IN THE
# Supreme Court of the United States

No. 24A1079

KRISTI NOEM, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY , *et al.*,
Applicants,

v.

SVITLANA DOE, *et al.*,
Respondents.

**On Application to Stay the Order Issued by the District Court**

## BRIEF *AMICUS CURIAE* OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, CITIZENS UNITED, AND CONSERVATIVE LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR STAY


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*Amici curiae* America's Future, Citizens United, and Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund are nonstock, not-for-profit organizations, exempt from federal income taxation under sections 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. Each is dedicated, *inter alia*, to the correct construction, interpretation, and application of law. *Amici* participate actively in the public policy process and have filed numerous *amicus curiae* briefs in federal and state courts. These *amici* filed an *amicus* brief in a case challenging the termination of the TPS designation for Venezuela on May 7, 2025 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and an *amicus* brief in this Court in support of the government's application for stay (No. 24A1059) on May 8, 2025.

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During the Biden Administration, the Government chose to allow millions of illegal aliens to enter the United States under a variety of bogus readings of immigration laws. One of these fabrications involved an abuse of the congressional authorization which allows the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the Secretary's discretion, on a case-by-case basis, to grant what is termed "parole." The statute provides:

> The Secretary of Homeland Security may except as provided in subparagraph (B) or in section 214(f), **in his discretion parole** into the United States **temporarily** under such conditions as he may prescribe **only on a case-by-case basis** for **urgent humanitarian**

[1] It is hereby certified that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part; and that no person other than these *amici curiae*, their members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

> **reasons** or **significant public benefit** any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall **not** be regarded as **an admission** of the alien and **when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served** the alien shall **forthwith return or be returned** to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States. [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added).]

Rather than comply with the requirements of this statute and parole individual aliens on a "case-by-case" basis, the Biden Administration unlawfully adopted a wholesale policy allowing aliens from four countries — Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela ("CHNV") — to have parole status.

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14165, "Securing Our Borders" (the "EO"). Section 7 of that Order directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to, consistent with applicable law, take all appropriate action to "[t]erminate all categorical parole programs that are contrary to the policies of the United States established in [the President's] Executive Orders, including the program known as the 'Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans' ["CHNV"]." In response, on March 25, 2025, Kristi Noem, as Secretary of Homeland Security, issued a Notice entitled "Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans," 90 *Fed. Reg.* 13611, announcing the termination of the unlawful Biden CHNV parole designations.

Suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts against President Trump, Secretary Noem, and other federal officials by 23 individual plaintiffs and

the Haitian Bridge Alliance, asking the judiciary to reverse the Secretary's CHNV decision.

The district court granted plaintiffs injunctive relief in the form of a stay of the Notice pending further litigation, and then denied the government's request for a stay of the court's order pending appeal. *See Doe v. Noem*, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70398 at *54 (D. Mass. 2025) ("*Doe*"). The district court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the immediate termination of the parole program was arbitrary and capricious. *Id.* at *47-48. The district court also concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the statute required case-by-case consideration of parole terminations which the statute did not require. *Id.* at *49-50. The court ruled that being required to return to their home nations would cause "irreparable harm" to the plaintiffs. *Id.* at *50-51. Finally, it ruled that the balance of equities and the public interest favored the plaintiffs. *Id.* at *53. The government then requested the First Circuit to stay the district court's order, which also was denied. *See* *Doe v. Noem*, Case No. 25-1384, at 2 (1st Cir. May 5, 2025).

The Trump Administration now asks this Court to stay the district court's order preventing the Trump Administration from revoking the Biden Administration's unlawful CHNV parole policy which purported to grant parole status to 532,000 illegal aliens.

## STATEMENT

The courts below are not alone in its effort to freeze in place the policies of the Biden Administration. Rather, the district court injunction is one of approximately 84 controversial injunctions issued by district court judges seemingly designed to prevent the Trump Administration from making the policy changes President Trump was elected by the People to implement. This dangerous series of injunctions requires close review. *See* Appendix.

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Conbress empowered the Secretary of Homeland Security with the ability to grant temporary parole to certain noncitizens on a case-by-case basis, and thereafter to withdraw that status, while protecting such parole decisions from judicial review. The district court improperly circumvented that jurisdictional barrier, preventing Secretary Noem from revoking the categorical parole granted by the Biden Administration, and determining that the jurisdictional barrier did not apply.

Hanging over this case is the fact that the Biden Administration violated the INA by granting categorical parole when the statute specifically requires it to be granted only on a case-by-case basis. Now, the district court requires the Trump Administration to withdraw status only on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the district court's is mandating that the executive continue the unlawful policies set up by the Biden Administration.

Even if one gets past the jurisdictional barrier, the district court was wrong in concluding that Secretary Noem's revocation was arbitrary and capricious. There should be no reliance interests by noncitizens in a parole policy that is admittedly temporary and is also contrary to the INA.

## ARGUMENT

### I. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER TO REVIEW THE SECRETARY'S PAROLE DETERMINATIONS.

Even if the district court believed the Trump Administration erred in revoking parole status, the Government is likely to succeed on the merits because the district court had no authority whatsoever to grant Respondents relief or even to review their challenge. In crafting the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress erected a virtually complete bar to any judicial review of any aspect of such decisions by the DHS Secretary's decisions:

> Notwithstanding **any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory)**, including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, **no court shall have jurisdiction to review** ... **any other decision or action** of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 208(a). [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).]

Accordingly, the district court's opinion below constituted nothing less than a judicial usurpation of the unreviewable authority Congress granted the Executive Branch in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

It appears that many lower court judges bristle at the thought of their jurisdiction being limited in any way. However, Congress could not have been more plain. None of the few exceptions to the "no jurisdiction" provision in the statute apply; there is simply no lawful judicial review function for the district court to have performed. Congress decreed that there is no judicial review for "any other decision or action" that is left "in the discretion of ... the Secretary of Homeland Security." Thus, as properly applied here, the statute provides that the district court had "no" jurisdiction to hear and rule on "any" challenge brought by Respondents to the Secretary's decision. Respondents' challenge should have been dismissed out-of-hand by the district court. As both the district and circuit courts have acted contrary to the statute, this Court now has the duty to restore order and void the district court's injunction without further delay.

Here, the district court sought to rationalize its way around the clear "no jurisdiction" language of the statute with linguistic gymnastics. First, the district court engaged in the circular reasoning that because the court believed that Secretary Noem's actions violated the INA, the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA does not apply:

> Because the **categorical termination** of the period of parole previously awarded to the parolees violates the parole statute, the same statute **cannot be read** to give the Secretary the discretion to

> take such unlawful action. Therefore, **Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is no bar to review**. [*Doe* at *29 (emphasis added).]

The district court assertion that the statute "cannot be read" contrary to how the court views the law is no basis for a gross judicial usurpation of power. In the view of the district court, when a challenge is brought to an act which is **not** subject to judicial review, it is the role of the courts **first** to conduct judicial review of the act to determine **whether** the court will honor the statute. Only if the district court agrees with the government on the merits will the jurisdictional bar be obeyed. At its core, the premise of the district court's theory is that federal judges are above the law.

The district court's "logic" inspires the question: if Congress wanted to bar all judicial review of a particular action, what language should it have used that the district court would honor? Remarkably, in deciding whether Congress **really** had stripped the court of review authority, the district court relied on its own evaluation that Respondents had a likelihood of success on the merits that the Government's actions were unlawful. This constitutes a shocking abuse of judicial power. The courts below have lawlessly elevated themselves over both the executive branch that exercised the discretionary authority it was given by Congress, and over the legislative branch, which sought to prevent judicial meddling in the executive's decisions on these issues.

The district court further claimed that none of the cases on which the Government relied in support of its position that the court lacked jurisdiction,

"involved Section 1182(d)(5)(A)," governing parole decisions. *Doe* at *31-32. If precedents were irrelevant unless identical to the issues being decided, then the normal process of legal reasoning by analogy goes out the window. There are at least two circuits which specifically have upheld the application of the § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) judicial bar to § 1182(d)(5)(A) orders, including to revocations. *See Samirah v. O'Connell*, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003); *Hassan v. Chertoff*, 593 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2010). By contrast, the district court could not identify any cases where any court has asserted jurisdiction to judicially review a parole decision.

The district court also failed to reasonably distinguish *Patel v. Garland*, 596 U.S. 328 (2022), addressing § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) — that precedes paragraph (ii), at issue in this case — which provision includes the broadening word "regarding." The district court held that since (a)(2)(B)(ii) does not include that broadening word, that provision somehow provides the court with more jurisdiction.[2] However, paragraph (ii) is broader than (i), even without the word "regarding." Paragraph (ii) is a residual clause that includes "any other action or decision" that is left to the discretion of the Secretary. Thus, the district court's effort to distinguish *Patel* fails.

The district court also argued that since, as a general proposition, the APA favors reviewability of agency actions, a court's default position should be that of reviewability. The court cited to *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967),

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[2] The district court reached this conclusion even though this Court had held in *Kucana v. Holder*, 558 U.S. 233, 248 (2010), that paragraphs (i) and (ii) "are of a like kind."

an APA case dealing with reviewability under the APA. *See Doe* at *33-34. But in *Abbott Labs*, this Court made clear that although the APA "embodies the basic presumption of judicial review," that rule applies only "**so long as no statute precludes such relief** or the **action is not one committed by law to agency discretion**." *Abbott Labs* at 140 (emphasis added). Here, both conditions are met. *Abbott Labs* does not support the district court's position, but rather undermines it.

The district court argued that "courts have declined to apply [Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)] to claims challenging **the legality of policies and processes** governing discretionary decisions under the INA." *Doe* at *30 (quotation marks omitted). But the statute's language is abundantly clear, barring review of "any other decision or action of ... the Secretary of Homeland Security" within the Secretary's statutory discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). This would necessarily include those "policies and processes" necessarily connected to reach such decisions. There is no textual support in the judicial bar statute to suggest the district court's creative reading. The district court simply makes up the principles necessary to justify its usurpation of power:

> as to the jurisdiction stripping statute, the distinction between an **individual** revocation of parole and the **categorical truncation** of grants of parole is warranted where the presumption of reviewability has been "consistently applied" to immigration statutes and can only be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude judicial review. [*Doe* at *31 (emphasis added).]

It was the Biden Administration that treated "case-by-case" parole determinations in a categorical fashion, but that troubled the district court not at all, as it seeks to

impose an atextual "case-by-case" requirement on the Administration's effort to undo the unlawful act of the Biden Administration. The lengths to which the district court goes to preserve the unlawful "open borders" immigration policies of the Biden Administration is shocking, as it ruled that what Biden did categorically and in an unlawful manner, the Trump Administration had no power to reverse in the same categorical manner.

The district court's decision also unduly restricts the Secretary of Homeland Security's authority and responsibility to adapt immigration policy to changing circumstances, in direct contravention of Congress's statutory scheme. This Court has recognized that immigration decisions, particularly those involving parole, are areas of significant executive discretion. *See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2020). Requiring case-by-case terminations and invalidating DHS's policy-based rationales imposes a judicially created standard which overrides the standard established by Congress. The district court impermissibly hampers the agency's ability to manage large-scale parole programs efficiently. This is particularly problematic given the Government's estimate of 532,000 CHNV parolees, a scale that makes individualized termination virtually impractical.

Furthermore, the district court's reliance on *Regents* to find the CHNV termination reviewable is misplaced. *Regents* was considering termination of DACA, which conferred affirmative benefits including work authorization and Social Security. By contrast, CHNV parole was explicitly temporary, with no

promise of permanent status. Parolees were informed that their status could be terminated at the Secretary's discretion, giving them no reasonable reliance interests even compared to DACA recipients.

The district court's attempt to bootstrap jurisdiction from its disagreement with the lawfulness of the Secretary's action falls flat. It is now the duty of this Court to restore order by giving effect to the "no jurisdiction" provision regardless of how any judge or justice may view the merits of the Secretary's order.

## II. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ILLEGALITY OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S CHNV PAROLE POLICY.

The district court acknowledged the Government's argument that "the decision to truncate all existing grants of parole was contrary to the statutory requirement that parole be exercised 'only on a case-by-case basis.'" *Doe* at *48. However, rather than addressing that argument, it jumped to whether the Government's categorical revocation must be done on a case-by-case basis.

First, the district court asserted that the Biden CHNV categorical policies were really, basically, sort of the same as if they had been done a case-by-case basis:

> Even under the [Biden] **categorical** programs, grants of parole were to be made on a **case-by-case** basis. While the reasons under grants pursuant to the CHNV programs were **likely fairly consistent**, an individual parolee's application was subject to case-by-case review. [*Doe* at *49 (emphasis added).]

And, without citing any evidence, the district court created the fiction that categorical grants of parole under CHNV "**may well have been justified**" for reasons other than the CHNV policies. *Id.* Thus, when the Biden Administration

used a categorical approach to allow massive inflows of aliens, the "case-by-case" requirement actually was met — sort of. However, the district court's deference to the decisions of the executive ended when President Biden left office. When the district court was evaluating Secretary Noem's revocation of the unlawful CHNV policy, the court asserted, without express statutory support, that that decision could be done only on a case-by-case basis, invoking the "seems to" principle of law: "The statute thus **seems to** contemplate termination of parole on **an individual, rather than categorical**, basis." *Id*. (emphasis added).

Aliens were required to apply for parole under the CHNV policy, but under that policy, they were pre-approved. In this sense, parole was more akin to the Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") that the INA authorizes the DHS to implement with respect to certain countries. However, TPS has certain factors that the Secretary must find to be met to make the country-specific finding, while parole is entirely discretionary. That is why Congress required it to be on a case-by-case basis, not a broad policy. As the Federal Register Notice ("FRN") explained, "discretionary parole determinations were intended by Congress to be narrowly tailored to specific instances and not based on a set of broadly applicable eligibility criteria." 90 *Fed. Reg*. 13612. As the government points out, "the district court's reasoning ... contradicts the plain text of the statute and creates a perverse one-way ratchet." Application at 5.

The Second Circuit has explained that "[t]he legislative history indicates that [the implementation of the case-by-case requirement] was animated by concern that

parole under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) was being used by the executive to circumvent congressionally established immigration policy." *Cruz-Miguel v. Holder*, 650 F.3d 189, 199 n.15 (2d Cir. 2011). Despite the clear purpose of the "case-by-case" requirement, the district court had no problem with the Biden Administration violating it, while at the same time without any statutory requirement, imposing it on the Trump Administration.

## III. THE DECISION TO TERMINATE THE UNLAWFUL CHNV POLICY WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

Should this Court choose to review the merits of Secretary Noem's termination of the Biden CHNV policy despite the INA's bar to judicial review, the result is still the same. The district court erroneously concluded that Secretary Noem's decision to categorically truncate existing parole grants was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

### A. The Court Improperly Rejected the Secretary's Broad Discretion Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

The district court's finding that the Secretary's categorical termination of CHNV parole grants was arbitrary and capricious rests on a misreading of the parole statute used by the Biden Administration in creating the CHNV policy and by Secretary Noem in terminating that policy, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). *See Doe* at *48-50. The statute grants the Secretary discretion to parole aliens "only on a case-by-case basis" and only "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit" and then to terminate parole when, "in the opinion of the Secretary," its

purposes have been served. *Id*. The district court imposed that "case-by-case" requirement on Secretary Noem to find DHS's categorical revocation unlawful.

First, the statute explicitly ties the "case-by-case" requirement to the granting of parole, not its termination. The termination clause states that parole ends "when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served," without mandating individualized review. The use of "such parole" refers to the specific grant made to an individual, but nothing in the text precludes the Secretary from determining that the purposes of an entire program — such as CHNV — have been served, thereby justifying categorical termination. The court's imposition of a case-by-case requirement for terminations engrafts a condition not found in the statute or supported by any court decision, undermining the Secretary's discretion to make policy-level decisions about parole programs.

Additionally, the court's view that the statute's singular language ("such alien," "such parole") implies an individualized termination requirement ignores the practical reality of terminating what essentially was an unlawful categorical determination. Secretary Noem's determination that the program no longer serves those purposes is a permissible exercise of discretion, consistent with the statute's grant of authority to assess the "purposes" of parole.

### B. The District Court Overlooked Secretary Noem's Justifications for Termination.

The court incorrectly deemed DHS's decision arbitrary and capricious, partly because it believed that one of Secretary Noem's rationales for rejecting the alternative of allowing parole to expire naturally was based on a "legal error" regarding expedited removal. *See Doe* at *45. The FRN stated that early termination was necessary to avoid parolees accruing over two years of continuous presence, which could necessitate lengthier removal proceedings. *See* 90 *Fed. Reg.* 13620. The district court held that CHNV parolees are not subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), regardless of their time in the United States, because they were paroled into the country. *Doe* at *44. This conclusion is flawed and does not render Secretary Noem's decision arbitrary.

First, the district court's interpretation of § 1225(b)(1) is incorrect. The statute allows expedited removal for aliens "arriving in the United States" or those "who have not been admitted or paroled" and lack two years of continuous presence. Although CHNV parolees were initially paroled, their status as parolees ends upon termination of their parole, potentially rendering them subject to expedited removal as noncitizens who "have not been ... paroled" at the time of removal proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in *Turner v. U.S. Attorney General*, 130 F.4th 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2025), supports this view, noting that the present perfect verb tense can denote a state continuing into the present. Secretary Noem's concern about avoiding prolonged removal proceedings was thus based on a proper interpretation of the statute, not a "legal error."

Second, the FRN provided multiple independent justifications for termination, which the court failed to adequately address. The FRN concluded that CHNV programs no longer served a significant public benefit, failed to achieve the claimed goals of mitigating the domestic effects of illegal immigration, and were inconsistent with the Trump Administration's foreign policy goals. These policy-based rationales reflect a permissible shift in priorities under a new administration, as agencies are entitled to change course when they provide a "reasoned explanation." *See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). The district court's narrow focus on only one rationale — the expedited removal rationale — ignored the Secretary's other justifications, which are more than sufficient to withstand arbitrary and capricious review.

### C. The Court Should Have Deferred to Secretary Noem's Assessment of Reliance Interests.

The FRN explicitly considered these interests and concluded they were outweighed by the government's sovereign interest in controlling immigration and terminating a program deemed inconsistent with current policy objectives. *See* 90 *Fed. Reg.* 13617, *et seq*. The FRN acknowledged that recipients of a CHNV parole "will have departed their native country; traveled to the United States; obtained housing, employment authorization, and means of transportation; and perhaps commenced the process of building connections to the community where they reside." These are not legitimate reliance interests because there were no promises ever made to parolees under the CHNV policy, as discussed in the FRN:

> any assessment of the **reliance interests** of CHNV parolees must account for CHNV **parolees' knowledge** at the outset that (1) the Secretary retained the **discretion to terminate** the parole programs **at any point in time**, and to terminate any grants of parole **at any time** when, in her opinion, the purposes of such parole have been served; and that (2) the initial term of parole would be limited to a maximum of two years. These clear, limiting conditions of the parole programs served to **attenuate any long-term expectations** and interests amongst CHNV parolees. Accordingly, DHS has taken these limiting conditions, along with CHNV parolees' knowledge of them, into consideration when weighing their reliance interests. [*Id*. at 13619 (emphasis added).]

In fact, as Applicants point out, in creating the CHNV policies, Secretary Mayorkas announced that he retained the authority to terminate parole at any time. *See* Application at 3.

Nevertheless, the district court faulted Secretary Noem for inadequately addressing parolees' reliance interests, such as their departure from home countries, employment, and community ties, calling those "significant reliance interests." *See Doe* at *47.

Secretary Noem's decision to provide a 30-day termination period, rather than allowing parole to expire naturally, constituted a reasoned balancing of these interests against the need for prompt action to align immigration policy with the new administration's priorities — enforcing existing immigration laws. The district court wanted a more detailed explanation of why humanitarian concerns no longer justify parole, but the agency met its burden to change policy.

Although the APA requires agencies to consider reliance interests, it does not mandate that they prioritize them over competing concerns. This Court previously explained:

> [Reliance interests] are certainly noteworthy concerns, but they are not necessarily dispositive.... DHS could respond that reliance on forbearance and benefits was unjustified in light of the express limitations in the DACA Memorandum. Or it might conclude that reliance interests in benefits that it views as unlawful are entitled to no or diminished weight. And, even if DHS ultimately concludes that the reliance interests rank as serious, they are **but one factor to consider**. DHS may determine, in the particular context before it, that other interests and policy concerns outweigh any reliance interests. [*Dep't of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 31-32 (2020) (emphasis added).]

The CHNV parolees were fully advised about the temporary nature of their grants of parole. Furthermore, as already explained, the CHNV policy was unlawfully implemented under the INA. As Justice Thomas has explained, "reliance interests are irrelevant when assessing whether to rescind an action that the agency lacked statutory authority to take. No amount of reliance could ever justify continuing a program that allows DHS to wield power that neither Congress nor the Constitution gave it." *Regents* at 60 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Individuals, especially noncitizens, should have no valid reliance interest that the federal government is going to continue to violate federal law.

The district court's determination that Secretary Noem's termination of CHNV parole was arbitrary and capricious was erroneous. It misread the parole statute to impose a case-by-case termination requirement, disregarded the

Secretary's reasoned justifications, and failed to defer to DHS's balancing of reliance interests against policy priorities.

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should stay the district court's de facto injunction, and order the dismissal of the complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

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# APPENDIX

**NOEM V. DOE**
**Appendix to Amicus Brief**

**FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION**
(January 20, 2025 through May 6, 2025)

## BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP

1. *New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00038 — Judge Joseph N. Laplante (G.W. Bush) of the District of New Hampshire enjoined any enforcement of Trump's birthright citizenship EO within the state.

2. *Washington v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00127 — Judge John C. Coughenour (Reagan) of the District of Washington enjoined any enforcement of Trump's birthright citizenship EO nationwide. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, where it is pending.

3. *New Jersey v. Trump; Doe v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-10139 — Judge Leo T. Sorokin (Obama) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined any enforcement of Trump's birthright citizenship EO within the state. The case was appealed to the First Circuit and the Supreme Court, where it is pending.

4. *CASA Inc. v. Trump*, No. 8:25-cv-00201 — Judge Deborah L. Boardman (Biden) of the District of Maryland enjoined any enforcement of Trump's birthright citizenship EO nationwide. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court, where it is pending.

## IMMIGRATION

5. *J.G.G. v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00766 — Judge James E. Boasberg (Obama) of the District of D.C. ordered flights of gang members and terrorists rerouted back to the United States, and then ordered that Trump cannot deport anyone under the Alien Enemies Act without a hearing. This was upheld by D.C. Circuit, then on April 7, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's TROs. Judge Boasberg on April 16 threatened the Trump administration with criminal contempt charges, but on April 18 the DC Circuit issued an administrative stay in the appeal from Judge Boasberg's Apr. 16 contempt-related order. Plaintiffs filed an April 24 amended complaint including a habeas petition for a class of individuals and an April 25 motion for a permanent injunction.

6. *Chung v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-02412 — Judge Naomi R. Buchwald (Clinton) of the Southern District of New York issued a temporary restraining order preventing Trump from deporting a Columbia University student for pro-Hamas activism.

7. *Phila. Yearly Meeting of The Religious Soc'y of Friends v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, No. 8:2025-cv-00243 — Judge Theodore D. Chuang (Obama) of the District of Maryland enjoined ICE raids in houses of worship.

8. *M.K. v. Joyce*, No. 1:25-cv-01935 — Judge Jesse M. Furman (Obama) of the Southern District of New York issued a temporary restraining order forbidding the removal of a prisoner from the U.S. to Venezuela until the court could rule on the merits of the removal. This case was transferred on March 19 as *Khalil v. Joyce*, 2:25-cv-01963 — Judge Michael E. Farbiarz (Biden) of the District of New Jersey ordered on that same day that "Petitioner shall not be removed from the United States unless and until the Court issues a contrary Order."

9. *Parra v. Castro*, No. 1:24-cv-00912 — Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales (Obama) of the District of New Mexico issued a temporary restraining order on February 9 blocking the transfer of three Venezuelans to Gitmo. They were then removed to their home country instead and voluntarily dismissed their case.

10. *Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Choate*, No. 1:25-cv-00881 — Judge Nina Y. Wang (Biden) of the District of Colorado enjoined the ICE deportation of a Mexican citizen.

11. *National TPS Alliance v. Noem*, No. 3:25-cv-01766 — Judge Edward M. Chen (Obama) of the Northern District of California enjoined ending Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") for 350,000 to 600,000 Venezuelans.

12. *Pacito v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00255 — Judge Jamal N. Whitehead (Biden) of the Western District of Washington granted a nationwide preliminary injunction on February 28 blocking President Trump's Executive Order indefinitely halting entry through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit partially granted the Trump administration's emergency motion to stay, and filed an order clarifying their stay on April 21.

13. *City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-01350 — Judge William H. Orrick III (Obama) of the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction April 24 enjoining President Trump's efforts to have the Department of Justice investigate and prosecute "sanctuary cities" policies and government officials interfering with immigration enforcement.

14. *D.V.D. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, No. 1:25-cv-10676 — Judge Brian E. Murphy (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined the Trump

administration over the recent policy of deporting non-citizens with final removal orders to a third country, specifically El Salvador, without first providing an opportunity to contest removal.

15. *Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto v. U.S. Dep't of HHS*, No. 3:25-cv-02847 — Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin (Biden) of the Northern District of California issued a temporary restraining order on April 1 blocking Defendants from terminating funding for Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) funding for legal representation services for unaccompanied immigrant children through April 16, then on April 10 extended the TRO through April 30. Defendants' appeal of the TRO to the Ninth Circuit was denied, as was a petition for rehearing en banc. On April 29, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction blocking Defendants from withdrawing the services or funds provided by ORR until a final judgment in the matter is issued. Defendants appealed the PI to the 9th Circuit on Apr. 30.

16. *J.A.V. v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00072 — Judge Fernando Rodriguez (Trump) of the Southern District of Texas on April 9 temporarily enjoined the Trump administration from deporting Venezuelans outside of the district under the Alien Enemies Act. On May 1, Judge Rodriguez certified a class and granted a permanent injunction.

17. *G.F.F. v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-02886 — Judge Alvin Hellerstein (Clinton) of the Southern District of New York granted a temporary restraining order on April 9 on behalf of a class of all persons in the district subject to deportation under the Alien Enemies Act. A Preliminary Injunction was granted May 6.

18. *Doe v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-10495 — Judge Indira Talwani (Obama) of the District of Massachusetts, on April 14, granted a motion to stay the Department of Homeland Security's blanket revocation of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela parole programs (the "CHNV parole programs") and ordering case-by-case review of any termination of work authorization permits to remain in the United States.

19. *Viloria Aviles v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00611 — Judge Gloria Maria Navarro (Obama) of the District of Nevada issued a preliminary injunction on April 17 prohibiting the government from removing the Petitioner from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act until after his merits hearing.

20. *D.B.U. v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-01163 — Judge Charlotte Sweeney (Biden) of the District of Colorado issued a temporary restraining order on April 22 forbidding the administration from removing Venezuelan illegal aliens from Colorado for deportation under the Aliens Enemies Act. A motion for a preliminary injunction is

pending. On appeal to the 10th Circuit, a panel on April 29 denied an emergency motion for stay.

21. *A.S.R. v. Trump*, No. 3:25-cv-00113 — Judge Stephanie Haines (Trump) of the Western District of Pennsylvania granted a temporary restraining order on April 25 on behalf of a class of all persons in the district subject to deportation under the Alien Enemies Act that they must be given 14 days' notice and hearing before any removal from the district, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in *J.G.G. v. Trump*.

22. *Mahdawi v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00389 — Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford (Obama) of the District of Vermont extended a temporary restraining order on April 24 "for a period of 90 days or until dismissal of this case or grant of a preliminary injunction, whichever is earliest ... no respondent... shall remove [Mohsen Mahdawi, a Palestinian] from Vermont without further order from this court."

23. *Yostin Sleiker Gutierrez-Contreras v. Warden Desert View Annex*, No. 5:25-cv-00911 — Judge Sunshine S. Sykes (Biden) of the Central District of California, issued a temporary restraining order on April 16 preventing the government from removing a Venezuelan at risk of being deported to El Salvador under the Alien Enemies Act. On April 28, the TRO was dissolved since the Plaintiff was in Texas when the petition was filed.

> *NOTE: According to *Politico*, there have been over 100 lawsuits and 50 restraining orders related to the F-1 visas and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) in 23 states. The Trump Administration is working to resolve this situation, so these cases are not included here.

**TRANSGENDER**

24. *Talbott v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00240 — Judge Ana C. Reyes (Biden) of the District of D.C., a lesbian, enjoined Trump's rule preventing "transgender" persons from serving in the military. The case is on appeal to the D.C. Circuit.

25. *PFLAG v. Trump*, No. 8:25-cv-00337 — Judge Brendan A. Hurson (Biden) of the District of Maryland granted an injunction against Trump's order denying federal funding to institutions performing chemical or surgical "transgender" mutilation on minors.

26. *Washington v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00244 — Judge Lauren J. King (Biden) of the Western District of Washington enjoined Trump's order denying federal funding to

institutions performing chemical or surgical "transgender" mutilation on minors. The case is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

27. *Ireland v. Hegseth*, No. 1:25-cv-01918 — Judge Christine P. O'Hearn (Biden) of the District of New Jersey enjoined the Air Force from removing two "transgender" service members pursuant to Trump's order banning "transgender" service members.

28. *Doe v. McHenry; Doe v. Bondi*, No. 1:25-cv-00286 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the District of D.C. enjoined the transfer of twelve "transgender women" to men's prisons under Trump's order, and terminating their taxpayer-funded hormone treatments. The injunction has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit.

29. *Moe v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-10195 — Senior Judge George A. O'Toole Jr. (Clinton) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined the transfer of a "transgender woman" to a men's prison under Trump's order. This case has been transferred to another, unidentified, district.

30. *Jones v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-401 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the District of D.C. enjoined the transfer of three "transgender women" to men's prisons and termination of their taxpayer-funded hormone treatments under Trump's order.

31. *Shilling v. Trump*, No. 2:25-cv-00241 — Judge Benjamin H. Settle (G.W. Bush) of the Western District of Washington enjoined Trump's order to remove "transgender" service members. The Ninth Circuit denied a request for a stay of the injunction; an Application for Stay filed at the Supreme Court (24A1030), and the stay was granted May 6.

32. *Maine v. Department of Agriculture*, No. 1:25-cv-00131 — Judge John Woodcock (G.W. Bush) of the District of Maine granted a temporary restraining order on April 11 on behalf of Maine, in its lawsuit against Trump's federal education funding freeze to Maine for its refusal to ban boys from girls' teams.

## GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

33. *Dellinger v. Bessent*, No. 1:25-cv-00385 — Judge Amy B. Jackson (Obama) of the District of D.C. issued a restraining order invalidating Trump's firing of U.S. special counsel Hampton Dellinger. The order was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, then was temporarily lifted by the Court of Appeals on March 5; on March 6, Dellinger announced that he was dropping his case.

34. *American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, No. 3:25-cv-01780 — Judge William H. Alsup (Clinton) of the Northern District of California enjoined Trump's order for six federal agencies to dismiss thousands of probationary employees. The injunction was upheld by the Ninth Circuit, but the Supreme Court issued a stay based on standing.

35. *Wilcox v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00334 — Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump's firing of National Labor Relations Board member Gwynne Wilcox, a Democrat, and ordered her reinstated to finish her term. The D.C. Circuit stayed the injunction, then reinstated it, and an application for a stay has been filed at the Supreme Court, and the district court decision stayed by Chief Justice Roberts.

36. *Harris v. Bessent*, No. 1:25-cv-00412 — Judge Rudolph Contreras (Obama) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump's firing of Merit Systems Protection Board member Cathy Harris and ordered her reinstated. The D.C. Circuit stayed the injunction, then reinstated it, an application for a stay has been filed at the Supreme Court, and the district court decision stayed by Chief Justice Roberts.

37. *American Foreign Service Association v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00352 — Judge Carl J. Nichols (Trump) of the District of D.C. issued a temporary restraining order against Trump's firing of USAID employees. He later vacated the TRO and denied a preliminary injunction against the firings.

38. *Does 1-9 v. Department of Justice*, No. 1:25-cv-00325 — Judge Jia M. Cobb (Biden) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump from releasing the names of any FBI agents who worked on the January 6 investigation.

39. *Doctors for America v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, No. 1:25-cv-00322 — Judge John D. Bates (G.W. Bush) of the District of D.C. ordered that CDC and FDA webpages that "inculcate or promote gender ideology" be restored after Trump ordered them removed.

40. *Perkins Coie v. DOJ*, No. 1:25-cv-00716 — Judge Beryl A. Howell (Obama) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump's directive barring government agencies doing business with Perkins Coie and banning PC attorneys from federal buildings.

41. *Jenner Block v. DOJ*, No. 1:25-cv-00916 — Judge John D. Bates (G.W. Bush) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump's directive barring government agencies from doing business with Jenner Block and banning that firm's attorneys from federal buildings.

42. *Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President*, No. 1:25-cv-00917 — Judge Richard J. Leon (G.W. Bush) of the District of D.C. enjoined Trump's directive barring government agencies from doing business with Wilmer and banning that firm's attorneys from federal buildings.

43. *Susman Godfrey LLP v. Executive Office of the President*, No. 1:25-cv-01107 — Judge Loren L. AliKhan (Biden) of the District of D.C. on April 15 enjoined Trump's directive barring government agencies from doing business with Susman Godfrey and banning that firm's attorneys from federal buildings.

44. *American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Ezell*, No. 1:25-cv-10276 — Senior Judge George A. O'Toole Jr. (Clinton) of the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order against Trump's buyout of federal employees. The judge later lifted the TRO and denied an injunction, allowing the buyout to go forward.

45. *Maryland v. US Dept. of Agriculture*, No. 1:25-cv-00748 — James K. Bredar (Obama) of the District of Maryland issued a TRO ordering 38 agencies to stop firing employees and reinstate fired employees. On April 9, the Fourth Circuit stayed the district court injunction, noting the Supreme Court's stay in *AFGE, AFL-CIO v. OPM and Ezell*).

46. *Does 1-26 v. Musk*, No. 8:25-cv-00462 — Judge Theodore D. Chuang (Obama) of the District of Maryland ordered DOGE to reinstate email access for fired USAID employees.

47. *American Federation of Teachers v. Bessent*, No. 8:25-cv-00430 — Judge Deborah L. Boardman (Biden) of the District of Maryland enjoined DOE and Office of Personnel Management from disclosing personal information of employees to DOGE. On April 7, the Fourth Circuit granted a stay to the Defendants pending the appeal.

48. *American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration*, No. 1:25-cv-00596 — Judge Ellen L. Hollander (Obama) of the District of Maryland granted an injunction forbidding the Social Security Administration from providing personal information to DOGE. The Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack jurisdiction.

49. *Brehm v. Marocco*, No. 1:25-cv-00660 — Judge Richard J. Leon (G.W. Bush) of the District of D.C. issued a temporary restraining order forbidding Trump from removing Brehm from, and appointing Marocco to, the U.S. African Development Foundation.

50. *American Oversight v. Hegseth*, No. 1:25-cv-00883 — Judge James E. Boasberg (Obama) of the District of D.C. issued an order "as agreed by the parties," for the government to preserve all Signal communications related to the leak to an *Atlantic* editor of DoD conversations in Houthi strike.

51. *National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00935 — Judge Paul Friedman (Clinton) of the District of D.C., on April 25, enjoined agencies from implementing Trump's executive order limiting collective bargaining rights for many federal employees, but specifically did not enjoin President Trump.

52. *Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. Department of Agriculture*, No. 1:25-cv-00097 — Judge Mary McElroy (Trump) of the District of Rhode Island issued a preliminary injunction against Trump's federal funding freeze for various departments including the EPA. The Trump administration appealed to the 1st Circuit on May 1.

53. *Associated Press v. Budowich*, No. 1:25-cv-00532 — Judge Trevor McFadden (Trump) of the District of D.C. on April 8 enjoined the White House from keeping AP reporters out of the White House press briefings until it agrees to refer to the "Gulf of America."

54. *Novedades Y Servicios, Inc. v. FinCEN*, 3:25-cv-00886 — Judge Janis L. Sammartino (G.W. Bush) of the Southern District of California granted a temporary restraining order on April 22 against Department of Treasury FinCEN's Geographic Targeting Order which requires businesses along the southern border to file Currency Transaction Reports with FinCEN at a $200 threshold.

55. *New York, et al. v. Donald J. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-01144 — Judge Jeannette A. Vargas (Biden) of the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction on February 21 blocking DOGE's access to certain Treasury Department payment records. Then on April 11, Judge Vargas partially dissolved her preliminary injunction since "based on existing record" mitigation, training and vetting procedures were adequate to satisfy her concerns.

**FUNDING**

56. *National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought*, No. 1:25-cv-00381 — Judge Amy B. Jackson (Obama) of the District of D.C. halted Trump's budget cuts and layoffs at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. On March 31, the government appealed Judge Jackson's preliminary injunction order to the D.C. Circuit; which on April 11 ordered a partial stay of the preliminary injunction.

57. *AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. Department of State*, No. 1:25-cv-00400 — Judge Amir H. Ali (Biden) of the District of D.C. ordered Trump to unfreeze and spend $2 billion in USAID funds. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling with Justices Alito, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch dissenting, left the order in place. On Apr. 2, defendants appealed Judge Ali's Mar. 10 preliminary injunction order to the D.C. Circuit.

58. *Colorado v. US Dept. of Health and Human Services*, No. 1:25-cv-00121 — Judge Mary S. McElroy (Trump) of the District of Rhode Island, issued a temporary restraining order on April 5 reinstating payments to a coalition of states which sued the Trump administration over the cancellation of $11 billion in public health funding.

59. *National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB*, No. 1:25-cv-00239 — Judge Loren L. AliKhan (Biden) of the District of D.C. blocked Trump's order to pause federal aid while reviewing to determine if it aligned with administration policy. Appeal to the D.C. Circuit docketed April 25.

60. *Massachusetts v. NIH*, No. 1:25-cv-10338 — Judge Angel Kelley (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts issued a preliminary injunction on March 5 prohibiting implementation of the NIH Guidance "in any form with respect to institutions nationwide."

61. *New York v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00039 — Judge John J. McConnell Jr. (Obama) of the District of Rhode Island enjoined Trump's order to freeze federal spending while reviewing to determine that it aligned with administration policy. The First Circuit, on March 26, denied defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction order.

62. *RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake*, No. 1:25-cv-00799 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the District of D.C. issued a temporary restraining order forbidding Trump from cutting funds to Voice of America.

63. *Widakuswara v. Lake*, No. 1:25-cv-01015 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the District of D.C. issued a preliminary injunction on April 22 requiring the reinstatement of employment positions and funding for Voice of America and U.S. Agency for Global Media. The government appealed to the DC Circuit April 24.

64. *Radio Free Asia v. United States of America*, No. 1:25-cv-00907 — Judge Royce C. Lamberth (Reagan) of the District of D.C. issued a preliminary injunction requiring restoration of funding of Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks on April 25. The government immediately filed an appeal to the D.C. Circuit, which granted a stay pending appeal on May 3.

65. *Massachusetts Fair Housing Ctr. v. HUD*, No. 3:25-cv-30041 — Judge Richard G. Stearns (Clinton) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined Trump's cuts to HUD grant funding and ordered spending reinstated.

66. *Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A.*, No. 1:25-cv-00698 — Judge Tanya S. Chutkan (Obama) of the District of D.C. issued a temporary restraining order enjoining EPA's Termination of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund Grants.

67. *Association of American Medical Colleges v. NIH*, No. 1:25-cv-10340 — Judge Angel Kelley (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts enjoined Trump's NIH grant funding cuts. The Case has been appealed to the First Circuit.

68. *American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education v. McMahon*, No. 1:25-cv-00702 — Judge Julie R. Rubin (Biden) of the District of Maryland issued an injunction requiring reinstatement of terminated education grant funds. Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. On April 1, the Fourth Circuit denied Plaintiffs' motion to place the case in abeyance, and on April 10, granted the defendants' motion for stay pending appeal.

69. *Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al. v. Vought*, No. 1:25-cv-00458 — Judge Matthew J. Maddox (Biden) of the District of Maryland issued a TRO preventing Trump from defunding the CFPB.

70. *Association of American Universities v. Department of Health and Human Services*, No. 1:25-cv-10346 — Judge Angel Kelley (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts issued a nationwide injunction against Trump's NIH funding cuts. Defendants appealed to the First Circuit on April 9.

71. *Association of American Universities v. Dept. of Energy*, No. 1:25-cv-10912 — Judge Allison D. Burroughs (Obama) of the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order on April 16 against the cap instituted on reimbursements for indirect costs for federal research grants from the Department of Energy.

72. *American Library Association v. Sonderling*, No. 1:25-cv-01050 — Judge Richard J. Leon of the District of D.C. granted a temporary restraining order on May 1 against the executive order which requires spending reduction of the Institute for Museum and Library Services.

73. *Rhode Island v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00128 — Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (Obama) of the District of Rhode Island, granted a preliminary injunction on May 6 to a coalition of states which sued over an Executive Order which requires 7 agencies to reduce their functions.

74. *State of New York v. U.S. Dep't of Education*, No. 1:25-cv-02990 — Judge Edgardo Ramos (Obama) of the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction that prohibits the U.S. Department of Education from cancelling over $1 billion in unspent COVID-19 pandemic funding grants extended past the original deadline by the prior administration.

75. *San Fransisco U.S.D. v. AmeriCorps*, 3:25-cv-02425 — Judge Edward M. Chen (Obama) of the Northern District of California granted a temporary restraining order on March 31 after San Francisco Unified School District sued over actions taken to fire employees and freeze grant funding at AmeriCorps.

76. *Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. DOGE Service*, 1:25-cv-00511 — Judge Christopher R. Cooper (Obama) of the District of D.C. issued a preliminary injunction on March 10 in a lawsuit against DOGE and Elon Musk regarding compliance with FOIA and the Federal Records Act.

## ELECTIONS

77. *League of United Latin American Citizens v. EOP*, No. 1:25-cv-00946 — Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (Clinton) of the District of D.C. granted a universal injunction on April 24 against Executive Order 14,248, requiring documentary proof of United States citizenship to vote in Federal elections. This case consolidates three suits brought by racial minority associations and by Democrat Party, campaigns, and elected officials.

## DEI-RELATED PROGRAMS

78. *Nat'l Ass'n of Diversity Officers in Higher Educ. v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-00333 — Judge Adam B. Abelson (Biden) of the District of Maryland enjoined Trump's order blocking federal funding for DEI programs. On March 14, the Fourth Circuit granted the government's motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

79. *California v. Department of Education*, No. 1:25-cv-10548 — Judge Myong J. Joun (Biden) of the District of Massachusetts granted a temporary restraining order blocking Trump's withdrawal of funds to schools teaching DEI. The First Circuit denied a motion for stay pending appeal. On April 4, the Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal, writing "the Government is likely to succeed in showing the District Court lacked jurisdiction" and that the case may need to be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.

80. *Chicago Women in Trades v. Trump*, No. 1:25-cv-02005 — Senior Judge Matthew F. Kennelly (Clinton) of the Northern District of Illinois entered a temporary restraining order commanding the reinstatement of DEI grants.

81. *Doe 1 v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, No. 1:25-cv-00300 — Judge Anthony J. Trenga (G.W. Bush) of the Eastern District of Virginia issued an "administrative stay" against firing DEI employees with CIA and DNI. The court then considered and rejected imposing a TRO to the same effect. On March 31, Judge Trenga granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants. On May 6, defendants filed notice of appeal to the 4th Circuit.

82. *American Federation of Teachers v. U.S. Department of Education*, No. 1:25-cv-00628 — Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher (Trump) of the District of Maryland enjoined the U.S. Department of Education's February 14, 2025 "Dear Colleague Letter" ending diversity, equity, and inclusion practices in schools by threatening to withhold federal funding from those that refuse to comply.

83. *National Education Association v. US Department of Education*, No. 1:25-cv-00091 — Judge Landya B. McCafferty (Obama) of the District of New Hampshire enjoined the U.S. Department of Education's February 14, 2025 "Dear Colleague Letter" ending diversity, equity, and inclusion practices in schools by threatening to withhold federal funding from those that refuse to comply.

84. *NAACP v. U.S. Department of Education*, No. 1:25-cv-01120 — Judge Dabney L. Friedrich (Trump) of the District of D.C. enjoined the U.S. Department of Education's February 14, 2025 "Dear Colleague Letter" ending diversity, equity, and inclusion practices in schools by threatening to withhold federal funding from those that refuse to comply.