

18-8807

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FRANCISCO QUINTERO-CORRAL,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ORIGINAL

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN CIRCUIT

FILED

MAR 25 2019

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Francisco Quintero-Corral

Reg No. 74583-198

Pro-Se Litigant

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Washington, MS 39190

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

- I. Whether all facts- including the facts of a prior conviction- that increase a defendant's statutory maximum must be pleaded in the indictment and either admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt?

Subsidiary questions:

Does the district court err in sentencing Quintero-Corral to a term of imprisonment greater than three years for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326?

Are the statutory enhancement provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) unconstitutional because Congress unequivocally intended the enhancements to be sentencing factors, not elements of separate offenses; but under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), such a scheme is unconstitutional?

Whether Quintero-Corral's guilty plea was involuntary and taken in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 because Quintero-Corral was not admonished that prior felony provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) stated an essential offense element that Quintero-Corral had the right to have the government prove, and a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt?

PARTIES

Francisco Quintero-Corral, is the Petitioner; he was the defendant-appellant below.

The United States of America is the Respondent; it was the plaintiff-appellee below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
Questions Presented	ii
Parties	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Index to Appendices	v
Table of Authorities	vi
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdictional Statement.....	1
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.....	1
Statement of the Case	4
Reasons for Granting the Writ	5
Conclusion	9

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A Judgment and Opinion if the Eleventh Circuit

Appendix B Judgment and Sentence of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:	PAGE NUMBER
<u>Apprendi</u> , (2000).....	4
<u>Dretke v. Haley</u> , 541 U.S. 386 (2004).....	4, 6
<u>Almendarez-Torres v. United States</u> , 523 U.S. 224 (1988)	4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
<u>Apprendi</u> , 466 at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring)	4
<u>Shepard</u> , 544 U.S. At 28.....	5, 6
<u>Haley</u> , 541 U.S. At 395-96	5
<u>Apprendi v. New Jersey</u> , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).....	6
<u>Dretke v. Haley</u> , 541 U.S. 386, 395-396 (2004)	6
<u>Nijhawan v Holder</u> , 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009).....	6
<u>Apprendi</u> , 530 U.S. At 490.....	6
<u>Rangel-Reyes v. United States</u> , 547 U.S. 1200, 1201(2006)	6
<u>Blakely v. Washington</u> , 542 U.S. 296, 301-302 (2004).....	6
<u>Alleyne</u> , 133 S. Ct. at 2164	8
<u>Cunningham v. California</u> , 546 U.S. 270, 291 n. 14 (2007).....	8
<u>Shepard v. United States</u> 544 U.S. 13, 26 n. 5 (2005).....	8

STATUTES

	Page No.
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).....	1
8 U.S.C. § 1326	1, 4
235 (c) 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).....	2
8 USCS § 1531 et seq	2
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).....	5, 9

RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.	1
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(A)(1);	4
Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1	5

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. Amend V	2
U.S. Const. Amend VI	2

MISCELLANEOUS

4 W. Blackstone, <u>Commentaries on the Laws of England</u> 343 (1769).....	7
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Francisco Quintero-Corral, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit..

OPINION BELOW

The unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is captioned as *United States v. Francisco Quintero-Corral*, No. 18-11945 and is provided in the Appendix to the Petition. [APPX, A]. The district court entered judgment 05th day of July, 2018, which the judgment is attached as an Appendix. [APPX.B]

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The petition is filed within 90 days of an opinion affirming the judgment, which was entered on January 22, 2019. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. The Court's jurisdiction to grant *certiorari* is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED

8 U.S.C. 1326 provides in part:

- (a) In general. Subject to subsection (b), any alien who--
 - (1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and thereafter
 - (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his re-embarkation at a place outside the United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the

Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance consent under this or any prior Act,

shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.

(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens.

Not notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case of any alien described in such subsection--

- (1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both;
- (2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both;
- (3) who has been excluded from the United States pursuant to section 235(c) [8 USCS § 1225(c)] because the alien was excludable under section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 USCS §1182(a)(3)(B)] or who has been removed from the United States pursuant to the provisions of title V [8 USCS §§ 1531 et seq.], and who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters the United States, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, and imprisoned for a period of 10 years, which sentence shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.[:] or
- (4) who was removed from the United States pursuant to section 241(a)(4)(B) [8 USCS § 1231(a)(4)(B)] who thereafter, without the permission of the Attorney General, enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States (unless the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's reentry) shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. For the purposes of this subsection, the term "removal" includes any agreement in which an alien stipulates to removal during (or not during) a criminal trial under either Federal or State law.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Gran Jury, except in case arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Trial Court Proceedings

This is a criminal case on direct appeal. The indictment was filed on November 22, 2017. It alleged that Petitioner Quintero-Corral was an alien who had knowingly entered, and was found in the United States of America after deportation, removal or exclusion, and without having received permission to reapply or readmission, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. *Id.* There were no allegations of any of the enhancement provisions under the statute that would raise the statutory maximum above 10 years. See 8 U. S. C. § 1326. Petitioner pleaded guilty with a written plea agreement to this indictment. The Factual resume, the plea agreement and the admonishment's at the re-arraignment all noted that maximum sentence was 10 years. The district court did not advise Petitioner that the "aggravated felony" provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) stated an essential element of the offense to which he was pleading guilty.

The district court then sentenced Mr. Quintero Corral to 30 months.

B. Circuit Court Proceedings

Petitioner appealed his sentence arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in *Apprendi*, (2000), *Dretke v. Haley*, 541 U.S. 386 (2004) and *Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), among others call into question the validity of this Court's decision in *Almendarez Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Petitioner noted that in *Apprendi*, Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that he had "succumbed to an "error" in joining the majority in *Almendarez-Torres*. See *Apprendi*, 466 at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in *Shepard* in which he stated that "in an appropriate case, [the Supreme] Court should

consider *Almendarez-Torres*' continuing viability." Shepard, 544 U.S. At 28. In Haley, the Supreme Court found that continued validity of prior conviction exception to *Apprendi* presented a difficult constitutional question...." Haley, 541 U.S. At 395-96.

The court of appeals summarily reviewed and affirmed. See Appx. A.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This court should use this case to answer the reoccurring, important question whether all the facts including the -- fact of a prior conviction that increase a defendant's --- statutory maximum must be pleaded in - the indictment and either admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt?

Introduction.

Petitioner was subjected to an enhanced statutory maximum under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) because the removal charged in the indictment followed a prior felony or aggravated felony conviction. Petitioner's sentence thus depends on the judge's ability to find the existence and date of a prior conviction, and to use that date to increase the statutory maximum. This power was affirmed in *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523, U.S. 224 (1998), which held that the enhanced maximums of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 represent sentencing factors rather than elements of an offense, and that they may be constitutionally determined by judges rather than juries. See *Alemdarez-Torrez*, 523 U.S. At 244.

This court, however, has repeatedly limited *Almendarez-Torres*. See *Alleyne v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013) (characterizing *Almendarez-Torres* as

narrow exception to the general rule that all facts that increase punishment must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); *Decamps v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2295 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that *Almendarez-Torres* should be overturned); *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (stressing that *Almendariz-Torres* represented “a narrow exception” to the prohibition on judicial fact-finding to increase a defendant’s sentence); *Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (Souter, J., controlling plurality opinion) (“While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to *Jones* and *Apprendi*, to say that *Almendarez-Torres* clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.”); *Dretke v. Haley*, 541 U.S. 386, 395-396 (2004) concluding that the application of *Almenarez-Torres* to the sequence of a defendant’s convictions represented a difficult constitutional question to be avoided if possible); *Nijhawan v Holder*, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009) (agreeing with the Solicitor General that the loss amount to a prior offense would represent an element of an 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) offense, to the extent that it boosted the defendant’s statutory maximum).

Further, any number of opinions, some authored by justices among the *Almendarez-Torres* majority, have expressed doubt about whether it was correctly decided. See *Apprendi*, 530 U.S. At 490; *Haley*, 541 U.S. At 395-396; *Shepard*, 544 U.S. At 26 n.5 (Souter J., controlling plurality opinion); *Shepard*, 544 U.S. 26-28 (Thomas, J., concurring); *Rangel-Reyes v. United States*, 547 U.S. 1200, 1201(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); *James v. United States*, 550 U.S. 192, 231-232 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). And this court has also repeatedly cited authorities as exemplary of the original meaning of the constitution that do not recognize a distinction between prior convictions and facts about the instant offense. See *Blakely v. Washington*, 542 U.S.

296, 301-302 (2004) (quoting 4 W . Blackstone, *Commentaries an the Laws of England* 343 (1769), 1 J. Bishop, *Criminal Procedure* § 87, p 55 (2d ed. 1872)); *Apprendi*, 530 U.S. At 478-479 (quoting J. Arcbold, *Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases* 44 (15th ed. 1862), 4 Blackstone 369-370).

In *Alleyne*, this Court applied *Apprendi*'s rule to mandatory minimum sentences, holding that any fact that produces a higher sentencing range-not just a sentence above the mandatory maximum-must be proved to jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 s. Ct. at 2162-63. In its opinion the Court apparently recognized that *Almendarez-Torres*'s holding remains subject to Fifth and Sixth Amendment attack. *Alleyne* characterized *Almendarez-Torres* as a “narrow exception to the general rule” that all facts that increase punishment must be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. At 2160 n. 1. But because the parties in *Alleyne* did not challenge *Almendarez-Torres*, this Court said it would “not revisit it for purposes of [its] decision today.” Id.

The Court's reasoning nerveless demonstrates that *Almendarez-Torres*'s recidivism exception may be overturned. *Alleyne* traced the treatment of the relationship between crime and punishment, beginning in the Eighteenth Century, repeatedly nothing how “[the] linkage of facts with particular sentences ranges... reflects the intimate connection between crime and punishment.” Id. At 2159 ('[i]f a fact was by law essential to the penalty, it was an element of the offense"); see id. (historically, crimes were defined as “the whole of wrong to which the law affixes [] punishment.... include[ing] any fact that annexes a higher degree of punishment”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). id. At 2160 ('the indictment must contains in allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted') (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court concluded that, because “the whole of the” crime and its punishment cannot be separated, the elements of a crime must be include any facts that

increase the penalty. The Court recognized no limitations or exceptions to this principle.

Alleyne's emphasis that the elements of a crime include the "whole" of the facts for which a defendant is punished seriously undercut the view, expressed in Almendarez-Torres, that recidivism is different from other sentencing facts. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. At 243-44; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. At 490 ('Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond reasonable doubt.') Apprendi tried to explain this difference by pointing out that, unlike other facts, recidivism "does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself[.]" 530 U.S. At 496 (quoting Almendarez-Torres), 523 U.S. At 230). But this Court did not appear committed to a that distinction; it acknowledged that Almendarez-Torres might have been "incorrectly decided." Id at 489; see also Shepard v. United States. 544 U.S. 13, 26 n. 5 (2005) (acknowledging that Court's holding in that case undermined Almendarez-Torres); Cunningham v. California, 546 U.S. 270, 291 n. 14 (2007) (rejecting invitation to distinguish between "facts concerning the offense, where Apprendi would apply, and facts [like recidivism] concerning the offender, where it would not." because Apprendi itself... leaves no room for the bifurcated approach").

Three concurring justices in Alleyne provide additional reason to believe that the time is ripe to revisit Almendarez-Torres. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2164 (Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan,J.J., concurring). Those justices noted that the viability of the Sixth Amendment principle set forth in Apprendi was initially subject to some doubt, and some justices believed the Court 'might retreat' from it. Id. At 2165. Instead, Apprendi's rule 'has become even more firmly rooted in the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.' Id Reversal of precedent is warranted when "the reasoning of [that precedent] has been thoroughly undermined by intervening decisions." Id at 2166.

The validity of *Almendarez-Torres* is accordingly subject to a reasonable doubt. If *Almendarez-Torres* is overruled in another case, the result will obviously undermine the use of Petitioner's prior conviction to increase his statutory maximum. Indeed, any *limitation* on the scope of this decision in another case will undercut the decision below. Petitioner's sentence depends on the district court's ability to find not merely that he was previously convicted, but that the date of his prior conviction preceded the deportation admitted by the plea of guilty. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (b) (requiring that the defendant's prior felony conviction precede his removal).

If this Court were to determine that the Constitution limits Petitioner's statutory range of imprisonment to not more than two years, then clearly such constitutional error substantially prejudiced Petitioner as evidenced by his 30 months sentence.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court grant certiorari, and reverse the judgment below, and /or vacate the judgment and remand for reconsideration in light of any relevant forthcoming.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March 2019.

/s/ Francisco Quintero-Corral
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APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDICES

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