

No. \_\_\_\_\_

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

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Richard Harley Greenway, Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,  
Respondents.

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**\*\* CAPITAL CASE \*\***

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**APPENDIX TO APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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*Greenway v. Ryan*

**APPENDIX TO APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

<b>Appendix A</b>	Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, May 11, 2017
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*Greenway v. Ryan*

## APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,  
May 11, 2017

**FOR PUBLICATION**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY,  
*Petitioner-Appellant,*

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of  
Arizona Department of  
Corrections,  
*Respondent-Appellee.*

No. 14-15309

D.C. No.  
4:98-cv-00025-RCC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Arizona  
Raner C. Collins, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 28, 2015  
Deferred January 25, 2016  
Resubmitted March 27, 2017  
San Francisco, California

Filed May 11, 2017

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,  
and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder;  
Concurrence by Judge Bea

**SUMMARY\***

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**Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty**

The panel affirmed the district court's judgment on remand denying Arizona state prisoner Richard Greenway's habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and death sentence.

The panel wrote that because the determination does not affect the scope of the issues before it in this appeal, it need not consider Greenway's argument that the district court erred in determining that some claims were outside the scope of this court's remand.

The panel held that neither of Greenway's certified claims of ineffective assistance of counsel has merit. As to his claim that trial counsel failed to present an overall defense theory, the panel held that ineffectiveness has not been shown. As to his claim that trial counsel should have explored the possibility of a mental incapacity defense of impulsivity in order to negate premeditation, the panel concluded that this *Christensen* defense would have been counterproductive.

The panel also deemed meritless Greenway's claim – as to which the panel asked for supplemental briefing – that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire in failing to discover that a juror had been the victim of a violent crime that would have disqualified that juror.

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\* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

The panel denied a certificate of appealability as to all other claims.

Concurring, Judge Bea would find that much of Greenway's ineffective-assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to challenge and remove a juror was not fairly – or at all – presented in any state court proceeding and is therefore procedurally barred.

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**COUNSEL**

Robin C. Konrad (argued) and Therese M. Day, Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey Sparks (argued) and Laura P. Chiasson, Assistant Attorneys General; Jeffrey A. Zick and Lacey Stover Gard, Chief Counsel; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona; for Respondent-Appellee.

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**OPINION**

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Richard Greenway is an Arizona state prisoner. A jury convicted him of the brutal 1988 murders of a mother and her teenage daughter during a burglary in Tucson, Arizona. He was tried and convicted of burglary, armed robbery, theft by control, arson of an unoccupied structure, as well as two counts of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death in 1989. Following his appeal and state court post-conviction proceedings, the district court denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.

We heard his first federal appeal in 2011. *Greenway v. Schriro*, 653 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011). Our decision affirmed the district court's denial of Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance at sentencing, but remanded for the district court to consider on the merits the claims of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal. *Id.* at 793. The district court has now done so and has denied them. Greenway seeks review in this appeal.

The district court spent a good deal of time attempting to determine what claims were within the scope of our remand, because Greenway made additional contentions. Although the district court found that many of the claims were not within the scope of the remand, it concluded that an intervening Supreme Court decision required consideration of some of the ineffectiveness claims in any event. *See Martinez v. Ryan*, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). We do not need to consider Greenway's argument that the district court erred in determining that some claims were outside the scope

of our remand, however, since the determination does not affect the scope of the issues before us in this appeal.

The district court granted a certificate of appealability regarding two claims of ineffectiveness. Both relate to trial counsel's alleged failure to present defenses. Neither has merit.

Greenway claims trial counsel failed adequately to present an overall defense theory. Defense counsel at trial argued that the evidence showed only that Greenway was involved in destroying the stolen property after the murders had occurred. This theory was consistent with the physical evidence. No viable alternative theory appears in the record, and Greenway does not suggest one. Ineffectiveness has not been shown.

The district court also certified the issue of whether trial counsel should have explored the possibility of a mental incapacity defense of impulsivity, as recognized in Arizona, in order to negate premeditation. *See State v. Christensen*, 628 P.2d 580, 583–84 (Ariz. 1981). We conclude the suggested defense would have been counterproductive, as it would have placed Greenway as a principal in the murders, and would likely not have overcome the strong evidence of premeditation in any event.

This court additionally asked for supplemental briefing on Greenway's claim that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire in failing to discover that a juror had been the victim of a violent crime that would have disqualified that juror. We conclude that this claim is also without merit. We deny a certificate of appealability as to all other claims.

### **BACKGROUND**

The facts relating to the nature of the crime and the procedural history are set forth fully in our prior opinion. *See Greenway*, 653 F.3d at 794. We summarize here briefly.

Police found the bodies of Lili Champagne and her daughter, Mindy Peters, in their home; each had been shot twice. Evidence suggested that the two had been killed in the course of a robbery. Following a news bulletin asking for information regarding the victims, Greenway's sister notified homicide detectives that Greenway knew something about the incident. Detectives picked up Greenway and his co-defendant, Chris Lincoln, for questioning. Lincoln confessed to participating in the killings and implicated Greenway. Greenway and Lincoln were then both arrested and charged with several counts, including murder.

Before trial, Greenway was placed in a cell with Anthony Schmanski. Schmanski, according to his trial testimony, asked Greenway why he was in jail, and Greenway answered, "Well, I just blew two people away" because "they had seen [my] face." Further investigation revealed Greenway had attempted to sell the victims' car stereo to Brian Mize, Greenway's co-worker. According to Mize's trial testimony, Greenway told Mize that he went to the victims' house and, after taking "some stuff," shot the victims. Greenway also told Mize that, after he shot the older lady, "her body rolled over and blood gushed out of her head." *See State v. Greenway*, 823 P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. 1991).

There was also evidence that Greenway knew the victims. He had been to a party with Mindy in late 1987. Greenway

met Lili shortly thereafter when Greenway went to their house to return Mindy's wallet.

Prior to trial, Greenway's trial counsel had submitted proposed voir dire questions to the court, including: "Have any of you ever been the victim of a crime or testified in a criminal case?" and "Has anyone on the panel ever been the victim of a sex related crime?" During voir dire, the trial court did not ask these questions as proposed. Instead, the trial court asked: "Have any of you ever been a witness in a criminal case? Ever come to Court and testified in a criminal case?" The court also asked whether any juror had "ever been a witness to a criminal act where the police came out and they took your statement." Juror Virginia Coker remained silent, indicating negative responses to the questions. The next day, Coker approached the bench and disclosed to the judge that she had called the police regarding a domestic violence incident, but she did not disclose any other occasion when she had been a witness or given a statement to the police. Before the conclusion of voir dire, the court asked the attorneys whether there were any specific questions that they thought the court should ask. Greenway's counsel did not ask for his questions as originally proposed. Juror Coker was empaneled on Greenway's jury.

Greenway's trial lasted only three days, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts the following day. In accordance with Arizona law at the time, the trial judge made the life or death sentencing decision after an aggravation-mitigation hearing. The judge sentenced Greenway to death.

In 1994, five years after trial, Coker signed an affidavit stating that, in addition to the domestic violence incident, she had been the victim of a violent crime—a home invasion and

sexual assault—seven years prior to serving on Greenway’s jury. She also said that she had testified against her attacker at his trial.

### DISCUSSION

Because Greenway filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies. *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Under AEDPA, we may disturb a state court’s rulings only if they were “contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In this case, the state court did not rule on the merits of the claims. *See Greenway*, 653 F.3d at 800. The district court therefore correctly considered the claims de novo. On appeal, we review de novo the district court’s denial of Greenway’s habeas petition. *See Lopez v. Schriro*, 491 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Greenway must show that counsel’s performance was both inadequate and that the inadequate performance prejudiced the defense. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). The inquiry under *Strickland* is “highly deferential,” and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” *Id.* at 689.

### **A. Ineffectiveness During Voir Dire**

Greenway did not raise an ineffective assistance claim relating to juror Coker in his state court post-conviction proceedings or in his original federal habeas petition. He did raise it before the district court on remand and we requested briefing on the merits in this appeal. Although the claim is unexhausted, we summarily discuss the merits.

The issue we must determine is whether counsel was ineffective during voir dire in not bringing forth the prior history of juror Coker. The answer must be in the negative. Counsel was not clairvoyant and had no reason to believe the prospective juror was withholding information. It is true that counsel requested the court to ask questions that, if the juror had decided to answer, might have put everyone on notice that the prospective juror had been a victim of a violent crime in her home. The judge did not ask the questions in precisely the requested form, however, and the juror answered the questions as posed by the judge. She revealed a domestic violence incident, but not her own sexual assault during a home invasion. Counsel had no reason to believe that there was anything more to disclose beyond the domestic violence incident she had described, nor are we persuaded that had Coker been asked the question as requested, she would have disclosed the sexual assault, and thereby been disqualified.

Greenway's claim is therefore far too speculative for a court to conclude that counsel was ineffective during voir dire. Accordingly, after reviewing the requested supplemental briefing from the parties, we find no basis for disturbing the district court's dismissal of the claim.

**B. Ineffectiveness with Respect to the Investigation and Defense Theory**

The state trial was brief, with high stakes, and in both state court and this court, Greenway faults counsel for failing to conduct a deeper and broader investigation, to present additional witnesses, and to present a cohesive defense theory. Yet, there is not now, nor has there ever been any suggestion of what that further investigation could have yielded in terms of evidence that would have changed the result of the trial.

The only available witness Greenway now argues should have been called was Schmanski's landlady who, he contends, would have testified that Schmanski was an untrustworthy drunk. The jury, however, knew that Schmanski was an alcoholic. In closing argument, the prosecutor conceded, "Mr. Schmanski has a drinking problem [and] is an alcoholic." Defense counsel, in closing argument, emphasized that Schmanski was not only an alcoholic, but also was receiving psychological treatment and wanted to cut a deal. In short, Schmanski's landlady would have added little to what the jury already knew. Even if the jury had heard from Schmanski's landlady, that Schmanski was a drunk whose word could not be trusted, there is no reasonable probability of a different result at trial.

There was another potential witness, named Darrin Saige, who could not be located at the time of trial. Greenway now raises the possibility that Saige might have provided testimony to suggest that Greenway had only helped to destroy the evidence and was not at the scene of the murders. The problem is that we have no affidavit from Saige, or anyone else, to that effect.

The only indication in the record that Saige may have had any relevant information is in the form of notes from an investigator. The notes do not suggest that Saige could have provided material, admissible, exculpatory evidence. The notes indicate that Lincoln told Saige three different versions of the events in this case. In two versions, Lincoln implicated Greenway in the burglary and murders. In one version, Lincoln said that Greenway only helped to dispose of the property. According to Greenway, trial counsel should have called Saige to testify as to this third version of events, which Saige would have asserted was the truthful version. We are asked to assume that the jury would have credited the exculpatory version, rather than the other versions, which inculpated Greenway. There is no basis for such an assumption. Because Saige's testimony could have been more harmful than helpful, counsel was not ineffective in failing to locate Saige or present his testimony at trial.

In light of the prosecution's case, Greenway's counsel was not deficient in his presentation of the defense theory. The prosecutor presented evidence tying Greenway to the crimes: Greenway had tried to sell the stolen stereo equipment to his co-worker; Greenway's fingerprints were on the door of the stolen Porsche and the stock of the murder weapon; and police found the keys to the Porsche in Greenway's trailer. The prosecutor established that Greenway knew the victims and where they lived, and had been seen driving the victims' Porsche. The prosecutor also presented two witnesses, Schmanski and Mize, who testified that Greenway had admitted to committing the murders.

At trial, Greenway's counsel argued that the evidence did not put Greenway at the scene of the murders. During opening statements, defense counsel emphasized to the jury

that Greenway's fingerprint simply showed "that at some point in time Mr. Greenway may have handled that rifle." In closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the evidence showed only that Greenway participated in disposing of the stolen property. Counsel further pointed out during closing that although Greenway's fingerprints were found on the stock of the gun, they were not found on the trigger. In addition, Greenway's fingerprints were not found at the murder scene. Defense counsel also attempted to discredit the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses by attacking their credibility. The theory of defense that counsel presented at trial was reasonable, given the evidence implicating Greenway in the crimes. Greenway's ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to the theory of defense therefore lacks merit.

**C. Ineffectiveness in Failing to Pursue a *Christensen* Defense**

Greenway argues defense counsel should have mounted a defense that Greenway was incapable of premeditation. In Arizona, a defendant charged with first-degree murder may seek to negate premeditation by presenting evidence of his impulsive and reflexive, rather than reflective, nature, from which the jury may infer that the defendant acted in accordance with his nature at the time of the crime. *Christensen*, 628 P.2d at 583 ("The establishment of the character trait of acting without reflection tends to establish that appellant acted impulsively. From such a fact, the jury could have concluded that he did not premeditate the homicide."). We recognized the defense in *Vickers v. Ricketts*, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1986), where we said, "The Arizona Supreme Court has held that the tendency to act on

impulse is probative of an absence of premeditation.” *Id.* at 373.

In this case, however, a *Christensen* defense would have been counterproductive. Had counsel argued that Greenway acted impulsively, counsel would have placed Greenway at the scene of the crimes and negated the defense that he had not participated in the murders, a defense consistent with the physical evidence.

Moreover, evidence of an impulsive character trait is relevant only to rebut the showing of premeditation required for first-degree murder. A *Christensen* defense therefore would have had no effect on the charge of felony murder, which does not require premeditation, and is also punishable by death in Arizona. *See Tison v. Arizona*, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987); *State v. Woratzeck*, 657 P.2d 865, 868 (Ariz. 1982).

A *Christensen* defense had little likelihood of success in any event, since the evidence of premeditation was substantial. The evidence showed planning and reflection. The murder weapon required manual reloading of each bullet. The two victims were each shot twice. One was shot in the forehead through a pillow. There was no sign of a struggle at the crime scene. The shell casings were removed from the home. Greenway’s co-worker testified that Greenway admitted he wore surgical gloves during the crimes. A *Christensen* defense would not likely have overcome such strong evidence of premeditation. For all these reasons, Greenway’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue a *Christensen* defense lacks merit.

### CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED**.

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BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in full in Judge Schroeder's opinion. Nevertheless, I write separately because I would find that much of Greenway's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to challenge and remove a biased juror was not fairly—or at all—presented in any state court proceeding, and is therefore procedurally barred by Greenway's failure to exhaust his state court remedies. Furthermore, that waiver is not excused under the very narrow exception recognized in *Martinez v. Ryan*, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that a defendant's failure to raise a claim of ineffectiveness as to *trial* counsel in state court post-conviction proceedings may be excused where the defendant's counsel in the “initial-review collateral proceedings” was *himself* ineffective). Our review, as a federal habeas court, is therefore limited to those arguments that were properly presented to the Arizona Superior Court.

As detailed in the Court's opinion, Greenway was sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty of murder, burglary, armed robbery, theft by control, and arson. See *State v. Greenway*, 823 P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. 1991). On direct appeal, Greenway challenged the judge's imposition of the death penalty and alleged a number of counts of ineffective

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) during the *sentencing* proceedings. These claims were all rejected on their merits. *Id.* at 40.

Greenway later discovered that one of the members of his jury, Virginia Coker (“Juror Coker”), had been the victim of a home break-in and sexual assault by knife point in the early 1980s. *See State v. Hauss*, 142 Ariz. 159, 160, 160–61, 166 (Ct. App. 1984). In fact, Juror Coker had testified against her assailant at his trial. Juror Coker failed to disclose this information during voir dire in Greenway’s case, despite clear questions from the trial court judge as to whether any venire member had ever “been a witness” or “come to Court and testified in a criminal case?” In 1994, approximately five years after Greenway’s trial, Juror Coker signed an affidavit admitting that she had failed to disclose her status as the victim of a violent crime during voir dire (the “Affidavit”).<sup>1</sup>

In August 1992, Greenway commenced collateral proceedings for post-conviction relief in Arizona Superior Court. These proceedings continued into 1996,<sup>2</sup> yet at no

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<sup>1</sup> Though the record is not entirely clear, it appears that it was Greenway’s counsel who discovered this information and obtained the Affidavit from Coker in December 1994, meaning that Greenway had access to, and was aware of, the Affidavit as of December 1994. *See infra*, n.2.

<sup>2</sup> We previously summarized the timeline of Greenway’s post-conviction proceedings as follows:

Greenway filed his *pro se* preliminary petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 32 petition”) in state court in August 1992. Judge Scholl appointed counsel and ordered counsel to file an amended petition by February

point did Greenway raise a claim of IAC based on Coker's falsities in his petition for post-conviction relief. Sometime after filing his initial petition, Greenway acquired new counsel, Carla Ryan ("Ryan"). In August 1996, Ryan filed an Addendum to Greenway's petition for post-conviction relief (the "Addendum") to state the factual bases for Greenway's new claims of IAC at trial and on direct appeal. The Addendum lists, largely in bullet-point form, the dozens of ways in which trial and direct appeal counsel were allegedly ineffective. Both before and at the time she filed the Addendum, Ryan had access to Coker's 1994 Affidavit, yet Ryan failed to raise any IAC claim related to Juror Coker or juror bias in the Addendum.<sup>3</sup>

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1, 1993. Counsel then filed a short, untimely petition raising only one issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and Greenway asked for a change of counsel that his attorney did not oppose. No further pleadings or proof were entered by counsel pending the change of counsel ruling. The trial judge, however, in January 1994, summarily denied the post-conviction petition in a minute order, without ruling on the request for change of counsel. The trial court subsequently granted Greenway's motion to proceed *in propria persona* and allowed him to file a motion for reconsideration. . . . [¶]

The case was reassigned to a different judge in January 1996. Greenway then filed the motion with the trial court seeking reconsideration of its denial of his post-conviction petition. . . . [and] leave to amend . . . ."

*Greenway v. Schriro*, 653 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2011).

<sup>3</sup> Though the precise timeline is not entirely clear from the record, Greenway admitted in the district court proceedings on remand from our 2011 disposition that he was aware of the Affidavit well before Ryan filed

The Arizona Superior Court summarily dismissed all the claims in Greenway's Addendum as procedurally barred under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2(a)(3).<sup>4</sup> Greenway petitioned for federal habeas relief, and the district court held that the state court's dismissal of Greenway's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) constituted an independent and adequate state ground sufficient to support a finding of procedural default. We reversed. We reasoned, first, that Rule 32.2(a)(3) applied only when there had been a "*prior* post-conviction proceeding." *Greenway v. Schriro*, 653 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). In Greenway's case, there had been "no such prior post-conviction proceeding" because Greenway had been "trying to amend his *first* petition" for post-conviction relief when the state court judge summarily dismissed his claims. *Id.* Because Rule 32.2(a)(3) did not even apply, it was not an "independent and adequate" state court ground barring our review. *Id.* Second, we reasoned that, under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.6(d), a defendant may amend a post-conviction petition for relief for "good cause." Yet, notwithstanding this provision,

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the Addendum. See Brief of Petitioner at 19 & n.24, *Greenway v. Ryan*, 2013 WL 6196293 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2013) (No. CV-98-25-TUC-RCC), ECF No. 169 ("Juror Coker had been the victim of rape and sexual assault. . . . This information was discovered during Greenway's post-conviction proceedings when he was represented by the Arizona Capital Representation Project. Greenway's successor counsel, Carla Ryan, who ultimately filed a request to amend his post-conviction petition . . . never included this information or a separate juror misconduct claim in the record.").

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<sup>4</sup> Rule 32.2(a)(3) provides, "A defendant shall be precluded from [post-conviction] relief under this rule based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3)).

the state court judge had failed to consider whether good cause existed in Greenway's case.<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 799. Thus, Rule 32.6(d) also did not bar our review of Greenway's petition. *Id.* (citing to our prior decision in *Scott v. Schriro*, 567 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2009), where we held that "Rule 32.6(d) was not an adequate bar to federal review because the rule was not clear, well-established, nor consistently applied in Arizona"). Having concluded that the claims in Greenway's Addendum were not barred, we remanded this case to the district court with instructions to review *de novo* the merits of *those* claims. Thus, our prior mandate limited the district court's review (and, correspondingly, our own review on appeal) to those claims stated in the Addendum.

Our review is likewise limited by the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, *See, e.g., Weaver v. Thompson*, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (A petitioner is barred from raising for the first time in federal habeas proceedings arguments that do not arise out of the "same [factual] incident" as the claims presented to the state court or which "fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In *Dickens v. Ryan*, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), for example, we held that even a related, but *more specific* claim might be barred in federal collateral proceedings if it significantly strengthened the evidentiary posture of the petitioner's state-court claim and thus fundamentally altered it. *Id.* at 1318. In *Dickens*, the petitioner had made only general allegations in the state court proceedings that "sentencing counsel did not effectively evaluate whether Dickens 'suffer[ed] from any medical or

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<sup>5</sup> Rule 32.6(d) provides, "After the filing of a post-conviction relief petition, no amendments shall be permitted except by leave of court upon a showing of good cause." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(d).

mental impairment.”” *Id.* at 1319. Then, for the first time on federal habeas review, Dickens offered evidence of “specific conditions” (Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and organic brain damage) in support of his IAC claim. *Id.* We concluded that Dicken’s “newly enhanced *Strickland* claim [was] procedurally barred” because the new factual predicate “substantially improved” the evidentiary posture of Dickens’ IAC claim. *Id.*

So here, Greenway’s current claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to take certain steps to prevent a biased juror (Juror Coker) from being empaneled was never “fairly presented” to the state court. *Picard v. Connor*, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“We emphasize that the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts.”). Greenway’s state-court Addendum contains no mention of Juror Coker, of juror bias, or of counsel’s failure to ask specific questions during voir dire. In fact, the only statement in the Addendum related to Greenway’s current juror bias claim is that trial counsel’s failure to use a juror questionnaire was “questionable.” But the Addendum states no basis as to *why* that failure was “questionable,” much less that such failure rose to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, Greenway offers no excuse for his failure to present a juror bias claim in state court. Indeed, Greenway admits that he was aware of Juror Coker’s December 1994 Affidavit nearly two years before Ryan filed the August 1996 Addendum. Still, he did not argue that the missing questionnaire rendered counsel’s performance ineffective *because* it could have asked whether any venire member had been the victim of a violent or sex-related crime. Under *Dickens*, I would find that Greenway’s cursory criticism in his Addendum of the *method* of voir dire does not preserve Greenway’s factually distinct and far more

specific claim that a biased juror was seated because trial counsel failed to ask the right *substantive questions*.

Nor may we overlook this default under *Martinez*, which permits a federal habeas court to excuse a defendant's failure to exhaust state court remedies in initial post-conviction review proceedings if counsel in those collateral proceedings was ineffective under *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). *Martinez v. Ryan*, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). Here, *Martinez* would apply only if Greenway can demonstrate that Ryan, his initial post-conviction review counsel, acted ineffectively in failing to raise an IAC claim as to trial counsel on the juror bias issue. Greenway did not even attempt to make this showing in his 99-page opening brief, which contained only the most cursory reference to *Martinez*. Indeed, Greenway specifically argued the *opposite*: that "Ryan fairly presented Greenway's IAC claim and gave the state court an opportunity to decide the federal claim." See *United States v. Kama*, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n issue is waived when the appellant does not specifically and distinctly argue the issue in his or her opening brief.").

But even assuming Greenway has not waived his *Martinez* argument by failing to make it, I would find that *Martinez*' "narrow exception" does not apply here. To prevail on a claim of IAC, Greenway would have to show that Ryan's performance (1) fell below objective standards of reasonableness "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance," and (2) prejudiced him by creating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding could have been different." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984). Importantly, Greenway is not alleging a *direct*

violation of his due process or Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Rather, he is alleging that trial counsel's failure to take certain steps that, *arguendo*, would have revealed Juror Coker's bias (thereby preventing a constitutional violation) rendered trial counsel's representation ineffective. For the reasons described in Judge Schroeder's opinion, however, this claim is predicated on multiple layers of speculation. A reasonable attorney in Ryan's position could therefore have concluded that it lacked merit; thus Ryan was not ineffective in failing to raise it. Thus, *Martinez* does not apply to excuse Greenway's failure to exhaust his state-court remedies.

In sum, I would find that Greenway has waived any claim of juror bias based on trial counsel's failure to ask certain questions that allegedly would have prevented Juror Coker from being seated on Greenway's jury.

*Greenway v. Ryan*

## **APPENDIX B**

Order Staying Time to File Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc,  
June 1, 2017

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

JUN 01 2017

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of Arizona  
Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 14-15309

D.C. No. 4:98-cv-00025-RCC  
District of Arizona,  
Tucson

ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner-Appellant's Motion to Stay Time to File Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc from the Court's May 11, 2017 opinion is GRANTED. Because there is a remaining issue pending before the court and scheduled for argument June 21, 2017, the time to file a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc on all matters in this appeal will run from the date of the court's decision on that issue.

*Greenway v. Ryan*

## **APPENDIX C**

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,  
August 8, 2017

**FOR PUBLICATION**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY,  
*Petitioner-Appellant,*

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of  
Arizona Department of Corrections,  
*Respondent-Appellee.*

No. 14-15309

D.C. No.  
4:98-cv-00025-  
RCC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Arizona  
Raner C. Collins, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 21, 2017  
San Francisco, California

Filed August 8, 2017

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,  
and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

**SUMMARY\***

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**Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty**

The panel affirmed the district court in an Arizona state prisoner's appeal arising from his habeas corpus petition challenging his 1989 conviction and death sentence for the killing of a mother and daughter.

After considering supplemental briefing regarding the impact on this case of *McKinney v. Ryan*, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), the panel held that neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the trial court applied an impermissible causal-nexus test to exclude mitigating evidence.

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**COUNSEL**

Therese M. Day (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Laura P. Chiasson (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey A. Zick and Lacey Stover Gard, Chief Counsel; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona; for Respondent-Appellee.

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\* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GREENWAY V. RYAN

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**OPINION****PER CURIAM:**

We continue to consider issues raised in Richard Greenway's first habeas petition challenging his 1989 conviction and death sentence for the brutal execution-style killing of a mother and daughter in 1988. In our first opinion, we affirmed the denial of relief on many claims, but remanded others. *See generally Greenway v. Schriro*, 653 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011).

Included among the claims we denied was the contention that the state trial court and the state supreme court, by failing to consider all mitigating circumstances, had violated the United States Supreme Court's teachings in *Lockett v. Ohio*, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) and *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Greenway argued that the Arizona Supreme Court limited consideration of mitigating factors to those causally linked to the commission of the crime. Relying on our court's prior decision in *Schad v. Ryan*, 606 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), we rejected the claim on the ground that the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion contained no indication that such a test had been applied. *Greenway*, 653 F.3d at 807–08 (citing *State v. Greenway*, 170 Ariz. 155, 168–71 (1991) (in banc)).

While Greenway's other claims remained under consideration in the federal courts, our court, in an en banc decision, overruled *Schad* and any presumption it may have suggested that the Arizona Supreme Court had followed the United States Supreme Court's decisions in *Lockett* and *Eddings* and had not applied a causal-nexus test. *McKinney v. Ryan*, 813 F.3d 798, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

Rather, *McKinney* held that no “clear indication” of the application of the causal-nexus test was required because the Arizona courts had “consistently,” during the period between 1989 and 2005, applied the wrong test. *Id.* at 815–26 (“The ‘clear indication’ rule . . . is an inappropriate and unnecessary gloss on the deference already required under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d).”). In other words, if there is to be a presumption, it is that the Arizona Supreme Court violated the dictates of *Lockett* and *Eddings* during that period.

We stayed proceedings in this appeal pending *McKinney*’s becoming final. When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, *Ryan v. McKinney*, 137 S. Ct. 39 (2016), we asked for supplemental briefing on *McKinney*’s impact on this case.

The parties appear to be in fundamental agreement that *McKinney* requires us to reexamine the state trial and appellate courts’ decisions to determine whether or not all mitigating factors were considered. The parties disagree, of course, on what the state courts did in petitioner’s case, with Greenway contending a causal-nexus test was used and the state contending it was not.

First, however, we consider Greenway’s threshold contention that it is not for us to determine what the state courts did, because our en banc court in *McKinney* has already ruled they applied the wrong test. We said in *McKinney* that the Arizona courts had “consistently” applied the causal-nexus test. 813 F.3d at 803. We did not say, however, that Arizona had always applied it. Notably, in listing the cases in which the causal-nexus test was erroneously applied by the state courts, the *McKinney* majority opinion did not include Greenway’s case.

## GREENWAY V. RYAN

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*McKinney*, *Id.* at 815–16, 824–26. And in *McKinney*, our holding resolved only the “precise question” whether the state court had applied the causal-nexus test in that specific case. *Id.* at 804. We therefore must examine the state court decisions in Greenway’s case to determine whether they took into account all mitigating factors.

Those decisions came in the context of a criminal prosecution for a double murder, *see Greenway*, 653 F.3d at 793, and the underlying circumstances of the crime have relevance to our understanding of how the state courts handled mitigating circumstances. We summarize the facts from our first opinion:

On March 28, 1988, Pima County Sheriffs found a burned 1983 Porsche, which officials determined belonged to Frank and Lili Champagne. A deputy went to inform the Champagnes at their home and discovered the bodies of Lili Champagne and her daughter, Mindy Peters. Lili had been shot once behind the knee and once between the eyes. Mindy had been shot twice, once in the jaw and once behind the ear. . . . [D]etectives picked up Greenway at his sister’s house, [and] Greenway told detectives that he had met a man named “Red” at a 7–Eleven convenience store, and that Red had given both Greenway and his co-defendant, Chris Lincoln, a ride in a white Porsche. . . . Lincoln confessed to stealing and burning the Porsche, and he implicated Greenway. During further questioning, Lincoln confessed to participating in the killings and again

implicated Greenway. Greenway and Lincoln were then both arrested and charged with several counts, including the murders of Lili and Mindy. . . . Further investigation revealed that Greenway had attempted to sell the victims' car stereo to Brian Mize, Greenway's co-worker. According to Mize's trial testimony, Greenway told Mize that Greenway went to the victims' house and after taking "some stuff" from the house, Greenway sent his co-defendant out and then shot the victims.

*Id.* at 794 (internal citations omitted).

We also provide in the margin the full text of the relevant Arizona Supreme Court discussion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well as the state trial court's evaluation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The relevant portion of the Arizona Supreme Court decision reads as follows:

(a) *Age*

Defendant presented one statutory mitigating factor, A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(5), age, and numerous nonstatutory mitigating factors. The trial court concluded that defendant's age, 19 at the time of the murders, was the only mitigating factor. We agree with the trial court.

(b) *Defendant's low I.Q.*

Defendant argues that because he has an I.Q. of 72, he "is not only immature and learning disabled, but is

## GREENWAY V. RYAN

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genuinely mentally retarded.” He also argues that “the effect of the retardation on . . . his ability to realize what he was doing has to be considered as a mitigating factor.” We do not agree.

Defendant’s own expert testified that defendant was borderline functional, and *not* mentally retarded. Moreover, the expert testified that a person with an I.Q. of 72 is fully capable of functioning in society and that defendant was capable of making judgments with limited impairment. Defendant’s former work manager testified that defendant was a responsible person, that he had been picked for promotion because he had shown an ability to supervise other people and that he handled problems without any outbreak of irrational behavior. As we stated in *State v. Ceja*, 126 Ariz. 35, 40, 612 P.2d 491, 496 (1980), “[t]his is not the slow, dull, [retarded] individual with [a] significantly impaired mental capacity which counsel [seeks] to depict,” but rather, an individual who planned two weeks in advance to rob the victims and carried out this plan.

We cannot accept defendant’s argument that, because he was inept at committing this crime and lacked criminal sophistication, his sentence should be reduced. We have never held that, as part of the sentencing process, the court must look at the crime itself to determine if it was carried out with criminal sophistication. We agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this case, defendant’s I.Q. of 72, which places him in a borderline functioning category, was neither significant enough to qualify as a mitigating factor, nor sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

*Greenway*, 170 Ariz. at 168–69.

The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion, on its face, as we observed before, does not expressly exclude any mitigation evidence or claim on the ground that it lacked causal relationship to the commission of the crime. *See Greenway*, 170 Ariz. at 168–69. Greenway had argued his low I.Q. should be considered, in addition to his young age. While the Arizona Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the trial court that Greenway's age (nineteen) was the only mitigating factor, it did consider the evidence presented with respect to the low I.Q. The court took it into account as a possible mitigator and appeared to weigh its importance. "We agree with the trial court that . . . defendant's I.Q. . . . was neither

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The trial court ruled, in relevant part, as follows:

Now, after determining whether or not the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt certain aggravating factors, the Court must then turn its direction to mitigating factors, not only those mitigating factors that are set forth in A.R.S. 13-1704(g), but any other mitigating factors that have been presented to the Court. Looking at A.R.S. 13-1704(g), the Court specifically finds there is a mitigating factor, and that is the age of the Defendant. At the time of the killings the Defendant was nineteen years old, only one year into adulthood. The Court has considered all other mitigating factors, those presented at the aggravation-mitigation hearing, and also those which have been submitted to the Court in the sentencing memorandum and any other matters of record. In looking at the mitigating factor of the age of the Defendant, the Court finds that the Defendant's actions, [and] evidence of brutality [] far outweigh[] his chronological, emotional and mental age, and the Court finds that there are no other mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

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[1] significant enough to qualify as a mitigating factor, nor  
[2] sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” *Id.* at 169.

The state supreme court not only took into account Greenway’s argument, but all the evidence presented in the trial court. The court set forth the evidence Greenway had submitted, including that of his own expert and work experience. *Id.* The court excluded nothing.

Moreover, the state court, in considering all the evidence Greenway presented, even cited *Lockett* for the breadth of circumstances that should be considered. The court said that the trial court must consider, in addition to Arizona’s statutory factors, “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less severe than death is appropriate.” *Id.* (citing *Lockett*, 438 U.S. at 586).

The state supreme court thus rejected, on the merits, Greenway’s claim that his low I.Q. was a mitigating factor, and it did so on the basis of the evidence in the record. *See id.* at 169. The court did not reject any mitigating factor, as a matter of law, on the theory that it was not related to the commission of the crime.

When we look to the language used in all of the state court opinions that *McKinney* did cite, we find very different language from that which the state supreme court used in this case. The *McKinney* court itself discussed the various impermissible causal-nexus approaches. 813 F.3d at 813–17, 824–26. A number of Arizona Supreme Court cases considered mitigating factors in terms of whether the defendant’s condition caused him to lose control of his behavior at the time of the crime. For example, in *State v.*

*Wallace*, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “[a] difficult family background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s control.” 160 Ariz. 424, 427 (1989) (in banc); see *McKinney*, 813 F.3d at 813–14. The Arizona Supreme Court echoed its focus on control in *State v. Hoskins*, 199 Ariz. 127, 151–52 (2000) (en banc); *State v. Martinez*, 196 Ariz. 451, 465 (2000) (en banc); *State v. Towerly*, 186 Ariz. 168, 189 (1996) (in banc) (giving little to no mitigating weight to a defendant’s family background where the defendant “[did] not prove a loss of impulse control or explain what caused him to kill”); *State v. Jones*, 185 Ariz. 471, 490–92, (1996) (in banc); *State v. Bolton*, 182 Ariz. 290, 314 (1995) (in banc); and *State v. Ross*, 180 Ariz. 598, 607 (1994) (in banc). See *McKinney*, 813 F.3d at 814–17, 824.

At other times, the Arizona Supreme Court focused on whether the defendant’s mental condition was “linked to his criminal behavior” or had “any effect on the crimes.” See e.g., *State v. Djerf*, 191 Ariz. 583, 598 (1998) (en banc). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Arizona Supreme Court began explicitly considering whether mitigating factors were *causally* linked or connected to the criminal conduct. See *State v. Canez*, 202 Ariz. 133, 164 (2002) (en banc) (“A defendant’s difficult childhood is mitigating only where causally connected to his offense. . . . [A] tenuous, speculative nexus is insufficient to constitute significant mitigation.”); *State v. Hoskins*, 199 Ariz. at 151. (“For our purposes on review, it is essential not only that a personality disorder be shown to exist but that it be causally linked to the crime at the time the crime is committed.”); *State v. Sharp*, 193 Ariz. 414, 425 (1999) (en banc) (“Because Appellant failed to establish a causal connection between his

unfortunate childhood or his abuse of drugs and alcohol and his criminal actions, sympathy for those events does not justify allowing him to receive diminished punishment for this brutal murder.”); *State v. Greene*, 192 Ariz. 431, 442 (1998) (en banc) (“While it is true that Greene killed to get money to buy drugs, this is not the sort of causal connection that would support a claim of mitigation.”). *State v. Rienhardt*, 190 Ariz. 579, 592 (1997) (en banc) (“Since [the defendant] declined to present any evidence of a causal connection at his aggravation-mitigation hearing, we reject this mitigating factor.”); *Jones*, 185 Ariz. at 490–92 (rejecting mitigating factors for lack of “causal connection”). And in *McKinney*’s case, unlike here, the Arizona Supreme Court cited directly to the causal-nexus test, as articulated in *Ross*. See *McKinney*, 813 F.3d at 803 (citing *State v. McKinney*, 185 Ariz. 567, 587 (1996) (in banc) (citing *Ross*, 180 Ariz. at 607)). None of the formulations we enumerated in *McKinney* are present in the state court’s *Greenway* decision.

The trial court in *Greenway*’s case likewise considered all mitigating factors and did not exclude anything on the ground it lacked a causal nexus to the crime. The trial court expressly noted that it was required to “turn its direction” not only to statutory mitigating factors but also “any other mitigating factors that have been presented to the court.” Applying this rule, the trial court “considered all other mitigating factors,” and found only one, *Greenway*’s age, deserving of any weight. The court then found that the aggravating factors—*Greenway*’s actions and the evidence of brutality—“far outweigh[ed]” *Greenway*’s “chronological, emotional, and mental age” and that no other factors were “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” The court thus considered and weighed all the factors.

The best that petitioner can do to show the state supreme court committed constitutional error by applying a causal-nexus test is to point to the way the court distinguished the mitigating factors in Greenway's case from those in *State v. Jimenez*, 165 Ariz. 444, 455–60 (1990) (in banc). But neither *Jimenez*, nor by extension *Greenway*, suggest a defendant's I.Q. should be excluded from consideration absent a showing of causal nexus. The Arizona Supreme Court decided *Jimenez* the year before Greenway's case, and the same court in *Jimenez* found the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. *See id.* at 460. In Greenway's case, the state court noted that Greenway had an I.Q. and age comparable to Jimenez, but that Jimenez, unlike Greenway, had offered testimony to establish that he suffered from hallucinations that compelled him to commit murder. *Greenway*, 170 Ariz. at 169 (citing *Jimenez*, 165 Ariz. at 456–60). The *Greenway* court said:

Although the defendants in both *Jimenez* and the instant case registered comparable I.Q.s and ages, the defendant in *Jimenez* offered substantial testimony to establish that he also suffered from hallucinations and delusions which compelled him to commit the murder. The defendant in the present case limited expert testimony about his mental condition to his I.Q. The defendant offered no testimony to establish he suffered from hallucinations or delusions at the time he committed the murder.

*Id.* (internal citation omitted).

Greenway argues this passage means that there was a causal nexus in *Jimenez* but not in Greenway's case, thus indicating application of the causal-nexus test to exclude mitigating evidence in his case. Yet when we look to the underlying Arizona Supreme Court opinion in *Jimenez*, we see the discussion related to the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime was not about the impermissible causal-nexus test, but about the applicability of a statutory factor relating to mental illness.

Arizona statutory law at that time required courts to find a mitigating factor when "[t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution." Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-703(G)(1) (1989) (current version at Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-751(G)(1)). Thus the court in *Jimenez*, echoing the statutory language, found the defendant's mental illness to be a mitigating factor: "Although [the defendant's] impairment was not great enough to constitute a defense to the crime, we find that defendant's mental incapacity was not only a substantial mitigating factor in this case, but a major contributing cause of his conduct that was sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating factors present in this case." See 165 Ariz. at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in *Jimenez*, the court concluded: "Given the strong evidence in this case of the severity of defendant's mental illness, combined with the substantial and relevant factor of defendant's young age and borderline intelligence level affecting his intellectual maturity, we believe that leniency is required." *Id.* at 460.

Jimenez was not only young and of borderline intelligence, but also suffered from a mental impairment that satisfied Arizona's statutory mitigation requirements. Greenway had no such impairment. Thus Greenway's case differed from *Jimenez*, not because Greenway failed to show a causal nexus between his low I.Q. and the murders, but because Greenway lacked the statutory factor of a mental impairment. In neither *Greenway* nor *Jimenez* did the Arizona Supreme Court apply a causal-nexus test to exclude mitigating factors.

Finally, even if we were to determine that the state court did apply the causal-nexus test in violation of *Eddings*, there could have been no prejudice because the aggravating factors overwhelmingly outweighed all the evidence that Greenway asserted as mitigating, including his age and low I.Q. "The harmless-error standard on habeas review provides that 'relief must be granted' if the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" See *McKinney*, 813 F.3d at 822 (quoting *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). Here, there were significant aggravating factors that the state court took into account: Greenway (1) committed multiple first degree murders; (2) for pecuniary gain; and (3) in an especially cruel, heinous, and depraved manner. *Greenway*, 170 Ariz. at 163–68. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the multiple first degree murders constituted "egregious circumstances" and were "especially cruel." *Id.* at 165, 168 (quoting *Evans v. State*, 304 Md. 487, 538 (1985)). Even if the Arizona Supreme Court had excluded Greenway's low I.Q. for lack of a causal connection to the crime, its factual determinations demonstrate that Greenway's I.Q. was entitled to little mitigating weight. The court noted expert testimony that Greenway was "fully capable of functioning in society" and

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GREENWAY V. RYAN

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“capable of making judgments with limited impairment.” *Id.* at 169. Given the significant aggravating factors, we can say “with fair assurance” that Greenway’s total evidence in nonstatutory and statutory mitigation, including his age and evidence of low I.Q., was not sufficient to overcome the aggravating factors and call for leniency. *See McKinney*, 813 F.3d at 822 (quoting *Kotteakos v. United States*, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).

**CONCLUSION**

Neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the trial court applied an impermissible causal-nexus test to exclude mitigating evidence. Both considered all of Greenway’s evidence offered in mitigation and found it insufficient to outweigh the serious aggravating factors. Accordingly, there was no violation of clearly established federal law.

**AFFIRMED.**

*Greenway v. Ryan*

## **APPENDIX D**

Order Denying Petition for Panel Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc,  
November 1, 2017

**FILED**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

NOV 01 2017

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Warden, Director of  
Arizona Department of Corrections,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 14-15309

D.C. No. 4:98-cv-00025-RCC  
District of Arizona,  
Tucson

ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny Petitioner-Appellant's petition for panel rehearing. Judges Rawlinson and Bea have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Schroeder has so recommended.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

Petitioner-Appellant's petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are denied.

*Greenway v. Ryan*

## **APPENDIX E**

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,  
July 28, 2011

**FOR PUBLICATION**  
**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS**  
**FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

<p>RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY, <i>Petitioner-Appellant,</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">v.</p> <p>DORA B. SCHRIRO, <i>Respondent-Appellee.</i></p>
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No. 07-99021  
D.C. No.  
CV-98-00025-RRC  
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Arizona  
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted  
January 13, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed July 28, 2011

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and  
Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

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GREENWAY v. SCHIRO

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**COUNSEL**

Therese M. Day, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona, for petitioner/appellant Richard Harley Greenway.

Jeffrey Alan Zick, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for respondent-appellee Dora B. Schiro.

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**OPINION**

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Richard Harley Greenway, was convicted and sentenced to death in 1989 for the 1988 murders of Lili Champagne and her daughter, Mindy Peters. After the Arizona state courts denied Greenway's post-conviction petition for relief, he filed a petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied. On appeal, Greenway is seeking relief on a number of different claims, but we affirm the denial of all except those relating to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal.

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GREENWAY V. SCHIRO

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Greenway's most colorful claim is that the trial judge should have been disqualified from hearing the case because the trial judge himself once briefly worked with the man who had been the husband of victims Lili Champagne and the father of Mindy Peters. The evidence Greenway presented shows, at best, however, that the judge may have had a brief working relationship eighteen years before the trial, with the man who had, by the time of trial, been dead more than eleven years. We agree with the district court that there was no showing of any impropriety or appearance of impropriety.

We affirm the denial of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing because we conclude they lack merit. We agree with the district court that the state courts adequately considered all mitigating evidence in sentencing Greenway to death, and therefore affirm denial of that claim as lacking merit as well.

The record with respect to the claims of ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal is procedurally complex, but we conclude those claims are not procedurally barred and remand for the district court to consider their merits. After the state trial court denied Greenway's initial post-conviction petition, the Supreme Court of Arizona declined to accept jurisdiction of Greenway's Petition for Special Action to consider those claims, but it did so without prejudice to Greenway's filing a motion with the trial court for reconsideration. Greenway then went back to the trial court to file the motion and to amend his initial post-conviction petition to include additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The trial court, however, denied the motion and declined to consider these additional claims on the ground that they had been offered too late and were barred by waiver. The district court held this was an adequate and independent state ground justifying dismissal of the claims. The relevant state rule, Rule 32.2(a)(3) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, provides for waiver of claims not raised in "previous collateral proceedings." Since Greenway was

still pursuing his first post-conviction petition when, in accordance with the suggestion of the state supreme court, he sought to amend his first petition, there was no “previous collateral proceeding.” Hence, there was no adequate and independent state ground supporting the trial court’s refusal to hear the claims of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal. We therefore remand only those claims for consideration by the district court.

## I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

### A. The Crimes

The facts surrounding the cold-blooded murders of Lili Champagne and Mindy Peters are contained in the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion. *State v. Greenway*, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991). We summarize them here.

On March 28, 1988, Pima County Sheriffs found a burned 1983 Porsche, which officials determined belonged to Frank and Lili Champagne. A deputy went to inform the Champagnes at their home and discovered the bodies of Lili Champagne and her daughter, Mindy Peters. Lili had been shot once behind the knee and once between the eyes. Mindy had been shot twice, once in the jaw and once behind the ear. *Id.* at 25.

Following a news bulletin asking for information regarding the victims or the Porsche, Greenway’s sister notified homicide detectives that Greenway knew something about the incident. After detectives picked up Greenway at his sister’s house, Greenway told detectives that he had met a man named “Red” at a 7-Eleven convenience store, and that Red had given both Greenway and his co-defendant, Chris Lincoln, a ride in a white Porsche. *Id.* at 25-26.

The detectives then took Greenway and Lincoln to the police station for questioning. Greenway and Lincoln were

questioned separately. Lincoln confessed to stealing and burning the Porsche, and he implicated Greenway. During further questioning, Lincoln confessed to participating in the killings and again implicated Greenway. Greenway and Lincoln were then both arrested and charged with several counts, including the murders of Lili and Mindy.

Greenway was placed in a cell with Anthony Schmanski. Schmanski, according to his trial testimony, asked Greenway why Greenway was in jail, and Greenway answered, "Well, I just blew two people away" because "they had seen [my] face." *Id.* at 26. Further investigation revealed that Greenway had attempted to sell the victims' car stereo to Brian Mize, Greenway's co-worker. According to Mize's trial testimony, Greenway told Mize that Greenway went to the victims' house and after taking "some stuff" from the house, Greenway sent his co-defendant out and then shot the victims. Greenway told Mize that, after he shot the older lady, "her body rolled over and blood gushed out of her head." *Id.*

There was also evidence that Greenway knew the victims. He met Mindy late in 1987 at a local Jack-in-the-Box fast food restaurant, and met Lili soon after, when Greenway went to Lili's house to return Mindy's wallet. *Id.*

### **B. Trial and Sentencing Proceedings**

Greenway was charged with two counts of first degree murder, one count of first degree burglary, one count of armed robbery, one count of theft by control, and one count of arson. Prior to trial, the trial court ordered a mental examination of Greenway. Dr. Ronald David, a psychiatrist, interviewed Greenway about his past history, his family background, drug use, the circumstances surrounding the crimes, and asked Greenway questions in order to ascertain his mental status. Dr. David also asked Dr. Harry Saslow, a psychologist, to conduct a psychological evaluation of Greenway.

Greenway's trial began on March 14, 1989, and Judge William Scholl presided. The guilt phase lasted only three days, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts on March 17, 1989. In accordance with Arizona law at the time, the trial judge made the life or death sentencing decision after an aggravation-mitigation hearing. In this case, that hearing took place on May 24, 1989, and extended over a two-day period.

The defense originally wanted to call Dr. David to testify at the sentencing hearing, because he was familiar with Greenway's mental deficiencies, social problems, and miserable family background. Dr. David, however, was also familiar with Greenway's admissions about how he committed the crimes, so the trial court ruled that if Dr. David were called, he could be cross-examined on Greenway's incriminating statements. The defense therefore chose not to call Dr. David, and instead made a proffer that Dr. David would have testified that Greenway's I.Q. was low, that he had an immature personality, that he was not a psychopath or sociopath, and that he could be rehabilitated. The defense actually called the other medical expert who had examined Greenway, Dr. Saslow, to testify along with the defense investigator and lay witnesses, including Greenway's mother, half-sister, brother-in-law, former co-worker, and childhood friend.

On June 15, 1989, Judge Scholl found one mitigating factor, Greenway's age, which was nineteen at the time of the crimes, and three statutory aggravating factors: (1) the murders were committed for pecuniary gain; (2) the murders were committed in a cruel, heinous, or depraved manner; and (3) the defendant had been convicted of another homicide, which was committed during the commission of each homicide offense. *Greenway*, 823 P.2d at 30-34.

The judge sentenced Greenway to death on the two first degree murder counts. On direct appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, Greenway challenged his convictions, the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute, and his

capital sentence. Greenway could not bring any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, because in Arizona, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised in post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” *Lambright v. Stewart*, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2001).

On December 3, 1991, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Greenway’s convictions and sentence. *Greenway*, 823 P.2d at 40. With respect to the death penalty, it concluded that the Arizona death penalty statute was constitutional and the death sentence was imposed in a fair and impartial manner. After an independent review, it found that a death sentence was an appropriate punishment. *Id.* at 35-38.

### **C. Post-conviction Proceedings**

Greenway filed his *pro se* preliminary petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 32 petition”) in state court in August 1992. Judge Scholl appointed counsel and ordered counsel to file an amended petition by February 1, 1993. Counsel then filed a short, untimely petition raising only one issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and Greenway asked for a change of counsel that his attorney did not oppose. No further pleadings or proof were entered by counsel pending the change of counsel ruling. The trial judge, however, in January 1994, summarily denied the post-conviction petition in a minute order, without ruling on the request for change of counsel. The trial court subsequently granted Greenway’s motion to proceed *in propria persona* and allowed him to file a motion for reconsideration.

In April 1994, Greenway, with new counsel, moved to vacate the denial of the inadequate post-conviction petition, but the trial court denied that motion as well. Greenway then filed a petition for special action with the Arizona Supreme Court. Although the Arizona Supreme Court declined to

accept jurisdiction of Greenway's petition, it stated that it did so without prejudice to Greenway's filing a motion with the trial court for reconsideration of the denial of post-conviction relief.

Before Greenway filed a motion for reconsideration, his counsel learned through a juror that Judge Scholl, during the trial, had told a juror that when the judge was working for law enforcement, he had a colleague who had earlier been married to Lili Champagne and had fathered Mindy Peters. In December 1994, Greenway filed a motion to disqualify Judge Scholl, but in January 1996, the motion was denied as moot because Judge Scholl was no longer on the bench.

The case was reassigned to a different judge in January 1996. Greenway then filed the motion with the trial court seeking reconsideration of its denial of his post-conviction petition. The motion also sought leave to amend the initial petition to add additional facts to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at other stages of the litigation, including at trial and on direct appeal, and a claim of judicial bias. The new state court judge found Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing precluded by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(2) because they had already been raised and denied on the merits. The judge also concluded that Greenway's additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at other stages of the litigation were waived under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because they had not been raised when the initial post-conviction petition was filed. The court denied the judicial bias claim as moot in light of the state supreme court's independent review of the sentence.

Greenway again petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to order the trial court to consider the amended petition. On October 22, 1997, the supreme court entered an order purporting to decline review of the state trial court's denial of the

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motion for reconsideration, but also granting the request for leave to amend the post-conviction petition. After sparring between the parties, however, in which each interpreted the order differently, the Arizona Supreme Court, on January 6, 1998, vacated the portion of that order granting the request for leave to amend the petition. The court then amended its order to deny the requested relief in its entirety.

This habeas petition in federal district court followed in 1998. In September 2007, after a number of interim rulings, the district court eventually denied the petition. During much of the intervening period, proceedings were stayed while the district court awaited exhaustion of claims relating to the constitutionality of Greenway's death sentence. *See Ring v. Arizona*, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the Arizona statute allowing a trial judge, sitting without a jury, to impose the death penalty). In addition, during the interim period, the Court decided *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that executions of mentally retarded criminals violate the Eighth Amendment. Greenway therefore filed a successive post-conviction petition in state court alleging that he was entitled to a new sentencing under *Ring* and that he was mentally retarded.

The United States Supreme Court in 2004 ruled that *Ring* did not apply retroactively. *Schiro v. Summerlin*, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). With respect to the *Atkins* claim, Greenway's expert eventually concluded in the state proceedings that Greenway did not meet the criteria for mental retardation, thus paving the way for the district court to consider the remaining claims.

In its denial of Greenway's habeas petition, the district court dismissed as procedurally barred the claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal. It held that the state court's ruling that the claims were waived was an adequate and independent state ground supporting denial. It also dismissed, as barred, the

claim that counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing hearings. The district court dismissed on the merits Greenway's ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to psychological evidence, and, also on the merits, dismissed Greenway's judicial bias claim. Finally, the district court found that the Arizona state courts properly considered all the mitigating evidence that was presented during the sentencing phase.

Greenway timely appealed the district court's denial of his habeas relief petition. On appeal, Greenway asserts that the district court erred by not reaching the merits of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal because he contends the procedural rule that the state court relied upon is not an independent or adequate bar to federal review. Greenway also challenges the district court's ruling that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to mitigating evidence was barred. As for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to psychological evidence, Greenway contends the district court erred on the merits and that his counsel's performance was deficient. Lastly, Greenway posits that the district court erred by denying Greenway an evidentiary hearing on his judicial bias claim and by finding that the state courts properly considered and gave effect to mitigating evidence in sentencing Greenway to death.

## II. DISCUSSION

### A. AEDPA Applicability

Because Greenway filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") applies. *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Under AEDPA, we may disturb the state court's rulings only if they were "contrary to" or "involved an unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). On appeal, however, we

review *de novo* the district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief. *See Scott v. Schiro*, 567 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2009).

**B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Trial and on Direct Appeal**

The district court concluded that all of Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on direct appeal, were procedurally barred by Arizona Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a)(3), which the district court found was consistently and regularly followed in Arizona and therefore constituted an independent and adequate ground upon which a procedural default may be found.

[1] Federal courts "will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." *See Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). To constitute an independent and adequate state procedural ground creating a procedural bar to consideration of claims in the federal court, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of a petitioner's purported default. *See Scott*, 567 F.3d at 580.

The general Arizona rule governing all procedural bars is Rule 32.2, which provides:

**a. Preclusion.** A petitioner will not be given relief under this rule based upon any ground:

- (1) Still raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31 or on post-trial motion under Rule 24;
- (2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding;

*(3) Knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently not raised at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.*

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (pre-1992) (emphasis added).<sup>1</sup>

[2] The state trial court and the district court relied upon Rule 32.2(a)(3), which bars claims not raised in previous post-conviction proceedings. The state trial court denied Greenway's attempts to reopen and amend the initial Rule 32 petition to include these ineffective assistance claims on the ground that the claims should have been brought in that petition when it was originally filed. Yet, Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not provide that petitions as originally filed cannot be amended. Indeed, Arizona has a procedural rule, Rule 32.6(d), which permits amendment of a Rule 32 Petition even if the petition has already been dismissed. *See Scott*, 567 F.3d at 577. Rule 32.2(a)(3) expressly bars only claims not brought in a "previous collateral proceeding." In this case, Greenway was trying to amend his first petition, and there had been no earlier petition or collateral proceeding. We therefore conclude there was no "previous collateral proceeding" in which these claims should have been brought, because Greenway's first petition for post-conviction relief remained in state court proceedings while he sought to include additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

We trace the procedural history of this case to illustrate that Petitioner did what he could, and, indeed, what the state supreme court effectively told him to do, in order to litigate the claims in the first petition. Greenway, with new counsel,

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<sup>1</sup>Arizona clarified that "the 1992 amendments to Rule 32 apply to 'all post-conviction relief petitions filed on and after September 30, 1992.'" *State v. Rodriguez*, 903 P.2d 639, 640 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Supreme Court Order, 171 Ariz. XLIV (Sept. 24, 1992)). Because Greenway's initial post-conviction petition was filed on August 28, 1992, the amendment to Rule 32.2 does not affect his petition.

first moved to vacate the trial court's denial of his original Rule 32 petition, and to obtain leave from the trial court to amend that petition. When that motion was denied, Greenway filed a Petition for Special Action with the Arizona Supreme Court, asking that court to order the trial court to allow the filing of an amended petition. The Arizona Supreme Court declined jurisdiction of the Special Action, but did so without prejudice to Greenway's seeking reconsideration of the denial of the post-conviction petition before the state trial court, presumably in order to amend it. The state supreme court thus appeared to authorize Greenway to seek relief in the trial court by amending his first and only Rule 32 petition.

Greenway did go back to the trial court to seek reconsideration and leave to amend his first petition to include, among other claims, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Greenway argued that the counsel who filed his initial post-conviction petition was ineffective because she missed one deadline after another, conducted no investigation to see if other meritorious claims could be raised, never met with Greenway to discuss his case, and even directed a non-attorney investigator to write the entire post-conviction petition, to which counsel then made no additions or modifications.

[3] As we recently recognized in *Scott*, Arizona Rules specifically allow the filing of an amended petition upon a showing of good cause, even after the trial court has already dismissed that petition. 567 F.3d at 577 (citing Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(d)). In this case, however, instead of determining whether Greenway had good cause to amend his petition, the state trial court, citing Rule 32.2(a)(3), denied those claims as procedurally barred because they had not been raised earlier. The state trial court thus failed to recognize the availability of the state procedural rule allowing the filing of an amended petition upon a showing of good cause. Since Arizona has a procedure for amending post-conviction relief petitions, the dismissal of claims as barred under a different

rule, Rule 32.2(a)(3), cannot constitute an independent and adequate state ground barring the district court's consideration of these claims.

Our opinion in *Scott* is instructive and controlling in key respects. In *Scott*, the original post-conviction petition for relief from Scott's conviction and capital sentence raised a single issue of ineffective assistance at sentencing. *Scott*, 567 F.3d at 578. While this petition was pending, Scott, like Greenway, sought to replace his post-conviction counsel. The trial court summarily denied the petition for post-conviction relief in a minute order, without a hearing with respect to the request for new counsel, just as the trial court did in this case. *See id.*

Scott then filed a motion to represent himself and the court appointed new counsel. With new counsel, Scott, like Greenway, then filed motions to vacate the denial of the post-conviction petition and for leave to file an amended petition, arguing that his previous counsel had been ineffective. *See id.* at 578-79. The state court denied the motions. In an order remarkably similar to the trial court's ruling on the ineffectiveness claims sought to be added in this case, the court said it had "no authority" under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(d) to allow the filing of an amended petition because the motion to amend was filed after the original petition had been denied. *Id.* at 579. Scott then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. *See id.*

The federal district court then dismissed Scott's subsequent federal habeas petition, just as the district court dismissed Greenway's claims, because it found that the state court's denial of post-conviction relief was based on an adequate and independent rule of state procedure. *See id.*

On appeal to this court, however, we reversed and remanded for a determination on the merits, holding that Rule

32.6(d) was not an adequate bar to federal review because the rule was not clear, well-established, nor consistently applied in Arizona. *Id.* at 581-82. We reviewed its history and concluded it had never been consistently applied to bar post-dismissal amendments to Rule 32 petitions. At least one Arizona appellate court had interpreted Rule 32.6(d) to allow the filing of an amended petition upon a showing of good cause, even if the trial court had already dismissed the original petition. *Id.* at 581 (citing *State v. Rodriguez*, 903 P.2d 639, 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)). Indeed, we found that the Arizona Supreme Court had subsequently followed *Rodriguez* and issued orders allowing defendants upon a showing of good cause to file amended or supplemental petitions even after their first petitions had been denied. *Scott*, 567 F.3d at 581 n.7. We therefore concluded that reliance on Rule 32.6(d) was not an independent and adequate state ground that barred *Scott*'s claims.

In this case, as in *Scott*, the state court held that the new claims were brought too late without considering whether there was good cause to amend the petition. Here, the state court relied on Rule 32.2(a)(3) to bar Greenway's claims, a provision that, on its face, applies only where there has been a prior post-conviction proceeding. There was no such prior post-conviction proceeding in Greenway's case, for Greenway, like *Scott*, was trying to amend his first petition after it had been dismissed. The state supreme court itself effectively told Greenway to return to the trial court to seek amendment of his first petition when it declined to accept jurisdiction of his special action. Therefore, Rule 32.2(a)(3)'s bar of claims not raised in an earlier petition cannot constitute an adequate and independent ground sufficient to support a finding of procedural default, and particularly in light of Rule 32.6(d)'s provision allowing for amendments to Rule 32 petitions. *See also Lambright v. Stewart*, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not bar federal habeas review of claims not raised in direct appeal in light of another Ari-

zona rule prohibiting claims from being raised on direct appeal when they rely on evidence outside the record).

The State cites a number of cases in which we recognized reliance on Rule 32.2(a)(3) to have been an independent and adequate state ground for the state courts' dismissal of claims. Yet none of those cases involved an attempt to amend a first Rule 32 petition. In those cases, the petitioner had filed an earlier Rule 32 post-conviction petition that had been conclusively ruled upon and become final. Thus those petitioners were trying to bring new claims before the state court in a successive petition. In *Ortiz v. Stewart*, 149 F.3d 923, 930 (9th Cir. 1998), for example, we held that additional claims raised for the first time in petitioner's third post-conviction petition were procedurally defaulted. In *Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis*, 80 F.3d 1301, 1304-06 (9th Cir. 1996), we determined that claims were barred because they were raised in second and third post-conviction petitions.

[4] The State cites no case in which we concluded Rule 32.2(a)(3) to be an independent and adequate state ground barring claims sought to be raised in state court through amendment of a first petition. Arizona has not consistently recognized any such bar, and its rules permit amendment. The district court erred in holding that Rule 32.2(a)(3) was an independent and adequate state ground that bars the consideration of Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of trial and on direct appeal.

[5] Greenway's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal of the state court proceedings are therefore remanded to the district court for consideration on the merits. On remand, the district court should consider those claims *de novo* because there is no state court determination on the merits to which the district court can defer. *Scott*, 567 F.3d at 584-85 (stating that when "a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, we must review it *de novo*" (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

**C. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing**

Greenway's claims with respect to ineffective assistance at sentencing raise two principal issues: whether counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating evidence, and whether counsel was ineffective in declining to call Dr. David to testify, and relying instead upon the testimony of Dr. Saslow. Because we conclude these claims lack merit, we affirm the district court's dismissal of them.

**1. Failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence**

Greenway argues that his trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing because he failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence. His federal habeas petition alleged that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate Greenway and his family background, including abuse, medical history, drug usage, chaotic upbringing, and learning disabilities.

[6] The district court dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust, holding that it was never fairly presented to the state court. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims in state court before coming to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by "fully and fairly presenting each claim to the highest state court." *Scott*, 567 F.3d at 582. Full and fair presentation requires the petitioner to provide the factual and legal basis for the claim to the state court. *Id.*

The district court concluded that this claim was never fairly presented to the state court because Greenway did not include the operative facts alleged in the habeas petition in his original state post-conviction relief petition. What the district court did not adequately take into account, however, was that Greenway's motion to amend his first post-conviction petition included these facts. That motion, filed after the state supreme

court denied his petition for Special Action without prejudice to filing such a motion, sought to add allegations that included the following mitigating circumstances:

emotional abuse[,] physical abuse[,] possibility of sexual abuse[,] effects of drug usage on Petitioner[,] effects of strict religious upbringing (Jehovah's witness)[,] chaotic childhood[,] why Petitioner was on his own as a teenager[,] why Petitioner lived with his sister rather than his parents[,] learning disabilities[,] sibling rivalries[,] why Petitioner ran away at 14[,] non-violent history[,] effects of living in a draining ditch as a teenager[,] lack of paternal affection[,] psychological abuse by family members and friends[,] potential character disorders not diagnosed and therefore not treated[,] parental history . . . .

The state trial court declined to consider these additional facts on the ground that it had already considered and dismissed, on the merits, Greenway's claim of ineffective assistance as to mitigation. In his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Greenway included in the Appendix a copy of the amended post-conviction relief petition he sought to file in the state trial court and requested the supreme court to allow the claims raised in the amended petition to proceed in the lower court. The supreme court denied his request.

[7] We have held that this is enough to satisfy the fair presentation requirement. In *Scott*, petitioner asked the Arizona Supreme Court to allow the claims in his amended post-conviction relief petition to proceed in the lower court and attached the amended petition, which included the operative facts and law, in the Appendix. 567 F.3d at 582. We held that petitioner exhausted those claims because the claims were fairly presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. *Id.* at 583. Here, Greenway's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to mitigation evidence was fairly presented to the Arizona Supreme Court because Greenway provided the factual

and legal basis for the claim in his amended post-conviction relief petition. The Arizona Supreme Court knew exactly which claim Greenway sought to present and chose to decline review of it. As we recognized in *Scott*, “[a]ll exhaustion requires is that the state courts have the opportunity to remedy an error, not that they actually took advantage of the opportunity.” *Id.* Accordingly, we hold that Greenway fairly presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to mitigating evidence and the district court therefore erred in holding the claim unexhausted. *See also Cone v. Bell*, 129 S. Ct. 1769 (2009) (“When a state court refuses to readjudicate a claim on the ground that it has been previously determined, the court’s decision does not indicate that the claim has been procedurally defaulted. To the contrary, it provides strong evidence that the claim has already been given full consideration by the state courts and thus is *ripe* for federal adjudication.”).

[8] We may nevertheless affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. *Holley v. Yarborough*, 568 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). We therefore look at the merits of the claim, and we determine it should have been denied on the merits.

Under Supreme Court precedent, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Greenway must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The inquiry under *Strickland* is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” *Id.* at 689.

[9] Greenway claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate for mitigating evidence, including: emotional, physical, and possibly sexual abuse; drug use; living in a drainage ditch; strict religious upbringing; chaotic childhood; sibling rivalries; lack of paternal affection; learning disabilities; and

potential psychological disorders. All of the matters that Greenway now claims were not investigated were, in fact, brought out at the aggravation-mitigation hearings. There, his trial counsel presented a total of eight witnesses, including his mother, half-sister, childhood friend, and Dr. Saslow. Greenway contends that the sentencing court did not hear testimony that Greenway was raised in a very strict environment by his father who was “an ardent Jehovah’s witness” and who beat Greenway with a belt and later with his fists. Greenway’s mother, however, testified that she and her husband were Jehovah’s witnesses and that they made Greenway go to church. Additionally, his mother and his half-sister testified that Greenway’s father beat him with a belt and later with his fists.

Greenway’s mother also testified that Greenway did not graduate from the seventh grade, he had problems in school, and he had learning disabilities. She acknowledged that she criticized Greenway, and that Greenway’s older brother ridiculed Greenway. She recalled an occasion when Greenway’s father and brother bought him baby food when he was 12. She also testified that Greenway ran away from home and was living in a drainage ditch, and that Greenway’s older brother was his father’s favorite. Greenway’s half-sister testified that her parents abused her and Greenway, but treated his older brother “[l]ike he could do no wrong.” She also testified that Greenway did poorly in school and that he could not read. Greenway’s childhood friend testified that Greenway and his brother did not get along well, and that Greenway told him that he received corporal punishment from his father. We therefore conclude that Greenway’s counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating evidence relating to his family background.

Greenway also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and develop on information obtained by the psychiatrist, Dr. David, which Greenway alleges revealed “tantalizing indications” of mental health issues, physical and

mental abuse, and past drug abuse. Greenway, however, has never explained how such indications would have led to specific and material evidence. Indeed, Dr. David himself noted in his interview worksheet that with regard to Greenway's "Mental Status Examination," Greenway "related well to the interviewer and spoke quietly with relatively good verbal skills throughout the interview . . . . Although he was obviously anxious, it did not seem overwhelming or to interfere with his behavior or thought processes." Furthermore, Greenway was "oriented," "had a good recent and remote memory," and "[t]here was no evidence of a gross psychotic thought disorder, but he did have difficulties [explaining] both on proverbs and similarities."

To satisfy any remaining doubts, Dr. David asked a psychologist, Dr. Saslow, to conduct a psychological evaluation of Greenway, because Dr. David "felt that there may be some question with respect to [Greenway's] intellectual functioning and for the possibility of the presence of a learning disability." Dr. Saslow subsequently interviewed Greenway on two separate occasions, and conducted four psychological and intelligence tests on him.

At the aggravation-mitigation hearing, Dr. Saslow testified that Greenway's I.Q. was a 72, which he characterized as borderline functioning. Dr. Saslow stated that although the tests he performed did not indicate any sign of sociopathology, he described Greenway's mental functioning as akin to that of an 11- or 12-year-old, which made him more prone to impulsiveness than someone who was mentally older. On cross-examination, Dr. Saslow acknowledged that he was not suggesting that Greenway suffered from any organic brain damage or that he was incapable of making judgments. Dr. Saslow's testimony thus developed the nature of Greenway's limitations.

In addition to presenting witnesses, defense counsel also prepared two sentencing memoranda arguing that Greenway's

age and immaturity constituted statutory mitigating factors. His counsel further argued that Greenway's mental retardation, learning disability, remorse, prior good deeds, good behavior while in custody, lack of significant criminal history, lack of violent propensity, and potential for rehabilitation constituted additional mitigating factors. Counsel pointed out that Greenway was not raised in a supportive environment, noting that his mother mistook his learning disability for laziness and that his father and brother "constantly belittled and criticized" him.

[10] The record shows that Greenway's counsel investigated and presented mitigating evidence at the state sentencing proceedings. His performance was not deficient. Accordingly, we conclude that the state court's denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of *Strickland*. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of this claim.

## **2. Failure to Call Dr. David to Testify**

The district court denied on the merits Greenway's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. David to testify. We agree that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Greenway's counsel initially intended to call Dr. David to testify at the sentencing hearing, and counsel asked the trial court to exclude incriminating statements Greenway made to Dr. David about the murders. When the trial court declined to limit the cross-examination of Dr. David, defense counsel decided not to call him.

[11] This was a reasonable strategic decision. In his interview with Dr. David, Greenway told Dr. David that he and his co-defendant were discussing committing a burglary in the weeks leading up to the murders because they were out of work and needed money. Greenway admitted that he shot the victims in the head, execution-style. He also described the murders as "a big adventure," and that he "felt like he was the

master.” Had Dr. David testified, the state would have cross-examined him about these inculpatory statements, and such testimony would have been highly prejudicial to the defense. Our precedent has repeatedly recognized similar decisions as being a reasonable strategy. *See Wong v. Belmontes*, 130 S. Ct. 383, 386 (2009) (“[I]t is necessary to consider *all* the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if [defendant] had pursued the different path—not just the mitigation evidence [defendant] could have presented, but also the . . . murder evidence that almost certainly would have come in with it.”) (emphasis in original); *Bonin v. Calderon*, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that it was reasonable for defense counsel to forego expert testimony because “it would have opened the door to precisely the type of cross-examination that [defendant] sought to avoid by refusing to call psychiatric experts”).

[12] Moreover, Dr. David’s testimony would not have added much to Greenway’s case. Defense counsel proffered that, “[Dr. David] would testify that in his opinion . . . [Greenway had] a low I.Q., that [Greenway] had developed an immature personality, [but that] Mr. Greenway [did] not fit within any kind of characterological [sic] disorder . . . such as a psychopath or sociopath.” He went on to say that Dr. David would agree with Dr. Saslow that Greenway was functioning at an 11- or 12-year-old level, and would testify that Greenway could be rehabilitated. Thus, much of Dr. David’s potential testimony would have been cumulative of the testimony provided by Dr. Saslow, while the drawbacks of calling Dr. David were substantial. Defense counsel was therefore not ineffective by his strategic decision not to call Dr. David. *See also Raley v. Ylst*, 470 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a strategic choice not to call an expert will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if that choice was reasonable under the circumstances).

### 3. Failure to prepare Dr. Saslow

Greenway contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing adequately to prepare Dr. Saslow because counsel had

not done enough background investigation. Greenway claims “counsel did not have sufficient background information to provide Dr. Saslow before he testified.”

[13] Yet Greenway does not allege what specific facts or information counsel should have provided to Dr. Saslow. Dr. Saslow’s testimony related principally to his own testing and interviews of Greenway. Dr. Saslow testified that he was given the information garnered by the defense investigation concerning Greenway’s background, but he testified that his conclusions concerning Greenway’s mental status and mental functioning were predicated primarily on the psychological tests he performed. Greenway has never alleged, much less demonstrated, what more counsel should have known or discovered. Greenway’s cursory and vague claim cannot support habeas relief. *See James v. Borg*, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”).

[14] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the state court was not objectively unreasonable in denying Greenway’s claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, for failing to call Dr. David to testify at the sentencing hearing, and for failing properly to prepare Dr. Saslow. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of those claims.

#### **D. Judicial Bias**

The claim of judicial bias came to light in December 1994 when counsel for Greenway learned from an alternate juror that the trial judge, Judge Scholl, had mentioned his prior working relationship with Vince Peters, Lili’s late husband and Mindy’s father. As a result of this new information, Greenway filed a motion for a change of judge and requested discovery in order to further investigate Judge Scholl’s ties to the victims. The new state court judge granted Greenway’s discovery motion and ordered the Tucson Police Department

("TPD") to provide Greenway with records about Judge Scholl and Vince Peters.

The TPD record demonstrates that Scholl was employed by Tucson Police Department from July 1970 until September 1971. He was on military leave from October 1970 until March 1971. Vince Peters was employed by TPD from April 1968 until July 1978. The TPD record does not indicate whether or not Judge Scholl and Vince Peters worked together. However, the TPD discovery response states that the time period that they "could have worked together would be limited to the period from March 22, 1971 when Judge Scholl return[ed] from military leave, to May 24, 1971, when Vince Peters transferred to Narcotics."

At a status conference in August 1996, Greenway's attorney stated that she spoke with Judge Scholl and Judge Scholl admitted that he knew Vince Peters but he did not have any recollection of Lili. Greenway's attorney also claimed that she was in the process of contacting Kurt Jackson, a colleague of both Judge Scholl and Peters. Although the attorney was unable to reach Jackson, her investigator spoke with Jackson's mother, who told the investigator that Judge Scholl and Peters were close. The attorney, however, did not present an affidavit from Jackson's mother.

In September 1996, the state court dismissed the judicial bias claim, stating that although there was some indication that "Judge Scholl may have had some type of relationship with Vince Peters," the issue was moot because the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the sentencing and approved the capital sentence.

The state court thus applied a harmless error analysis to dismiss the claim. This was incorrect because when a defendant's right to have his case tried by an impartial judge is compromised, there is structural error that requires automatic reversal. *See Tumey v. Ohio*, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (reject-

ing the argument that the judge's failure to recuse himself was harmless in light of defendant's clear guilt because "[n]o matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to have an impartial judge"); *see also Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (recognizing the right to an impartial judge as among those "constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error").

Because the state court's harmless error analysis was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, this Court must review Greenway's judicial bias claim *de novo*. *See Panetti v. Quarterman*, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (holding that when the state court's decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, a "federal court must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires"); *see also Frantz v. Hazey*, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (stating that if there is 2254(d)(1) error, "we must decide the habeas petition by considering *de novo* the constitutional issues raised").

Greenway raised the judicial bias claim in his federal habeas petition in 1998, four years after the underlying facts came to light. During the intervening years, no additional facts have been unearthed to illustrate the nature of the relationship or the possible effect it may have had upon the trial. In support of this claim, Greenway relies only on the TPD record and the affidavit from the alternate juror. In the affidavit, the juror declared that the judge had called him to his office and told him about having known the husband of one of the victims. The juror stated: "After being selected as the alternate juror, the trial judge called me into his office. During our conversation, the judge told me that he used to be a police officer. He also told me that when he was a police officer, his partner was the ex-husband of one of the victims in the Richard Greenway case."

The district court denied this claim on the merits, and without an evidentiary hearing, because the facts described could

not establish bias. The court accurately stated that the evidence presented by Greenway shows, at best, “that for a brief period of time (two to three months at most), eighteen years prior to trial, Judge Scholl and Vince Peters *may* have worked or even partnered together as police officers. In addition, by the time of trial, Vince Peters had been deceased for eleven years. Petitioner can point to no evidence indicating that Judge Scholl had a personal relationship or even acquaintance with either Lili Champagne or Mindy Peters.” The district court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to raise a colorable claim of judicial bias, and we agree.

[15] A showing of judicial bias requires facts sufficient to create actual impropriety or an appearance of impropriety. *Crater v. Galaza*, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007). Although Greenway argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the merits of his judicial bias claim, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he alleged facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. *Gonzalez v. Pliler*, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). He has not done so.

[16] Greenway does not contend there was any actual bias on the part of the trial judge, but only an appearance of bias on the basis of having known Peters. The Supreme Court has recognized only a few circumstances in which an appearance of bias necessitates recusal to ensure due process of law. The landmark case is *Tumey v. Ohio*, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). There, the Supreme Court held that the judge should have recused himself because the judge had a direct, substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, because the judge received money from each conviction. The court in *In re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955), recognized an appearance of impropriety when the judge acted as both the grand jury and the trier of the accused. The Court stressed the improper appearance of the trial judge being “part of the accusatory process.” *Id.* In *Mayberry v. Pennsylvania*, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1971), the Court held that where the defendant

had rudely insulted the trial judge, a different judge should preside over the contempt proceeding. The trial judge had become embroiled in “a running, bitter controversy” with the defendant, creating an appearance of impropriety when the same judge ruled on whether the defendant had been guilty of contempt.

More recently, in a case where one party was a large donor to the judge’s election campaign, the Court ruled there had been a denial of due process. The Court held recusal was required when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.*, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (quoting *Withrow v. Larkin*, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

[17] All these cases involved some direct, personal relationship of the judge to the case, or with one of the parties, before the judge. That was not the situation here. Greenway’s claim does not suggest any possible connection of the trial judge to his case that approaches the prior involvement of the judges in *Tumey*, *Murchison*, *Mayberry*, or *Caperton*. Here, Greenway has never presented any additional evidence, other than the TPD record and the alternate juror’s affidavit, to support his bias claim. It continues to rest only upon a relationship that existed eighteen years before trial, lasted, at most, a few months, and was with a person who died more than eleven years before the trial. We agree with the district court that the record lacks support for a claim of judicial bias. The judge had no interest in, or relationship to, Greenway or the victims; at most, there was but a brief tangential employment relationship with a member of the victims’ family. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Greenway’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and we affirm the dismissal of this claim.

#### **E. State Courts’ Consideration of Mitigating Factors**

Greenway’s final claim is that the state trial court and Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider mitigating factors

because they were following the then commonly applied test in Arizona requiring a nexus between mitigating factors and the crime. *See Schad v. Ryan*, 606 F.3d 1022, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2010), *vacated on other grounds*, 131 S. Ct. 2092 (2011). In *Schad* we cited *State v. Djerf*, 959 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1998), as illustrating the Arizona nexus test, and concluded that such a test was found to be inconsistent with later constitutional analysis by the Supreme Court in *Tennard v. Dretke*, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), and *Smith v. Texas*, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), which required consideration of all mitigating factors. *Schad*, 606 F.3d at 1045-47.

[18] The record in this case, however, does not indicate that either the state trial court or the Arizona Supreme Court applied such a nexus test. In sentencing Greenway to death, the trial court stated that it had “considered all other mitigating factors, those presented at the aggravating-mitigating hearing, and also those which have been submitted to the Court in the sentencing memorandum and any other matters of record,” and concluded that “evidence of brutality . . . far outweighs his chronological, emotional and mental age,” and that “there are no other mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” The Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion indicates that it also considered all of the mitigating factors and did not find them sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. *Greenway*, 823 P.2d at 35-38 (reviewing all the mitigating factors, including Greenway’s age and low I.Q., and finding that they were “not sufficient to outweigh the three aggravating factors”).

[19] We have recently rejected a similar argument under similar circumstances. *See Schad*, 606 F.3d at 1046 (“[T]here is no indication that the state courts applied a nexus test . . .”). Accordingly, we must conclude that under the standards applicable to our habeas review, the Arizona state court decision is neither contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor an unreasonable application of the law. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

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### III. CONCLUSION

The dismissal of Greenway's claims of ineffectiveness with respect to the trial and on direct appeal is **VACATED** and the claims are **REMANDED** to the district court for consideration on the merits because we hold they are not procedurally barred. The district court's judgment dismissing the petition is **AFFIRMED** in all other respects.

**AFFIRMED** in part, **VACATED** and **REMANDED** in part.

*Greenway v. Ryan*

## **APPENDIX F**

Order Granting Joint Motion for Supplemental Briefing based on *McKinney v. Ryan*,  
November 28, 2016

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

NOV 28 2016

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD HARLEY GREENWAY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, Director of Arizona  
Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 14-15309

D.C. No. 4:98-cv-00025-RCC  
District of Arizona,  
Tucson

ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

The joint motion for supplemental briefing based on *McKinney v. Ryan*, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) is GRANTED. Supplemental briefing is ordered in accordance with the proposed schedule.

Petitioner-Appellant's supplemental brief addressing the impact of *McKinney v. Ryan* on his case is due no later than December 15, 2016;

Respondents-Appellees will file a response no later than January 12, 2017;

Petitioner-Appellant will file a reply no later than January 26, 2017.