

No. 22-\_\_\_

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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FAISAL ASHRAF,  
*Applicant,*

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*Respondent.*

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**APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO  
FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

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September 19, 2023

## **PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS**

Applicant Faisal Ashraf, pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States that included an appeal waiver, was convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of three counts of intentionally accessing a computer without or in excess of authorization with the intent to obtain information. *See* 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(a)(2). Applicant was the defendant in the district court and the appellant in the Ninth Circuit. The United States was the plaintiff in the district court and the appellee in the Ninth Circuit.

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To the Honorable Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and Rules 13.3, 13.5, 22, and 30.3 of the Rules of this Court, applicant Faisal Ashraf respectfully requests a 58-day extension of time, to and including December 1, 2023, within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

The court of appeals entered its opinion and judgment on March 20, 2023 (slip opinion attached as Exhibit A) and denied applicant's timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on July 6, 2023 (order attached as Exhibit B). The time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, if not extended, will expire on October 4, 2023.

This application is being filed more than ten days before that date. The jurisdiction of this Court will be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

1. This case presents an important question on which circuits are split: whether appellate courts can refuse to consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis for a guilty plea when the plea agreement includes an appeal waiver. Citing the appeal waiver in applicant's plea agreement, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider his argument that the facts admitted in the plea agreement do not constitute a crime under the CFAA in light of this Court's decision in *Van Buren v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021), which was decided after applicant's plea was entered but while his appeal from his conviction was pending. *See* slip op. at 2-3 (stating that defendant was aware when he entered into the plea agreement that his conduct might be non-criminal and reaffirming circuit precedent that "[a]n appeal waiver in a plea agreement is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the defendant's right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made." (quoting *United States v. Minasyan*, 4 F.4th 770, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)).

The Ninth Circuit's approach is consistent with that of several other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit. *See, e.g., In re Sealed Case*, 40 F.4th 605, 606-08 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (refusing to consider defendant's argument that the facts admitted in his plea omitted a basis for an essential element of his conviction for importing controlled substances because his plea was voluntary and included an appeal waiver). By contrast, other courts of appeals consider challenges to the sufficiency of the factual

basis for a plea notwithstanding any appeal waiver in the plea agreement. *E.g.*, *United States v. Lloyd*, 901 F.3d 111, 117-19 (2d Cir. 2018) (considering defendant’s insufficient-factual-basis argument despite appeal waiver); *United States v. Trejo*, 610 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] valid waiver of appeal does not bar review of a claim that the factual basis for a guilty plea fails to establish the essential elements of the crime of conviction.”).

2. The CFAA charges to which applicant pleaded guilty arose from his use of a Hewlett Packard (HP) web-based portal created for discounted, high-volume purchases of HP products for a company’s internal use only—not for resale. The plea agreement established that: HP provided login credentials to applicant’s business partner; the business partner gave applicant the credentials to make purchases on the portal; and the purchases were not in fact for internal use by a company but for resale. Applicant argued to the Ninth Circuit that such conduct is not a crime in light of *Van Buren*, which interpreted the same CFAA subsection under which applicant was convicted (§ 1030(a)(2)), making clear that the CFAA “does not cover those who, like Van Buren, have improper motives for obtaining information that is otherwise available to them.” 141 S. Ct. at 1652. But the Ninth Circuit refused to even consider whether the facts applicant admitted in the plea agreement established a crime in light of *Van Buren*, stating that his insufficient-factual-basis argument was waived by the plea agreement. Slip op. at 2-3.

3. The 58-day extension is necessary because the University of Texas School of Law Supreme Court Clinic has now joined applicant’s Ninth Circuit counsel,

Mark G. Parenti, in representing applicant before this Court. And Erin Glenn Busby of the Clinic will be serving as counsel of record in this Court. The Clinic did not represent applicant below and requests this additional time to work together with co-counsel in reviewing the record, analyzing relevant authorities, and ensuring submission of a thorough petition that fully engages the critical rights and procedures of the criminal justice system that are at stake and over which the courts of appeals disagree.

For the foregoing reasons, applicant requests that the time within which he may file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this matter be extended for 58 days, to and including December 1, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Erin Glenn Busby

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September 19, 2023

# EXHIBIT A



NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MAR 20 2023

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FAISAL ASHRAF, AKA Sal,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50071

D.C. No.

8:13-cr-00088-DOC-1

MEMORANDUM\*

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Central District of California  
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 14, 2023  
Pasadena, California

Before: O'SCANNLAIN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Faisal Ashraf appeals his conviction pursuant to plea agreement on three misdemeanor counts of intentionally accessing a computer without or in excess of authorization with the intent to obtain information. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Ashraf also appeals the district court's order to pay to Hewlett Packard ("HP") about \$12.6 million in restitution. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

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\* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

§ 3231. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

I

Ashraf first challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court erred in finding the plea to have a sufficient factual basis. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). However, Ashraf’s plea agreement waived any appeal of his conviction except “based on a claim that [his] guilty pleas were involuntary.” “An appeal waiver in a plea agreement is enforceable if the language of the waiver encompasses the defendant’s right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.” *United States v. Minasyan*, 4 F.4th 770, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

Ashraf argues that his factual-basis claim goes to knowledge and voluntariness because the factual-basis requirement is “designed to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading [guilty] . . . without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.” *McCarthy v. United States*, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). But while Rule 11(b)(3) may have the purpose of protecting uninformed defendants, it does not follow that every Rule 11(b)(3) violation renders the plea unknowing or involuntary. Here, the record shows that Ashraf was fully informed that his admitted conduct might not constitute a crime. Specifically, Ashraf waived any argument “pursuant to *United States v. Nosal*, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir.

2012) (en banc),” that his conduct was noncriminal. Ashraf does not challenge the district court’s finding that this waiver was knowing and voluntary. Instead, he implausibly asserts that his factual-basis argument is not “pursuant to *Nosal*.” While Ashraf’s opening brief does not cite *Nosal*, his argument depends on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Van Buren v. United States*, which endorsed *Nosal*’s holding. 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1653 n.2 (2021) (noting circuit split involving *Nosal*); *id.* at 1662 (resolving the circuit split in favor of *Nosal*). Put simply, Ashraf knew his admitted conduct was arguably noncriminal, and chose to waive the argument and to plead guilty.

## II

Ashraf also challenges his conviction on the ground that the district court erred by improperly participating in plea discussions. *See* Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Ashraf argues that the district court’s participation renders his appeal waiver invalid. *See United States v. Gonzalez-Melchor*, 648 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2011). But in contrast to *Gonzalez-Melchor*, where the appeal waiver was “negotiated by the district court in exchange for a reduced sentence,” *id.*, the district court here at most encouraged Ashraf not to move to withdraw from an existing agreement. Whether or not such after-the-fact encouragement violates Rule 11(c)(1), it cannot retroactively render a plea agreement involuntary. Since Ashraf’s Rule 11(c)(1) claim does not go to knowledge or voluntariness, it is waived.

Even if we were to reach the merits, Ashraf has not shown prejudicial error. *See United States v. Davila*, 569 U.S. 597, 601 (2013) (holding that a Rule 11(c)(1) violation warrants vacatur only if prejudice is shown). Although the district court encouraged Ashraf to move to withdraw his plea and then discouraged him from doing so, the court later retracted its statements, offered to appoint new counsel to consult with Ashraf, provided additional time for Ashraf to consult with new counsel, and stated that it would not prejudice any motion. The court's later comments ameliorated any earlier impropriety. Ashraf has not offered any basis for concluding that he would have moved to withdraw absent the court's statements, or that the court would have granted such a motion. Since Ashraf cannot show prejudicial error, his Rule 11(c)(1) claim would fail even if not waived.

### III

Finally, Ashraf argues on various grounds that the district court's restitution order was erroneous. Although Ashraf's plea agreement waived his right to appeal "the amount and terms of any restitution order," this waiver cannot be enforced because, as the Government concedes, Ashraf did not receive "a reasonably accurate estimate of the amount of the restitution order to which he [was] exposed at the time [he agreed] to waive the appeal." *United States v. Lo*, 839 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

2016) (cleaned up).<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, we reach the merits.

Ashraf first argues that the restitution order lacked statutory authorization because HP's losses were not caused by "the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction." *United States v. Yijun Zhou*, 838 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). But restitution can be ordered for losses beyond those caused by the offense conduct if the defendant specifically consented to such restitution. *United States v. Soderling*, 970 F.2d 529, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Ashraf agreed to restitution "for any losses suffered" as a result of conduct "relevant" to the convictions. HP's losses resulted from Ashraf's purchases through its computer system, which related to Ashraf's convictions for accessing that system.

Ashraf also argues that the district court adopted an erroneous valuation method for HP's losses. To the contrary, the district court correctly concluded that actual losses include lost entitlement to the "higher price" for products improperly obtained at a discount. *United States v. Ali*, 620 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010). Ashraf suggests that later precedent limited losses to "lost profits on sales that would have taken place if not for the infringing conduct." *United States v. Anderson*, 741 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2013). But *Ali* and *Anderson* do not conflict; they simply

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<sup>1</sup> Ashraf raised this argument in his reply brief. No rule of this circuit required him to raise it earlier. *Cf. United States v. Desotell*, 929 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting circuit split regarding whether appeal waivers must be attacked in the defendant-appellant's opening brief).

involve different kinds of losses. In *Anderson*, a copyright infringer had no right to sell the product, and so the victim was entitled to the profits it would have made absent those sales. 741 F.3d at 953. In *Ali*, a discount appropriator had no right to receive the product at a discount, and, since he had already received it, the victim was entitled to the proper, higher price. 620 F.3d at 1070. *Ali* governs the present case: Ashraf did not violate a copyright, but rather obtained an improper discount.

Last, Ashraf argues that the district court unreasonably assumed that HP had the same overhead costs for products sold at a discount and products sold at the higher price.<sup>2</sup> But the district court assumed no such thing. Overhead costs are simply irrelevant for calculating HP's lost entitlement.

#### IV

The judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED**.

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<sup>2</sup> As evidence for such a disparity, Ashraf cites a colloquy from a different case in which an HP representative agreed that revenue differs from profits. Ashraf's unopposed motion for judicial notice of this colloquy (Dkt. No. 60) is **GRANTED**.

# EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

**FILED**

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUL 6 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FAISAL ASHRAF, AKA Sal,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50071

D.C. No.

8:13-cr-00088-DOC-1

Central District of California,

Santa Ana

ORDER

Before: O'SCANNLAIN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc. The panel has voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing. Judge Bade has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judges O'Scannlain and Hurwitz have so recommended. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are **DENIED**.