

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUVAD DARADAGAN — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

VS.

KWAME RAOUL — RESPONDENT(S)

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*

The petitioner asks leave to file the attached petition for a writ of certiorari without prepayment of costs and to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

Please check the appropriate boxes:

Petitioner has previously been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in the following court(s):

Will County Circuit Court, Twelfth Judicial District, State of Illinois;

Case: Dardagan v. Nicholson, 19 MR 1996 (2019) (Civil) (Continue next page)

Petitioner has **not** previously been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in any other court.

Petitioner's affidavit or declaration in support of this motion is attached hereto.

Petitioner's affidavit or declaration is **not** attached because the court below appointed counsel in the current proceeding, and:

The appointment was made under the following provision of law: _____

_____, or

a copy of the order of appointment is appended.


(Signature)

RECEIVED

NOV - 3 2023

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

((CONTINUATION))

Petitioner has been previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the following courts:

- The Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District;

Case: Dardagan v. Nicholson, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313-U;


- The Supreme Court of Illinois;

Case: Dardagan v. Nicholson, 2023 IL 129383 (2023);

- The United States District Court,

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division;

Case: Dardagan v. Hammers, 21-cv-1317 (2021)



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Suivad Dardagan", is written over a horizontal line. To the left of the signature, the letters "/s/" are handwritten, indicating a signature.

Suivad Dardagan

**AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATION
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS***

I, Suvad Dardagan, am the petitioner in the above-entitled case. In support of my motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of this case or to give security therefor; and I believe I am entitled to redress.

1. For both you and your spouse estimate the average amount of money received from each of the following sources during the past 12 months. Adjust any amount that was received weekly, biweekly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually to show the monthly rate. Use gross amounts, that is, amounts before any deductions for taxes or otherwise.

Income source	Average monthly amount during the past 12 months		Amount expected next month	
	You	Spouse	You	Spouse
Employment	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Self-employment	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Income from real property (such as rental income)	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Interest and dividends	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Gifts	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Alimony	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Child Support	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Retirement (such as social security, pensions, annuities, insurance)	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Disability (such as social security, insurance payments)	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Unemployment payments	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Public-assistance (such as welfare)	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Other (specify): <u>State-pay</u>	\$ <u>13.00</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>13.00</u>	\$ <u>0</u>
Total monthly income:	\$ <u>156.00</u>	\$ <u>0</u>	\$ <u>N/A</u>	\$ <u>0</u>

2. List your employment history for the past two years, most recent first. (Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)

Employer	Address	Dates of Employment	Gross monthly pay
NONE	N/A	N/A	\$ N/A
			\$
			\$

3. List your spouse's employment history for the past two years, most recent employer first. (Gross monthly pay is before taxes or other deductions.)

Employer	Address	Dates of Employment	Gross monthly pay
N/A			\$
			\$
			\$

4. How much cash do you and your spouse have? \$ 0

Below, state any money you or your spouse have in bank accounts or in any other financial institution.

Type of account (e.g., checking or savings)	Amount you have	Amount your spouse has
N/A	\$ N/A	\$ N/A
	\$	\$
	\$	\$

5. List the assets, and their values, which you own or your spouse owns. Do not list clothing and ordinary household furnishings.

Home
Value 0

Other real estate
Value 0

Motor Vehicle #1
Year, make & model N/A
Value

Motor Vehicle #2
Year, make & model N/A
Value

Other assets
Description NONE
Value N/A

6. State every person, business, or organization owing you or your spouse money, and the amount owed.

Person owing you or your spouse money	Amount owed to you	Amount owed to your spouse
0	\$ 0	\$ N/A
	\$ _____	\$ _____
	\$ _____	\$ _____

7. State the persons who rely on you or your spouse for support. For minor children, list initials instead of names (e.g. "J.S." instead of "John Smith").

Name	Relationship	Age
NONE	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

8. Estimate the average monthly expenses of you and your family. Show separately the amounts paid by your spouse. Adjust any payments that are made weekly, biweekly, quarterly, or annually to show the monthly rate.

	You	Your spouse
Rent or home-mortgage payment (include lot rented for mobile home)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Are real estate taxes included? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
Is property insurance included? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
Utilities (electricity, heating fuel, water, sewer, and telephone)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Home maintenance (repairs and upkeep)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Food	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Clothing	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Laundry and dry-cleaning	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Medical and dental expenses	\$ 0	\$ N/A

	You	Your spouse
Transportation (not including motor vehicle payments)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Recreation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc.	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Insurance (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)		
Homeowner's or renter's	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Life	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Health	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Motor Vehicle	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Other: _____	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Taxes (not deducted from wages or included in mortgage payments)		
(specify): _____	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Installment payments		
Motor Vehicle	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Credit card(s)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Department store(s)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Other: _____	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Alimony, maintenance, and support paid to others	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Regular expenses for operation of business, profession, or farm (attach detailed statement)	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Other (specify): _____	\$ 0	\$ N/A
Total monthly expenses:	\$ 0	\$ N/A

9. Do you expect any major changes to your monthly income or expenses or in your assets or liabilities during the next 12 months?

Yes No If yes, describe on an attached sheet.

10. Have you paid – or will you be paying – an attorney any money for services in connection with this case, including the completion of this form? Yes No

If yes, how much? _____

If yes, state the attorney's name, address, and telephone number:

11. Have you paid—or will you be paying—anyone other than an attorney (such as a paralegal or a typist) any money for services in connection with this case, including the completion of this form?

Yes No

If yes, how much? _____


If yes, state the person's name, address, and telephone number:

12. Provide any other information that will help explain why you cannot pay the costs of this case.

I am not employed due to my incarceration.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.


Executed on: October 2, 2023



(Signature)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and correct. I understand that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) states that the court shall dismiss this case at any time if the court determines that my allegation of poverty is untrue.

Date: _____


Signature of Applicant

Suyad Dardagan
(Print Name)

NOTICE TO PRISONERS: In addition to the Certificate below, a prisoner must also attach a print-out from the institution(s) where he or she has been in custody during the last six months showing all receipts, expenditures and balances in the prisoner's prison or jail trust fund accounts during that period. Because the law requires information as to such accounts covering a full six months before you have filed your lawsuit, you must attach a sheet covering transactions in your own account - prepared by each institution where you have been in custody during that six-month period. As already stated, you must also have the Certificate below completed by an authorized officer at each institution.

CERTIFICATE
(Incarcerated applicants only)
(To be completed by the institution of incarceration)

I certify that the applicant named herein Suyad Dardagan, I.D. # R20682, has the sum of \$ 17.52 on account to his/her credit at (name of institution) Western IL Corn Center. I further certify that the applicant has the following securities to his/her credit: N/A. I further certify that during the past six months the applicant's average monthly deposit was \$ 91.40. (Add all deposits from all sources and then divide by number of months).

8.4.73

Date


Signature of Authorized Officer

J. Snyder
(Print Name)

Date: 8/3/2023

Time: 3:48pm

d_list_inmate_trans_statement_composite

Western Illinois Correctional Center
Trust Fund

View Transactions

Page 1

Inmate: R20682 Dardagan, Suvad

Housing Unit: WIL-04-C -26

Date	Source	Transaction Type	Batch	Reference #	Description	Amount	Balance
						Beginning Balance:	72.18
02/03/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0343169	Chk #160674	52173, DOC: 523 Fund, 01/27/2023	Inv. Date: -.10	72.08
02/03/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0343169	Chk #160674	52205, DOC: 523 Fund, 01/31/2023	Inv. Date: -.40	71.68
02/08/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0393209	Chk #160753	52353, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/07/2023	Inv. Date: -13.80	57.88
02/08/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0393209	Chk #160758	52384, Reserve Accou, 02/08/2023	Inv. Date: -2.94	54.94
02/08/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0393209	Chk #160758	52384, Reserve Accou, 02/08/2023	Inv. Date: -3.18	51.76
02/14/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0453169	Chk #160824	52391, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/08/2023	Inv. Date: -2.10	49.66
02/14/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	0451208		P/R month of 1 2023	12.76	62.42
02/17/23	Mail Room	15 JPAY	048200	153303019	Wruble, Scott	100.00	162.42
02/21/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0523192	Chk #160924	52492, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/15/2023	Inv. Date: -3.00	159.42
02/21/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0523192	Chk #160924	52500, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/15/2023	Inv. Date: -2.70	156.72
02/21/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0523192	Chk #160924	52589, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/17/2023	Inv. Date: -3.30	153.42
02/21/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0523192	Chk #160943	52495, Reserve Accou, 02/15/2023	Inv. Date: -1.74	151.68
02/21/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0523192	Chk #160943	52495, Reserve Accou, 02/15/2023	Inv. Date: -1.74	149.94
02/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0593192	Chk #161075	52636, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/22/2023	Inv. Date: -8.70	141.24
02/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0593192	Chk #161075	52666, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/24/2023	Inv. Date: -13.90	127.34
02/28/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0593192	Chk #161083	52765, Reserve Accou, 02/27/2023	Inv. Date: -4.14	123.20
03/01/23	Mail Room	10 Western Union	060200	5145007631	Stephens, Courtlan	42.00	165.20
03/01/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	0607210	1119034	Commissary	-116.85	48.35
03/08/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	0671208		P/R month of 2 2023	12.32	60.67
03/10/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0693192	Chk #161319	52783, DOC: 523 Fund, 02/28/2023	Inv. Date: -.90	59.77
03/10/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0693192	Chk #161319	52938, DOC: 523 Fund, 03/06/2023	Inv. Date: -.240	57.37
03/10/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0693192	Chk #161328	52947, Reserve Accou, 03/07/2023	Inv. Date: -1.98	55.39
03/10/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage	0693192	Chk #161328	52947, Reserve Accou, 03/07/2023	Inv. Date: -1.98	53.41
03/15/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0743192	Chk #161372	53132, DOC: 523 Fund, 03/14/2023	Inv. Date: -3.70	49.71
03/24/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0833192	Chk #161556	53208, DOC: 523 Fund, 03/15/2023	Inv. Date: -.80	48.91
03/24/23	Disbursements	84 Library	0833192	Chk #161556	53272, DOC: 523 Fund, 03/20/2023	Inv. Date: -.20	48.71
03/27/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	0867217	1121116	Commissary	-45.84	2.87
04/12/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	1021208		P/R month of 3 2023	13.00	15.87
04/13/23	Mail Room	10 Western Union	103200	1864890005	Jelks, Harmon	30.00	45.87
04/14/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1047217	1122576	Commissary	.00	45.87
04/17/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1077196	1122814	Commissary	-28.36	17.51
04/28/23	Mail Room	15 JPAY	118200	155976817	Wruble, Scott	100.00	117.51
05/05/23	Disbursements	84 Library	1253192	Chk #162415	54328, DOC: 523 Fund, 05/02/2023	Inv. Date: -20.70	96.81
05/05/23	Disbursements	84 Library	1253192	Chk #162415	54328, DOC: 523 Fund, 05/02/2023	Inv. Date: -4.80	92.01

Date: 8/3/2023

Time: 3:48pm

d_list_inmate_trans_statement_composite

Western Illinois Correctional Center
Trust Fund
View Transactions

Page 2

Inmate: R20682 Dardagan, Suvad**Housing Unit: WIL-04-C -26**

Date	Source	Transaction Type	Batch	Reference #	Description	Amount	Balance
05/05/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1253192 Chk #162415	54338, DOC: 523 Fund, 05/03/2023	-.60	91.41
05/12/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment		1321208	P/R month of 4 2023	13.00	104.41
05/16/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary		1367217 1125689	Commissary	-94.63	9.78
05/24/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1443192 Chk #162766	54691, DOC: 523 Fund, 05/17/2023	-.70	9.08
05/24/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1443192 Chk #162766	54728, DOC: 523 Fund, 05/19/2023	-1.40	7.68
06/09/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage		1603192 Chk #162990	055050, Reserve Acco, 06/07/2023	-1.50	6.18
06/09/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment		1601208	P/R month of 5 2023	12.32	18.50
06/13/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary		1647196 1127791	Commissary	-14.46	4.04
06/14/23	Mail Room	15 JPAY		165200 157775129	Haskovic, Senad	100.00	104.04
06/16/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1673192 Chk #163069	55112, DOC: 523 Fund, 06/09/2023	-3.10	100.94
06/23/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1743192 Chk #163173	55301, DOC: 523 Fund, 06/23/2023	-3.30	97.64
06/30/23	Disbursements	81 Legal Postage		1813192 Chk #163332	55348, Reserve Accou, 06/26/2023	-1.50	96.14
07/07/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1883192 Chk #163380	55491, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/03/2023	-2.90	93.24
07/07/23	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment		1881208	P/R month of 6 2023	13.00	106.24
07/10/23	Disbursements	88 Headphone Repair		1913192 Chk #163393	55586, Koss Corporat, 07/10/2023	-9.00	97.24
07/11/23	Mail Room	15 JPAY		192200 158779067	Wruble, Scott	100.00	197.24
07/12/23	Point of Sale	60 Commissary		1937196 1129860	Commissary	-164.12	33.12
07/14/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1953209 Chk #163544	55664, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/11/2023	-5.30	27.82
07/14/23	Disbursements	84 Library		1953209 Chk #163544	55733, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/13/2023	-.70	27.12
07/21/23	Disbursements	80 Postage		2023192 Chk #163620	55760, Reserve Accou, 07/18/2023	-6.30	20.82
07/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library		2093209 Chk #163734	55840, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/24/2023	-.30	20.52
07/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library		2093209 Chk #163734	55876, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/24/2023	-.50	20.02
07/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library		2093209 Chk #163734	55877, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/24/2023	-.80	19.22
07/28/23	Disbursements	84 Library		2093209 Chk #163734	55885, DOC: 523 Fund, 07/25/2023	-.50	18.72

0 • *

12.76+
 100.00+
 42.00+
 12.32+
 13.00+
 30.00+
 100.00+
 13.00+
 12.32+
 100.00+
 13.00+
 100.00+
 548.40*
 548.40*
 6.40*
 91.40*

012

Total Inmate Funds:	18.72
Less Funds Held For Orders:	.00
Less Funds Restricted:	1.20
Funds Available:	17.52
Total Furloughs:	.00
Total Voluntary Restitutions:	.00

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

No.

DARDAGAN, Suvad,
Petitioner,


v.

RAOUL, Kwame,
Respondent.

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33 1(h), I certify that the petition for a writ of certiorary contains 4890 words, excluding the parts of the petition that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 2, 2023.



Petitioner, Suvad Dardagan.

No. _____

ORIGINAL

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

K
S.

SUVAD DARDAGAN — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

vs.

KWAME Y. RAOUL — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Suvad Dardagan

(Your Name)
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Route 99 South
(Address)

Mt. Steling, ILLINOIS 62353
(City, State, Zip Code)

N/A
(Phone Number)

QUESTION PRESENTED

I. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, apt of being jurisdictional in and of itself, requires Warrants issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, naming the person or things to be seized. Petitioner has never been accused of a crime that would trigger the Fourth Amendment requirement for issuance of a warrant for his arrest, and no testimony was given under oath, providing the name of the petitioner, nor probable cause for his arrest.

Whether in the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause the executive branch of the state government lacks a legal authority to seek a charging instrument upon a nonexistent offense?

LIST OF PARTIES

PETITIONER:

Suvad Dardagan
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Route 99 South
Mt. Sterling, ILLINOIS 62353

RESPONDENT:

Kwame Y. Raoul
Attorney General of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, ILLINOIS 60601-3218

RESPONDENT:

Brittany Greene
Warden
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Route 99 South
Mt. Sterling, ILLINOIS 62353

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

All parties **do not** appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

RUSSEL K. BENTON
Assistant Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601-3218
(773) 590-6954
eserve.criminalappeals@ilag.gov

RELATED CASES

- Dardagan v. Nicholson, 19 MR 1996, Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. Judgment entered July 9, 2021.
- Dardagan v. Nicholson, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313-U, Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District. Judgment entered September 28, 2022.
- Dardagan v. Nicholson, No. 129383, Supreme Court of Illinois. Judgment entered May 24, 2023.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW.....	1
JURISDICTION.....	
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED	
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT	
CONCLUSION.....	

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A ORDER; Appellate Court, AFFIRMED

APPENDIX B ORDER; Appellate Court, Rehearing DENIED

APPENDIX C JUDGMENT; Circuit Court of Will County, DISMISSED

APPENDIX D ORDER; Supreme Court of Illinois, PLA DENIED

APPENDIX E ORDER; Supreme Court of Illinois, Rehearing DENIED

APPENDIX F COMPLAINT/PETITION

APPENDIX G Motion to Dismiss

APPENDIX H Legal Argument

APPENDIX I Appellant's Appellate Brief

APPENDIX J Appellee's Appellate Brief

APPENDIX K Motion for Rehearing on Appeal

APPENDIX L Petition for Leave to Appleal (PLA)

APPENDIX M Motion to Supplement PLA

APPENDIX N Motion for Rehearing on PLA

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES	PAGE NUMBER
People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23	7, 15, 16, 18, 19
United States v. Ball (1896), 163 U.S. 662	7
Maxfield v. Levy (1797), 4 U.S. 330	7-8
Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103	8
Napue v. Illinois (1959), 330 U.S. 264	8
Beacham v. Walker (2008), 231 Ill.2d 51	9, 17, 20-21
Giordenello v. United States (1957), 241 F.2d 575	10-12
People v. Curtis (1st Dist. 1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 241	12, 18, 24
People v. Macon (1st Dist. 2009), 920 N.E.2d 1224	13-15
Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008), 554 U.S. 191	13-14
Data Disc, Inc. v. System Technology Associates, Inc. (1977), 557 F.2d 1280	16
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aerohawk Aviation, Inc. (2003), 259 F.Supp.2d 1096	17
People v. Pankey (1983), 94 Ill.2d 12	17, 19, 22, 24
People v. Beacham (1st Dist. 1987), 189 Ill.App.3d 483	18
People v. Benitez (1996), 169 Ill.2d 245	21-22
People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817	14, 19-20, 23-24

STATUTES AND RULES

Ill. S. Ct., Rule 315(a) (enclosed)	7
U.S. S. Ct., Rule 10(b) (enclosed)	7
Ill. S. Ct., Rule 721(c) (enclosed)	10
U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 3 (enclosed)	11-12
U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 4(a) (enclosed)	12
720 ILCS 5/1-3 (enclosed)	15-16, 18
720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(1) (enclosed)	16, 18
720 ILCS 5/1-6(a) (enclosed)	19
735 ILCS 5/2-615 (enclosed)	20
735 ILCS 5/10-124 (enclosed)	21

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from **federal courts**:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix _____ to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

For cases from **state courts**:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at Appendix D to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District court appears at Appendix A to the petition and is

reported at _____; or,
 has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
 is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was _____.

[] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on the following date: _____, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix _____.

[] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ___A_____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[x] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was May 24, 2023. A copy of that decision appears at Appendix D.

[x] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date: July 28, 2023, and a copy of the order denying rehearing appears at Appendix E.

[] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to and including _____ (date) on _____ (date) in Application No. ___A_____.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9: App.I, p. 5

Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.

U.S.C.A. CONST. Am. IV: App.I, p. 5

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.

U.S.C.A. CONST. Am. XIV: App.I, p. 5

No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Ill. S. Ct., Rule 721(c) App.I, p. 6

U.S.C.S. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 3 App.I, p. 4-5

720 ILCS 5/1-3 App.I, p. 4

720 ILCS 5/1-5 App.I, p. 4

720 ILCS 5/1-6 App.I, p. 7

735 ILCS 5/2-615(b) App.I, p. 6

735 ILCS 5/10-124 App.I, p. 6-7

Ill. Sup. Ct., R 315

Illinois State Rules and Local Federal Rules Reflect Changes Received through August 23,
2023.

**IL - Illinois Local, State & Federal Court Rules Illinois Supreme Court
Rules Article III. Civil Appeals Rules Part B. Appeals from the Appellate Court
to the Supreme Court**

Rule 315. Leave to Appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court.

(a) Petition for Leave to Appeal; Grounds. Except as provided below for appeals from the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission division of the Appellate Court, a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Court may be filed by any party, including the State, in any case not appealable from the Appellate Court as a matter of right. Whether such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed.

Document: 720 ILCS 5/1-3

720 ILCS 5/1-3

Statutes current with legislation through Public Act 103-188 of the 2023 Regular Session of the 103rd General Assembly.

Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Chapter 720 CRIMINAL OFFENSES (§§ 5/1-1 – 690/4.5) CRIMINAL CODE (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/49-6) Criminal Code of 2012 (Titles I – V) Title I. General Provisions (Arts. 1 – 3) Article 1. Title and Construction of Act; State Jurisdiction (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/1-8)

720 ILCS 5/1-3 Applicability of common law

No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code or in another statute of this State. However, this provision does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or civil judgment.

History

P.A. 79-1360.

▼ Annotations

Notes

Document: 720 ILCS 5/1-5

720 ILCS 5/1-5

Statutes current with legislation through Public Act 103-188 of the 2023 Regular Session of the 103rd General Assembly.

Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Chapter 720 CRIMINAL OFFENSES (§§ 5/1-1 – 690/4.5) CRIMINAL CODE (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/49-6) Criminal Code of 2012 (Titles I – V) Title I. General Provisions (Arts. 1 – 3) Article 1. Title and Construction of Act; State Jurisdiction (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/1-8)

720 ILCS 5/1-5 State criminal jurisdiction.

(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or outside the State, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:

(1) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the State; or

(2) the conduct outside the State constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within the State; or

(3) the conduct outside the State constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the State; or

(4) the conduct within the State constitutes an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this State and such other jurisdiction.

(b) An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within the State. In a prosecution pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 [720 ILCS 5/9-1], the attempt or commission of a forcible felony other than second degree murder within this State is conduct which is an element of the offense for which a person is subject to prosecution in this State. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death, or the

Document: 720 ILCS 5/1-6

720 ILCS 5/1-6

Statutes current with legislation through Public Act 103-188 of the 2023 Regular Session of the 103rd General Assembly.

Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Chapter 720 CRIMINAL OFFENSES (§§ 5/1-1 – 690/4.5) CRIMINAL CODE (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/49-6) Criminal Code of 2012 (Titles I – V) Title I. General Provisions (Arts. 1 – 3) Article 1. Title and Construction of Act; State Jurisdiction (§§ 5/1-1 – 5/1-8)

720 ILCS 5/1-6 Place of trial.

(a) Generally.

Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law. The State is not required to prove during trial that the alleged offense occurred in any particular county in this State. When a defendant contests the place of trial under this Section, all proceedings regarding this issue shall be conducted under Section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 [725 ILCS 5/114-1]. All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial.

(b) Assailant and Victim in Different Counties.

If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the time of the commission of the offense, trial may be had in either of said counties.

(c) Death and Cause of Death in Different Places or Undetermined.

If cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in another county, the offender may be tried in either county. If neither the county in which the cause of death was inflicted nor the county in which death ensued are known before trial, the offender may be tried in the county where the body was found.

Document: 735 ILCS 5/10-124

735 ILCS 5/10-124

Statutes current with legislation through Public Act 103-188 of the 2023 Regular Session of the 103rd General Assembly.

Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated Chapter 735 CIVIL PROCEDURE (§§ 5/1-101 – 30) Code of Civil Procedure (Arts. I – XXII) Article X. Habeas Corpus (§§ 5/10-101 – 5/10-137)

735 ILCS 5/10-124 Causes for discharge when in custody on process of court

If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the following causes:

- 1.** Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person.
- 2.** Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to be discharged.
- 3.** Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law.
- 4.** Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case or under circumstances where the law does not allow process to issue or orders to be entered for imprisonment or arrest.
- 5.** Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued in a case or under circumstances unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or where the person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is not the person empowered by law to detain him or her.
- 6.** Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense or bribery.
- 7.** Where there is no general law, nor any judgment or order of a court to authorize the process if in a civil action, nor any conviction if in a criminal proceeding. No court, on the

return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally constituted.

History

P.A. 82-280.

▼ Annotations

Notes

Editor's Notes

This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 110, ¶ 10-124.

CASE NOTES

In General

Actual Restraint Necessary

Applicability

—In General

—Act or Event

—Clemency

—Extended Sentence

—Illustrative Cases

—Insanity

—Judgment and Detention

Document: USCS Fed Rules Crim Proc R 3

USCS Fed Rules Crim Proc R 3

Current through changes received September 1, 2023.

USCS Federal Rules Annotated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Title II.
Preliminary Proceedings**Rule 3. The Complaint**

The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Except as provided in Rule 4.1, it must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer.

History

As amended April 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; April 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; April 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002; April 26, 2011, eff. Dec. 1, 2011.

▼ Annotations

Notes

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES**Other provisions:**

Notes of Advisory Committee. The rule generally states existing law and practice, 18 U.S.C. [former] § 591 [see § 3041] (Arrest and removal for trial); *United States v. Simon* (D.C.Pa. 1916) 248 F. 980; *United States v. Maresca* (D.C.N.Y. 1920) 266 F. 713. It eliminates, however, the requirement of conformity to State law as to the form and sufficiency of the complaint. See, also, Rule 57(b).

Notes of Advisory Committee on 1972 amendments. The amendment deletes the reference to "commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the United States" and substitutes therefor "magistrate."

The change is editorial in nature to conform the language of the rule to the recently enacted Federal Magistrates Act. The term "magistrate" is defined in rule 54.

The Rule is amended to conform to the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 [P.L. 101-650, Title III, Section 321] which provides that each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge.

Notes of Advisory Committee on 2002 amendments. The language of Rule 3 is amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic and no substantive change is intended, except as described below.

The amendment makes one change in practice. Currently, Rule 3 requires the complaint to be sworn before a "magistrate judge," which under current Rule 54 could include a state or local judicial officer. Revised Rule 1 no longer includes state and local officers in the definition of magistrate judges for the purposes of these rules. Instead, the definition includes only United States magistrate judges. Rule 3 requires that the complaint be made before a United States magistrate judge or before a state or local officer. The revised rule does, however, make a change to reflect prevailing practice and the outcome desired by the Committee — that the procedure take place before a federal judicial officer if one is reasonably available. As noted in Rule 1(c), where the rules, such as Rule 3, authorize a magistrate judge to act, any other federal judge may act.

Notes of Advisory Committee on 2011 amendments. Under the amended rule, the complaint and supporting material may be submitted by telephone or reliable electronic means; however, the rule requires that the judicial officer administer the oath or affirmation in person or by telephone. The Committee concluded that the benefits of making it easier to obtain judicial oversight of the arrest decision and the increasing reliability and accessibility to electronic communication warranted amendment of the rule. The amendment makes clear that the submission of a complaint to a judicial officer need not be done in person and may instead be made by telephone or other reliable electronic means. The successful experiences with electronic applications under Rule 41, which permits electronic applications for search warrants, support a comparable process for arrests. The provisions in Rule 41 have been transferred to new Rule 4.1, which governs applications by telephone or other electronic means under Rules 3, 4, 9, and 41.

NOTES TO DECISIONS▼ **I. IN GENERAL**▼ **1. Generally**▼ **2. Function of complaint**

Document: USCS Fed Rules Crim Proc R 4

USCS Fed Rules Crim Proc R 4

Current through changes received September 1, 2023.

USCS Federal Rules Annotated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Title II.
Preliminary Proceedings

Rule 4. Arrest Warrant or Summons on a Complaint

(a) Issuance. If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it. At the request of an attorney for the government, the judge must issue a summons, instead of a warrant, to a person authorized to serve it. A judge may issue more than one warrant or summons on the same complaint. If an individual defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a judge may, and upon request of an attorney for the government must, issue a warrant. If an organizational defendant fails to appear in response to a summons, a judge may take any action authorized by United States law.

(b) Form.

(1) Warrant. A warrant must:

- (A)** contain the defendant's name or, if it is unknown, a name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty;
- (B)** describe the offense charged in the complaint;
- (C)** command that the defendant be arrested and brought without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer; and
- (D)** be signed by a judge.

(2) Summons. A summons must be in the same form as a warrant except that it must require the defendant to appear before a magistrate judge at a stated time and place.

(c) Execution or Service, and Return.

(1) By whom. Only a marshal or other authorized officer may execute a warrant. Any person authorized to serve a summons in a federal civil action may serve a summons.

(2) Location. A warrant may be executed, or a summons served, within the jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere else a federal statute authorizes an arrest. A summons to an organization under Rule 4(c)(3)(D) may also be served at a place not within a judicial district of the United States.

(3) Manner.

(A) A warrant is executed by arresting the defendant. Upon arrest, an officer possessing the original or a duplicate original warrant must show it to the defendant. If the officer does not possess the warrant, the officer must inform the defendant of the warrant's existence and of the offense charged and, at the defendant's request, must show the original or a duplicate original warrant to the defendant as soon as possible.

(B) A summons is served on an individual defendant:

- (i)** by delivering a copy to the defendant personally; or
- (ii)** by leaving a copy at the defendant's residence or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing at that location and by mailing a copy to the defendant's last known address.

(C) A summons is served on an organization in a judicial district of the United States by delivering a copy to an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to another agent appointed or legally authorized to receive service of process. If the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires, a copy must also be mailed to the organization.

(D) A summons is served on an organization not within a judicial district of the United States:

- (i)** by delivering a copy, in a manner authorized by the foreign jurisdiction's law, to an officer, to a managing or general agent, or to an agent appointed or legally authorized to receive service of process; or

(ii) by any other means that gives notice, including one that is:

- (a)** stipulated by the parties;
- (b)** undertaken by a foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, a letter of request, or a request submitted under an applicable international agreement; or
- (c)** permitted by an applicable international agreement.

(4) Return.

(A) After executing a warrant, the officer must return it to the judge before whom the defendant is brought in accordance with Rule 5. The officer may do so by reliable electronic means. At the request of an attorney for the government, an unexecuted warrant must be

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Illinois Attorney General conceded the fact that the petitioner, Suvad Dardagan, has never been accused of nor arrested for the charges alleged in the charging document, returned by the grand jury on July 13, 1999. (See APPENDIX ("App.") H)

The filing of the instant State Habeas Corpus Petition was solely based on an affidavit from the Cook County State's Attorney's Office (CCSAO), attached to the complaint as EXHIBIT ("Ex.") B, ¶ 7), addressing the court: "[T]here was no complaint or arrest report submitted to the court on June 18, 1999, as the court hearing on that date was Mr. Dardagan's bond hearing." (App.F; Ex. B, ¶ 7)

On July 3, 2019, petitioner filed the complaint in the circuit court, Dardagan v. Nicholson, 19 MR 1996 (2019) (Will County, Illinois), attacking the venue of the circuit court of Cook County. (App.F, ¶¶ 3-6)

On May 4, 2020, the Illinois Attorney General, Kwame Raoul, through and by his assistant, Russell Benton, filed a motion to dismiss addressing the court: "[P]laintiff was convicted in the circuit court of Cook County on four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, and ultimately sentenced to an aggregated prison term of 90 years." (App.G, p. 1) "[P]laintiff's allegation that there was no complaint filed against him is untrue. The affidavit in his complaint noted that the appropriate charging documents were filed against him on July

13, 1999. See Compl. Exh. B, ¶ 6." (App.G, p. 4)

"[P]laintiff's complaint alleges events that occurred prior to his conviction, namely that the CCSAO failed to properly indict him." (App.G, p. 5)

On February 9, 2021, petitioner filed a "LEGAL ARGUMENT" in support of the instant complaint, and attached thereto the record from June 18, 1999, court proceeding as Ex.C, (App.H, C) and a copy of two criminal complaints and an arrest report, (App.H, Ex. D) both appear to be filed on June 18, 1999. (See also App.H, pp. 11-12)

After reviewing the record from June 18, 1999, court proceeding, (App.H, Ex. C) and after a thorough examination of the documents, which appear to be filed on June 18, 1999, (App.H, Ex. D) the trial court rendered a judgment to dismiss instant State Habeas Corpus Petition, with prejudice. (App.C)

On appeal, the same record from June 18, 1999, (App.H, Ex. C) and documents, which appear to be filed on June 18, 1999, (App.H, Ex. D) were presented before the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, the Court concluded that: "[T]he undisputed facts of record and settled legal authorities indicate Dardagan's arguments are fabricated." Dardagan v. Nicholson, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶ 16. (App.A, p. 8) Judgment AFFIRMED.

On October 18, 2022, a Motion for Rehearing was filed, (App.K) and on November 7, 2022, Motion for

Rehearing was denied. (App.B)

On February 21, 2023, the petitioner filed a Petition for Leave to Appeal (PLA), seeking a discretionary review by the supreme court. (App.L) On March 20, 2023, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition for Leave to Appeal. (App.M) Petition for Leave to Appeal was denied on May 24, 2023, (App.D)

On June 28, 2023, the petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing. (App.N) On July 28, 2023, the Motion for Rehearing was denied. (App.E)

CONTACT INFORMATION

The final decision was made by the state court of last resort on July 28, 2023. The petitioner is given 90 days to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorary. The petitioner's access to law library is limited to minimum, giving him a small window of opportunity to timely file instant petition before the United States Supreme Court, having not enough time to contact an attorney to represent him.

The list of the broadcasting news and media and of the potential attorney who is willing to represent petitioner in this matter, is attached hereto as APPENDIX X. (App.X)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Petitioner, Suvad Dardagan, sought a discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Ill. S. Ct., Rule 315. Leave to Appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court, the decision entered in Dardagan v. Nicholson, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313-U, in the existence of conflict between decision sought to be reviewed and the Supreme Court decision in People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d 23, 26-27 (1976).

Whether this case qualifies for a discretionary review in the United States Supreme Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10. Considerations Governing Review on Certiorary, depends on whether: "(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States Court of Appeals." U.S. S. Ct., Rule 10(b) (Eff. Jan. 1, 2023).

This case qualifies for a discretionary review based on jurisdictional grounds: no state or federal government sought a warrant for the petitioner's arrest, and there is no record that he was arrested without a warrant. "In the absence of appearance or acquiescence by the State, a judgment entered by a court having no jurisdiction over either the cause or the party is absolutely void." United States v. Bell (1896), 163 U.S. 662, 669. (App.L, p. 9)

The jurisdiction, once challenged, is to be proven, not by the court, but by the party attempting to assert jurisdiction. Maxfield v. Levy, 4 U.

S. 330 (1797). The burden of proof of jurisdiction lies with the asserter. The court is only to rule on the sufficiency of the proof tendered. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936). (App.M, p. 3)

Petitioner claims that "The State's Attorney of Cook County never filed a criminal complaint in the circuit court of Cook County to commence a criminal action against petitioner Suvad Dardagan, pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)." (App.F, ¶ 5) The Attorney General responded that "The CCSAO affirmed in an affidavit that it had sent plaintiff a copy of the 'arrest report' and the 'charging documents' from July 13, 1999, but that July (error-June) 18, 1999, was the date of plaintiff's bond hearing and no charging document was filed on that date. (App.G, p. 2) The affidavit referenced in his complaint noted that the appropriate charging documents were filed against him on July 13, 1999. (App.G, p. 4)

Petitioner filed a "LEGAL ARGUMENT" (App.H) in support of the complaint, providing the court with the record from June 18, 1999, (App.H, Exh.C), and a copy of two criminal complaints, as well a copy of an arrest report, which appear to be filed on June 18, 1999. (App.H, Exh.D; also, compare Exh.C to Exh.D) A conviction obtained through the use of false evidence, known to the officers of the court and representatives of the State to be such, must fail. Napue v. Illinois, 330 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). (App.H, p. 14)

After a thorough examination of the record from

June 18, 1999, (App.H, Exh.C), and after reviewing two criminal complaints and an arrest report, which appear to be filed on June 18, 1999, (App.H, Exh.D), and after a careful consideration of the complaint and the answer to the complaint, the appellate court concluded that: "Here, the Attorney General is correct that the record and Dardagan's own exhibits indicate his arguments on appeal are entirely without merit. For example, the affidavit from the Cook County State's Attorney plainly demonstrate that Dardagan was provided the arrest report and charging documents from July 13, 1999." Dardagan, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶ 16.

The appellate court further held that "an order of habeas corpus will be entered only if (1) the prisoner was incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or (2) an occurrence after the prisoner's conviction entitles him or her to a release from prison. Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill.2d 57-58 (2008). Here, personal jurisdiction was acquired by the circuit court of Cook County when Dardagan, undisputedly, appeared on charges of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Subject matter jurisdiction was also acquired since the charges of predatory criminal sexual assault under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 were 'justiciable matter[s].'" As such, Dardagan was not incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction. See Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 58." Dardagan, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶¶ 13-14.

On appeal, petitioner addressed the appellate court: "If the counsel had initiated an action in the circuit court, he was required to produce:

1. the identity of the prosecuting authority, authorized by the Supreme Court Rule 721(c)-Practice of Law, to commence and prosecute a criminal charge in the circuit court;
2. the identity of the complainant, as a fundamental prerequisite to accuse a person of the commission of a criminal offense;
3. the identity of an arresting officer, as a fundamental prerequisite to establish the name of the person arrested; the date, place, and county of the arrest; and most importantly;
4. to preserve the record of the violation of the Criminal Code of 1961." (App.I, pp. 11-12)

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.C.A. CONST. Am. IV; Giordenello v. United States, 241 F.2d 575, 580 (1957). (App.I, p. 21; see also App.L, p. 6)

"For a warrant to be issued upon a complaint probable cause must appear from the complaint, and, of course, probable cause is inherent in an indictment or information. *** The commission of a crime must be shown by the facts positively stated before a commissioner has jurisdiction to issue a warrant of arrest. *** A United States Commissioner acts in a judicial capacity and should issue a warrant only upon competent evidence. The facts and not the complainant's conclusion from the facts, should have been before the commissioner. Worthington v. United States, 6 Cir., 166 F.2d 557, 565. What was said by the First Circuit in Giles v. United States, 1st Cir., 248 F. 208, 214, is true here:

"In this case, as no facts were put before the commissioner, he was ousted from his judicial function, and remitted to a performance purely perfunctory. The prohibition agent was an applicant, affiant, in effect the judge of the existence of probable cause, and the officer serving the writ. This is a very dangerous amalgamation of powers." "Giordenello, 241 F.2d at 581.

"United States Commissioners are inferior officers. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352, S.Ct. 153, 156, 75 L.Ed. 374. They have such authority only as is conferred upon them by valid statute or rule. Their authority to issue warrants of arrest is that prescribed by rules 3 and 4(a), F.R. Crim. Proc.:

'Rule 3. The Complaint

The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It

shall be made upon oath before a commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the United States.' (Emphasis supplied.)

'Rule 4. Warrant or Summons upon Complaint
(a) Issuance. If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, 'probable cause' must appear 'from the complaint' itself, and the 'essential facts' must be stated in the complaint. In the safeguarding of such fundamental rights, the rules wisely leave nothing to speculation nor to oral testimony as to what was before the commissioner." Giordenello, 241 F.2d at 582.

In People v. Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d 241 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1985); (App.K, p. 7; App.L, p. 6-7; and in App.M, p. 2), the Court held:

"When an arrest warrant is sought in a felony case, a felony complaint is presented by an assistant State's Attorney to a judge in the circuit court. In addition to naming the State as a plaintiff, the felony complaint names the accused as a defendant and charges that he has committed a specified felony offense. The judge must examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses presented by the assistant State's Attorney. If it appears to the judge, from his examination of the complainant and the testimony of the witness presented by the assistant State's Attorney, that there is probable cause to believe that the accused has committed the offense charged, he may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." 12 Ill. App. 3d at 244.

complainant and the witnesses presented by the assistant State's Attorney and the contents of the complaint, that the person charged committed the offense, the judge will approve the filing of the complaint naming the person charged as the defendant, and the judge will issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest." Id. at 246-47.

In People v. Macon, 920 N.E.2d 1224 (Ill.App.1st Dist. 2009); (App.K, p. 7; and App.L, pp. 10-11) the Court described the difference between an adversarial proceeding for a judicial determination of probable cause ["June 18, 1999"], and commencement of a criminal prosecution upon a charging instrument ["July 13, 1999"]. Macon, 920 N.E.2d at 1227; "A complaint could only be an initiation of adversarial proceedings affording a right to counsel if the complaints were filed by the State's Attorney. The courts were evaluating the actions of the State by looking at what documents had been filed rather than looking at what was occurring at the certain stages in the prosecutorial process that would require the accused be represented by an attorney. The right to counsel is a protection that has most recently been revisited by the United States Supreme Court in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008). Rothgery holds that the right to counsel is triggered by the initiation of adversarial proceedings. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 202-03; (the right to counsel applies at preindictment preliminary hearing at which 'the sole purposes ... are to determine whether there is sufficient evidence against

the accused to warrant presenting his case to the grand jury, and, if so, to fix bail if the offense is bailable.') Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 203." Macon, 920 N.E.2d at 1227-28. However, what commences prosecution in tolling the statute of limitations is not analogous to what initiates adversarial proceedings for right to counsel purposes. The tolling of the statute of limitations occurs when the State commences prosecution, and the attachment of right to counsel occurs when the State initiates adversarial proceedings. Although both of these occasions occur at the earlier stage of criminal proceedings and they appear as though they may be the same, they are not. Macon, 920 N.E.2d at 1228.

The appellate court held "Section 10-124 of the Code provides that a prisoner may be released on a ground when the circuit court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction." Dardagan, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶13.

This holding overrules Gilmore, 63 Ill 2d at 26-27; is in conflict with People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, 983 N.E.2d 439 (IL 2013); and contradicts subsection (3) of section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 735 ILCS 5/10-124(3) (West 2020).

In Illinois, the supreme court established that two types of jurisdiction apply to criminal cases: (1) State criminal jurisdiction, which is strictly statutory; Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26-27, 29; and (2) subject matter jurisdiction, which is strictly

constitutional. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶-20-21.

According to Gilmore, the State criminal jurisdiction has no existence aside a judicial finding of probable cause; see Giordenello, 241 F.2d 581-82 (F.R. Crim. Proc., Rule 3); Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d at 246-47; Macon, 920 N.E.2d at 1227 (citing Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 202-03).

Gilmore was presented in the circuit court App. H, p. 5; before the appellate court App.I, p. 22 and App.K, p. 10; and before the supreme court in App.L, p. 7; App.M, p. 2 and App.N, p. 2.

In Gilmore, the Court held: "The circuit courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving offenses which fall within the ambit of section 1-5 of the Criminal Code." Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26. Further, the Court described that three components of probable cause must appear on the face of a complaint before any proceedings are instituted in a circuit court: (1) a violation of the Criminal Code under the scope of section 1-3; 720 ILCS 5/1-3; Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 27; (2) the name of the person subject to prosecution in this State for a violation of the Criminal Code under the scope of section 1-5; 720 ILCS 5/1-5; Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26; and (3) the name of the circuit court of the county in which a violation of the Criminal Code occurred under the scope of section 1-6. 720 ILCS 5/1-6. (West 2020).

As to the first component, or jurisdiction over a criminal offense, the Court held that "An examination of the statutory scheme shows clearly that failure to charge an offense does not serve to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. On the

contrary, the relevant statutes draw a clear distinction between the absence of jurisdiction and the failure to state an offense. Section 1-3 of the Criminal Code provides: 'No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code, or in another statute of this State.' 720 ILCS 5/1-3." Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 27.

As to the second component, or jurisdiction over a person accused of a crime, the Court reflected on the statutory provisions under section 1-5 of the Criminal Code, which provides:

"§ 1-5. State Criminal Jurisdiction

(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or outside the State, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:

(1) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the State." Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26.

In criminal cases, an analysis of personal jurisdiction has two components: first, "whether an applicable state rule or statute confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and second, whether assertion of such jurisdiction accords with the constitutional principles of due process." Data Disc, Inc. v. System Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (1977); in reference to App.H, p. 9 (in the circuit court); App.I, pp. 28 (in the appellate court); and in App.M, p. 5 (before the supreme court).

As to the first inquiry, the applicable statute

in the State of Illinois are sections 5/1-3; 5/1-5 and 5/1-6 of the Criminal Code. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26-27; accord to Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d at 246-47; see also F.R. Crim. Proc., Rules 3 and 4(a); in Giordenello, 241 F.2d at 581-82.

As to the second inquiry, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must meet due process standards. National Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh v. Aerohawk Aviation, Inc., 259 F.Supp.2d 1096, 1103 (under due process of the Fourteenth Amendment, the accused has right to a judicial determination of probable cause before any proceedings are instituted against him. U.S.C.A. CONST. Am. XIV: Id.); see App.H, pp. 8-9 (circuit court); App.I, p. 28 (appellate court) and App.M, p. 5 (supreme court).

According to Curtis, the State surrenders to the personal jurisdiction by filing of a felony complaint, naming the State as a "plaintiff". Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d at 246.

In Illinois, a State's Attorney, as the representative of the People of the State of Illinois, has a duty to "commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court of his county in which the people of the State may be concerned." People v. Pankey, 94 Ill.2d 12, 16 (1983).

In this case, the appellate court concluded that the supreme court's decision in Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill.2d 51 (2008), applies as a standard of review of dismissal of the complaint. Dardagan, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶12.

In Beacham's case, the facts and allegations of criminal offenses presented before the court, were procedurally the opposite to this instant case. In this case, there is no record that the State sought a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. Rather, the record reflects no name of an arresting officer or his or her testimony under oath before a judge for judicial determination of probable cause required by Gilmore. See App.H, Exh.C and Exh.D; compare to Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26-27; and Macon, 920 N.E.2d 1227-28; see also Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d at 246-47; and Giordenello, 241 F.2d at 581-82.

In People v. Beacham, 189 Ill.App.3d 483, 485 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1987), the record reveals that on May 11, 1986, at a Mother's Day party at Huskies' Lounge in Chicago, County of Cook, Beacham shot and killed Will James and shot and crippled Frank James. Beacham, 189 Ill.App.3d at 485. The State filed a felony complaint in the Cook County circuit court, and sought an arrest warrant, naming the State as a Plaintiff, and naming Reginal Beacham as a defendant. Following arrest, Beacham appeared before a committing judge at a bond hearing. Id. According to Gilmore, all three components of probable cause naturally came into existence at the time criminal offenses were committed: (1) murder and attempted murder were violations of the Criminal Code under the scope of section 1-3; 720 ILCS 5/1-3; Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 27; (2) Reginald Beacham was named as a person subject to prosecution for violations of the Criminal Code under the scope of section 1-5 of the Criminal Code; 720 ILCS 5/1-5; Gilmore, 63 Ill.

2d at 26; and (3) violations of the Criminal Code occurred in Chicago, County of Cook, the assistant State's Attorney of Cook County sought a warrant for Beacham's arrest under the scope of section 1-6 of the Criminal Code; 720 ILCS 5/1-6; Pankey, 94 Ill.2d at 16.

According to Gilmore, a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction, as conferred by constitution, Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9, has no existence aside from a circuit court having State criminal jurisdiction. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26-27, 28-29.

In Hughes, the Court held: "[I]t is undisputed that the criminal offenses originally alleged in the indictment fall within the general class of cases that the circuit court has the power to hear under Criminal Code of 1961, thereby invoking the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction over a justiciable criminal matter. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 21. Thus, we have always held and continue to hold that a defendant has a right to challenge the sufficiency of a charging instrument for failing to state an offense based on statutory and due process grounds. However, a successful challenge would render the conviction voidable not void for lack of jurisdiction. See *People v. Gilmore*, 63 Ill.2d 23, 28-29, 344 N.E.2d 456 (1976)." Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 29.

According to Hughes, in criminal cases, rather, subject matter jurisdiction is nonjurisdictional in nature. *Id.* Further, the Court held: "[A] judgment is void, and hence subject to attack at any time,

only when a court either exceeds its jurisdiction or has simply not acquired jurisdiction." Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 84. (App.H, pp. 6-7; App.I, p. 26; App.K, pp. 12-13; and App.L, p. 2)

After the decision on direct appeal, Beacham filed numerous applications in state and federal courts. After convictions and sentences for murder and attempted murder were affirmed, state habeas corpus petitions were denied, and federal habeas corpus petition was dismissed, Beacham filed complaint for state habeas corpus, asserting that consecutive sentence for attempted murder was void and that he was entitled to immediate release. Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 51. The circuit court dismissed complaint on pleadings, and petitioner appealed. Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 51. The appellate court reversed and remanded. Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 51. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 51. The Court held:

"[W]e are called upon to review the circuit court's ruling on section 2-615 motion to dismiss. A Section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its face. [Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 57]. We review de novo an order granting or denying a section 2-615 motion, accepting as true all wellpleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. [Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 58]. Habeas corpus provides relief only

on the grounds specified in section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 1996). It is well established that an order of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release. [Beacham, 231 Ill.2d at 58]."Dardagan, 2022 IL App (3d) 210313, ¶ 12.

This holding is in conflict with Hughes.

According to Hughes, in criminal cases, subject matter jurisdiction is nonjurisdictional in nature and rather renders a judgment of a circuit court voidable not void for lack of jurisdiction. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 29. In Beacham, the supreme court reversed the decision of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in view of the record of probable cause hearing in accord to Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 26-27.

Gilmore was reaffirmed in People v. Benitez, 169 Ill.2d 245 (1990). (See App L, pp. 14-15) The Court noted that the defendant was never properly charged with an offense on basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The initial indictment failed to name him and the second indictment was not valid because the State failed to follow accepted methods for amending the indictment. Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 255.

The Court held: "[W]e disagree that this issue may be resolved on jurisdictional grounds. Defendant fails to acknowledge the principle of Illinois jurisprudence, in effect since this court's decision in People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 26, that jurisdiction is not conferred by an information or indictment, but rather by constitutional provisions. Accordingly, a charging instrument which fails to charge an offense does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. (Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d at 27.) The holding in Gilmore has often been reaffirmed by this court. See, e.g., In re M. M. (1993), 156 Ill.2d 53, 74 (reaffirmation of Gilmore); People v. Pankey, 94 Ill.2d 12, 17, 26-27 (a three justice plurality reaffirms Gilmore). We reaffirm Gilmore today. Therefore, the invalid indictment in this case did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction." Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 255-56. (App.L, p. 14)

In Beacham, the Court described that rather the lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not form a ground for release from custody, through section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 10-124 reads in a pertinent part as follows:

"If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court LEGALLY CONSTITUTED, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the following causes:

1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its

jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person. (In reference to Hughes, 2012 IL 112817 at ¶ 84) and

3. Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law. (In reference to Gilmore, 63 Ill 2d at 26-27; also Curtis, 132 Ill.App.3d at 246-47; see also F.R. Crim. Proc., Rules 3 and 4(a); Giordenello, 241 F. 2d at 581-82)

According to the supreme court, the opinion in Hughes reflects that a lack of the circuit court's subject matter or personal jurisdiction is not cognizable by section 10-124 of the Code. In Hughes, Justice Freeman dissenting, delivered the opinion:

"Today's decision upholds a conviction upon a plea for which no criminal charge was actually before the trial court. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 74. *** As such, the court holds that defendant's conviction is merely voidable, not void. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 81. *** This holding finds no support in Illinois law. In Illinois, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution. Pursuant to article VI, section 9, of our constitution, the circuit court has jurisdiction over all 'justiciable matters.' This means that there must be a justiciable matter in existence before subject matter jurisdiction attaches. In Illinois, it is the State's Attorney, as representative of the People of the State of Illinois, who is empowered to commence and prose-

cute criminal cases in which the People of the State may be concerned. People v. Pankey, 94 Ill.2d 12, 16, 445 N.E.2d 284, 67 Ill.Dec. 804 (1983). The decision whether to initiate any criminal prosecution at all as well as to choose which of several charges shall be brought are the functions within the exclusive discretion of the State's Attorney. *Id.* As such, a justiciable matter is created when the State levels charges against a criminal defendant and files them in the circuit court. (Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 82.) *** More troubling than this, however, is the fact that today's opinion gives our circuit courts the power to enter judgment and impose a prison sentence on a criminal charge that does not exist. This is an extraordinary result." (Emphasis added.) Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 87.


In this case, the petitioner provided the trial court with the record that exists in regard to the State criminal jurisdiction, June 18, 1999. (App. H, Exh.C) The record undisputedly reveals that the State never created a justiciable matter to invoke subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. No witness was called to testify on June 18th, and no person was qualified to appear before the grand jury, and testify in regard to the charges against petitioner.

No court can create a jurisdiction where none existed. Petitioner was prosecuted and convicted by an illegally constituted court having no prosecutor nor an accuser nor the record of his arrest.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Suval Dardagan". It is written in a cursive, fluid style with a prominent "S" at the beginning.

Petitioner, Suval Dardagan.

Date: October 2, 2023

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUVAD DARDAGAN — PETITIONER
(Your Name)

VS.

KWAME RAOUL — RESPONDENT(S)

PROOF OF SERVICE


I, SUVAD DARDAGAN - PETITIONER, do swear or declare that on this date, _____, 20_____, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS* and PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

<u>Kwame Y. Raoul</u>	<u>Russell K. Benton</u>
<u>500 South Second Street</u>	<u>100 West Randolph Street, 12th Fl.</u>
<u>Springfield, IL 62701</u>	<u>Chicago, IL 60601</u>

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.


Executed on October 2, 2023



APPENDIX A

Appellate Court
ORDER

STATE OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT



Matthew G. Butler
Clerk of the Court
815-434-5050

1004 Columbus Street
Ottawa, Illinois 61350
AC3@IllinoisCourts.gov

September 28, 2022

RE: Dardagan, Suvad v. Nicholson, Walter
General No.: 3-21-0313
County: Will County
Trial Court No: 19MR1996

The decision of the Court has been filed this date. To access the decision go to illinoiscourts.gov. Under Appellate Court, click on "Rule 23 Orders" to locate your decision.



Matthew G. Butler
Clerk of the Appellate Court

c: Hon. Brian E. Barrett
Kwame Y. Raoul
Russell Kenneth Benton
Suvad Dardagan

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 210313-U

Order filed September 28, 2022

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022

SUVAD DARDAGAN,)	Appeal from the Circuit Court
)	of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant,)	Will County, Illinois,
)	
v.)	Appeal No. 3-21-0313
)	Circuit No. 19-MR-1996
WALTER NICHOLSON,)	Honorable Brian E. Barrett,
)	Judge, Presiding.
Defendant-Appellee.)	

JUSTICE HAUPTMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McDade and Peterson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 *Held:* The circuit court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's petition for *habeas corpus*, with prejudice, under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, this appeal is frivolous under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Within 30 days, plaintiff must show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.

¶ 2 Suvad Dardagan filed a petition for *habeas corpus* against the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, Walter Nicholson, under section 10-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/10-102 *et seq.* (West 2018)). Nicholson filed a motion to dismiss Dardagan's petition for *habeas corpus* under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)), which was granted by the circuit court with prejudice. Dardagan appeals.

¶ 3

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 1999, Dardagan was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of his niece in the circuit court of Cook County under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)). In April 2003, the circuit court of Cook County entered a judgment of conviction and sentence against Dardagan under grand jury indictment No. 99-CR-15727. The judgment was later modified in October 2007. Dardagan's conviction and sentence was affirmed by the First District of our appellate court, which noted he unsuccessfully challenged his indictment before trial. See *People v. Dardagan*, No. 1-03-3415, p. 4 (2006) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Our supreme court denied Dardagan's petition for leave to appeal. Dardagan is presently serving a 90-year prison sentence.

¶ 5 On July 3, 2019, Dardagan filed a petition for *habeas corpus* in the circuit court of Will County against the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, Nicholson, under section 10-102. Dardagan alleged the circuit court of Cook County was not provided with information that he "committed any felony criminal offense *** within the territorial jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook County, or in any other County within the borders of this State." Likewise, no police department within the territorial jurisdiction of the circuit court of Cook County had a claim or record of his arrest. The Cook County State's Attorney allegedly failed to file a criminal complaint to commence a criminal action against Dardagan. Dardagan argued, pursuant to an attached affidavit from the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, "[t]here was no arrest report or complaint submitted to the court on June 18, 1999[,] as the court hearing on that date was Mr. Dardagan's bond hearing." Therefore, Dardagan requested an order that vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and directed Nicholson to grant his immediate release from custody.

¶ 6 On May 4, 2020, Nicholson filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-615. Nicholson also requested a finding of frivolousness under section 22-105 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West

2020)). Nicholson argued the circuit court of Cook County was vested with subject matter jurisdiction under article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution. Nicholson also argued the circuit court of Cook County obtained personal jurisdiction over Dardagan by his appearance.

¶ 7 Further, Nicholson disputed Dardagan's claim that there was no criminal complaint filed by the Cook County State's Attorney, stating “[t]he affidavit referenced in *** [Dardagan's] complaint noted that the appropriate charging documents were filed against him on July 13, 1999[,] *** [a]nd [that] the appellate court noted *** [he] had sought dismissal of the indictment prior to trial and filed separate motions for discharge and to quash the indictment, which were denied.” According to the affidavit, the Cook County State's Attorney provided Dardagan with “the only arrest report in the case as well as the charging documents from July 13, 1999.”

Further, Dardagan did not challenge the indictment in his appeal. Nicholson argued Dardagan's petition for *habeas corpus* identified no postconviction basis for an immediate release from custody. Since Dardagan only raised events that occurred prior to his conviction, Nicholson sought a dismissal of the petition for *habeas corpus* due to the failure to state a claim.

¶ 8 On July 9, 2021, the circuit court dismissed Dardagan’s petition for *habeas corpus*, with prejudice, under section 2-615, and entered a finding of frivolousness under section 22-105. The circuit court imposed fines related to this litigation against Dardagan. Dardagan appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, Dardagan argues the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition because “[t]he claim raised *** [was] that the Cook County Circuit Court never established the *existance* [sic] of the territorial jurisdiction to commence and prosecute a criminal charge.” Dardagan asserts that his petition was supported by an affidavit of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, which indicated “that ‘[t]here was no complaint or arrest report submitted to the court on

June 18, 1999[,] as the court hearing on that date was Mr. Dardagan’s bond hearing.’ ” Since no charge existed, Dardagan argues he must be granted an immediate release from custody.¹

¶ 11 Nicholson has not filed a brief on appeal. However, the Attorney General filed a brief, echoing Nicholson’s arguments in the circuit court. The Attorney General also requests a further finding of frivolousness and the imposition of sanctions against Dardagan, arguing his “custody is supported by a plainly valid conviction and both his *** [petition] and his appellate brief raise an allegation disproved by his own exhibit and available court records.”²

¶ 12 Relevantly, a motion to dismiss a petition for *habeas corpus* under section 2-615 is reviewed *de novo*. See *Beacham v. Walker*, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 57-58 (2008); accord *Blumenthal v. Brewer*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. Such a motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the petition due to facially apparent defects. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 57; accord *Blumenthal*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. When reviewing the motion to dismiss, courts must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 57-58; accord *Blumenthal*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. Courts must also construe the allegations contained in the petition in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58; see also *Blumenthal*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19. The petition should not be dismissed unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proven to entitle the plaintiff to relief. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58. However, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to bring the claim within a legally recognized cause of action. See *id.*; see also *Blumenthal*, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 19.

¹Dardagan does not appeal the circuit court’s finding of frivolousness or the imposition of fines under section 22-105.

²The Attorney General notes Dardagan’s *habeas corpus* arguments were presented to and rejected by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. See *Dardagan v. Hammers*, No. 21-cv-1317 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2021) (unpublished order).

¶ 13 Further, section 10-124 of the Code, pertaining to causes for discharge when in custody on process of court, provides the only grounds on which *habeas corpus* relief is available. See 735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2018); *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58 (citing *People v. Gosier*, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 205 (2001); *Barney v. Prisoner Review Board*, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998)). As indicated by those grounds, an order of *habeas corpus* will be entered only if (1) the prisoner was incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or (2) an occurrence after the prisoner's conviction entitles him or her to a release from prison. *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58 (citing *Gosier*, 205 Ill. 2d at 205; *Barney*, 184 Ill. 2d at 430); accord *Round v. Lamb*, 2017 IL 122271, ¶ 8; *White v. Phillips*, 405 Ill. App. 3d 190, 192 (2010). Even in cases of constitutional rights, a petition for *habeas corpus* may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit such defects. *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58 (citing *Gosier*, 205 Ill. 2d at 205; *Barney*, 184 Ill. 2d at 430). Likewise, the remedy of *habeas corpus* is not available to review errors that are of a nonjurisdictional nature, as to merely render a judgment voidable as opposed to void. *Id.* at 58-59 (citing *People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye*, 42 Ill. 2d 311, 313 (1969)); accord *White*, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 192. In practice, a petition for *habeas corpus* must be “ ‘in substantial accord and compliance with the provisions of the statute[] and *** show[] upon its face that the petitioner is entitled to *** discharge.’ ” *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 59 (quoting *Hennings v. Chandler*, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 28 (2008)). If it is clear from a review of the petition for *habeas corpus* that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, then the petition must be denied. *Id.* (quoting *Hennings*, 229 Ill. 2d at 26).

¶ 14 Here, personal jurisdiction was acquired by the circuit court of Cook County when Dardagan, undisputedly, appeared on charges of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See *People v. Rios*, 2013 IL App (1st) 121072, ¶¶ 15-16; accord *People v. Abtahi*, 2020 IL App (1st) 181631, ¶ 18. Subject matter

jurisdiction was also acquired since the charges of predatory criminal sexual assault under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 were “justiciable matter[s],” *i.e.*, “controvers[ies] appropriate for review by the court, in that *** [they were] definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, [and] touch[ed] upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” See *Rios*, 2013 IL App (1st) 121072, ¶¶ 15-16 (quoting *Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.*, 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334-35 (2002)); see also *Abtahi*, 2020 IL App (1st) 181631, ¶ 18. This is all that was required by our constitution for subject matter jurisdiction. See *Rios*, 2013 IL App (1st) 121072, ¶¶ 15-16; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9; *Abtahi*, 2020 IL App (1st) 181631, ¶ 18. As such, Dardagan was not incarcerated under a judgment by a court that lacked jurisdiction. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58; accord *Round*, 2017 IL 122271, ¶ 8; *White*, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 192. Dardagan’s other asserted bases for a release, such as the mistaken belief that an arrest report and charging documents were filed on June 18, 1999, instead of July 13, 1999, occurred before his conviction and would not render the judgment of conviction and sentence void. See *Beacham*, 231 Ill. 2d at 58-59; accord *Round*, 2017 IL 122271, ¶ 8; *White*, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 192. For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Dardagan’s petition for *habeas corpus* under section 2-615.

¶ 15 Next, we recognize that the circuit court exercised its statutory authority under section 22-105 by entering a finding of frivolousness and imposing certain fines against Dardagan. Now, we address the Attorney General’s request for a finding that Dardagan’s appeal is also frivolous, such that the imposition of sanctions is warranted in this appeal. Our authority to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal derives from Rule 375(b), which provides as follows:

“If, after consideration of an appeal *** in a reviewing court, it is determined that the appeal *** itself is frivolous[] *** an appropriate sanction

may be imposed upon any party or the attorney or attorneys of the party or parties.

An appeal or other action will be deemed frivolous where it is not reasonably well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law *** .

Appropriate sanctions for violation of this section may include an order to pay to the other party *** the reasonable costs of the appeal *** and any other expenses necessarily incurred by the filing of the appeal ***, including reasonable attorney fees.

A reviewing court may impose a sanction upon a party *** upon the motion of another party *** or on the reviewing court's own initiative where the court deems it appropriate. If the reviewing court initiates the sanction, it shall require the party or attorney, or both, to show cause why such a sanction should not be imposed before imposing the sanction. Where a sanction is imposed, the reviewing court will set forth the reasons and basis for the sanction in its opinion or in a separate written order." Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

See also *Johnson v. Williams*, 2016 IL App (3d) 150824, ¶¶ 10-12 (Third District applying Rule 375(b) in an appeal from the dismissal of a *habeas corpus* action). The propriety of sanctions under Rule 375(b) is determined by an objective standard of conduct. *Garlick v. Bloomingdale Township*, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 59. Rule 375(b) sanctions are intended to condemn and punish litigants' abusive conduct since frivolous litigation wastes time, money and resources that could be better spent addressing the potentially meritorious claims of good-faith litigants. *Id.*; *Johnson*, 2016 IL App (3d) 150824, ¶ 10. Rule 375(b) sanctions may be imposed against *pro se* litigants "under sufficiently egregious circumstances." *Garlick*, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 59.

¶ 16 Here, the Attorney General is correct that the record and Dardagan's own exhibits indicate his arguments on appeal are entirely without merit. For example, the affidavit from the Cook County State's Attorney plainly demonstrates that Dardagan was provided the arrest report and charging documents from July 13, 1999. Nevertheless, in this appeal, Dardagan persists in arguing that no charges existed in the Cook County circuit court because there is no arrest report or charging documents for the date of his bond hearing, June 18, 1999. Likewise, the undisputed facts of record and the settled legal authorities indicate Dardagan's arguments are fabricated. The bases for a release, alleged by Dardagan, occurred before his conviction. Further, Dardagan undisputedly appeared in the circuit court of Cook County, where the circuit court could clearly address the justiciable matters raised by the charges under section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See *Rios*, 2013 IL App (1st) 121072, ¶¶ 15-16; *Abtahi*, 2020 IL App (1st), ¶ 18.

¶ 17 For these reasons, Dardagan's appeal is frivolous under Rule 375(b). His arguments are not reasonably well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law, or warranted by a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); *Garlick*, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 59. Therefore, within 30 days of this order, Dardagan is ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 375(b). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); *Johnson*, 2016 IL App (3d) 150824, ¶ 12 (Third District ordering *pro se* plaintiff, in appeal from the dismissal of a *habeas corpus* action, to show cause within 30 days why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 375(b)).

¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION


¶ 19 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 20 Affirmed.

A P P E N D I X B

Appellate Court
Rehearing DENIED

STATE OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT



Matthew G. Butler
Clerk of the Court
815-434-5050

1004 Columbus Street
Ottawa, Illinois 61350
AC3@IllinoisCourts.gov

November 7, 2022

Suvad Dardagan
Reg. No. R20682
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Rt. 99 South
Mt. Sterling, IL 62353

RE: Dardagan, Suvad v. Nicholson, Walter
General No.: 3-21-0313
County: Will County
Trial Court No: 19MR1996

The Court has this day, November 07, 2022, entered the following order in the above entitled case:

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. G. Butler".

Matthew G. Butler
Clerk of the Appellate Court

c: Kwame Y. Raoul
Russell Kenneth Benton

A P P E N D I X D

Supreme Court of Illinois
Petition for Leave to Appeal DENIED



SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING
200 East Capitol Avenue
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721
(217) 782-2035

Suvad Dardagan
Reg. No. R20682
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Rt. 99 South
Mt. Sterling IL 62353

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE
160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601-3103
(312) 793-1332
TDD: (312) 793-6185

May 24, 2023

In re: Suvad Dardagan, petitioner, v. Walter Nichoison, respondent.
Leave to appeal, Appellate Court, Third District.
129383

The Supreme Court today DENIED the Petition for Leave to Appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate Court on 06/28/2023.

Very truly yours,

Cynthia A. Grant

Clerk of the Supreme Court

A^{en} C

A P P E N D I X E

Supreme Court of Illinois
Rehearing DENIED



SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING
200 East Capitol Avenue
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

CYNTHIA A. GRANT
Clerk of the Court
(217) 782-2035
TDD: (217) 524-8132

July 28, 2023

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE
160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601-3103
(312) 793-1332
TDD: (312) 793-6185

Suvad Dardagan
Reg. No. R20682
Western Illinois Correctional Center
2500 Rt. 99 South
Mt. Sterling, IL 62353

In re: Dardagan v. Nicholson
129383

Today the following order was entered in the captioned case:

Motion by Petitioner, *pro se*, for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying petition for leave to appeal. Denied.

Order entered by the Court.

This Court's mandate shall issue forthwith to the Appellate Court, Third District.

Very truly yours,

Cynthia A. Grant

Clerk of the Supreme Court

cc: Appellate Court, Third District
Attorney General of Illinois - Criminal Division

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**