ATTACHMENT A

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 24-12953

KEVIN DON FOSTER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00597-JES-KCD

ORDER:

Kevin Don Foster, a Florida inmate sentenced to death, applies for a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because he fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, Foster's application for a certificate of appealability is **DENIED**.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1998, a Florida jury convicted Kevin Don Foster of the first-degree murder of Mark Schwebes. Foster was the leader of the "Lords of Chaos," a group that included students from Riverdale High School in Fort Myers, Florida. On April 30, 1996, Foster and seven others decided to vandalize Riverdale High School and set its auditorium on fire. That plan was interrupted when Schwebes, the Riverdale band director, confronted two members of the group. Foster had run away before Schwebes arrived. When Chaos member Christopher Black told Foster that Schwebes was planning to contact the school resource officer the next day, Foster agreed with Black that Schwebes "has got to die."

Foster and other Chaos members went to Foster's home, where Foster obtained a shotgun, a map, gloves, and ski masks. Foster, Black, Peter Magnotti, and Derek Shields headed to Schwebes's home. On the way, they stopped and placed a stolen license tag on Shields's vehicle. When Schwebes answered their knock on the door, Foster shot him in the face and pelvis.

Foster alleges that the Fort Myers News-Press published several articles in response to the murder. On May 2, 1996, the newspaper published an article on the loss to Riverdale High School students from Schwebes's death. On May 5, 1996, two days after Foster's arrest, the paper published a story detailing Chaos members' plan to commit "a mass murder of black people" at Disney World. The article quoted Foster as telling "his comrades" that they would "just go around shooting every [n****r] [they] see." The next day, the paper ran a front-page story with the headline "Lee checks racist gang's link to militia groups" that allegedly portrayed Chaos members as being members of a "racist and homophobic militia." On May 7, 1996, another article stated that Foster "wanted to go on a racist killing spree at the park" and "talked up a plan to mug Disney characters, steal their costumes[,] and roam the park with a silenced gun shooting blacks." Two days later, an article referred to Foster as "head of pack," an "Opie with a gun," and "a Jekyll-and-Hyde character—a polite, respectful young man with a searing dark side." Foster alleges that the article featured various pictures, including one of Foster holding an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle, and emphasized a quote from a local teacher comparing Foster to Adolf Hitler.

On May 18, 1996, the newspaper published poems written by students in tribute to Schwebes. These poems, Foster asserts, "depicted Foster and members of the Lords of Chaos as '[s]ons of the devil,' 'evil to the core,' having 'brains . . . filled with the darkness of evil,' and 'hounds of [h]ell.'" On June 30, 1996, an article described Foster as a "psychotic" person who was "consumed with

anarchy, the Ku Klux Klan[,] and satanism" and compared Chaos members to Hitler. That article also included a drawing of Ku Klux Klan members and swastikas allegedly attributable to Foster. Other news media also covered Foster during 1996. For example, the Tampa Tribune and the Ocala Star-Banner published stories in June 1996 detailing Foster's alleged plan to shoot black tourists at Disney World.

The media coverage slowed in the months after Foster's arrest. Articles published on June 21, 1997, and September 27, 1997, covered other Chaos members' plea agreements, depicted Foster as the ringleader, and opined that the plea agreements "bolster[ed] the prosecution's chances of putting Foster in Florida's electric chair." The September article also commented on Foster's culpability and included a quote from prosecutor Randall McGruther that the state did "not intend to offer him a plea."

More coverage returned when Foster's trial approached two years later. On March 1, 1998, two days before his trial began, a News-Press column titled "Old Sparky's hot jolt may await Foster" described Foster as "one twisted kid" and "a redneck, racist, pyromaniacal, gun-crazed punk" for whom "Hell is waiting." That column also referred to other crimes that Chaos members had committed and stated that they "graduated from vandalism to vehicle thefts to robbery to arson to murder." The next day, the Naples Daily News referenced the crimes attributed to Chaos members,

including setting fire to a Fort Myers Coca-Cola bottling plant, a Baptist church, and an aviary outside a restaurant.

The trial court conducted voir dire in two phases. The first phase evaluated the venire's exposure to pretrial publicity, and the second evaluated its views on the death penalty. Most prospective jurors stated that they had read or heard something about Foster's case. But the trial court eliminated those who stated that their fixed opinion would prevent them from fairly evaluating the evidence. The trial court also allotted Foster additional peremptory challenges. The jurors selected all stated that they would be fair and could set aside what they had heard. Foster did not challenge for cause any selected juror.

A Florida jury convicted Foster of first-degree murder. At the penalty phase, the defense called 24 witnesses who "presented a picture of Foster as a kind and caring person." The trial court accepted the jury's nine-to-three recommendation and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Foster's conviction and sentence. Foster did not petition the Supreme Court of the United States.

Foster filed several state post-conviction motions. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on Foster's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial. At that hearing, Foster called one of his two trial attorneys (the other, Robert Jacobs, had since passed away); a defense investigator; a defense paralegal; and numerous mental health experts. In rebuttal, the state called three mental health experts. In 2011, the post-

conviction court denied all of Foster's claims. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

Foster petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus on October 16, 2014. At Foster's request, the district court stayed Foster's appeal to allow the Supreme Court of Florida to consider the application of *Hurst v. Florida*, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), for death-sentenced prisoners and to allow Foster to exhaust claims based on *Hurst*. The district court later denied his petition and denied him a certificate of appealability.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party who seeks to appeal the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must obtain a certificate of appealability. *See Gonzalez v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr.*, 366 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004), *aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Gonzalez v. Crosby*, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). We may issue a certificate "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." *Lott v. Att'y Gen., Fla.*, 594 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Where, as here, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act . . . applies, we look to the [d]istrict [c]ourt's application of [the Act] to petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason."

Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Foster seeks a certificate of appealability on two grounds. First, he argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial. Second, he argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because the trial court denied his repeated motions to change venue.

A. Foster's Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase Do Not Merit a Certificate of Appealability.

Foster argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial. During that phase, defense counsel called 24 witnesses who "presented a picture of Foster as a kind and caring person." Two of Foster's neighbors—May Ann Robinson and Robert Moore—testified that they considered Foster a hard-worker and well-mannered. Shirley Boyette also testified that Foster was intelligent, caring, and well-mannered. Robert Fike, Foster's supervisor at a carpentry shop, and James Voorhies, his coworker, testified that they considered him a reliable worker. Voorhies also testified that Foster was very supportive to his son who suffered from and eventually died of leukemia. Raymond and Patricia Williams testified that Foster was nice to their son who suffered from spina bifida. Peter Albert, who was confined to a wheelchair, testified that Foster prepared his meals, repaired things around his house, and helped him in and out of his swimming pool. Foster's sister, Kelly Foster, testified that Foster obtained his GED

after dropping out of high school and completed an "auto cad" program at a vocational school. Foster's mother, Ruby Foster, testified that he was born prematurely and that his father abandoned him a month after birth. Foster contends that counsel failed to conduct a competent investigation of his child abuse and mental health; counsel abdicated their responsibility for the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence to his mother; and counsel was impaired and disorganized.

Foster argues that a competent investigation would have revealed that he "had a difficult childhood," witnessed "abuse in the home, had a history of mental illness in [his] family, was suicidal, [and] had a history of head trauma." On his "difficult childhood," Foster describes his mother marrying four times; his grandfather "refus[ing] to have any relationship with [him]"; his "overdependent" relationship with his mother; his lack of "positive, consistent male role models"; and two of his stepfathers' "physical[] and mental[] abus[e]." On his history of head trauma, Foster alleges that he suffered from birth shock and respiratory distress syndrome; a concussion after being hit in the head with a baseball bat at 5 or 6 years old; and "[t]he bottom of his skull split open" after he "jumped off a cliff." Foster asserts that he suffered from "developmental delays, recurrent depression that escalated to" him shooting himself in the stomach, "antisocial personality disorder" and "manic episodes indicative of Bipolar disorder." Foster acknowledges that his "verbal IQ tested at 137 [and] his nonverbal IQ was 105," but he asserts that

his "verbal/nonverbal IQ split" is an "indication of right versus left hemisphere dysfunction."

Reasonable jurists would not debate the resolution of Foster's claims under the double deference of *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and section 2254(d). *See Everett v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.*, 779 F.3d 1212, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2015). Under *Strickland*, to establish constitutionally ineffective counsel, a defendant must establish that his attorney's performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. *Id.* at 1248. We will not grant a certificate of appealability so long as reasonable jurists would not debate that there are "fairminded jurists [who] could agree with the state court's decision." *Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison*, 911 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Foster's defense counsel conducted an extensive investigation before the penalty phase. At the evidentiary hearing, Roberta Harsh, a defense investigator, testified that the defense team "pulled out all the stops" and used everything at their disposal to defend Foster. Marquin Rinard, one of Foster's two trial attorneys who was experienced in capital cases, explained that to prepare for the penalty phase, the defense team compiled copious information about Foster helping others and being a good person, which they thought was necessary to overcome the negative guilt phase evidence. The defense team also compiled and reviewed Foster's school and medical records. Psychiatrist Dr. Robert Wald testified that, early in the case, he examined Foster for two-and-a-half hours,

reviewed records, and examined Foster's mother. Dr. Wald testified that he would have orally communicated his findings to lead counsel Robert Jacobs. Paralegal James Wootton testified that the defense team discussed Dr. Wald's mental health evaluation and decided that no other experts needed to be hired because nothing in the evaluation or any other material warranted more investigation into Foster's mental health. The mitigation investigation led to the defense team calling 24 witnesses to testify on Foster's behalf during the penalty phase.

Based on their investigation, defense counsel had no reason to believe that Foster had experienced child abuse. Foster did not inform defense counsel that he had been abused. Wootton testified that trial counsel questioned Foster's mother about his upbringing, and she insisted that Foster had obtained an education, was raised in a good home, and had never been abused. Rinard testified that seven of Foster's relatives reported in their depositions that Foster had a normal childhood with a loving mother and extended family. None testified to any abuse in Foster's home. Nor did any of the other witnesses presented at the penalty phase—Foster's family members, childhood friends, employers, and neighbors—suggest that Foster had anything but a normal upbringing.

Jurists of reason would not debate that the Florida courts reasonably rejected Foster's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover evidence of abuse. "An attorney does not render ineffective assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood abuse that his client does not mention to him." *Williams*

v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1237 (11th Cir. 1999). "The reasonableness of a trial counsel's acts, including lack of investigation . . . , depends critically upon what information [Foster] communicated to counsel." *See Chandler v. United States*, 218 F.3d 1305, 1324 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the light of Foster's failure to inform his counsel about any child abuse and the other evidence suggesting that Foster did not experience abuse, the Florida courts reasonably concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to discover his alleged history of child abuse.

Defense counsel also had no reason to believe that Foster suffered from mental health issues or brain trauma. The school and medical records obtained by defense counsel did not include any red flags suggesting that Foster suffered from mental illness. Rinard testified that, during a defense investigator's interview in 1996, Foster denied having "any suicide attempts, involuntary commitment, chronic drug or alcohol abuse, seizures, retardation, or serious head injuries." Rinard testified that Foster's mother denied any familial history of mental illness. Wootton also recalled that trial counsel questioned Foster's mother and that she was adamant that Foster had no mental issues. Dr. Wald did not report any mental illness or impairments to Foster's counsel. Nor did Foster's defense team identify any signs of mental illness during their frequent encounters with Foster. None of the witnesses contacted by the

defense team provided any information that caused them to suspect that Foster had mental health problems.

Jurists of reason would not debate that the Florida courts reasonably concluded that defense counsel's decision not to hire additional mental health experts or conduct a further investigation did not constitute ineffective assistance. Defense counsel received no information that Foster was mentally ill from his medical and school records; their interviews of Foster, his family, and other witnesses; or Dr. Wald's evaluation of Foster and his mother. As Wootton testified, the defense team considered and deliberately decided against hiring additional experts in the light of Dr. Wald's evaluation and the other evidence. We have held that "counsel need not investigate every evidentiary lead," but "must gather enough knowledge of the potential mitigation evidence to arrive at an informed judgment in making that decision." *DeBruce v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr.*, 758 F.3d 1263, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Jurists of reason would not debate the reasonableness of concluding that defense counsel made a tactical decision not to pursue further mental health investigation after receiving an initial diagnosis that Foster had no mental health issues and after receiving no suggestion of mental illness or other childhood mitigation from Foster and his family.

Foster also argues that his counsel abdicated their mitigation investigation to his mother. Foster contends that "the entire penalty phase was presented as . . . Foster's [mother's] version of [Foster's] life" and that "[c]ounsel did not question whether her version was,

in fact, true." Foster compares his case to *DeBruce v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections*, where defense counsel spoke only to the defendant and his mother, who provided "grossly inaccurate" information, in preparation for the penalty phase. *Id.* at 1274. A social worker's pretrial report contradicted the information that DeBruce's mother had provided counsel and stated that he had attempted suicide four times, was in a "'low average'" intelligence range, and "'ha[d] a history of problems since childhood including marijuana and alcohol abuse.'" *Id.* at 1271–72. DeBruce's attorney testified that he did not conduct a background investigation because he "'just didn't have time.'" *Id.* at 1272. Because counsel made clear that his failure not to investigate that report was not a strategic decision, but the result of insufficient time, we held that counsel deficiently investigated mitigating evidence. *Id.* at 1275.

Jurists of reason would not debate that the Florida courts reasonably concluded that defense counsel did not abdicate their investigation to Foster's mother. To be sure, Foster's mother provided alibi information for the guilt phase and provided a long list of possible witnesses for the penalty phase. But, unlike in *DeBruce*, Foster's counsel did not rely only on a mother's "grossly inaccurate" depiction of her son's life. *Id.* at 1274. Rinard testified that Jacobs conducted a thorough investigation and, together with Foster, decided on the theory of defense. Counsel independently verified the information shared by Foster and his mother by compiling his school and medical records and speaking to several witnesses. Defense counsel had no reason to believe that the information shared by Foster, his mother, and the other witnesses they interviewed was

inaccurate. Jacobs took primary responsibility for the trial and penalty phase and decided that, based on the information they had, they must attempt to humanize Foster.

Finally, jurists of reason would not debate whether any disorganization, confusion, or impairment rose to a *Strickland* violation. In support of this assertion, Foster relied on investigator Harsh's testimony that Jacobs suffered from tremors "for years"; Foster's biological father's opinion that Jacobs would sometimes get "frustrated, or somewhat confused" at trial; Wootton's testimony that the files were disorganized when he was first hired; and author Jim Greenhill's opinion in his book *Someone Has to Die Tonight* that Foster's counsel appeared "confused." But Rinard and Wootton, both of whom were present with defense counsel during the trial, testified that they did not observe any tremors or effects of Jacobs's Parkinson's disease. Wootton's testimony that Foster's documents in a box were "more so disorganized than organized" when he started his job with the public defender's office did not refer to the defense team's organization, but to the documents' disorganization. And Wootton testified that he organized and created digital records of the documents before trial.

As for prejudice, no jurist of reason would debate whether the mental illness and child abuse mitigation evidence would have outweighed the aggravation presented at the penalty phase. To evaluate the prejudice element of *Strickland*, we must compare "the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding"—with

"the evidence in aggravation." *Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr.*, 822 F.3d 1248, 1274 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At sentencing, the trial court found two aggravating factors: "(1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest" and "(2) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." The court rejected the statutory age mitigator—Foster was 18 at the time of the crime—and attached little to no weight to the 23 other mitigators offered by Foster. Even if the evidence presented by post-conviction counsel had been available to the jury and sentencing court, there is no evidence of any significant mitigation in Foster's background that a jury would have found supported a life recommendation in the light of the substantial aggravation.

Jurists of reason also would not debate the resolution of the claim that a better investigation would have uncovered additional mitigation evidence. Foster's mother testified at the penalty phase that Foster was born prematurely and abandoned by his father, so more of that evidence would have been cumulative. And Foster's antisocial personality disorder is a trait most jurors look disfavorably upon and is often more harmful than helpful. *See Cummings v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr.*, 588 F.3d 1331, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder "is not mitigating but damaging"); *Morton v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.*, 684 F.3d 1157, 1168 (11th Cir. 2012) ("That a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder has negative characteristics or presents a double-edged sword renders it uniquely a matter of trial strategy that a defense

lawyer may, or may not, decide to present as mitigating evidence."). There was no reasonable probability that, had Foster's additional mitigation evidence been presented, the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different.

B. Foster's Claims About Change of Venue Do Not Merit a Certificate of Appealability.

Foster next argues that the district court erred in denying his 17 motions for change of venue based on the "pervasive and prejudicial media coverage that preceded his trial." To succeed on his change of venue claim, Foster must make "a substantial showing of the denial" of his constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). That is, Foster must make a substantial showing that the pretrial publicity was so widespread, pervasive, and prejudicial as to saturate the community. *United States v. Campa*, 459 F.3d 1121, 1150 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). And Foster must make a substantial showing that "there is a reasonable certainty that the prejudice prevent[ed] [him] from obtaining a fair trial." *Id.*

Our precedent distinguishes between jurors' "mere familiarity with the defendant and his past crimes and an actual predisposition against him." *Id.* at 1144 (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Qualified jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved." *Id.* at 1147. Even a juror's "preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is [in]sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality." *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 722–

23 (1961). "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." *Id.* at 723.

Jurists of reason would not debate that the record supports the rulings of the Florida courts as reasonable. The trial court eliminated all who stated that their fixed opinion would prevent them from fairly evaluating the evidence. And most news articles were published about two years before Foster's trial began and were "too old to be inflammatory or prejudicial." *Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1145. Foster also failed to challenge for cause any selected juror.

Jurists of reason would not debate that the Florida courts reasonably rejected Foster's claim that any prejudice prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. Foster cites the impartiality of Juror M as "[t]he misconduct most germane to this claim." During voir dire, Juror M stated that she had learned about the case from the news media but maintained that she could be fair and impartial. Foster alleges that Juror M used pretrial publicity against him because an excerpt from a book, *Someone Has to Die Tonight*, revealed that when photographs of the crime scene were published to the jury, Juror M thought that they were more detailed than what she saw in the newspaper. Assuming that this account is true, it does not suggest that Juror M was partial. It instead confirms that Juror M read about the crime in the newspaper, which she had acknowledged during voir dire. No reasonable jurist would debate whether the Florida courts reasonably rejected Foster's claim that his pretrial publicity was so widespread, pervasive, and prejudicial that it

saturated the community and prevented him from obtaining a fair trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

Foster's application for a certificate of appealability is **DENIED**.



CHIEF CIRCUIT JUDGE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith
Clerk of Court

For rules and forms visit
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March 21, 2025

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Appeal Number: 24-12953-P
Case Style: Kevin Don Foster v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
District Court Docket No: 2:14-cv-00597-JES-KCD

The enclosed copy of this Court's order denying the application for a Certificate of Appealability is issued as the mandate of this court. See 11th Cir. R. 41-4. Counsel and pro se parties are advised that pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 27-2, "a motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify an order must be filed within 21 days of the entry of such order. No additional time shall be allowed for mailing."

Any pending motions are now rendered moot in light of the attached order.

Clerk's Office Phone Numbers

General Information:	404-335-6100	Attorney Admissions:	404-335-6122
Case Administration:	404-335-6135	Capital Cases:	404-335-6200
CM/ECF Help Desk:	404-335-6125	Cases Set for Oral Argument:	404-335-6141

Enclosure(s)

DIS-4 Multi-purpose dismissal letter

ATTACHMENT B

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 24-12953

KEVIN DON FOSTER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00597-JES-KCD

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Foster's motion for reconsideration of the March 21, 2025, order denying his motion for a certificate of appealability is DENIED.[1]

[1] Judge Jordan dissents in part and would grant a COA on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith
Clerk of Court

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May 07, 2025

Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer
Parmer DeLiberato, PA
PO BOX 18988
TAMPA, FL 33679

Appeal Number: 24-12953-P
Case Style: Kevin Don Foster v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
District Court Docket No: 2:14-cv-00597-JES-KCD

The enclosed order has been ENTERED.

Electronic Filing
All counsel must file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause. Although not required, non-incarcerated pro se parties are permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an account at www.pacer.gov. Information and training materials related to electronic filing are available on the Court's website.

Clerk's Office Phone Numbers

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MOT-2 Notice of Court Action