

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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**JAMAAL HAMEEN,**  
*Petitioner,*

v.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**  
*Respondent.*

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**ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

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**APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO  
FILE FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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A. Fitzgerald Hall, Esq.  
Federal Defender, MDFL

Meghan Ann Collins, Counsel of Record  
Research and Writing Attorney  
Appellate Division  
Federal Defender's Office, MDFL  
201 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 300  
Orlando, Florida 32801  
Telephone: (407) 648-6338  
E-mail: Meghan\_Boyle@fd.org

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**APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A  
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit:

Pursuant to Rule 13.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Petitioner Jamaal Hameen respectfully requests a 30-day extension of time, up to and including January 17, 2024, to file his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

**BASIS FOR JURISDICTION**

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida had original jurisdiction over this criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Eleventh Circuit issued its decision on September 18, 2023.

This Court will have jurisdiction over any timely filed petition for certiorari in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Under Supreme Court Rules 13.1, 13.3, and 30.1, Mr. Hameen's petition for a writ of certiorari is currently due on December 18, 2023. He files this Application more than ten days before that date pursuant to S. Ct. Rule 13.5.

## **JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT**

On September 18, 2023, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Mr. Hameen's judgment and sentence upon revocation. *See United States v. Hameen*, Nos. 19-14279 and 22-12968, 2023 WL 6053541 (11th Cir. September 18, 2023). A copy of the opinion is attached as Appendix A-1. Mr. Hameen did not seek rehearing.

## **REASONS FOR GRANTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME**

The undersigned counsel of record is a Research and Writing Attorney with the Federal Defender's Office in the Middle District of Florida. At present, she is counsel of record in over 18 open appellate cases and over 300 cases related to Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

In the past two months undersigned counsel filed an initial brief in *United States v. Read*, case no. 23-10271 (11th Cir.); a reply brief in *United States v. Espinosa Chavez*, case 22-13769 (11th Cir.); an initial brief in *United States v. Nash*, Case No. 23-10649 (11th Cir.); and an initial brief in *United States v. Johnson*, No. 23-11576 (11th Cir.). In upcoming weeks, undersigned counsel will devote her time to several other matters, including an initial brief in *United States v. Johnson*, No.

23-11730 (11th Cir.), and drafting motions to reduce sentence pursuant to Amendment 821 for approximately 100 inmates who may be entitled to immediate release in February 2024.

A 30-day extension would allow the undersigned counsel to effectively contribute to these pending client matters, including Mr. Hameen's petition. Mr. Hameen respectfully submits that these facts support a finding of good cause under S. Ct. R. 13.5.

### **CONCLUSION**

Wherefore, undersigned counsel respectfully asks this Honorable Court to grant a 30-day extension of time, until January 17, 2024, in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

A. Fitzgerald Hall  
Federal Defender, MDFL

/s/ Meghan Ann Collins  
Meghan Ann Collins, Esq.  
Research and Writing Attorney  
Florida Bar Number 0492868  
201 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 300  
Orlando, Florida 32801  
Telephone: (407) 648-6338  
E-mail: Meghan\_Boyle@fd.org

**APPENDIX**

Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, *United States v. Hameen*, 2023 WL 6053541 (11th Cir. September 18, 2023)..... A-1

Amended Judgment of the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, *United States v. Hameen*, Case No. 3:18-cr-115-MMH-JBT (M.D. Fla. October 24, 2019)..... A-2

# **APPENDIX A-1**

2023 WL 6053541

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jamaal A. HAMEEN, a.k.a. Charles  
Flowers, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 19-14279 &amp; 22-12968

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Non-Argument Calendar

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Filed: 09/18/2023

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle  
District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00115-MMH-  
JBT-1

#### Attorneys and Law Firms

Roberta Josephina Bodnar, U.S. Attorney's Office, Ocala,  
FL, Kathryn W. Drey, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pensacola,  
FL, Holly Lynn Gershow, U.S. Attorney Service—Middle  
District of Florida, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office,  
Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Rosemary Cakmis, Law Office of Rosemary Cakmis,  
Orlando, FL, Meghan Ann Collins, Conrad Benjamin Kahn,  
Katherine Grace Howard, Federal Public Defender's Office,  
Orlando, FL, Michelle Yard, Joshi Law Firm, PA, Orlando,  
FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jamaal A. Hameen, Jesup, GA, Pro Se.

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

#### Opinion

PER CURIAM:

\*1 Jamaal Abu Talib Hameen appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.<sup>1</sup> First, he argues that the district court erred in permitting him to proceed *pro se* at sentencing without conducting a second *Faretta*<sup>2</sup> hearing. Second, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding that he had failed to show excusable neglect for his untimely *Rehaif*<sup>3</sup> motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Third, he contends that the omission of the knowledge-

of-status element from the indictment and jury instructions constituted plain error that prejudiced his substantial rights and infected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Fourth, he contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Fifth, Hameen contends that the district court erred when it determined that his prior Florida conviction for aggravated assault was a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) and a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Sixth, he contends that the district court erred in determining that his prior Florida drug convictions, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 893.13, were “serious drug offenses” under the ACCA and “controlled substance offenses” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). Finally, he contends that his ACCA-enhanced sentence is unconstitutional.


#### I. DISCUSSION







##### A. Second *Faretta* Hearing

A district court's conclusion that a defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowing and voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact that we review *de novo*. *United States v. Garey*, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (*en banc*). The government bears the burden of proving the waiver was valid in a case on direct appeal. *Id.* We review this *de novo*. *United States v. Hakim*, 30 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022).





A defendant's right to self-representation is implicit in the Sixth Amendment. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 819. To do so, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. *Id.* at 835. However, the right to self-representation is not absolute. *Indiana v. Edwards*, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008). A trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; *see also United States v. McLeod*, 53 F.3d 322, 325 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that “a defendant who misbehaves in the courtroom may forfeit his constitutional right to be present at trial”).


The “ideal method of assuring that a defendant understands the consequences of a waiver is for the trial court to conduct


a pretrial hearing at which the district court should inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him, possible punishments, basic trial procedure and the hazards of representing himself.”  *Garey*, 540 F.3d at 1266 (quotation marks omitted). However, failing to hold a *Faretta* hearing is not an error as a matter of law if the record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily elected to represent himself. *Nelson v. Alabama*, 292 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). We have observed that the ultimate test is the defendant's understanding, stating that a waiver may be valid where the record establishes that the defendant understood the risks of self-representation and freely chose to face them. *United States v. Owen*, 963 F.3d 1040, 1049 (11th Cir. 2020).

\*2 Although we have not yet addressed in a published opinion the continuing validity of a valid waiver, several circuit courts have held that a valid waiver remains in effect at subsequent proceedings in the absence of an explicit revocation by the defendant or a sufficient change of circumstances that would suggest that the district court should make a renewed inquiry of the defendant. *See, e.g.*,  *United States v. Hantzis*, 625 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2010) (persuasive authority) (stating that no federal circuit that has considered the issue “has held that renewed *Faretta* warnings are required at each subsequent court proceeding”);  *United States v. McBride*, 362 F.3d 360, 367 (6th Cir. 2004) (persuasive authority) (adopting the rule that “a defendant's waiver of counsel at trial carries over to subsequent proceedings absent a substantial change in circumstances”);   *United States v. Unger*, 915 F.2d 759, 762 (1st Cir. 1990) (persuasive authority) (holding that the district court was free to find that the defendant's earlier waiver was still in force at the sentencing hearing in the absence of intervening events);  *United States v. Fazzini*, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1989) (persuasive authority) (“Once the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, only a substantial change in circumstances will require the district court to inquire whether the defendant wishes to revoke his earlier waiver.”); *Panagos v. United States*, 324 F.2d 764, 765 (10th Cir. 1963) (persuasive authority) (concluding that there were no facts or circumstances preventing “the initial waiver of the right to counsel, knowingly and intelligently made, from extending to and being fully effective at the time of sentencing”);  *Davis v. United States*, 226 F.2d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 1955) (persuasive authority) (holding that defendant's waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an

implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings, including sentencing four days later).

We have recognized that a valid waiver of counsel may occur not only when a cooperative defendant affirmatively invokes his right to self-representation, but also when an uncooperative defendant rejects the only counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled, understanding his only alternative is self-representation.  *Garey*, 540 F.3d at 1265. The defendant filed a motion to disqualify his counsel and substitute different counsel based on purported irreconcilable differences and conflicts of interest.  *Id.* at 1259. After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion and told him he could either accept his court-appointed counsel or proceed *pro se*. *Id.* After further colloquy in which the defendant repeatedly refused to waive his right to counsel but also refused to let his court-appointed counsel represent him, the defendant stated he was involuntarily electing to represent himself, and the district court ultimately found that he had knowingly and voluntarily decided to proceed *pro se*.  *Id.* at 1259–60. We stated that, when an indigent defendant rejects competent, conflict-free counsel, he may waive his right to counsel “by his uncooperative conduct, so long as his decision is made with knowledge of his options and the consequences of his choice.”  *Id.* at 1266. We characterized our holding as merely recognizing that, “in some instances, a defendant's conduct will reveal a voluntary decision to choose the path of self-representation over the continued assistance of counsel.” *Id.*

We have further stated that “[a] defendant cannot use the right to counsel as a means to manipulate the court and cause delay” and “may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling with the court.”  *United States v. Graham*, 643 F.3d 885, 894 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). Evidence of a defendant's manipulation or intentional delay implies his greater understanding of the proceedings and an understanding of the risks and complexities of a criminal trial. *Owen*, 963 F.3d at 1051–52.

In *McLeod*, the defendant engaged in “abusive, threatening, and coercive” conduct toward his second appointed counsel, which caused counsel to move to withdraw.  53 F.3d at 326. The district court did not allow the defendant to testify at the hearing held on counsel's motion after he refused to take an oath, and the defendant requested a third attorney after the hearing. *Id.* We held that, even though the district court did






not warn the defendant that his misbehavior may lead to his self-representation, the district court properly concluded that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel. *Id.*

Here, the district court did not err in failing to conduct a second *Faretta* hearing, because Hameen's alleged mental health issues did not rise to the level of an intervening event that sufficiently changed his prior waiver to the point that it was undermined. First, the record indicates that Hameen did not have a history of serious mental health issues. He testified at the *Faretta* hearing that, besides a brief stint in counseling for depression in 2006, he had no history of mental illness. He also denied any psychiatric or psychological treatment and testified that he periodically obtained religious counseling, not professional counseling. Notably, the unobjected-to facts in the PSI stated that Hameen was diagnosed with a personality disorder while enlisted in the military and was discharged after becoming medically unstable. But the probation officer did not receive a response to a request for Hameen's military records and noted that Hameen told Dr. Demery during the competency evaluation that he was discharged for smoking marijuana, not mental illness. Although medical records showed that Hameen had previously been diagnosed with PTSD, Dr. Demery reported in his competency evaluation and testified at the competency hearing that Hameen did not have a history of serious mental illness that would serve as a basis to find him incompetent. And while Hameen's sister told the probation officer that Hameen suffered from mental illness, she was unable to cite a particular illness and repeatedly stated that he was “highly intelligent.”

\*3 Next, the record shows that Hameen understood the nature and consequences of the proceedings. *Garey*, 640 F.3d at 1265. Hameen exhibited an understanding of the charges, possible punishments, basic trial procedure, and the hazards of representing himself. *Id.* at 1266. He testified that he had previously represented himself in several state-court criminal cases, including both misdemeanor and felony charges, had conducted at least five civil lawsuits pro se, and was familiarizing himself with the federal rules. While Dr. Demery stated that Hameen had “an inflated perception about his understanding of the law,” he found that Hameen understood the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, was capable of properly assisting in his defense, appreciated the possible penalties, understood the adversarial nature of the legal process, and had an adequate appreciation of the range of plea options. After engaging with Hameen throughout numerous hearings and filings, the court

repeatedly stated that he was “clearly very intelligent” and was “fully capable” of representing himself.

Further, the record does not directly support or imply that Hameen's mental capacity diminished throughout the proceedings such that his pre-trial waiver of counsel could no longer be considered to have been knowing and intelligent. His assertion before sentencing that he suffered from mental health issues for which he was on new medication did not constitute a change of circumstances that required the district court to conduct a second *Faretta* hearing. Hameen did not assert that he suffered from mental health issues that would prevent him from self-representation until after his fourth appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw prior to sentencing. He explained that he was on new medication that did not seem to be working and did not know whether he was “going or coming” because his body had not yet responded to the medication. Yet, his behaviors after the alleged change in circumstance do not reflect any change in his ability to understand the proceedings. To the contrary, Hameen subsequently raised multiple objections to his PSI, including objections to his classification as an armed career criminal, and arguments based upon *Rehaif*. The *Rehaif* objections especially demonstrate his continued understanding of the proceedings and awareness of changes in relevant law, as the Supreme Court issued its decision in *Rehaif* nearly four months after the jury convicted Hameen of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.  *Rehaif*, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (issued June 21, 2019).

Moreover, the sequence of events in this case strongly suggests that Hameen was engaging in calculated maneuvers designed to force the district court to delay the proceedings, which is a further implication of his continued understanding of the proceedings and their risks and complexities. *See Owen*, 963 F.3d at 1051–52. As noted by the district court, a criminal defendant may forfeit his right to counsel by virtue of his actions. *See*  *McLeod*, 53 F.3d at 325 (holding that a defendant who is abusive towards his attorney may forfeit his right to counsel). Here, the record is rife with instances of Hameen engaging in behavior to force his several appointed counsel to withdraw and otherwise “manipulate the court and cause delay.”  *Graham*, 643 F.3d at 894. As the district court observed, Hameen also had a “pattern of raising issues at the eleventh hour.”

By engaging in obstructionist misconduct, refusing the only counsel to which he was entitled, explicitly requesting to

proceed pro se, and harassing his attorneys with lawsuits, interlocutory appeals claiming ineffective assistance, and threats of physical violence, Hameen forfeited his right to counsel. *Faretta*, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; *Graham*, 643 F.3d at 894; *McLeod*, 53 F.3d at 325; *Garey*, 540 F.3d at 1265–66. Thus, the court did not err by failing to conduct a second *Faretta* hearing prior to sentencing because the record indicates that, throughout the entirety of his case before the district court, Hameen understood the nature and consequences of the proceedings. *Garey*, 640 F.3d at 1265.

#### B. Untimely *Rehaif* Motion

\*4 We review a district court's denial of a motion on the grounds of untimeliness for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Snipes*, 611 F.3d 855, 864 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court can abuse its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. *United States v. Brown*, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005). While we liberally construe the filings of *pro se* litigants, we still require conformity with procedural rules. See *United States v. Padgett*, 917 F.3d 1312, 1316 n.3 (11th Cir. 2019).

“A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). “Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.” *Id.* 33(b)(2). The district court may extend the time for filing a motion after this period expires if the moving party failed to act due to excusable neglect. Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1)(B).

Where a district court in a criminal proceeding determines “excusable neglect” in light of *Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership*, the factors to consider include the following: (1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The *Pioneer* standard is “at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission.” *Id.* The Supreme Court accorded “primary importance” to the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party and to the interest of efficient judicial

administration. *Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.*, 71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hameen's October 10, 2019, *Rehaif* motion as untimely because he failed to show excusable neglect. First, as to Hameen's argument that the district court misapplied the law by failing to consider prejudice to the government, the main focus of the court's discussion as to Hameen's prejudice appears to have been in the context of its merits consideration, not in its consideration of the *Pioneer* factors. But, Hameen was not prejudiced by dismissal of his motion because the jury heard ample evidence to support a finding that he knew his prohibited status at the time he possessed the firearm. As to prejudice against the government, Hameen correctly notes on appeal that the government was aware of *Rehaif* prior to sentencing and its potential impact on his case. But, it had no reason to expect that he would file a motion just before sentencing based on his knowledge-of-status that would continue litigation if granted. See *Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.*, 71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding the nonmovant was not prejudiced by the movant's six-day delay where the parties expected to continue litigating). Although prejudice is of “primary importance,” the balance of the other *Pioneer* factors heavily weighs against a finding of excusable neglect. See *id.*

As to the second *Pioneer* factor, the length of the delay was extensive, as Hameen filed the motion more than seven months after the jury returned its verdict and over three months after the Supreme Court's decision in *Rehaif*. And its potential to interfere with the proceedings was amplified by his filing the motion only two business days before his sentencing hearing, which had already been continued by over a month. Therefore, the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings would counsel against granting the request. See *Pioneer*, 507 U.S. at 395. Third, while Hameen raises his pro se status as an excuse for the delay, he filed several other pro se *Rehaif*-based motions months prior to his October 10 motion. But, regardless of those prior filings, his pro se status does not excuse his nonconformity with procedural rules, and he did not explain why he did not file his motion until two months after he forfeited his right to counsel. Moreover, his assertion on appeal that the timing of the *Rehaif* decision and his discovery of the superseding indictment were reasons for the delay is unpersuasive, as *Rehaif* was decided in July 2019 and he failed to raise the knowledge-of-status argument in any of his

previous *Rehaif*-based motions. Finally, in light of the whole record exhibiting Hameen's pattern of late filings and attempts to delay proceedings, the court properly found that he had not acted in good faith.

### C. Omission of Knowledge-of-Status from Indictment and Jury Instructions

\*5 We ordinarily review *de novo* whether an indictment is insufficient and whether the district court misstated the law in its jury instruction. *United States v. Steele*, 178 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 1999) (indictment); *United States v. Joseph*, 709 F.3d 1082, 1093 (11th Cir. 2013) (jury instruction). However, we review challenges to an indictment and jury instructions not presented below for plain error. *United States v. Vernon*, 723 F.3d 1234, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2013); *Joseph*, 709 F.3d at 1093. In *Reed*, we reviewed for plain error new challenges to the indictment, jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence that were based on *Rehaif*, which was decided after our initial opinion affirming the appellant's conviction. *United States v. Reed*, 941 F.3d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 2019); *see also Greer v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (applying plain-error review to unpreserved knowledge-of-status challenges to the indictment and jury instructions based on *Rehaif*). In *Greer*, the Supreme Court held that, “[i]n felon-in-possession cases, a *Rehaif* error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” *Greer*, 141 S. Ct. at 2100.

To demonstrate plain error, the appellant must show that an error occurred that was both plain and affected his substantial rights, meaning that he must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. *Molina-Martinez v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016). If the appellant does so, we may, at our discretion, correct the error if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. *Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1021. The Supreme Court has instructed that appellate courts may consult the entire record, including the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), when considering the effect of a *Rehaif* instructional error on a defendant's substantial rights. *Greer*, 141 S. Ct. at 2098.

To be sufficient, an indictment must (1) present the essential elements of the charged offense; (2) notify the defendant of the charges to be defended against; and (3) enable the defendant to rely on a judgment under the indictment as a bar against future prosecutions for the same offense. *United States v. Wayerski*, 624 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010). This is sufficient to “satisfy the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of notice to the accused of the nature and the cause of the accusation, and the Fifth Amendment's assurance that a grand jury will return an indictment only when it finds probable cause for all elements of the crime.” *Id.* Additionally, the indictment's specific reference to the statute upon which the charge is based adequately informs the defendant of the charge. *Id.* at 1349–50. An indictment also fulfills the constitutional standard when it tracks the statute's wording, as long as the language sets forth the essential elements of the crime. *Id.* at 1350. Failure to allege a *mens rea* element is a non-jurisdictional error. *United States v. Brown*, 752 F.3d 1344, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2014).

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for any person, “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ... possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 924(a)(2) provides that a defendant who knowingly violates § 922(g) is subject to up to ten years’ imprisonment. *Id.* § 924(a)(2). A statutory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment applies to “a person who violates section 922(g)” and qualifies as an armed career criminal. *Id.* § 924(e)(1).

In *Rehaif*, the Supreme Court held that, “[i]n a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” *Rehaif*, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. A defendant's knowledge of his status can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. *Id.* at 2198 (citing *Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 615 n.11 (1994)).

\*6 In *Moore*, we rejected the argument that *Rehaif* created a jurisdictional defect in an indictment, holding that an indictment's omission of a statement that a defendant knew

that he was a felon prohibited from possessing a firearm was a non-jurisdictional omission. *United States v. Moore*, 954 F.3d 1322, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 2819 (2021) (stating “the law is clear: the omission of an element in an indictment does not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction”); *see also United States v. Morales*, 987 F.3d at 978–79 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the indictment’s omission of the knowledge-of-status element did not deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction).

Following *Rehaif*, we concluded in *Reed* that the defendant had established that errors had occurred with respect to his indictment and at his trial that *Rehaif* made plain because his indictment failed to allege that he knew that he was a felon, the jury was not instructed to find that he was a felon, and the government was not required to prove that he was felon.

*Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1021. However, we also concluded that the defendant could not “prove that the errors affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial” because the record established that the jury could conclude that he knew that he was a felon at the time that he possessed the gun. *Id.* We specifically pointed to the parties’ stipulation that the defendant had been convicted of a felony offense in the past and that he had not had his right to possess a firearm restored, his admission on cross-examination that he knew that he was not permitted to have a gun, and his failure to object to the PSI’s statement that he had served at least 18 months in prison prior to his arrest for firearm possession.

*Id.* at 1021–22.

Under our prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting *en banc*.” *United States v. Archer*, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). To overrule a prior decision, the Supreme Court or *en banc* decision must be clearly on point. *Id.* There is no exception to the rule based upon an overlooked or misinterpreted precedent reason or a perceived defect in the prior panel’s reasoning or analysis as it relates to the law in existence at that time. *United States v. Fritts*, 841 F.3d 937, 942 (11th Cir. 2016). However, “when a precedent of the Supreme Court has direct application, we must follow it.” *United States v. Johnson*, 921 F.3d 991, 1001 (11th Cir. 2019) (*en banc*) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed abandoned. *Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.*, 739 F.3d 678, 682–83 (11th Cir. 2014).

Here, Hameen’s argument that the district court erred in declining to dismiss his indictment as jurisdictionally defective is foreclosed by our binding precedent in *Moore*. Hameen cannot satisfy plain-error review because, while an error that was plain did occur, he fails to show that the error affected his substantial rights. *See Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1020–22. While Hameen argues that the deficiencies in the indictment violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and this substantially affected his rights, this Court has held that an indictment that specifically mentions a statute will adequately inform the defendant of the charges. *See Wayerski*, 624 F.3d at 1349–50. Hameen’s indictment specifically listed 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). And the indictment tracked the language of § 922(g)(1) and cited 15 of his prior convictions and the dates on or about when the felonious conduct occurred. Nonetheless, in light of *Reed* and *Rehaif*, an error that was plain occurred because the indictment did not require that the government prove that Hameen knew that he belonged to a category of people prohibited from possessing a firearm and the jury was not instructed that, in order to find him guilty, it needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm. *See Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1021; *Rehaif*, 139 S. Ct. at 2200.

\*7 Hameen’s arguments on appeal fail to meet the requirement set by the Supreme Court in *Greer* to show that the error affected his substantial rights. *See Greer*, 141 S. Ct. at 2100. In his supplemental filing, Hameen avers that he met the *Greer* requirement by arguing on appeal that, had the indictment and jury instructions included the knowledge-of-status element, he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know he was a felon. However, the representation to which he refers was made in his reply brief, not his initial brief, and this Court declines to address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. *See Sapuppo*, 739 F.3d at 682–83. Accordingly, because his representation on appeal speaks to the mere possibility that he could satisfy the requirement in *Greer* and he makes no such argument or representation in his initial brief, like the defendants in *Greer*,

Hameen cannot satisfy plain-error review. See *Greer*, 141 S. Ct. at 2100.

Even if this Court were to consider the merits, Hameen cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of his trial probably would have been different. *Molina Martinez*, 136 S. Ct. at 1343. Hameen's indictment listed 15 felony convictions that occurred prior to his possession in the instant case. And the court at sentencing admitted certified copies of Hameen's three felony judgments that were relied upon in the PSI's classification of him as an armed career criminal after the government presented evidence matching his fingerprints to each of the judgments of conviction. The jury could have inferred that Hameen knew he was a felon from his stipulation that he was a convicted felon, his testimony that he had been convicted of ten prior felony convictions in the preceding ten years (admitting the fact of each conviction, date, and nature of the offense), and his testimony as to his 2017 Florida conviction for selling heroin. Moreover, the jury was permitted to reject Hameen's explanation as to picking up a jacket at random without knowing it contained a firearm and infer his knowledge-of-status from circumstantial evidence of the officers' testimony that he possessed the firearm tucked under his arm and attempted to avoid arrest by turning away from Driggers when the officer reached out to arrest him for trespassing. *Rehaif*, 139 S. Ct. at 2198, 2200 (stating knowledge of status can be inferred from circumstantial evidence). Despite Hameen not testifying to his knowledge of his felon status at trial, the jury could reasonably have concluded, if presented with proper jury instructions, that he knew he had been convicted of at least one crime punishable by a term exceeding one year. See *Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1021–22. Therefore, he cannot show that the errors affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. *Greer*, 141 S. Ct. at 2100; *Reed*, 941 F.3d at 1021–22.

#### D. Constitutionality of § 922(g)

We ordinarily review constitutional challenges to statutes *de novo*. *United States v. Wright*, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). However, where a constitutional challenge to a statute is raised for the first time on appeal, we review only for plain error. *Id.*

Pursuant to § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a convicted felon “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

In *Lopez*, the Supreme Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power, in part, because the statute could not be sustained on the reasoning that the regulated activities, in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that the challenged statute “contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce.” *Id.*

\*8 Since *Lopez*, we have repeatedly upheld § 922(g) as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See *Wright*, 607 F.3d at 715 (citing *United States v. Nichols*, 124 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), and *United States v. McAllister*, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also *United States v. Scott*, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the jurisdictional element of the statute, *i.e.*, the requirement that the felon ‘possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from [a] facial constitutional attack”). We have also held that § 922(g) is constitutional as applied where the government proved a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce by demonstrating that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. *Wright*, 607 F.3d at 715–16 (quotation marks omitted); see also *United States v. Jordan*, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that § 922(g) is not unconstitutional as applied to “a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate” when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce). In *Wright*, we determined that firearms that were manufactured in Massachusetts and later discovered in the defendant's possession in Florida necessarily traveled in interstate commerce, which satisfied the minimal-nexus requirement. 607 F.3d at 716.

Here, our binding precedent forecloses Hameen's argument that § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.

#### E. Florida Aggravated Assault Conviction

We review *de novo* a district court's conclusion that a prior conviction is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA, *United States v. Oliver*, 962 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2020), or a crime of violence under the Guidelines, *United States v. Rosales-Bruno*, 676 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2012). We review for plain error an appellant's argument that a prior Florida conviction for aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because it can be committed with a *mens rea* of recklessness where the appellant failed to raise the issue before the district court. *United States v. Innocent*, 977 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 2827 (2021).

The ACCA caps a federal prison sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon under § 922(g)(1) at ten years, except when the person being sentenced has three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, which increases the minimum prison sentence to 15 years. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1). The ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that:

- (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
- (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

§ 924(e)(2)(B). The first prong of this definition is sometimes referred to as the “elements clause,” while the second prong contains the “enumerated crimes” and, finally, what is commonly called the “residual clause.” *United States v. Owens*, 672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court in *Johnson* held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague because it creates uncertainty about how to evaluate the risks posed by a crime and how much risk it takes to qualify as a violent felony. *Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591, 597–99, 606 (2015). The Court clarified that, in holding that the residual clause is void, it did not call into question the application of



the elements clause and the enumerated crimes of the ACCA's definition of a violent felony. *Id.*


A “crime of violence” for purposes of § 4B1.1(a) is defined in § 4B1.2(a), the career-offender provision, and includes any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that has, as an element, the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1, comment. (n.1), 4B1.2(a)(1) (elements clause). Because the elements clauses in § 4B1.2(a) and the ACCA “are virtually identical,” we look to cases applying the ACCA for guidance when considering whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. *United States v. Ochoa*, 941 F.3d 1074, 1107 (11th Cir. 2019), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 2553 (2020).

\*9 Florida aggravated assault is an assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to kill” or “[w]ith an intent to commit a felony.” Fla. Stat. § 784.021(1). An assault, in turn, is defined by Florida law as “an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” *Id.* § 784.011(1).




In *Turner*, we held that Florida aggravated assault categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. *Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium)*, 709 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2013), *abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). In *Golden*, we reaffirmed the holding in *Turner* as binding for the determination that a conviction for Florida aggravated assault constitutes a crime of violence under the similarly worded elements clause in the Guidelines. *United States v. Golden*, 854 F.3d 1256, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating “*Turner* is binding”); *see also Innocent*, 977 F.3d at 1085 (reaffirming *Turner*).


In June 2021, while Hameen's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in *Borden* held that a criminal offense with a *mens rea* of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA's elements clause. *Borden v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021). Writing for four of the Justices, Justice Kagan reasoned that the phrase “against another” in the elements clause, which modifies “the use of force,” requires that the perpetrator direct his action at

or target another individual and that reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.  *Id.* at 1826. Concurring in judgment and writing separately, Justice Thomas further reasoned that a crime that can be committed through mere recklessness does not have as an element the “use of physical force” because that phrase has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.  *Id.* at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).







After *Borden*, this Court certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court regarding the *mens rea* required for a Florida aggravated assault conviction.  *Somers v. United States*, 15 F.4th 1049 (2021). The Florida Supreme Court held the Florida's aggravated assault statute demands specific intent to direct a threat at another person and therefore cannot be violated by a reckless act. *Somers v. United States*, 355 So. 3d 887, 891 (Fla. 2022). Based on the Florida Supreme Court's answer to our certified questions that aggravated assault under Florida law requires a *mens rea* of at least knowing conduct, we held aggravated assault under Florida law qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under *Borden*. *Somers v. United States*, 66 F.4th 890, 891 (11th Cir. 2023). Because *Somers* holds that a Florida aggravated assault conviction is a crime of violence under ACCA, Hameen's challenge fails.




#### F. Serious Drug Offense







We review *de novo* whether a conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense under the ACCA.  *United States v. White*, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). We also review *de novo* whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense under  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).  *United States v. Lange*, 862 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).

To qualify as a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA, the prior state conviction must (1) involve manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, and (2) carry a maximum prison term of ten years or more.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

\*10 Section 2K2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a base offense level of 24 if the defendant committed the instant offense after having previously been convicted of at least 2 crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.

 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The term “controlled substance offense” carries the same meaning for purposes of  § 2K2.1 as it does under the career-offender guidelines in  § 4B1.2.  *Id.* § 2K2.1, comment. (n.1). “Controlled substance offense” is defined, in  § 4B1.2, as an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term that is greater than one year that prohibits (1) the manufacture, distribution, import, export, or dispensing of a controlled substance or (2) the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.  *Id.* § 4B1.2(b).

 Section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes criminalizes the sale, manufacture, and delivery of a controlled substance, as well as possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver.  Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(1). Knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is not an element of the offense.  Fla. Stat. § 893.101.

In *Smith*, we held that  Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) is both a “serious drug offense,” under  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A), and a “controlled substance offense,” under  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), stating “[n]either definition requires that a predicate state offense includes an element of *mens rea* with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled substance.” 775 F.3d at 1268 (quotation marks omitted). We have subsequently reaffirmed *Smith*'s holding as binding in several published decisions. *See*  *United States v. Pridgeon*, 853 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the argument that *Smith* was wrongly decided and affirming *Smith*'s holding that convictions under  Fla. Stat. § 893.13 qualify as controlled substance offenses under the Guidelines);  *United States v. Bishop*, 940 F.3d 1242, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2019), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 1274 (2020) (same).

In *Shular*, the Supreme Court held that a court determining whether an offense qualifies as a serious drug offense need only consider whether the offense's elements “necessarily entail” the types of conduct identified in the ACCA's definition of a serious drug offense, rather than engage in a “generic-offense matching exercise.” 140 S. Ct. at 783–84 (quotation marks omitted) (affirming our decision that the

petitioner's prior convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) (a) qualified as serious drug offenses under the ACCA, noting we based our holding in the case on *Smith*). We have reaffirmed after *Smith* that the argument that a prior conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1) cannot qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA because the state offense lacks a *mens rea* element is foreclosed by our precedent in *Smith* and the Supreme Court's precedent in *Shular*. *United States v. Smith*, 983 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir. 2020).

Here, Hameen's challenge that his Florida drug convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under the Guidelines or serious drug offenses under the ACCA is foreclosed by our binding precedent in *Smith*.<sup>4</sup>

#### G. ACCA Enhanced Sentence

\*11 Generally, all elements of a crime must be alleged by indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. *Smith*, 775 F.3d at 1266. However, the Supreme Court in *Almendarez-Torres* carved out an exception for prior convictions, holding that the government need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions or allege them in the indictment in order to use those convictions to enhance a defendant's sentence. *Almendarez-Torres v. United States*, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998); see *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 489–90 (2000) (declining to revisit the exception in *Almendarez-Torres*). We have repeatedly held that *Almendarez-Torres* forecloses the argument that an ACCA enhancement was unconstitutionally applied because the fact of a prior conviction was not alleged in the indictment or proven to a jury. See, e.g., *United States v. Deshazor*, 882 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018); *Smith*, 775 F.3d at 1266. We have also “repeatedly rejected the argument that judicially determining whether prior convictions were committed on different occasions from one another for purposes of the ACCA violates a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” *United States v. Dudley*, 5 F.4th 1249, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2021).

Here, Hameen's argument that his ACCA-enhanced sentence violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because the ACCA's

requirements were not charged in the indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in *Almendarez-Torres* and our binding precedent applying *Almendarez-Torres*.

#### H. Consolidated Appeal

We consolidated Hameen's pro se 2022 appeal (Appeal No. 22-12968) of two orders with his direct appeal. The 2022 appeal challenges two orders: a magistrate judge's August 1, 2022, order denying his amended motion to appoint counsel and request for an indicative ruling concerning whether Hameen should receive a reduction in his sentence based on our June 10, 2022, decision in *United States v. Jackson* (“*Jackson P*”), and the district court's August 17, 2022, order overruling Hameen's objections to the magistrate judge's order.

We grant the Government's motion to dismiss this appeal. The challenged orders did not constitute final postjudgment orders because they did not resolve all of the issues raised in the amended motion to appoint counsel that initiated the postjudgment proceedings. In that motion, Hameen sought relief from his sentence under *Jackson I* and counsel to help him obtain that relief. Shortly after filing that initial motion, he filed a related motion more explicitly seeking that relief—vacatur of the sentence under *Jackson*—that was pending before this Court when Hameen filed his notice of appeal.<sup>5</sup> The orders addressing only the initial motion thus did not end the postjudgment proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; *Mayer v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc.*, 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012); *Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n*, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010). The orders were also not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the issues raised in the amended motion to appoint counsel were capable of review after the district court issued a final postjudgment order.<sup>6</sup> See *Plaintiff A v. Schair*, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2014); see also *Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller*, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (stating that the collateral order doctrine is narrow, and its “reach is limited to trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”).

## II.

\*12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hameen's conviction and sentence. We dismiss the consolidated appeal.



**All Citations**

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.<sup>7</sup>





Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2023 WL 6053541

**Footnotes**


1 We granted Hameen's motion to consolidate appeal No. 22-12968 with his direct appeal, No. 19-14279.

2   *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

3  *Rehaif v. United States*, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).

4 Hameen filed additional briefing on this issue after the release of  *United States v. Jackson*, 36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir. June 10, 2022) ("*Jackson I*"), where we held that certain Florida cocaine-related offenses, like Hameen's 2008 conviction under  Fla. Stat. § 893.13(a)(1) for sale or delivery of cocaine, are not "serious drug offense[s]" under the ACCA because they include a substance, namely ioflupane, that is not included in the federal controlled substances definition. However, this court vacated that opinion and then issued a new opinion,  55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022), cert. granted 2023 WL 3440568 (May 15, 2023) ("*Jackson II*"), where we held that "ACCA's definition of a state 'serious drug offense' incorporates the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense."  *Id.* at 854. At the time of Hameen's 2008 Florida cocaine conviction, both the Florida and federal controlled substances schedules included ioflupane.

This *Jackson* issue was raised by Hameen for the first time on appeal, and even then only after both his initial and reply briefs were filed, thus raising issues of preservation or forfeiture. We need not decide the preservation/forfeiture issues because our *Jackson II* decision is binding and forecloses Hameen's new challenge based on the *Jackson* issue.

5 That is, appointed counsel had already filed a supplemental brief in Hameen's direct appeal seeking that same relief under the then-extant  *Jackson* decision, 36 F. 4th 1294.

6 On March 20, 2023, the district court entered a final postjudgment order denying an evidentiary hearing and vacatur of the sentence, as well as several other related postjudgment motions.

7 All pending motions are DENIED.

# **APPENDIX A-2**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA  
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Case Number: 3:18-cr-115-J-34JBT

JAMAAL ABU TALIB HAMEEN  
a/k/a Charles Flowers

USM Number: 70797-018

Pro Se  
Christopher Eric Roper, CJA, Standby  
301 West Bay Street, Suite 1413  
Jacksonville, FL 32202

AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

The defendant was found guilty of Count One of the Indictment. The defendant is adjudicated guilty of this offense:


<u>Title &amp; Section</u>	<u>Nature of Offense</u>	<u>Date Offense Concluded</u>	<u>Count Number(s)</u>
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)	Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon	February 2018	One

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 5 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

**IT IS ORDERED** that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

Date of Imposition of Sentence:

October 17, 2019  
First Amended: October 24, 2019

  
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

October 24, 2019

Jamaal Abu Talib Hameen  
3:18-cr-115-J-34JBT

**IMPRISONMENT**

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of **ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180) MONTHS**.

The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

- Incarceration at a facility located as close as possible to Jacksonville, Florida.
- Defendant participate in the 500 hour intensive, residential substance abuse treatment program, as well as any other substance abuse treatment programs available.
- Defendant receive mental health treatment.
- Defendant enroll in any educational and vocational programs as are available.
- The Court recommends to the Bureau of Prisons that Defendant receive credit towards his sentence in this case for all time served since his arrest on February 7, 2018.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

**RETURN**

I have executed this judgment as follows:

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Defendant delivered on \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

at \_\_\_\_\_, with a certified copy of this judgment.

\_\_\_\_\_  
UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By: \_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy United States Marshal

Jamaal Abu Talib Hameen  
3:18-cr-115-J-34JBT

### **SUPERVISED RELEASE**

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of **FIVE (5) YEARS**.

### **MANDATORY CONDITIONS**

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
4. You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

Jamaal Abu Talib Hameen  
3:18-cr-115-J-34JBT

### STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer
5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchucks or tasers).
11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

### U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: [www.uscourts.gov](http://www.uscourts.gov).

Defendant's Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Jamaal Abu Talib Hameen  
 3:18-cr-115-J-34JBT

**ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE**

1. You shall participate in a substance abuse program (outpatient and/or inpatient) and follow the probation officer's instructions regarding the implementation of this court directive. Further, you shall contribute to the costs of these services not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the Probation Office's Sliding Scale for Substance Abuse Treatment Services. During and upon the completion of this program, you are directed to submit to random drug testing.
2. You shall participate in a mental health treatment program (outpatient and/or inpatient) and follow the probation officer's instructions regarding the implementation of this court directive. Further, you shall contribute to the costs of these services not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the Probation Office's Sliding Scale for Mental Health Treatment Services.
3. You shall submit to a search of your person, residence, place of business, any storage units under your control, or vehicle, conducted by the United States Probation Officer at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of release. You shall inform any other residents that the premises may be subject to a search pursuant to this condition. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation.

**CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES**

The defendant must pay the following total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments set forth in the Schedule of Payments.

	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>AVAA Assessment<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>JVTA Assessment<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>Restitution</u>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$100.00</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>

**SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS**

The Special Assessment in the amount of **\$100.00** is due in full and immediately.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes a period of imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court, unless otherwise directed by the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

<sup>1</sup> Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

<sup>2</sup> Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.