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IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

***THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2025 AT 6:00 P.M.***

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APPENDIX A

Gudinas v. State SC2025-0794 (Fla., June, 17, 2025)

Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC2025-0794

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

June 17, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Lee Gudinas, a prisoner under sentence of death for whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for June 24, 2025, appeals the circuit court's orders summarily denying his third successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and denying his demand for public records, which was made under rule 3.852. We have jurisdiction. *See* art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denials of postconviction relief and the

demand for public records. Additionally, we deny Gudinas's motion for a stay of execution, filed on June 8, 2025.

I. BACKGROUND

After leaving an Orlando bar in the early morning hours of May 24, 1994, Gudinas sexually battered and murdered M.M.¹ The victim's body was found in a nearby alley, naked, except for a bra that was pushed up above her breasts. There were sticks inserted into her genitalia, and it was also determined that she had been vaginally and anally penetrated by something other than the sticks. Gudinas admitted to his roommates that he killed the victim and then had sex with her body. The medical examiner determined that the victim's cause of death was a brain hemorrhage resulting from blunt force injuries to her head, probably inflicted by a stomping-type blow from a boot. Gudinas was convicted of the victim's murder and two counts of sexual battery. He was also convicted of attempted burglary with an assault and attempted sexual battery against a second woman, whom he had attempted to attack after

1. A more complete recitation of the facts can be found in this Court's opinion on direct appeal. *See Gudinas v. State*, 693 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1997).

leaving the bar and before murdering M.M. *Gudinas v. State*, 693 So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Fla. 1997).

At the penalty phase, the State introduced evidence of Gudinas's prior felony convictions from Massachusetts, including burglary of an automobile; assault; theft; assault with intent to rape; indecent assault and battery; and assault and battery. Gudinas's mother testified about his behavioral and substance abuse problems in his youth and his "low IQ." Gudinas's sister testified about the abuse he suffered at the hands of his father. Dr. James Upson, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified that Gudinas was seriously emotionally disturbed at the time of the murder and that he was "quite pathological in his psychological dysfunction." Dr. Upson testified that Gudinas has an IQ of 85, and that the murder was consistent with the behavior of a person with his psychological makeup. Dr. James O'Brian, a physician and pharmacologist, testified that Gudinas is unable to control his impulses in an unstructured environment and was unable to control them at the time of the murder due to his marijuana and alcohol consumption. The jury recommended and the trial court ultimately imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on

three aggravating circumstances,² one statutory mitigating circumstance,³ and twelve “nonstatutory” mitigating circumstances.⁴ *Id.* at 958-59.

This Court affirmed Gudinas’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal, *id.* at 968, which became final when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review in 1997, *Gudinas v.*

2. The court found that the following aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery; and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

3. The court found one statutory mitigating circumstance established: the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

4. The court found the following “nonstatutory” mitigating circumstances established: (1) the defendant had consumed cannabis and alcohol the evening of the homicide; (2) the defendant has capacity to be rehabilitated; (3) the defendant’s behavior at trial was acceptable; (4) the defendant has an IQ of 85; (5) the defendant is religious and believes in God; (6) the defendant’s father dressed as a transvestite; (7) the defendant suffers from personality disorders; (8) the defendant was developmentally impaired as a child; (9) the defendant was a caring son to his mother; (10) the defendant was an abused child; (11) the defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder as a child; and (12) the defendant was diagnosed as sexually disturbed as a child.

Florida, 522 U.S. 936 (1997); *see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)(B)* (“For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is final . . . on the disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, if filed.”). In the decades since, Gudinas has unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences in state and federal courts. *See Gudinas v. State*, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1099-1100 (Fla. 2002) (affirming denial of Gudinas’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denying his state petition for a writ of habeas corpus); *Gudinas v. State*, 879 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 2004) (affirming the denial of Gudinas’s first successive motion for postconviction relief); *Gudinas v. State*, 982 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2008) (denying Gudinas’s pro se Petition Seeking Review of Non-Final Order in Death Penalty Postconviction Proceeding Pursuant to Rule 9.142(b)); *Gudinas v. McNeil*, No. 2:06-cv-357-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL 3835776, at *65 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2010) (denying Gudinas’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus), *aff’d sub nom. Gudinas v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.*, 436 Fed. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2011); *Gudinas v. Tucker*, 565 U.S. 1247 (2012) (denying certiorari review of the denial of federal habeas relief); *Gudinas v. State*, 235 So. 3d

303, 304 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of Gudinas’s second successive motion for postconviction relief).

Governor Ron DeSantis signed Gudinas’s death warrant on May 23, 2025. Gudinas then filed a third successive motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.851, raising three claims: (1) Gudinas’s lifelong mental illnesses place him outside the class of individuals who should be put to death, and executing him will be violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution; (2) Florida’s use of its unique and obstructive “conformity clause” is unconstitutional and violates Gudinas’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and his Eighth Amendment right to a true merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society; and (3) applying the procedural bar in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(d)(2) to Gudinas’s Claim One would violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, his Eighth Amendment right to a true merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The

circuit court summarily denied all three claims, as well as Gudinas's demand for public records from the Executive Office of the Governor. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Newly Discovered Evidence/Extension of *Roper*/Extension of *Atkins*

In his first issue on appeal, Gudinas argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his claim that his unspecified lifelong mental illnesses place him outside the class of individuals who should be put to death. Gudinas claims that an evaluation conducted by Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, on May 29, 2025, provides newly discovered evidence of “brain impairment.”⁵ He also contends that “Dr. Eisenstein finds that Gudinas’s age at the time of crime, a little over twenty [years], is

5. In the appendix to the initial brief, Gudinas includes writings that were apparently composed by him before the instant proceedings, and presumably intended to support statements contained in Dr. Eisenstein’s report, but which were not submitted to the circuit court. We decline to consider materials that were not presented to and considered by the circuit court. *See, e.g., Altchiler v. State*, 442 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (stating it is elemental that an appellate court may not consider material matters outside the record).

similar to [United States Supreme Court] precedent barring juveniles from execution,” although he does not categorize this as newly discovered evidence, and Dr. Eisenstein, in fact, made no such “finding.”⁶ Gudinas argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove that due to “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” he should be deemed outside the class of individuals subject to capital punishment.

Similar to a number of other recent post-warrant arguments, Gudinas’s argument is essentially that because of his mental illnesses and “brain impairment” and the fact that he was twenty years old when he committed the murder, the protections of *Atkins*

6. Dr. Eisenstein made no mention of any Supreme Court precedent, nor did he compare Gudinas’s case or circumstances to that of any other defendant. The only mention in Dr. Eisenstein’s evaluation report of Gudinas’s age was made in the “Summary & Conclusions” section and states:

Gudinas was twenty years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Developmental literature and neuroscience research states that there was a lack of maturity, an undeveloped sense of responsibility, increased vulnerability and susceptibility to outside negative influences in a person that was not fully formed at this age.

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)—which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually disabled—and *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)—which held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”—should be extended to him, and that these claims should be entertained at this late stage because Dr. Eisenstein’s May 30, 2025, evaluation report constitutes newly discovered evidence. The circuit court summarily denied this claim as untimely, procedurally barred, and without merit.

Rule 3.851 requires that “[a]ny motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). But there is an exception to this rule for claims involving newly discovered evidence—i.e., claims predicated on facts that “were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). “[A]ny claim of newly discovered evidence in a death penalty case must be brought within one year of the date such evidence was discovered or could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” *Glock v. Moore*, 776 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001). In order to obtain relief based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant has the burden to establish:

(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal or yield a less severe sentence on retrial.

Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021).

Although his convictions and sentences became final nearly thirty years ago, Gudinas asserts that his claim is based on newly discovered evidence and is therefore timely under the exception in rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) to the one-year time limit for postconviction claims. Gudinas summarily states that “[t]he newly discovered evidence is an evaluation conducted by Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist who evaluated Gudinas at Florida State Prison on May 29, 2025.” He alternately states that the evaluation is newly discovered evidence of “brain impairment” and “mental impairments.” It appears that Gudinas is using “brain” and “mental” interchangeably rather than arguing that there are two

different claims of newly discovered evidence, but he does not elaborate as to what kind of brain or mental impairment he believes has recently been discovered.

Dr. Eisenstein's report does not use the term "mental impairments," and the only reference to "brain impairment" in the report is a single conclusory statement in the section titled "Summary & Conclusions" that Gudinas "presented with significant brain impairment and frontal lobe dysfunction." But Gudinas admits in his briefing that evidence of his "mental impairment" was presented during the penalty phase of his trial and "more" evidence was presented during the evidentiary hearing on his initial motion for postconviction relief. He describes his "impairments" in his initial brief here as "life-long" and "in place at the time of the crimes." With regard to the specific possibility of "frontal lobe dysfunction," Dr. Joseph Lipman, a neuropharmacologist retained by Gudinas during the initial postconviction proceedings, reported in 1999 that Gudinas may have "deficits of frontal or temporal lobe function in his brain." That Gudinas may have "brain impairment" or "frontal lobe dysfunction" has been known to him for at least twenty-five or thirty years, if not longer, and has been raised

previously. We therefore cannot determine what exactly it is that Gudinas believes is newly discovered.

Moreover, even if we were to assume that Dr. Eisenstein's finding of "brain impairment" is newly discovered, to raise a facially sufficient claim based on newly discovered evidence, it is necessary to assert not only that there is evidence that was not and could not have been known at the time of trial by the use of due diligence but also that the evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce a life sentence on retrial. *Damren v. State*, 397 So. 3d 607, 610 (Fla. 2023), *cert. denied*, 144 S. Ct. 1398 (2024). Gudinas has not done this. His failure to identify any evidence that was not previously presented and his failure to plead that whatever it is that he believes is newly discovered would probably produce an acquittal at retrial are fatal to any argument that this claim may be timely under rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).

Gudinas's contention that this claim is timely because he had "no reason to have a new mental health evaluation until the commencement of his clemency proceedings, and most specifically, the signing of the death warrant" is also without support. Neither clemency proceedings nor the signing of his death warrant has

anything to do with the timeliness of Gudinas's claim that he is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment due to "brain impairment."

The circuit court was also correct in concluding that this claim is procedurally barred. Gudinas first introduced the possibility of "brain impairment" at the penalty phase in 1995 through his expert, Dr. Upson. Dr. Upson testified that despite extensive evaluation and testing, he found no evidence of neuropsychological impairment on either side or the frontal portion of Gudinas's brain and "ruled out" neuropsychological impairment. Dr. Upson also testified that Gudinas's mental health records indicated that he had been evaluated by neuropsychologists on several prior occasions, none of whom found any indication of "brain impairment" or organic brain damage, although the records did indicate that Gudinas has "significant emotional disturbances." The trial court considered Dr. Upson's testimony credible and relied on it to find mitigating circumstances in the sentencing order, including the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

Dr. Upson testified again at the evidentiary hearing on Gudinas's initial motion for postconviction relief in 1999, at which time he maintained his opinion that Gudinas had no significant cognitive dysfunction. Despite contrary testimony at that hearing from Dr. Lipman "that Gudinas has neuronal damage and a developmental brain problem," the postconviction court concluded—a conclusion that this Court affirmed on appeal—that there was no reasonable probability that Gudinas would have received a life sentence had Dr. Lipman presented that opinion at trial due to the conflicting and more credible evidence presented by Dr. Upson. *Gudinas*, 816 So. 2d at 1107-08.

Because the current claim of "brain impairment" is a variation of his prior claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a neuropharmacologist who would have testified that Gudinas has "neuronal damage and a developmental brain problem," it is procedurally barred. Moreover, even if it were not a variation of a prior claim, because Gudinas's alleged "brain impairment" in the form of "neuronal damage and a developmental brain problem" was known at the time of his postconviction proceedings, more than a quarter of a century ago, this claim would

still be procedurally barred because it should have been raised previously. *See Rogers v. State*, No. SC2025-0585, 2025 WL 1341642, at *4 (Fla. May 8) (“[I]n an active warrant case, a postconviction claim that could have been raised in a prior proceeding is procedurally barred.”), *cert. denied*, No. 24-7169, 2025 WL 1387828 (U.S. May 14, 2025).

Gudinas’s argument that his age of twenty years at the time of the murder should bar his execution based on “developmental literature and neuroscience research which states that there was a lack of maturity, an undeveloped sense of responsibility, increased vulnerability and susceptibility to outside negative influences in a person that was not fully formed at this age” is also procedurally barred, because it too could have been raised in a prior proceeding. Gudinas does not identify any specific “literature” or “research” that he believes would apply here, but literature, research, studies, reports, and cases discussing maturity, age, and the fact that the brain is not fully developed or matured by the age of eighteen or twenty or even twenty-five have been well known in the public domain for decades, and even before *Roper* was decided. *See, e.g., Barwick v. State*, 361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (noting that a

2022 “resolution” from the American Psychological Association taking the position that the death penalty should be banned when the offender was under twenty-one years old at the time of the capital offense was “based on a compilation of studies, research, data, and reports, published between 1992 and 2022 and relying on data from as early as 1977”); *Morton v. State*, 995 So. 2d 233, 245-46 (Fla. 2008) (mentioning a 2004 brain mapping study, which establishes that sections of the human brain are not fully developed until age twenty-five; a 2007 article stating that in the past few decades, neuroscientists have discovered that two key developmental processes, myelination and pruning of neural connections, continue to take place during adolescence and well into adulthood; and a 1967 article stating that brain regions responsible for basic life processes and sensory perception tend to mature fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavioral inhibition and control, risk assessment, decision making, and emotion maturing take longer). Thus, any claim that *Roper* should be extended to him based on his age at the time of the murder could have been raised in one of Gudinas’s many prior proceedings. The same is true for any claim that *Atkins* should be extended to

him based on his “lifelong mental illnesses” or his “impairments,” which he concedes “were in place at the time of the crime[s].” Thus, Gudinas’s claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised previously. *E.g.*, *Barwick*, 361 So. 3d at 795 (concluding that extension-of-*Atkins* claim was procedurally barred in an active warrant case because it could have been raised previously); *Branch v. State*, 236 So. 3d 981, 986 (Fla. 2018) (holding that an extension-of-*Roper* claim was procedurally barred in an active warrant case because it could have been raised previously); *Simmons v. State*, 105 So. 3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting as procedurally barred a claim, based on *Roper* and *Atkins*, that the defendant was exempt from execution based on mental illness and neuropsychological deficits because it could have been raised in prior proceedings). The circuit court therefore properly concluded that Gudinas’s claim of newly discovered “brain impairment” that he argues should subject him to protections similar to those afforded by *Atkins* and *Roper* is untimely and procedurally barred.

Finally, this claim lacks merit. Even if Gudinas’s claim of newly discovered evidence were facially sufficient and Dr. Eisenstein’s finding of “brain impairment” could be deemed newly

discovered, it cannot be said that such general and conclusory evidence would be of such a nature that it would probably produce a life sentence at retrial. This is especially true given the extensive testing and evaluation that Dr. Upson performed on Gudinas, and the credibility findings made with regard to Dr. Upson by both the trial and postconviction courts.

Further, we have repeatedly held that “the categorical bar of *Atkins* that shields the intellectually disabled from execution does not apply to individuals with other forms of mental illness or brain damage.” *Barwick*, 361 So. 3d at 795 (quoting *Dillbeck v. State*, 357 So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023)); *see also Hutchinson v. State*, No. SC2025-0517, 2025 WL 1198037, at *6 (Fla. Apr. 25) (rejecting claim that *Atkins* should be extended to individuals with certain neurocognitive disorders), *cert. denied*, No. 24-7087, 2025 WL 1261217 (U.S. May 1, 2025); *Dillbeck*, 357 So. 3d at 100 (rejecting claim *Atkins* should be extended to individual with mental illness and neurological impairments); *Carroll v. State*, 114 So. 3d 883, 887 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting claim that the protections of *Atkins* and *Roper* should be extended to defendant who is less culpable as a result of mental illness as untimely, procedurally barred, and meritless);

Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 511 (rejecting as meritless claim that persons with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with intellectual disability due to reduced culpability); *Lawrence v. State*, 969 So. 2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting assertion that the Equal Protection Clause requires extension of *Atkins* to the mentally ill due to their reduced culpability).

We have also repeatedly rejected the argument that *Roper*'s categorical ban on the execution of individuals who were under eighteen years old at the time they committed their capital offense(s) should be extended to defendants whose chronological age was over eighteen at the time of their offense(s). *See Ford v. State*, 402 So. 3d 973, 979 (Fla.) (rejecting claim that the protections of *Roper* should be extended to Ford, who was thirty-six at the time of his capital crimes, because he has a mental and developmental age below eighteen years), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 1161 (2025); *Barwick v. State*, 88 So. 3d 85, 106 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting claim that *Roper* should extend to Barwick, who was nineteen when he committed the capital crime, because his mental age was less than eighteen); *Stephens v. State*, 975 So. 2d 405, 427 (Fla. 2007) (rejecting claim that *Roper* and the Eighth Amendment barred execution of

defendant who had a mental and emotional age of less than eighteen years because his chronological age at the time of his crimes was twenty-three); *Hill v. State*, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting an extension-of-*Roper* claim and holding “*Roper* only prohibits the execution of those defendants whose *chronological* age is below eighteen”). Unlike many of the defendants in the cases cited by Gudinas, Gudinas does not allege that his mental or developmental age was under eighteen at the time of the murder; he simply argues that *Roper*’s protections should be extended to him based on his chronological age of twenty at the time of the murder in this case. But because Gudinas was indeed twenty years old “at the time of the murder[], it is impossible for him to demonstrate that he falls within the ages of exemption, rendering his claim facially insufficient and therefore properly summarily denied.” *Ford*, 402 So. 3d at 979 (citing *Morton*, 995 So. 2d at 245) (“Because it is impossible for Morton to demonstrate that he falls within the ages of exemption, his claim is facially insufficient and it was proper for the court to deny Morton a hearing on this claim.”)).

This claim also lacks merit because, as we have explained, this Court lacks the authority to extend *Atkins* or *Roper*.

The conformity clause of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” This means that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both the floor and the ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual punishment in Florida, and this Court cannot interpret Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to provide protection that the Supreme Court has decided is not afforded by the Eighth Amendment.

Id. at 979 (alteration in original) (quoting *Barwick*, 361 So. 3d at 794).

Because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to limit the exemption from execution based on mental functioning to those who are intellectually disabled or insane and the exemption from execution based on age to those whose chronological age was less than eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s), this Court is bound by those interpretations and is precluded from interpreting Florida’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to exempt individuals from execution whose

mental or cognitive issues do not rise to the level of intellectual disability or those whose chronological age was over eighteen years at the time of their capital crime(s). This claim was therefore properly denied as meritless.

B. Florida's Eighth Amendment Conformity Clause

Gudinas next contends that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that Florida's Eighth Amendment conformity clause in article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution is unconstitutional. Gudinas claims that by applying the conformity clause and foreclosing the possibility of courts interpreting the Florida prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to provide more protections than the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, Florida is foreclosing Gudinas's access to the courts, violating his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and violating his Eighth Amendment right to a true merits-based evaluation of his claims, premised on the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. The circuit court properly determined this claim to be procedurally barred and meritless.

Post-warrant claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding are procedurally barred. *Rogers*, 2025 WL 1341642, at *4. Gudinas’s reason for not raising this claim earlier is that it is a “purely legal claim[] in support of Claim One,” which was his newly discovered evidence/*extension-of-Atkins*/*extension-of-Roper* claim. As we have already explained, Gudinas’s “Claim One” could have and should have been raised in a prior proceeding, and this “supporting” claim likewise could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

Gudinas has also failed to show how the conformity clause in article I, section 17 violates his federal constitutional rights. While the states are required to adhere to the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments require states to expand the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment or to interpret their own corresponding state constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment in a more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal prohibition.

Gudinas’s assertion that Florida’s adherence to the conformity clause in article I, section 17 has denied him access to the courts is

baseless. Even the fact that this claim is now procedurally barred does not violate his access to the courts or his right to be heard at the appropriate time and in accordance with the laws and procedural rules of this state.

C. Applicability of Rule 3.851(d)(2)

Gudinas next posits that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that application of rule 3.851(d)(2)—which sets forth the three exceptions to the one-year time limit for filing motions for postconviction relief⁷—is unconstitutional when applied to successive motions filed after the signing of a death warrant. We recently addressed and rejected this argument in *Ford*, 402 So. 3d

7. Rule 3.851 limits the filing of a motion for postconviction relief to within one year of the date the defendant's conviction and sentence become final, unless it alleges one of the following exceptions set forth in subdivision (d)(2):

(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or

(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively, or

(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.

at 977-78, which was another post-death warrant proceeding. Gudinas concedes that our decision in *Ford* is directly adverse to the arguments he presents here, but nonetheless “raises these arguments with the good faith belief that the application of Rule 3.851(d)(2) to active warrant cases continues to raise serious constitutional concerns.”

Gudinas, who is represented by the same attorneys who argued *Ford*, presents essentially the same arguments made in *Ford*. In rejecting these arguments in *Ford*, we explained that finding rule 3.851(d)(2) inapplicable to defendants under an active death warrant would allow defendants, upon the scheduling of an execution date, to be permitted to litigate anew any claim that was (and likely those that should have been) raised previously and entitled to a ruling on the merits of those claims. We found this position lacking any legal support and contrary to the intent of the Legislature. We explained that

[i]n crafting the terms and conditions that govern criminal appeals and collateral review, the Legislature provided “that all terms and conditions of direct appeal and collateral review be strictly enforced, including the application of procedural bars, to ensure that all claims of error are raised and resolved at the first opportunity.” § 924.051(8), Fla. Stat. The litigation of a successive

motion for postconviction relief filed by a defendant under an active death warrant is collateral review. If the Legislature intended to suspend procedural bars for claims raised by defendants under active death warrants, it could have done so. *See Cason v. Fla. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs.*, 944 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2006) (“[T]he Legislature ‘knows how to’ accomplish what it has omitted in the statute in question.”).

Id. (second alteration in original). Gudinas has provided neither a basis on which we could rely to violate the intent of the Legislature regarding procedural bars as applied to collateral review nor a compelling reason to depart from our recent precedent on the matter.

We also rejected Ford’s claims that application of rule 3.852(d) resulted in a denial of due process and his right to access to courts. *Id.* at 978. Like Ford, Gudinas has not been denied an opportunity to bring his claims before the courts and to be heard at the appropriate time(s) and through the appropriate channel(s).

D. Demand for Public Records

After the death warrant was signed on May 23, 2025, Gudinas filed a demand for the production of public records from the

8. The circuit court summarized the records demanded as follows:

- a) All communications between the Governor or any current or former employee of his office with the Florida Parole Commission and/or the Office or Executive Clemency related “in any way whatsoever” to Defendant;
- b) All communications between the Governor or any current or former employee of his office with any other current or former employee of the Office of the Attorney General related “in any way whatsoever” to Defendant;
- c) Any document outlining the criteria for obtaining executive clemency and/or the process for selecting suitable candidates;
- d) Any document outlining the criteria for determining how to grant executive clemency and the factors considered;
- e) The number of death row inmates selected for clemency review and the number for whom review has been completed;
- f) All documents outlining the selection criteria and processes for inmates subject to the entry of a death warrant, including the factors considered in issuing a warrant;
- g) Names of everyone on Florida’s Death Row who have had complete or partial clemency investigations or whose case resulted in clemency[;]
- h) Names and dates of those whom clemency was denied; and

Procedure 3.852(h)⁹ and (i)¹⁰. The circuit court found that the records Gudinas requested generally related to the Governor's processes for granting clemency, which it concluded renders them

i) All correspondence/written communications between the Governor's office and the Florida Supreme Court identifying individuals eligible for a death warrant from January 1, 2023 to present.

9. Rule 3.852(h)(3) provides that within ten days after the signing of a death warrant, a records request may be made to "a person or agency from which collateral counsel has previously requested public records." The rule provides that upon such request, "[a] person or agency shall copy, index, and deliver to the [records] repository any public record: (A) that was not previously the subject of an objection; (B) that was received or produced since the previous request; or (C) that was, for any reason, not produced previously."

10. Rule 3.852(i)(1) provides that collateral counsel may obtain public records "in addition to those provided under subdivisions (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this rule" if counsel files an affidavit in the trial court which:

(A) attests that collateral counsel has made a timely and diligent search of the records repository; and

(B) identifies with specificity those public records not at the records repository; and

(C) establishes that the additional public records are either relevant to the subject matter of the postconviction proceeding or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and

(D) shall be served in accord with subdivision (c)(l) of this rule.

“clearly confidential and exempt from public records requests under section 14.28, Florida Statutes (2024)[,] and the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency.” The court also found the demands overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to a colorable claim for relief. The court further concluded that Gudinas’s failure to previously request documents from the Executive Office of the Governor foreclosed any current effort to obtain those records under rule 3.852(h)(3). We review the denial of Gudinas’s demand for public records for abuse of discretion, *Muhammad v. State*, 132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2013), and find none.

The requested records relating to the clemency process are exempt from disclosure. *Id.* at 203. Section 14.28, Florida Statutes (2024), provides that “[a]ll records developed or received by any state entity pursuant to a Board of Executive Clemency investigation shall be confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.” In other words, they are exempt from disclosure as public records. Additionally, rule 16 of the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency provides:

Due to the nature of the information presented to the Clemency Board, all records and documents generated and gathered in the clemency process as set forth in the Rules of Executive Clemency are confidential and shall not be made available for inspection to any person except members of the Clemency Board and their staff.

This Court has held that “to the extent section 14.28 could be read to exclude certain clemency materials from confidentiality [i.e., non-investigatory documents], Rule of Executive Clemency 16, which provides that *all* records in the clemency process are confidential, controls” *Chavez v. State*, 132 So. 3d 826, 831 (Fla. 2014). And under section 14.28 and rule 16, only the Governor can authorize the release or inspection of such records. See § 14.28, Fla. Stat. (2024) (“[S]uch records may be released upon the approval of the Governor.”); Rule 16, Rules of Executive Clemency (“Only the Governor . . . has the discretion to allow such records and documents to be inspected or copied.”). Thus, the circuit court was without the authority to grant Gudinas’s demands related to the clemency process. See *Parole Comm’n v. Lockett*, 620 So. 2d 153, 157-58 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a trial judge’s order to disclose clemency records “would effectively overrule the rules of

executive clemency, resulting in a violation of the separation of powers doctrine”).

The circuit court also concluded that the demands were not reasonably calculated to lead to a colorable claim for relief. The procedures of rule 3.852(h) and (i) are “not intended to be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.” *Cole v. State*, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1065-66 (Fla.) (quoting *Asay v. State*, 224 So. 3d 695, 700 (Fla. 2017)), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); *see also Dailey v. State*, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019) (stating that under rule 3.852(i), requests must show how the records relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief); *Rutherford v. State*, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (affirming denial of records request under rule 3.852(h)(3) because the records were not related to a colorable claim for postconviction relief).

Gudinas expressly stated in his demand that the records were sought in hopes of discovering evidence that “Florida’s clemency process, and the manner in which the Governor determined that Gudinas should receive a death warrant on May 23, 2025,” are unconstitutional. But this Court has repeatedly denied similar

claims and consistently held that Florida's established clemency proceedings and the Governor's absolute discretion to issue death warrants do not violate the Florida or United States Constitutions. *E.g.*, *Bolin v. State*, 184 So. 3d 492, 503 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting claim that Governor's discretion to select an inmate for execution is unconstitutional); *Muhammad*, 132 So. 3d at 203-04 (concluding that "records would not relate to a colorable claim because we have held many times that claims challenging clemency proceedings are meritless"); *Wheeler v. State*, 124 So. 3d 865, 890 (Fla. 2013) (rejecting claim that because there are no meaningful standards that constrain the Governor's absolute discretion in determining which death warrant to sign, Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment); *Carroll*, 114 So. 3d at 887 (rejecting argument that the Governor's power to select which death row prisoner for whom he will sign a death warrant is arbitrary, without standards, and without any process for review, thus rendering the death penalty unconstitutional); *Mann v. State*, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1163 (Fla. 2013) (holding that records sought in the hopes of supporting allegation that the Governor's selection of Mann for a death warrant was somehow tainted by public input

were not relevant to any colorable claim, and that such a claim is not cognizable); *Gore v. State*, 91 So. 3d 769, 780 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting constitutional challenge to clemency process and warrant selection because of Governor's absolute discretion to sign death warrants); *Valle v. State*, 70 So. 3d 530, 551-52 (Fla. 2011) (rejecting a claim that the Governor's absolute discretion to sign death warrants renders Florida's death penalty structure unconstitutional). Thus, Gudinas's demands seeking records to challenge the constitutionality of Florida's clemency process and the Governor's absolute discretion to sign a death warrant cannot relate to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.

We also find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's determination that Gudinas's demands were overly broad and unduly burdensome, and that Gudinas's failure to previously request documents from the Executive Office of the Governor foreclosed any current effort to obtain those records under rule 3.852(h)(3).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the circuit court's orders summarily denying Gudinas's third successive motion for

postconviction relief and denying his demand for public records.

We also deny his motion for a stay of execution.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court. The mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,

John E. Jordan, III, Judge

Case No. 481994CF007132000AOX

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Adrienne Joy Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Leslie T. Campbell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Lisa-Marie Lerner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Appellee

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

***THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2025 AT 6:00 P.M.***

APPENDIX B

Order Denying Public Records Demand

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND
FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NUMBER: 1994-CF-007132-
A-O

UCN: 24-1994-CF-000150-CF-BM

Supreme Court: SC1960-86070

STATE OF FLORIDA

Plaintiff,

vs.

ACTIVE DEATH WARRANT

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS

Defendant.

_____ /

ORDER DENYING PUBLIC RECORDS DEMAND

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the “Defendant’s Demand for Public Records [Executive Office of the Governor]” filed on May 28, 2025. Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s May 23, 2025 directive to expedite postconviction matters following the issuance of a death warrant, and this Court’s Scheduling Order, issued on May 27, 2025, the Court held a hearing on May 29, 2025 at 3:00 p.m. on the Demand as well as the Executive Office of the Governor’s response and objections filed on May 29, 2025 at 9:59 a.m. After considering the

briefs and argument of counsel, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to the records he requests.

Defendant's demands can be summarized as follows:

- a) All communications between the Governor or any current or former employee of his office with the Florida Parole Commission and/or the Office of Executive Clemency related "in any way whatsoever" to Defendant;
- b) All communications between the Governor or any current or former employee of his office with any other current or former employee of the Office of the Attorney General related "in any way whatsoever" to Defendant;
- c) Any document outlining the criteria for obtaining executive clemency and/or the process for selecting suitable candidates;
- d) Any document outlining the criteria for determining how to grant executive clemency and the factors considered;
- e) The number of death row inmates selected for clemency review and the number for whom review has been completed;

- f) All documents outlining the selection criteria and processes for inmates subject to the entry of a death warrant, including the factors considered in issuing a warrant;
- g) Names of everyone on Florida's Death Row who have had complete or partial clemency investigations or whose case resulted in clemency.
- h) Names and dates of those whom clemency was denied; and
- i) All correspondence/written communications between the Governor's office and the Florida Supreme Court identifying individuals eligible for a death warrant from January 1, 2023 to present.

The Executive Office of the Governor raises the following objections:

1. The records demanded are exempt from disclosure under Florida Law and the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency.
2. The demands are overly broad, unduly burdensome and not related to a colorable claim for postconviction relief.
3. Defendant has not previously requested records from the Executive Officer of the Governor and has not demonstrated good cause for not making these requests before.

ANALYSIS AND RULING

Defendant requests records pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(h)(3) and (i). Subsection (h)(3), is limited to persons under sentence of death whose sentence finalized before October 1, 1998 (Defendant's sentence finalized in 1997). Rule 3.852(h) requests are limited to recipients of public records requests made at the initiation of postconviction proceedings but are not intended to promote "fishing expeditions" into entities not previously subject to requests. *Sims v. State*, 753 So. 2d 66, 69-70 (Fla. 2000); *Dailey v. State*, 283 So. 3d 782, 792 (Fla. 2019); *Cole v. State*, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1065-66 (Fla. 2024). Under subsection (i), Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that requests are not overly broad or unduly burdensome, are timely and not due to lack of diligence as well as that *any* requests are relevant to the proceeding or reasonably calculated to lead to additional admissible evidence. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(i)(1) (A)-(C). Regardless of the vehicle for requesting records, if the Defendant's request neither "relates to a colorable claim for relief" and is "foreclosed by precedent" denial of the request is appropriate. *Tanzi v. State*, No. SC2025-0371, 2025 WL 971568, *3 (Fla. April 1, 2025), *cert. denied sub nom. Tanzi v. Dixon*, No. 24-6932, 2025 WL 1037494 (U.S. April 8, 2025) (quoting *Cole* at 1066); *See also Muhammad v. State*, 132 So. 3d 176, 201 (Fla. 2013) ("...requests for records under rule 3.852(h)(3) may be denied

as far exceeding the scope of subsection (h)(3) if they are overbroad, of questionable relevance, and unlikely to lead to discoverable evidence.”).

Defendant’s motion admits that the executive’s clemency powers are not “generally” subject to second-guessing from the judicial branch. *Lambrix v. State*, 217 So. 3d 977, 990 (Fla. 2017). However, after considering argument and case law, the Court agrees with the Governor’s Office that these demands, which generally relate to the Governor’s processes for granting clemency, are clearly confidential and exempt from public records requests under section 14.28, Florida Statutes (2024) and the Florida Rules of Executive Clemency. *Chavez v. State*, 132 So. 3d 826, 830-31 (Fla. 2014) (“...[clemency] proceedings are within the exclusive purview of the executive branch and *will not* be second-guessed by the judicial branch.”) (emphasis added); *Carroll v. State*, 114 So. 3d 883, 888 (Fla. 2013) (the Florida Constitution vests the clemency power solely in the discretion of the executive; “...it is not this Court’s prerogative to second-guess the executive branch on matters of clemency in capital cases.”); *Gore v. State*, 91 So. 3d 769, 779 (Fla. 2012) (the Governor has “unfettered discretion” in exercising the clemency power).

With regard to the clemency process, Defendant does not identify any specific violation of the law or his constitutional rights. He merely speculates that

the Governor is acting improperly in denying clemency and issuing a death warrant both generally and specifically in Defendant's case. But Defendant does not provide, and the Court is unaware of, any case law consistent with this argument. This Court is bound by the cases previously cited and must deny Defendant's records demands.

Additionally, the Court finds that the demands are overly broad, unduly burdensome and not reasonably calculated to lead to a colorable claim for relief. While Defendant's counsel clarified at the hearing that all demands are limited in time from January 1, 2023 onward, Defendant nevertheless still requests records from multiple agencies and individuals but has failed to establish good cause why his records demands for clemency information were not made until after the death warrant was signed and these expedited postconviction proceedings commenced. Even if the Court were to order Defendant to narrowly tailor his demands, it is not reasonable to suspect that this avenue of discovery will lead to a colorable postconviction claim given its speculative nature, issues regarding separation of powers and the likely confidential nature of the documents.


Finally, the Court agrees that Defendant's failure to request documents from the Executive Office of the Governor previously forecloses any effort now to obtain those records under Rule 3.852(h)(3). *Jimenez v. State*, 265 So. 3d 462, 472

(Fla. 2018) (the plain language of Rule 3.852(h)(3) requires that the Defendant seek documents from entities previously subject to records requests). Additionally, the failure to inquire of the executive's clemency procedures until after the signing of a death warrant fails to satisfy the due diligence requirement for requests under 3.852(i).

Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED AND ADJUDGED** that:

1. The Executive Office of the Governor's objections to "Defendant's Demand for Public Records [Executive Office of the Governor]" filed on May 28, 2025 are **SUSTAINED**.

DONE AND ORDERED at Orlando, Orange County, Florida, on May 29, 2025.


eSigned by John E Jordan 05/29/2025 16:18:36 MQ9Z16n2 —
Honorable John E Jordan
Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing was filed with the Clerk of the Court by using the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal System. Accordingly, a copy of the foregoing is being served on this day to all attorney(s)/interested parties identified on the ePortal Electronic Service List, via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by the ePortal System to include the following:

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No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

***THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2025 AT 6:00 P.M.***

APPENDIX C

Transcript of May 29, 2025 Public Records Hearing

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
2 NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
3 FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
 CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION

4 **STATE OF FLORIDA,**

5 Plaintiff,

CASE NO.: 48-1994-CF-7132-A-O

6 **vs.**

DIVISION NO.: 16

7 **THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,**

8 Defendant.

9
10 **PUBLIC RECORDS HEARING**

11 **BEFORE**

12 **THE HONORABLE JOHN E. JORDAN**

13
14 Orange County Courthouse
15 425 North Orange Avenue
16 Orlando, Florida 32801
17 Courtroom 9D
18 May 29, 2025
19 Stenographically reported

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22
23
24
25 (Appearances on next page.)

1 **A P P E A R A N C E S:**

2 **LESLIE CAMPBELL, ESQUIRE (Via VTC)**

Office of the Attorney General
3 1515 North Flagler Drive, Suite 900
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
4 On behalf of the State

5 **ZACHARY LOYED, ESQUIRE (Via VTC)**

Executive Office of the Governor
6 The Capitol, PL-5
400 South Monroe Street
7 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
On behalf of Governor Ron DeSantis and
8 the Executive Office of the Governor

9 **ALI SHAKOOR, ESQUIRE (Via VTC)**

ADRIENNE SHEPHERD, ESQUIRE (Via VTC)
10 Capital Collateral Regional Counsel
12973 North Telecom Parkway
11 Temple Terrace, Florida 33637
On behalf of the Defendant
12

13 **ALSO PRESENT:**

14 **ANNA DIXON, CCRC Investigator (Via VTC)**

15

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I N D E X

May 29, 2025

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Rebuttal By Mr. Shakoor	19

RULING

21

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

24

- - -

P R O C E E D I N G S

(May 29, 2025; 3:02 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Case No. 1994-CF-7132, State of
Florida vs. Thomas Lee Gudinas.
State?

THE COURT: Can you guys hear us?

MS. CAMPBELL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Loyed, you're the
Assistant General Counsel, correct?

MR. LOYED: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You want to go ahead and
state your presence?

MR. LOYED: Yes, Your Honor. Zachary Loyed for
Governor DeSantis.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Campbell.

MS. CAMPBELL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Leslie Campbell with the Attorney General's Office on
behalf of the State.

THE COURT: Mr. Shakoor, you're up.

MR. SHAKOOR: My name is Ali Shakoor on behalf of
CCRC Middle Region. I'm representing Thomas Gudinas.
I will be speaking today.

THE COURT: All right. Everybody else is just
watching?

1 Okay. So we're here today -- as you recall, we
2 did a scheduling order and Mr. Shakoor had made a
3 request for records as to the Executive Office of the
4 Governor seeking, you know, records of the clemency
5 process, death warrant procedures, and so forth. The
6 governor's office filed an objection and response this
7 morning, and I believe it was Mr. Loyed that authored
8 that response. I've had an opportunity to review the
9 request for records, the response, and the cases that
10 you-all cited.

11 So it's your objection, State. Go ahead. Or
12 Mr. Loyed.

13 **MR. LOYED:** Excuse me, Your Honor.

14 **THE COURT:** I'm sorry. Assistant General Counsel,
15 go ahead.

16 **MR. LOYED:** Yes, Your Honor.

17 And I'll primarily stand on our written response,
18 but the records requested in this case are requested
19 under Rule 3.852(h) and (i). There's some differences,
20 but most of the standards are similar under both rules;
21 that as a threshold matter, all of the records
22 requested by Mr. Gudinas in this case are clemency
23 process records, which are shielded by both statute
24 rule and a wide body of Florida Supreme Court
25 precedent.

1 So the statute I would turn Your Honor to is
2 Section 14.28 Florida Statute. I'd also turn
3 Your Honor to Rule 16 of the Rules of Executive
4 Clemency, and a Supreme Court case, such as
5 *Chavez vs. State*, which reasons that both investigatory
6 and non-investigatory clemency process records are not
7 public records and are shielded from disclosure, and a
8 Court compelling the disclosure of those records would
9 be a separation of powers violation. So as a threshold
10 matter, that shields all of the records requested here
11 from public disclosure, because if they were to exist,
12 it would only exist as part of the governor's
13 determination of whether or not to grant clemency to
14 Mr. Gudinas or whether or not to sign a death warrant
15 and, therefore, to deny him clemency.

16 But as to the merits of the claims, both (h) and
17 (i) have several substantive requirements. The first
18 is that the request must be related to a colorable
19 claim for post-conviction relief. Here, it is clear
20 based on the request that the claim for relief that's
21 being alleged would be a constitutional challenge to
22 Florida's clemency process. However, the Florida
23 Supreme Court has held time and time again that
24 constitutional challenges to clemency proceedings are
25 not a colorable claim for post-conviction relief.

1 There are multiple Florida Supreme Court cases on that
2 point. One I would point the Court to is *Muhammad vs.*
3 *State*.

4 Also, requests under (h) or (i) cannot be overly
5 broad or unduly burdensome, and this is a very broad,
6 very burdensome request. It has, I believe, nine
7 different categories, multiple different forms of
8 communication or records. It has no limitation on time
9 frame, no limitation on the gubernatorial
10 administration or anything of the sort. So for that
11 reason, this request would be overly broad and unduly
12 burdensome.

13 I would also point the Court to recent records
14 request cases, such as this one. There are multiple
15 that are cited in my response. Three that I'll point
16 the Court to would be *State vs. Owen*, *State vs. Gaskin*,
17 and most recently, *State vs. Hutchinson*, with merely
18 identical records requests where the Court agreed that
19 these sorts of records are not subject to disclosure.

20 And the final reason that these records would not
21 be subject to disclosure is because, for records sought
22 under (h), there has to have been a prior request to
23 the agency for records before from collateral counsel.
24 Nowhere in the records request does it allege that
25 collateral counsel or Mr. Gudinas has previously

1 requested records from the Executive Office of the
2 Governor, and I'm certainly not aware of such request.
3 So based on the plain language of (h), that would not
4 be applicable here.

5 As for (i), there has to be good reason shown as
6 to why the records have not been requested before,
7 other than just the fact that now a death warrant has
8 been signed, and there's no good reason shown here as
9 to why these records were not previously requested and
10 are just being requested here now in the eleventh hour,
11 Your Honor.

12 So for all of those reasons, we request that you
13 would deny the demand.

14 **THE COURT:** All right. Mr. Shakoor, go ahead.

15 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Thank you, Judge.

16 First thing is first, our record did define a
17 finite -- or, excuse me, our records request did define
18 a finite time period. We're requesting records from
19 January 1st, 2023, so it's just not a broad fishing
20 expedition. It's not going against -- or going across
21 multiple administrations. We're just asking for
22 records since January 1st, 2023.

23 And, also, Judge, we raised these demands under
24 (h) and (i). So under (h), we understand that no
25 previous request has been made on the governor's

1 office, but this is also a very, very unique case based
2 on the facts alleged in our demand and also the facts
3 we're going to be speaking about today. So it's a
4 very, very unique case where the facts do not align
5 with the other case law where such demands were denied,
6 but we are proper under (i) under any interpretation,
7 because under 3.852(i), it's irrelevant whether or not
8 a previous request was made upon the governor's office.
9 This request was made timely. As soon as the
10 governor's office signed the death warrant, we started
11 preparing and researching this issue.

12 Now, again, it's not broad and it's not an unfair,
13 overly broad request because we're asking for records
14 particularly regarding Thomas Gudinas. Your Honor has
15 the discretion of limiting our request and parsing it
16 out based on your own review of this record and review
17 of today's testimony, but we're asking for everything.
18 But if Your Honor wanted to restrict what we're asking
19 for, we're absolutely asking for anything related to
20 Tommy Gudinas, any relevant conversations, e-mails,
21 text messages, everything that we outlined in our
22 demand related to Thomas Gudinas.

23 And, specifically, we're asking for a list of the
24 people who are clemency eligible, because this is a
25 very, very unique fact pattern. We understand the

1 nature of the case law, but the case law is not
2 absolute regarding what discretion the governor's
3 office has.

4 I would like to cite first *Valle v. State*, that's
5 So.3d -- or, excuse me, 70 So.3d 530, Florida, 2011.
6 It's page 552 of that case. This Court has always
7 proceeded very carefully in addressing claims regarding
8 separation of powers. So I'm asking this Court, yes,
9 please proceed carefully. Definitely, take a cautious
10 approach, as it says in *Sullivan v. Askew*,
11 848 So.2d 312.

12 As we cited in our demand, *Lambrix v. State*,
13 generally based on separations of powers, courts do not
14 second-guess the clemency considerations of the
15 executive branch. So, generally, we understand that.
16 We're not asking for a broad-based ruling. We're
17 saying, specific to the facts of this case, inquiry is
18 required, further scrutiny is required. Because this
19 case is not like the other cases cited by the State.
20 It's not -- it's very unique compared to the cases of
21 precedent that the State is trying to use against us.

22 In this particular case, Judge -- well, first of
23 all, we want to know how many people are clemency
24 eligible. This should be available information. How
25 many people are eligible for the clemency process?

1 Because that helps us determine and investigate whether
2 or not there any due process violations.

3 We know right now there are about 271 inmates on
4 death row. That's as of May 1st -- excuse me,
5 May 21st, 2025. Looking at research, it indicates
6 there's 271 inmates on death row. How many of those
7 people are death eligible? We don't know. How many of
8 these people are truly death eligible because they've
9 gone through the clemency process? We don't know
10 because we're being shielded from that information.
11 And shielding us from that information totally
12 contradicts and goes against the rights of our clients,
13 particularly the rights of Mr. Gudinas, because he has
14 to have that information in order to determine to what
15 extent he's being treated unfairly as far as his due
16 process rights. We do know how many -- again, we don't
17 know how many people have gone for clemency in the last
18 five years, the last ten years. It's a secretive
19 process that we believe we're entitled to.

20 Based on some research and talking to the other
21 attorneys in the field, we see some records that
22 34 inmates have gone through clemency since 2012, but,
23 respectively, we need records from the governor's
24 office to tell us how many inmates have gone through
25 clemency, because there's no basis for that secret,

1 particularly under the unique facts of this case.

2 How many attorneys are practicing post-conviction
3 in Florida? As of August 14, 2024, there are
4 35 registered capital registry attorneys. CCRC Middle,
5 the agency I work for, Attorney Shakoor -- and I'll be
6 using my name in the third person, not for some
7 Rickey Williams -- or Rickey Henderson-type, but I need
8 to make a record, because Attorney Shakoor is relevant
9 to these proceedings as it affects my client,
10 Thomas Gudinas.

11 So CCRC Middle has 14 attorneys, including myself,
12 Ali Shakoor. So we're talking about 35 attorneys on
13 the registry. CCRC Middle has 14 attorneys.

14 CCRC North, four attorneys as lead counsel, three
15 second chairs. That's based on my research and based
16 on me inquiring with these other offices.

17 CCRC South has five lead qualified attorneys.
18 That doesn't count second chairs for CCRC.

19 So 35 plus 14 plus 7, just doing some quick math,
20 we're looking at, I don't know, 50 to 60-some-odd
21 capital post-conviction attorneys practicing in
22 Florida. And don't hold me to that. I'm trying to do
23 math off the top of my head on the record, but the
24 record speaks for itself as far as how many attorneys
25 are available to practice post-conviction law.

1 Now, despite all these different practicing
2 attorneys doing post-conviction and despite all these
3 different death-eligible attorneys -- I'm sorry,
4 death-eligible defendants on death row, one attorney,
5 Ali Shakoor, Attorney Shakoor, has received four death
6 warrants since July 29th, 2024, so that's just -- it's
7 just curious. It's just -- it requires more inquiry.
8 It requires more scrutiny, because this is different
9 from the cases cited by the State when we're talking
10 about one particular attorney being selected for four
11 death warrants in less than one year's time, despite
12 all of the available clemency -- post-clemency
13 defendants and all of the other attorneys practicing
14 post-conviction. It's just curious.

15 Not just that, Attorney Ali Shakoor has been
16 copied and served on three death cases that aren't even
17 his case, that aren't even my case, and I cited it in
18 the demand itself. And I was actually served by
19 Mr. Loyed's office, so I'm sure he has a record of this
20 information, that I was served on *State v. Tanzi* on
21 March 10th, 2025. I was served on *State v. Hutchinson*,
22 March 31st, 2025. Most recently, I was served on
23 *State v. Wainwright*, May 5th, 2025. And on that day
24 when I was -- I don't represent any of these people.
25 Attorney Shakoor does not represent any of those three

1 people, but on that same day I was served on the
2 Defendant Wainwright case, I also got notice from the
3 Court for Wainwright to appear at a hearing on Monday,
4 of which a client I do not -- I don't even represent.
5 So that's just curious. It was concerning. And
6 luckily I got that e-mail and notified the judge that I
7 will not be there because I do not represent that
8 defendant.

9 So these issues are relevant because it's relevant
10 to the clients of Attorney Shakoor, particularly
11 Thomas Gudinas, because if Thomas Gudinas is just
12 living his life on death row -- and we understand the
13 governor has unfettered discretion to sign on whoever
14 he wants to, but, again, there's also qualifying
15 language, as I mentioned before, regarding, generally,
16 we don't question that, we have to take a cautious
17 approach, so it's not absolute.

18 So we are entitled to -- particularly, Mr. Gudinas
19 is entitled to more records to find out -- well,
20 records from the governor's office to find out how his
21 case got selected, why his case got selected, and to
22 what extent his attorney had anything to do with that.
23 We don't know, but this is very, very suspicious, so we
24 need to make a record.

25 It would be irresponsible and naive not to make a

1 record at this point, because a little bit inside -- a
2 little inside baseball regarding how this works in the
3 legal community, the legal defense bar, capital defense
4 bar is really curious, just talking to people, talking
5 to me, and people talking about the process of these
6 death warrants just coming over and over and over in
7 the last couple years. Why is Attorney Shakoor getting
8 so many death warrants? It's just curious. It's
9 prejudicial to the rights of Shakoor's clients.
10 Because even though the governor might have so-called
11 unfettered discretion, they are still -- the discretion
12 still has to be used under the basis of the United
13 States Constitution.

14 Hypothetically, a governor cannot just sign death
15 warrants on people based on where they're from or their
16 religion or hair color. I'm just giving hypotheticals.
17 So it's not unfettered discretion. I would say that a
18 governor similarly could not sign death warrants based
19 on any characteristics of who that -- who represented
20 the defendant. We're just speculating. We don't know,
21 but we know that there's very, very strange and
22 irregular practices going on in this case.

23 So, again, this is our fourth -- this is my
24 fourth, my team's fourth, death warrant since last
25 July, but we have not filed any prior record demands

1 for the governor's office. We didn't file one in
2 Rogers. We didn't file one in *Ford*. We did not file
3 one in *Cole*. But at this point, it's very, very
4 curious and it would be irresponsible not to ask more
5 information to get further inquiry regarding why
6 Thomas Gudinas had a clemency on April 2nd, 2025, at a
7 clemency review, and less than two months later, he
8 gets a death warrant signed on him and he happens to be
9 represented by Attorney Shakoor, the same person who
10 received his fourth death warrant since last July 29th,
11 2025 [sic].

12 So based on the unique facts of this case,
13 Mr. Gudinas is entitled to more records to figure out
14 what's going on in his case to see how his rights may
15 or may not be violated. Yes, the government might have
16 unfettered discretion, but Mr. Gudinas is entitled to
17 basic fundamental fairness to be treated like any other
18 person on death row; not based on who represents him,
19 but based on the facts of this case and the crime and
20 any other factors that are constitutional.

21 So this case is very, very, very unique. It's
22 very peculiar. And at this point, Mr. Gudinas is just
23 simply asking for additional records who has laid his
24 case as far as, he's asking only for records at this
25 point. He's not asking for an evidentiary hearing yet.

1 We might need an evidentiary hearing to find out more
2 information regarding why he was selected after just
3 having clemency on April 2nd, 2025, but we need to make
4 a record at this point. It's important to make a
5 record for Mr. Gudinas and future defendants.

6 Because, again, like, when I'm served on these
7 cases that I don't represent the defendant on, like the
8 example I just gave for Mr. Wainwright, if I didn't get
9 that e-mail, then Mr. Wainwright's attorney would not
10 have known that there was a court date on Monday, and
11 this slows down the process for people trying to
12 litigate their cases in a very expedited period of
13 time. Serving me when it's not my case inhibits the
14 process for the people who should be served. It slows
15 everything down. And this is publicly available
16 information as far as who represents who. It's easy to
17 find out on the internet who is representing somebody
18 after a death warrant is signed or, particularly,
19 before a death warrant is signed. It's easy to access
20 that information.

21 So under the very, very unique and troubling
22 factors of this case, it's important to make a record.
23 So this case is not like past cases cited by the State.
24 This case would be -- if we are granted relief in this
25 case, State v. Gudinas would create a high bar. It

1 would create -- it would be very difficult to replicate
2 the fact pattern of State v. Gudinas, so this might
3 open the flood gates of people, future defendants,
4 reaching out to the governor's office seeking a review,
5 unless there was some type of irregular, strange fact
6 pattern that would necessitate such -- the granting of
7 such records, such as the strange, abnormal fact
8 pattern of this case.

9 That's all I have right now. Thank you.

10 **THE COURT:** Mr. Loyed?

11 **MR. LOYED:** Yes, Your Honor.

12 I would just disagree with what Mr. Shakoor said.
13 First and foremost, I don't think this would set a high
14 bar. I think the bar this would set would just be, if
15 an attorney says that the case is curious and needs
16 more inquiry, then the Court would disregard the
17 separation of powers and would disregard Florida
18 Supreme Court precedent and open up the hood to allow
19 an unlimited fishing inquiry for records. So I do not
20 think Your Honor would be irresponsible to deny this
21 request.

22 And directly quoting from the Florida Supreme
23 Court, the Florida Supreme Court has said that the
24 clemency process in Florida go absolute in our
25 constitution. The people of Florida have vested sole,

1 unlimited, unrestricted discretion exclusively in the
2 executive in exercising this act of grace, and those
3 are the process records the defendant is seeking in
4 this case, are solely clemency records.

5 As to the time frame that Mr. Shakoor mentioned, I
6 do see on the final portion of his request, Section I,
7 a January 1st, 2023 to present time frame, but -- I
8 could be missing that, but I don't see it on any other
9 portion of the request. So I would disagree that this
10 is a discrete time period being requested. This is a
11 very broad and burdensome request, like I mentioned in
12 the opening of my argument, and nothing has changed
13 with that. And it's also simply just not related to a
14 colorable claim for post-conviction relief.

15 So I'll rest with that and on my written response,
16 Your Honor.

17 **THE COURT:** Okay. Mr. Shakoor, I'll give you one
18 final word, if you'd like.

19 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Yes. Thank you very much, Judge.

20 We're asking for everything since January 23rd, so
21 if it's not clear --

22 **THE COURT:** Well, can I interrupt you on that one?

23 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Yes.

24 **THE COURT:** Because, likewise, I noticed only
25 request (i) was limited between January 1st, '23 to the

1 present. The rest talked either about Mr. Gudinas or
2 policies in general and had no time limitation on them.
3 So if I read your request wrong, let me know.

4 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Then I apologize for that. So let
5 me clarify. We want everything only since January 1st,
6 2023, the current term we're discovering, and we don't
7 want anything beyond the rules. We're going to make it
8 as simple as possible. This is really about
9 Mr. Gudinas' rights and this is about what Mr. Gudinas
10 is going through and him getting a death warrant less
11 than two months after his clemency review under the
12 unique, strange factors of this case based on who his
13 attorney is -- or, perhaps, based on who his attorney
14 is. So just since January 23rd of 2021 -- sorry,
15 January 1st of 2023 is all we're asking for.

16 And, again, like we -- I appreciate Mr. Loyed's
17 response, but it's ignoring the fact pattern of this
18 case. This is not any attorney in a future dispute.
19 You can't just say it, you've got to prove it. And I
20 think we've proven it here how strange it is that
21 Mr. Gudinas got a death warrant under these
22 circumstances.

23 **THE COURT:** All right. Thank you.

24 And, Mr. Shakoor, just for the record, you
25 represent Mr. Gudinas, correct?

1 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Yes, I did -- yes, I do, Judge.

2 **THE COURT:** Okay. All right. So thank you for
3 the oral argument and all the materials and cases you
4 provided. I'm going to give you my verbal ruling now
5 and then I will file the order this afternoon.

6 So the Court finds that the defendant seeks
7 numerous records and communications concerning the
8 clemency process and the issuance of a death warrant.
9 And although at the hearing today, you limit it to
10 January 1st, 2023 to the present, the Court finds that
11 still it would be overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
12 not reasonably calculated to lead to a colorable claim
13 for post-conviction relief.

14 The Court finds that clemency decisions are within
15 the purview of the governor's discretion and, likewise,
16 are exempt from disclosure. The defendant has not
17 identified any specific violation of the law or his
18 constitutional rights. Defendant is speculating the
19 governor acted improperly.

20 The Court finds the defendant's request is
21 untimely and thereby fails to meet the due diligence
22 requirement of (h), and no good reason shown why the
23 records were not requested before.

24 So the Court is sustaining the objections of the
25 Executive Office of the Governor and I will have a

1 written order for you this afternoon.

2 All right. Is there anything else we want to talk
3 about? You have your expert going tomorrow?

4 **MR. SHAKOOR:** He's there today, Judge. My motion
5 will be filed -- the motion will be filed timely.

6 **THE COURT:** Saturday?

7 **MR. SHAKOOR:** Yes, Saturday; will be filed timely.
8 Our motion will be filed timely, Judge.

9 **THE COURT:** Okay. And then Sunday at 3 p.m.,
10 State, Ms. Campbell?

11 **MS. CAMPBELL:** Yes, Your Honor, we'll be filing
12 it.

13 **THE COURT:** Filing your response to that motion
14 that's going to be filed by 2 p.m. on Saturday.

15 And then we have our *Huff* hearing at 9 a.m. on
16 Monday, June 2nd, and we have an evidentiary hearing
17 scheduled for Tuesday, June 3rd, at 9 a.m. Everybody
18 agree?

19 **MS. CAMPBELL:** Yes, Your Honor.

20 **THE COURT:** And note, you know, I originally
21 prepared a scheduling order and then you-all -- we kind
22 of went back and forth during that first hearing about
23 adjusting some times and I adjusted them. Well, I
24 adjusted the end times for me for filing my final
25 order. I'm going to use the deadline the Supreme Court

1 used, which is Thursday, June 5th, at 2 p.m. So you'll
2 see that at the end of my scheduling order.

3 All right. Is there anything else we can discuss
4 before I let you go?

5 **MR. SHAKOOR:** No, Judge.

6 **MS. CAMPBELL:** Nothing from the State.

7 **THE COURT:** All right. That'll conclude the
8 hearing then.

9 (The proceedings were concluded at 3:26 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF FLORIDA:

COUNTY OF ORANGE:

I, Breean Crisp, RMR, CRR, Official Court Reporter of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, do hereby certify, pursuant to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.535(h)(3), that I was authorized to and did report in stenographic shorthand the foregoing proceedings, and that thereafter my stenographic shorthand notes were transcribed to typewritten form by the process of computer-aided transcription, and that the foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcription of my shorthand notes taken therein.

WITNESS my hand this 30th day of May, 2025, in the City of Orlando, County of Orange, State of Florida.

s/Breean Crisp, RMR, CRR
Breean Crisp, RMR, CRR

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

THOMAS LEE GUDINAS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida

APPENDIX TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

***THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
WITH AN EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR
TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2025 AT 6:00 P.M.***

APPENDIX D

Writings Showing Severe Mental Illness

Dear Mr. President Donald Trump, Alarlas

Sir, what I'm about to reveal to you the United States government, should be top secret info. I've shared some of this info. with my appeal attorney's, my name is THOMAS GUAINAS, I reside on Florida's - Death-Row. I'm a true believer in God, I'm Catholic and feel God pointed me in this direction to reveal what I've uncovered recently, a secret system running under the nose of the Government and the reason why I was put on Death-Row. A lot of what I found deals with intelligence and I believe terrorist could be involved in this system as well, on the fraud side of it. I asked my attorney out of Tampa - Florida "ALI SHAKOOR" to file a motion for a full investigation, and to file this as newly discovered evidence - as it is and to file for a new trial and my out-right release from Custody of D.O.C. into public life, as I'm being held here on a secret system of fraud, conspiracy, all my rights have been violated because of this newly discovered evidence. I really can't explain much on paper, of what I found, I need experts in the field of decoding, which I asked my attorney to provide as well. My case was circumstantial and no eye witness to any crime, I knew something was wrong when I first was arrested and the new evidence proves in fact, that the system was pre-planned to put me in the area, where these crimes were committed, so I could take the fall for other's actions involved with this fraud. I wasn't even born yet while this info existed. But wearing my name I ended up being a "vehicle" in this fraud. On top of that there is info in this system I don't know how to read, but experts could - it could take years of investigation, to try to figure out a small portion of what I already uncovered. I also believe our government is at "risk" of being bugged - through "words, letters and names and numbers - systems" →

CCRC - MIDDLE

MAR 10 2025

RECEIVED BY

"LEGAL MAIL"

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

I believe most of us are forced to live in it or with it in many ways - Some are good ways and some are terrible and ILLEGAL!!

Enclosed: You'll find what I have already gave and tried to explain to my current attorney - A Letter and Exhibits 1-20 showing some of the things I found and tried to formulate for my attorney to the best of my ability. I DID Let my attorney know, this information I gave him is "Dangerous" and he agreed, because knowing this - could alert terrorists to take action under a disguise etc., All this info. I uncovered, I realize goes deeper than what I'm explaining and what I'm explaining ought to scare people. This is of "great public importance" but may need to be kept secret until a full investigation.

The importance of this info, has far reaching effects, I believe it's a world-wide system, with secret passages within the info. This system could be the reason, why someone tried to shoot you and you should know everything about this system - It's not bright at all Mr. President, that decent people can get railroaded by this secret system. Isn't strange that I found my name in the victim's name, for the crimes I was charged with, you won't believe all the other things I uncovered. This is all an invasion of privacy and much more. A violation of all my rights as a natural-born U.S. citizen. The Florida Governor is a Catholic, and no true Catholic would ever kill or execute someone in the name of Jesus or any other name "with the info. of this secret system of fraud and device work - without a full investigation and where the public has the right to see the full investigation "report" because average citizen's lives are at risk under this secret system.

Sir, please give the Florida governor a call on these matters. Once a full investigation is done by attorneys and the government, I feel it's the government's duty "to pardon me of all charges" And I hope you agree Mr. President in light of the evidence. This is a very serious matter, Thank you for your time and help.

Sincerely, Thomas L. Guadalupe Jr.

FL. Clemency Board

THOMAS L. GUADALUPE JR. AND

FL. Governor Ron Desantis,

United States Supreme Clerk of Court

Ali Shakoor Appeal Attorney,

Orange County orlando States attorney,

CC:

LEGAL (1 of 1 Letter) I Alleged: DATE: 12/2/24

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Im Sending a copy to All parties involved and All major media
and Front-line on P.B.S. who study Conspiracies. Separately
RECENTLY I Came to Study words,

AND Found a Secret system, Connected with
why I was persued and charged with False crimes.
Im going to LAY DOWN, step by step several patterns
to show you real facts of newly discovered evidence -
Id like for everything I write about these facts to be viewed
by all major media and to be public record. I cared about my
life and well so much, something inside me my spirit, told me
to Study these words the way I did. I started out studying the
Calendar and Symbols on the clock - using numbers and letters
and numbers dont lie - unless you change the position of them. -

(FIRST) Im to Let you know I found my name in several buisnesses
and others places around the world - hidden in many different words
and names - each letter has a number - I also found my name "last"
which is very rare in the word "D.N.A" I want to show you -
Exhibit #1 to show you how I do every word or name to get
the information of All these facts under this Secret system. I allege
I didnt know any of these facts until recently nor do I believe that
my trial judges or prosecutor or Attorneys - were aware of all these facts
of newly discovered evidence - because I dont believe they are the ones who
actually set this system up - its much bigger than that. There is a -
conspiracy and the true facts are un-covered "prove there is
a bigger conspiracy not only to my case, but a way of life
for some people. Im send a copy to my Appeal attorney and
other parties in the near future, so I can have them file a motion
for my release, either at the trial court level or straight to the
united States Supreme court - this could raise a conflict
in filing - where some of this ongoing discovery puts these
organizations of LAW in the middle of the evidence discovery
so, there may have to be a special hearing to ensure fairness
and due-process of my rights in presented all the facts
that have now been gathered and any other future facts
gathered in this discovery. This is of great public importance
and the courts should take great interest, in releasing me to my
family, with my fact findings. Sincerely Thomas A. Madson.

LEGAL

I Allege:

EXIBIT #1

You Add (D to N to A) Bring them Down
Continue the process

$\begin{matrix} & =C & =4 & =14 & =1 \\ & =P & =m & & \\ W & = & S & = & T & = & R & = & O \end{matrix}$

You start with
(D, N, A.)
You will find
my full name
(THOMAS GUDINAS)

$\begin{pmatrix} D, N, A. \\ K=R / O=H+I \\ K= / G=U=H+I \\ =R / =B=T \end{pmatrix}$ side note RO=G
(Double plug in)

once you get to the end
you add all the top letters
together. Then you connect
all other letters to get a
complete reading of the complete
word. Every word comes to
a complete end in my study.

The ALPHABET A B C D E all the way to Z

$\begin{matrix} 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\ F & G & H & I & J \\ 6 & 7 & 8+9 & 10 \end{matrix}$

(numbers DON'T LIE)

You
Turn
H
its
an
I

You have other letters like Y where if you turn it there
is also AT) and Z has a double L in it, turn
it to the right and upside down to the right. Q has
an Electrical connection - which I call the curve line
in the Q (A plug in)

LEGAL

I Alleged:

EXHIBIT #2 THE VICTIM FROM MAY 24th 1994
MICHELLE MCGRATH

I found my name inside the victims ("Hidden")

(THIS IS How I found it) ↓

~~*The victims LAST name*~~

GUDINAS → MCGRATH
= R = J = S = U = B + C
= B = ~~DD~~ = RL = N = W = E

side note:
AS you notice the word
Jury has already appeared
in my study + you could add
the S (JuryS)

I Don't Have to
Complete the process
on the victims name
because I already found
the newly discovered facts
of evidence. Before I even
finished it.

note AS you See I already
found my LAST name
Gudinas in her LAST
name and I'm not
even finished with the
study at this point -
found it very quickly.

I Alleged:

(I uncovered a Conspiracy to
Execute an innocent person
To The charges of 1st degree murder)

LEGAL* QUOTE - * They SAY the (PEN) IS mightier Than The Sword *

I Alleged

EXHIBIT #3 THE TRIAL Judge in my case out of orange county FL.
(BELVIN PERRY)

Trial Judge
This is what I found in
Belvin PERRY'S name

I Alleged:
Facts of Evidence

I Alleged:
AS you notice
which I find very
often in words

LEQ which is A
Cop and this cop looks
like he is from Berlin-
Germany or IRE short
for IRELAND - You also
HAVE DIE VERN in the
Trial Judges name
AND PIG = COP

(Plug in)
(Electrical Device Source)

AS you can see I also
found the word "HIRE"
I Alleged to be a fit in
in something bigger
The judge was hired to
have me executed "BLINDLY"
under conspiracy

BELVIN
RQ = HIRE = D = WV
= IG
= P

There's an
O in Q
So RO = G = P
RA = I X

CNS is the link
and hospitals
using needle
drugs to
A device
hooked into
the computer
systems to
control people's
minds + actions
in electrical circuits

Defendant
Thomas GUDENAS

PERRY
UN
RG
Y = T
on the
TURN
T = OT
EN
= NS
= GUNS

AS you notice T.G
is my name initials

X = mark the spot AND X LIST

Jury
in his name

N = Gun
BI - J
K U

14 = N I y
ADN (P) C = 0
ER M =
W

J O
LAW E
M X U
K F

United Kingdom
FEW

BIBLE LEO
Q = plug in

whether he realizes this
or not
A Jew Cop
under the disguise
of the word dye
where you change the
color of someone's skin
through drugs + devices
perry is a Jew out of
the bible in this way

T = + means
TO THE T
Got the job
done

The letter Y is a symbol
of money - the word money
came from a two part source
no money is transacted with-
out both sources which includes
electrical devices - and letters to a two part Data Source

* NOT All cops know or are
aware they are in a systematic
system only the few know. *
note: There's a Truth source
to money + a lie source to
money transactions throughout
the world for specific Business.

charts.

* LEGAL *

Exhibit #S

I Alleged:

need ^{cop} SSI Q
CRS Z
UK
F

JOSH ON The Turn

drUGS | GUDINAS
VLBZ | B
Q-HN

match

The CROSS
Happens
Through
Drug
Process

United Kingdom
Parliament
plugin

I Alleged:
THE Bible clearly states
NOT TO Swear on anything
ALL courts use the Bible
to Swear in witnesses
IF You TAKE this
True fact for example
between Truth + LIES

JOSH is in the Bible = cop
AND there are

Spain + England
Are Connected
AS Friends
Through The
word WASP
and Washington DC

People here on
the Row with
That name and
others with that name

THE words
↓ ↓

LIE GOD
1295 7184
26 26 ← ADD together

EXACT MATCH
numbers DON'T LIE
when in correct position.

THERE IS A Truth God
AND A LIE God
The Covenant made
in the bible I Alleged
was with the LIARS
LIE God (Abraham)
which is also the
name of a dead
President or money

↓

ISRAEL = cop
B Q

plugin

SBQ-Q
US-N
= BUNS
= ASS
= SEX
money

= short for
Buisness

Double plugin
= BOOKS
= BOOKIES

LEGAL

I ALlege:

Exhibit #6

I ALlege:

Due to this new discovered Evidence

THE WORD BUSINESS

PLAYS an Important roll

For my ILLegal Arrest and Confinement

AS you will see what I find Hidden
in this particular word:

I didn't →
even finish
the word
And found
my name
immediately

"BUSINESS" →
C A
G DB

The circled letters
spell GUDINAS
AND

BUG = Device
Electrical

CA =
California

in, electrical → Elect →
politicians

(Q = plugin)

LEGAL

Allege
Exhibit #7

* accumulated * TO ALL Exhibits + motion *
LAW
* Fruit of the poison Tree *
Newly discovered Evidence
True FACTS
That no public servant of
The LAW can ignore and
Everyday citizens

Devices

locks
Every
name you
put on a
clock reads
a Symbol

Computers
= R

INTERNET / TECHNOLOGIES
= W = X
underlined
Letters
Spell lies

It Tells you
where the
SCIENTIFIC
LABS
are
Located too.

most people who work for these media systems
are not aware of the few who use Devices
in these medias - for criminal acts + cons.
Electrical outlets/inlets

Diagram illustrating a complex system of symbols and codes, likely related to media and technology, with various branches and connections.

Media ABC

- ABC = C = E
- H = N = H
- R = V = H

Media ABC

- A = Z
- A = A

Media ABC

- ON the turn
- IRAN FT.

Media ABC

- ON the turn of H
- = F, you get the
- Q plugin for the
- police organisation
- "ICE" = HI
- HAWII FIVE
- meaning Cop.

Media ABC

- plugin (PIN)
- British Columbia
- PEN -
- united
- cup / cube
- Like an "ICE"
- cube
- cup
- u. N.

Media ABC

- CBS
- X = E = U
- X = Z
- ↑
- Tripple
- XXX
- SEX
- Cubes
- cubs

Media ABC

- IP.B.S.
- X = R = U
- K = M
- ↑
- = PIG
- = Rum
- = Bums
- meaning
- ASS
- money.

Media ABC

- THOMAS
- S = B
- FOX T = C
- = U = m A J
- = H I
- HIT SET
- "Hum"
- HAWII FIVE
- They HAVE
- the Hum
- Commercial
- on T.V.
- Then you got
- Sum = X
- money (BIS)

LEGAL
FRANCIS
EXhibit #8

NEWLY discovered controlling facts
accumulated.

ON Every U.S. dollar is, 5^s, 10^s, 20^s, 50^s, 100^s

You HAVE The words
IN GOD WE TRUST

← HAVING someone else
PAY for their sins
G.O.P.

ASIA

STUDY The

Kings name
SHIVAX

→ over a thousand
Years ago and
You will find
G.O.P.
in order

The U.S.
Government
Grand old party
Did not originate
From America

whether politicians know
it or not and work
under the disguise - The few,
A money LIE

(26) Lie = (26)

← match →

people's Lives ARE For
Buissness

under A (LIE)
numbers DON'T LIE

my name is connected
in digits = money / time
And a few other things.

I Found my name THOMAS GUBINAS
in the Letter O And number O/ZERO

DOCTORS - Are connected

TO D.O.C. workers

Department of Corrections

where a needle

can be administered

AND Hospital's

THIS Also proves

They were SLAVES

For Sale + buissness

over a 1000 years ago

SLAVES did not originate

In Africa or America

I Alleged:

Exhibit #9

newly discovered evidence
prosecution witness *

1994

Orlando Florida

FRANK
Q=X=S=O=Y
Q=Q=H=N
⑤=Y=V
GN=④

Wriggley
Q

IF you
want to use
SLANG

SHOT
on the turn
From Y

FQX media
plug IN
money

He is a
Police phen
Pony

RANKS
are in his name.

GUNS & plug in.

MR. Wriggley

was the first one to contact
the police in this fraud case -
He HAS A LEQ plug in in
his name above - why didn't
Fred or Dwayne HARRIS

go to the police until MR. Wriggley
Got them to go to the police -
it was a set-up by MR. Wriggley
whether he knew about my newly
discovered evidence "today" back then
in 1994, then he is being used
as a vehicle if he didn't, to
get me convicted of someone else's
doing of 1st degree murder.

Through the plug in Q system
in LEQ.

* LEGAL *

I Alleged;
Exhibit #10

in All Exhibits

This can't All

be a Coincidence

where real facts

EXIST,

IN The bible

The LAW

it equals "SIN"

it SAYS That.

I owned A Bible

once That had A

Symbol hidden on the cover

in which I discovered it was A RADIO.

FN MAY
YOUNG AMY
who is found
in Doc
out of
new York

Jan / Feb / Mar / April / May / June

in the
POSITIVE
= RADIO
ENERGY
Electrical
BAR

= RADIO
in the
negative

JJ
= TO THE T

number 20 on the alphabet = T

The number 4 = LIARS The month of April

IF You Look A + ANY
Electrical outlet closely enough
you can see owl EYES
+ HEAD

And SCIENTIFIC RATS

Literally humans were made
for sacrifices in the system

There is a Scientific RAT
made for every police force

* True FACTS True statement of facts *

The Clemency Attorney appointed
by the Florida Governor

First name JASON / Last name

(K)

my first Longtime childhood friend

His name was Jason Bowers

His First name is

Actually on The Calendar

we All or Some Live by

STARTING with

July / August / September / October / November

↑

THEN Dec

short for Decision

SIN

LEGAL


I Allege;
* All these exhibits an motions
Are of Great public interest True and valid claims.

Exhibit #11 I Allege;

* TRUE FACTS of newly discovered evidence *
Anything found in any parties name working for
the STATE of Florida under the Law against the defendant
Creates a serious conflict and a prejudice
to due process and fair hearings on trials with
the Evidence + facts found in all these exhibits an motions.

/ IN God we TRUST
money pyramid
Comes from EGYPT
A DYE/HIDE

This is what I found in The prosecutor's name from my TRIAL



Ⓜ
DNA
JOKE A
NCLPLTG
OOB I
DA
S - Ⓜ
UB

AS you notice Tom/G.
is there

using the D.N.A TOOL

The YEAR of Lucifer
IN THE YEAR of THE LORD

Jesus

Jesus = 74 Lucifer = 74

↑
MATCH

How did I find
this wisdom

How I found five 0 = F → 666 in the Bible
666 is 18 1+8 = 9 = I


* LEGAL *

Exhibit #12
I Alleged:


* where the victim worked *
NASA

I FOUND THIS IN


A Scientific
organisation
+ Technologies
That use
Devices
AS well



— which you find in exhibit #11
in the prosecutor's name, SAT
AND N to the O



Found in the prosecutor's
name,
AND TAT
found in the prosecutor's
name
exact match



* This was facts
way before the
crimes charged
and convicted of
At trial "Exsisted"
in the prosecutors
name. *

LEGAL

I Alleged:

Exhibit #B

U.S. Citizens
That reside
Secretly in
Cuba

Connected
to the American
Constitution

The BAY of
PIGS must
Likely, where
this stemmed
From.

I Alleged: which I believe is A business
DEAL

(I HAVE FOUND THE COUNTRY → Cuba
INSIDE THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION)

* (W) CONSTITUTION

=R=C=G=M=C=C=O=C=X=C

=U=J=T=P=F=R=D=R=A=A

=E=D=J=V=X=V=V=S=(B)

=I=N=F=T=T=P=O=U

=W=T=Z=N=J=E=(J)

=Q=T=N=X=O=O

=K=H=L=M=D

=S=T=Y=(Q)

=M=S=P

=F=I

T (L)
MA
D Q P
B
GUN
TA =
Touch down
TQM
LAMB/PAD
LAMP/QIL map
LA police HI Five
PLUG IN.

my Full name is above
Thomas Lee Gudinas JR.

Q
mD. Doctor
by bullet or needle
plugin
SHOT
HOLE
KITS
TQMS/plug
notice, how there
A" WIRE & plugin
down the left side.

COP/PROOF
READ

Jed/I/can/Gun
Their are IN/lets
and outlets

Joe/Joe mode
INLET Cuba J&B
outlet ? Question

TWAIN/WIN
Totlet, Q-Plugin ZN
TNT ZONE
Double Gun NN
CON/CAN

" ABOVE newly discovered Evidence "


LEGAL
Allege #14

newly Discovered
Information

ATTORNEYS on the case

michael  IRWIN

BOB  BLANC

Amy  Settemire

Look
↓
IN Exhibit #20
You find michael Irwin
in Detective
Griffin
the arresting officer

As you notice
my first
chair trial
attorney also
has a LEQ
plugin in
his name

As you notice
above there is
a LEQ plugin
in my trial
attorneys name
and he was
the only one
that tried to
get me to
confess on
a tape -
recorder he
brought up
to the orange
county Jail

LEQ = cop plugin
in the above name

we will file
a motion to
dismiss all
charges against
me on time
with the proper
procedures.


me + my appeal attorney will finish
the above names in the near future
to uncover the rest of facts connected
to the case and other sources
what we have already in all these
exhibits is extremely damaging to
the states stand against me for
false imprisonment and fraud and
preditorial injury "prejudice" and Conspiracy.

* LEGAL *

Exhibit #15 IAllege,

newly discovered facts and evidence
of a conspiracy to commit fraud on an
innocent person of 1st Degree murder.

I Allege: The
MR LAMAR might
of not been aware
of this conspiracy
and was used as a tool
of the court, through
the actual people who
know how to run
the SYSTEM I've un-covered
That would be know in
an immediate investigation
into these facts and claims
that show proof of a
conspiracy and false imprisonment.



LEGAL
 I Alleged:
 Exhibit #16

Thomas Gudinas Have newly discovered
 evidence below. This was taking off my case
 This Judge and replaced by belvin perry:

1ST, original Judge handling case in question: MR DAWSON

RISKY = R - K (S)
 DANIEL P.
 = E = D = W = N = Q = 16th
 = T = L = K = E
 = F = W = P
 = C = M
 Letter of the Alphabet

I Come → MOVIE

Towel
 means the
 throw in
 towel in
 is there

circled
 SPAIN I
 SHIP

CAP is there
 ELK TOWN
 is there
 INK/wink =
 BYE, there.

AS You notice

DAN is above -
 that can also be
 DNA same letters
 Gudinas is in DNA,
 and the word LIE
 is right next to
 DAN - with IEL -
 LION is there

ION, being an
 electrical device
 present and
 Leo/LEQ plugin.

16 on the
 clock 4
 which is
 APRIL
 4th month
 = LIAR
 P/D
 Police dept.

DAWSON
 = E = X = P = H
 = C = N = X
 = Q = L
 = C
 Letter of the Alphabet

(WASP)
 EXP.
 - Y U Z Y
 - A U Z Y
 ENGLISH/ENG.
CHAP

July
 CODE NAME
 For JASON on the calendar

AL, Cox and Cole
 is in his name there
 two were on the Row

CQW plugin is there
 WA, DC. is there

DECCY is there with A plugin.
 → DA = District Attorney
 → is there.

LEGAL

NEWLY Discovered Evidence

I Alleged: →

Exhibit #17

note: After sharing this newly discovered information with the clemency Commission I feel they may want to sign my warrant to have me executed because of these facts secretly hidden we uncovered recommended to the Governor. This information we uncovered is so dangerous, having the information could put anyone's life in Jeopardy. This info. shows they would be executing an innocent person under a conspiracy plot by a system of individuals that knows how to work this un-lawful system, either way a recommendation would be illegal unless they gave me a full pardon - and a warrant would be illegal due to the nature and fraud we been un-lawfully arrested under. A full investigation needs to ensue into these facts we uncovered. Thank you!

② CLEMENCY

D=Q=R=R=S=Q=B W
FA=F=I=J=K=J=S
=O=S=U=U=C
=H=N=P=X
P ⊕
F ⊕
L
V ⊕
Z=R
= ⊕

③ Commission

=R=B=Z=V=B=L=B=X=C
=T=B=V=X=N=N=Z=A
=V=X=T=L=B=N=A
=T=R=F=N=P=O
S=L=X=T=D=E
=J=R=X=I
W D =B=P=G
Z W S =R=W
= ⊕

private Florida T.V.
Brit, LEQ plugin
money jobs.
BRAVO

up above in Clemency
The words COLE
LEO, LEQ, money,
Con. Are there und others
Cole is connected to
A plugin LEQ / cop
who they took out of
u.c. and executed
at F.S.P. recently, I
feel like the push for
Clemency for, is sending
me down that same
road "Cole" unfortunately
had to go down, as
I Now believe he was
an innocent person too.
In Question: if he were
Guilty, it would be due
to Electrical Devices
T. clearly un-carred in my studies.

As You notice Above:
Cole Loran is there
PIG, DIE, DON
Baltimore, where
they did D.V.A
Testing, TEXAS LED
out of London ENG
Coon, Brit —
woods, i S where
the Devices place
you in a scene
Undetected of
the actions taken
They have the
word "Row"
not suprisingly
At the end
of Commission

LEGAL

I Alleged:
Exhibit #18

Newly Discovered Evidence
From Japan to America
where I first found out I
was LIED in the country

JAPAN

= K-Q-Q-O-T
= B-H-F-D-X-E
= J-N-C-G
= X

Z
D
I D
K
O

(PA) is there too!
(AK) is there too
Two, plug ins
From Japan to
these States of
America

TX. FED

DC. Police Department
Present

~~JOHN~~
JOHN

(BAP) + 15m
8 DAYS old

(A TX. John
penis plugin)

I was Baptised
AT 8 days old

(Ice is present)
FOX plugin.

BQQK
possibly BIBLE
or BQQK
THE HQK


HBC
T.V. Station
JQB

* LEGAL *

Allego:
Exhibit #19

* NEWLY Discovered Evidence
with collaboration and True facts *

This is what I found in the Secret/ System
in the words



You'll find word
Print in Private

CLOWN
OALK
Pmwx
CK
L(N) = Gun

P.M. MAP
The cover
of wool of
Sheeps clothing
in the Law

Question: how did fingerprints
become to be in the process
of united states state/federal
LAWS ???

You may need to
find an expert to
Study my Studies ?
if there is one out there. for expert validation
on these True facts.

police department / ROX
is part of the
Electrical, Device
SYStem AS you'll find
that in alot of different names
to lead to plugging in to the Q.

* LEGAL *


I Alleged
Exhibit #20

* STATEMENT of True Facts
* Newly Discovered Evidence

on the Arresting Detective while confined in north Carolina,
HAVE uncovered, A Scheme to bring me to the state of Florida.

DETECTIVE DAVID GRIFFIN

This is what I found in his name: EXACT matches. I



→ The word "BLX" (Gun money)

will become a very important word in the scheme of electronics and devices which I can explain on court record in the court of Law along with all my other studies.

AS you notice on the United States map if you look at Florida very closely at the very TOP there is a symbol of a GUN! *HAND GUN*

which will play an important role in my testimony.

ION, Deals with electrical current-devices to animals and humans alike.