03-6539 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA

Ruling below: California Supreme Court, 71 P.3d 270

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

- (1) Did the California Supreme Court violate the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and the equal protection clause when it declared that the threshold for a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection is proof that it is "more likely than not" that discrimination occurred, which test presents a much higher and more difficult threshold to reach than the standard established by this Court in Batson, namely, that a prima facie case is shown when there is an "inference" of discrimination?
- (2) In a criminal case where the prosecutor peremptorily challenged all three black prospective jurors, leaving Petitioner, a black man, to be tried by a jury with no black jurors, did the California Supreme Court violate Batson when it held that the challenges to all three black jurors, did not present even an inference of racial discrimination, which is necessary to establish a prima facie case?
- (3) Did the California Supreme Court violate the Constitution when it refused to apply comparative juror analysis -- namely, comparing answers given on voir dire by minority jurors who were challenged with the answers given to the same questions by white jurors who were accepted -- in determining whether the claimed reasons for challenging the minority jurors were pretextual?
- (4) Is not this Court's recent opinion in *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 154 L.Ed.2d 931, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003), which expressly approves comparative juror analysis, retroactively applicable to a case on direct appeal, pursuant to *Griffith v. Kentucky*, 479 U.S. 314, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), or, instead, is the state court free to ignore *Miller-El*, and to refuse to apply comparative juror analysis, and to refuse to determine if claimed reasons for challenges to minority jurors are pretextual?

CERT. GRANTED: 12/1/03

Limited to the following question:

Whether to establish a prima facie case under *Batson* v. *Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79 1986), the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias?