Due 041724 ex of CertioRARI 60 augs FOR X+ENSION WERMAN + IRA DWERMAN FOR WE CONSTRAINTS COMING Obla Due to Un Familiarity with the ASCOUR Y Please grant me the time Loces DECISION SHOWLD ORKHUL Atme 040124

100 D'MERNAM USSCX 031624 238677 Su 2 con correctly, corning which takes PMAR. 141513 BKAZZO PG July Dinealuan MAR 29 2024

150 DWSSC# TEAPHILZ, 2024 1106 4/HO/E 150 16 W 106 4/HO/E 150 16 16 10 106 4/HO/E 150 16 16 2 150 CEDAY 1858 Slus 18 hay 3 Reguest for more 2 (032924) of this is muf thered of 02 TE24, Please Sport me the time to Weakle mer case. (60 Parp) wey ketchen fearwas Lake it halls) my kitchen ferences Sally Dineacuear

Son & Minutes 34 1230 BL NY11230

Son & Minutes 34 1230 BL NY11230

Supplement E-1124 Dineacuear

Rito away:

Thought a Son July Mentaus

Thought a Special we as The fellow Process

The seas of got a Selection of did nothing to 3

Office away and contraction of did nothing to 3

And I sindere This was Count dataset all montains

The Desir condensation of did nothing to 3 The State of the day Well Pucentice

June 1 farable, telly Pucentice

(1) 11111 11, 21, 10 mars (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) an Willed all a 11 parame, any suffer of 11230

Will Warrence to showed for surger of 11230

World Weller with sempleony working E 13 11230

World Thavior and John the Viger Espectfully Sucay Duncer



23-86-cv (L) Travco Ins. Co. v. Dinerman

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

#### SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18<sup>th</sup> day of December, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
Circuit Judges.

TRAVCO INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUBROGEE OF ERIC VICTOR,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

v.

Nos. 23-86-cv(L), 23-163-cv(CON)

SALLY DINERMAN, IRA DINERMAN,

Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants.\*

(de)

<sup>\*</sup> The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

FOR PLAINTIFF-COUNTER-DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Daniel J. Krisch, Halloran & Sage LLP, Hartford, CT

FOR DEFENDANTS-COUNTER-CLAIMANTS-APPELLANTS Sally Dinerman, *pro se*, Brooklyn NY; Ira Dinerman, *pro se*, Brooklyn, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hector Gonzalez, *Judge*).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Appellants Sally and Ira Dinerman, proceeding *pro se*, appeal the judgment and various orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gonzalez, *J.*) granting the appellee's motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), denying their motion for attorneys' fees, and denying their motion for reconsideration. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

This appeal stems from an action brought by Travco Insurance Company ("Travco") against the Dinermans as a result of fire and water damage to an

house apartment insured by Travco. Travco blamed the Dinermans, who lived in an adjoining apartment, for the damage and sought to recover over \$161,000. Years into the litigation, the Dinermans mailed Travco a check for \$20,000—an amount corresponding exactly to a settlement offer that they had previously made to Travco cashed the check and informed the Dinermans that it fully settled Travco's claims against them. After the Dinermans refused to sign a stipulation of dismissal, Travco moved under Rule 41(a)(2) to voluntarily dismiss its case against the Dinermans with prejudice. The Dinermans filed a response that the District Court construed as opposing Travco's motion and also moving for attorneys' fees. The District Court granted Travco's motion to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice and denied the Dinermans' motion for attorneys' 101/224 fees and their subsequent motion for reconsideration.1

### I. Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(2)

We review a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) for abuse of

3 \ Y

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Travco raises a challenge to this Court's appellate jurisdiction. A party ordinarily lacks standing to appeal an order unless aggrieved by it, and by extension cannot appeal a judgment or decree entered in his or her favor. *See Spencer v. Casavilla*, 44 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1994). Because the District Court's judgment could be viewed as ratifying the existence of a settlement agreement that the Dinermans dispute, the Dinermans are sufficiently aggrieved by the District Court's judgment to have standing to appeal.

discretion. *Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. First Equities Corp.*, 338 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2003). We "liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." *Publicola v. Lomenzo*, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022).

Here, the dismissal with prejudice of the claims against the Dinermans has "the effect of a final adjudication on the merits favorable" to them. Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). In other words, the Dinermans won the case below and cannot be sued again by Travco for claims arising from the apartment fire. See id. at 60–61. On appeal, they nevertheless claim that they never agreed to settle with Travco and want Travco to return the \$20,000 payment. In effect, the Dinermans challenge the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal on the ground that it prevents them from recovering that payment.

We are not persuaded. While we review Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals for possible harm to the defendant when the plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice, we do not do the same for claims that are dismissed with prejudice.

Cf. Camilli v. Grimes, 436 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding, in the context of evaluating a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal without prejudice, that factors such as "vexatiousness on the plaintiff's part" and "the extent to which the suit has

progressed" have "little relevance" when "no possibility of relitigation at the instance solely of the plaintiff exists"). And while the District Court here assumed without deciding in its dismissal order that the parties had reached a settlement, the dismissal was premised on the plaintiff's desire to discontinue the case, not the existence of a settlement. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (providing that a dismissal pursuant to a court order may be conditioned on terms that the court considers proper).

Because the District Court did not finally decide whether there was a settlement, that issue remains unresolved. The dismissal itself does not prevent the Dinermans from challenging the existence of the settlement and attempting to recoup the \$20,000 payment in a separate action. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty.

Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that issue preclusion applies under New York law only if "the issue in question was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding" (quotation marks omitted)); see In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding a lack of prejudice in denial of motion to intervene when a party "remain[ed] free to file a separate action"); D'Alto v. Dahon California, Inc., 100 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1996)

("[S]tarting a litigation all over again does not constitute legal prejudice.").

In summary, the Dinermans have not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the motion for voluntary dismissal or denying the motion for reconsideration. *See Warren v. Pataki*, 823 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2016).

#### II. Motion for Attorneys' Fees

We review the denial of attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. Scarangella v. Grp. Health, Inc., 731 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). "Under the prevailing American rule, in a federal action, attorneys' fees cannot be recovered by the successful party in the absence of statutory authority for the award." Odeon Capital Grp. LLC v. Ackerman, 864 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). However, "[p]ursuant to its inherent equitable powers . . . a court may award attorneys' fees when the opposing counsel acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the Dinermans failed to show that Travco's subrogation claim was meritless or brought for improper purposes. See Kerin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2000). We accordingly affirm the District Court's order denying the motion for attorneys' fees.

#### **CONCLUSION**

We have considered the Dinermans' remaining arguments and conclude

that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Cathrine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

Catherine Second & Se

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfg Clerk
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

(\* CIRCUIT.)\*

# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17<sup>th</sup> day of January, two thousand twenty-four,

Before:

Dennis Jacobs,

Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., William J. Nardini, Circuit Judges.

TravCo Insurance Company, as subrogee of Eric Victor,

**ORDER** 

Docket No. 23-86(L), 23-163(Con)

SECOND \* paul offe

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

٧.

Sally Dinerman, Ira Dinerman,

Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants.

Sally Dinerman and Ira Dinerman having filed a petition for panel rehearing and the panel that determined the appeal having considered the request,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is DENIED.

For The Court: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PRIORITAN Will PROOF OF SERVICE \_\_, do swear or declare that on this date, , 2021, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days. The names and addresses of those served are as follows I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

USSCATION No. # 1-181 NE 1-181 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PRIORITAN Wed word 2 more mo PROOF OF SERVICE \_, do swear or declare that on this date, served the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days. The names and addresses of those served are as follows I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.