No. 25A___

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND STATE OF MICHIGAN EX REL. ERIK OLSEN, M.D., WILLIAM BERK, M.D., AND SAJITH MATTHEWS, M.D.,

Petitioners,

v.

TENET HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

Respondents.

APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM JULY 21, 2025, TO SEPTEMBER 19, 2025

To the Honorable Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, as Circuit Justice for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and Supreme Court Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.3, petitioners United States of America and State of Michigan ex rel. Erik Olsen, M.D., William Berk, M.D., and Sajith Matthews, M.D., respectfully request that the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari be extended 60 days from July 21, 2025, to and including September 19, 2025. On April 22, 2025, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioners' complaint. Addendum (Add.). Without an extension, the petition for a writ of certiorari would be due on July 21, 2025. This application is being filed at least 10 days before that date. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. This Court will have jurisdiction to review the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

1. This case presents an important question that deeply divides the circuits over whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard requires False Claims Act plaintiffs who plead a fraudulent billing scheme with particularity to identify specific false claim submissions to the government to avoid dismissal.

The False Claims Act (FCA) empowers private individuals, known as relators, to bring actions alleging fraud on the government's behalf. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 3729 *et seq.* The statute imposes liability when a person presents a claim for payment or approval to the government that is false or fraudulent and acts with knowledge, actual knowledge, or deliberate ignorance regarding the truth or falsity of the claim. *See ibid.* Because it is an anti-fraud statute, claims brought under the FCA are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), which requires that a party "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

2. Petitioners are three current and former physicians at Detroit-area hospitals who allege that their hospitals' parent company, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, and subsidiary hospital system, Detroit Medical Center, fraudulently billed the government for inpatient care that patients did not and could not receive. Add. 1. Petitioner Erik Olsen, M.D., is an emergency room physician who has worked and trained at Detroit Medical Center hospitals since about 2004 and, until recently, practiced at Detroit Receiving Hospital. Add. 4. Petitioners Sajith Matthews, M.D., and William Berk, M.D., are both physicians who, like Olsen, still practice or once practiced at Detroit Medical Center hospitals. *Ibid.* Respondents are Tenet Healthcare Corporation and Detroit Medical Center.

Petitioner Olsen filed the initial qui tam complaint under seal; after the United States and the State of Michigan declined to intervene, petitioners Olsen, Matthews, and Berk filed an amended complaint claiming that respondents violated the False Claims Act (FCA) and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act by knowingly presenting false or fraudulent claims for payment to government healthcare programs. *See* Add. 1, 4. Petitioners allege that respondents "fraudulently bill for inpatient care when patients are held in emergency room facilities ('ERs'), a practice known as 'boarding.'" Add. 2 (quotation marks omitted). "These patients, with an inpatient admission order, are 'boarded' in the ER until either a bed in an inpatient unit becomes available, or the patient is discharged." *Ibid.* Inpatient care is generally "administered at a higher level than the care required in ERs and is" therefore "reimbursed at higher rates, so boarded patients 'ought to be billed as outpatient.'" *Ibid.* (citation omitted). Based on their first-hand observations and experiences working within these hospitals, though, petitioners allege that respondents "routinely bill Medicare, Medicaid and other government healthcare programs for inpatient care that was not delivered or capable of being delivered at the [Detroit Medical Center]'s acute care hospitals' emergency departments." Add. 7 (quotation marks omitted).

3. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that relators failed to satisfy Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), or 12(b)(6). Add. 4.

The district court granted respondents' motion to dismiss. *See* Add. 5. The court rejected respondents' argument that adding petitioners Matthews and Berk to the

complaint violated the FCA's first-to-file rule. *See ibid.* But the court reasoned that because petitioners had not alleged the details of any particular false or fraudulent submission to the government, petitioners thus failed to "sufficiently allege that [respondents] directly participated in the submission of any of the purported false claims" or "directed their subsidiary hospitals to bill government programs while knowing that, at the time the billing period began, the hospitals failed to render the care required for payment of medical claims by the government." *See ibid.* (quotation marks omitted).

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Add. 1. The panel confirmed the circuit's "'clear and unequivocal requirement that a relator allege specific false claims when pleading a violation of the FCA.'" Add. 7-8 (quoting *United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network*, 816 F.3d 399, 411 (6th Cir. 2016); *United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Community Health Sys., Inc.*, 501 F.3d 493, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2007); *Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co.*, 447 F.3d 873, 877-78 (6th Cir. 2006)). The panel thus held that it was insufficient for relators to "rely on an inference that false claims must have been submitted" based on the elaborate fraud scheme alleged; instead, relators had to "identify [a] specific false claim for payment submitted to the government." *See* Add. 10-11. In the Sixth Circuit, the panel explained, Rule 9(b) "'does not permit a False Claims Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in detail but then to allege simply that claims requesting illegal payments must have been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted to the Government.'" *Ibid.* (quoting *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877; cleaned up).

This timely application for extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME

The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari should be extended for 60 days for three reasons:

1. The forthcoming petition is likely to be granted.

First, there is a well-recognized circuit division over whether Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs in False Claims Act cases who plead a fraudulent scheme with particularity to also plead specific details of false claims, or whether the existence of false claims can be inferred from circumstances including the fraudulent scheme itself.

As many as seven circuits do not require specific details of a particular false submission. The "Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits ... have overtly adopted a 'more lenient' pleading standard." *See United States ex rel. Chorches v. Am. Med. Response, Inc.*, 865 F.3d 71, 89 (2d Cir. 2017) (describing cases on "lenient" side of the split). "Those courts have allowed a complaint that does not allege the details of an actually submitted false claim to pass Rule 9(b) muster by 'alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.'" *Ibid.* (quoting *United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti*, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)); *see Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC*, 754 F.3d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2014) (agreeing with *Grubbs*); *Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz*, 616 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); *United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.*, 614 F.3d 1163, 1172

(10th Cir. 2010) (same); *United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc.*, 791 F.3d 112, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same); *see also United States ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC*, 836 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Our case law establishes that a plaintiff does not need to present, or even include allegations about, a specific document or bill that the defendants submitted to the Government."); *United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp.*, 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009) ("We don't think it essential for a relator to produce the invoices (and accompanying representations) at the outset of the suit."). These courts reason that the text and purpose of Rule 9(b) are satisfied when relators provide sufficient factual detail to support a strong inference of fraudulent conduct, even if they lack access to specific billing records to allege the details of an actual fraud submission, as is often the practical reality in FCA cases. And the Second Circuit, commenting on the split directly, also "decline[d] to require that every *qui tam* complaint allege on personal knowledge the specific identified false invoices submitted to the government." *See Chorches*, 865 F.3d at 86.[1]

In contrast, at least five other circuits rigidly require relators to plead specific details of false submissions in addition to details of fraudulent schemes. In this case, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its entrenched rule that petitioners must "'provide examples of specific false claims submitted to the government pursuant to that scheme,'" and applied that rule to hold that relators "fail to plead with particularity

[1] Although the Second Circuit suggested its rule is "consistent with the approach taken by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits," the alignment is not perfect because the Second Circuit's rule conditions the more flexible standard on the relevant facts being within the opposing party's knowledge, which the other circuits do not. *See Chorches*, 865 F.3d at 89 (requiring that "those who can identify examples of actual claims must do so at the pleading stage").

a specific fraudulent claim for payment." *See* Add. 7-8 (quoting *Bledsoe*, 501 F.3d at 510; cleaned up); *see also ibid.* (quoting *Kettering*, 816 F.3d at 411; *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877-78). The First, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits agree with the Sixth Circuit's per se pleading requirement. *See, e.g.*, *United States ex rel. Nargol v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.*, 865 F.3d 29, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2017); *United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc.*, 912 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 2018); *United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford County Mem'l Hospital*, 915 F.3d 1158, 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 2019); *Carrel v. AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc.*, 898 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit itself acknowledges the often harsh consequences of its rigid approach, expressing in this case that it was "sensitive to relators' situation" as physicians who "may have limited visibility into defendants' billing practices and policies" and "may also lack access to information" about billing responsibilities, yet concluding that they could not sufficiently allege their FCA claims without it. *See* Add. 12.

Second, the Sixth Circuit's side of the split is wrong. Rule 9(b)'s text requires only that "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud," Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and the Sixth Circuit's rigid interpretation ignores the rule's core purpose of providing defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them. As the Government has acknowledged, a "per se rule that a relator must plead the details of particular false claims" is "unsupported by Rule 9(b) and undermines the FCA's effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against the United States." U.S. Cert. Amicus Br., *United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals N. Am., Inc.*, No. 12-1349, 2014 WL 709660, at *10 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2014).

More importantly, the Sixth Circuit's approach allows fraudsters to escape liability through compartmentalization. In most cases, relators will not have specific details of actual false claims—perhaps because the relator's role does not give them access to that information, or because the defendant has effectively concealed it. As the Second Circuit observed in *Chorches*, defendants' billing procedures often "ma[k]e it virtually impossible for most employees to have access to all of the information necessary to certify on personal knowledge both that a particular invoice was submitted for payment and that the facts stated to justify the invoice were false." *See* 865 F.3d at 82. A rule requiring plaintiffs to allege details about both the scheme and the bills thus allows fraudsters to stymie FCA enforcement by compartmentalizing relevant knowledge. *See id.* at 82, 86. The inevitable result is that more fraud on the Government will go unchecked.

Third, this is a good vehicle to finally resolve the long-recognized split. The panel acknowledged the "concerning" nature of petitioners' allegations, "particularly with respect to lapses in patient care arising from the described boarding practices." Add. 7. And the panel acknowledged that petitioners described "egregious lapses in patient care" through "six representative examples of patients who had admission orders but were boarded in the ER, while false claims for inpatient care were billed," including instances in which a patient was left "in her own urine and stool" and another was found "dead with his BiPAP breathing apparatus disconnected." Add. 8 (quotation marks omitted). Despite finding respondents' conduct "troubling" and acknowledging that petitioners had alleged "systematic fraudulent billing" for

services that were not and could not have been provided to patients like the six individuals whose inadequate care was described in the complaint, the panel was constrained by circuit precedent to grant dismissal because petitioners did not take the further step of providing the details of the actual bills that were submitted. *See* Add. 3, 7-9 (quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the court even acknowledged petitioners' "situation" as physicians with "limited visibility into defendants' billing practices." *See* Add. 12.

And while the Government suggested in the past that the circuit split was unripe for this Court's review, that was on the premise that the circuits were converging on the flexible approach that the panel rejected once again in this case. *See* U.S. Cert. Amicus Br., *Takeda Pharmaceuticals*, *supra*, 2014 WL 709660, at *10 (arguing that the "extent of the disagreement among the lower courts" was "uncertain" and might "be capable of resolution without this Court's intervention"); *see also* U.S. Cert. Amicus Br. 10, *Johnson v. Bethany Hospice*, No. 21-462, 2022 WL 1715610, at *15 (May 24, 2022) (suggesting that "the courts of appeals have largely converged on a more flexible standard" and predicting that the split would resolve itself). But the Government's prediction that the split would resolve itself didn't pan out; the panel in this case reaffirmed the Sixth Circuit's per se pleading requirement, entrenching the rigid approach the court has steadfastly maintained since at least 2006. *See* Add. 7-8 (quoting, *e.g.*, *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877-78). And, again, the Government agrees with petitioner's view of the merits. *See* U.S. Cert. Amicus Br., *Takeda Pharmaceuticals*, *supra*, 2014 WL 709660, at *10 (opposing "a per se rule that a

relator must plead the details of particular false claims" because such a rule "is unsupported by Rule 9(b) and undermines the FCA's effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against the United States").

2. The press of other matters before this and other courts makes the existing deadline on July 21, 2025, exceedingly difficult to meet. Petitioners only recently retained undersigned counsel to prepare the petition. Further time is needed for counsel to study the issues and prepare a concise petition for this Court's review. And besides this case, in the last month undersigned counsel has had to prepare and file a Cert. Reply Brief in this Court in *Martinez v. City of Rosenberg*, No. 24-892 (June 2, 2025); a Petition for Review in the California Supreme court in *Bullock v. Rivian Automotive, Inc.*, No. S290922 (June 2, 2025); an amicus brief in this Court in *Pitchford v. Cain*, No. 24-7351 (July 3, 2025); and a Reply in Support of the Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court in *Bullock v. Rivian Automotive, Inc.*, No. S290922 (July 3, 2025). Counsel must now finish preparing and filing a merits response brief in the Ninth Circuit in *Epic v. Apple*, No. 25-2935 (due August 8, 2025); and opening brief in the Fourth Circuit in *United States v. Windom*, No. 25-4217 (due August 18, 2025); a Petition for a Write of Certiorari in *United States ex rel. Mark J. O'Connor v. USCC Wireless Investment, Inc.*, No. 25-___ (due September 5, 2025); and other various filings in the state and federal courts from now through September. In addition, Counsel must assist with preparing oral argument in several patent cases before the Federal Circuit, the first of which is to be argued August 14, 2025, in *Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Motorola Mobility LLC*, No. 2024-1468.

3. Whether or not the extension is granted, the petition will be considered—and, if the petition is granted, the case will be considered on the merits—next Term. Thus, the extension will not substantially delay the resolution of this case or prejudice any party.

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari should be extended for 60 days to and including September 19, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,



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July 11, 2025

ADDENDUM

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 25a0215n.06

Case No. 24-1785

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and STATE OF MICHIGAN *ex. rel.* ERIK OLSEN, M.D., WILLIAM BERK, M.D., and SAJITH MATTHEWS, M.D., Relators - Appellants v. TENET HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants - Appellees.	)	ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN O P I N I O N

Before: COLE, McKEAGUE, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Circuit Judge. Three current and former physicians at Detroit-area hospitals allege that their hospitals' parent company, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, and subsidiary hospital system, Detroit Medical Center, fraudulently billed the government for inpatient care that patients did not and could not receive. They bring claims under the qui tam provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C § 3729 (FCA), and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act, M.C.L. § 400.610a(1) (MMFCA), on behalf of themselves, the United States, and the State of Michigan. The United States and the State of Michigan both declined to intervene. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

Because this case comes to us on appeal of a motion to dismiss, we "recite the facts as they are alleged in the complaint." *Savel v. MetroHealth Sys.*, 96 F.4th 932, 937 (6th Cir. 2024). Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet) is a for-profit, publicly traded healthcare services company that, through subsidiaries, joint ventures, and partnerships, operates around 700 healthcare facilities across the United States. One of Tenet's subsidiaries, Detroit Medical Center (DMC), is comprised of a non-acute care hospital, two ambulatory surgery centers, and five acute care hospitals, which include Detroit Receiving Hospital and Sinai-Grace Hospital.[1] Tenet acquired DMC—a formerly nonprofit institution considered the "'hospital of last resort' for the underserved inner-city population"—in 2013. (Am. Compl., R. 19, PageID 96, 104, 109.)

As alleged, defendants "fraudulently bill for inpatient care when patients are held in emergency room facilities ('ERs'), a practice known as 'boarding.'" (*Id.* at PageID 94.) These patients, with an inpatient admission order, are "boarded" in the ER until either a bed in an inpatient unit becomes available, or the patient is discharged. Generally, inpatient care is administered at a higher level than the care required in ERs and is reimbursed at higher rates, so boarded patients "ought to be billed as outpatient." (*Id.* at PageID 94, 112, 113.)

The staffing shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic intensified boarding at DMC, particularly at Detroit Receiving Hospital and Sinai-Grace Hospital, with patients being boarded in the ER "for far longer than medically reasonable." (*Id.* at PageID 110–11.) These boarding practices have continued, even as the pandemic's emergency conditions have receded. And while

[1] Detroit Medical Center is an assumed name for the health system entity VHS of Michigan, Inc. Since improperly naming a party can be cured by amendment, we analyze relators' claims as though they had named the proper property. *See Krupski v. Costa Crociere*, 560 U.S. 538, 548–89 (2010).

"some boarding in ERs is normal and even perfectly acceptable," the amended complaint describes defendants' boarding and billing practices as problematic in two respects. (*Id.* at PageID 95, 111.)

First, in pursuit of higher profits, defendants have let hospitals become understaffed. They have systemically reduced staffing or failed to ameliorate staffing shortages, resulting in inadequate resources to provide inpatient care, yet still "aggressive[ly] bill[] for services . . . that do not actually occur." (*Id.* at PageID 96–97.) In other words, defendants bill for care that staff is not present to provide.

Second, defendants prioritize profit at the expense of patient care. They "refuse to spend resources to provide care for the crowded ERs created by the boarded patients[,]" resulting in a situation where patients do not receive the billed-for inpatient care or even the "observation level of care required in an ER setting." (*Id.* at PageID 94, 113.) So, while the government is being billed as if a boarded patient has been transferred to an inpatient department and is receiving the attendant care, the patient is actually "sitting in a hallway on a gurney, receiving no care at all." (*Id.* at PageID 118.)

The result is "systematic fraudulent billing, such that the federal and state governments are routinely being billed for services that do not actually occur." (*Id.* at PageID 97.) And the ensuing substandard care has severe consequences for ER-boarded patients. (*Id.* at PageID 113, 121.) The amended complaint offers six representative examples of substandard care. In every example, patients who had admission orders were boarded in the ER and left without appropriate care for several days.

In addition to the representative examples, the amended complaint identifies data from several hospital sources that track ER capacity, the number of patients being boarded, the length of their ER stay, and whether they were ultimately transferred to an inpatient unit. One internal

tracking system enables physicians to identify which boarded patients are listed as Medicaid or Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. The data from these sources shows that a serious boarding problem at DMC hospitals exists.

Erik Olsen, M.D., is an emergency room physician who has worked and trained at DMC hospitals since about 2004 and, until recently, practiced at Detroit Receiving Hospital. Frustrated by the declining quality of patient care at DMC since Tenet's acquisition and accelerated by the pandemic and his "realiz[ation] that Tenet was billing for services that he knew from his personal experience. . .were not being delivered," Olsen filed a qui tam complaint under seal against Tenet on July 13, 2022. (Compl., R. 1, PageID 17–18.) When the United States and the State of Michigan declined to intervene, the district court unsealed the complaint.

On January 18, 2024, Olsen amended his complaint to add two additional relators. He added Sajith Matthews, M.D., and William Berk, M.D., both physicians who, like Olsen, still practice or once practiced at DMC hospitals, including Detroit Receiving Hospital, both before and after Tenet's acquisition. (Am. Compl., R. 19, PageID 106–07.) The amended complaint also added DMC as a defendant. After filing the amended complaint, relators moved to consolidate the case with another pending case involving identical parties and underlying facts.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), and 12(b)(6). They also argued that Berk and Matthews were added to the amended complaint in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)'s first-to-file bar, which permits only the government to "intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action." (Mot. to Dismiss, R. 28, PageID 166 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).)

The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and accordingly decided that relators' motion to consolidate was moot. Addressing defendants' first-to-file argument, the court

concluded that "the addition of relators by amendment does not implicate the first-to-file rule" and so Berk and Matthews's addition was permissible. (Op. and Order, R. 38, PageID 500.)

The district court also determined, however, that the amended complaint failed to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 9(b). Specifically, relators failed to "sufficiently allege that [d]efendants directly participated in the submission of any of the purported false claims" or "directed their subsidiary hospitals to bill government programs while knowing that, at the time the billing period began, the hospitals failed to render the care required for payment of medical claims by the government." (*Id.* at PageID 505–06.) And

> without allegations suggesting that [d]efendants made staffing decisions on behalf of the hospitals, and that they knowingly directed the hospitals to have physicians sign admission orders for patients and bill them as inpatients while they were boarded in the ER and not receiving care, liability for fraud cannot be imparted to [d]efendants as parent corporations.

(*Id.* at PageID 508.)

Relators timely appealed. Neither party challenges the district court's disposition of defendants' 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) first-to-file argument, so we do not reach the issue here.

II.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, including dismissal for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b). *United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys.*, 501 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) ("*Bledsoe II*") (citation omitted). In doing so, we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view the facts in the relators' favor. *United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 532 F.3d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). But to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must present facts that sufficiently state a facially plausible claim to relief. *Id.* (citation omitted). Unsupported, conclusory statements are insufficient, *Bell*

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007), and are not entitled to the assumption of truth, *see Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

III.

The FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, "prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government." *United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.*, 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003) ("*Bledsoe I*"). Its qui tam provision empowers private individuals, known as relators, to bring actions alleging an FCA violation on the government's behalf. *Id.* (citing 31 U.S.C § 3730). The statute

> imposes liability when (1) a person presents, or causes to be presented, a claim for payment or approval; (2) the claim is false or fraudulent; and (3) the person's acts are undertaken 'knowingly,' i.e., with actual knowledge of the information, or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the claim.

Id. (citing 31 U.S.C § 3729(a)(1), (b)).

Qui tam actions brought under the FCA are subject to Rule 9(b), which requires that a party "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); *Bledsoe II*, 501 F.3d at 503. We interpret Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement in conjunction with Rule 8(a)'s requirement for a short and plain statement. *Bledsoe II*, 501 F.3d at 503. In doing so, we do not "require omniscience," but we require that "the circumstances of the fraud be pled with enough specificity to put defendants on notice as to the nature of the claim." *Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.*, 848 F.2d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, relators "must allege the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation [;] the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud." *United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network*, 816 F.3d 399, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

While relators' allegations are concerning, particularly with respect to lapses in patient care arising from the described boarding practices, relators fail to meet their pleading requirements: they fail to plead with particularity a specific fraudulent claim for payment. That pleading deficiency alone requires dismissal.[2]

A.

The amended complaint alleges that Tenet and DMC "routinely bill Medicare, Medicaid and other government healthcare programs for inpatient care that was not delivered or capable of being delivered at the DMC's acute care hospitals' emergency departments." (Am. Compl., R. 19, PageID 112.) In doing so, relators describe a scheme where defendants "extract from the government 'money the government otherwise would not have paid.'" *Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C.*, 655 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Mikes v. Straus*, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001)). And since the FCA applies to claims submitted by healthcare providers to government programs like Medicaid and Medicare, the alleged scheme would support a claim of fraud for purposes of an FCA action. *Id.* (noting that "one of [the FCA's] primary uses has been to combat fraud in the health-care field").

The FCA, however, "attaches liability [] not to the underlying fraudulent activity. . . but to the claim for payment." *Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co.*, 447 F.3d 873, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Our caselaw thus imposes a "clear and unequivocal requirement that a relator allege specific false claims when pleading a violation of the FCA." *Kettering*, 816 F.3d at 411 (cleaned up). Of course, when relators allege a "complex and far-reaching fraudulent

[2] Relators raise several additional arguments, including that the district erred in holding that the amended complaint did not sufficiently plead that defendants directly participated in their subsidiaries' fraudulent conduct and, alternatively, that the district court erred in determining that relators failed to pierce the corporate veil. Since failure to plead with particularity alone requires dismissal under Rule 9(b), we do not reach those arguments here.

scheme," they are not required "to plead every specific instance of fraud." *Bledsoe II*, 501 F.3d at 509–10. But they are required to "provide[] examples of specific false claims submitted to the government pursuant to that scheme[.]" *Id.* at 510. A single representative example will do. *United States ex rel. Ibanez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*, 874 F.3d 905, 915 (6th Cir. 2017).

Relators contend that they have offered "six representative examples of patients who had admission orders but were boarded in the ER, while false claims for inpatient care were billed." (Appellant Br. 21; Reply Br. 6.) The first patient, who waited seven days for an inpatient bed without receiving intensive care, later died after finally being transferred to an inpatient unit. The second patient was boarded for about three days, during which time he did not receive appropriate care. The third patient waited almost eight days before being transferred but lost the eye that she was admitted to receive treatment on. One of the relators found the fourth patient "in her own urine and stool" after being boarded for more than six days without proper care, further worsening her health. (Am. Compl., R. 19, PageID 123.) The fifth patient, admitted in 2022 with respiratory failure caused by COVID-19, was found dead with his BiPAP breathing apparatus disconnected after being boarded for approximately thirty-six hours. The final patient was left in a hallway unattended for a day, without care or monitoring, and was later found by the physician "lying in her own feces and urine." (*Id.* at PageID 124–25.)

Each of these examples describe egregious lapses in patient care, but they fall short of the specificity pertaining to a fraudulent claim for payment required to satisfy Rule 9(b). For example, in *United States ex rel. USN4U, LLC v. Wolf Creek Federal Services*, 34 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2022), we determined that a complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) where it alleged specific examples of false quotes and invoices submitted by the defendant to the government. *Id.* at 512, 514. Those examples detailed specific work order proposals that the defendant submitted to the government

and alleged that those work orders overestimated costs and labor hours, as calculated using industry standards. *Id.* at 514 ("The proposal that [the defendant] submitted to [the government] stated that the project would take 80 carpenter hours, 20 HVAC mechanic hours, and 16 plumber hours. [The relator], however, alleges that the project required only 7 carpenter hours, 6 HVAC mechanic hours, and zero plumber hours.").

Here, relators provide "no specific information about the filing of the claims themselves" with respect to each example. *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877. And the "complaint neither identifies which of the named defendants actually submitted falsified [invoices or bills] to the government, nor which [documents or reimbursement claims] contained misrepresentations upon which the government relied." *Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005). Nor does the amended complaint allege that defendants instructed or required the medical professionals in any of these cases to board these six patients for any period of time and to bill for care that was not administered.

Moreover, although these examples suggest troubling mismanagement, the prolonged boarding practices they describe do not create an automatic inference of fraud on the part of the defendants. *Cf. United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.*, 160 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1998). Boarding is not an automatically fraudulent practice: the amended complaint itself concedes that "some boarding in ERs is normal and even perfectly acceptable," so long as staff can provide the requisite care. (Am. Compl, R. 19, PageID 95.) And, as the district court observed, Tenet and DMC's "protocol" to bill boarded patients as "inpatient" upon a physician's issuance of an admission order—rather than the moment when a patient is given a bed in an inpatient unit—is consistent with federal regulations. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 412.3(a) ("For purposes of payment under Medicare Part A, an individual is considered an inpatient of a hospital, including a critical access

hospital, if formally admitted as an inpatient pursuant to an order for inpatient admission by a physician or other qualified practitioner[.]") Relators fail to identify the point at which a "normal" or "perfectly acceptable" decision to board a patient is converted into a fraudulent action. (*See* Am. Compl, R. 19, PageID 95.)

Instead, relators argue that defendants' boarding practices are inherently fraudulent because their resources and staffing "cause patients to be billed as inpatient while still boarded in the ER" and because defendants bill for inpatient care despite "already know[ing] that the hospital will not—indeed, cannot—provide inpatient care to [patients]." (Appellant Br. 27.) But general policies and practices, as troubling as they may be, cannot satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements without further detail. *See, e.g.*, *United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab'y Corp. of Am.*, 290 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (determining that a relator's allegations fell short of Rule 9(b) where the relator alleged general practices that resulted in the submission of false payment claims to the government, but did not identify charges, actual dates, policies about billing, second-hand information about billing practices and did not provide a copy of a single bill or payment).

The general allegations supported by data from the hospitals' internal tracking systems also lack the necessary specificity. For example, relators point to one system that reported that patients at Detroit Receiving Hospital in December 2022 "spent a total of 24,246 hours boarded in the ER," which "equates to billing more than one thousand inpatient treatment days." (Am. Compl., R. 19, PageID 129.) But relators do not identify any specific false claim for payment submitted to the government during that time; they instead rely on an inference that false claims must have been submitted. Rule 9(b), however, "does not permit a False Claims Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in detail but then to allege simply [] that claims requesting illegal payments must have been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted to the Government."

Sanderson, 447 F.3d at 877 (quoting *Clausen*, 290 F.3d at 1311). We have thus repeatedly held that such allegations are insufficient. *See, e.g.*, *Kettering*, 816 F.3d at 412; *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877; *Snapp*, 532 F.3d at 506.

Relators further argue that, even without identifying the submission of a specific claim, they can still satisfy the requirement by pleading "facts which support a strong inference that a claim was submitted." (Appellant Br. 24 (quoting *United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc.*, 838 F.3d 750, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2016).) Indeed, we have previously determined that a relator's specific personal knowledge of a defendant's billing practices may support a strong inference that defendants submitted false claims, thereby satisfying Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement even without the identification of a specific representative claim. *Prather*, 838 F.3d at 768–69. But this exception is a narrow one and limited to circumstances where a relator has detailed personal knowledge of the relevant payment scheme. *See United States ex rel. Hirt v. Walgreen Co.*, 846 F.3d 879, 881–82 (6th Cir. 2017).

In *Prather*, for example, we determined that a relator's "detailed knowledge of the billing and treatment documentation related to the submission of requests for final payment" to Medicare was sufficient to overcome her failure to identify a particular request to the government for payment. *Prather*, 838 F.3d at 770. But in that case, the relator's job responsibilities included reviewing documentation for Medicare claims. *Id.* And, as part of her complaint, the relator "identified approximately the dates of the applicable episode of care and the dates on which [relevant certifications and documentation] were signed, alleged that requests for anticipated payment and for final payment were submitted (sometimes giving dates of submission for one or both), and identified the amount that was requested for the final payment." *Id.* at 769–70.

Relators here fall short of alleging this level of personal knowledge of and access to Tenet and DMC's billing practices and policies. Indeed, relators themselves concede that they "do not know at this stage of the litigation precisely which entity keys in the bills[.]" (Appellant Br. 18).[3] Relying on *Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education*, 428 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2005), they instead argue that "it is not necessary that they know every detail of the scheme at this stage." (Appellant Br. 18.) But *Evans-Marshall* did not involve fraud claims subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements. 428 F.3d at 226. And "at a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires that the plaintiff specify the 'who, what, when, where, and how' of the alleged fraud." *Sanderson*, 447 F.3d at 877 (citation and brackets omitted). The "who" is therefore a minimum requirement. *Id.*

We are sensitive to relators' situation. As physicians, they may have limited visibility into defendants' billing practices and policies. They may also lack access to information about which entity—the non-party hospitals, the hospital system, or the hospital system's parent company—is ultimately responsible for submitting claims to the government and about the content of those claims. Relators have instead alleged what they know as physicians: that some of their patients are not being administered the care they were admitted to the hospital to receive. But "neither the Federal Rules nor the [FCA] offer any special leniency under these particular circumstances to justify [relators] failing to allege with the required specificity the circumstances of the fraudulent conduct [they] assert[] in [their] action." *See Clausen*, 290 F.3d at 1314.

In failing to identify a false claim, relators therefore cannot satisfy Rule 9(b)'s minimum pleading requirements. As such, we need not determine whether they sufficiently allege falsity,

[3] Relators argue that, if VHS of Michigan, Inc. should be named rather than DMC, they should be permitted to amend their complaint. But they did not move to amend below. In any case, even if VHS of Michigan, Inc. was named, the pleading deficiencies described here would remain unchanged, so dismissal is appropriate. *See United States ex rel. VIB Partners v. LHC Group, Inc.*, No. 24-5393, 2025 WL 1103997, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (denying request for leave to amend in an FCA case because, in part, "[w]ithout specifying how the proposed amendments would address the deficiencies, Relators have failed to provide a meaningful basis for the court to evaluate their request").

scienter, materiality, and causation to conclude that the district court correctly dismissed their FCA claims.

IV.

Since claims brought under the FCA and MMFCA are "identical in every relevant respect here and are frequently analyzed in tandem," *United States v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP*, 858 F. App'x 876, 880–81 (6th Cir. 2021), relators' MMFCA claims are subject to the same analysis as above. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing them.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1785

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and STATE OF MICHIGAN *ex. rel*. ERIK OLSEN, M.D., WILLIAM BERK, M.D., SAJITH MATTHEWS, M.D.,

Relators - Appellants,

v.

TENET HEALTHCARE CORPORATION; DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Before: COLE, McKEAGUE, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was submitted on the briefs without oral argument.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk