 319 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 2003). On

⁷ Relatedly, the majority misstates the effect of Congress’s enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Maj. Op. at 4 (“The 1948 law eliminated the need for courts to review distant judgments by creating a new cause of action in 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”). Even under the majority’s preferred construction of the savings clause, however, there would be *some* need for such review of distant judgments. To characterize the enactment of § 2255 as “eliminat[ing]” any need for collateral review reads the language of § 2255(e)—which, since 1948, has explicitly contemplated such a need—into thin air.

this point, the majority cannot make up its mind. On the one hand, it favors a system in which our court applies Supreme Court decisions to the law of the sentencing circuit, because “[a]ny new decision from the Supreme Court binds both courts.” Maj. Op. at 17. Yet when it comes to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Carachuri-Rosendo*, the majority says this case “offers [no] clear direction” in this context, *id.* at 18 (quoting *Simmons*, 649 F.3d at 250 (Duncan, J., dissenting)), contrary to its initial statement that Supreme Court decisions provide the certainty necessary to opine on other circuits’ law. At bottom, applying intervening circuit court decisions set forth in § 2241 petitions would be no more difficult or uncomfortable than what this circuit has done for years.

Second, the majority frets over a rule allowing forum-shopping prisoners—who, in the majority’s hypothetical, have the capacity to effect their own transfers to circuits with more favorable law—to benefit when “the circuit precedent in the court of confinement is more favorable to the prisoner’s claim than the circuit precedent in the sentencing court.” Maj. Op. at 17. Yet Hueso has not proposed such a rule, nor would I. Such a rule “would base the choice of law decision on the fortuitous placement of a prisoner by the Bureau of Prisons, not the more rational factor of the place of conviction.” *Chaney v. O’Brien*, No. 07-cv-121, 2007 WL 1189641, at *3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2007) (citing *Zuniga-Hernandez v. Gilkey*, 242 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (S.D. Ill. 2001)), *aff’d*, 241 F. App’x 977 (4th Cir. 2007). Ninth Circuit law, the law of the circuit where Hueso was sentenced, is clearly the law to be applied to Hueso’s § 2241 petition. Sixth Circuit law is immaterial to

assessing the petition. Nothing about a rule permitting prisoners to raise intervening circuit court decisions would result in the type of confusion the majority imagines.

For all space the majority devotes to these exaggerated concerns, it is silent on the Kafkaesque implications of its holding. To be clear: The majority today withholds relief from Hueso—whose legal arguments have now been undisputedly accepted by the Ninth Circuit, where he would be resentenced under a new rule that would cut his mandatory minimum in half and could result in his immediate release from prison—because, nearly a decade ago, he did not argue to the Ninth Circuit that its standing interpretation of the law was incorrect. *See* Appellee Br. at 16 (“[I]t appears Hueso could have been *the* prisoner to raise *Carachuri-Rosendo* to the Ninth Circuit and—based on the language in *Valencie-Mendoza* [sic]—he would have succeeded.”); Maj. Op. at 22 (“[I]f Hueso had timely raised his claim, the Ninth Circuit may well have found that its earlier decisions conflicted with this ‘higher intervening authority’ in his case, not in Valencia-Mendoza’s case.”). This suggestion is surprising given the majority’s recognition of “society’s interest in stopping perpetual attacks on final criminal judgments.” Maj. Op. at 1. The rule created today not only incentivizes but *requires* prisoners to raise arguments to courts that are squarely foreclosed by binding precedent, to the detriment of judicial efficiency. *See In re Davenport*, 147 F.3d at 610 (“It would just clog the judicial pipes to require defendants, on pain of forfeiting

all right to benefit from future changes in the law, to include challenges to settled law in their briefs on appeal and in postconviction filings.”). Judicial economy aside, it is unclear how the interests of justice are furthered when we reject a meritorious claim from a prisoner who actually did raise winning arguments years before they became the law of the circuit where he was sentenced, *see* Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 16, *Hueso v. Sepanek*, No. 13-cv-19, 2013 WL 4017117, (E.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 2013), but not in the circuit where he was sentenced. In the world the majority creates, relief inures to Valencia-Mendoza and not to Hueso, prisoners sentenced in the same circuit, purely by chance. All of this the majority fashions based on an erroneous interpretation of text and precedent.

Each day that Ramon Hueso sits in prison longer than the law requires, our invocations of justice and fairness ring a little hollower. In the death-penalty context, Justice Blackmun once expressed a concern that “[t]he more the Court constrains the federal courts’ power to reach the constitutional claims of those sentenced to death, the more the Court undermines the very legitimacy of capital punishment itself.” *Sawyer v. Whitley*, 505 U.S. 333, 359–60 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring). I fear the “crusade to erect petty procedural barriers” against undisputedly meritorious claims, manifest in the majority opinion and other recent decisions by this court, works a similar effect on this circuit’s habeas jurisprudence. *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 758–59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On this point, Chief Judge Gregory’s dissenting words in

the Fourth Circuit's now-vacated opinion in *United States v. Surratt* are apt:

I do not doubt that the majority is sympathetic to [the defendant]. In the end, I suppose we just have fundamentally different views on the role of habeas corpus, as well as the role of the judiciary in granting the writ. I see it as our solemn responsibility to guard against a morbid encroachment upon that which is so precious our Framers ensured its continued vitality in our Constitution. . . . Our abdication of this responsibility begs the question: quis custodiet ipsos custodiet? Who will guard the guards themselves?

United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 276 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), *pet. for reh'g en banc granted*, (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).⁸ The majority opinion provides no answers to Chief Judge Gregory's question.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

⁸ The Fourth Circuit voted to rehear *Surratt* en banc, thereby vacating the panel decision. *See* 4th Cir. Local Rule 35(c). Before the en banc court could issue an opinion, however, the President commuted Surratt's sentence from life imprisonment to 200 months' imprisonment. *See* Commutations Granted by President Barack Obama (2009–2017), United States Department of Justice, <https://www.justice.gov/pardon/obama-commutations>. A majority of the Fourth Circuit's judges concluded that this commutation rendered Surratt's appeal moot. *United States v. Surratt*, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 138 S. Ct. 554 (2017).

Appendix B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
(at London)

RAMON HUESO,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	Civil Action No. 6:
)	18-176-DCR
V.)	
)	
J. A. BARNHART, Warden,)	MEMORANDUM
)	OPINION AND
Respondent.)	ORDER

*** **

Federal prisoner Ramon Hueso has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking relief from his sentence. [Record No. 1] The matter is pending for consideration of several issues related to the petition.

I.

After conducting an initial screening, the Court entered an Order on June 20, 2018, finding that, Hueso’s petition required a response before his claims may be adjudicated. [Record No. 4] The Order directed that a response be filed within sixty days of service on the respondent. [*Id.*] The record reflects that the respondent received a copy of the petition on September 13, 2018. [Record No. 7]

When no response had been filed by October 22, 2018, Hueso requested an entry of default against respondent, arguing that the applicable time limit for filing a response had expired. [Record No. 9] The Court denied Hueso's motion, noting that, as respondent did not receive a copy of the petition until September 13, 2018, the response time had not yet expired. [Record No. 10] Hueso then moved for reconsideration of the Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). [Record No. 11]

A court may grant relief under Rule 59(e) only to (1) correct a clear error of law; (2) account for newly discovered evidence; (3) accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) prevent a manifest injustice. *American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. v. McCreary Co., Ky.*, 607 F.3d 439, 450 (6th Cir. 2010); *Besser v. Sepanek*, 478 F. App'x 1001, 1001-02 (6th Cir. 2012). Hueso's motion does not satisfy any of these criteria.

Hueso first argues that the Court erroneously calculated the time within which a response to his habeas petition must be filed. He contends that, because the warden is named as the respondent to the petition only in his official capacity, service of the petition on the United States Attorneys' Office and the United States Attorney General is sufficient for service upon the respondent. However, to serve an employee of the United States sued only in an official capacity, "a party must serve the United States *and* also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the...employee." Fed. R. Civ. P 4(i)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, for service to be complete, it must be

made on the United States, and a copy of the petition must be sent to the respondent. Because the respondent did not receive a copy of the petition until September 13, 2018 [Record No. 7], the response was due within sixty days from that date. [Record No. 4] Therefore, this period had not expired prior to Hueso's motion for default.¹

Hueso next argues that the Court erred in allowing the respondent 60 days to file a response. He argues that 28 U.S.C. § 2243 requires the Court to “forthwith” issue the writ or require the respondent to show cause why it should not be granted within three days, or no more than twenty days. But this assertion is simply incorrect.

Following screening of the petition, the Court possesses the discretion to require a response, but only when necessary and within a time it concludes was reasonable. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that “the judge shall order the respondent to file an answer or other pleading within the period of time fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge deems appropriate.” Rule 1(b) of the 2254 Rules makes this rule applicable to proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, Rule 4 takes precedence over § 2243. *Hendon v. Burton*, No. 2:14-CV-14023, 2014 WL 8186698, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2014). Thus, the Court acted within its discretion in providing 60 days within which

¹ Hueso's motion to reconsider was also filed before the expiration of the 60-day response period. [Record No. 11] Although that period has now expired, the respondent has filed a motion for extension of time to file a response. [Record No. 12]

respondent may file a response to the petition. For these reasons, the Court adheres to its prior conclusion that Hueso's motion for entry of default was properly denied.

II.

The Court previously screened Hueso's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and concluded that a response to the petition was needed before this matter could proceed. [Record No. 4] However, a petition will be denied "if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)). In light of authority from the Sixth Circuit issued after the Court initial screening, it is now clear that Hueso is not entitled to relief. Thus, a response is no longer required, and the petition will be dismissed for the reasons outlined below.

A.

Following a jury trial in October 2009, Hueso was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska of one count of unlawfully and knowingly conspiring with another to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (i.e., 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing actual methamphetamine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Before trial, the United States filed a notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 identifying Hueso's two prior drug felony drug convictions from the State of Washington. As a result, he was subject to enhanced statutory penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), including a maximum sentence of

life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years. In January 2010, Hueso was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 240 months. *United States v. Hueso*, No. 3:09-CR-48-RRB-1 (D. Alaska 2009).

Hueso's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, *United States v. Hueso*, 420 F. App'x 776 (9th Cir. 2011). Thereafter, his motions for post-conviction relief filed with the trial court, including a motion to vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a motion for modification or reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), were denied. *United States v. Hueso*, No. 3:09-CR-48-RRB-1 (D. Alaska 2009).

Hueso's § 2241 petition presents two arguments for relief. First, he contends that the enhancement of his sentence was improper in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in *Descamps v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and *Mathis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), as well as the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in *United States v. Hinkle*, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016). More specifically, he argues that, in light of *Mathis*, the statute of his prior state drug convictions used to enhance his federal sentence pursuant is broader than the federal definition of a "felony drug offense." Thus, he asserts that the use of these prior convictions as predicate offenses violated his due process rights. [Record No. 1 at p. 6; Record No. 1-1 at p. 11-12] Next, Hueso asserts that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), and the Fourth Circuit's

decision in *United States v. Simmons*, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), his prior convictions do not qualify as “felony drug offenses” for purposes of his §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement because neither of these two convictions were “punishable for a term exceeding one year.” [Record No. 1 at p. 7; Record No. 1-1 at p. 16-17]

Having thoroughly reviewed the petition, the Court will deny relief because Hueso’s claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus petition under § 2241 and because they are without merit.

B.

A federal prisoner generally may not use a § 2241 petition to challenge the enhancement of his sentence. *See United States v. Peterman*, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead, a prisoner who wishes to challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence must file a motion under § 2255. *Id.* (explaining the distinction between a § 2255 motion and a § 2241 petition). A § 2241 petition may not be used for this purpose because it does not function as an additional or alternative remedy to the one available under § 2255. *Hernandez v. Lamanna*, 16 F. App’x 317, 320 (6th Cir. 2001).

The “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) creates a narrow exception to this prohibition if the remedy afforded by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the prisoner’s detention. *Truss v. Davis*, 115 F. App’x 772, 773-74 (6th Cir. 2004). A motion under § 2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” simply because the prisoner’s time to file a § 2255 motion has passed; he did not file a § 2255 motion; or he did file such a motion and was denied relief. *Copeland v. Hemingway*, 36 F.

App'x 793, 795 (6th Cir. 2002); *Taylor v. Gilkey*, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 2241 is available “only when a structural problem in § 2255 forecloses even one round of effective collateral review...”). In other words, prisoners cannot use a habeas petition under § 2241 to get another “bite at the apple.” *Hernandez*, 16 F. App'x at 360.

The decidedly narrow scope of relief under § 2241 applies with particular force to challenges to the sentence imposed. *Peterman*, 249 F.3d at 462; *Hayes v. Holland*, 473 F. App'x 501, 502 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The savings clause of section 2255(e) does not apply to sentencing claims.”). In *Hill v. Masters*, 836 F. 3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth Circuit articulated a very narrow exception to this general rule, permitting a challenge to a sentence to be asserted in a § 2241 petition, but only where (1) the petitioner’s sentence was imposed when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory before the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); (2) the petitioner was foreclosed from asserting the claim in a successive petition under § 2255; and (3) after the petitioner’s sentence became final, the Supreme Court issued a retroactively applicable decision establishing that - as a matter of statutory interpretation - a prior conviction used to enhance his or her federal sentence no longer qualified as a valid predicate offense. *Hill*, 836 F. 3d at 599-600. At a minimum, Hueso’s claims fail to satisfy the first and third requirements.

Hueso was sentenced in 2010, long after *Booker* was decided, and under a discretionary guidelines regime. See *Contreras v. Ormond*, No. 18-5020 at p. 2-3 (6th Cir.

Sept. 10, 2018) (petitioner did not fall within the narrow exception recognized by *Hill* because he was sentenced post-*Booker* in 2009, under the advisory sentencing guidelines). In addition, to the extent that Hueso claims that the use of his prior convictions to enhance his sentence violated his due process rights, this is not a claim based upon statutory interpretation but a constitutional claim. It is therefore a claim he could and must have asserted before the trial court, upon direct appeal, or through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As a result, it falls outside the purview of § 2241.

Moreover, Hueso argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced because his predicate convictions were not analyzed using the “categorical approach” applied in *Mathis*, *Descamps*, and *Hinkle*. But both *Mathis* and *Descamps* addressed the proper procedures to be used when determining whether a conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under the “enumerated offenses” clause of the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Acts (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Similarly, in *Hinkle*, the Fifth Circuit applied the categorical approach of *Mathis* to determine whether a prior Texas conviction is a “controlled substance offense” within the meaning of § 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. *Hinkle*, 832 F.3d 569, 570-71.²

² Likewise, in *Dowell v. Quintana*, No. 17-5297 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2017), another case relied upon by Hueso, the petitioner’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because of a prior “controlled substance offense,” as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.

However, Hueso's sentence was enhanced under the far simpler provisions of § 841(b)(1)(A) because of his two prior "felony drug offenses." To qualify as a "felony drug offense," no detailed comparison of elements is required. Rather, 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) merely requires that the prior state or federal offense: (1) be punishable by more than one year in prison, and (2) that it "prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances." By its terms, § 802(44) does not require that the prior offense constitute any particular species of crime, but only that it "relat[e] to" conduct involving drugs.

Given the breadth of this definition, the use of the categorical approach is neither necessary nor appropriate. See *United States v. Graham*, 622 F.3d 445, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Spikes*, 158 F.3d 913, 932 (6th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 525 U.S. 1086 (1999). Indeed, multiple decisions of the Sixth Circuit issued after Hueso's petition was filed confirm that *Descamps* and *Mathis* are inapplicable to sentences enhanced under § 841(b)(1)(A). See *Smith v. Ormond*, No. 18-5101 (6th Cir. July 30, 2018) at p. 4. See also *Hidalgo v. Smith*, No. 18-5230 at p. 4 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 2018) (*Mathis* and *Descamps* are inapplicable where petitioner's sentence was increased under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) because he had previously committed a "felony drug offense."); *Romo v. Ormond*, No. 17-6137 at p. 4 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018) ("*Mathis*...is inapplicable to sentences enhanced under § 841(b)(1)(A)."); *McKenzie v. Ormond*, No. 18-5072 at p. 4)(6th Cir. July 11, 2018).

In addition to the foregoing, Hueso entitled to relief under *Carachuri-Rosendo* or *Simmons*. In *Carachuri-Rosendo*, the Supreme Court more narrowly defined the meaning of the term “aggravated felony” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101 *et seq.* *Carachuri-Rosendo*, 560 U.S. at 566.³ However, the Court did not address, directly or inferentially, the definition of “felony drug offense” for purposes of the enhancement set forth in § 841(b)(1). *Fields v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP1*, 612 F. App’x 980, 982 (11th Cir. 2014); *Stewart v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low*, 589 F. App’x 934, 937 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[*Carachuri-Rosendo*]’s ultimate holding that non-recidivist simple drug possession could not be an “aggravated felony” [under the INA] has no bearing on whether such an offense could be a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 841.”). Regardless, in *Simmons*, the Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s decision in *Carachuri-Rosendo* in holding that the defendant’s prior North Carolina conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana did not constitute a predicate “felony drug” conviction because, under the “unique statutory regime mandated by the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act,” the defendant could not have received a sentence in excess of twelve months for

³ Courts considering the question have routinely held that *Carachuri-Rosendo* is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Cf. *United States v. Bowman*, 561 F. App’x 294 (4th Cir. 2014); *Lansdowne v. Wilson*, 897 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406-07 (E.D. Va. 2012); *Stewart v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Low*, No. 5: 11-CV-98-OC-29SPC, 2011 WL 6004594, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2011).

his North Carolina conviction. *Simmons*, 649 F.3d at 240.

Hueso argues that, pursuant to *Carachuri-Rosendo*, as interpreted by *Simmons*, his prior drug convictions do not qualify as “felony drug offenses” for purposes of his § 841(b)(1)(A) enhancement because neither of these two convictions were “punishable for a term exceeding one year.” This claim is without merit. As previously discussed, § 841(b)(1) provides for a sentencing enhancement based on a prior “felony drug offense,” which is defined as any state or federal offense related to narcotic drugs “that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State...” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).

In contrast to the “unique statutory regime” at issue in *Simmons*, Hueso’s prior convictions were for violations of Washington state law, which clearly provides that he faced a potential maximum five-year sentence with respect to each of his two convictions. Specifically, Hueso had prior Washington convictions for possession of methamphetamine in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 69.50.4013(1) and possession of cocaine, also in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 69.50.4013(1). [Record No. 1-2; *United States v. Hueso*, No. 3:08-cr-48-RRB-1 (D. Alaska) at Record No. 25] At the time of his 2006 conviction, Wash Rev. Code § 69.50.4013(2) provided that “any person who violates this section is guilty of a class C felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW.” Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.4013 (effective July 1, 2004 to December 5, 2012). In turn, at the time of Hueso’s conviction, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.20.021(1)(c) provided in relevant part that, “[u]nless a different maximum

sentence for a classified felony is specifically established by a statute of this state, no person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished by confinement or fine exceeding the following...[f]or a class C felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for five years...” Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.20.021(1)(c). Even the Washington Judgment of his convictions submitted by Hueso in support of his petition indicates that, with respect to both convictions, he faced a maximum term of five years. [Record No. 1-2, Felony Judgment and Sentence, Superior Court of Washington, County of Kittitas at p. 3]

The Ninth Circuit, which includes Alaska (the federal district in which Hueso was sentenced) and Washington (the state of his predicate convictions) has specifically instructed that, “[t]o determine whether a state ‘felony drug offense’ is punishable by more than one year, we look to the state’s statutory maximum sentence and not the maximum sentence available under the state sentencing guidelines.” *United States v. Rosales*, 516 F.3d 749, 758 (9th Cir. 2008). In *Rosales*, the defendant had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance with an intent to deliver in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(d), which was also classified as a Washington Class C felony under the terms of that statute. *Id.* at 758. The Ninth Circuit held that, as the maximum penalty provided by Washington law for the crime to which the defendant pled guilty is five years of imprisonment, which is greater than one year, the defendant’s prior conviction qualified as a “felony drug offense” under § 841(b)(1)(B). Thus, the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. *Id.*

Hueso has failed to show that the maximum sentence he faced with respect to his prior Washington State convictions was anything other than the maximum five-year term provided by Washington statutory law. Because his prior convictions relate to drugs and were “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” under the law of Washington State, both convictions qualify as “felony drug offenses” under § 802(44) and qualify as predicate offenses for purposes of the sentencing enhancement provided by § 841(b)(1)(A).

In summary, Hueso’s claims fail to fall within the limited exception recognized by *Hill*. Therefore, he may not challenge his sentence in this § 2241 proceeding. And because Hueso’s petition fails to establish any basis for habeas relief, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. Hueso’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous Order denying entry of default [Record No. 11] is **DENIED**.
2. Hueso’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Record No. 1] is **DENIED**.
3. Respondent’s motion for extension of time to file a response [Record No. 12] is **DENIED AS MOOT**.
4. This matter is **DISMISSED** and **STRICKEN** from the docket.

Dated: November 26, 2018.

Signed By: /s/
Danny C. Reeves

United States District Judge

Appendix C

AO 245B (Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case
Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
District of Alaska

RECEIVED

FEB 17 2010

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
ANCHORAGE, AK

UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

V.

RAMON HUESO

***AMENDED
JUDGMENT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE**

Case Number: 3:09-CR-
00048-01-RRB

USM Number: 35937-086

Rex Lamont Butler
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

pleaded guilty to count(s) _____

pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _____
which was accepted by the court.

X was found guilty on count(s) 1 of the Indictment
after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

80a

<u>Title & Section</u>	<u>Nature of Offense</u>	<u>Offense Ended</u>	<u>Count</u>
21 U.S.C. §§ 846(b)(1) (A)	Drug Conspiracy	5/06/2008	1

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 6 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

Count(s) 2 of the Indictment* is
 (are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

JANUARY 15, 2010

Date of Imposition of Judgment

SIGNATURE REDACTED

Signature of Judge

RALPH R. BEISTLINE, U.S.
DISTRICT JUDGE

Name and Title of Judge

2/17/10

Date

DEFENDANT: RAMON HUESO
CASE NUMBER: 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: 240 months on Count 1 of the Indictment.

X The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

Court recommends that the defendant participate in the 500 hour Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program. Court recommends that the defendant serve his time at the facility located in Sheridan, Oregon.

X The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

a _____ a.m. p.m. on _____.

as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

before 2 p.m. _____.

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

82a

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered _____ to _____
_____ at _____, with a
certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By: _____
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: RAMON HUESO
CASE NUMBER: 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: 10 years.

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, not to exceed 12 tests per month as determined by the probation officer.

- The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)
- The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

- X The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)
- The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)
- The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;

85a

- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- 10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law

86a

enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and

- 13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

DEFENDANT: RAMON HUESO
CASE NUMBER: 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant as directed by the Bureau of Prisons prior to release or by the probation officer upon release.
2. In addition to submitting to drug testing in accordance with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the defendant shall participate in an outpatient treatment program approved by the United States Probation Office for substance abuse treatment, which program shall include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol. At the direction of the probation officer, the defendant may be required to pay for all or a portion of any treatment program.
3. The defendant shall submit to a warrantless search of his person, residence, vehicle, his personal effects, his place of employment, and other property by a Federal probation or pretrial services officer or other law enforcement officer, based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or a violation of a condition of supervision. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation.
4. The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other weapon.

5. The defendant shall provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information, including authorization to conduct credit checks, and shall not incur any new debts or apply for credit without the prior approval of the probation officer.

////////////////////////////////////

DEFENDANT: RAMON HUESO
CASE NUMBER: 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>Restitution</u>
TOTALS	\$ 100.00	\$	\$

- The determination of restitution is deferred until _____. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case* (AO 245C) will be entered after such determination.
- The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

90a

<u>Name of Payee</u>	<u>Total Loss</u> ¹	<u>Restitution Ordered</u>	<u>Priority or Percentage</u>
	\$ _____	\$ _____	
TOTALS	\$ _____	\$ _____	

- Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ _____
- The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
- The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:
- the interest requirement is waived for the
 - fine restitution.
 - the interest requirement for the
 - fine restitution is modified as follows:

¹ Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: RAMON HUESO
CASE NUMBER: 3:09-CR-00048-01-RRB

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:

- A Lump sum payment of \$ 100.00 due immediately, balance due
 not later than _____, or
 in accordance C, D, E, or F below; or
- B Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or
- C Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
- D Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
- E Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court

will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Any unpaid amount of the special assessment is to be paid during the period of supervision in monthly installments of not less than 10% of the defendant's gross monthly income or \$25, whichever amount is greater.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

93a

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.