

No.\_\_\_\_\_

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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

EMMANUEL ANTIONE HEMPHILL, PETITIONER

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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**QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

## PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The parties to the proceedings in the courts below were Emmanuel Hemphill and the United States of America.

## RELATED PROCEEDINGS

*United States v. Emmanuel Hemphill*, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Number 5:22 CR 306-OLG-1, Judgment entered September 27, 2023.

*United States v. Emmanuel Hemphill*, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Number 23-50675, Judgment entered December 20, 2024.

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## **PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

Emmanuel Hemphill asks that a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion and judgment entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

### **OPINION BELOW**

The opinion of the court of appeals, *United States v. Hemphill*, No. 23-50675, 2024 WL 5184299 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2024) was not published. The opinion is attached to this petition as Appendix A.

### **JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

The opinion and judgment of the court of appeals were entered on December 20, 2024. This petition is filed within 90 days after entry of judgment. *See* Supreme Court Rule 13.1. The Court has jurisdiction to grant certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED**

Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

### **STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED**

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in and affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

## STATEMENT

In May 2022, police officers found two firearms on the glove compartment of the car that Petitioner Emmanuel Hemphill had been driving. Hemphill was charged by indictment with being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).<sup>1</sup> The indictment alleged that the firearm “had traveled in interstate and foreign commerce.” Appendix B.

Hemphill pleaded not guilty to that charge, and to a walk-away escape charged under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) that was also lodged against him. He went to trial.

At trial, the government introduced a judgment and commitment order showing that Hemphill had convictions from 2014 for the federal felony offenses of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with the intent to distribute it and possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute it. *See* 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.

The officers who arrested Hemphill in 2022 testified that two firearms were found in the glove compartment of the car he was driving. Hemphill’s front-seat

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<sup>1</sup> The district court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

passenger, Tiwanika McDay, was the one who admitted there were guns in the glove compartment. Agent Matthew Gulezian of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms testified that the Glock pistol found in the glove compartment had been manufactured in Austria and the Taurus pistol found there had been manufactured in Brazil. No evidence showed that Hemphill had purchased the guns. They were simply found in a car that he was driving.

The jury found Hemphill guilty as charged. The district court sentenced him to 5 years' imprisonment on the escape conviction and 10 years' imprisonment on the felon-in-possession conviction.

Hemphill appealed. He argued, among other things, that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause because mere firearm possession is local, noncommercial conduct and thus is not an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the firearm conviction, holding that, under its precedent, § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress's authority over commerce. Appendix A at 22.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

### **BECAUSE MERE POSSESSION OF A FIREARM IS NOT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY, SECTION 922(g)(1) CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY THE COMMERCE POWER.**

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibits specified categories of persons from possessing firearms “in or affecting commerce.” Subsection 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons who were previously convicted of felony offenses. In cases involving previous iterations of a federal felon-firearm prohibition statute, the Court has ruled that the proof of the statutory element “in and affecting commerce” can be satisfied by proof that, at some point in the past, the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. *See Scarborough v. United States*, 431 U.S. 563, 566–67 & n.5 (1977) (interpreting predecessor statute). *Scarborough* did not, however, consider whether a statute that reaches conduct with such a minimal, temporally distant link to interstate commerce is a constitutional exercise of the federal commerce power.

The Court should consider that issue now. In *United States v. Lopez*, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), holding that Congress lacked the power to criminalize the mere possession of a firearm on school premises. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). *Lopez* and later decisions indicate that noncommercial activity, whether mere possession of an object or non-participation in an economic activity, is not a proper subject for commerce clause regulation. Because that is so, the congressionally created “commerce” element in § 922(g) cannot make the statute constitutional. Congress cannot, through statutory design, confer upon itself a power the constitution does not grant it.

The U.S. Constitution created a federal government of enumerated powers. *See* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; *Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012) (Roberts. C.J.) (plurality op.). “The Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others.” *Id.* at 534 (Roberts. C.J.) (plurality op.). One power not granted to the federal government is a general police power. *United States v. Morrison*, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000). Because Congress lacks a general police power, it cannot criminalize acts simply because it thinks that doing so would advance the societal good. Instead, any crime created by Congress, as with every other exercise of Congressional power, must be justified by reference to a particular grant of enumerated authority. *See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.*, 567 U.S. at 535 (Roberts. C.J.).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition of firearm possession by felons is said to rest on Congress’s exercise of the commerce clause. *See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar*, 733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013); *United States v. Griffith*, 928 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir. 2019). The commerce clause grants Congress the authority “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. *Lopez* identified three categories of activities that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: “First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce . . . Finally, Congress’s commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at

558–59 (internal citations omitted). The Court concluded that § 922(q) did not fall within the first two categories. Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny, it had to fall “under the third category as a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 559.

The third *Lopez* category requires an inquiry to determine “whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.” *Id.* at 559. The Court concluded that section 922(q) failed the “substantial effect” test because mere possession of a gun was not commercial activity and because regulation of such possession was not a part of a greater scheme of commercial regulation. *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 561–63; *see also Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 615–19 (holding federal statute governing gender-motivated non-economic violence unconstitutional under Commerce Clause).

Section 922(g)(1) does not regulate the channels of commerce. Nor does it regulate only things “in” commerce. *See Scarborough v. United States*, 431 U.S. 563, 573 (1977) (stating that under § 922’s predecessor statute, “Congress must have meant more than to outlaw simply those possessions that occur in commerce or in interstate facilities”). Thus, to be constitutional, § 922(g)(1) must fall within the third *Lopez* category: it must regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.

A substantial effect on commerce cannot be shown merely through claims that gun possession or violent crime may cause harms that require the spending of money

to remedy or that gun possession may harm economic productivity in some imaginable way. *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 563-67; *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 612-18. This social-cost rationale sweeps too broadly. Under it “Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 564. If the costs of crime in general qualified firearm possession as economic activity, “it is difficult to perceive any limitations on federal power[.]” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 564.

Thus, even if mere possession has some effect on commerce, that effect is too minimal to save § 922(g)(1). Activities with a *de minimis* commercial impact can be regulated under the Commerce Clause only as part of “a general regulatory statute [that] bears a substantial relation to commerce.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 558. Such regulation is permitted if the statute regulates non-commercial activity that is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the activity would be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 560-61; *see Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 613 (noting that “thus far in our Nation’s history,” the Court has upheld intrastate regulation under Commerce Clause only where the regulated activity is economic in nature). Section 922(g)(1), a statute with a police function—to reduce crime—does not meet this criterion. Gun possession is not commercial activity. The sale of guns may be regulated as commercial activity, and thus a law prohibiting sales to felons might be a viable, constitutional way to keep guns from felons. But criminalizing simple, local possession of a gun is not commercial activity. Prohibiting the non-economic act of possessing a gun, as opposed

to buying or selling a gun, is not necessary to achieve the goals of reducing sales to felons and it does not otherwise regulate commerce in firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate-commerce element, which is supposed to ensure, "through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce," *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 561, cannot save the statute. In *United States v. Bass*, 404 U.S. 336, 339 n.4 (1971), the Court considered whether § 922(g)'s predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), barred all possession of firearms by felons without requiring the government to prove that the felon's possession was "in commerce or affecting commerce." *Id.* at 338. The Court declined to reach the constitutional issue, instead resolving the question as a matter of statutory interpretation. *Id.* at 339 n.4. The Court held that the government was required to demonstrate some nexus between interstate commerce and the felon's possession of the weapon. *Id.* at 350.

The Court again addressed the statutory interstate nexus issue in *Scarborough*. There, it, concluded that proof the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce satisfied the "statutorily required nexus" between the firearm possession and commerce, again pretermitted the question of whether the statute was constitutional. 431 U.S. at 564, 566–67. *Scarborough* addressed only the type of proof needed to meet the statutory requirements of what was then § 1202. 431 U.S. at 570–76. In *Scarborough*, as in *Bass*, the statutory-nexus question was distinct from the constitutional issue whether a statute regulating mere possession falls without the commerce power and was not addressed.

*Lopez* acknowledged that the presence of a statutory nexus should be considered in determining whether a statute violates the commerce clause. *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 561. Some courts have inferred from this suggestion that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element of the type found in § 922(g)(1) will always save a statute from a commerce clause challenge. *See, e.g., United States v. Santiago*, 238 F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2001); *United States v. Dorris*, 236 F.3d 582, 585 (10th Cir. 2000); *cf. United States v. Rawls*, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding § 922(g)(1), in part, on presence of jurisdictional element). But that inference treats too lightly our constitutional structure of a limited central government with enumerated powers. And the Court cast significant doubt on the viability of the inference in *Jones v. United States*, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).

*Jones* considered whether the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which contains a jurisdictional element like the one in § 922(g)(1), criminalizes the destruction of privately-owned property. *Jones*, 529 U.S. at 850. The Court construed the jurisdictional element in § 844(i) narrowly and limited its reach to the crime of arson of property that is “currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce.” *Jones*, 529 U.S. at 859. In so ruling, the Court noted that a broader construction might render the statute unconstitutional under *Lopez*. *Id.* at 858. Although *Jones*’s analysis turned on the definition of the word “use” in the arson statute—a term not present in the felon-in-possession statute—the case nonetheless has important implications for § 922(g)(1). *Jones* indicated that the mere presence of a jurisdictional element will not save a statute from a commerce clause challenge.

Instead, that element must be construed, if possible, to bring the statute within the limits set by the Constitution. *Id.*

Thus, both *Lopez* and *Jones* cast doubt on the constitutionality of the *Scarborough* statutory analysis, which requires only a minimal, tangential connection to commerce. *See United States v. Bell*, 70 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting doubt). *Lopez* clarified that the regulated activity must substantially affect commerce “to be within Congress’s power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.” *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 559.

The Court should grant certiorari to address the doubts raised about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The statute has faced and continues to face repeated challenges to its constitutionality throughout the nation. *See United States v. Scott*, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases to that point); *see also United States v. Moore*, 2021 WL 3502933 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021); *United States v. Libsey*, 2021 WL 3466041 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2021); *United States v. Vaughn*, 2024 WL 4615853 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024). These ongoing challenges and the many § 922(g)(1) prosecutions brought each year mean that the issue presented will recur until the Court provides a definitive statement regarding the application of *Lopez*’s principles to the statute.

Hemphill’s case presents the Court with the opportunity to make that definitive statement. His case involves purely non-commercial possession. Nothing

remotely or tangentially like commerce was shown to exist in his case. It therefore provides an appropriate vehicle for addressing the constitutional question.

### Conclusion

FOR THESE REASONS, Petitioner asks that the Court grant a writ of certiorari and review the judgment of the court of appeals.

/s/ PHILIP J. LYNCH  
*Counsel of Record for Petitioner*

DATED: March 5, 2025.