

No. _____

In the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Rifat Shafique

1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW, #513, Washington, DC 20005

(on behalf of herself, and all other similarly situated)

Petitioner,

vs.

EQUITY RESIDENTIAL

T/A EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

Two North Riverside Plaza, Suite 400, Chicago, IL 60606-2624

Respondent.

**Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in the matter of**

Rifat Shafique v Equity Residential Management, LLC, 23 CV 0513

APPENDICES TO CERTIORARI

Opinions Below

Rifat Shafique


1500 Massachusetts Avenue, Apartment 513
Washington, DC 20005
Shafique.rifat@gmail.com

Appellant Pro Se Sui Juris Feme Sole

APPENDIX 1²⁵⁰¹

Judgment From Which Review is Sought
*(Decision within the District of Columbia Court of Appeals from which arises this
petition)*

District of Columbia
Court of Appeals



No. 23-CV-0513

RIFAT SHAFIQUE,

Appellant,

2023-CAB-001282

v.

EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Appellee.

BEFORE: Beckwith and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Fisher, Senior Judge.

JUDGMENT

On consideration of appellee's motion for summary affirmance and the opposition thereto, appellant's brief, and the record on appeal, it is


ORDERED that appellee's motion for summary affirmance is granted. *See Oliver T. Carr Mgmt., Inc. v. Nat'l Deli., Inc.*, 397 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1979) (per curiam). Appellant's brief contains only conclusory allegations and does not identify any claims of error with respect to the trial court's orders denying her motions to reinstate her complaint and for relief from judgment. *See S. Hills Ltd. P'ship v. Anderson*, 179 A.3d 297, 299 (D.C. 2018) ("[A]ppellant bears the burden of convincing the appellate court that the trial court erred.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also In re Shearin*, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C. 2000) ("Points not urged in a party's initial brief are treated as abandoned."). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to reinstate her complaint where she filed her motion after the 14-day filing period had ended and failed to provide good cause to reinstate her case. *See Wagshal v. Rigler*, 711 A.2d 112, 114 (D.C. 1998) ("The decision whether to vacate a dismissal under Rule 41(b) is clearly a matter of trial court discretion"); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b)(3) (providing that a party whose claim is dismissed by the court sua sponte may file a motion showing good cause to vacate the dismissal within 14 days). Likewise, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to join the judges of a prior motions panel as defendants where it did not reinstate her case, *see Settemire v. D. C. Off. of Emp. Appeals*, 898 A.2d 902, 905 (D.C. 2006) (explaining that an event that renders relief impossible or unnecessary also renders that appeal moot), and the panel's prior

No. 23-CV-0513

rulings are not a basis for liability in any event. *See, e.g., Hammond v. Quick*, 829 A.2d 509, 510 (D.C. 2003) (“It is well established that judges are immune from liability for acts done in their judicial capacity if the particular act at issue is a judicial act.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also, e.g., Khawam v. Wolfe*, 84 A.3d 558, 569 (D.C. 2014) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”) (quoting *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Finally, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration where she did not offer any grounds for relief and instead simply restated her earlier arguments that the trial court had already rejected. *See Johnson v. Marcheta Inv’rs Ltd. P’ship*, 711 A.2d 109, 111 (D.C. 1998) (explaining that “appellate review of the denial of [a Rule 60(b)] motion is limited to determining whether or not the trial court abused its discretion”); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b)(1), (6) (providing that a party may challenge a final judgment or order for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or “any other reason that justifies relief”). It is

FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the orders on appeal are affirmed.

ENTERED BY DIRECTION OF THE COURT:



JULIO A. CASTILLO
Clerk of the Court

Copies e-served to:

Honorable Juliet McKenna

QMU – Civil Division

Rifat Shafique

Matthew M. Moore, Esquire

cml

APPENDIX 2

Order Violated by the Court

Order from related case of

Equity Residential Management, LLC Supt. Crt. D.C. case number 22 LTB 0462,

issued on July 26, 2022.


**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION**

EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, :
LLC TA 1500 MASS A :
: :
v. : Case No. 2022 LTB 000462
: :
RIFAT SHAFIQUE : :

ORDER ASSIGNING CASE AFTER REMAND

This case has been remanded to this Court by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Consistent with Rule 40-I, the Court orders that the case is assigned to the Landlord & Tenant Calendar. The Court schedules a remote status hearing before a civil judge on August 15, 2022 at 3:00 p.m. in virtual courtroom B-109. Instructions for remote participation are attached.

SO ORDERED.



Anthony C. Epstein
Judge

Date: July 26, 2022

Copies to:

Defendant and counsel for plaintiff by CaseFileXpress