

**UNPUBLISHED****UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

---

**No. 24-1295**

---

MICHAEL ROSS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BLUEFIELD AREA TRANSIT; JOHN REEVES, General Manager,

Defendants - Appellees.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (1:23-cv-00425)

---

Submitted: September 19, 2024

---

Decided: September 23, 2024

---

Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

---

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

---

Michael Ross, Appellant Pro Se.

---

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Ross appeals the district court's order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge as modified and granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Ross' civil rights complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. *Ross v. Bluefield Area Transit*, No. 1:23-cv-00425 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2024). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA  
AT BLUEFIELD

MICHAEL ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION No. 1:23-00425

BLUEFIELD AREA TRANSIT and  
JOHN REEVES,

Defendants.

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

By Standing Order, this action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn for submission of findings and recommendations regarding disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn submitted to the court his Proposed Findings and Recommendations ("PF&R") on July 31, 2023, in which he recommended that the court grant defendants' motion to dismiss, dismiss this case with prejudice, and remove the matter from the docket of the court.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the parties were allotted fourteen days plus three mailing days in which to file any objections to Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn's Findings and Recommendations. The failure of any party to file such objections within the time allowed constitutes a waiver of such party's right to a de novo review by this court. Snyder v.

Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989). On August 2, 2023, Ross filed his objections. See ECF No. 52. That same day, he filed a motion to produce as well as a motion for appointment of counsel. See ECF Nos. 50 and 51. Ross has gone on to file numerous motions, affidavits, documentation, and copies of documents filed with other entities. See ECF Nos. 53-56, 58-93, 95-104.

Pursuant to § 636(b)(1), a district court is required to conduct a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's report to which a specific objection has been made. The court need not conduct de novo review, however, "when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) ("The district court to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule."). The court has considered the entire record in this matter and reviewed de novo Ross' objections.

Background

According to plaintiff's complaint:

On 3/23/2023, I boarded the Bluefield Area Transit from Mercer Mall leaving Planet Fitness. I was denied a seat by a passenger stating "You can't sit here." I proceeded to find another seat, another passenger denied me the right to sit beside her as well. I am totally blind, upon finding a seat I was assaulted by another passenger being struck in the face as he then proceeded to utter a racial slur. My only reaction was self defense, which is my Second Amendment. The right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. The West Virginia State Police were called out to the scene, I was not charged with a crime. Officer Morris proceeded with an investigation, I was not charged with a crime. I traveled home on the Bluefield Area Transit. The following day, I was denied access to board the Bluefield Area Transit per John Reeves the General Manager of the Bluefield Area Transit. Which violated the US Code 2000a, prohibition against discrimination or segregation in places of accommodation.

As a result of not being able to access public accommodations I have suffered tremendously. . . . I utilized the transit along side of my disability to motivate and be an inspiration to others during my commute. . . .

ECF No. 2-1.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See ECF. No. 8. In support of their motion, they offered the affidavit of John Reeves, the General Manager of Bluefield Area Transit ("BAT"). See ECF No. 10. According to Reeves, "[o]n March 22, 2023, [he] was notified of an incident that occurred between two of [BAT's] patrons." Id. Reeves called the driver of the bus, Jenni

Pickens, who relayed what had happened and informed him that the West Virginia State Police responded to the incident. See id. After the bus returned to the BAT station, Reeves obtained the video footage from cameras on the bus. According to Reeves, the video showing plaintiff boarding the bus outside Planet Fitness at Mercer Mall. See id. According to Reeves, "Ross is a frequent passenger" and he believes that Ross is "legally blind." Id. Reeves made the following observations from the video:

Mr. Ross attempts to sit in the front passenger seat which was occupied by another individual. Mr. Ross attempts to sit in the passenger's lap, to which the passenger refuses Mr. Ross the opportunity to sit on him. Mr. Ross then has a verbal exchange with the passenger during which Ross aggressively makes a motion towards the passenger causing him to flinch away. Mr. Ross then attempts to sit in the front driver's side seat, which was also occupied. The individual in that seat also refuses to allow Ross to sit on her. Mr. Ross is shown having a verbal altercation with a passenger seated in the back of the bus over finding an available seat. Ross then sits in the second-row seating on the passenger side of the bus. Ross continues to argue with the passenger seated immediately behind him touching him numerous times. On the video, Ross is shown turned in his seat facing towards the individual that he is having the argument with, and that individual proceeds to strike Ross once in the face. As the bus pulls away, Mr. Ross engages in physical combat with the passenger seated behind him with wh[om] he had been arguing. During the fight, Ross throws his cane which strikes a bystander riding the bus in an adjacent seat. While the fight is happening, Driver Pickens requests that Ross stop multiple times, which he fails to do. Pickens stops the bus and evacuates all remaining

passengers but for Ross and the individual he is striking.

Id. Eventually, Ross is transported to his destination on the BAT. See id.

Upon reviewing the video footage of the incident, Reeves determined that sanctions were warranted for Ross and the other individual involved in the fight. See id. He consulted BAT's Passenger Conduct Policy and Rules for Riding. Reeves decided to impose a thirty-day suspension for both Ross and the other individual. See id. Reeves informed Ross of his suspension on March 24, 2023. See id. Reeves attached copies of the Bluefield Area Transit Conduct Policy and the Rules for Riding to his affidavit. See ECF No. 10-1 and 10-2.

Defendants moved for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint arguing that: (1) plaintiff had failed to state a viable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the complaint fails to adequately alleged a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) plaintiff fails to allege a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; and (4) plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a Second Amendment claim. See ECF No. 9.

Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn issued a Roseboro notice informing Ross that he had the right to file a response to defendants' motion and to "submit Affidavit(s) or statements subject to the penalties of perjury, exhibits, and/or other

legal or factual material supporting his positions and issues in the case as they are challenged by Defendants in the aforesaid Motion." ECF No. 11. The Roseboro notice further informed Ross that "actual statements in Affidavits or Declarations submitted by Defendants will be accepted as true unless the Plaintiff sets forth facts in response indicating the existence of a genuine or actual dispute of fact for trial." Id. Ross was "advised that a failure to respond to the Defendants' Motion may result in a recommendation of denial of the relief sought in the Complaint and dismissal of th[e] suit." Id.

In response to defendants' motion, Ross offered a number of documents, most of which did not address defendants' arguments. See ECF Nos. 12-14, 16. He also filed a videotape of the incident. See ECF No. 19. For the most part, Ross' filings did not grapple with defendants' arguments in support of dismissal.

Defendants' reply brief was accompanied by another affidavit from Reeves and an incident report prepared by BAT employee Jenni Pickens on the day of the incident. See ECF No. 20.

In his PF&R, Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn noted that Ross failed to respond to defendants' argument that neither BAT nor Reeves denied Ross a seat on the bus or uttered a racial slur towards him. See ECF No. 48. It also noted that Ross did not rebut defendants' evidence that his

suspension was due to fighting because he was determined to have violated the Passenger Conduct Policy. See id. As for the Second Amendment claim, the PF&R found that Ross did not respond to defendants' arguments in support of dismissal. See id. By failing to respond to defendants' arguments as to certain claims, Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn wrote that those claims were abandoned and subject to dismissal. See id. He wrote:

Indeed, the Plaintiff's own pleadings do not dispute the Defendants' own recounting of the events at issue here - private citizens (other passengers) are alleged to [have] prevent[ed] the Plaintiff from taking occupied seats at the front of the bus, and another passenger called the Plaintiff a racial slur. Accordingly, the undersigned would recommend the Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with prejudice on the basis he fails to address or respond to the Defendant[s'] substantive arguments.

Alternatively, this Court can dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint because nowhere in the Complaint or in any of his supporting documentation or responsive pleadings does he indicate that BAT or Reeves actually violated his rights under Sections 2000a, 1983 or any other statute or federal law. The plaintiff repeatedly alleges private actors, not named in this lawsuit, supposedly violated his rights. Indeed, having reviewed the recording contained on the Plaintiff's DVD exhibit, the undersigned finds that nothing in that video supports the Plaintiff's allegations that his rights were violated in any way by these Defendants - if anything, the video supports the Defendants' arguments that the Plaintiff himself was the aggressor on that day and caused his thirty-day suspension to ride the BAT.

Id. at 8-9.

In his objections, Ross states that

The bus station did not provide the reasonable accommodations that [are] needed for certain disabilities. I waited for the bus [to] arrive and when it did so I went to the front seats that [are] supposed to be available. I unknowingly sat on another individual that was in the provided front seat. The man then proceeds to push me off and states "you can't sit here." Being blind I was startled. I quickly tried to find a seat and happen to find yet another that was occupied. The man that was seated stated, "Sit down black nigger" in which I replied "who are you talking to." I then finally felt an empty seat in front of the fellow passenger. After a few minutes of riding[,] I then felt a hit on the side of my face. Knowing that due to my disability I needed to protect myself before they got the upper hand of me. I shouldn't have to worry when traveling safely on the bus. . . . I have been informed that a few statements have been made that I also tried to sit on the women in the opposite seat of the fellow I accidentally sat on. I wanted to inform the courts that the video is proof that I was never close to the said woman, "Mary Taylor." The woman then provided a statement for the courts that the reason she did move [and] these allegations was made was because she did not want to sit by a person of my color. I have 2 witness statements that prove that what happened on the bus was uncalled for and should not have happened. The bus station was wrong for not meeting the necessary ADA law for public transportation. This law states that transportation entities are required to make reasonable modifications/accommodations to policies, practices, and procedures to avoid discrimination [and]m ensure that their programs are accessible to individuals with disabilities. John Reeve general manager states that the public is required to move for said disabled. These rules w[ere] not [e]nforced and this could have been avoided.

ECF No. 52.

Analysis

The PF&R purports to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). However, defendants offered matters outside the pleadings and the magistrate judge considered them. Therefore, the magistrate judge converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Lewis v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., Civil Action Nos. 2:15-00394, 2015 WL 2452997, at \*3 (S.D.W. Va. May 22, 2015) (acknowledging that taking an affidavit into account "would require the court to transform the defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment") (Copenhaver, J.). The federal rules contemplate as much as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that "[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Rule 12(d) goes on to state that "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion." The Roseboro notice entered in this case informed Ross of his opportunity to provide evidence pertinent to defendants' motion. And the record reflects that he took advantage of that opportunity.

Pursuant to Rule 56(a) a court should "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The material facts of this case are not in dispute. With respect to his claims of racial discrimination, Ross has failed to put forth any evidence of discrimination on the part of these defendants. There is no evidence that the BAT or Reeves used racial slurs or discriminated against him based upon race. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on any claims for race discrimination.

Many of the documents Ross has filed confirm that his chief complaint is that, on one occasion, the bus driver did not make the people in the front seats of the bus move to accommodate him. He never addresses the status of the two individuals in the front seats, including whether they are disabled or elderly and if he had a superior claim to those seats.

Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities, including "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," id. § 12131(1), from discriminating "by reason of" disability against a "qualified individual with a disability." Id. § 12132. For purposes of Title II, a "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as an individual with a disability "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Title II of the ADA applies to "anything a public entity does." Seremeth v. Bd. of County

Comm'rs of Frederick County, 673 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing cases) (citations omitted); see also Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787 F. Supp. 2d 360, 380-81 (D. Md. 2011) (collecting authority).

Title II also includes provisions targeted at discrimination in public transportation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-50, 12161-65.

Ash v. Maryland Transit Admin., Civil Action No. ELH-18-1216, 2019 WL 1129439, at \*3 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2019). The Fourth Circuit has recognized "three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations." Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 n.5 (4th Cir. 2016). Ross complains of defendants' alleged failure to make a reasonable accommodation.

Ross, however, has not pointed to any provision in the ADA that would mandate the specific accommodation he seeks. Furthermore, there is no indication that BAT or any employee of BAT denied him an accommodation. Ross does not allege that the bus driver told him he could not sit in priority seating. Nor does he allege that he told the bus driver he needed to sit in the front seats or that he asked her to have the other passengers move. See Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 10-11254, 472 F. App'x 287, 296 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2012) (holding that plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of disability discrimination where on one occasion "she is

dissatisfied with her seating location and makes no effort to ask the venue's staff as to where alternative accessible seating is located or if she and her family can be accommodated").

Furthermore, Ross himself acknowledged the BAT accommodated his disability numerous times over a period of years. He complains of a failure to accommodate on only one occasion. According to an affidavit filed by Ross and dated September 21, 2023, "[t]he bus driver[s] on the Bluefield Area Transit have always helped to ensure my safety on and off the bus. I have been riding the transit for a total of 3 y[ea]rs and have never experienced any discrimination and have always had reasonable accommodation from the bus driver until March 23, 2023.". ECF No. 62. Another affidavit from Ross, dated October 19, 2023, also described the accommodations BAT and its employees provided: "November thru Jan 2022 to 2023, me and my totally blind wife traveled on the Bluefield Area Transit with a 3 yr old sited son. The bus drivers showed a reasonable accommodation[] for our disability. They did not discriminate against us. They helped us find seats to make sure we are safe. The bus drivers made it their priority to make sure we were safe." ECF No. 70.

"[T]he regulations under the ADA do not require perfect bus service for disabled bus riders, and [ ] occasional problems,

without more, do not constitute a violation of the ADA."

Cisneros v. Metro Auth. and Agents, Civil No. 3:13-0061, 2014 WL 993315, at \*4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 13, 2014); see also Chapman v.

Pier 1 Imp. (U.S.) Inc., 779 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)

("[R]egulations implementing the ADA do not contemplate perfect service.") (internal citation and quotation omitted). The inadequate service that Ross is alleged to have received on one occasion does not violate his rights under the ADA. See

Gustafson v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of the Missouri-Illinois

Metro. Dist., 29 F.4th 406, 412 (8th Cir. 2022) (upholding grant of summary judgment in favor of transit agency where disabled plaintiff "allege[d] three incidents of discrimination by Bi-State during an eight-month period" and "there is nothing in the record to indicate that [plaintiff]'s experiences were anything more than frustrating, but isolated, instances which do not, without more, establish a violation of the ADA") (internal citation and quotations omitted); Moore v. Niagara Frontier

Trans. Auth., Inc., 21-CV-1160-LJV, 2023 WL 8718762, at \*6

(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2023) ("[F]our 'isolated' instances of subpar service over a period of more than four years do not amount to 'regular' interference with Moore's use of PAL service or a 'pattern or practice that significantly limits' Moore's access to PAL service.").

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's objections to the PF&R are **OVERRULED** and defendants are entitled to entry of judgment in their favor on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.

For the reasons set forth above, the court overrules plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate's Findings and Recommendations. Accordingly, the court adopts his Findings and Recommendation except as modified herein and **GRANTS** defendants' motion for summary judgment, **DISMISSES** this case with prejudice, and directs the Clerk to remove this case from the court's active docket. All other pending motions are **DENIED**.

The Clerk is directed to forward a certified copy of this Order to counsel of record and plaintiff.

**IT IS SO ORDERED** this 29th day of March, 2024.

ENTER:

David A. Faber

David A. Faber  
Senior United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA  
BLUEFIELD DIVISION

MICHAEL ROSS,

**Plaintiff,**

**1:23-CV-00425**

vs.

BLUEFIELD AREA TRANSIT,  
JOHN REEVES, General Manager,

**Defendants.**

**PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION**

Pending before the Court are the *Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)* and *Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)* (ECF Nos. 8, 9). By Administrative Order entered on June 8, 2023, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 3) Having examined the *Complaint* and numerous supporting documentation and Affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff (ECF Nos. 2, 2-1, 6, 7, 19, 22, 23, 23-1, 24, 25, 25-1, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 46), other pleadings of record and pertinent legal authority, the undersigned has concluded that the *Motion to Dismiss* should be **GRANTED** for the reasons stated *infra*:

**Plaintiff's Allegations**

The Plaintiff names two Defendants in this lawsuit, the Bluefield Area Transit ("BAT") and John Reeves ("Reeves"), its General Manager. The Plaintiff asserts this matter falls under this

Court's federal question jurisdiction, specifically pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, "Title 42 Chp. 21 U.S.C.", and the Second Amendment.

The Plaintiff alleges that on March 23, 2023, when he boarded the BAT, he was denied a seat by a passenger. (ECF No. 2-1 at 1) When he tried to sit elsewhere, another passenger denied him a seat. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges that he is totally blind and was struck in the face by another passenger who also called him a racial slur. (Id.) The Plaintiff asserts that he acted in self-defense, which is protected under the Second Amendment, noting that law enforcement was called to the scene and the Plaintiff was not charged with a crime. (Id.) The Plaintiff was able to ride the BAT to his home, but the following day, he was denied access to board per Reeves. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges this violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, as he believes this is discrimination in a place of public accommodation. (Id. at 1-2)

The Plaintiff states the BAT is his main means of transportation, and having been denied to ride has greatly impacted his ability to get groceries, attend doctors' appointments, and go to the gym. (Id. at 2) As a result, the Plaintiff now suffers from depression most days, and due to the infraction against his civil rights under Section 2000a, including his right to bear arms, he asks for \$500,000. (Id.)

#### **Procedural History**

On June 8, 2023, the Plaintiff, acting *pro se*<sup>1</sup>, filed his Complaint for violations of federal statutes governing discrimination in a place of public accommodation and his constitutional right to self-defense. (ECF Nos. 2, 2-1)<sup>2</sup> On June 28, 2023, the BAT and Reeves filed their Motion to

---

<sup>1</sup> Because the Plaintiff is acting *pro se*, the documents which he has filed in this case are held to a less stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore, they are construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

<sup>2</sup> In further support of his Complaint, the Plaintiff filed additional documentation prior to service of the original Complaint and before any responsive pleadings were filed by the Defendants (ECF Nos. 6, 7). After service of his Complaint and after the Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff filed additional documentation in

Dismiss, supporting Memorandum of Law, with a supporting Affidavit of Reeves (ECF Nos. 8, 9, 10, 10-1, 10-2). In accordance with the Roseboro notice issued by the undersigned (ECF No. 11), the Plaintiff filed his responses in opposition to the Defendants' Motion (ECF Nos. 12, 12-1 through 12-4, 14, 14-1, 14-2, 15, 16). On July 13, 2023, Reeves filed his Affidavit and additional documentation (ECF Nos. 20, 20-1, 20-2, 20-3, 20-4, 20-5). Consequently, the pending Motion in this matter is fully briefed and ready for resolution.

#### **Defendants' Argument in Support of Dismissal**

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that entitle him to relief, as he was not denied full and equal enjoyment of a public accommodation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin and the Second Amendment does not provide for any private cause of action.

The Defendants provide further background of the incident occurring on a BAT vehicle: the Plaintiff boarded, and attempted to sit in a seat that was already occupied by another passenger, who stopped the Plaintiff from sitting down while stating "No, no, no"; the Plaintiff raised his white cane in response that caused the other passenger to flinch and got into a verbal disagreement with the passenger; the Plaintiff attempted to sit in another occupied seat; the Plaintiff then finds another seat, but prior to sitting down, gets into another verbal altercation with a passenger in the back of the bus. The Plaintiff then sits down and turns to the passenger to continue the verbal argument, and the passenger seated in the back pushed the Plaintiff's face away from him. The Plaintiff then proceeded to strike the passenger repeatedly although the passenger made no further

---

further support of his Complaint (e.g., ECF Nos. 19, 22, 23, 23-1, 24, 25, 25-1, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 33-1, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46). After review of the numerous additional documentation the Plaintiff filed in support of his Complaint, the undersigned declines to address or describe each of these, as the majority of these filings are devoid of meaningful context alongside his Complaint, for instance: articles regarding incidents on busses in Los Angeles; Jim Crow laws; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Reverse Psychology; a Guide to Disability Rights Laws; a homicide investigation on a New York City subway; offers for settlement, etc.

attempts at aggression towards the Plaintiff. The BAT employee requested the Plaintiff to stop multiple times to no avail. Not until the arrival of law enforcement did the Plaintiff cease further aggression against the passenger, though the Defendants note that video surveillance on the bus shows that the Plaintiff and the passenger had a brief intermission where they were speaking to one another while exiting the bus. However, the Plaintiff reengages in what appeared to be physical combat without provocation by the passenger. The passenger was taken to his destination by law enforcement, and the Plaintiff was transported by BAT to his destination.

The following day, the Plaintiff was informed that his privileges were suspended for thirty days during a phone call with Reeves when the Plaintiff attempted to board a BAT bus. The Plaintiff was further informed that the reason for the suspension was due to his violation of the Passenger Conduct Policy. Reeves determined the suspension was warranted on the basis of the severity of the fight which showed three different outbursts by the Plaintiff, his failure to follow the driver's instruction, the safety violation by leaving his seat while the bus was in motion, striking another innocent passenger with his cane during the first outburst, and the disruption of BAT services when the driver had to pull off their predestined route and the bus had to be evacuated for the safety of the other passengers.

To the extent that the Plaintiff alleges a Section 1983 claim for the violation of his Second Amendment rights, the Defendants state that the Plaintiff fails to meet pleading standards as he fails to allege any specific policy or custom of BAT allegedly responsible for his damages. Additionally, the Plaintiff's claim under Section 2000a also fails because the Plaintiff himself alleges that private individuals denied him a seat and used a racial slur, none of which is attributed to the actions, policy, or procedure of these Defendants that would trigger liability under this

Section. The Defendants argue that there are also no alleged facts to support they violated the Plaintiff's Second Amendment rights.

**Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Dismissal**

The Plaintiff submits what is purportedly a list of signatures from other patrons of BAT ostensibly stating that they have ridden the BAT with the Plaintiff numerous times without incident (ECF No. 12). The Plaintiff states that the passenger who was transported by law enforcement was also taken to jail due to an outstanding warrant; the Plaintiff further asserts that the law enforcement officer contacted Reeves to request that the Plaintiff's riding privileges be reinstated but was denied. (ECF No. 14 at 3) In response to Reeve's Affidavit, the Plaintiff states that he was unable to use the seats in the front of the bus that are intended for elderly and disabled passengers. (ECF No. 15) The Plaintiff appears to allege that when he attempted to sit on an "apparent Caucasian passenger", Jim Crow laws were used by State and local laws to enforce racial segregation. (ECF No. 16) The Plaintiff filed a copy of DVD that recorded the subject incident. (ECF No. 19)

**Defendant Reeves Affidavit and Supporting Documentation**

Reeves attests that he believes the Plaintiff meets the legal definition of blind but has no knowledge of his actual diagnosis or the extent of his blindness. (ECF No. 20) Reeves has no firsthand knowledge if the Plaintiff was called a racial slur, but states that none was used by a BAT employee or himself. (*Id.*) Reeves denies ever speaking with the law enforcement officer regarding the Plaintiff or the events of the incident and is only aware that he communicated with the driver to take the Plaintiff to his destination. (*Id.*) From the DVD of the video surveillance footage provided by the Plaintiff, Reeves attests that the Plaintiff is mistaken as to the date of the occurrence based on the date and time stamps from the video footage. (*Id.*) Regarding the BAT

rules that provide front seats are intended for elderly and disabled passengers, Reeves has no reason to presume the status of the two individuals who were seated in the front seats at the time the Plaintiff attempted to sit there. (Id.)

In addition to the supplemental documentation filed by the Plaintiff himself, Reeves attaches a BAT “Incident Report” signed by a BAT employee Jenni Pickens, the driver of the bus during the subject incident. (ECF No. 20-5) Ms. Pickens alleged that the incident occurred on March 22, 2023, at the Planet Fitness located at Mercer Mall. (Id.) She indicated that the incident occurred on the vehicle. (Id.) She states that when the Plaintiff boarded, he accidentally almost sat on another passenger and concedes that the Plaintiff is blind. (Id.) She states that the passenger “put his fist up like he was gonna hit [the Plaintiff].” (Id.) She states that another passenger was “cussing & calling names” to the Plaintiff “which escalated the situation[:] They got in each others faces and eventually started hitting each other. I immediately got on the radio saying I had emergency on the bus call 911 to [sic] men are fist fighting.” (Id.) She states that just before law enforcement arrived, both the Plaintiff and the passenger got off the bus, they were then questioned by law enforcement, and she was questioned by law enforcement; she was advised to wait so that law enforcement can check for any outstanding warrants. (Id.) After being cleared to leave, Ms. Pickens drove the Plaintiff to the “south Bluefield bus to get home.” (Id.)

#### **The Standard**

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although factual allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1959.

This Court is required to liberally construe *pro se* documents, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1978). Liberal construction, however, “does not require courts to construct arguments or theories for a *pro se* plaintiff because this would place a court in the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Miller v. Jack, 2007 WL 2050409, at \* 3 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1978)). Further, liberal construction does not require the “courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985). In other words, a court may not construct legal argument for a plaintiff. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993). Finally, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990)). Where a *pro se* Complaint can be remedied by an amendment, however, the District Court may not dismiss the Complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); also see Goode v. Central Va. Legal Aide Society, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2015).

### Discussion

As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that the Plaintiff does not respond or otherwise address the Defendants' arguments that neither prevented him from sitting on the bus or uttered a racial slur towards the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also does not address the arguments that his riding privileges were suspended due to the altercation he had with other passengers, or that he was determined to have violated the Passenger Conduct Policy. The Plaintiff also does not respond to the Defendants' arguments that they did not violate his Second Amendment right, and that he cannot bring a private cause of action under this Amendment, or that neither were acting under color of law at the time of the incident. The undersigned finds that the Plaintiff's silence on these issues can be construed as a concession to these specific arguments. Intercarrier Communications, LLC v. Kik Interactive, Inc., 2013 WL 4061259, at \*3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2013) (citing Cureton v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 322 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2004) ("When a plaintiff files a response to a motion to dismiss but fails to address certain arguments made by the defendant, the court may treat those arguments as conceded, even when the result is dismissal of the case."); see Chamblee v. Old Dominion Sec. Co., L.L.C., 2014 WL 1415095, at \*8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2014) ("[Plaintiff] did not respond to the arguments made by any of the defendants with regards to Counts IX and X. As a result, [Plaintiff] abandoned these claims.").

By failing to respond in any way to Defendants' arguments for dismissal of his Section 2000a and Second Amendment claims, the Plaintiff has abandoned them. Indeed, the Plaintiff's own pleadings do not dispute the Defendants' own recounting of the events at issue here – private citizens (other passengers) are alleged to prevent the Plaintiff from taking occupied<sup>3</sup> seats at the

---

<sup>3</sup> Although the Plaintiff also seems to allege that he was "not allowed to sit in the unoccupied seats beside the other person" and this was "ignored by Mr. John [Reeves]", this allegation still fails to demonstrate that either Defendant in this action violated any of the statutes or constitutional rights alleged by the Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 23) Again, the Plaintiff appears to endorse the fact that the Defendants prevented the Plaintiff from taking a seat to ride the bus or

front of the bus, and another passenger called the Plaintiff a racial slur. Accordingly, the undersigned would recommend the Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with prejudice on the basis he fails to address or respond to the Defendant's substantive arguments.

Alternatively, this Court can dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint because nowhere in the Complaint or in any of his supporting documentation or responsive pleadings does he indicate that the BAT or Reeves actually violated his rights under Sections 2000a, 1983 or any other statute or federal law. The Plaintiff repeatedly alleges private actors, not named in this lawsuit, supposedly violated his rights. Indeed, having reviewed the recording contained on the Plaintiff's DVD exhibit, the undersigned finds that nothing in that video supports the Plaintiff's allegations that his rights were violated in any way by these Defendants – if anything, the video supports the Defendants' arguments that the Plaintiff himself was the aggressor on that day and caused his thirty-day suspension to ride the BAT.

#### PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned therefore respectfully **PROPOSES** that the District Judge confirm and accept the foregoing findings and **RECOMMENDS** that the District Judge **GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)** (ECF No. 8), **DISMISS** the Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 2) **WITH PREJUDICE**, and remove this matter from the Court's docket.

The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is hereby **FILED**, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rules

---

called him any names: the Plaintiff submitted a hand-written letter purportedly written by Christopher J. Bingham who stated that two bus "patrons refused to let" the Plaintiff sit and called him a racial slur. (ECF No. 24) The Plaintiff subsequently filed a hand-written "witness statement" that indicates "Miss Mary Taylor" "made a mistake" and that she admitted discriminating against the Plaintiff about being able to sit next to her. (ECF No. 40)


6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and then three days (mailing/service) from the date of filing this Proposed Findings and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of the Proposed Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause shown.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of *de novo* review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 106 S.Ct. 466, 475, 88 L.E.2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.E.2d 933 (1986); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 846 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208, 104 S.Ct. 2395, 81 L.E.2d 352 (1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on opposing parties, District Judge Faber, and this Magistrate Judge.

The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to the *pro se* Plaintiff and to counsel of record.

ENTER: July 31, 2023.



  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Omar J. Aboulhosn  
United States Magistrate Judge