

No. 17 - 8422

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEAN M. DONAHUE

VS.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 44 of this Court, the Petitioner respectfully petitions for rehearing of this case before a full nine-Member Court.

“Early in life I have noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain, for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie. I saw great battles reported where there had been no fighting, and complete silence where hundreds of men had been killed. I saw troops who had fought bravely denounced as cowards and traitors, and others who had never seen a shot fired hailed as the heroes of imaginary victories; and I saw newspapers in London retailing these lies and eager intellectuals building emotional superstructures over events that had never happened. I saw, in fact, history being written not in terms of what happened but of what ought to have happened according to various ‘party lines’, [Looking Back on the Spanish War, 1943. George Orwell].”

- (1) The Supreme Court of the United States erred in its constitutional duty by not independently reviewing this case and has further erred by not reversing the unconstitutional criminal conviction in this case.

Sean M. Donahue

Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to Rule 44 of the Supreme Court of the United States

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

- (2) Newly released pretrial hearing transcripts and trial argument transcripts, not previously released by the trial court, prove that Pennsylvania prosecuted two counts of a crime with which the Petitioner was never charged and that the trial court then substituted a guilty verdict on those two uncharged counts for two counts of a different but related statute with which the Petitioner was charged.
- (3) The Pennsylvania statute with which the Petitioner was charged is identical to the very same statute governing the very same offense in New York state, which was struck down in 2013 by the New York Court of Appeals as being overly broad. The Pennsylvania statute should be struck down too.
- (4) There was no "true threat" and the convictions in similar cases throughout the United States have been reversed.
- (5) The state trial judge and state magistrate demonstrated overt unethical bias against the Petitioner that had separate and distinct material impacts on each phase of the case, pre-trial, trial and post-trial. Newly released pretrial hearing transcripts and trial argument transcripts, not previously released by the trial court, reveal that the trial judge went into the trial harboring unethical bias against the Petitioner and that she attempted to coerce a guilty plea that the Petitioner had no intention of giving in to. When all of the pre-trial, trial and post-trial transcripts and all of the post-trial court and appellate court opinions are taken together, clear patterns of unethical bias by the state trial court and the state magistrate are easily seen.

(6) There was evidence tampering that could not have been known of by the
Petitioner until several months after the trial had been completed.

THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

By remaining passive, the Supreme Court of the United States has enabled corruption and tyranny on the part of Pennsylvania state actors and has served to reduce its own efficacy. The failure of the Court to recognize absolute rights under the US Bill of Rights, as was indisputably the intent of the First US Congress, has created a circumstance that can only be corrected through clearly necessary senior executive and legislative actions against the courts. In this case, the courts have stood by and allowed millions of illegal and legal foreigners to steal the American Dream, while simultaneously allowing the Petitioner to be denied the dutifully earned statutory respect and honor that his honorable military service bestows upon him. The courts stripped the Petitioner of his right to free speech by prosecuting him for exercising that very right and wrongfully enabled the creation of a circumstance in which he will be charged with felony if he dares exercise that fundamental right again. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot, in good faith, allow such an injustice to stand.

If the Court does not reverse the convictions and order that the Petitioner receive his honorably earned veterans preference for both job placement services and for actual hiring into government jobs, then the nation must repay the Petitioner for the total value of his military service and each individual in the nation must reduce the amount of freedom, liberty and justice (ie: the American Way) that he or she enjoys by the

increment (compounded through time) that was protected by the Petitioner's government service. Because the Court has failed to honor the Petitioner's military service and has failed to reverse these unconstitutional criminal convictions, the US Supreme Court must now determine a mechanism to allow the Petitioner to claw back that honorable military service to the nation on the grounds that the nation has failed to keep its end of the bargain (ie: the Social Contract). In this case, it is the nation that owes the Petitioner, not the Petitioner who owes the nation and the Court must outline a means through which the Petitioner can proceed to collect that which is owed to him by the nation and its sovereign signatory of Pennsylvania.

TRIAL COURT SUBSTITUTED VERDICTS

The recently released transcripts of the pretrial hearings and the opening and closing trial arguments are now included in this case as attachments to this document. When taken as a whole, the court records clearly show that the Pennsylvania prosecutor displayed the mens rea for persecuting the state harassment statute with which the Petitioner had never been charged and that the court then substituted two guilty verdicts under that statute for guilty verdicts under a different Pennsylvania harassment statute under which the Petitioner was charged but for which the state prosecutor never displayed the mean rea to prosecute. In response to the jury's own sua sponte request for clarification, the trial court itself instructed the jury on Pennsylvania's summary "course of conduct" harassment statute, with which the Petitioner had not been charged.

The core foundation of the case that the Pennsylvania prosecutor actually tried in her mind, (ie: the prosecution for which she actually displayed the mens rea to prosecute) was not a legitimate basis for trying the crime with which the Petitioner was actually formally charged. The trial court accommodated the prosecution by displaying the same mens rea to facilitate a trial on a harassment statute other than the one with which the Petitioner was charged.

“THE COURT: Although they may try to show that it's an ongoing course of conduct[Transcript Of Proceedings Jury Trial, Before: Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, April 18-19, 2016, P11].”

“MS. ADAM:... I believe that would be appropriate, because in proving a course of conduct for -- [Id, p12, line 13]

“MS. ADAM:... To prove a course of conduct for harassment, I have to show a course of conduct [Id, p12, line 24-25].”

“ATTORNEY ADAM:...You're going to hear something called a course of conduct. Repeatedly communicating, or a course of conduct, is not one day. And this is not one day. And this is not one email. This is three days. This is four emails. He continuously is doing this act. He's guilty [Transcript Of Proceedings, Opening And Closing Remarks Of Counsel, Before: Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, April 19, 2016, p18].”

“THE FOREPERSON: That is me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You asked the question of the terroristic threats again and the harassment...

“For harassment, the Commonwealth has charged that the defendant did, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, engage in a course of conduct to communicate threatening language to the individuals listed, the same listing of individuals as the terroristic threats[Transcript Of Proceedings Jury Trial, Before: Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, April 18-19, 2016, p99].”

The recently released transcripts of the pretrial hearings and the opening and closing trial arguments prove that the jury did not reach their verdict with the true threats doctrine in mind. In fact, the only argument upon which they found the Appellant guilty was an argument regarding "course of conduct" harassment, 18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709 (a)(3), a crime with which the Appellant WAS NOT formally charged. The Appellant cannot be convicted of a crime for which he was not charged and for which he was never tried. What is more, the trial court can't just take a guilty verdict for "course of conduct" harassment for which the Prosecutor tried the Petitioner, 18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709 (a)(3), and substitute it as a verdict under other harassment charges with which the Petitioner was charged but not actually tried, 18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709 (a)(4); **"A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person... communicates to or about such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings or caricatures"**.

The prosecutor never actually argued, nor did she display the mens rea to argue, that the Petitioner was guilty of 18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709 (a)(4) but instead focused her trial and her arguments on 18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709 (a)(3), which reads, **"A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person...engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose"**. The jury found the Petitioner guilty of two counts of **"engag[ing] in a course of conduct or repeatedly commit[ting] acts which serve no legitimate purpose"**, which is a summary offense. The trial court then substituted that verdict as a guilty verdict for two counts of

"communicat[ing] to or about such other person ... threatening... language", which is a misdemeanor offense. The conviction is unconstitutional and must be reversed.

"(c) Grading.–

(1) Except as provided under paragraph (3), an offense under subsection (a)(1), (2) or (3) shall constitute a summary offense.

(2) An offense under subsection (a)(4), (5), (6) or (7) or (a.1) shall constitute a misdemeanor of the third degree."

IDENTICAL STATUTE STRUCK DOWN BY NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

The statute under which the Petitioner was charged is overly broad. The identical statute governing the very same kind of alleged offense in New York state was struck down by the New York Court of Appeals as being overly broad and unconstitutional. All previous convictions under the New York statute were expunged. The Supreme Court of the United States denied hearing the New York case and the New York state legislature was forced to modify its statute.

"Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a) provides that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she . . . communicates with a person, anonymously or {**23 NY3d at 467}otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." We agree with defendant that this statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that his conviction of three counts of aggravated harassment related to his conduct toward Schiffman, Goranson and Cargill must be vacated.

"In *People v Dietze* (75 NY2d 47 [1989]), this Court struck down a similar harassment statute, former Penal Law § 240.25, which prohibited the use of abusive or obscene language with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person. We determined that the statute [*8]was unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions, noting that "any proscription of pure speech must be sharply limited to words which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or tend naturally to evoke immediate violence" (id. at 52).

"The reasoning applied in Dietze applies equally to our analysis of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a). The statute criminalizes, in broad strokes, any communication that has the intent to annoy. Like the harassment statute at issue in Dietze, "no fair reading" of this statute's "unqualified terms supports or even suggests the constitutionally necessary limitations on its scope" (id. at 52; see also *People v Dupont*, 107 AD2d 247, 253 [1st Dept 1985] [observing that the statute's vagueness is apparent because "(i)t is not clear what is meant by communication 'in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm' to another person"]). And, as in Dietze, "we decline to incorporate such limitations into the statute by judicial construction" because that would be "tantamount to wholesale revision of the Legislature's enactment, rather than prudent judicial construction" (id. at 52, 53).

"Three federal judges have already found this statute unconstitutional (see *Vives v City of New York*, 305 F Supp 2d 289, 299 [SD NY 2003, Scheindlin, J.], revd on other grounds 405 F3d 115 [2d Cir 2005] ["where speech is regulated or proscribed based on its content, the scope of the effected speech must be clearly defined"]; see also *Vives*, 405 F3d 115, 123-124 [2d Cir 2005, Cardamone, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part] [Penal Law § 240.30 (1) unconstitutional on its face and as applied]; *Schlagler v Phillips*, 985 F Supp 419, 421 [SD NY 1997, Brieant, J.], revd on other grounds 166 F3d 439 [2d Cir 1999] [statute is "utterly repugnant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and also unconstitutional for vagueness"])).

"{**23 NY3d at 468}Accordingly, we conclude that Penal Law § 240.30 (1) is unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions, and we vacate defendant's convictions on these counts. [See *People v Golb*, 2014 NY Slip Op 03426 [23 NY3d 455], May 13, 2014; http://www.courts.state.ny.us/Reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_03426.htm]¹".
"The Volokh Conspiracy [had this to say;]

¹ From a draft pdf copy of Glob's Petitioner for Certiorari; "OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals can be found in the Appendix ("App."), below, at App. 1- App. 22. It is reported as *People v. Golb*, 23 N.Y.3d 455, 991 N.Y.S.2d 792, 15 N.E.3d 805 (2014). The Court of Appeals judgment modified and affirmed a decision of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, which is reported at 102 A.D.3d 601, 960 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept. 2013). (App. 23.) An unreported decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, dated February 11, 2010, can be found in the Appendix. (App. 38.)"

“New York’s ‘aggravated harassment’ statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague

“By Eugene Volokh May 13, 2014 Email the author

“ So holds New York’s highest court in Tuesday’s Raphael Golb / Dead Sea Scrolls case (though it upheld many of Golb’s other convictions)...

“Recall that this is the statute that a prosecutor said would be violated even by speech about a person, not just speech to the person:

“JUDGE PIGOTT: So if ... you get some college kid who write — who e-mails the girlfriend of his roommate saying, you know, he really is a useless person. Is that aggravated harassment with respect to the victim, boyfriend/roommate?

“MR. RIVELLESE: Yes, because it’s got —

“JUDGE PIGOTT: Really?

“MR. RIVELLESE: It meets all the elements. It does not require that the person that you send the communication to is the same person that you intend to harass, annoy and alarm. It’s —

“ For some examples on how such statutes have indeed been read to cover constitutionally protected speech about a person, see this article; the article also talks about how some other criminal harassment statutes have been upheld, if properly worded and if limited to speech to a person (such as harassing telephone calls to the person’s home) [The Washington Post, The Volokh Conspiracy, By Eugene Volokh May 13, 2014]”.

In order to meet US Constitutional constraints, the language of the New York statute ,
“**with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person**” has been restricted only
to offenses that require illegal physical contact. The Pennsylvania harassment statute

with which the Petitioner was charged is fully comprised of language that is identical to the same statute that was struck down in the state of New York;

"18 Pa. C.S. "§ 2709. Harassment.

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person:

- (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same;**
- (2) follows the other person in or about a public place or places;**
- (3) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose;**
- (4) communicates to or about such other person any lewd, lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings or caricatures;**
- (5) communicates repeatedly in an anonymous manner;**
- (6) communicates repeatedly at extremely inconvenient hours; or**
- (7) communicates repeatedly in a manner other than specified in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6)."**

Like the New York statute, the comparable Pennsylvania statute must also be struck down as being overly broad and unconstitutional.

THERE WAS NO TRUE THREAT

The full context of the messages in question was not taken in the proper context by the state appellate court, nor by the trial court and its jury. In fact, the state appellate court accepted as fact the findings of the trial judge, which were not the findings of the jury. The finding of the jury was that there are two kinds of criminal threats, threats of violence and other kinds of threats, and that the Petitioner engaged in a "course of conduct" harassment crime that did not involve threats of violence. Under the "true threat doctrine", there are not two kinds of criminal threats. It is only for making a "true threat" that an individual may be criminally prosecuted. The jury was not instructed as to what a "true threat" was. Although the jury did come around to this question on is

own, the jury's question went unanswered. A true understanding of the "true threat doctrine" would not have yielded a guilty verdict in this case. A jury instruction on the "true threat doctrine" is required in Pennsylvania². Because such an instruction was not given and because the jury clearly convicted the Petitioner for threatening lawsuits and administrative complaints, the conviction must be reversed.

The mere mention of guns in a message to people who don't want to read messages about guns and who don't want other people sending messages about guns is not a crime [Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc, STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Martin Kilburn, Petitioner, No. 73301-5, Decided: February 12, 2004]. What is more, it was the Pennsylvania government, not the Petitioner, who brought up the subject of guns. Using Pennsylvania's logic, it is state government employees who should be charged with crimes, not the Petitioner. Pennsylvania clearly set out to entrap the Petitioner into a dialogue about guns and violence until they could get a response that they could use as an excuse to charged him with a crime. This entrapment was carried out as a means of getting the Petitioner on something so that the state could avoid having to hire him for a civil service job for which he had state statutory veterans preference. The Petitioner's

² See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. SEAN DONAHUE Appellee, J.A22033/14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37, Docket No. 2184 MDA 2013, p18, Footnote 11; "See generally Commonwealth v. Baker, 722 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Pa. Super. 1998) ("When engaged in a constitutionally protected activity of the fundamental nature of freedom of speech, we must exercise restraint in prohibiting the activity lest we destroy the right. However, the right to free speech is not absolute, and certain well-defined, limited classes of speech may be prevented and punished without raising constitutional problems. Lewd, obscene, profane, libelous and insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace are not constitutionally protected. Only true threats fall within that group of expressions, such as fighting words, which are not constitutionally protected pure speech. A true threat is one which on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditionally immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution." (citations and quotation marks omitted))."

positioning at the top of the hiring list for a job that still had approximately 90 open positions triggered a state statutory requirement to only hire veterans to fill any of the 90 positions for which the Petitioner was passed over in the hiring process. Because there were less than 20 veterans on the list, the Petitioner was bound to be hired as an operation of law.

THERE WAS OVERT UNETHICAL COURT BIAS

It is clear that the true reason for which the Petitioner was initially bound over for trial by the local state magistrate had little to do with the criminal charges and much more to do with his political statements, which were made out of court.

“MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE STEWART:
'America will be white again.' It will be a long time before that happens...

“MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE STEWART:
Place him under bail, 500,000. Bail is 500,000 straight. Take him back. [Transcript Of Proceedings, Preliminary Hearing, Before: Marsha C. Stewart, Magisterial District Judge Date: July 1, 2015, 11:52 A.M.]”

At the trial level, the trial judge kept inventing excuses to feign false justifications for keeping the Petitioner incarcerated as a means of coercion. It was repeatedly made clear to the Petitioner that if he pled guilty he could go home but if he didn't he was a threat to society³.

“THE COURT: I think at this point what I intend to do is to have the mental health evaluation done at Dauphin County Prison, and we'll revisit the issue of releasing him on bail pending the outcome of that examination [Transcript Of Proceedings Bail Reduction/Habeas Hearing Before: Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, July 30, 2015].”

³ There is still a missing transcription of the prosecutor explicitly stating on the record to the trial court her concerns that the Petitioner didn't fully understand that if he just “pleads guilty as charged... he can go home today”. The Petitioner fully understood and pled NOT GUILTY!!!!

"THE COURT: All right. We're going to deny the bail at this time. We're going to expedite the mental health evaluation. We'll set a hearing based on mental health evaluation, and I will look into the bail situation[Transcript Of Proceedings, Bail Reduction/Habeas Hearing, Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, August 26, 2015]."

"ATTORNEY PADDICK:...The mental health assessment by and large said he has no psychotic disorders, no issue with mental health History. He has always shown up for court. The e-mail at issue has shown that it's been – it was sent to media outlets. He wants to be heard. He certainly wants to be heard.

"THE COURT: And that's why I'd like to give him his day in court.

The trial judge made sarcastic facial expressions and expressed resentment when she discovered that the Petitioner graduated from the same college that she did.⁴ The judge was resentful towards the fact that the Petitioner lived with his parents at age 46. She clearly discriminated against him for not being financially successful.

"ATTORNEY PADDICK:...He's got a bachelor's degree from Dickinson. He's got two master's degrees from Columbia, one in statistics, one in international affairs.

THE COURT: How old are you?

THE DEFENDANT: 46, Your Honor.

THE COURT: 46?...

"THE COURT: Well, I think the mental health report we got basically just shows that he's competent to handle himself in court and understands the nature of the charges and understands -- and is able to assist you in his own defense. I don't think it ever diagnosed him one way or the other.

ATTORNEY ADAM: I think it said he had no diagnosable mental disorders.

THE COURT: And that's why you want your own doctor to evaluate him.

ATTORNEY PADDICK: And to speak to the issues that would be at issue at trial, whether or not, given his condition, what his intent -- whether his intent would be or would not be discernible at the time.

THE COURT: I think that's going to be in the purview of the jury. That's not going to be a doctor's opinion.

⁴See trial judge's biography attached;
http://www.dauphincounty.org/government/court_departments/curcillo_biography.php

ATTORNEY PADDICK: Right. But a doctor could certainly opine on whether you could make the diagnosis or the determination.

THE COURT: I'm not sure about that.

All right. We're going to keep the bail as is, and we're going to set this for December 2nd. Hopefully you'll get that doctor in there to see him as quickly as possible.

Thank you.

Time will run against the defense[Transcript Of Proceedings

Bail Hearing, Before: Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, October 22, 2015].”

The Petitioner changed defense attorneys and the trial judge overtly pressured the Petitioner for a guilty verdict that he had no intention of agreeing to⁵.

“THE COURT: I know he's been incarcerated for a good period of time.

ATTORNEY SLUZIS: I'm asking at this point if you would reduce the bail.

THE COURT: I'm not going to reduce the bail, but I will set this for March 29th at 10:00 a.m.

ATTORNEY SLUZIS: That's great.

THE COURT: Hopefully we'll get it resolved on that date[Transcript Of Proceedings Continuance, Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo, March 7, 2016].”

When the trial judge prepared her opinion for the appellate court, she drafted a new message that was comprised of sentence fragments taken from at least 3 separate emails, that she allegedly sent over the course of many days. She put the sentence fragments into quotes and then formulated them into new sentences, as if the emails were written in Colonial era code, which involved placing a key over a letter that was made by a piece of cloth or a piece of parchment with holes in it and then reading only the words and sentence fragments that are visible through the holes. Any reasonable person could just as easily have created a different keys and read only different sentence fragments and words and effectively formulated them into a completely different messages.

⁵ There is additional trial court transcription that is missing on this point. The prosecutor explicitly stated in court and on the record that she was concerned that the Petitioner did not understand that if he would only “plead guilty as charged....he could go home today”. The Petitioner fully understood and pled NOT GUILTY!!!!

THERE WAS EVIDENCE TAMPERING

The emails in question at trial were not the same emails that were released in discovery. The trial Defense Attorney did not pick up on this fact and the prosecutor had an obligation to point this fact out but didn't. The emails that were presented at trial were modified by a police officer and accessed in state employee email accounts without a warrant authorizing that access. The Court should remand to the state trial court for a hearing on this matter. The Petitioner was not given copies of the trial exhibits by his attorney at trial. The trial defense attorney assumed that they were the same emails that were previously released in pre-trial discovery and that the Petitioner had seen them and had his own copies with him but the trial was based on completely different alleged copies of the same emails that were actually fabricated stage props that were formulated by police who accessed state employee email accounts without first requesting a warrant to do so. No such warrant was ever disclosed to the defense before, during or after trial.

For the above stated reasons, the Supreme Court of the United States should require a brief in opposition and independently review this case on all grounds complained of by the Petitioner, including those raised in his April 2, 2018 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

The foregoing document is true in both fact and belief and submitted under penalty of perjury.

Respectfully Submitted,

June 23, 2018
Date

Sean M. Donahue
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Sean M. Donahue

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Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to Rule 44 of the Supreme Court of the United States

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**

No. 17 - 8422

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SEAN M. DONAHUE

VS.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

TO THE CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

The Petitioner supplements his June 23, 2018 Petition for Rehearing (served via USPS Priority Mail of June 25, 2018) with the two items that are attached to this filing;


- (1) A newly released transcript that was not available until June 26, 2018.
- (2) The required Certification Of A Party Unrepresented By Counsel certifying that the Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Respectfully Submitted,

June 27, 2018
Date

Sean M Donahue
Sean M. Donahue

Sean M. Donahue
SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR REHEARING



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Certification Of A Party Unrepresented By Counsel

I hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay and is limited to intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not previously presented.

Respectfully Submitted,

June 27, 2018
Date

Sean M. Donahue
Sean M. Donahue

Sean M. Donahue

SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION FOR REHEARING