


APPENDIX A

District of Columbia  
Court of Appeals

No. 24-CO-0049



TOMMY T. BRANCH,  
Appellant,

v.

2012-CF3-016873

UNITED STATES,  
Appellee.

BEFORE: Blackburne-Rigsby, Chief Judge, and McLeese and Shanker, Associate Judges.

JUDGMENT

On consideration of appellant's motion for summary reversal, appellee's opposition and cross motion for summary affirmance, and the record on appeal, it is

ORDERED that appellant's motion for summary reversal is denied. *See Watson v. United States*, 73 A.3d 130 (D.C. 2013). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that appellee's motion for summary affirmance is granted. *See id.* The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant (1) did not meet the eligibility criteria for compassionate release and (2) failed to show he was not presently dangerous. *See D.C. Code § 24-403.04; Colbert v. United States*, 310 A.3d 608, 612 (D.C. 2024) ("We review the trial court's rulings, both as to eligibility and as to dangerousness, under the abuse of discretion standard."). Although appellant failed to challenge the trial court's eligibility determination and we could conclude that appellant has abandoned that issue and affirm on that basis, *see Bardoff v. United States*, 628 A.2d 86, 90 n.8 (D.C. 1993), the trial court's findings as to eligibility also are supported by the record.


In challenging the dangerousness determination, appellant argues only that the trial court, which did not explicitly state that it was applying the preponderance standard, applied a higher standard of proof. However, "[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law." *Bailey v. United States*, 251 A.3d 724, 730 (D.C. 2021) (quoting *Saidi v. United States*, 110 A.3d 606, 613 (D.C. 2015)). Unlike in *Bailey*, on which appellant relies, the trial court's written order in this case does not indicate that it

may have applied a heightened evidentiary standard. *See Autrey v. United States*, 264 A.3d 653, 659 n.14 (D.C. 2021) (affirming the trial court's denial of a compassionate release motion where the trial court did not explicitly invoke the preponderance standard, because "the trial court order [did] not employ the sort of language inconsistent with the preponderance standard that caused us to remand in *Bailey* for a clarified ruling").

While appellant points to evidence in the record that could suggest at least some level of rehabilitation, such as his participation in programming, the trial judge was not required to find that this positive evidence equated to a lack of present dangerousness. *See, e.g., United States v. Falcon*, 288 A.3d 317, 338 (D.C. 2023) (observing that a prisoner's participation in employment, coursework, and other programming, lack of significant discipline history, and close relationships with family members are not factors which, even when taken collectively, necessarily establish lack of present dangerousness). The trial court weighed appellant's programming against his disciplinary record, lack of a detailed release plan, and appellant's convictions, finding that the evidence weighed against appellant. Further, the trial judge permissibly focused on the serious and violent nature of appellant's underlying offenses in concluding that appellant failed to meet his burden to show he was not presently dangerous. *See, e.g., Bailey*, 251 A.3d at 733 ("When considering a prisoner's dangerousness, it is appropriate to weigh the nature and circumstances of their underlying offense(s) as informing their present and future dangerousness.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). There is no indication on the face of the trial court's order that it considered impermissible factors, such as a desire to promote a policy of deterrence, or to see appellant further punished for his crimes. *See, e.g., id.* at 732 ("Where a defendant is eligible for early release and found to be non-dangerous, there is simply no room in the statutory scheme for concerns about general deterrence and victim restitution to trump those determinations."). It is

FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment on appeal is affirmed.

ENTERED BY DIRECTION OF THE COURT:



JULIO A. CASTILLO  
Clerk of the Court

**No. 24-CO-0049**

Copies e-served to:

Honorable Lynn Leibovitz

Director, Criminal Division

Steven R. Kiersh, Esquire

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Esquire  
Assistant United States Attorney

cml

# Appendix B

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL DIVISION—FELONY BRANCH

UNITED STATES

: Case No: 2012 CF3 16873

:

v.

:

:

TOMMY BRANCH

: Judge Lynn Leibovitz

:

### ORDER

Before the court are defendant's *pro se* Motion for Compassionate Release, filed August 18, 2020, defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release and Motion to Supplement Motion When all Medical Records are Produced, filed April 1, 2022, defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release, filed July 17, 2022, defendant's *pro se* Motion for Compassionate Release, filed August 24, 2023, and the government's Opposition to the defendant's motion, filed August 12, 2022. For the following reasons, the court will deny defendant's Motion.<sup>1</sup>

### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 1, 2013, a jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery, two counts of armed robbery, aggravated assault while armed, assault with intent to rob while armed, four counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence ("PFCV"), and attempted credit

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<sup>1</sup> Defendant's first *pro se* Motion for Compassionate Release was assigned to another judge, who appointed counsel other than counsel on the instant motion, to supplement defendant's motion. No subsequent supplemental motion was filed at that time. On May 26, 2021, defendant filed a *pro se* Motion for relief pursuant to the Incarceration Reduction Act ("IRAA"). This court appointed current counsel to explore the defendant's eligibility to file an IRAA motion. Counsel sought, and was granted, a number of extensions for this purpose, and for the purpose of supplementing the Motion for Compassionate Release, which counsel stated was delayed because of a delay in receipt of defendant's BOP medical records. Ultimately, counsel gave notice that defendant is not eligible to file for IRAA sentence reduction at this time and was no longer seeking release on those grounds. Confusion arising from the parallel tracks of the two motions gave rise to delay after the instant Motion for Compassionate Release became ripe.

card fraud. On July 2, 2013, the Honorable Robert I. Richter sentenced defendant to 288 months and 180 days incarceration.

On February 23, 2015, defendant filed a *pro se* Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to Rule 59 (b), which the court treated as a motion pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110. On August 20, 2015, defendant sent a letter to chambers, which the court treated as a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b). The court denied both of these motions by written order on August 31, 2015. On December 15, 2015, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. *Branch v. United States*, No. 13-CF-740, Mem. Op. & J. 1 (D.C. Dec. 15, 2015). On May 23, 2018, defendant filed a second *pro se* motion pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110. On August 29, 2018, the court denied defendant's motion, except that the court also amended the Judgment and Commitment Order to vacate as merged counts 3 and 10. Defendant's amended sentence remained 288 months and 180 days incarceration. On September 14, 2018, defendant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for Reconsideration of its August 28, 2018, Order, which this court denied on October 1, 2018. This denial was affirmed on appeal. *Tommy T. Branch v. United States*, No. 18-CO-1129 (D.C. July 30, 2020).

On May 9, 2020, this court received defendant's *pro se* letter, which it treated as a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to D.C. Super. Ct. R. 35(b). On June 1, 2020, the court denied the motion.

In the instant motion, defendant requests that he be granted compassionate release in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, pursuant to DC Code § 24-403.04.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In defendant's *pro se* Motions for Compassionate Release, he also makes certain other arguments addressing the merits of his conviction. These include claims that he is "actually innocent," that the aggravated assault while armed statute is unconstitutionally vague, that his attorney gave him bad advice concerning the plea offer, and that the government engaged in "hardball" plea negotiation. ( *Pro se* Motion for Compassionate Release filed August 24, 2023). Counsel adopted and incorporated the claims made in defendant's *pro se* motions by email communication to chambers. The court will deny the instant motion to the extent that it is a Motion pursuant to D.C. Code §23-110,

## ANALYSIS

Pursuant to D.C. Code § 24-403.04, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court “shall modify a term of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant if it determines the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community pursuant to the factors to be considered in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(g) and 3553(a) and evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation while incarcerated,” and “(1) The defendant has a terminal illness, which means a disease or condition with an end- of-life trajectory; (2) The defendant is 60 years of age or older and has served at least 20 years in prison; or (3) Other extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a modification.” D.C. Code § 24-403.04(a)(1)–(3). Other “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence modification include:

- (A) A debilitating medical condition involving an incurable illness, or a debilitating injury from which the defendant will not recover;
- (B) Elderly age, defined as a defendant who:
  - (i) Is 60 years of age or older;
  - (ii) Has served the lesser of 15 years or 75% of the defendant's sentence; and
  - (iii) Suffers from a chronic or serious medical condition related to the aging process or that causes an acute vulnerability to severe medical complications or death as a result of COVID-19;
- (C) Death or incapacitation of the family member caregiver of the defendant's children; or
- (D) Incapacitation of a spouse or a domestic partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or domestic partner.

D.C. Code § 24-403.04(a)(3)(A)-(D).

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because the claims defendant makes are successive in that they have been made and rejected before, and otherwise are procedurally barred. They also are vague and conclusory.

Defendant is 34 years old and has served approximately 11.5 years, or 47%, of his 24.5 year sentence. He thus cannot satisfy his burden as to § 24-403.04(a)(3)(B)((i) or (ii). Defendant nevertheless claims that he has established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. He further asserts that he no longer poses a danger to the community.

The government opposes defendant's motion, arguing that defendant cannot establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because he cites no health concerns that create an acute vulnerability to COVID-19, and he has been fully vaccinated against COVID-19. The government also argues that defendant has not established that he is no longer a danger to any person or the community.

The government represents that it contacted the wife of one of the victims of the instant offenses, and that she opposes defendant's release. The government represents that it has made efforts to contact the other victims in this case to ascertain their position on the defendant's Motion, without success.

#### Health

Defendant is 34 years old and has served about 11.5 years, or 47%, of his 24.5-year sentence. Defendant concedes that he "does not have a health issue that puts him at particularized risk" of severe illness arising from COVID-19. (Motion for Compassionate Release at 2). He claims nevertheless that he has established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release on the basis that COVID presents extra danger to incarcerated persons and persons of color. *Id.*

Defendant was vaccinated in June and July 2021, and received a booster in February 2022. That defendant has been vaccinated does not exclude him from eligibility for consideration under the Compassionate Release statute. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals highlighted the need for flexibility by the courts "in responding to the ever-changing

realities on the ground,” in light of the emerging COVID-19 variants. *Autrey v. United States*, 264 A.3d 653, 657-58 (D.C. 2021) (citing *Page v. United States*, 254 A.3d 1129 (D.C. 2021)).

The Court, in pertinent part, stated,

[t]hat flexibility requires trial courts to consider ‘any reasonable factor[.]’ not just vaccination, in determining whether a prisoner has shown “an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence modification.” *Page*, 254 A.3d at 1130. Those factors include, at least to the extent any litigant introduces it, evidence regarding (1) whether a prisoner is unable to benefit from a vaccine due to being immunocompromised, (2) whether a prisoner’s medical conditions continue to render him acutely vulnerable to severe illness or death despite receiving some benefit from the vaccine, which may implicate vaccine efficacy data for certain subpopulations, (3) emerging research about “long COVID,” (4) the availability of booster shots to the extent they are necessary to prevent severe illness or death due to waning immunity, and (5) the rise of new virus variants to the extent they impair the efficacy of the existing vaccines in preventing severe illness or death.

*Id.* In this case, defendant is fully vaccinated and boosted, and his medical records demonstrate that he is a remarkably healthy 34-year-old. For these reasons, the court concludes that defendant has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release arising from “an acute vulnerability to severe medical complications or death as a result of COVID-19.” This is so even assuming, as a general matter, defendant’s race and incarceration create risks not faced by others.

Defendant claimed in his initial *pro se* Motion for Compassionate Release that he was at risk for serious illness as a result of COVID, because he was assaulted in 2013 by a correctional officer at the DC Jail, and his head was cracked open, requiring closure with staples. He further claimed that he suffered head trauma and concussion when he was in school playing football. He states he has suffered from brain trauma, concussion, migraines and blurred vision as chronic conditions as a result of these injuries. Defendant’s BOP medical records, submitted by the government as G. Sealed Ex. 1, contain no reference to any such head injuries and include a

March 15, 2022, record of a medical encounter in which defendant denied that he had ever experienced head injury or loss of consciousness.<sup>3</sup>

For all of the reasons stated, the court concludes that defendant has not established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

#### Safety and Rehabilitation

Even if defendant has established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, the court concludes that defendant has not met his burden to show, by means of evidence of rehabilitation while incarcerated, or in consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(g) & 3553(a), that he is “not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.” D.C. Code § 24-403.04.

For purposes of consideration of evidence of rehabilitation, the court notes the facts of the offenses as stated by the Court of Appeals:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial was as follows. On August 17, 2012, Mr. Branch drove with Sunny Kuti and Michael Moore from Mr. Branch’s home in Southeast Washington, D.C. to Northwest Washington, D.C. The group drove in Mr. Branch’s car. Both before and during the drive, Mr. Branch discussed committing a robbery. Mr. Kuti suggested that the group use a non-operable BB gun, which Mr. Kuti then removed from the trunk of Mr. Branch’s car, by reaching through the armrest in the back seat. Mr. Moore had seen the gun in the trunk of Mr. Branch’s car before but did not know the gun to be Mr. Branch’s.

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<sup>3</sup> Defendant also claimed in his *pro se* Motion that his child is cared for by his mother, who has unspecified health conditions that could make her unavailable to care for the child. This claim is not supported in defendant’s materials. In addition, according to the Motion and supplemental materials filed by counsel, the defendant’s children’s mother is able to care for them. Although the statute provides for relief in circumstances involving the death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s children, defendant has not met his burden under those provisions. D.C. Code § 24-403.04(a)(3)(C).

The group drove around in the Adams Morgan neighborhood, looking for someone who would be easy to rob. They eventually parked in a secluded alley and got out of the car. They were all encouraging each other to rob someone. Mr. Kuti was carrying the BB gun. They eventually gave up and got back in the car, and Mr. Branch drove to a different alley, apparently near Eastern Market in Southeast Washington, D.C. A little after 1 a.m. on August 18, 2012, Mr. Branch pointed a man out to Mr. Moore and said, “[T]hat’s him.” Mr. Branch said, “[I]f he struggles I’m going to hit him so he doesn’t remember any faces.” Mr. Moore then saw that Mr. Branch was holding a silver baseball bat.

The group got out of the car and walked up behind the victim, Thomas Maslin. Mr. Moore got ready to punch Mr. Maslin, but Mr. Maslin noticed Mr. Moore and put his hands up, as if to surrender. Mr. Kuti then pointed the BB gun at Mr. Maslin and told him to “give that shit up.” When Mr. Maslin nevertheless turned to walk away, Mr. Kuti hit him on the right side of the head with the BB gun. After that blow, Mr. Maslin was “woozy” but was still standing and talking and knew what was going on. Mr. Moore pushed him into Mr. Kuti, who again demanded that he “[g]ive that shit up.” Mr. Maslin then indicated a willingness to give up his phone and began reaching for his pocket. At that point, Mr. Branch hit Mr. Maslin in the back of the head with the baseball bat. Mr. Branch swung the bat forcefully, using two hands. Mr. Maslin fell face down on the ground and began making a snoring sound.

Mr. Branch and Mr. Moore ran back to the car. Mr. Kuti came behind them carrying a bank card, a cell phone, and a set of keys, which he handed to Mr. Branch. The group drove to a gas station in Southeast Washington D.C., where Mr. Branch unsuccessfully tried to use the bank card. At one point, Mr. Moore heard police sirens and became scared, so he threw Mr. Maslin’s bank card out the window.

The group drove to the Barry Farms neighborhood, where they met up with Mr. Branch’s cousin. Mr. Branch described the robbery to his cousin, saying that he had “Barry Bonds[ed]” the victim. After a further conversation about purchasing marijuana, the group concluded that it needed more money. They then agreed to commit another robbery, to get cash. Mr. Branch, Mr. Moore, Mr. Kuti, and Mr. Branch’s cousin all got in the car, and Mr. Branch drove the group back to Adams Morgan.

As they were driving around, Mr. Branch and his cousin discussed what had gone right and wrong during the earlier robbery. The group agreed that everyone

but Mr. Branch's cousin would get out of the car, while Mr. Branch's cousin remained with the car so that they could get away. Mr. Branch, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Kuti then walked around, looking for someone drunk who would be easy to rob. They focused on a group of three people, one of whom was drunk and fell down the steps as he left a club. The intended victims were Jeffery Whalen, Austin Blais, and Alan Murray. Mr. Branch followed Mr. Blais into a nearby alley, hit him, and started wrestling with him. Mr. Whalen and Mr. Murray ran to help Mr. Blais, but Mr. Kuti pointed the BB gun and said "try fighting now." Mr. Moore grabbed one of the intended victims and put him in a choke hold.

Mr. Blais then put his hands up and emptied his pockets. Mr. Whalen also emptied his pockets. Mr. Branch picked up a wallet, a phone, and a set of keys and tossed them to Mr. Moore. Mr. Branch, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Kuti then ran from the scene of the robbery. Mr. Moore discarded the keys and determined that the wallet contained around \$20.

After the robbers fled, Mr. Murray called 911. At around 3:15 a.m. on August 18, 2012, the police apprehended the robbers as they were running down a nearby alley. Mr. Kuti threw down the BB gun. Officers recovered the BB gun, and they also recovered from Mr. Moore the phone and wallet taken in the second robbery, as well as the phone taken from Mr. Maslin in the first robbery. Mr. Branch had keys taken from Mr. Maslin in the first robbery.

At about 8 a.m. on the morning of August 18, 2012, a witness found Mr. Maslin, the victim of the first robbery, lying on his back on a porch at 711 North Carolina Ave., in Southeast Washington D.C. Mr. Maslin was unconscious, and his legs were moving spasmodically. After the witness called for emergency assistance, an ambulance took Mr. Maslin to the hospital. Mr. Maslin had suffered severe head injuries, was in a coma, and was having difficulty breathing. His skull had been shattered into multiple pieces, apparently as a result of significant blunt- force trauma. Mr. Maslin's brain was bleeding internally and there was a substantial blood clot in his brain.

Doctors performed emergency surgery to repair Mr. Maslin's shattered skull, reduce the pressure on Mr. Maslin's brain, and prevent further injury. Eventually, Mr. Maslin underwent five additional surgeries. Mr. Maslin suffered significant problems with speech and cognitive function, as well as weakness of the right side of his body. It took about ten or twelve days after the injury for Mr. Maslin to be able to communicate at all. At the time of trial, approximately eight months after the robbery, Mr. Maslin walked with a limp, had limited use of his right hand and

arm, and had difficulty speaking and understanding speech. Given the damage caused by the head injury, Mr. Maslin was not expected to ever make a full recovery.

After the arrest, Mr. Branch's mother retrieved Mr. Branch's car, removed a silver bat from the car, and threw the bat away. Mr. Branch made several statements about his involvement in one or both of the robberies. When his mother asked him about the second robbery, Mr. Branch said that he had only been found with keys. When his mother asked about a news story relating to the first robbery, Mr. Branch said that the man had fallen down and hit his head. Speaking to a police detective about the first robbery, Mr. Branch denied trying to kill anyone and said that it was just a robbery. He said that he shoved the victim, who fell and hit his head, and that he took the victim's credit card and tried to use it to buy gas. Finally, Mr. Branch admitted to a friend, Benicisha Gleaton, that he, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Kuti had robbed some people in Adams Morgan. Ms. Gleaton had seen a BB gun in Mr. Branch's house before the robberies but never saw the BB gun again after Mr. Branch was arrested.

*Branch v. United States*, No. 13-CF-740, Mem. Op. & J. at 1-4 (D.C. Dec. 15, 2015). Defendant was 22 years old at the time of these offenses.

In addition to the instant offenses, defendant was convicted, in Case No. 2013 CF3 5417, of an unrelated conspiracy to commit a violent crime for offenses he committed six days earlier. He was sentenced in that case to 42 months consecutive to the sentence in this case. Were he to be released in the instant case, he would be paroled to the sentence in the conspiracy case.

Defendant's disciplinary history is significant and has escalated in recent years. He committed two 100 level infractions in 2020, both for possessing drugs/alcohol. In 2021, he committed 5 infractions, including 1 200 level offense for assault without serious injury, one 300 level offense for destruction of property and 3 300 level offenses for refusals to participate in work/program assignment. Earlier offenses included a phone abuse in 2017 and a refusal to obey an order in 2016, both 300-level offenses.

Defendant's programming has been substantial throughout his incarceration. Defendant provided his Inmate Education Data Transcript dated 8-10-20, showing that he got his GED in

2014, has recently participated in college courses and has taken numerous classes including Latin, religious studies, crochet, introduction to psychology, English composition, alternatives to violence, culinary arts, wiring, guitar, and small business. He has participated in over 900 hours of educational programming while in the BOP.

Defendant states he is remorseful and has participated in religious and psychological programming. He attaches to his Motion, certificates demonstrating his participation in a Black History Month program, a nonviolence workshop, and achievements in English.

Defendant's reentry plan is good with respect to his housing prospects, but otherwise undefined. He can live with his parents and brother in their 4 bedroom home in Fort Washington Maryland, and will have their support and the support of the mother of his two teenage children. Defendant has maintained contact with his daughters. Otherwise, defendant states no concrete plan. Defendant states he can become employed but provides no evidence that he has pursued employment in any way.

Notwithstanding defendant's family support and programming efforts, defendant has not established that he can safely return to the community in light of the seriousness of defendant's criminal history, his demonstrated failure to abide by the institutional rules of the BOP, and his undefined reentry plan.

#### CONCLUSION

The Court concludes, considering the record as a whole, that defendant has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate that at this time he is "not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, pursuant to the factors to be considered in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(g) and 3553(a) and evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation while incarcerated." D.C. Code § 24-403.4.

Accordingly, it is this 12th day of January, 2024, hereby

**ORDERED** that defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release is **DENIED**.



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Lynn Leibovitz  
Associate Judge  
(Signed in chambers)

cc: Margaret Chriss  
Kacie Weston  
Special Proceedings Division  
United States Attorney's Office  
USADC.ECFSpecialProceedings@usdoj.gov

Steven R. Kiersh  
*Counsel for Defendant*

# Attachment Appendix C

BEC8  
PAGE 001 OF 001 \*

INMATE EDUCATION DATA  
TRANSCRIPT

\* 07-02-2024  
\* 15:22:16

REGISTER NO: 49644-007  
FORMAT.....: TRANSCRIPT

NAME...: BRANCH  
RSP OF: BEC-BECKLEY FCI

FUNC: PRT

----- EDUCATION INFORMATION -----  
 FACL ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION START DATE/TIME STOP DATE/TIME  
 BEC ESL HAS ENGLISH PROFICIENT 08-26-2014 1011 CURRENT  
 BEC GED HAS COMPLETED GED OR HS DIPLOMA 08-26-2014 1012 CURRENT

----- EDUCATION COURSES -----  
 SUB-FACL DESCRIPTION START DATE STOP DATE EVNT AC LV HRS  
 BEC CALISTHEN M, W, F 1300 04-12-2024 CURRENT  
 BEC YOGA 04-12-2024 CURRENT  
 BEC REC BEG DRAWING CLASS 01-30-2024 03-25-2024 P C P 24  
 BEC ACE BLACK HISTORY CLASS 03-12-2024 03-12-2024 P C P 2  
 BEC V-COOK DOL APPRENTICESHIP 10-07-2022 06-26-2023 P P A 1216  
 BEC S- OSHA10 CERTIFICATION 02-13-2023 02-16-2023 P C P 12  
 BEC ACE TPC EFFECT COMM FOR SUPER 11-21-2022 02-06-2023 P C P 14  
 BEC SECRETS OF SPICES IN COOKING 10-31-2022 02-06-2023 P C P 6  
 BEC HOW TO MASTER OUTDOOR GRILLING 10-07-2022 10-31-2022 P C P 10  
 BEC ACE INTRO TO APPRENTICESHIPS 10-07-2022 10-07-2022 P C P 2  
 HAF FCI SELF STUDY THE HUMAN EYE 03-01-2022 03-03-2022 P C P 3  
 HAF SELF-STUDY ACE: MONEY SKILLS 08-09-2021 08-13-2021 P C P 3  
 FTD GP MERCER COUNTY COMMUNITYCOLLEGE 09-24-2017 03-25-2021 P W I 0  
 FTD GP BEGINNING LATIN 2 - WEST 08-16-2019 11-07-2019 C W V 0  
 FTD GP BEGINNING LATIN 1 - WEST 01-17-2019 07-31-2019 C C P 0  
 FTD GP INTRO RELIGIOUS STUDIES - WEST 01-17-2019 03-21-2019 C W V 0  
 FTD GP COLLEGE SUCCESS SKILLS - WEST 08-15-2018 02-19-2019 C C P 0  
 FTD GP CROCHET 1 - WEST 10-02-2018 12-27-2018 P C P 10  
 FTD GP INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 02-02-2018 06-25-2018 C C P 0  
 FTD GP ENGLISH COMPOSITION I 02-02-2018 06-25-2018 C C P 0  
 FTD GP ADVANCED ALTERNATIVES TO VIOLE 05-15-2018 05-17-2018 P C P 22  
 FTD GP REENTRY LIFESTYLES 03-20-2018 03-20-2018 P C P 3  
 FTD GP BLACK HISTORY 02-20-2018 02-20-2018 P C P 4  
 FTD GP ALTERNATIVES TO VIOLENCE-WEST 01-08-2018 01-10-2018 P C P 20  
 FTD GP REMEDIAL ENGLISH NONCREDIT 09-28-2017 12-23-2017 P C P 28  
 FTD GP ACE MATH 033 09-22-2017 12-19-2017 P C P 44  
 SCH FCI VT CULINARY ARTS - RPP-2 01-19-2016 05-10-2016 P W V 240  
 SCH FCI PARENTING TWO 05-27-2015 07-29-2015 P C P 16  
 SCH FCI PARENTING ONE 05-27-2015 07-29-2015 P C P 16  
 SCH VT BASIC RESIDENT WIRING -RPP2 10-14-2014 04-02-2015 P C M 437  
 SCH RESEARCH SELF - JOB INTERVIEW 12-04-2014 01-28-2015 P C P 8  
 SCH BUSINESS PLANS TWO 12-02-2014 01-26-2015 P C P 8  
 SCH ACE BUSINESS PLANS 11-04-2014 01-29-2015 P C P 8  
 SCH LEARNING GUITAR PART 1 09-16-2014 12-26-2014 P C P 8  
 SCH JOB CANDIDATES MARKETABILITY 10-09-2014 11-03-2014 P C P 8  
 SCH BUSINESS PROFESSIONAL 10-07-2014 11-01-2014 P C P 8  
 SCH APPROPRIATE WRK HABITS 09-04-2014 10-01-2014 P C P 8  
 SCH ACE SMALL BUSINESS 09-02-2014 10-01-2014 P C P 10

G0000

TRANSACTION SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED