1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	ALBERT A. DELIA, SECRETARY, :
4	NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF :
5	HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, : No. 12-98
6	Petitioner :
7	v. :
8	E.M.A., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH :
9	HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, :
10	DANIEL H. JOHNSON, ET AL. :
11	x
12	Washington, D.C.
13	Tuesday, January 8, 2013
14	
15	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
16	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
17	at 11:16 a.m.
18	APPEARANCES:
19	JOHN F. MADDREY, ESQ., Solicitor General, Raleigh, North
20	Carolina; on behalf of Petitioner.
21	CHRISTOPHER G. BROWNING, JR., ESQ., Raleigh, North
22	Carolina; on behalf of Respondents.
23	GINGER D. ANDERS, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
24	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
25	United States, as amicus curiae, supporting

1	Respondents.
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	JOHN F. MADDREY, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	4
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	CHRISTOPHER G. BROWNING, JR., ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondents	27
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	GINGER D. ANDERS, ESQ.	
10	For United States, as amicus curiae,	45
11	supporting Respondents	
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
13	JOHN F. MADDREY, ESQ.	
14	On behalf of the Petitioner	56
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:16 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next in Case 12-98, Delia v. E.M.A.
5	Mr. Maddrey?
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN F. MADDREY
7	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8	MR. MADDREY: Mr. Chief Justice and may it
9	please the Court:
10	The Medicaid Act requires States to take
11	reasonable measures to seek reimbursement from liable
12	third parties and that States require recipients to
13	assign their rights for to payment for medical care.
14	The Act does not direct how a State must determine what
15	portion of a recipient's third-party recovery is
16	properly attributable to past medical expenses. North
L7	Carolina's procedure establishes
18	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do you know that ex
19	ante?
20	MR. MADDREY: Excuse me?
21	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How could you ever know
22	that ex ante? I mean, without looking at the individual
23	facts of the case, the 30 percent is going to be
24	underinclusive in some circumstances, overinclusive in
25	others So how do you deal with our holding that you

- 1 are not entitled to the overinclusive portion?
- 2 MR. MADDREY: Justice Sotomayor, the -- the
- 3 answer to that depends on whether the State has to
- 4 predict with certainty the amount --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Life is never certain,
- 6 and so I don't even go to that issue. I go just simply
- 7 to the question, how can you, ex ante, predict --
- 8 particularly with a statute that wasn't based on any
- 9 empirical data -- that 30 percent normally is the right
- 10 amount?
- 11 You just picked it out of the air? You
- 12 could pick 40, 50, 60. How do we draw the line?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the -- the statute
- 14 doesn't predict; it defines. It tells the recipient how
- 15 much out of a recovery they must allocate to satisfy the
- 16 repayment obligation. If it were a prediction, that
- 17 would make it a presumption and you would have to defend
- 18 it as such.
- 19 But here the statute defines the portion
- 20 that the State, as a condition of extending the Medicaid
- 21 benefits, tells the recipient they must allocate --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: They must allocate? Is the
- 23 State saying, You do not own that 30 percent of the
- 24 recovery, so you never get a property right in it, so
- 25 that there's never any problem about asserting a lien

- 1 against it? I thought that's what's going on here. And
- 2 I think that's sort of disguised by talking about
- 3 allocation.
- I thought the State is saying, as to
- 5 30 percent of the recovery, you have no property right
- 6 in it. Is it not saying that? Am I wrong?
- 7 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the State is
- 8 saying that as to the amount of Medicaid benefits
- 9 provided, the State has a right of recovery. And it
- 10 says that of any third party --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Maybe -- maybe you didn't
- 12 hear my -- my question. My question is: Is the State
- 13 saying that you have no property right in the
- 14 30 percent?
- MR. MADDREY: The State has the right to
- 16 recover that portion.
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Let me ask my question
- 18 again. Is the State saying that you have no property
- 19 right in the 30 percent? I think that can be answered
- 20 "yes" or "no."
- 21 MR. MADDREY: And -- yes, Your Honor, the
- 22 position would be there is no property right in that --
- 23 in that percentage that the State has conditioned the --
- 24 the extension of benefits on.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now, how does it have

- 1 the right to announce that in a FELA case or in a Jones
- 2 Act case where those injured parties, they have a
- 3 property right in their protection but this statute
- 4 applies to that recovery as well?
- 5 MR. MADDREY: If those -- if those litigants
- 6 are Medicaid recipients, it applies to them as a
- 7 condition of having received the State Medicaid
- 8 benefits.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So they can deny a
- 10 litigant a property right in that recovery?
- MR. MADDREY: As a --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't know how you can
- 13 go in and ask for something you don't own. I don't know
- 14 how the plaintiff can go in and litigate a case if they
- 15 don't have a property interest that they can then assign
- 16 to someone else. I've never heard of such a thing, how
- they would have standing to sue on your behalf if they
- 18 have no property interest in the recovery.
- 19 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I'm -- I'm
- 20 confused by the question. I was --
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do you sue for
- 22 something you have no property interest in?
- MR. MADDREY: I don't know how you'd sue for
- 24 something you don't have a property interest in, Your
- 25 Honor.

1	JUSTICE	SOTOMAYOR:	So	ao	back	to

- 2 Justice Scalia's question.
- 3 MR. MADDREY: The inner --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There has to be some
- 5 interest in the 30 percent by the plaintiff.
- 6 MR. MADDREY: The -- the 30 percent attaches
- 7 upon the recovery from a third party. The -- the cause
- 8 of action is for whatever sources of injury that
- 9 individual would have. To the extent the recovery is
- 10 for medical expenses previously paid for by Medicaid,
- 11 that's what the State's interest could --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could I just clarify one
- 13 point? Does this rule preclude parties, as we said in
- 14 Ahlborn, from stipulating to a settlement at all?
- MR. MADDREY: No, Your Honor.
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Your brief is not clear
- 17 on that. They can still stipulate. It's only if after
- 18 the stipulation, it hasn't been allocated that you can
- 19 recover?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the stipulation
- 21 must include the State as a party to it for it to be
- 22 binding. That's --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you're basically
- 24 now saying is that there can never be a stipulation.
- 25 MR. MADDREY: There could be an advance

- 1 agreement, Your Honor, but --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're saying that the
- 3 parties cannot enter into a stipulation.
- 4 MR. MADDREY: If the parties are private
- 5 litigants, a plaintiff and a defendant in a medical
- 6 malpractice action, their -- their stipulation doesn't
- 7 bind the State. All parties to this case agree that --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: You can bind the parties
- 9 for other purposes, I assume. There are other purposes
- 10 for which the distinction between pain and suffering and
- 11 medical expenses might make a difference, right?
- 12 What -- what if the parties agreed that it's
- 13 50/50? Would the State take 50 percent then, or is the
- 14 State still limited to 30?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the statutory
- 16 percentage applies in that situation as well. The
- 17 33 percent cap would apply.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
- 19 MR. MADDREY: Again, the State's interest is
- 20 the amount of the Medicaid benefits it provided, capped
- 21 at 33 percent of the recovery.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: General, how do you come up
- 23 with 33? Why 33? Why not 10 or 60 or 90? Why -- how
- 24 did you come up with the number?
- 25 MR. MADDREY: The North Carolina General

- 1 Assembly first enacted it as it relates to Medicaid in
- 2 1988. It reflects a legislative history in
- 3 North Carolina going back to 1935 with a -- a statutory
- 4 lien applicable to medical providers in -- in civil
- 5 actions. It became specifically applicable to Medicaid
- 6 scenario in the 1988 provision.
- 7 JUSTICE ALITO: What if this case is tried
- 8 to a verdict and there is a special verdict and the jury
- 9 says that 10 percent was medical expenses? Would the --
- 10 the statute would override that?
- 11 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I believe the
- 12 judge imposing judgment following that jury verdict
- 13 would have to conform the verdict to the law. Just as
- if the verdict had said, there was 100 -- excuse me,
- 15 \$1 million in punitive damages when there is a statutory
- 16 cap of \$500,000 for punitive damages, the judge would
- 17 have to conform the verdict to the applicable law.
- 18 JUSTICE ALITO: What's the difference
- 19 between that case and Ahlborn, where you have -- where
- 20 the State has agreed that a certain amount is
- 21 attributable for medical expenses, and then this
- 22 hypothetical that the jury has determined that a certain
- 23 amount constitutes medical expenses? What's the
- 24 difference between those two?
- MR. MADDREY: In the jury verdict scenario,

- 1 the State's not a party to that and didn't commit to
- 2 the -- to the portion that -- that was attributable to
- 3 medical expenses. The jury doesn't have any authority
- 4 to countervene the statute, to enter a verdict in
- 5 violation of -- of the statutory requirement. And --
- 6 and here the statute tells the Medicaid recipient, in
- 7 advance, how much of any recovery, whether that be from
- 8 a settlement or a verdict, has to be allocated and paid
- 9 back to the State.
- 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't the reasoning of
- 11 Ahlborn that when we know to a certainty how much the
- 12 medical expenses were and what -- what part of the
- 13 judgment this represents or the settlement represents
- 14 medical expenses, then only that much can be assigned to
- 15 the government? And I don't see the difference between
- 16 that and the verdict situation.
- 17 MR. MADDREY: The verdict situation would
- 18 depend upon what -- would be in the hands of the parties
- 19 to the lawsuit, what evidence was presented, what --
- 20 what theories were advanced. The State would not have
- 21 any control over that. It would be --
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but it can --
- 23 it can participate in that process, can't it? Its --
- 24 its money's at issue?
- 25 MR. MADDREY: The State can initiate a

- 1 lawsuit on behalf of its -- its medical claim by virtue
- 2 of the subrogation and the assignment of the right. It
- 3 could participate in advance or it could participate
- 4 afterwards. But that doesn't come without costs
- 5 because, of course, if the State participates on its own
- 6 in advance, it would be for the full amount of the
- 7 medical payments. Here --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm sorry.
- 9 MR. MADDREY: -- here 1.9 million, and the
- 10 33 percent cap would have no application. That applies
- 11 only to amounts recovered by a recipient from -- from a
- 12 third party.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: General, you were -- you
- 14 were telling me a little bit about the history of this
- 15 statute. But why 30? Is there any indication of why
- 16 the State picked 30?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, historically
- 18 33 percent or three times the medicals was the -- the
- 19 rule of thumb used in -- in tort actions that -- that
- 20 parties used that as the -- the methodology, the way to
- 21 come up with a value to the case, with the theory being
- 22 33 percent for the medicals, 33 percent for attorneys'
- 23 fees and 33 percent to the victim. That was -- that was
- 24 the underlying --
- 25 JUSTICE KAGAN: If that's where it comes

- 1 from, then it does relate to a kind of estimate, doesn't
- 2 it?
- 3 MR. MADDREY: Historically it does. It's
- 4 been the policy of the State of North Carolina for
- 5 almost a century, as I referenced the lien statutes that
- 6 apply generally to -- to tort actions, to civil
- 7 recoveries, to protect the providers of medical
- 8 services, in those cases date back to 1935.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Can I ask you a somewhat
- 10 technical -- and I appreciate your paying attention
- 11 because it's hard for me to keep all this in my mind.
- 12 All right. It's my understanding of North Carolina,
- 13 everyone accepts the rule and North Carolina agrees that
- 14 if you in -- in North Carolina advance to the victim
- 15 \$50,000 in medical expenses -- now, you're never going
- 16 to get more than that back and you don't want more than
- 17 that back.
- 18 Now, the victim and the tortfeasor enter
- 19 into a settlement and you have a rule and the rule is
- 20 you will never get more than 50,000 or 33 percent,
- 21 whichever is less. That's the rule, whichever is less.
- So if the settlement is for \$100,000, you
- 23 are not going to take more than 33, so you have advanced
- 24 50. Okay. So you have basically three situations. The
- 25 first situation is where a judge has said -- you know

- 1 what, I find that only \$10,000 of this settlement is for
- 2 medical expenses. In that case you take \$10,000, no
- 3 more. Is that right?
- 4 MR. MADDREY: No, Your Honor.
- 5 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh. I got the impression
- 6 that if there was a judicial -- there are three
- 7 situations: One is there is a judicial finding that
- 8 only 10 percent was medical. And the second is the
- 9 situation where they stipulate that only 10 percent is
- 10 for medical, and the third situation is this situation,
- 11 namely there is no stipulation and there is no judicial
- 12 finding.
- So my thought, which is wrong I guess, is if
- 14 the judge says it's 10 percent you won't take more than
- 15 10 percent, but if in fact it's a stipulation of
- 16 10 percent North Carolina courts have not yet decided
- 17 that, and this is a case where there is no stipulation
- 18 and no judicial finding. Now you're telling me I have
- 19 that wrong. So you explain what the North Carolina is
- 20 on that because I think it makes quite a difference.
- 21 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the statute
- 22 applies to settlements or judgments received by a
- 23 Medicaid recipient from a third party for --
- 24 JUSTICE BREYER: I know, but in the
- 25 settlement they stipulate that 10 percent is for medical

- 1 and the rest for pain and suffering. Now, I thought
- 2 North Carolina courts have not yet decided whether North
- 3 Carolina -- which would like more than 10 percent -- can
- 4 get it. Is that true or not true?
- 5 MR. MADDREY: That is not true, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE BREYER: They have decided?
- 7 MR. MADDREY: The North Carolina Supreme
- 8 Court in the Andrews case said --
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: Said?
- 10 MR. MADDREY: -- said that the key point in
- 11 Ahlborn was the stipulation --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: This has nothing to do with
- 13 Ahlborn. Ahlborn, we all agree, says you cannot get
- 14 more than medical -- the medical expense, okay? The
- 15 question here is how to figure that.
- 16 So I thought that one way to figure it -- I
- 17 will just be repeating myself. One way to figure it is
- 18 how much of this \$100,000 settlement is attributable to
- 19 medical expenses as a judge would say. Now, you're
- 20 telling me there is a case in North Carolina which says
- 21 if the judge himself says that 10 percent of the
- 22 settlement is for medical, that's not what California --
- 23 that doesn't matter according to North Carolina law,
- 24 and I'd like the name of the case, the State case that
- 25 says that.

- 1 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I'm not aware of
- 2 any such case.
- 3 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So we don't know the
- 4 answer to that. We know what you would like, but we
- 5 don't know the answer.
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Don't you think the statute
- 7 may -- may give you the answer? It says: "Any attorney
- 8 retained by the beneficiary shall out of the proceeds
- 9 obtained on behalf of the beneficiary by settlement
- 10 with, judgment against, or otherwise from a third party
- 11 by reason of injury or death distribute to the
- 12 department the amount of assistance paid by the
- department on behalf of...up to 33 percent." It applies
- 14 to judgments as well as to settlements.
- 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You answered the question
- 16 with respect to jury verdicts. I suppose it would be no
- 17 different if it 's the judge that found the 10 percent
- 18 rather than the jury.
- MR. MADDREY: I would agree,
- 20 Justice Ginsburg. The statute --
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I didn't hear Justice
- 22 Ginsburg's question.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: The question that
- 24 Justice Breyer was asking about the 10 percent has
- 25 already been answered because we were told that if a

- 1 jury allocated 10 percent to medicals, it would not make
- 2 any difference, the statute entitles the State to
- 3 30 percent.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Basically you are saying
- 5 the judge would be required to give you your one-third
- 6 regardless of what the jury said.
- 7 MR. MADDREY: Exactly. As we said, he would
- 8 either have to conform a jury verdict to the --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So all those States that
- 10 have jury verdicts, special verdicts that require a
- 11 certain amount, they could avoid that by just simply
- 12 passing this law and avoid the anti-lien statute that
- 13 way?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, it would -- it
- 15 would depend how the State could rationally defend their
- 16 statute under their experience as consistent with their
- 17 jurisprudence. Of course, tort law being primarily the
- 18 province of --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 16 States already have
- 20 something close to a presumption of a percentage. Do
- 21 you have any evidence that in those 16 States where it's
- 22 only a presumption and not a fixed amount, that they are
- 23 falling apart because of it?
- 24 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I -- I don't have
- 25 any evidence as to the specific performance in those 16

- 1 States. That would leave 34 States that don't have one.
- 2 It also would raise the question of how many of those
- 3 States -- I believe the 16 States were the ones that had
- 4 some sort of procedure, some post-settlement either
- 5 hearing or trial to allocate --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In the absence of this
- 7 statute, what did your State do beforehand?
- 8 MR. MADDREY: This statute dates back to
- 9 1988. Prior to 1988 I don't know how -- from the 1965
- 10 effective date of Medicaid how things were handled. But
- 11 certainly for the last --
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: General, on your theory am I
- 13 correct that the North Carolina legislature could amend
- 14 this statute tomorrow to make it two-thirds?
- 15 MR. MADDREY: Certainly a statute could be
- 16 amended. Whether it could be defended under -- under
- 17 the circumstances --
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: But that's what I mean. I
- 19 mean, on your theory it seems not to matter whether this
- 20 statute says one-third or two-thirds. And I'm asking
- 21 whether that's correct.
- MR. MADDREY: Two-part answer, Your Honor.
- 23 As to the anti-lien provision of the Medicaid Act, if
- 24 the statute defines the amount of medicals as 230 --
- 25 excuse me -- two-thirds, that would present the same

- 1 analysis under the anti-lien provision of the Medicaid
- 2 Act. The difference would be whether the State could
- 3 show a rational basis in its -- in its tort law, in its
- 4 jurisprudence.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess I'm not sure about
- 6 that. In other words, I'm assuming an amendment that
- 7 just all it does is it changes one-third to two-thirds.
- 8 And so your theory it seems to me would work the exact
- 9 same way. Then you say, well, you need a rational basis
- 10 for doing that. But I thought you told me that the
- 11 one-third really doesn't have anything to do with an
- 12 estimate of how much is medical and how much is not
- 13 medical. So it seems that you would have the same basis
- 14 to say two-thirds as you do to say one-third. Am I
- 15 wrong about that?
- 16 MR. MADDREY: I would say, Justice Kagan,
- 17 the reason it's not the same is that it would treat
- 18 Medicaid recipients decidedly differently than other
- 19 tort litigants in North Carolina. Given the 1935
- 20 history of the allocation of -- of tort settlements and
- 21 the liens in favor of the providers of medical care that
- 22 preexist the North Carolina Medicaid statute, if you
- 23 then change the Medicaid statute --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But you're saying there's a
- 25 kind of side constraint, that Medicaid recipients have

- 1 to be treated like others, but then presumably, the
- 2 State could change everybody's?
- 3 MR. MADDREY: I -- I believe that would be
- 4 the case, yes. The -- the question would be whether
- 5 there was any disparate treatment, any singling out
- 6 of -- of a Medicaid recipient. And certainly, we've
- 7 demonstrated that under the -- the North Carolina
- 8 experience, that is not the case.
- 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought -- I thought
- 10 your brief said that at some point, if it gets too high,
- 11 you do have a problem under the anti-lien provision of
- 12 Medicaid?
- MR. MADDREY: I -- I believe, Your Honor, in
- 14 response to the 90 percent or 100 percent scenario or
- 15 hypothetical, I would certainly posit it would be
- 16 difficult for a State to defend --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Why? I don't understand
- 18 that. You see, I think the only way you can defend it
- 19 is that -- is that the recipient never -- never had a
- 20 property right. Once -- once recovery is given to the
- 21 recipient, the recovery does not belong to the
- 22 recipient. And if that's true for 33 percent, it can be
- 23 through -- true for 100 percent.
- 24 Has there ever been any litigation since
- 25 1935 about takings problems, with -- with the State

- 1 requiring 33 percent to go to the medical provider, even
- 2 though it may well be that -- that less or more of that
- 3 amount went to medical damages --
- 4 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, under the general
- 5 lien statutes in Chapter 44 of the North Carolina
- 6 general statutes, Sections 49 and 50 are the two
- 7 provisions that we cite. I'm not aware of any
- 8 takings-related challenges to those laws. I am aware of
- 9 State supreme court opinions saying that the attorney
- 10 had to distribute proceeds in accordance with the
- 11 statute.
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: -- can I go back for a
- 13 second? Because I want to show you where I got my
- 14 perhaps mistaken idea from.
- 15 There is a case called Andrews. And there
- is a statement in Andrews, which is a South --
- 17 North Carolina case -- which says in certain
- 18 circumstances, although the statute says just what
- 19 Justice Scalia says, the lawyer sits there, he takes
- 20 one-third and pays it to the State. Then this case has
- 21 this sentence in it: "Ahlborn controls when there has
- 22 been a prior determination or stipulation as to the
- 23 medical expense portion of a plaintiff's settlement. In
- 24 those cases, the State may not receive reimbursement in
- 25 excess of the portion so designated."

- 1 Now, having read that sentence, I thought
- 2 the law of North Carolina was that this statute does not
- 3 apply, and that when, in fact, the jury or the judge
- 4 finds that only 10 percent was for medical expenses, the
- 5 State cannot take more than 10 percent. And the same is
- 6 true of a stipulation. That's what those words seem to
- 7 say to me.
- Now you're telling me I'm not reading
- 9 those words correctly, that the case of Andrews does not
- 10 affect our case here, and that you -- that the law of
- 11 North Carolina is that you get one-third.
- Now, what is it? Do you see why I am
- 13 confused?
- MR. MADDREY: Yes, Your Honor. I will
- 15 try -- try, if I can, to explain what I believe to be
- 16 the source of the confusion is.
- 17 The stipulation in Ahlborn referenced in the
- 18 Andrews decision was between the Medicaid recipient and
- 19 the State of Arkansas, the lienholder. It came in the
- 20 Federal court action to challenge Arkansas's imposition
- 21 of its lien.
- JUSTICE BREYER: I see.
- MR. MADDREY: Therefore, there was a
- 24 stipulation binding the State, the lienholder, that
- 25 controlled in Ahlborn.

1	JUSTICE	BREYER:	They	say	а	prior
---	---------	---------	------	-----	---	-------

- 2 determination or stipulation. I took prior
- 3 determination to mean a determination by a judge or a
- 4 jury. What does it mean, if it doesn't mean that?
- 5 MR. MADDREY: I think later in the Andrews
- 6 decision, you will see a reference to the parties
- 7 certainly had the opportunity to negotiate with the
- 8 State a lesser amount than -- that the amount of the
- 9 statutory lien. That would be -- that would be the
- 10 prior determination, I believe.
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Am I correct that what
- 12 you believe and what the courts have been doing in your
- 13 State, the lower courts, is that they won't approve a
- 14 settlement that doesn't have the one-third, and they
- 15 won't enter a judgment that doesn't have the one-third?
- 16 Is that correct?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, when there's a
- 18 lump sum settlement in -- in these actions, the court
- 19 directs the attorney for the recipient to enforce the
- 20 statute to protect the State --
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So I'm right. They just
- 22 won't accept the private stipulation that doesn't do
- 23 that, and they won't enter into a judgment that doesn't
- 24 do that, correct?
- MR. MADDREY: Here, the -- the State court

- 1 ordered the \$933,000 --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Just answer my question.
- MR. MADDREY: Yes, Your Honor.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right.
- 5 Going back to Justice Alito's. The jury
- 6 says it's less or more or whatever of -- of the
- 7 settlement is medical expenses, it doesn't matter what
- 8 they say, the court can't enter a judgment for that
- 9 amount, they have to enter a judgment for either the
- 10 one-third or the full medical expenses.
- 11 MR. MADDREY: They have to enter a judgment,
- 12 yes, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And that's what they
- 14 have been doing.
- 15 MR. MADDREY: Yes, Your Honor. And -- and
- 16 that is the rationale behind the statute that the jury,
- 17 nor the judge, can enter a judgment that's not in
- 18 conformity with the statute.
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you how often
- 20 this comes up in North Carolina? Do you have any
- 21 figures where you have a dispute of this nature, during
- 22 the course of a year?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I've tried in the
- 24 briefs to indicate the dollar amounts involved. The
- 25 numbers of cases are in the hundreds, it's my

- 1 understanding because, typically, they involve
- 2 third-party payments, not just from medical malpractice
- 3 cases, but insurance coverage and other situations that
- 4 -- that trigger the repayment obligation.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: I don't want to take up
- 6 too much time talking about Andrews, but it seems to me
- 7 that what the North Carolina Supreme Court said in
- 8 Andrews is that in those States where there is a prior
- 9 determination, that controls, but the -- North Carolina
- 10 is entitled to adopt a different procedure and have a
- 11 one-third across-the-board rule.
- 12 That's the way I read it.
- MR. MADDREY: Well, certainly, that --
- 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Does -- does that accord
- 15 with your understanding?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I think they were
- 17 saying two things. Other States have different
- 18 procedures --
- 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yes.
- 20 MR. MADDREY: -- and that in North Carolina,
- 21 this is the rule, and that the prior determination also
- 22 could include an action involving binding the State of
- 23 North Carolina.
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I know that was argued
- 25 before. But I read Ahlborn very carefully, and I don't

- 1 see it. I read the amici briefs that reference
- 2 different procedures, and not one of them referenced the
- 3 North Carolina procedure. So I know that was argued
- 4 before. You didn't argue it in your brief here, and I
- 5 assume you didn't because you did what I did, which was
- 6 to read Ahlborn carefully and read what it cited, and I
- 7 don't see it cited.
- 8 MR. MADDREY: I'm sorry. I don't know --
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't see the North
- 10 Carolina procedure referenced in Ahlborn as something
- 11 that States could do. It wasn't referenced directly in
- 12 the -- in the opinion, and it wasn't referenced
- 13 indirectly by the amici. The amici were talking about
- 14 substantially different procedures.
- 15 MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the holding in
- 16 Ahlborn said you can't go beyond the amount
- 17 represented -- that represents repayment for medicals.
- 18 It didn't say how a State has to or could determine
- 19 that, and that's the question that's presented.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But my point is, Justice
- 21 Kennedy's question was that somehow in that opinion, we
- 22 approved the North Carolina system.
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, I think --
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is there a direct
- 25 reference to North Carolina's system --

Τ.	MR. MADDREY. ADSOTUTETY NOT
2	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: in that or in any of
3	the amici brief that talked about different State rules?
4	MR. MADDREY: Not that I'm aware of.
5	If there are no further questions, Your
6	Honor, I would like to reserve the remainder of my time
7	for rebuttal.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
9	Mr. Browning?
10	ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER G. BROWNING, JR.,
11	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
12	MR. BROWNING: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
13	please the Court:
14	The General Maddrey has steadfastly
15	argued that the North Carolina statute overrides a jury
16	verdict. I think his argument is well-grounded, given
17	the language of the statute, but that illustrates the
18	very problem here, that this statute takes one-third of
19	a settlement or judgment regardless of the true facts of
20	the case. And that is problematic under Ahlborn.
21	Justice Kagan, you had asked Mr General
22	Maddrey about the basis for the North Carolina statute.
23	General Maddrey had referred to it being a rule of thumb
24	of three times medicals. But if you actually turn to

the Fourth Circuit's decision, which is based on the

25

- 1 briefs that were filed in the Fourth Circuit, in the
- 2 petition at page 20A, the rule of thumb is actually
- 3 three times specials, which of course is different than
- 4 three times medicals because special damages would
- 5 include things like lost wages and various other things.
- 6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Browning, let me give
- 7 you a different rationale for this statute. It's
- 8 different from the one the State suggests, but it would
- 9 go something like this:
- 10 There is an allocation that has to be made.
- 11 In making allocations there are two ways of doing it.
- 12 We can do it case-by-case, individualized
- 13 decisionmaking; or we can use some bright-line rules.
- 14 And the advantage of bright-line rules is that they are
- 15 cheap and efficient and sometimes they are not more
- 16 inaccurate than individualized decisionmaking because in
- 17 individualized decisionmaking you can maker errors, too.
- 18 So this is a reasonable way to make an
- 19 allocation decision. And nothing that we said in
- 20 Ahlborn suggests that a State needs to use case-by-case
- 21 decisionmaking rather than bright-line rules to make the
- 22 allocation that it needs to make between medical and
- 23 nonmedical damages. What about that?
- 24 MR. BROWNING: Well, Your Honor, I would
- 25 turn to the language of the Ahlborn decision which makes

- 1 clear that States cannot lay claim to more than a
- 2 portion of a settlement or judgment that represents
- 3 payment for medical care or medical expenses.
- When you have --
- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but that doesn't
- 6 answer the question. I mean that portion, according to
- 7 North Carolina, is one-third.
- 8 MR. BROWNING: It is the State saying it is
- 9 one-third even though there is no basis and even though
- 10 you have cases like this where it's clearly not
- 11 one-third --
- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but what the State
- 13 says is the law. I mean, the State says one-third is
- 14 for medical.
- 15 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, if that is all
- 16 North Carolina had to do, of course, the Ahlborn
- 17 decision would have been dramatically different if
- 18 Arkansas had simply enacted a cap of 100 percent or
- 19 50 percent or 40 percent because, in the Ahlborn
- 20 decision, the State of Arkansas was only seeking to
- 21 recover 39 percent of the tort settlement.
- 22 And under North Carolina's theory, if
- 23 Arkansas had simply been bright enough to implement a
- 24 cap, the Ahlborn decision would have been completely
- 25 different. And that makes absolutely no sense. I think

- 1 the Ahlborn decision indicates that there has to be a
- 2 process in order to fairly and appropriately determine
- 3 the amount that the State may --
- 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you need, ultimately you
- 5 need an adjudication. You have to leave it either to a
- 6 jury to decide what percentage of the total award is --
- 7 is medical expenses or have a separate proceeding.
- 8 Let's say where there has been a settlement, you need a
- 9 separate proceeding to decide how much of it is really
- 10 for medical. You know, they may say 10 percent is, but
- 11 who believes that? You -- you need a proceeding.
- 12 That is awfully time-consuming. And -- and
- 13 as Justice Kagan suggests, I'm not sure it's going to be
- 14 very accurate. I don't think a jury determination is
- 15 going to be -- is going to be accurate on that score.
- 16 And I don't know how you go about determining how much
- 17 of a settlement is attributable to -- to medical
- 18 expenses versus other things, especially when the
- 19 settlement itself says only 10 percent is medical
- 20 expenses.
- 21 MR. BROWNING: Well, Justice Scalia, I think
- 22 it is very easy for States to follow that and to put in
- 23 practices or procedures that result in appropriate
- 24 allocation of medical expenses.
- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: How do you do that?

- 1 MR. BROWNING: Yes. There are a variety of
- 2 ways that States can do it.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 16 are doing it already.
- 4 MR. BROWNING: Absolutely. 16 and the
- 5 District of Columbia have a process for appropriate
- 6 adjudication. Moreover, it is perfectly appropriate if
- 7 a State wants to have a presumption. The problem is it
- 8 can't be an irrebuttable presumption.
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: How does it work? Because
- 10 I would imagine at the negotiation you have the -- the
- 11 victim's lawyer and the tortfeasor's lawyer and the
- 12 tortfeasor's lawyer is interested that the bottom line
- 13 number be as low as possible and the victim's number,
- 14 that it be as high as possible. And the victim's
- 15 lawyer, in fact, would like as little as possible to be
- 16 allocated to a source which is going to take that money
- 17 away from him.
- 18 So they can reach agreement. What they will
- 19 do is say 1 penny is for medical expenses and everything
- 20 else is for pain and suffering, and that's very good for
- 21 the victim. And it's irrelevant to the tortfeasor.
- So -- so when you see that on a piece of
- 23 paper, what is it you are going to do? What kind of
- 24 proceeding are you going to have? And it's a proceeding
- 25 about a proceeding. It's a proceeding about the

- 1 settlement negotiation. What's it going to look like?
- 2 What does it look like in the 16 States? We will have a
- 3 plaintiff's lawyer testify. He will say, Your Honor, I
- 4 really wanted 1 penny and only 1 penny to be allocated
- 5 to pain and -- to medical expense. And the defendant's
- 6 lawyer, he's being very honest, he'll say, I didn't
- 7 care; if that's what he wants, that's fine with me.
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but it's worse
- 9 than that. He does care because the smaller amount
- 10 means that the victim is going to actually get to keep
- 11 more and that's all the victim's lawyer is concerned
- 12 about, and that's fine with the tortfeasor's lawyer
- 13 because otherwise he would have to pay more.
- JUSTICE BREYER: Exactly. So what does it
- 15 look like?
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sorry to --
- 17 MR. BROWNING: Mr. Chief Justice, if I first
- 18 can turn to your point and then respond to
- 19 Justice Breyer's question.
- JUSTICE BREYER: It's the same point.
- 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's the same point.
- 22 (Laughter.)
- MR. BROWNING: Well, let me say this at the
- 24 outset: That first of all, it is our position that the
- 25 parties simply can't stipulate or reach an agreement

- 1 that somehow deprives the State of their interest.
- 2 There has to be an appropriate adjudication. It's
- 3 worked well in the States that have implemented this
- 4 process.
- 5 JUSTICE BREYER: How does it work in those
- 6 States?
- 7 MR. BROWNING: Yes, Your Honor, and -- and
- 8 Justice Breyer, I don't think it's all of that
- 9 complicated.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand. What
- 11 do you adjudicate? What is the issue in the
- 12 adjudication? How much of the award should have been
- 13 allocated to medical expenses, or how much of the award
- 14 was, in fact, allocated to medical expenses? Which is
- 15 the issue?
- MR. BROWNING: What should be adjudicated --
- 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: It seems to me it should be
- 18 the latter, shouldn't it?
- 19 MR. BROWNING: What should be adjudicated
- 20 consistent with the Ahlborn decision is the portion of
- 21 the settlement that represents payment for medical
- 22 expenses. And that, that is --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: That's right. How much was
- 24 allocated, right? It doesn't matter what ought to have
- 25 been. The issue is what proportion did the parties in

- fact allocate to medical expenses, right?
- 2 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, I don't think --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: And they say 1 penny. How
- 4 are you going to contradict that?
- 5 MR. BROWNING: We would not assert that the
- 6 parties' subjective belief is necessarily binding.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: No, no. But that's --
- 8 JUSTICE BREYER: But I am asking the same
- 9 question. There are 16 States that have this procedure.
- 10 How does it work?
- 11 MR. BROWNING: Yes, and in most of those --
- 12 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't want to know that
- 13 they have it. I want to know how it works. We have put
- 14 the problem as to why it seems it might not work too
- 15 well, and now I would like you to tell us how it really
- 16 works.
- 17 MR. BROWNING: How it really works in those
- 18 States is the States will -- will generally negotiate
- 19 with the State Medicaid agency and come to a fair
- 20 allocation without the necessity for a judicial
- 21 determination that's appropriate.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about fair?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that because they
- 24 know they are going to be subject to a hearing if they
- 25 don't reach an agreement?

- 1 MR. BROWNING: Yes.
- 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So there is an
- 3 inducement for them to do what this State didn't do.
- 4 MR. BROWNING: Correct, Your Honor.
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: When told to come in,
- 6 they ignored it. In those States, States know they are
- 7 going to increase potentially their costs, so they come
- 8 in more often.
- 9 MR. BROWNING: Exactly, Justice Sotomayor.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Exactly what?
- 11 MR. BROWNING: It levels the playing field
- 12 so that there is an incentive on both sides to come to
- 13 an appropriate allocation.
- 14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how is this allocation
- 15 not happening?
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was going to say,
- 17 how do we know what's fair and appropriate? You come
- in -- let's say you have \$20,000 in medical expenses and
- 19 a claim for pain and suffering. And they come in and
- 20 they recover a million dollars, right?
- 21 So what's appropriate in that case? The
- other side will say, well, we settled on a million
- 23 dollars, pain and suffering was really 20 million and we
- 24 came down to a million. So what's fair allocation in
- 25 the case of the medical expenses? It seems to be an

- 1 entitled -- entirely artificial judgment. To the extent
- 2 it's not, it depends on the views of the two parties
- 3 negotiating and I thought we established that that is
- 4 entirely subject to manipulation.
- 5 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, it is a process
- 6 that the courts can determine based upon the experience
- 7 of the judge, that who generally would be very
- 8 experienced in the valuation of cases, can make an
- 9 appropriate decision, and can consider all the facts,
- 10 the equities --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, do judges do
- this in non-Medicaid cases regularly?
- MR. BROWNING: Oh, absolutely. They do it
- in North Carolina in the context of workers'
- 15 compensation liens, having to come up with an
- 16 appropriate allocation, and there the court has --
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Let's deal with what
- 18 appears to be many of my colleagues' gut instinct, okay?
- 19 This is -- it costs too much, it's too burdensome.
- 20 We've already answered why not, but in the end, they
- 21 don't believe you could ever figure out the number.
- 22 That's really their bottom line, that this number's
- 23 artificial no matter what you do, so you might as well
- 24 just throw a label on it, reasonable or not, and leave
- 25 it alone. How do you answer that argument?

- 1 Because that's the essence of their -- of
- 2 their belief --
- MS. BROWNING: Your Honor --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that this bottom line
- 5 allocation is always going to be wrong somehow.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's -- it's a
- 7 little better than that, but go ahead and answer.
- 8 (Laughter.)
- 9 MR. BROWNING: Justice Sotomayor, the -- the
- 10 concern, of course, is that -- forgive me, I've lost my
- 11 train of thought here, Mr. Chief Justice.
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, this is what I
- 13 envision happening, if the -- if the parties can't -- if
- 14 the State and the -- and the recipient of the -- of
- 15 Medicaid assistance can't come to an agreement.
- 16 Basically, you have to make an estimate of what the
- damages would have been if the case had been tried and
- 18 then you determine that the medical portion of the
- 19 damages would have been 15 percent and so you reduce,
- 20 then you take the amount of the settlement, and the
- 21 amount of the settlement that is attributable to the
- 22 medical expenses is 15 percent. That would be what I
- 23 would envision. Is that not correct?
- MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, that is -- that
- 25 is certainly an approach similar to Ahlborn, a

- 1 proportionality sort of review. You -- you -- you look
- 2 at how much you're able to recover versus the amount --
- 3 the amount of the total claim versus the amount of the
- 4 settlement and you come to an appropriate --
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: That seems very -- that
- 6 seems really very complicated.
- 7 MR. BROWNING: Well --
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: How can a judge -- where the
- 9 case is settled and the judge doesn't really know
- 10 anything about the proof, how is a judge going to be in
- 11 a position really to do that?
- MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, it is a matter of
- 13 the parties coming forward, presenting evidence as to
- 14 the damages in the case, perhaps an explanation as to
- 15 why the case settled for less than full value, and the
- 16 court using their experience to determine is this
- 17 appropriate, should there be any reductions and of
- 18 course --
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is that -- is that what
- 20 happens? You said you -- that in North Carolina for
- 21 workers' compensation -- for settlements that are
- 22 subject to workers' compensation liens, you have this
- 23 type of system.
- MR. BROWNING: Yes, in the context of
- 25 third-party liability.

- 1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How does it work for
- 2 workers' compensation recoveries that have the same
- 3 thing, they -- they owe the State for the medical.
- 4 MR. BROWNING: Yes, Your Honor. The -- the
- 5 statute -- the North Carolina statute directs in -- in
- 6 that lien situation for the court to consider the
- 7 likelihood that the plaintiff would have actually
- 8 recovered on the claim, and various other factors that
- 9 the court deems appropriate and it puts it in the
- 10 discretion of the court.
- 11 What we're saying here is that Ahlborn
- 12 requires that there must be a determination of the
- 13 portion of the settlement that represents payment for
- 14 medical --
- 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, in those
- 16 proceedings, are witnesses called or is it usually done
- 17 on papers?
- 18 MR. BROWNING: It's usually done in a fairly
- 19 expedited process, yes, Your Honor.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: You know, putting --
- 21 putting it in the discretion of the court, as you say is
- done in the workmen's compensation, is quite different
- 23 from what you're proposing here. That seems to me quite
- 24 workable -- you know. The -- the court hears the
- 25 evidence and he decides how much should be reimbursed

- 1 within -- within the court's discretion. But here,
- 2 you're -- you're asking a court to decide how much of a
- 3 recovery or how much of a settlement was attributable
- 4 to -- to the medical portion.
- 5 MR. BROWNING: I think it needs to be --
- 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's a totally different
- 7 question.
- 8 MR. BROWNING: Justice Scalia, I think it's
- 9 an objective determination. I don't think the parties
- 10 can skew it one way because of the way they structured
- 11 the settlement just because -- just as the State can't
- 12 skew it the other way because they have an arbitrary
- 13 number, whether it be 100 percent, 90 percent,
- 14 75 percent, it doesn't allow for the fact that --
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Are you satisfied --
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You've said several
- 17 times that the way you do this is based on the judge's
- 18 experience and so on with -- with the cases. And I
- 19 think what your -- your friend on the other side is
- 20 saying is that's pretty much what's going on here except
- 21 over time -- I mean, would it be all right if over time
- the judge says, well, typically, sometimes it's
- 23 25 percent, sometimes it's 35 percent, over time, it's
- 24 sort of 33 percent. And so we're going to have that as
- 25 an absolute rule so that we don't have to go through

- 1 these proceedings every time just to make sure that it's
- 2 30 percent rather than 33 percent.
- What's -- I guess it's Justice Kagan's
- 4 question -- what's wrong with the bright-line rule here?
- 5 MR. BROWNING: There would be nothing wrong
- 6 with a rule that creates a presumption. What is the
- 7 problem is, you have cases that are on the extremes like
- 8 this case where you have absolutely horrendous injuries
- 9 and a physician who -- who doesn't have the financial
- 10 wherewithal to pay for the extent of the damages that he
- 11 caused.
- 12 Here, EMA's guardian had no option but to
- 13 settle the case for the available funds of \$2.8 million.
- 14 But that is a far cry from how anyone would objectively
- 15 evaluate --
- JUSTICE BREYER: So you're -- you're
- 17 satisfied with the presumption. Is there any law here
- 18 that gives you a leg-up? I mean, is this like Chevron
- 19 or Skidmore or something like that?
- 20 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, I certainly think
- 21 in this case the fact that the United States Department
- 22 of Health and Human Services has filed an amicus brief
- 23 that points out that this sort of ill rebuttable
- 24 presumption, this sort of --
- 25 JUSTICE BREYER: I know that's their

## Official

- 1 position. But my question is, does the law mean that
- 2 when we decide this case, I see you have a reasonable
- 3 point, they have a reasonable point, that if both points
- 4 are reasonable, you get the benefit of some kind of
- 5 legal presumption like Chevron, Skidmore, et cetera.
- 6 Maybe you can think of another one, I don't know. Do
- 7 you or don't you?
- 8 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, I think it would
- 9 be appropriate to give Chevron deference to the
- 10 arguments of the United States --
- 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, we're dealing
- 12 with a North Carolina statute. Don't they get deference
- 13 along the same lines?
- MR. BROWNING: No, Your Honor. I don't
- 15 think -- the starting point has to be the Federal
- 16 statute, Medicaid's anti-lien provision, which is very
- 17 clear that no lien may be imposed.
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it can't be
- 19 very clear because CMS took the opposite position before
- 20 this case, right?
- 21 MR. BROWNING: I don't think that they took
- 22 the opposite position. With regard to the letter that
- 23 was sent to Congressman Coble that that was a -- an
- 24 employee who was not within a policymaking decision, who
- 25 has to field thousands of these sort of requests for

- 1 information coming into CMS. So I don't think we can
- 2 put a whole lot of credence on that particular letter
- 3 that has been expressly disavowed by the secretary and
- 4 the director of CMS.
- 5 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you a question
- 6 on this different point? Could the -- suppose the North
- 7 Carolina legislature passed a statute that says
- 8 something like the following: "In any tort action in
- 9 which an item of damages sought is medical expenses, the
- 10 plaintiff may not recover for any other item of damages
- 11 until the full amount of the medical expenses is
- 12 satisfied."
- Now, there they're just restructuring their
- 14 tort law. Would there be a problem with that?
- 15 MR. BROWNING: Your Honor, I think in the
- 16 case of the anti-lien provision, that that would
- 17 effectively circumvent the anti-lien provision and allow
- 18 by the backdoor what we would contend would not be --
- 19 the State could not do directly. So yes, I do see
- 20 potential problems with that. Obviously, it would be
- 21 different than the scenario that we have here, but it
- 22 does -- the starting point has to be the anti-lien
- 23 provision, which is no lien may be imposed.
- 24 This Court in Ahlborn assumed without
- 25 deciding that there would be an implied exception to

- 1 that statute. But that -- that exception is very
- 2 limited. It has to be in the context of, as this Court
- 3 recognized, a State can only lay claim to that portion
- 4 of the settlement that represents payment for medical
- 5 care. So until you have --
- 6 JUSTICE ALITO: Does Federal law -- did
- 7 Federal law require your client to seek compensation for
- 8 medical expenses?
- 9 MR. BROWNING: No, Your Honor, I don't
- 10 believe that there is a requirement that Medicaid
- 11 beneficiaries would have to file a suit and try to
- 12 recover medical expenses.
- JUSTICE ALITO: So you could have -- could
- 14 you have filed suit and disclaimed any -- any claim for
- 15 medical expenses, you only want to be compensated for
- 16 other things?
- 17 MR. BROWNING: If -- first of all, there
- 18 would be some medical expenses that wouldn't be
- 19 Medicaid, medical expenses that were incurred by the
- 20 family. But moreover, even in that scenario, I think
- 21 given the language of the North Carolina statute, the
- 22 State would still be seeking one-third. So, if one were
- 23 to take that route, it would be an extremely treacherous
- 24 route that you would be -- not being able to -- to get
- 25 full -- full recovery from the defendant, but still

- 1 having to be paying a third to the State of North
- 2 Carolina.
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: But it would be the
- 4 defendant who's -- who's -- who's jiggering the system,
- 5 I mean, not suing for the medical portion simply because
- 6 the defendant knows that at least some of that portion,
- 7 if not all of it, would -- would go -- would go to the
- 8 State. So, in a situation, such as yours, where the
- 9 total recovery is -- is not going to suffice to cover
- 10 both pain and suffering and medical expenses, it'd be
- 11 very intelligent to do what Justice Alito proposed. And
- 12 that seems to me a real, I don't know, gaming -- gaming
- 13 of the system.
- MR. BROWNING: I don't think it would be a
- 15 gaming of the system, Justice Scalia, if the State,
- 16 based upon the statute, based upon its previous
- 17 directives would expect the Medicaid beneficiary to seek
- 18 recovery of those claims and to remit one-third to the
- 19 State. Thank you, Your Honor.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- Ms. Anders?
- ORAL ARGUMENT OF GINGER D. ANDERS,
- FOR UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
- 24 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENTS
- MS. ANDERS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

- 1 please the Court:
- 2 To start with the types of procedures that
- 3 States may use to allocate medical damages, I think the
- 4 States have a broad range of discretion to determine
- 5 what should be an appropriate allocation.
- 6 They're not --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you move the
- 8 microphone so it's a little closer to you?
- 9 MS. ANDERS: Sorry.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you.
- 11 MS. ANDERS: Is this better?
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. Thanks.
- 13 MS. ANDERS: So the States are not
- 14 determining, they're not trying to reconstruct what the
- 15 plaintiff's and the defendant's intent was in entering
- 16 into the settlement. Often, there will be no shared
- 17 intent. What -- what the States are doing is
- 18 determining what the appropriate allocation should be.
- 19 And the States that have individualized determinations,
- 20 which is what we think is required here, have developed
- 21 a number of different procedures for doing that.
- For instance, a district court in
- 23 Pennsylvania, in McKinney --
- 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. I have a -- I
- 25 have a theoretical problem right at the outset. I mean,

- 1 what the statute forbids is asserting a lien on recovery
- 2 that is for medical expenses. And you're telling me
- 3 that the States aren't even trying to find out what
- 4 portion of the recovery was for medical expenses.
- 5 They're looking to determine what proportion should have
- 6 been for medical expenses.
- 7 How does that tie in with the -- with the
- 8 prohibition of the lien?
- 9 MS. ANDERS: Well, I think this Court
- 10 established in Ahlborn that the beneficiary and the
- 11 State, they respectively have interests in the
- 12 settlement that arises from the fact that in the tort
- 13 case the plaintiff has asserted claims for medical
- 14 damages and for nonmedical damages.
- 15 And so Ahlborn establishes that we need to
- 16 divide the two in order to determine what the State may
- 17 recover. Ahlborn also establishes that the beneficiary
- 18 has an interest in the settlement that arises from her
- 19 nonmedical claims that can be allocated away by an
- 20 allocation method, such as one that gives -- that says
- 21 that 100 percent of the settlement must always be
- 22 allocated to -- to medical damages.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: So -- so you're saying that
- 24 the State can, in making this determination, in fact
- 25 take away from a plaintiff who has recovered a -- a

- 1 greater amount in medical expenses, or a lesser amount
- 2 in medical expenses, can take -- take away that by
- 3 determining how much should have been allocated to
- 4 medical expenses, right?
- 5 MS. ANDERS: The State does have some
- 6 discretion to determine what the appropriate allocation
- 7 is --
- 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you're messing up the
- 9 lien law anyway, no matter which way you play it.
- 10 MS. ANDERS: Well, I think Ahlborn
- 11 establishes that we have to make some kind of division
- 12 of the settlement, and when the parties haven't done it,
- 13 there's no jury determination. We don't know ahead of
- 14 time before the allocation has been done what precisely
- 15 the amount the medical damages should be. But we do
- 16 know because the plaintiff, the beneficiary, has
- 17 asserted nonmedical claims and she has compromised them,
- 18 we do know that she has an interest in the settlement
- 19 that arises from her nonmedical claims.
- 20 So for instance, you can imagine the
- 21 situation in which a plaintiff has a claim -- a claim
- 22 that is 10 percent medical damages and 90 percent lost
- 23 -- past lost wages. So they're both equally concrete.
- 24 In that situation, when the plaintiff settles for
- 25 pennies on the dollar, I think we -- we would have

- 1 serious questions about whether a one-third allocation
- 2 to medical damages in that case would be appropriate.
- 3 But without an individualized determination,
- 4 there would be no way to know whether this is a case in
- 5 which the -- the blanket rule that the State has is
- 6 actually overestimating the amount that should be
- 7 appropriately allocated to medical damages.
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Ms. Anders, could you
- 9 please finish your response, when you said various
- 10 States do various things. Could you describe some of
- 11 them?
- 12 MS. ANDERS: Certainly. So for instance, in
- 13 McKinney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, this is a
- 14 district court case in Pennsylvania, what the court did
- 15 was it said, we have the settlement; we know how much
- 16 the past medical damages were because we know what the
- 17 medical bills were; and we can -- we can assume that the
- 18 jury, had this case gone to trial, would have awarded
- 19 100 percent of the medical damages because they were
- 20 provable and because there weren't disputes about --
- 21 about that.
- 22 And so the court then said, I'm going to
- 23 then apply a discount rate for the uncertainty that the
- 24 defendant would have been held liable at all.
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that a

- 1 reasonable -- this is the Federal district court?
- 2 MS. ANDERS: That was the Federal district
- 3 court.
- 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it's not a State
- 5 Procedure?
- 6 MS. ANDERS: Pennsylvania law. That case
- 7 happened to be in Federal court. Pennsylvania law
- 8 provided a -- a rebuttable presumption, and so the court
- 9 determined --
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What if -- what if
- 11 the other -- the parties I guess are coming in and
- 12 saying, well, that's not how juries work. They don't
- 13 care that this measure of damages is particularly
- 14 calculable. They come to a general view. You've got
- 15 medical expenses, you've got pain and suffering. They
- 16 make a judgment about that. Would that be a good
- 17 argument to make?
- 18 MS. ANDERS: I think the Court could take
- 19 that into account in allocating, yes, so some --
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So how would it take
- 21 it into account? You said, well, because the medical
- 22 expenses are readily calculable, we assume that that's
- 23 what the jury meant first, and then the other stuff is
- 24 extra so the State can get it. But maybe sometimes they
- 25 just come to a -- a total figure and they don't care how

- 1 it's allocated. You say, well, that's an argument they
- 2 can make.
- Well, what's a judge supposed to do in a
- 4 particular case?
- 5 MS. ANDERS: Well, I -- this is positing a
- 6 situation in which there's been a settlement rather than
- 7 a jury determination. So I think that the -- the court
- 8 that's doing the allocating has some discretion here.
- 9 And so one thing it can do is say I'm going to
- 10 essentially prioritize medical damages because I think
- 11 juries usually will award them. But a State could also
- 12 provide that the inquiry should be more equitable and
- 13 open-ended.
- So, for instance, Illinois and Missouri have
- 15 provided simply that -- that the court shall make an
- 16 equitable allocation. It can take into account the fact
- 17 that the -- that the plaintiff may receive a double
- 18 recovery.
- 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you agree -- do you
- 20 agree that the only flaw in the North Carolina statute
- 21 is that it's a fixed amount, and that if it were a
- 22 rebuttable presumption it would be okay? If the North
- 23 Carolina law says 30 percent is the cap, but in a
- 24 particular case you can show that that's not a fair
- 25 allocation?

- 1 MS. ANDERS: That's absolutely right. And
- 2 -- and to return to one of Justice Kagan's earlier
- 3 questions, I think a one-third allocation may be in the
- 4 mine run of cases a reasonable presumption. But there
- 5 will be some cases, like my 90 percent, 10 percent
- 6 example, where it isn't a reasonable allocation.
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: And in those rebuttal
- 8 presumption States, can both sides come in and try to
- 9 rebut it? So the individual beneficiary can try to
- 10 rebut it, but the States could as well? Or is it just a
- 11 right for the beneficiary to try to rebut the
- 12 presumption?
- MS. ANDERS: I think in those States, it's
- 14 just a right for the beneficiary to try to rebut the
- 15 presumption. Some of those States start with a
- 16 rebuttable presumption of full reimbursement. So that
- 17 the presumption starts at the full amount that the State
- 18 paid.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So this is a real,
- 20 significant increase in the burden on the State under
- 21 the Medicaid program. You're saying yes, you can try to
- 22 recover recovery from third-party tortfeasors, but if
- you do that you've got to set up this apparatus where
- 24 everybody can come in and you've got to prove what the
- 25 allocation was and all that.

- 1 So -- I mean some -- 34 States haven't done
- 2 that, right?
- MS. ANDERS: Well, I think what's more
- 4 significant for our purposes is that 16 States plus D.C.
- 5 have, and --
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, yes, for your
- 7 purposes. But I'm interested in -- in my purposes. And
- 8 I'm trying to figure out whether or not that's a
- 9 significant financial burden on the State -- if they're
- 10 going to go about trying to recover this money, that
- 11 they've got to provide some apparatus, administrative,
- 12 judicial, whatever, to make a calculation that I still
- don't understand what it's addressed to.
- 14 And -- and not only that, but even if you do
- 15 know what it's addressed to, you just take into account
- 16 all these things and come up with an equitable.
- MS. ANDERS: I don't think that these States
- 18 have found that it's a significant administrative
- 19 burden. One reason is that once the allocation rules
- 20 are in place, it's our understanding that most of these
- 21 cases settle. The beneficiary and the State agree as to
- 22 what the allocation is, so this doesn't go to a hearing
- 23 in the first place. But even -- even when there are
- 24 hearings, I think States can take significant measures
- 25 to lessen the burden.

1	For	instance	

- 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How many States have
- 3 North Carolina's rule? Do you know?
- 4 MS. ANDERS: There are -- there are five
- 5 other States like North Carolina that have an
- 6 irrebuttable presumption with a cap. There are 10
- 7 others that have an irrebuttable presumption, we think,
- 8 of full reimbursement. But -- but I should caveat that
- 9 by saying that we simply don't know in those States what
- 10 they do, what their practices are.
- 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Why isn't -- the missing
- 12 part here -- maybe I just missed it -- we're
- interpreting a statute, and the part that trumps the
- 14 lien provision is the part that says the State is
- 15 entitled to payment that has been made for medical
- 16 assistance for health care items -- and some other
- 17 similar language is in the statute.
- 18 They think their one-third rule is a good
- 19 way of measuring that. You think that the one-third
- 20 rule as a rebuttable presumption is a better way of
- 21 measuring that. Now normally, or often, I would see
- 22 government arguments like that where they'd say, and, by
- 23 the way, we're interpreting very technical language in
- 24 our statute, and Chevron and/or Skidmore means that you
- 25 should give us particular weight.

## Official

- 1 Is that part of your argument here, and if
- 2 it isn't, why isn't it?
- MS. ANDERS: Well, I think -- we think that
- 4 -- the position reflected in our brief is HHS's
- 5 considered position, and we do think that it's -- it is
- 6 persuasive. Now, HHS presumably could regulate, it
- 7 could go through notice and comment rulemaking and
- 8 establish rules that --
- 9 JUSTICE BREYER: My impression is that you
- 10 get Chevron deference on the basis of whether
- 11 Congress -- and there's a lot of rules and so forth, but
- 12 --
- 13 MS. ANDERS: We haven't claimed Chevron
- 14 deference.
- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: -- you haven't claimed it.
- 16 And I -- so that puzzles me -- and I don't --
- MS. ANDERS: -- there aren't regulations on
- 18 this.
- 19 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not -- you argue what
- 20 you want to argue, but I -- this is awfully technical
- 21 language. It's a minor interstitial point.
- 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not sure that HHS
- 23 has -- has authority over -- over how a State recovers.
- 24 I don't see that it's part of the administration of the
- 25 statute committed to HHS. So I -- you know, I admire

- 1 you're not citing Chevron.
- 2 (Laughter.)
- MS. ANDERS: Well, HHS has -- the statute
- 4 requires the States to -- to enact reasonable measures
- 5 for recovery. HHS thinks that a measure that
- 6 circumvents the anti-lien provision like North
- 7 Carolina's wouldn't be a reasonable measure, but there
- 8 aren't regulations on that subject.
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
- General Maddrey, you have three minutes
- 11 remaining.
- 12 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN F. MADDREY
- ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- MR. MADDREY: We have heard a lot about what
- 15 a State could or maybe should do, but what must a State
- 16 do under the Medicaid Act to fulfill its obligations?
- 17 The Fourth Circuit and respondents and apparently the
- 18 United States say they have to have a post-settlement
- 19 trial, I guess a trial to settle the settlement. And
- that, while an available option, is not a mandatory
- 21 requirement under anything that I can see in the
- 22 Medicaid Act.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, General, how about
- 24 this, and I am having a little bit of trouble here
- 25 because I think a State could come in, or I think there

- 1 is a reasonable argument that a State could come in and
- 2 say -- you know, we've made an estimate, and here's our
- 3 best estimate, and we don't think there is a need for an
- 4 individualized decision-making on top of that.
- 5 But as I understand your argument, that is
- 6 not what you are saying. You are making a very
- 7 different kind of argument, suggesting that you can peg
- 8 this number any place, no matter what the relationship
- 9 between the number and the actual allocation that
- 10 cases -- that allocation of medical and nonmedical
- 11 damages in the real world.
- So if that's the case, what do I do?
- MR. MADDREY: Your Honor, the statute --
- 14 North Carolina's statute defines the amount that must be
- 15 included for the repayment by the Medicaid recipient.
- 16 It's not guessing after the fact, but instead providing
- in advance, the recipe as to how to put the settlement
- 18 together. It tells the parties what they have to do.
- 19 And that makes it a bright-line rule, which I think you
- 20 need to compare to the alternative, which is this --
- 21 this, what the Fourth Circuit called a true value
- 22 hearing after the fact, after the settlement, how did --
- 23 how did they get there? Is it what they did or what
- 24 they should have done or what they could have done?
- In this case you've got a \$42 million damage

## Official

1	claim settled for 2.8 million
2	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how do what do we
3	do with the Federal statute that says, You are not
4	entitled to a lien of any amount that is greater than
5	your medical expenses? And using the Solicitor
6	General's Office example, everybody knows that the true
7	value of medical expenses in a particular case was only
8	10 percent, you are still getting 30 percent. How do
9	we how do we honor the terms of the Federal statute?
10	MR. MADDREY: Because the State statute says
11	the State never recovers more than its actual medical
12	expenses. If in that hypothetical the medical expenses
13	were 100,000 or 10 percent, the North Carolina statute
14	would say North Carolina gets up to one-third of the
15	settlement but never more than they paid.
16	So by definition it can't be for something
17	that was not medicals. And that's the bright-line rule
18	that the North Carolina statute creates.
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
20	The case is submitted.
21	(Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the case in the
22	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
23	
24	
25	

	ı	1	1	ı
<b>A</b>	advance 8:25	47:19,22 48:3	46:9,11,13	appropriate
able 38:2 44:24	11:7 12:3,6	49:7 51:1	47:9 48:5,10	30:23 31:5,6
above-entitled	13:14 57:17	allocating 50:19	49:8,12 50:2,6	33:2 34:21
1:15 58:22	advanced 11:20	51:8	50:18 51:5	35:13,17,21
<b>absence</b> 18:6	13:23	allocation 6:3	52:1,13 53:3	36:9,16 38:4
absolute 40:25	advantage 28:14	19:20 28:10,19	53:17 54:4	38:17 39:9
absolutely 27:1	<b>affect</b> 22:10	28:22 30:24	55:3,13,17	42:9 46:5,18
29:25 31:4	agency 34:19	34:20 35:13,14	56:3	48:6 49:2
36:13 41:8	<b>agree</b> 9:7 15:13	35:24 36:16	Andrews 15:8	appropriately
52:1	16:19 51:19,20	37:5 46:5,18	21:15,16 22:9	30:2 49:7
accept 23:22	53:21	47:20 48:6,14	22:18 23:5	approve 23:13
accepts 13:13	agreed 9:12	49:1 51:16,25	25:6,8	approved 26:22
accord 25:14	10:20	52:3,6,25	and/or 54:24	arbitrary 40:12
account 50:19	agreement 9:1	53:19,22 57:9	announce 7:1	argue 26:4
50:21 51:16	31:18 32:25	57:10	answer 5:3 16:4	55:19,20
53:15	34:25 37:15	allocations	16:5,7 18:22	argued 25:24
accurate 30:14	agrees 13:13	28:11	24:2 29:6	26:3 27:15
30:15	ahead 37:7	<b>allow</b> 40:14	36:25 37:7	argument 1:16
across-the-bo	48:13	43:17	answered 6:19	3:2,5,8,12 4:4
25:11	Ahlborn 8:14	alternative	16:15,25 36:20	4:6 27:10,16
<b>Act</b> 4:10,14 7:2	10:19 11:11	57:20	ante 4:19,22 5:7	36:25 45:22
18:23 19:2	15:11,13,13	<b>amend</b> 18:13	anti-lien 17:12	50:17 51:1
56:16,22	21:21 22:17,25	amended 18:16	18:23 19:1	55:1 56:12
action 8:8 9:6	25:25 26:6,10	amendment	20:11 42:16	57:1,5,7
22:20 25:22	26:16 27:20	19:6	43:16,17,22	arguments
43:8	28:20,25 29:16	<b>amici</b> 26:1,13,13	56:6	42:10 54:22
actions 10:5	29:19,24 30:1	27:3	anyway 48:9	arises 47:12,18
12:19 13:6	33:20 37:25	amicus 1:25	<b>apart</b> 17:23	48:19
23:18	39:11 43:24	3:10 41:22	apparatus 52:23	Arkansas 22:19
actual 57:9	47:10,15,17	45:23	53:11	29:18,20,23
58:11	48:10	<b>amount</b> 5:4,10	apparently	Arkansas's
<b>AD</b> 1:9	air 5:11	6:8 9:20 10:20	56:17	22:20
addressed 53:13	<b>AL</b> 1:10	10:23 12:6	APPEARAN	artificial 36:1,23
53:15	ALBERT 1:3	16:12 17:11,22	1:18	asked 27:21
adjudicate	<b>Alito</b> 10:7,18	18:24 21:3	appears 36:18	asking 16:24
33:11	11:10 24:19	23:8,8 24:9	applicable 10:4	18:20 34:8
adjudicated	35:14 37:12	26:16 30:3	10:5,17	40:2
33:16,19	38:5,8 43:5	32:9 37:20,21	application	Assembly 10:1
adjudication	44:6,13 45:11	38:2,3,3 43:11	12:10	assert 34:5
30:5 31:6 33:2	Alito's 24:5	48:1,1,15 49:6	applies 7:4,6	asserted 47:13
33:12	allocate 5:15,21	51:21 52:17	9:16 12:10	48:17
administration	5:22 18:5 34:1	57:14 58:4	14:22 16:13	asserting 5:25
55:24	46:3	amounts 12:11	<b>apply</b> 9:17 13:6	47:1
administrative	allocated 8:18	24:24	22:3 49:23	assign 4:13 7:15
53:11,18	11:8 17:1	analysis 19:1	appreciate	assigned 11:14
admire 55:25	31:16 32:4	<b>Anders</b> 1:23 3:9	13:10	assignment 12:2
adopt 25:10	33:13,14,24	45:21,22,25	approach 37:25	assistance 16:12

37:15 54:16	7:17 12:1 16:9	briefs 24:24	26:6	cause 8:7
Assistant 1:23	16:13 27:11	26:1 28:1	Carolina 1:4,20	caused 41:11
<b>assume</b> 9:9 26:5	56:13	<b>bright</b> 29:23	1:22 9:25 10:3	caveat 54:8
49:17 50:22	<b>belief</b> 34:6 37:2	bright-line	13:4,12,13,14	century 13:5
assumed 43:24	believe 10:11	28:13,14,21	14:16,19 15:2	certain 5:5
assuming 19:6	18:3 20:3,13	41:4 57:19	15:3,7,20,23	10:20,22 17:11
attaches 8:6	22:15 23:10,12	58:17	18:13 19:19,22	21:17
attention 13:10	36:21 44:10	broad 46:4	20:7 21:5,17	certainly 18:11
attorney 16:7	believes 30:11	<b>Browning</b> 1:21	22:2,11 24:20	18:15 20:6,15
21:9 23:19	<b>belong</b> 20:21	3:6 27:9,10,12	25:7,9,20,23	23:7 25:13
attorneys 12:22	beneficiaries	28:6,24 29:8	26:3,10,22	37:25 41:20
attributable	44:11	29:15 30:21	27:15,22 29:7	49:12
4:16 10:21	beneficiary 16:8	31:1,4 32:17	29:16 36:14	certainty 5:4
11:2 15:18	16:9 45:17	32:23 33:7,16	38:20 39:5	11:11
30:17 37:21	47:10,17 48:16	33:19 34:2,5	42:12 43:7	cetera 42:5
40:3	52:9,11,14	34:11,17 35:1	44:21 45:2	challenge 22:20
authority 11:3	53:21	35:4,9,11 36:5	51:20,23 54:5	challenges 21:8
49:13 55:23	benefit 42:4	36:13 37:3,9	58:13,14,18	change 19:23
available 41:13	<b>benefits</b> 5:21 6:8	37:24 38:7,12	Carolina's 4:17	20:2
56:20	6:24 7:8 9:20	38:24 39:4,18	26:25 29:22	changes 19:7
avoid 17:11,12	<b>best</b> 57:3	40:5,8 41:5,20	54:3 56:7	Chapter 21:5
<b>award</b> 30:6	better 37:7	42:8,14,21	57:14	<b>cheap</b> 28:15
33:12,13 51:11	46:11 54:20	43:15 44:9,17	case 4:4,23 7:1,2	Chevron 41:18
awarded 49:18	<b>beyond</b> 26:16	45:14	7:14 9:7 10:7	42:5,9 54:24
aware 16:1 21:7	<b>bills</b> 49:17	<b>burden</b> 52:20	10:19 12:21	55:10,13 56:1
21:8 27:4	<b>bind</b> 9:7,8	53:9,19,25	14:2,17 15:8	<b>Chief</b> 4:3,8
awfully 30:12	binding 8:22	burdensome	15:20,24,24	11:22 27:8,12
55:20	22:24 25:22	36:19	16:2 20:4,8	32:8,16,17,21
<b>a.m</b> 1:17 4:2	34:6		21:15,17,20	34:22 35:10,16
	<b>bit</b> 12:14 56:24	<u>C</u>	22:9,10 27:20	37:6,11 40:16
<u>B</u>	blanket 49:5	<b>C</b> 3:1 4:1	35:21,25 37:17	42:11,18 45:20
back 8:1 10:3	<b>bottom</b> 31:12	calculable 50:14	38:9,14,15	45:25 49:25
11:9 13:8,16	36:22 37:4	50:22	41:8,13,21	50:4,10,20
13:17 18:8	Breyer 13:9	calculation	42:2,20 43:16	52:19 53:6
21:12 24:5	14:5,24 15:6,9	53:12	47:13 49:2,4	56:9 58:19
backdoor 43:18	15:12 16:3,24	California 15:22	49:14,18 50:6	CHRISTOPH
<b>based</b> 5:8 27:25	21:12 22:22	called 21:15	51:4,24 57:12	1:21 3:6 27:10
36:6 40:17	23:1 31:9	39:16 57:21	57:25 58:7,20	Circuit 28:1
45:16,16	32:14,20 33:5	<b>cap</b> 9:17 10:16	58:21	56:17 57:21
basically 8:23	33:8 34:8,12	12:10 29:18,24	cases 13:8 21:24	Circuit's 27:25
13:24 17:4	40:15 41:16,25	51:23 54:6	24:25 25:3	circumstances
37:16	54:11 55:9,15	capped 9:20	29:10 36:8,12	4:24 18:17
<b>basis</b> 19:3,9,13	55:19	care 4:13 19:21	40:18 41:7	21:18
27:22 29:9	<b>Breyer's</b> 32:19	29:3 32:7,9	52:4,5 53:21	circumvent
55:10	<b>brief</b> 8:16 20:10	44:5 50:13,25	57:10	43:17
<b>behalf</b> 1:20,22	26:4 27:3	54:16	case-by-case	circumvents
3:4,7,14 4:7	41:22 55:4	carefully 25:25	28:12,20	56:6

	-	·	1	1
<b>cite</b> 21:7	completely	45:20 56:9	57:11	17:15
<b>cited</b> 26:6,7	29:24	58:19	<b>DANIEL</b> 1:10	depends 5:3
citing 56:1	complicated	countervene	<b>data</b> 5:9	36:2
<b>civil</b> 10:4 13:6	33:9 38:6	11:4	date 13:8 18:10	deprives 33:1
<b>claim</b> 12:1 29:1	compromised	course 12:5	dates 18:8	describe 49:10
35:19 38:3	48:17	17:17 24:22	deal 4:25 36:17	designated
39:8 44:3,14	concern 37:10	28:3 29:16	dealing 42:11	21:25
48:21,21 58:1	concerned 32:11	37:10 38:18	<b>death</b> 16:11	determination
claimed 55:13	concrete 48:23	<b>court</b> 1:1,16 4:9	<b>decide</b> 30:6,9	21:22 23:2,3,3
55:15	condition 5:20	15:8 21:9	40:2 42:2	23:10 25:9,21
<b>claims</b> 45:18	7:7	22:20 23:18,25	decided 14:16	30:14 34:21
47:13,19 48:17	conditioned	24:8 25:7	15:2,6	39:12 40:9
48:19	6:23	27:13 36:16	decidedly 19:18	47:24 48:13
clarify 8:12	<b>conform</b> 10:13	38:16 39:6,9	decides 39:25	49:3 51:7
<b>clear</b> 8:16 29:1	10:17 17:8	39:10,21,24	deciding 43:25	determinations
42:17,19	conformity	40:2 43:24	decision 22:18	46:19
clearly 29:10	24:18	44:2 46:1,22	23:6 27:25	determine 4:14
client 44:7	confused 7:20	47:9 49:14,14	28:19,25 29:17	26:18 30:2
<b>close</b> 17:20	22:13	49:22 50:1,3,7	29:20,24 30:1	36:6 37:18
closer 46:8	confusion 22:16	50:8,18 51:7	33:20 36:9	38:16 46:4
CMS 42:19 43:1	Congress 55:11	51:15	42:24	47:5,16 48:6
43:4	Congressman	<b>courts</b> 14:16	decisionmaking	determined
<b>Coble</b> 42:23	42:23	15:2 23:12,13	28:13,16,17,21	10:22 50:9
colleagues 36:18	consider 36:9	36:6	decision-maki	determining
Columbia 31:5	39:6	<b>court's</b> 40:1	57:4	30:16 46:14,18
come 9:22,24	considered 55:5	<b>cover</b> 45:9	deems 39:9	48:3
12:4,21 34:19	consistent 17:16	coverage 25:3	defend 5:17	developed 46:20
35:5,7,12,17	33:20	creates 41:6	17:15 20:16,18	difference 9:11
35:19 36:15	constitutes	58:18	defendant 9:5	10:18,24 11:15
37:15 38:4	10:23	credence 43:2	44:25 45:4,6	14:20 17:2
50:14,25 52:8	constraint 19:25	cry 41:14	49:24	19:2
52:24 53:16	contend 43:18	<b>curiae</b> 1:25 3:10	defendant's	different 16:17
56:25 57:1	context 36:14	45:23	32:5 46:15	25:10,17 26:2
<b>comes</b> 12:25	38:24 44:2		defended 18:16	26:14 27:3
24:20	contradict 34:4	<b>D</b>	deference 42:9	28:3,7,8 29:17
<b>coming</b> 38:13	control 11:21	<b>D</b> 1:23 3:9 4:1	42:12 55:10,14	29:25 39:22
43:1 50:11	controlled 22:25	45:22	<b>defines</b> 5:14,19	40:6 43:6,21
comment 55:7	controls 21:21	damage 57:25	18:24 57:14	46:21 57:7
commit 11:1	25:9	damages 10:15	<b>definition</b> 58:16	differently
committed	<b>correct</b> 18:13,21	10:16 21:3	<b>Delia</b> 1:3 4:4	19:18
55:25	23:11,16,24	28:4,23 37:17	demonstrated	difficult 20:16
compare 57:20	35:4 37:23	37:19 38:14	20:7	direct 4:14
compensated	correctly 22:9	41:10 43:9,10	<b>deny</b> 7:9	26:24
44:15	costs 12:4 35:7	46:3 47:14,14	department 1:4	directives 45:17
compensation	36:19	47:22 48:15,22	1:24 16:12,13	directly 26:11
36:15 38:21,22	counsel 27:8	49:2,7,16,19	41:21	43:19
39:2,22 44:7	36:11 39:15	50:13 51:10	<b>depend</b> 11:18	director 43:4

directs 23:19	<b>enact</b> 56:4	58:6	<b>F</b>	following 10:12
39:5	enacted 10:1	exception 43:25	F 1:19 3:3,13 4:6	43:8
disavowed 43:3	29:18	44:1	<b>F</b> 1:19 3:3,13 4:6 56:12	<b>forbids</b> 47:1
disclaimed	<b>enforce</b> 23:19	excess 21:25	<b>fact</b> 14:15 22:3	forgive 37:10
44:14	enter 9:3 11:4	excuse 4:20	31:15 33:14	forth 55:11
discount 49:23	13:18 23:15,23	10:14 18:25	34:1 40:14	forward 38:13
discretion 39:10	24:8,9,11,17	46:24	41:21 47:12,24	<b>found</b> 16:17
39:21 40:1	entering 46:15	<b>expect</b> 45:17	51:16 57:16,22	53:18
46:4 48:6 51:8	entirely 36:1,4	expedited 39:19	factors 39:8	Fourth 27:25
disguised 6:2	entitled 5:1	expense 15:14	facts 4:23 27:19	28:1 56:17
disparate 20:5	25:10 36:1	21:23 32:5	36:9	57:21
dispute 24:21	54:15 58:4	expenses 4:16	fair 34:19,22	friend 40:19
disputes 49:20	entitles 17:2	8:10 9:11 10:9	35:17,24 51:24	<b>fulfill</b> 56:16
distinction 9:10	envision 37:13	10:21,23 11:3	fairly 30:2 39:18	full 12:6 24:10
distribute 16:11	37:23	11:12,14 13:15	falling 17:23	38:15 43:11
21:10	equally 48:23	14:2 15:19	family 44:20	44:25,25 52:16
district 31:5	equitable 51:12	22:4 24:7,10	<b>family</b> 44:20   <b>far</b> 41:14	52:17 54:8
46:22 49:14	51:16 53:16	29:3 30:7,18	favor 19:21	funds 41:13
50:1,2	equities 36:10	30:20,24 31:19	Federal 22:20	further 27:5
divide 47:16	errors 28:17	33:13,14,22	42:15 44:6,7	
division 48:11	especially 30:18	34:1 35:18,25	50:1,2,7 58:3,9	G
doing 19:10	<b>ESQ</b> 1:19,21,23	37:22 43:9,11	fees 12:23	<b>G</b> 1:21 3:6 4:1
23:12 24:14	3:3,6,9,13	44:8,12,15,18	FELA 7:1	27:10
28:11 31:3	essence 37:1	44:19 45:10	field 35:11 42:25	<b>gaming</b> 45:12,12
46:17,21 51:8	essentially 51:10	47:2,4,6 48:1,2	figure 15:15,16	45:15
dollar 24:24	establish 55:8	48:4 50:15,22	15:17 36:21	<b>general</b> 1:19,24
48:25	established 36:3	58:5,7,12,12	50:25 53:8	9:22,25 12:13
dollars 35:20,23	47:10	experience	<b>figures</b> 24:21	18:12 21:4,6
<b>double</b> 51:17	establishes 4:17	17:16 20:8	file 44:11	27:14,21,23
dramatically	47:15,17 48:11	36:6 38:16	filed 28:1 41:22	50:14 56:10,23
29:17	estimate 13:1	40:18	44:14	generally 13:6
<b>draw</b> 5:12	19:12 37:16	experienced	financial 41:9	34:18 36:7
<b>D.C</b> 1:12,24	57:2,3	36:8	53:9	General's 58:6
53:4	et 1:10 42:5	explain 14:19	<b>find</b> 14:1 47:3	getting 58:8
	evaluate 41:15	22:15	finding 14:7,12	<b>GINGER</b> 1:23
E	everybody	explanation	14:18	3:9 45:22
<b>E</b> 3:1 4:1,1	52:24 58:6	38:14	finds 22:4	Ginsburg 16:15
earlier 52:2	everybody's	expressly 43:3	fine 32:7,12	16:20,23 20:9
easy 30:22	20:2	extending 5:20	finish 49:9	38:19 39:1
effective 18:10	evidence 11:19	extension 6:24	first 10:1 13:25	51:19
effectively 43:17	17:21,25 38:13	<b>extent</b> 8:9 36:1	32:17,24 44:17	Ginsburg's
efficient 28:15	39:25	41:10	50:23 53:23	16:22
either 17:8 18:4	ex 4:18,22 5:7	extra 50:24	five 54:4	give 16:7 17:5
24:9 30:5	exact 19:8	extremely 44:23	fixed 17:22	28:6 42:9
EMA's 41:12	Exactly 17:7	extremes 41:7	51:21	54:25
empirical 5:9	32:14 35:9,10	<b>E.M.A</b> 1:8 4:4	flaw 51:20	<b>given</b> 19:19
employee 42:24	example 52:6		follow 30:22	20:20 27:16

44:21	56:14		inner 8:3	40:22 51:3
gives 41:18	hearing 18:5		inquiry 51:12	judges 36:11
47:20	34:24 53:22	idea 21:14	instance 46:22	judge's 40:17
<b>go</b> 5:6,6 7:13,14	57:22	<b>ignored</b> 35:6	48:20 49:12	judgment 10:12
8:1 21:1,12	hearings 53:24	ill 41:23	51:14 54:1	11:13 16:10
26:16 28:9	hears 39:24	Illinois 51:14	instinct 36:18	23:15,23 24:8
30:16 37:7	held 49:24	illustrates 27:17	insurance 25:3	24:9,11,17
40:25 45:7,7	he'll 32:6	imagine 31:10	intelligent 45:11	27:19 29:2
53:10,22 55:7	HHS 55:6,22,25	48:20	intent 46:15,17	36:1 50:16
going 4:23 6:1	56:3,5	implement 29:23	interest 7:15,18	judgments
10:3 13:15,23	HHS's 55:4		7:22,24 8:5,11	14:22 16:14
24:5 30:13,15	high 20:10 31:14	implemented 33:3	9:19 33:1	judicial 14:6,7
30:15 31:16,23	historically	implied 43:25	47:18 48:18	14:11,18 34:20
31:24 32:1,10	12:17 13:3	imposed 42:17	interested 31:12	53:12
34:4,24 35:7	history 10:2	43:23	53:7	juries 50:12
35:16 37:5	12:14 19:20	imposing 10:12	interests 47:11	51:11
38:10 40:20,24	holding 4:25	imposing 10.12	interpreting	jurisprudence
45:9 49:22	26:15	22:20	54:13,23	17:17 19:4
51:9 53:10	honest 32:6	impression 14:5	interstitial	jury 10:8,12,22
<b>good</b> 31:20	honor 5:13 6:7	55:9	55:21	10:25 11:3
50:16 54:18	6:21 7:19,25	inaccurate	involve 25:1	16:16,18 17:1
government	8:15,20 9:1,15	28:16	involved 24:24	17:6,8,10 22:3
11:15 54:22	10:11 12:17	incentive 35:12	involving 25:22	23:4 24:5,16
greater 48:1	14:4,21 15:5	include 8:21	irrebuttable	27:15 30:6,14
58:4	16:1 17:14,24	25:22 28:5	31:8 54:6,7	48:13 49:18
guardian 1:9	18:22 20:13	included 57:15	irrelevant 31:21	50:23 51:7
41:12	21:4 22:14	increase 35:7	issue 5:6 11:24	<b>Justice</b> 1:24 4:3
guess 14:13 19:5	23:17 24:3,12	52:20	33:11,15,25	4:8,18,21 5:2,5
41:3 50:11	24:15,23 25:16	incurred 44:19	item 43:9,10	5:22 6:11,17
56:19	26:15,23 27:6	indicate 24:24	items 54:16	6:25 7:9,12,21
guessing 57:16	28:24 29:15	indicates 30:1	it'd 45:10	8:1,2,4,12,16
<b>gut</b> 36:18	32:3 33:7 34:2	indication 12:15	J	8:23 9:2,8,18
H	35:4 36:5 37:3	indirectly 26:13	January 1:13	9:22 10:7,18
<b>H</b> 1:10	37:24 38:12	individual 4:22	jiggering 45:4	11:10,22 12:8
<b>handled</b> 18:10	39:4,19 41:20	8:9 52:9	<b>JOHN</b> 1:19 3:3	12:13,25 13:9
hands 11:18	42:8,14 43:15 44:9 45:19	individualized	3:13 4:6 56:12	14:5,24 15:6,9
happened 50:7	57:13 58:9	28:12,16,17	JOHNSON 1:10	15:12 16:3,6
happening	horrendous	46:19 49:3	Jones 7:1	16:15,20,21,21 16:23,24 17:4
35:15 37:13	41:8	57:4	JR 1:21 3:6	17:9,19 18:6
happens 38:20	Housing 49:13	inducement	27:10	18:12,18 19:5
hard 13:11	Human 1:5	35:3	judge 10:12,16	19:16,24 20:9
health 1:5 41:22	41:22	information	13:25 14:14	20:17 21:12,19
54:16	hundreds 24:25	43:1	15:19,21 16:17	22:22 23:1,11
hear 4:3 6:12	hypothetical	initiate 11:25	17:5 22:3 23:3	23:21 24:2,4,5
16:21	10:22 20:15	injured 7:2 injuries 41:8	24:17 36:7	24:13,19 25:5
<b>heard</b> 7:16	58:12	injuries 41:8 injury 8:8 16:11	38:8,9,10	25:14,19,24
	20.12	mjury 0:8 10:11	. ,	
		1	1	1

26.0.20.20.24	21.22.42.4	loggon 52,25		52.1
26:9,20,20,24	31:23 42:4	lessen 53:25	M	53:1
27:2,8,12,21	48:11 57:7	lesser 23:8 48:1	Maddrey 1:19	means 32:10
28:6 29:5,12	know 4:18,21	letter 42:22 43:2	3:3,13 4:5,6,8	54:24
30:4,13,21,25	7:12,13,23	let's 30:8 35:18	4:20 5:2,13 6:7	meant 50:23
31:3,9 32:8,14	11:11 13:25	36:17	6:15,21 7:5,11	<b>measure</b> 50:13
32:16,17,19,20	14:24 16:3,4,5	levels 35:11	7:19,23 8:3,6	56:5,7
32:21 33:5,8	18:9 25:24	liability 38:25	8:15,20,25 9:4	measures 4:11
33:10,17,23	26:3,8 30:10	liable 4:11 49:24	9:15,19,25	53:24 56:4
34:3,7,8,12,22	30:16 34:12,13	lien 5:25 10:4	10:11,25 11:17	measuring
34:23 35:2,5,9	34:24 35:6,17	13:5 21:5	11:25 12:9,17	54:19,21
35:10,14,16	38:9 39:20,24	22:21 23:9	13:3 14:4,21	Medicaid 4:10
36:11,17 37:4	41:25 42:6	39:6 42:17	15:5,7,10 16:1	5:20 6:8 7:6,7
37:6,9,11,12	45:12 48:13,16	43:23 47:1,8	16:19 17:7,14	8:10 9:20 10:1
38:5,8,19 39:1	48:18 49:4,15	48:9 54:14	17:24 18:8,15	10:5 11:6
39:15,20 40:6	49:16 53:15	58:4	18:22 19:16	14:23 18:10,23
40:8,15,16	54:3,9 55:25	lienholder 22:19 22:24	20:3,13 21:4	19:1,18,22,23
41:3,16,25	57:2		22:14,23 23:5	19:25 20:6,12
42:11,18 43:5	knows 45:6 58:6	liens 19:21	23:17,25 24:3	22:18 34:19
44:6,13 45:3	$oxed{\mathbf{L}}$	36:15 38:22 <b>Life</b> 5:5	24:11,15,23	37:15 44:10,19 45:17 52:21
45:11,15,20,25	label 36:24		25:13,16,20	
46:7,10,12,24	language 27:17	likelihood 39:7	26:8,15,23	56:16,22 57:15
47:23 48:8	28:25 44:21	limited 9:14 44:2	27:1,4,14,22	Medicaid's
49:8,25 50:4	54:17,23 55:21		27:23 56:10,12	42:16
50:10,20 51:19	Laughter 32:22	line 5:12 31:12	56:14 57:13	medical 4:13,16
52:2,7,19 53:6 54:2,11 55:9	37:8 56:2	36:22 37:4 <b>lines</b> 42:13	58:10	8:10 9:5,11
55:15,19,22	law 10:13,17	LITEM 1:9	maker 28:17	10:4,9,21,23 11:3,12,14
56:9,23 58:2	15:23 17:12,17	litigant 7:10	making 28:11	12:1,7 13:7,15
58:19	19:3 22:2,10	litigants 7:5 9:5	47:24 57:6	14:2,8,10,25
30.19	29:13 41:17	19:19	malpractice 9:6	15:14,14,19,22
K	42:1 43:14	litigate 7:14	25:2	19:12,13,21
Kagan 9:22 12:8	44:6,7 48:9	litigation 20:24	mandatory	21:1,3,23 22:4
12:13,25 18:12	50:6,7 51:23	little 12:14	56:20	24:7,10 25:2
18:18 19:5,16	laws 21:8	31:15 37:7	manipulation	28:22 29:3,3
19:24 27:21	lawsuit 11:19	46:8 56:24	36:4	29:14 30:7,10
28:6 30:13	12:1	look 32:1,2,15	matter 1:15	30:17,19,24
52:7 56:23	<b>lawyer</b> 21:19	38:1	15:23 18:19	31:19 32:5
<b>Kagan's</b> 41:3	31:11,11,12,15	looking 4:22	24:7 33:24	33:13,14,21
52:2	32:3,6,11,12	47:5	36:23 38:12	34:1 35:18,25
keep 13:11	lay 29:1 44:3	lost 28:5 37:10	48:9 57:8	37:18,22 39:3
32:10	leave 18:1 30:5	48:22,23	58:22	39:14 40:4
KENNEDY	36:24	lot 43:2 55:11	<b>McKinney</b> 46:23 49:13	43:9,11 44:4,8
25:5,14,19	legal 42:5	56:14	46:23 49:13 mean 4:22 18:18	44:12,15,18,19
Kennedy's	legislative 10:2	low 31:13		45:5,10 46:3
26:21	legislature	lower 23:13	18:19 23:3,4,4 29:6,13 40:21	47:2,4,6,13,22
key 15:10	18:13 43:7	lump 23:18	41:18 42:1	48:1,2,4,15,22
kind 13:1 19:25	leg-up 41:18	F =====	45:5 46:25	49:2,7,16,17
			+J.J 40.2J	
	<u> </u>	·	<u> </u>	1

	l	l	l	l
49:19 50:15,21	31:10 32:1	56:16	P	25:2
51:10 54:15	never 5:5,24,25	obtained 16:9	<b>P</b> 4:1	pays 21:20
57:10 58:5,7	7:16 8:24	Obviously 43:20	page 3:2 28:2	<b>peg</b> 57:7
58:11,12	13:15,20 20:19	Office 58:6	paid 8:10 11:8	pennies 48:25
medicals 12:18	20:19 58:11,15	<b>Oh</b> 14:5 36:13	16:12 52:18	Pennsylvania
12:22 17:1	nonmedical	okay 9:18 13:24	58:15	46:23 49:14
18:24 26:17	28:23 47:14,19	15:14 16:3	pain 9:10 15:1	50:6,7
27:24 28:4	48:17,19 57:10	36:18 51:22	31:20 32:5	<b>penny</b> 31:19
58:17	non-Medicaid	once 20:20,20	35:19,23 45:10	32:4,4 34:3
messing 48:8	36:12	53:19	50:15	<b>percent</b> 4:23 5:9
<b>method</b> 47:20	normally 5:9	ones 18:3	paper 31:23	5:23 6:5,14,19
methodology	54:21	one-third 17:5	papers 39:17	8:5,6 9:13,17
12:20	<b>North</b> 1:4,19,21	18:20 19:7,11	part 11:12 54:12	9:21 10:9
microphone	4:16 9:25 10:3	19:14 21:20	54:13,14 55:1	12:10,18,22,22
46:8	13:4,12,13,14	22:11 23:14,15	55:24	12:23 13:20
million 10:15	14:16,19 15:2	24:10 25:11	participate	14:8,9,14,15
12:9 35:20,22	15:2,7,20,23	27:18 29:7,9	11:23 12:3,3	14:16,25 15:3
35:23,24 41:13	18:13 19:19,22	29:11,13 44:22	participates	15:21 16:13,17
57:25 58:1	20:7 21:5,17	45:18 49:1	12:5	16:24 17:1,3
<b>mind</b> 13:11	22:2,11 24:20	52:3 54:18,19	particular 43:2	20:14,14,22,23
mine 52:4	25:7,9,20,23	58:14	51:4,24 54:25	21:1 22:4,5
minor 1:8 55:21	26:3,9,22,25	open-ended	58:7	29:18,19,19,21
minutes 56:10	27:15,22 29:7	51:13	particularly 5:8	30:10,19 37:19
<b>missed</b> 54:12	29:16,22 36:14	opinion 26:12	50:13	37:22 40:13,13
missing 54:11	38:20 39:5	26:21	parties 4:12 7:2	40:14,23,23,24
Missouri 51:14	42:12 43:6	opinions 21:9	8:13 9:3,4,7,8	41:2,2 47:21
mistaken 21:14	44:21 45:1	opportunity	9:12 11:18	48:22,22 49:19
money 31:16	51:20,22 54:3	23:7	12:20 23:6	51:23 52:5,5
53:10	54:5 56:6	opposite 42:19	32:25 33:25	58:8,8,13
money's 11:24	57:14 58:13,14	42:22	34:6 36:2	percentage 6:23
<b>move</b> 46:7	58:18	<b>option</b> 41:12	37:13 38:13	9:16 17:20
N	notice 55:7	56:20	40:9 48:12	30:6
	number 9:24	oral 1:15 3:2,5,8	50:11 57:18	perfectly 31:6
N 3:1,1 4:1	31:13,13 36:21	4:6 27:10	<b>party</b> 6:10 8:7	performance
name 15:24 nature 24:21	40:13 46:21	45:22	8:21 11:1	17:25
	57:8,9	order 30:2 47:16	12:12 14:23	persuasive 55:6
necessarily 34:6	numbers 24:25	ordered 24:1	16:10	petition 28:2
necessity 34:20 need 19:9 30:4,5	<b>number's</b> 36:22	ought 33:24	passed 43:7	Petitioner 1:6
30:8,11 47:15	0	outset 32:24	passing 17:12	1:20 3:4,14 4:7
57:3,20	O 3:1 4:1	46:25	<b>pay</b> 32:13 41:10	56:13
needs 28:20,22	<b>objective</b> 40:9	overestimating	paying 13:10	Philadelphia
40:5	objectively	49:6	45:1	49:13
negotiate 23:7	41:14	overinclusive	payment 4:13	physician 41:9
34:18	obligation 5:16	4:24 5:1	29:3 33:21	pick 5:12
negotiating 36:3	25:4	override 10:10	39:13 44:4	picked 5:11
negotiation	obligations	overrides 27:15	54:15	12:16
negonation	onigations	owe 39:3	payments 12:7	<b>piece</b> 31:22
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

<b>place</b> 53:20,23	<b>predict</b> 5:4,7,14	proceedings	43:2 57:17	28:18 36:24
57:8	prediction 5:16	39:16 41:1	puts 39:9	42:2,3,4 50:1
plaintiff 7:14	preexist 19:22	proceeds 16:8	putting 39:20,21	52:4,6 56:4,7
8:5 9:5 39:7	present 18:25	21:10	puzzles 55:16	57:1
43:10 47:13,25	presented 11:19	process 11:23	<b>p.m</b> 58:21	reasoning 11:10
48:16,21,24	26:19	30:2 31:5 33:4	<b>p.iii</b> 30.21	rebut 52:9,10,11
51:17	presenting	36:5 39:19	Q	52:14
plaintiff's 21:23	38:13	program 52:21	question 5:7	rebuttable
32:3 46:15	presumably	program 32.21	6:12,12,17	41:23 50:8
play 48:9	20:1 55:6	<b>proof</b> 38:10	7:20 8:2 15:15	51:22 52:16
playing 35:11	presumption	properly 4:16	16:15,22,23	54:20
please 4:9 27:13	5:17 17:20,22	property 5:24	18:2 20:4 24:2	rebuttal 3:12
46:1 49:9	31:7,8 41:6,17	6:5,13,18,22	26:19,21 29:6	27:7 52:7
plus 53:4	41:24 42:5	7:3,10,15,18	32:19 34:9	56:12
point 8:13 15:10	50:8 51:22	7:22,24 20:20	40:7 41:4 42:1	receive 21:24
20:10 26:20	52:4,8,12,15	proportion	43:5	51:17
32:18,20,21	52:16,17 54:6	33:25 47:5	questions 27:5	received 7:7
42:3,3,15 43:6	54:7,20	proportionality	49:1 52:3	14:22
43:22 55:21	pretty 40:20	38:1	quite 14:20	recipe 57:17
points 41:23	previous 45:16	proposed 45:11	39:22,23	recipient 5:14
42:3	previously 8:10	proposing 39:23		5:21 11:6
policy 13:4	primarily 17:17	proposing 37.25	R	12:11 14:23
policymaking	prior 18:9 21:22	23:20	<b>R</b> 4:1	20:6,19,21,22
42:24	23:1,2,10 25:8	protection 7:3	raise 18:2	22:18 23:19
<b>portion</b> 4:15 5:1	25:21	provable 49:20	<b>Raleigh</b> 1:19,21	37:14 57:15
5:19 6:16 11:2	prioritize 51:10	prove 52:24	range 46:4	recipients 4:12
21:23,25 29:2	private 9:4	<b>provide</b> 51:12	rate 49:23	7:6 19:18,25
29:6 33:20	23:22	53:11	rational 19:3,9	recipient's 4:15
37:18 39:13	problem 5:25	provided 6:9	rationale 24:16	recognized 44:3
40:4 44:3 45:5	20:11 27:18	9:20 50:8	28:7	reconstruct
45:6 47:4	31:7 34:14	51:15	rationally 17:15	46:14
posit 20:15	41:7 43:14	provider 21:1	reach 31:18	recover 6:16
positing 51:5	46:25	providers 10:4	32:25 34:25	8:19 29:21
position 6:22	problematic	13:7 19:21	read 22:1 25:12	35:20 38:2
32:24 38:11	27:20	providing 57:16	25:25 26:1,6,6	43:10 44:12
42:1,19,22	problems 20:25	province 17:18	readily 50:22	47:17 52:22
55:4,5	43:20	provision 10:6	reading 22:8	53:10
possible 31:13	procedure 4:17	18:23 19:1	real 45:12 52:19	recovered 12:11
31:14,15	18:4 25:10	20:11 42:16	57:11	39:8 47:25
post-settlement	26:3,10 34:9	43:16,17,23	<b>really</b> 19:11	recoveries 13:7
18:4 56:18	50:5	54:14 56:6	30:9 32:4	39:2
potential 43:20	procedures	provisions 21:7	34:15,17 35:23	recovers 55:23
potentially 35:7	25:18 26:2,14	punitive 10:15	36:22 38:6,9	58:11
practices 30:23	30:23 46:2,21	10:16	38:11	recovery 4:15
54:10	proceeding 30:7	purposes 9:9,9	<b>reason</b> 16:11	5:15,24 6:5,9
precisely 48:14	30:9,11 31:24	53:4,7,7	19:17 53:19	7:4,10,18 8:7,9
preclude 8:13	31:24,25,25	put 30:22 34:13	reasonable 4:11	9:21 11:7
•	, , -	1		
	1	1	1	1

	_	_	_	_
20:20,21 40:3	required 17:5	53:6 56:9	40:6,8 45:3,15	46:16 47:12,18
44:25 45:9,18	46:20	58:19	46:24 47:23	47:21 48:12,18
47:1,4 51:18	requirement	route 44:23,24	48:8 55:22	49:15 51:6
52:22 56:5	11:5 44:10	rule 8:13 12:19	Scalia's 8:2	56:19 57:17,22
<b>reduce</b> 37:19	56:21	13:13,19,19,21	scenario 10:6,25	58:15
reductions	requires 4:10	25:11,21 27:23	20:14 43:21	settlements
38:17	39:12 56:4	28:2 40:25	44:20	14:22 16:14
reference 23:6	requiring 21:1	41:4,6 49:5	<b>score</b> 30:15	19:20 38:21
26:1,25	reserve 27:6	54:3,18,20	second 14:8	settles 48:24
referenced 13:5	respect 16:16	57:19 58:17	21:13	<b>shared</b> 46:16
22:17 26:2,10	respectively	rulemaking	secretary 1:3	<b>show</b> 19:3 21:13
26:11,12	47:11	55:7	43:3	51:24
referred 27:23	respond 32:18	rules 27:3 28:13	Sections 21:6	side 19:25 35:22
reflected 55:4	respondents	28:14,21 53:19	see 11:15 20:18	40:19
reflects 10:2	1:22 2:1 3:7,11	55:8,11	22:12,22 23:6	sides 35:12 52:8
regard 42:22	27:11 45:24	run 52:4	26:1,7,9 31:22	significant
regardless 17:6	56:17		42:2 43:19	52:20 53:4,9
27:19	response 20:14	S	54:21 55:24	53:18,24
regularly 36:12	49:9	s 3:1 4:1 16:17	56:21	similar 37:25
regulate 55:6	rest 15:1	satisfied 40:15	seek 4:11 44:7	54:17
regulations	restructuring	41:17 43:12	45:17	<b>simply</b> 5:6 17:11
55:17 56:8	43:13	satisfy 5:15	seeking 29:20	29:18,23 32:25
reimbursed	result 30:23	<b>saying</b> 5:23 6:4	44:22	45:5 51:15
39:25	retained 16:8	6:6,8,13,18	sense 29:25	54:9
reimbursement	return 52:2	8:24 9:2 17:4	sent 42:23	singling 20:5
4:11 21:24	review 38:1	19:24 21:9	sentence 21:21	sits 21:19
52:16 54:8	<b>right</b> 5:9,24 6:5	25:17 29:8	22:1	situation 9:16
relate 13:1	6:9,13,15,19	39:11 40:20	separate 30:7,9	11:16,17 13:25
relates 10:1	6:22 7:1,3,10	47:23 50:12	serious 49:1	14:9,10,10
relationship	9:11 12:2	52:21 54:9	<b>services</b> 1:5 13:8	39:6 45:8
57:8	13:12 14:3	57:6	41:22	48:21,24 51:6
remainder 27:6	20:20 23:21	says 6:10 10:9	set 52:23	situations 13:24
remaining 56:11	24:4 33:23,24	14:14 15:13,20	<b>settle</b> 41:13	14:7 25:3
remit 45:18	34:1 35:20	15:21,25 16:7	53:21 56:19	skew 40:10,12
repayment 5:16	40:21 42:20	18:20 21:17,18	settled 35:22	Skidmore 41:19
25:4 26:17	46:25 48:4	21:19 24:6	38:9,15 58:1	42:5 54:24
57:15	52:1,11,14	29:13,13 30:19	settlement 8:14	smaller 32:9
repeating 15:17	53:2	40:22 43:7	11:8,13 13:19	<b>Solicitor</b> 1:19,23
represented	rights 4:13	47:20 51:23	13:22 14:1,25	58:5
26:17	ROBERTS 4:3	54:14 58:3,10	15:18,22 16:9	somewhat 13:9
represents	11:22 27:8	Scalia 5:22 6:11	21:23 23:14,18	sorry 12:8 26:8
11:13,13 26:17	32:8,16,21	6:17 9:8,18	24:7 27:19	32:16 46:9
29:2 33:21	34:22 35:10,16	16:6 20:17	29:2,21 30:8	sort 6:2 18:4
39:13 44:4	37:6 40:16	21:19 29:5,12	30:17,19 32:1	38:1 40:24
requests 42:25	42:11,18 45:20	30:4,21,25	33:21 37:20,21	41:23,24 42:25
require 4:12	49:25 50:4,10	33:10,17,23	38:4 39:13	Sotomayor 4:18
17:10 44:7	50:20 52:19	34:3,7 39:20	40:3,11 44:4	4:21 5:2,5 6:25
				l
-				

	•	ī	ī	
7:9,12,21 8:1,4	40:11 43:19	57:13,14 58:3	supposed 51:3	they'd 54:22
8:12,16,23 9:2	44:3,22 45:1,8	58:9,10,13,18	<b>supreme</b> 1:1,16	thing 7:16 39:3
16:21 17:4,9	45:15,19 47:11	statutes 13:5	15:7 21:9 25:7	51:9
17:19 18:6	47:16,24 48:5	21:5,6	<b>sure</b> 19:5 30:13	things 18:10
23:11,21 24:2	49:5 50:4,24	statutory 9:15	41:1 55:22	25:17 28:5,5
24:4,13 25:24	51:11 52:17,20	10:3,15 11:5	system 26:22,25	30:18 44:16
26:9,20,24	53:9,21 54:14	23:9	38:23 45:4,13	49:10 53:16
27:2 31:3	55:23 56:15,15	steadfastly	45:15	think 6:2,19
34:23 35:2,5,9	56:25 57:1	27:14		14:20 16:6
36:11,17 37:4	58:10,11	stipulate 8:17	T	20:18 23:5
37:9 39:15	statement 21:16	14:9,25 32:25	<b>T</b> 3:1,1	25:16 26:23
46:7,10,12	<b>States</b> 1:1,16,25	stipulating 8:14	take 4:10 9:13	27:16 29:25
49:8 54:2 58:2	3:10 4:10,12	stipulation 8:18	13:23 14:2,14	30:14,21 33:8
sought 43:9	17:9,19,21	8:20,24 9:3,6	22:5 25:5	34:2 40:5,8,9
<b>source</b> 22:16	18:1,1,3,3 25:8	14:11,15,17	31:16 37:20	40:19 41:20
31:16	25:17 26:11	15:11 21:22	44:23 47:25	42:6,8,15,21
sources 8:8	29:1 30:22	22:6,17,24	48:2,2 50:18	43:1,15 44:20
<b>South</b> 21:16	31:2 32:2 33:3	23:2,22	50:20 51:16	45:14 46:3,20
special 10:8	33:6 34:9,18	structured	53:15,24	47:9 48:10,25
17:10 28:4	34:18 35:6,6	40:10	takes 21:19	50:18 51:7,10
specials 28:3	41:21 42:10	<b>stuff</b> 50:23	27:18	52:3,13 53:3
specific 17:25	45:23 46:3,4	subject 34:24	takings 20:25	53:17,24 54:7
specifically 10:5	46:13,17,19	36:4 38:22	takings-related	54:18,19 55:3
standing 7:17	47:3 49:10	56:8	21:8	55:3,5 56:25
start 46:2 52:15	52:8,10,13,15	subjective 34:6	talked 27:3	56:25 57:3,19
starting 42:15	53:1,4,17,24	submitted 58:20	talking 6:2 25:6	thinks 56:5
43:22	54:2,5,9 56:4	58:22	26:13	<b>third</b> 4:12 6:10
starts 52:17	56:18	subrogation	technical 13:10	8:7 12:12
<b>State</b> 4:14 5:3	<b>State's</b> 8:11 9:19	12:2	54:23 55:20	14:10,23 16:10
5:20,23 6:4,7,9	11:1	substantially	tell 34:15	45:1
6:12,15,18,23	<b>statute</b> 5:8,13,19	26:14	telling 12:14	third-party 4:15
7:7 8:21 9:7,13	7:3 10:10 11:4	sue 7:17,21,23	14:18 15:20	25:2 38:25
9:14 10:20	11:6 12:15	suffering 9:10	22:8 47:2	52:22
11:9,20,25	14:21 16:6,20	15:1 31:20	tells 5:14,21	<b>thought</b> 6:1,4
12:5,16 13:4	17:2,12,16	35:19,23 45:10	11:6 57:18	14:13 15:1,16
15:24 17:2,15	18:7,8,14,15	50:15	terms 58:9	19:10 20:9,9
18:7 19:2 20:2	18:20,24 19:22	suffice 45:9	testify 32:3	22:1 36:3
20:16,25 21:9	19:23 21:11,18	suggesting 57:7	<b>Thank</b> 27:8	37:11
21:20,24 22:5	22:2 23:20	<b>suggests</b> 28:8,20	45:19,20 46:10	thousands 42:25
22:19,24 23:8	24:16,18 27:15	30:13	56:9 58:19	three 12:18
23:13,20,25	27:17,18,22	<b>suing</b> 45:5	<b>Thanks</b> 46:12	13:24 14:6
25:22 26:18	28:7 39:5,5	<b>suit</b> 44:11,14	theoretical	27:24 28:3,4
27:3 28:8,20	42:12,16 43:7	sum 23:18	46:25	56:10
29:8,12,13,20	44:1,21 45:16	supporting 1:25	theories 11:20	throw 36:24
30:3 31:7 33:1	47:1 51:20	3:11 45:24	theory 12:21	<b>thumb</b> 12:19
34:19 35:3	54:13,17,24	suppose 16:16	18:12,19 19:8	27:23 28:2
37:14 39:3	55:25 56:3	43:6	29:22	tie 47:7
1				

	l	Ī	Ī	
time 25:6 27:6	Tuesday 1:13	verdict 10:8,8	54:12,23	<b>1</b> 31:19 32:4,4
40:21,21,23	turn 27:24 28:25	10:12,13,14,17	<b>we've</b> 20:6 36:20	34:3
41:1 48:14	32:18	10:25 11:4,8	57:2	<b>1.9</b> 12:9
times 12:18	<b>two</b> 10:24 21:6	11:16,17 17:8	wherewithal	<b>10</b> 9:23 10:9
27:24 28:3,4	25:17 28:11	27:16	41:10	14:8,9,14,15
40:17	36:2 47:16	verdicts 16:16	whichever 13:21	14:16,25 15:3
time-consuming	<b>Two-part</b> 18:22	17:10,10	13:21	15:21 16:17,24
30:12	two-thirds	<b>versus</b> 30:18	witnesses 39:16	17:1 22:4,5
told 16:25 19:10	18:14,20,25	38:2,3	words 19:6 22:6	30:10,19 48:22
35:5	19:7,14	<b>victim</b> 12:23	22:9	52:5 54:6 58:8
tomorrow 18:14	type 38:23	13:14,18 31:21	work 19:8 31:9	58:13
top 57:4	types 46:2	32:10	33:5 34:10,14	<b>100</b> 10:14 20:14
tort 12:19 13:6	typically 25:1	victim's 31:11	39:1 50:12	20:23 29:18
17:17 19:3,19	40:22	31:13,14 32:11	workable 39:24	40:13 47:21
19:20 29:21		view 50:14	worked 33:3	49:19
43:8,14 47:12	U	views 36:2	workers 36:14	<b>100,000</b> 58:13
tortfeasor 13:18	ultimately 30:4	violation 11:5	38:21,22 39:2	<b>11:16</b> 1:17 4:2
31:21	uncertainty	virtue 12:1	workmen's	<b>12-98</b> 1:5 4:4
tortfeasors	49:23		39:22	<b>12:17</b> 58:21
52:22	underinclusive	<b>W</b>	works 34:13,16	<b>15</b> 37:19,22
tortfeasor's	4:24	wages 28:5	34:17	<b>16</b> 17:19,21,25
31:11,12 32:12	underlying	48:23	world 57:11	18:3 31:3,4
total 30:6 38:3	12:24	<b>want</b> 13:16	worse 32:8	32:2 34:9 53:4
45:9 50:25	understand	21:13 25:5	<b>wouldn't</b> 44:18	<b>1935</b> 10:3 13:8
totally 40:6	20:17 33:10	34:12,13 44:15	56:7	19:19 20:25
train 37:11	53:13 57:5	55:20	wrong 6:6 14:13	<b>1965</b> 18:9
treacherous	understanding	wanted 32:4	14:19 19:15	<b>1988</b> 10:2,6 18:9
44:23	13:12 25:1,15	wants 31:7 32:7	37:5 41:4,5	18:9
treat 19:17	53:20	Washington		
treated 20:1	<b>United</b> 1:1,16,25	1:12,24	X	2
treatment 20:5	3:10 41:21	wasn't 5:8 26:11	<b>x</b> 1:2,11	<b>2.8</b> 58:1
trial 18:5 49:18	42:10 45:23	26:12		<b>20</b> 35:23
56:19,19	56:18	way 12:20 15:16	Y	<b>20A</b> 28:2
<b>tried</b> 10:7 24:23	use 28:13,20	15:17 17:13	year 24:22	<b>2013</b> 1:13
37:17	46:3	19:9 20:18	ф	<b>230</b> 18:24
trigger 25:4	usually 39:16,18	25:12 28:18	\$	<b>25</b> 40:23
trouble 56:24	51:11	40:10,10,12,17	<b>\$1</b> 10:15	<b>27</b> 3:7
true 15:4,4,5		48:9 49:4	<b>\$10,000</b> 14:1,2	
20:22,23 22:6	V	54:19,20,23	<b>\$100,000</b> 13:22	3
27:19 57:21	<b>v</b> 1:7 4:4 49:13	ways 28:11 31:2	15:18	<b>30</b> 4:23 5:9,23
58:6	valuation 36:8	weight 54:25	<b>\$2.8</b> 41:13	6:5,14,19 8:5,6
<b>trumps</b> 54:13	<b>value</b> 12:21	well-grounded	<b>\$20,000</b> 35:18	9:14 12:15,16
try 22:15,15	38:15 57:21	27:16	<b>\$42</b> 57:25	17:3 41:2
44:11 52:8,9	58:7	went 21:3	<b>\$50,000</b> 13:15	51:23 58:8
52:11,14,21	variety 31:1	weren't 49:20	<b>\$500,000</b> 10:16	<b>33</b> 9:17,21,23,23
trying 46:14	various 28:5	<b>we're</b> 39:11	<b>\$933,000</b> 24:1	12:10,18,22,22
47:3 53:8,10	39:8 49:9,10	40:24 42:11	1	12:23 13:20,23
	l	<u> </u>	l	<u> </u>

16:13 20:22 21:1 40:24 41:2 34 18:1 53:1 35 40:23 39 29:21  4 43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 01:32 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 60 5:12 9:23 7 75 40:14 8 8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22 52:5				70
21:1 40:24 41:2 34 18:1 53:1 35 40:23 39 29:21  4 43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22			<u> </u>	
41:2 34 18:1 53:1 35 40:23 39 29:21  4 43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50,000 13:20 50,50 9:13 56 3:14  6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
34 18:1 53:1 35 40:23 39 29:21  4 43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
35 40:23 39 29:21  4 43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
39 29:21  4  43:4  405:12 29:19  44 21:5  45 3:10  49 21:6  5  50 5:12 9:13  13:24 21:6  29:19  50,000 13:20  50/50 9:13  56 3:14  6  6  60 5:12 9:23  7  75 40:14  8  8 1:13  9  90 9:23 20:14  40:13 48:22				
4 43:4 405:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	<b>39</b> 29:21			
43:4 40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
40 5:12 29:19 44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
44 21:5 45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
45 3:10 49 21:6  5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
5       50 5:12 9:13       13:24 21:6       29:19       50,000 13:20       50/50 9:13       56 3:14       6       60 5:12 9:23       7       75 40:14       8       8 1:13       9       90 9:23 20:14       40:13 48:22				
5 50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14 6 60 5:12 9:23 7 75 40:14 8 8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	49 21.0			
50 5:12 9:13 13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14 6 60 5:12 9:23 7 75 40:14 8 8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	5			
13:24 21:6 29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14   6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
29:19 50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
50,000 13:20 50/50 9:13 56 3:14 				
50/50 9:13 56 3:14  6 60 5:12 9:23  7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
56 3:14       6       60 5:12 9:23       7       75 40:14       8       8 1:13       9       90 9:23 20:14       40:13 48:22				
6       60 5:12 9:23       7       75 40:14       8       8 1:13       9       90 9:23 20:14       40:13 48:22				
60 5:12 9:23       7       75 40:14       8       8 1:13       9       90 9:23 20:14       40:13 48:22				
7 75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
75 40:14  8 8 1:13  9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	<b>60</b> 5:12 9:23			
8 8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	7			
8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	<b>75</b> 40:14			
8 1:13 9 90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	8			
90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22				
90 9:23 20:14 40:13 48:22	9			
40:13 48:22				
	52.0			