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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2024

ANTOINE WIGGINS,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: *United States v. Wiggins*, Docket No. 22-2831 (not precedential)..... App. 1-6

Lewis v. United States, No. 23-198, Petition for Certiorari, 2023 WL 5753604 (August 31, 2023).....App. 7-25

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2831

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTOINE WIGGINS,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1:18-cr-00459-001)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 17, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and McKEE, *Circuit Judges*

(Filed: September 27, 2024)

OPINION*

PHIPPS, *Circuit Judge*.

After Antoine Wiggins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the District Court calculated his sentencing range as 100 to 120 months, as capped by the ten-year statutory maximum, before varying downward and sentencing Wiggins to 96 months in prison. *See id.* § 924(a)(2) (2012) (amended by the

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022) (removing the statutory maximum for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g))). Wiggins now brings two challenges to the calculation of the Guidelines range for his sentence. On *de novo* review of issues of law, *see United States v. Caraballo*, 88 F.4th 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2023), and review of factual findings for clear error, *see id.* at 243–44, we will affirm the sentence imposed.

On May 28, 2018, police stopped Wiggins for driving without a seatbelt in Camden, New Jersey. During the stop, they learned of an active warrant for his arrest, and Wiggins briefly attempted to flee on foot. The police apprehended him, and he then told them that he had a handgun in the center console of his car and drugs in its trunk. Wiggins provided consent to search in writing and, consistent with his prior statement, the police uncovered a .22 caliber Beretta handgun, with a round in the chamber and seven more in the magazine, as well as crack cocaine in fifty-seven plastic containers of assorted color. After he was charged with one count of being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Wiggins pleaded guilty through an open plea in which his sentence was undetermined.

Wiggins’s initial sentencing hearing was held on January 23, 2020, but then continued for forty-four months until September 26, 2022, when the District Court sentenced him to 96 months in prison. The District Court arrived at that sentence by using a base offense level of 24 after finding that Wiggins committed the firearm offense following “at least two felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(a)(2); *see also id.* § 4B1.2(b) (defining ‘controlled substance offense’). From there, the District Court applied a four-level enhancement based on its finding that Wiggins possessed the firearm in connection with another felony. *See id.* § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Those findings, which took the offense level up to 28, along with a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, which reduced the offense level to 25, *see id.* § 3E1.1(a)–(b), and a criminal history in Category V, generated a Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months, which, by statute, could not exceed 120 months, *see* U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A; *see also* 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). Then, after considering Wiggins’s allocution and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court varied downward to impose a 96-month prison term.

Wiggins timely invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction to challenge the base offense level of 24 and the four-level enhancement. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b); *see also* 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (giving district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction in federal criminal cases). If he succeeds on both fronts, his total offense level would be 12 and his new Guidelines range would be 27 to 33 months in prison. *See* U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) (providing a base offense level of 14 if the defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm at the time of the offense), 3E1.1(b) (limiting the reduction for acceptance of responsibility to two levels if the total offense level is below 16 before the application of any responsibility decrease).¹

I.

Wiggins’s challenge to the base offense level fails under Circuit precedent. In *United States v. Lewis*, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023), this Court determined that the term ‘controlled substance’ in the Guidelines refers to a “drug regulated by either state or federal

¹ If only his base-level challenge were successful, then that level of 14 would be increased by a net of one (plus four from the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement and minus three for acceptance of responsibility) yielding a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A); *see also id.* § 3E1.1(b). If only the challenge to the four-level enhancement were successful, then his offense level of 25 would be reduced by four to 21 and the sentencing range would be 70 to 87 months. *See id.* § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A); *id.* § 3E1.1(b); *see also id.* § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); *see generally* U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.

law.” *Id.* at 771. Still, Wiggins argues that only convictions for violations of state laws that categorically match the drugs regulated under the Controlled Substances Act, *see* 21 U.S.C. § 812 (providing schedules of controlled substances), may constitute “controlled substance offense[s]” under the Guidelines, so the District Court should have concluded that his base offense level was 14, *see* U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A), rather than 24, *see id.* § 2K2.1(a)(2). But that argument is foreclosed by *Lewis*, as Wiggins concedes. Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that it did not need to determine whether New Jersey law defines ‘cocaine’ more broadly than federal law before it found that Wiggins’s prior convictions for cocaine distribution were “controlled substance offense[s].” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2); *see also Lewis*, 58 F.4th at 771.

II.

The District Court likewise did not err in applying the four-level enhancement under Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That subsection of the Guidelines imposes a four-level enhancement when a firearm is used or possessed “in connection with another felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Based on these principles, Wiggins raises three challenges: (i) that he was not engaged in another felony because he was not drug trafficking; (ii) that even if he was drug trafficking, his possession of the Beretta .22 was not in connection with that activity; and (iii) that he rebutted any presumption that his firearm was connected with the drug trafficking.

A.

Ample record evidence supports the District Court’s conclusion that Wiggins was drug trafficking. He had many containers broken up for retail sale, which, as the District Court explained, would be a strange way to purchase drugs for individual use. The drugs were secreted away in the trunk, out of plain view. Also, the ready accessibility of the

loaded firearm suggests that Wiggins was seeking to protect himself and the drugs in a manner consistent with trafficking.

Wiggins's counterarguments do not amount to clear error. The absence of any cash in the vehicle is not enough to produce a "definite and firm conviction" that Wiggins was not trafficking. *Caraballo*, 88 F.4th at 244 (quoting *United States v. Napolitan*, 762 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2014)). Nor does his concession that he was an occasional drug-user, coupled with the explanation that the assorted colors of the containers represented purchases from different dealers for personal use, sufficiently undermine the District Court's findings on clear error review under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. *See id.* at 244 (quoting *Napolitan*, 762 F.3d at 307).

B.

The District Court did not clearly err in finding that the gun and drugs were connected. Wiggins had the loaded gun readily accessible to him while he transported the drugs in the same car, and the most obvious explanation for doing so is to protect himself and the drugs from would-be assailants. This fact also breaks Wiggins's attempted analogy to *United States v. West*, 643 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2011), because there, the defendant possessed a gun in the trunk, which would not immediately have been useful to protect that defendant's drugs stored in the glove compartment. *See id.* at 116 (explaining that the government failed to produce evidence that a gun in the trunk "served to protect the marijuana in [the defendant's] glove compartment"). Also, Wiggins himself associated the drugs and the gun by self-reporting both to the police at the same time. This record does not generate a definite and firm conviction that the drugs and the gun were not connected.

C.

Wiggins's contention that the District Court misapplied a rebuttable presumption of a firearm-drug connection permitted by *United States v. Perez*, 5 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2021), fares no better. At the time of the initial sentencing hearing in January 2020, *Perez* had not been decided, and the District Court said nothing to indicate that it would presume a connection between the gun and drugs. By the time of the final sentencing hearing, *Perez* had been decided, and thus a sentencing court could then presume a connection between a firearm and a drug trafficking offense when the firearm was in close proximity to the drugs. *See id.* at 400. But *Perez* emphasized that the presumption was rebuttable upon consideration of four factors:

- (1) the type of gun involved, with handguns more likely to be connected with drug trafficking than hunting rifles;
- (2) whether the gun was loaded;
- (3) whether the gun was stored (or . . . possessed) near the drugs or drug-related items; and
- (4) whether the gun was accessible.

Id. at 401.

Even if the District Court relied on the *Perez* presumption, such a presumption cannot be rebutted here. That is so because the District Court made factual findings against Wiggins with respect to each of the *Perez* factors. It determined that that the gun was (1) a handgun, (2) loaded, (3) near the drugs, and (4) readily accessible. So, contrary to Wiggins's argument here, the District Court did not err by applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed.

2023 WL 5753604 (U.S.) (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing)
Supreme Court of the United States.

Jamar LEWIS, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 23-198.
August 31, 2023.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

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***I QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

Under the [federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1\(a\)\(4\)\(A\)](#), a defendant previously convicted of a “controlled substance offense” is subject to a sentencing enhancement. The Guidelines define “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law * * * that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a *controlled substance*.” [U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\(b\)](#) (emphasis added); *see id.* [§ 2K2.1](#) application note 1. The Guidelines do not, however, define “controlled substance.”

In [McNeill v. United States](#), 563 U.S. 816 (2011), this Court confronted the “serious drug offense” enhancement in the Armed Career Criminal Act. According to this Court, to determine the elements of a prior predicate conviction for purposes of applying the categorical approach and thus to determine whether that conviction qualifies as a “serious drug offense,” a court should look to the state law at the time of the predicate conviction. *Id.* at 818.

The questions presented are:

1. Under this Court's decision in *McNeill*, is the term “controlled substance” in the Sentencing Guidelines defined at the time of the predicate conviction or when federal consequences attach?
2. When a federal defendant is subject to a controlled substance enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, does the term “controlled substance” in the Sentencing Guidelines refer only to those substances controlled under federal law or also include substances controlled under state law?

***II PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING**

Jamar Lewis, petitioner on review, was the defendant-appellee below.

The United States of America, respondent on review, was the appellant below.

***III RELATED PROCEEDINGS**

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:

- *United States v. Lewis*, No. 21-2621 (Jan. 26, 2023) (reported at 58 F.4th 764)
- *United States v. Lewis*, No. 21-4067 (May 3, 2023) (not reported)

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey:

- *United States v. Lewis*, Crim. No. 20-583 (FLW) (Aug. 10, 2021)

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***1 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

Jamar Lewis respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Third Circuit's opinion is reported at [58 F.4th 764](#) and reproduced at Pet. App. 1a-19a. The order denying rehearing is not reported, and is reproduced at Pet. App. 47a-48a. The District Court's opinion is not reported, and is reproduced at Pet. App. 20a-46a.

***2 JURISDICTION**

The Third Circuit entered judgment on January 26, 2023. Petitioner filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc, which was denied on May 3, 2023. On June 7, 2023, Justice Alito granted an extension of the period to file this petition until August 31, 2023. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under [28 U.S.C. § 1254\(1\)](#).

GUIDELINES PROVISIONS INVOLVED

[U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1\(a\)\(4\)\(A\)](#) provides in relevant part: Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest): * * * (4) **20**, if - (A) the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.

Application note 1 to [U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1](#) provides in relevant part:

“Controlled substance offense” has the meaning given that term in [§ 4B1.2\(b\)](#) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to [§ 4B1.2](#) (Definitions of Terms Used in [Section 4B1.1](#)).

[U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\(b\)](#) provides:

The term “controlled substance offense” means an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a

counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit ***3** substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.

INTRODUCTION

This petition presents two persistent and deep circuit splits regarding this Court's categorical approach. The categorical approach is a tool often used to apply the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the federal Sentencing Guidelines. It requires courts to compare the elements of a predicate offense to a relevant comparator—such as the elements of a generic offense. If a predicate offense categorically “matches” the comparator, a harsher penalty attaches under federal law.

This particular case involves the categorical approach's application to the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, defendants who have committed a prior “controlled substance offense” receive significantly enhanced sentences. The Guidelines define a “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law” involving “a controlled substance.” [U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2\(b\)](#). The Guidelines, however, do not define “controlled substance.” To define that critical phrase, courts look to controlled substance schedules, such as the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Using the categorical approach, courts then compare that schedule against the predicate to determine whether the defendant's prior offense involved a “controlled substance.”

But this application of the categorical approach presents two complications: Drug schedules change over time. And states and the federal government have different controlled substance schedules. This ***4** case provides an example: In 2012, Petitioner Jamar Lewis was convicted under a New Jersey law criminalizing marijuana possession. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty to an unrelated federal crime. In the interim, however, the definition of marijuana under both federal law and New Jersey law changed. As a result, Lewis's predicate New Jersey marijuana conviction from 2012 no longer categorically matched either the 2020 federal or New Jersey controlled substance schedules. This mismatch raises two legal questions that have deeply divided the circuits.

First, when defining a “controlled substance” to create the comparator for the categorical approach, should the sentencing court look to the drug schedule in effect at the time when federal law imposes an additional consequence as a result of the defendant's predicate offense? Or should the court rely on an outdated drug schedule from the time of the predicate conviction? The same question arises in the context of ACCA, with respect to a predicate “serious drug offense” enhancement. [18 U.S.C. § 924\(e\)](#).

The Circuits have adopted three different approaches based on divergent applications of [McNeill v. United States](#), 563 U.S. 816 (2011). *McNeill* concerned whether historic or contemporary law defines a *predicate offense's* elements for ACCA. Five circuits read *McNeill* narrowly and define the federal comparator for the Guidelines or ACCA based on drug schedules in effect when the federal consequences associated with that predicate attach. This is the “time-of-consequences approach.” By contrast, two circuits read *McNeill* broadly and look to drug schedules from the time of the predicate offense. This is the “time-of-conviction approach.” Meanwhile, ***5** two more circuits apply *McNeill* inconsistently depending on whether the case involves ACCA or the Guidelines. These circuits apply the time-of-consequences approach in ACCA cases, but the time-of-conviction approach for the Guidelines.

The circuits are further divided over a second question involving the meaning of “controlled substance”: Does “controlled substance” mean *only* drugs on the federal schedule? Or does “controlled substance” also include drugs that individual states have deemed controlled? Three circuits define a “controlled substance” by exclusive reference to federal law. Six circuits, by contrast, hold that “controlled substance” means *any* substance regulated by federal *or* state law.

In the decision below, the Third Circuit decided both questions presented incorrectly—leading to a truly bizarre result. To decide whether Lewis was subject to a controlled substance offense enhancement in 2020, the Third Circuit looked back in time to the meaning of controlled substance in 2012. And rather than adopting a consistent comparator, the Third Circuit held that *any* substance controlled under New Jersey law counted as a “controlled substance.” As a result, the Third Circuit collapsed the categorical approach—intended to assess whether Lewis should be subject to a federal controlled-substance-offense enhancement in 2020—into a single question: When Lewis committed his predicate New Jersey marijuana offense in 2012, were the regulated

substances that comprised the elements of his offense controlled under New Jersey law? In other words, the Third Circuit compared the 2012 New Jersey law against *itself*-and presto, found a categorical match.

*6 The Third Circuit's approach is as wrong as it sounds. The “chief” purpose of the categorical approach is to “ensure[] that all defendants whose convictions establish the *same facts*” receive “consistent[]” and “predictabl[e]” treatment “under federal law.” *Moncrieffe v. Holder*, 569 U.S. 184, 205 n.11 (2013) (emphasis added). The purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is likewise to eliminate “disparities among similarly situated offenders.” *Peugh v. United States*, 569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013). To further that goal of national uniformity, sentencing courts must apply the law “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). And under the venerable *Jerome* presumption-which serves as the interpretive underpinning for the categorical approach-this Court applies a consistent interpretation of federal law across all jurisdictions, rather than pinning the interpretation of federal law to the vagaries of state statutes. See *Jerome v. United States*, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1941).

The Third Circuit's approach violates these foundational principles. By defining a controlled substance based on the schedule in effect at the time of the predicate, the Third Circuit's decision fosters dis-uniformity among similarly-situated defendants sentenced on the same day and imposes penalties for subsequently-decriminalized conduct. And by looking to a state schedule to define the *federal* comparator, the Third Circuit imposes federal sentencing enhancements based on each *state* legislature's choice of what substances to criminalize. Worse still, the confluence of these two holdings means that the Third Circuit imposes a *federal* sentencing enhancement for *any* state offense at any point in time.

*7 This Court should grant this petition. This Court has already granted review of two ACCA cases implicating the first question presented, *Brown v. United States*, No. 22-6389 (May 15, 2023), and *Jackson v. United States*, No. 22-6640 (May 15, 2023). This petition provides a clean vehicle to resolve the timing question for purposes of the Guidelines, to the extent the Court's decision in *Brown* and *Jackson* does not do so already.

The time has also come to resolve the second question, whether *federal* law alone defines a “controlled substance” in the *federal* Guidelines. In 2022, Justice Sotomayor joined by Justice Barrett identified this exact split. *Guerrant v. United States*, 142 S. Ct. 640, 641 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). Justice Sotomayor noted that the Sentencing Commission lacked a quorum at that time, and expressed hope that the Commission would regain function and resolve this split on its own. But the Commission has a quorum and has acknowledged this split, yet nevertheless has failed to resolve it.

This Court should step in and ensure the uniform application of federal sentencing law. See S. Ct. R. 10(a). In the alternative, the Court should hold this petition in abeyance pending resolution of *Brown* and *Jackson*. The Court should then dispose of this petition as appropriate in light of that decision.

STATEMENT

A. Legal Framework

At sentencing, criminal defendants with certain previous convictions for “controlled substance offenses” are subject to enhanced penalties. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); *id.* § 4B1.1(a). The *8 Sentencing Guidelines define a “controlled substance offense” as:

an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance * * * or the possession of a controlled substance * * * with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b); see *id.* § 2K2.1 application note 1. The Guidelines do not define “controlled substance.”

To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense, courts apply the “categorical approach.” See *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 598-599 (1990). Under the categorical approach, the facts of the predicate offense are irrelevant. Instead, the categorical approach compares the elements of a predicate offense to a generic comparator, such as a generic offense or “some other criterion,” to determine whether the predicate is a categorical match. *Shular v. United States*, 140 S. Ct. 779, 783 (2020). The purpose of the categorical approach—and the reason courts use a standard comparator across all cases—is to ensure “that all defendants whose convictions establish the same facts will be treated consistently, and thus predictably, under federal law.” *Moncrieffe*, 569 U.S. at 205 n.11. The categorical approach thus reflects the longstanding presumption that “federal laws are not to be construed so that their application is dependent on state law.” *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 591 (citing *Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc.*, 460 U.S. 103, 119-120 (1983)).

*9 B. Procedural History

1. In 2012, Jamar Lewis was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Pet. App. 3a. At the time, both New Jersey and the United States defined marijuana to include hemp. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-2 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (B) (2012). In 2018, Congress amended the federal definition in the CSA to exclude hemp. See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 12619, 132 Stat. 4490, 5018; 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i). New Jersey followed suit in 2019. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:35-2, 4:28-8 (2019).

2. In 2020, Lewis pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. Pet. App. 3a. The Probation Office recommended applying a controlled-substance-offense enhancement based on Lewis's 2012 New Jersey conviction, which would substantially increase his base offense level. *Id.* at 21a; see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

Lewis objected. He explained that “controlled substance” in the Guidelines means only substances listed in the current federal schedule. Pet. App. 21a. But the New Jersey statute under which Lewis was convicted in 2012 defined marijuana more broadly than the federal schedule in effect at the time of Lewis's federal offense and sentencing. Pet. App. 22a-23a. The Government argued that “controlled substance” includes substances controlled under state law, even if they are not also controlled federally. *Id.* In the Government's view, because New Jersey regulated hemp in 2012, Lewis's 2012 conviction triggered the controlled-substance-offense enhancement. *Id.* at 22a.

*10 The District Court agreed with Lewis. The District Court relied on the *Jerome* presumption, the rule “that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on state law.” *Jerome*, 318 U.S. at 104; see Pet. App. 41a-44a. As the District Court explained, that presumption made particular sense in this context. The Guidelines' “animating principle is uniformity in sentencing.” Pet. App. 42a. A “federal sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines requires something more than a conviction based on a state's determination that a given substance should be controlled.” *Id.* at 43a.

After declining to apply the enhancement for Lewis's marijuana conviction, the District Court varied upwards slightly and sentenced Lewis to 42 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. *Id.* at 23a.

3. After the government appealed, the Third Circuit disagreed with the District Court and reversed.

The Third Circuit first addressed whether to look to federal or state law to define “controlled substance.” *Id.* at 8a-13a. The court acknowledged that “courts of appeals have answered the question differently.” *Id.* at 8a. The Third Circuit held that because a “controlled substance offense” includes “offenses ‘under federal or state law,’” federal and state laws can “define what drugs are controlled substances.” *Id.* at 9a (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)) (some emphases added). Because the definition of “offenses” “contemplates state-law discrepancies,” the Third Circuit saw “no reason to apply the” *Jerome* “presumption against state law to” the portion of the definition involving controlled substances. *Id.* at 11a.

***11** The panel also declared the “sentencing goal of uniformity” to be “illusory.” *Id.* And the court emphasized the fact that “the Guidelines often do cross-reference the United States Code,” but the definition of controlled substance offense does not explicitly cross-reference the CSA. *Id.* at 9a. Based on that evidence, the Third Circuit concluded that a “controlled” substance includes substances regulated solely under state law. *See id.*

The Third Circuit next addressed whether to define a “controlled substance” based on drug schedules from “the date of the predicate state conviction” or schedules from “the date of federal sentencing.” *Id.* at 13a. The court again expressly acknowledged that the question “has divided the courts of appeals.” *Id.* at 14a.

The court “start[ed]” its analysis with *McNeill*. *Id.* In *McNeill*, this Court interpreted ACCA’s “serious drug offense” enhancement. That enhancement applies when the predicate offense carries a “maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more.” 563 U.S. at 817-818 (citation omitted). In *McNeill*, the state law qualified at the time the defendant committed the offense. But by the time of the defendant’s federal offense and sentencing, the state had reduced the maximum penalty, meaning the state law no longer qualified under ACCA. *Id.* at 818. The question was whether, in light of that change, the predicate still qualified as a “serious drug offense.” This Court answered yes, holding that whether a predicate qualifies for an ACCA enhancement turns on the predicate’s elements “at the time of that conviction.” *Id.* at 820.

***12** The Third Circuit acknowledged that *McNeill* did “not control Lewis’s case” but nevertheless found *McNeill* “persuasive.” Pet. App. 15a. The court recognized that “*McNeill* prescribes only the time for analyzing the elements of the [predicate] state offense, rather than the time for determining the elements of the” comparator. *Id.* at 16a (cleaned up). But the court deemed this difference immaterial. In the court’s view, because Lewis was convicted under a law that, at the time, qualified as a controlled substance offense, “it would strain credulity” and “yield absurd results” to “reclassify Lewis’s prior conviction as something other than possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.” *Id.* at 16a-17a.

4. Lewis petitioned for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit denied the petition. *Id.* at 47a-48a. Judges Restrepo and Freeman would have granted rehearing en banc. *Id.* at 47a n.*.

Lewis moved to stay the mandate, and explained that he had been released from prison and is currently serving a three-year term of supervised release. Staying the mandate would prevent the risk that he would be resentenced and returned to prison while his petition was pending.

The Third Circuit panel stayed the issuance of the mandate. This petition follows.

***13 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION**

I. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER WHETHER *MCNEILL* DICTATES A TIME-OF-CONSEQUENCES OR TIME-OF-CONVICTION APPROACH.

This Court should grant this petition to resolve the first question presented. The decision below deepens an acknowledged circuit split over the application of *McNeill* to defining a “controlled substance” in Guidelines cases and a “serious drug offense” in ACCA cases. Five circuits read *McNeill* narrowly and look to a drug schedule in effect when federal consequences attach (the “time-of-consequences approach”). Two circuits read *McNeill* broadly and look to a drug schedule in effect at the time of the predicate offense (the “time-of-conviction approach”). Two more circuits—including the Third Circuit in the decision below—adopt the time-of-consequences approach for ACCA and the time-of-conviction approach for the Guidelines.

This Court already acknowledged that this question presents an important issue worthy of resolution when it granted certiorari in two ACCA cases raising this precise question. *See Brown*, No. 22-6389; *Jackson*, No. 22-6640. This Court could grant

this petition to decide this question in the context of the Guidelines, if it determines that *Brown* and *Jackson* do not provide appropriate vehicles. At minimum, this Court should hold this petition pending the resolution of *Brown* and *Jackson*.

***14 A. The Circuits Are Deeply Divided Over The Application Of *McNeill* To The Timing Question.**

In both Guidelines and ACCA cases, the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits read *McNeill* narrowly and define the relevant federal comparator based on a controlled substance schedule in effect when federal consequences attach. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits read *McNeill* broadly and look to law in effect at the time of the predicate conviction. Finally, the Third Circuit and Eighth Circuits apply the former approach in Guidelines cases and the latter approach in ACCA cases. Even looking at just Guidelines cases, the circuits are divided 3-3: the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits apply a time-of-consequences approach, and the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply a time-of-conviction approach. The Court should resolve this entrenched split.

1. The First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits define a “controlled substance” based on the federal drug schedule in effect when federal consequences attach. These circuits read *McNeill* narrowly as defining only the elements of a predicate offense—not the elements of the relevant federal provision against which the predicate offense is compared.¹

¹ These circuits are sub-divided over whether to use the drug schedule in effect at sentencing or at the time the federal offense was committed. Compare, e.g., *United States v. Hope*, 28 F.4th 487, 504-505 (4th Cir. 2022), with, e.g., *United States v. Williams*, 61 F.4th 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2023). That distinction is not at issue here.

Consider the Ninth Circuit. In *United States v. Bautista*, 989 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 2021), the defendant *15 committed a state-law offense, after which Congress amended the federal CSA to narrow the definition of the substance in question, *id.* at 701. The Ninth Circuit held that the state conviction no longer qualified as a controlled substance offense because the state-law predicate offense did not categorically match the current federal drug schedule. *Id.* at 703. The Ninth Circuit explained that this approach promotes “uniformity in federal sentencing law.” *Id.* In contrast, “[a]pplying superseded versions of the” relevant schedule “depending on when in the past a defendant committed an identical state crime would cause the very sentencing disparities Congress has repeatedly stated it intends to avoid.” *Id.* at 703-704.

In so holding, the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected the Government's argument that *McNeill* required defining the comparator “at the time of the prior state conviction.” *Id.* at 703. As the Ninth Circuit explained, *McNeill* has nothing to say on that question: *McNeill* speaks to how to determine the elements of a predicate offense, not the elements of the comparator. See *id.* at 703-704. And in *Bautista*, only the comparator had changed. Moreover, it “would be illogical to conclude that federal sentencing law attaches ‘culpability and dangerousness’ to an act that, at the time of sentencing, Congress has concluded is not culpable and dangerous.” *Id.* at 703. Indeed, adopting the Government's approach “would prevent amendments to federal criminal law from affecting federal sentencing and would hamper Congress' ability to revise federal criminal law.” *Id.*

The First Circuit has likewise adopted the time-of-consequences approach to define “controlled substance.” See *16 *United States v. Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d 519, 523-531 (1st Cir. 2021). As the First Circuit explained, *McNeill* confirms that “the elements of the state offense of conviction are locked in at the time of that conviction,” meaning courts must “look back to the time of conviction * * * to discern the elements of” a predicate offense. *Id.* at 525. But *McNeill*'s “backward-looking inquiry” says nothing about whether the definition of controlled substance is also “locked in as of the time of the previous conviction.” *Id.* at 526-527 (internal quotation marks omitted). Echoing the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit emphasized the oddity of applying a federal sentencing enhancement “based in no small part on a judgment about how problematic that past conduct is when viewed as of the time of the sentencing itself * * * without regard to whether the conduct” involved a substance that is no longer controlled. See *id.* at 528.

The Second Circuit also follows the time-of-consequences approach. *United States v. Gibson*, 55 F.4th 153, 162-167 (2d Cir. 2022). Like the First and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit reads *McNeill* as narrowly focused on how to define the predicate, not

the comparator. *Id.* at 162. The Second Circuit has also emphasized the logic of looking to modern drug schedules: A “defendant’s culpability and dangerousness plainly change in the eyes of federal law when the conduct for which he was previously convicted under state law is no longer unlawful.” *Id.* Indeed, controlled substance schedules are intended to be “a moving target,” and the federal CSA has frequently changed over time. *Id.* at 163 (citation omitted).

***17** In ACCA cases, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits likewise define the comparator using the drug schedule in effect when federal consequences attach.

In *Hope*, the Fourth Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Bautista*, a Guidelines case; it likewise concluded that *McNeill* explained how to define the elements of a predicate, not the comparator; and the Fourth Circuit held that it would be “illogical” to define a controlled substance according to an outdated drug schedule. *United States v. Hope*, 28 F.4th 487, 505 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 703).

In *Williams*, the Tenth Circuit agreed with “[t]he overwhelming majority of circuits” that “the correct point of comparison is the time of the instant federal offense—not the prior state offense.” *United States v. Williams*, 48 F.4th 1125, 1139 (10th Cir. 2022). The Tenth Circuit likewise declined to rely on *McNeill*, holding that *McNeill* involved “a subsequent change in the prior offense of conviction—and not the federal definition to which it is compared.” *Id.* at 1142.

2. In sharp contrast to those five Courts of Appeal, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits read *McNeill* more expansively to support defining the federal comparator based on the law at the time of the predicate offense. This is the “time-of-conviction approach.”

In *Clark*, the Sixth Circuit defined a “controlled substance” based on drug schedules in effect at the time of conviction. *United States v. Clark*, 46 F.4th 404, 408–409 (6th Cir. 2022). According to the Sixth Circuit, the Guidelines’ use of the term “prior” in describing the relevant felony convictions that can ***18** trigger an enhancement means a “court should take a backward-looking approach and assess the nature of the predicate offenses at the time [of those] convictions.” *Id.* at 408–409 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c)). The Sixth Circuit read *McNeill* to “confirm” the appropriateness of “a time-of-conviction rule.” *Id.* at 409. According to that court, both *McNeill* and *Clark* involved “recidivism enhancements” and “an intervening change” in law “that ostensibly shifts the meaning of a provision that enhances [a] sentence.” *Id.* The court recognized that other circuits take the opposite approach, but determined that those “courts insufficiently grapple with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in *McNeill*.” *Id.* at 414.

The Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar approach for ACCA cases in *Jackson*, which this Court is hearing this term. See *United States v. Jackson*, 55 F.4th 846, 855 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023). According to the Eleventh Circuit, *McNeill* “requires” interpreting a “serious drug offense” in ACCA “to incorporate the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect” at the time of the predicate state conviction. *Id.* The Eleventh Circuit concluded that looking to drug schedules at the time federal consequences attach “would ‘erase an earlier state conviction for ACCA purposes,’ in violation of *McNeill*.” *Id.* at 856 (alterations omitted) (quoting *McNeill*, 563 U.S. at 823). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit read *McNeill* to mandate “a backward-looking perspective,” which it read to support looking to “the federal controlled-substances schedules” “in effect at the time the defendant’s prior federal drug conviction occurred.” ***19** *Id.* at 857–859. But like the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit recognized its “sister circuits” had reached the opposite result based on “thoughtful arguments.” *Id.* at 860.

3. The Third and Eighth Circuits split the difference. For ACCA cases, these courts define the federal comparator based on drug schedules in existence at the time federal consequences attach. But they adopt the time-of-conviction approach for Guidelines cases.

The Third Circuit adopted the time-of-consequences rule for ACCA in *United States v. Brown*, 47 F.4th 147 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2458 (2023), which this Court will hear this term. The Third Circuit held that *McNeill* prescribes “only the time for analyzing the elements of the state [predicate] offense.” *Id.* at 154 (citing *United States v. Jackson*, 36 F.4th 1294, 1306, superseded by 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023); *Hope*, 28 F.4th at 505; *Bautista*, 989

F.3d at 703; *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 526). The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that *McNeill* does not speak to how to determine the comparator under ACCA. See *United States v. Perez*, 46 F.4th 691, 699 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 525).

But these courts reverse course for Guidelines cases, read *McNeill* expansively, and define “controlled substance” based on drug schedules in effect at the time of the predicate. In the decision below, the Third Circuit held that just as “later amendments to state law did not change the classification of the already-adjudicated offense in *McNeill*, deregulation of hemp does not reclassify Lewis’s prior conviction as *20 something other than possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.” Pet. App. 15a-16a. The Third Circuit acknowledged the tension between its holding here and *Brown*, which reached the opposite result under ACCA. *Id.* at 18a. But the Third Circuit reasoned that *Brown* had taken “no view on the correctness of” the time-of-consequences rule as applied to the Guidelines and concluded that the result in *Brown* stemmed from other factors not present in Guidelines cases. *Id.* (citation omitted); see also *United States v. Bailey*, 37 F.4th 467, 469-470 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (adopting time-of-conviction approach under the Guidelines).

4. As the decision below acknowledges, the question presented “has divided the courts of appeals.” Pet. App. 14a. Indeed, just looking at Guidelines cases, the circuits are split 3-3. Compare *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 531 (time-of-consequences), and *Gibson*, 55 F.4th at 162-167 (same), and *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 703-705 (same), with *Clark*, 46 F.4th at 406 (time-of-conviction), and Pet. App. 14a-16a (same), and *Bailey*, 37 F.4th at 469-470 (same). This Court has already granted review of this question in the ACCA context; hearing this case would allow the Court to expressly resolve the Guidelines issue as well.

At a minimum, however, this Court should hold this petition pending its resolution of *Brown* and *Jackson*. As the *Jackson* petition explained, resolving “the question presented” in those cases “will clarify the widespread confusion about this Court’s decision in *McNeill*,” thereby providing important guidance for both ACCA and “Guidelines cases around the country.” Pet. for Cert. 30, *Jackson*, No. 22-6389 (Jan. 24, 2023). Indeed, this Court has long recognized that *21 precedent and principles from statutory cases can inform the Guidelines, and vice versa. See, e.g., *Dorsey v. United States*, 567 U.S. 260, 276 (2010) (applying background principle from the Guidelines to interpret Fair Sentencing Act); *United States v. Rodriguez*, 553 U.S. 377, 392 (2008) (using Sentencing Reform Act to interpret ACCA); see also, e.g., *United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez*, 775 F.3d 483, 504 n.24 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Much of the case law developing the [categorical approach] has arisen in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act[.] * * * We have long recognized the applicability of this precedent to the career offender inquiry.”).

B. The Decision Below Is Wrong.

Federal law generally applies “the Guidelines that are ‘in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.’” *Dorsey*, 567 U.S. at 275 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii)) (emphasis omitted). This principle requires defining “a controlled substance offense” based on the drug schedule “at the time of a defendant’s federal sentencing.” *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 527.

Defining sentencing enhancements based on current law makes intuitive sense. Sentencing enhancements reflect “how problematic [a defendant’s] past conduct is when viewed as of the time of the sentencing itself.” *Id.* at 528; accord *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 703. They do not “punish” someone for having committed a prior offense in the past. *Gibson*, 55 F.4th at 165. Instead, they constitute a “judgment” in the present about the need to incarcerate a person for the future. *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 528. But imposing an enhancement based on outdated drug schedules would mandate an *22 additional and often extremely harsh penalty for conduct that “is no longer a * * * crime.” *Gibson*, 55 F.4th at 165. It “would be illogical to conclude that federal sentencing law attaches ‘culpability and dangerousness’ to an act that, at the time of sentencing,” the legislature “has concluded is not culpable and dangerous.” *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 703.

Moreover, defining a controlled substance at the time federal consequences attach “serves the goal of uniformity in federal sentencing law.” *Id.* The time-of-consequences approach ensures that two similarly-situated “individuals” who “were sentenced at the same time” do not “receive radically different sentences.” *Dorsey*, 567 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). By contrast, varying the definition of a controlled substance depending on the date of a predicate conviction could mean two individuals sentenced on

the same day would receive different penalties for “an identical state crime” “depending on when in the past” each “defendant committed” the offense. *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 703.

The Third Circuit's contrary time-of-conviction approach does not withstand scrutiny.

First, the Third Circuit erred by relying on *McNeill*. *McNeill* asked only how to define a predicate offense. “*McNeill* simply had no occasion to address” or “answer” the question of when to define the comparator. *Abdulaziz*, 998 F.3d at 526 & n.3.

Second, the Third Circuit's policy arguments do not hold up. The court below worried that under the time-of-consequences approach, some defendants will not receive enhanced sentences because of a change in state law. Pet. App. 16a. But that argument has little *23 to do with defining a “controlled substance”; it is an objection to the categorical approach. The categorical approach assumes the defendant committed the least culpable conduct and asks whether that least culpable conduct meets the measure of a uniform comparator, precisely to avoid leaving federal sentencing “to the vagaries of state law.” *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 588. In other words, the categorical approach is underinclusive by design. *Moncrieffe*, 569 U.S. at 205 & n.11. That a state may change its law-and a state offense may no longer constitute a federal predicate is already baked into the categorical approach.

Third, the Third Circuit's divergent approach to ACCA and the Guidelines does not pass muster. According to the Third Circuit, because ACCA expressly defines controlled substance by reference to the federal CSA, “it makes sense” to rely on the current version of the CSA. Pet. App. 18a. But sentencing courts must likewise use the current version of the Guidelines, and the current definition of any terms they contain. And given the fundamental similarity between ACCA enhancements and Guidelines enhancements and the analytical framework underlying them, it makes little sense to adopt different approaches for ACCA and the Guidelines. *See supra* pp. 20-21 (discussing overlap of ACCA and Guidelines' precedent).

II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER WHETHER “CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE” INCLUDES SUBSTANCES CONTROLLED ONLY BY STATE LAW.

The Court should also grant this petition to address a second deep and acknowledged split. The Courts of *24 Appeals disagree 3-6 over whether “controlled substance” includes substances controlled under federal law only or also includes substances controlled under state law. As two Justices of this Court have recognized, this split erodes national uniformity in federal sentencing. Given the Sentencing Commission's longstanding inability to address this question, this Court should grant this petition to resolve this split.

A. The Decision Below Deepened An Acknowledged Split Over The Federal-Or-State-Law Question.

1. In the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, a criminal defendant will only face an enhanced federal sentence based on a substance controlled under federal law.

In *United States v. Townsend*, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), the Second Circuit held that the phrase “controlled substance” in the Guidelines refers only to substances controlled under the CSA. The Second Circuit explained that as “a general rule, commonly called the *Jerome* presumption, the application of a federal law does not depend on state law unless” the drafter “indicates otherwise.” *Id.* at 71 (citing *Jerome*, 318 U.S. at 104). As the Second Circuit recognized, this Court's categorical-approach precedent represents a specialized application of *Jerome*. *See id.* (citing *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 579; *Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions*, 581 U.S. 385, 393 (2017)). Combined, these precedents confirm that when it comes to the Guidelines, “federal law is the interpretive anchor.” *Id.*

*25 Relying on these principles, the Second Circuit made short work of the question presented. Absent contrary evidence, a “federal sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines requires something more than a conviction based on a state's determination that a given substance should be controlled.” *Id.* “[I]f the Sentencing Commission wanted ‘controlled substance’

to include substances controlled under only state law to qualify, then it should have” defined that term to “read ‘* * * a controlled substance *under federal or state law*.’ But it [did] not.” *Id.* at 70 (ellipsis and emphasis in original). Thus, the words “controlled substance” “must refer exclusively to those drugs listed under federal law—that is, the CSA.” *Id.* at 71.

The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that a “controlled substance” refers to only substances controlled under federal law.² *United States v. Leal-Vega*, 680 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012). Applying “a national definition” of “controlled substance” promotes the “uniform application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” *Id.* at 1167; see *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 702 (reiterating that defining “controlled substance” based on federal law “further[s] uniform application of federal sentencing law”).

² *Leal-Vega* involved U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement for a prior “drug trafficking offense,” which is defined as an offense involving “a controlled substance.” The Ninth Circuit later extended *Leal-Vega*’s holding to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)’s “identical” “text.” *Bautista*, 989 F.3d at 702.

The Fifth Circuit followed the same approach in *United States v. Gomez-Alvarez*, 781 F.3d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 2015). There, the Fifth Circuit expressly “adopt[ed] the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit” and held that for a prior state conviction to qualify as a *26 predicate conviction, “the government must establish that the substance underlying that conviction is covered by the CSA.” *Id.*³

³ Like *Leal-Vega*, *Gomez-Alvarez* involved U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

Finally, the First Circuit has noted the clear circuit split and signaled its agreement with the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. *United States v. Crocco*, 15 F.4th 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2021). Although it has yet to squarely confront the question, the First Circuit has explained that defining controlled substances based on federal law “is appealing,” while the contrary approach is “fraught with peril.” *Id.* at 23. Federal “courts cannot blindly accept anything that a state names or treats as a controlled substance.” *Id.* Otherwise, the courts would “turn the categorical approach on its head by defining a controlled substance offense as whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

2. In contrast, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits define “controlled substance” by reference to federal and state law.

In the decision below, the Third Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and held that a substance regulated by state law is a “controlled substance” even if it is not regulated by federal law. Pet. App. 8a. The court recognized that the ordinary meaning of “controlled substance”—“a drug regulated by law”—does not shed light on “*which* law must regulate the drug.” *Id.* at 9a. According to the court, the Guidelines answer that question because the definition of a controlled substance *27 offense “explicitly includes offenses ‘under federal or state law.’” *Id.* (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)).

The Third Circuit faulted the circuits on the other side of the split for “read[ing] into” the definition of a controlled substance offense “a cross-reference to the CSA that isn’t there” and for “rely[ing] too heavily on the rebuttable presumption that federal law does not turn on the vagaries of state law.” *Id.* at 9a-10a (citing *Jerome*, 318 U.S. at 104).

The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in *United States v. Ruth*, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020). The defendant argued that his state conviction did not qualify as a predicate controlled substance offense because state law defined cocaine more broadly than the CSA. *Id.* at 644. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. According to that court, the “Sentencing Commission clearly knows how to cross-reference federal statutory definitions when it wants to.” *Id.* at 651. Because the definition of a controlled substance “does not incorporate, cross-reference, or in any way refer to the Controlled Substances Act,” the court concluded that the phrase “controlled substance” includes substances regulated by federal or state law. *Id.*

The Fourth Circuit took the same approach in *United States v. Ward*, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2020). It too highlighted the lack of an express cross-reference to the CSA on the theory that, if the Commission “intended for the federal definition of ‘controlled substance’ to apply,” it could have said so. *Id.* at 373. The Fourth Circuit also declined to rely on the *Jerome* presumption because, in defining controlled substance offense, the Guidelines *28 specifically reference offenses under “state law.” *Id.* at 373-374 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)).

The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits likewise look to federal or state law in defining a “controlled substance.” Those courts similarly emphasize the Guidelines’ textual reference to an offense under state law and the lack of an explicit cross-reference to the CSA in the Guidelines. See *United States v. Jones*, Nos. 22-1280/1281, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 5543660, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 2023); *United States v. Henderson*, 11 F.4th 713, 718-719 (8th Cir. 2021); *United States v. Jones*, 15 F.4th 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2021).

Given this straightforward division in authority on an important and recurring question, the Court should grant certiorari.

B. The Decision Below Is Wrong.

This Court’s precedent establishes a clear rule: absent an express indication to the contrary, federal sentencing law does not depend on state law. Indeed, the entire purpose of the Guidelines and the categorical approach is to ensure nationally uniform sentencing law. That leads to a straightforward conclusion here: “controlled substance” means only those substances controlled under federal law.

The principle that federal law—in particular federal criminal law—does not turn on state law is shot through this Court’s precedent. Nearly a century ago, *Jerome* explained that courts “must generally assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, that” federal law does not “depend[] on state law.” *Jerome*, 318 U.S. at 104. Among other things, “[t]hat assumption is based on the fact that the application of *29 federal legislation is nationwide.” *Id.* Since *Jerome*, this Court has repeatedly “rejected attempts to impose enhanced federal punishments on criminal defendants in light of a state conviction” without ensuring that the state-law conviction meets “a uniform federal standard.” *Townsend*, 897 F.3d at 71 (collecting cases); see, e.g., *Dickerson*, 460 U.S. at 119-120; *United States v. Turley*, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).

Indeed, the categorical approach itself is an application of this principle. In *Taylor*, this Court cited *Jerome*’s progeny and developed the categorical approach to prevent federal sentencing enhancements from varying based on “the vagaries of state law.” *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 588, 591-592 (citing *Dickerson* and *Turley*). In the Court’s words, the “chief concern” of the categorical approach is to “ensure[] that all defendants whose convictions establish the same facts will be treated consistently, and thus predictably, under federal law.” *Moncrieffe*, 569 U.S. at 205 n.11. To secure uniformity, the categorical approach compares state predicate offenses against a “uniform, categorical definition[],” *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 590, even if that uniform comparator is at times underinclusive, see *Moncrieffe*, 569 U.S. at 205 & n.11.

These principles resolve this question presented: Had the Commission wanted the definition of “controlled substance” to include substances controlled under only state law, the Commission could have said so. It didn’t. Instead, the Guidelines are silent regarding whether a “controlled substance” includes substances controlled under only federal law, or federal and state law. Given that silence, this Court’s precedent dictates that federal law alone controls.

*30 Defining controlled substance according to both federal and state law, as the Third Circuit did, undermines the categorical approach’s goals. “Whereas the categorical approach was intended to prevent inconsistencies based on state definitions of crimes,” defining a “controlled substance” based on state law “creates” inconsistencies. *Ward*, 972 F.3d at 383-384 (Gregory, C.J., concurring in judgment). Under the Third Circuit’s approach, it is immaterial whether a drug is “not federally regulated.” Pet. App. 19a. Indeed, according to the decision below, a defendant can face an enhanced federal sentence for a state-law offense that is not—and never has been—illegal under federal law, or in any of the other 49 states. That is precisely the “odd result []” the categorical approach seeks to prevent. See *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 591.

The Third Circuit reached the wrong result for three reasons.

First, the Third Circuit picked the wrong starting point for its analysis. The court acknowledged that neither the text of the Guidelines nor the plain meaning of controlled substance directly answer the question at hand. *See* Pet. App. 9. But instead of applying the *Jerome* presumption and the corresponding principals underlying the categorical approach, the Third Circuit took silence to imply that the Guidelines incorporate state law. According to the Third Circuit, because “the Guidelines often do cross-reference the United States Code,” the *absence* of a cross-reference means the Guidelines incorporated state law. *Id.*

***31** That fundamental mistake “has it backwards.” *Townsend*, 897 F.3d at 70. Silence means the Guidelines incorporate *only* federal law. As this Court explained in *Taylor*, “we do not interpret Congress’ omission of” certain language to mean “that * * * Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses.” 495 U.S. at 591.

Second, the Third Circuit stated that because the Guidelines define a “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law,” it could disregard the *Jerome* presumption. Pet. App. 9a-10a (some emphases added) (citation omitted).

That butchers the text. The fact that the Commission sought to include “an offense ‘under federal or state law’” “does not also mean that the *substance* at issue may be controlled under federal or state law.” *Townsend*, 897 F.3d at 70. That language simply means that if substance X is deemed controlled, a conviction under federal or state law involving substance X qualifies as a “controlled substance offense”—whereas a conviction under foreign law involving substance X does not. It says nothing about what law defines whether the *substance* is controlled. If anything, the fact that the Commission specified that “an offense” includes an offense under federal or state law but did not similarly define a “controlled substance” as a substance controlled under federal or state law supports the federal-only approach.

Third, the Third Circuit gave short shrift to this Court’s goal of national uniformity in federal sentencing law. The Third Circuit acknowledged that ***32** its approach “would treat differently” two “offenders who had previously trafficked hemp—one in a state where it was criminalized and another in a state where it was legal.” Pet. App. 11a. But the Third Circuit worried that relying on federal law to define a controlled substance also created dis-uniformity depending on whether an offender was convicted in a state whose state schedule matched the federal schedule. *Id.* at 11a-12a.

That is a yet another thinly-veiled attack on the categorical approach. The categorical approach always assumes the defendant committed the least culpable conduct necessary to have committed the predicate offense. If a state law criminalizes less culpable conduct than a federal comparator, the predicate will always fail to categorically match the comparator. Any “objection to that underinclusive result is little more than an attack on the categorical approach itself.” *Moncrieffe*, 569 U.S. at 205.

Every federal defendant sentenced at “the same time, [in] the same place, and even [by] the same judge” ought to be treated the same. *Dorsey*, 567 U.S. at 277. This Court should grant this petition to make that goal a reality.

III. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE IMPORTANT, RECURRING, AND WARRANT REVIEW.

The two questions presented are critically important, impact countless defendants across the country, and are worthy of this Court’s review.

These two persistent circuit splits undermine the very purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines. Congress tasked the Sentencing Commission with eliminating “unwarranted sentencing disparities” for those “found ***33** guilty of similar criminal conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). Consistent with that goal, the Commission’s Guidelines play a “central role in sentencing.” *Molina-Martinez v. United States*, 578 U.S. 189, 191 (2016). “[D]istrict courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007).

But allowing these circuit splits to persist creates the very discrepancies the Guidelines seek to avoid. Today, a defendant being federally sentenced in roughly half the circuits could receive a substantially lengthy sentencing increase that he or she would not receive in the other circuits. The Guidelines should not treat a defendant differently “simply because they were lucky enough to commit” their federal offense “on the right side of the border”-or unlucky enough to commit it on the wrong side. *Ward*, 972 F.3d at 381 (Gregory, C.J., concurring in judgment).

This persistent dis-uniformity is all the more troubling because prior convictions involving a controlled substance trigger numerous sentencing enhancements, including the extremely serious career-offender enhancement. *See, e.g.*, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (career offender provision); *id.* § 2K2.1 (possession of a firearm); *id.* § 2K1.3 (explosive-materials); *id.* § 5K2.17 (semiautomatic-firearms); *id.* § 2L1.2 (unlawful reentry). Federal courts impose these enhancements thousands of times every year, often leading to years- or even decades-long sentencing increases. *See generally* U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, *Quick Facts: Career Offenders* 1 (1,356 *34 career offenders in fiscal year 2022)⁴; U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, *Use of Guidelines and Specific Offense Characteristics Guideline Calculation Based Fiscal Year 2022* 129 (§ 2K2.1 enhancement applied 4,016 times for controlled substances or crimes of violence in fiscal year 2022).⁵

⁴ Available at <https://tinyurl.com/mpcr8aj4>.

⁵ Available at <https://tinyurl.com/bd3m5843>.

Courts are deeply divided, and the questions presented are not going away. Nor are these questions limited to prior marijuana convictions like Lewis’s 2012 New Jersey conviction. The same disparities arise in cases involving all sorts of controlled substances. *See, e.g.*, *Henderson*, 11 F.4th 713 (cocaine); *Ward*, 972 F.3d 364 (heroin); *United States v. Holliday*, 853 F. App’x 53 (9th Cir. 2021) (methamphetamine). Because federal drug definitions “are updated every year” and do not necessarily track state law, there is every reason to think these problems will only grow worse. *Gibson*, 55 F.4th at 165. And given that the issues and arguments have been fully developed across multiple cases, there is no need to wait for any additional circuits to weigh in.

Indeed, this Court has already signaled that each question presented warrants review. It recently granted certiorari to review the timing question as it pertains to ACCA, confirming that this question is deeply important. Meanwhile, as Justice Sotomayor noted in a statement joined by Justice Barrett, the federal-or-state-law question presented has “direct and severe consequences for defendants’ sentences.” *35 *Guerrant*, 142 S. Ct. at 641 (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari).

In fact, the combination of the questions presented produces a particularly concerning result that cries out for this Court’s intervention. In the decision below, the Third Circuit defined the controlled substance comparator (1) based on the law in effect at the time of predicate conviction, and (2) based on state law, rather than federal law. In other words, the court defined the comparator as the state law in effect at the time of Lewis’s predicate conviction-meaning it effectively compared his state law predicate *against itself*. That “turns the categorical approach on its head by defining [a controlled substance] as whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted.” *Esquivel-Quintana*, 581 U.S. at 393. As a result, *every* prior controlled substance conviction will *always* count as a “controlled substance offense.” That will produce enhanced sentences in *every single case-often* meaning defendants receive years or decades more than they should. That bizarre result is as wrong as it sounds-and calls out for this Court’s review.

This Court should not hesitate to resolve the questions presented because they involve the Guidelines. As Justice Sotomayor explained in 2022, the Sentencing Commission has a “responsibility” to address circuit splits, and often gets the first crack at solving them. *Guerrant*, 142 S. Ct. at 640 (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari). At that time, the Commission lacked a quorum, and Justice Sotomayor expressed hope that the Commission would resume its duties and resolve the second question presented.

*36 Since Justice Sotomayor's statement, however, the Commission gained a quorum, but has not solved these splits. Indeed, the Commission labeled resolving the second question presented a "priority," requested public comment on that issue, and even amended *other* aspects of the definition of "controlled substance." See [Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle](#), 87 Fed. Reg. 67756, 67756 (Nov. 9, 2022). Yet the Commission declined to resolve the federal-or-state-law question. See [Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts](#), 88 Fed. Reg. 7180, 7200-7201 (Feb. 2, 2023); [Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts](#), 88 Fed. Reg. 28254, 28276 (May 3, 2023).⁶

⁶ The Commission's priorities for the upcoming amendment cycle include discussing the use of the "categorical approach" in determining career-offender status. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, *Federal Register Notice of Final 2023-2024 Priorities* 4, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/federal-register-notices/20230824_fr-final-priorities.pdf. But the Commission did not expressly identify resolving either circuit split as a priority. And it is unclear whether the Commission will propose-much less promulgate-an amendment addressing the categorical approach that resolves either question presented (let alone both).

Hoping against reason that the Commission might act is not a rational basis for denying review. The Guidelines are federal law, and this Court has an independent "duty" "to say what the law is." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). This Court already permitted the "Commission * * * the opportunity to address" these reoccurring issues "in the first instance," *Longoria v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 978, 979 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the *37 denial of certiorari), and was "restrained and circumspect in using * * * certiorari power as the primary means of resolving" these conflicts over the proper interpretation of the Guidelines, *Braxton v. United States*, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). But the Commission has let the first question presented fester and affirmatively chose "not to act" on the second. *McClinton v. United States*, 143 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). This Court should "take up" these issues, exercise its own obligation to resolve conflicting approaches among the federal courts, and eliminate these glaring dis-uniformities in federal sentencing law. *Id.*; see also *Early v. United States*, 502 U.S. 920, 920 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging review where the Commission "has not addressed" a "recurring issue").

IV. THIS PETITION IS A GOOD VEHICLE.

This petition is a good vehicle for resolving both questions presented. There are no jurisdictional problems or factual disputes. The record is not voluminous. And the two questions presented are outcome determinative: As a result of the Third Circuit's decision, Lewis must be resentenced under a *higher* Guidelines range. Had the court interpreted "controlled substance" to mean substances listed in the federal CSA or substances controlled when federal consequences attach, Lewis's existing sentence would stand. Moreover, this case presents both the timing question and the federal-or-state-law question, unlike prior petitions that have presented only one of those two questions.

*38 This case is also a good vehicle because Lewis will remain on supervised release through April 2025, obviating any risk of mootness if the Court grants review this term. Further, Lewis does not have any other prior convictions that could substitute as a predicate offense. If Lewis's 2012 marijuana conviction is not a predicate offense, then his prior sentence will stand.

At a minimum, the Court should hold this petition pending its decision in *Brown* and *Jackson*. That decision will likely clarify *McNeill*. At that point, if appropriate, the Court could grant this petition, vacate the judgment, and remand for consideration in light of *Brown* and *Jackson*. Alternatively, depending on the resolution of *Brown* and *Jackson*, the Court could grant the petition to consider the second question presented.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted and the decision below reversed. Alternatively and to the extent the Court deems it appropriate here, the Court should hold this petition pending resolution of *Brown* and *Jackson*, and should dispose of it in light of the decisions in those cases.

*39 Respectfully submitted,

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