

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT

)	
Meghan Kelly)	Appellate Court
Plaintiff,)	No.: 21-3198
v.)	No. 22-2079
Disciplinary Counsel Patricia B.)	
Swartz, et al.)	District Court
)	No.: 1:21-cv-01490-CFC
Defendants.)	

Appellant Plaintiff Meghan M Kelly’s Motion to stay the Proceeding until the conclusion of the originating disciplinary proceeding, until final non-appealable determinations are made or the time of appeal has lapsed. I further move the Court, for good cause for permission to file the “for cause” motion 30 days after the stay is lifted.

I, Appellant, Plaintiff Meghan M. Kelly, move this Court to stay this proceeding, until conclusion of the originating disciplinary proceeding, until final non-appealable determinations are made or the time of appeal has lapsed. I further moves the Court, for good cause, for permission to file the “for cause” motion 30 days after the stay is lifted.

1. On January 1, 2023, I previously requested this Court grant an extension of time in the amount of 45 days, which I incorporate herein by reference, incorporating each document referred to therein herein too. 3DI 126.

2. I understand this Court must afford opposing counsel an opportunity to respond in accordance to the rules. The date they have to respond is on or before the due date of the brief January 10, 2023. This places me in a dangerous position where I may potentially lose the opportunity to be heard in defense of my

First Amendment rights, and to prevent the loss of my license and opportunities associated for it for punishment for the exercise of my private petitions to alleviate a substantial burden and to seek relief relating to bar dues without selective application that disparately treats similarly situated attorneys.

3. I seek meaningful opportunity to appeal to another Court, the US Supreme Court, the original disciplinary Order and a reciprocating disciplinary Order.

4. Any determination by the US Supreme Court will affect this case, albeit I seek relief for state interreference and procedural due process violations in Kelly v Trump too.

5. There is evidence the Delaware Supreme Court retaliated against me for two petitions in January 2020 and February 2020, as well as petitions in Kelly v Trump.

6. The statute of limitations will soon expire to seek relief for the retaliations against me for petitioning the Court for relief on bar dues.

7. I do not feel well and require time to care for my health to sustain my health and life.

8. I lost data. I have had technical problems with regards to printing, computers and internet.

9. I will likely overturn the Delaware Supreme Court decision on appeal for procedural due process violations. It is not normal for Courts to conceal evidence in the accused favor my pleadings to fix the outcome, terminate potential witnesses, preventing their discovery, denying orders by ignoring motions or rendering email orders, lying by stating notice is sent out on a date I was not served and no opposing counsel was appointed yet, and other blatant procedural due process violations based on disdain for my religious political beliefs, speech, affiliation and petitions.

10. The Defendants are allowed to think my beliefs suck. Even if they think my religious beliefs suck, people who have beliefs that allegedly suck are protected by the First Amendment from government persecution for their religious beliefs, speech, petitions, exercise of beliefs and affiliation. US Amend I, XIV.

11. My beliefs are genuine. I believe in Jesus but I do not want to be persecuted by the government through government agents or government incitement of private conduct which selectively targets me based on unconformity with government religious belief.

12. The Delaware Supreme Court placed my Delaware license to practice law on disabled inactive on August 10, 2022.

13. I seek the opportunity to access to the courts to appeal this Order, not the guarantee of being heard. It is the opportunity I fight for. There is no hope of justice when people are denied the right to petition the courts for help.

I. A stay is required to prevent increased potentially needless costs from creating an obstacle to my access to the Courts in defense of my first amendment rights, and the compelled violation of my religious belief against indebtedness

14. Fighting multiple cases at once creates a substantial burden upon my access to this court and the US Supreme Court on appeal, due to time constraints, my poverty and religious beliefs against debt. (*Bible, Romans 13:8*)

15. I require a stay from this Court in order to seek a meaningful opportunity to appeal the Delaware disciplinary order with the US Supreme Court.

16. A determination on appeal by the US Supreme Court of the original disciplinary matter may lead courts to vacate pending disciplinary proceedings.

17. A stay is required to protect my meaningful access to the courts, this court and other courts.

18. The additional law suits have increased costs. If I expend all my resources in terms of time, paper and other costs, by defending all cases simultaneously only to run out of resources, I would be prevented from defending my exercise of fundamental rights in any case to its conclusion.

19. A lawyer's right, my right to pursue my profession constitutes a property protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of which I cannot be deprived for any whimsical, capricious or unreasonable cause, including the state's disagreement with my religious-political beliefs.

20. I must be afforded access to the courts to defend my license to practice law from being placed on inactive disabled but for my faith in Jesus Christ, and exercise of fundamental rights.

21. I am utterly poor. A stay is required to prevent a substantial burden and obstacle to my access to the Courts, and compelled violation of my religious belief against debt, in contravention to my First Amendment right to access to the Courts applicable to the State via the 14th Amendment, for me, a member of class of one due to religious beliefs against incurring debt combined and due to utter poverty. *See, Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie*, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) ("This requires us first to determine whether Appellant is a member of a suspect class or whether a fundamental right is implicated. Neither prisoners nor indigents are suspect classes.") *Citing, e.g., Pryor v. Brennan*, 914 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990); *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. 297, 323, (1980) (noting that poverty is not a suspect classification); (*But see, Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 370 (1996) "[A]t all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect [indigent persons] from invidious discriminations.")

22. “Because this case implicates the [Constitutionally protected] right of access to the courts,” in defense of my First Amendment rights of speech, religious belief, religious exercise, and association, the government’s decision to grant a stay, based on poverty, is still determined under a strict scrutiny basis test. *Citing, Tennessee v. Lane*, 541 U.S. 509, 533 n.20 (2004).

23. The Supreme Court noted, “There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 370 (1996); (internal citations omitted)

24. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun joined, in dissenting of US Supreme Court in *Murray v. Giarratano*, 492 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) recognized,

“When an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure. . . [T]he discrimination is not between ‘possibly good and obviously bad cases,’ but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. . . . The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.” Douglas, 372 U.S., at 357-358

25. I expected to rejoin my old law firm after standing up for something more important than money in *Kelly v Trump*, my free exercise of religious-political belief, exercise of religious and political speech, and association as a

party, attorney, democrat, and Christian, without government incited persecution, but for my exercise of fundamental rights.

26. The Delaware Disciplinary proceeding and determination against me creates a government incited economic substantial burden upon me, and prejudices me by forcing me into a maintained state of poverty by preventing me from seeking to get my former position back at my old law firm as an attorney, or any work at a law firm. The State of Delaware's conduct harms my reputation to make me less attractive to other employers by harming my prospects of employment by the libelous published accusations against me. While, poverty is not a suspect class, my right to meaningful access to the courts, despite the inherent burden of poverty, and my religious beliefs and strongly held religious exercise relating to my religious belief against indebtedness is protected.

27. Fundamental First Amendment rights of speech, belief, exercise of belief, and association are implicated, in this case. Thus, this Court must have a compelling reason to deny my request for a stay of the proceeding to prevent irreparable to me, narrowly tailored to meet the important justification.

28. There is no compelling reason to deny my request for a stay. Defendants are not prejudiced, nor is the public. Nor is any justification narrowly tailored to meet any compelling reason. This Court must grant a stay to prevent an

obstacle to my access to the courts. This Court may stay the case, with no prejudice, while potentially avoiding needless work for the court, the appellate courts and the parties.

29. However, I face an undue burden should this court deny my request for a stay of the proceeding. I risk loss of my First Amendment rights, property interest in my license, loss to my reputation, other damages, loss of employment opportunities and a substantial burden to my access to the courts.

II. Legal Authority to grant a stay

30. “This Court has discretion to stay a civil proceeding.” *Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Hvizdzak Capital Mgmt.*, Civil Action 1:20-154, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2021), *Citing. Landis v. North American Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); *Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers' Int'l Union*, 544 F.2d 1207, 1215 (3d Cir. 1976).

31. “While staying a case is an extraordinary measure, ...courts will not hesitate to grant a stay when the interests of justice seem to require it.” *Id. Citing, United States v. Breyer*, 41 F.3d 884, 893 (3d Cir. 1994); *See Kashi v. Gratsos*, [790 F.2d 1050, 1057](#) (2d Cir. 1986); *see also United States Secs. and Exch. Comm'n v. Santillo*, No. 18 Civ. 5491, 2018 WL 6039324 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2018); *Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. v. Dahdaleh*, No. 8-299, 2012 WL 5305167

(W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012); *Walsh Secs., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd.*, [7 F.Supp.2d 523](#) (D.N.J. 1998).

32. Justice requires a stay in my case.

33. “The Court's discretion to stay a matter is ‘incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’” *Id.*, *Citing, Landis*, 299 U.S. at 254-55.

34. “In deciding how to exercise this discretion, the Court must ‘initially assess to what extent the issues in ... cases overlap, and consider the status of the ... case, including whether the defendant has been indicted.’” *Id. Citing, Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Podlucky*, No. 07-0235, 2007 WL 2752139, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2007); (*citing In re Derivative Litig.*, No. 06-02964, 2007 WL 1101276 (E.D. Pa. April 11, 2007)).

35. Per the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court, in *Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Hvizdzak Capital Mgmt.*, Civil Action 1:20-154, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2021), “the Court is not to consider whether [the Delaware Disciplinary proceeding and civil rights case] ‘overlap in their entirety,’ but whether and to

what extent the issues overlap.” Id. “The record presently before the Court [in my case] demonstrates adequate similarity of issues weighing in favor of a stay.” Id. at *3. The two cases relate to the same facts and issues as the case before this Honorable Court.

36. After the Court examines the overlap of cases, then, the court must weigh the following factors: (1) the interests of the court (2) the Defendant’s interests and the potential prejudice to the Defendants of a delay; (3) the interests of third parties; and (4) the interest of the public; and (5) the prejudice to me. Id. *Citing, Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc.*, 87 F.R.D. 53, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).

III. Factor 1, Interest of the Court

37. The Court has a strong interest in judicial efficiency. Staying this action could restructure the proceeding in this Court because collateral estoppel could prevent re-litigation of issues adjudicated on appeal in the original matter and in the civil rights proceeding. In addition, should the US Supreme Court vacate the original disciplinary proceeding, this case may be vacated as well. Thus, the interests of the Court weigh in favor of a stay, to prevent needless waste of judicial resources by a superseding US Supreme Court decision.

IV. Factors 2, 3, and 4, Defendant's Interests, third parties' interests and the public's interest

38. There is no prejudice towards the Defendants, third parties or the public by a delay, should a stay be granted. I agree not to practice law in this jurisdiction, without this court's authorization. I am retired in this jurisdiction. I require time and meaningful opportunity to not only defend myself on appeal in the original proceeding, but also to present my case in the civil rights proceeding.

39. I require time to preserve my life and health too.

40. On January 4, 2022, I discovered my Aunt Jackie's health deteriorated. I asked opposing counsel to please consider not objecting to my Motion for additional time in order that I may also have time to pray for my aunt Jackie before it is too late and she is dead, her fate sealed for judgment day for eternal life or death. See attached Exhibit A.

41. I require time to pray in order that she may have a fuller type of love with God please.

42. The public and third parties are not harmed by a stay. Yet, the public may be harmed if a stay is not granted, by setting a precedent that the state may eliminate Constitutional liberties in a government compelled exchange for the

license to buy in sell in a profession. Every citizen, holding a license, may lose Constitutional rights or be in danger of being adjudicated disabled, for merely believing differently than the state, or for standing up for their religious-political beliefs in Court, should I not be granted meaningful opportunity to contest the original case on appeal to the US Supreme Court and in the civil rights case.

43. I have good cause to contest the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court to place me on disabled inactive, as punishment for my exercise of my First Amendment right to religious-political speech, religious-political belief, religious-political-exercise, and my exercise of the right to make religious-political petitions.

44. The Delaware Disciplinary proceeding is defective on its face. The record shows evidence of fraud, and collusion. The Court was not partial, but instigated the proceeding against me and colluded with the state.

45. The Delaware Supreme Court's members concealed evidence in my favor to prejudice the fixed outcome against me in aid of the Delaware ODC. The Court denied my requests for opportunity to perform discovery and for adequate time to prepare to hide the fact they terminated two court staff who are material to my case. The Court also secretly sealed four of my pleadings in Kelly v Trump that were material to my defense.

46. The Record also evidences the State's violations of my opportunity to be heard on ignored motions. The state ignored my motions to perform discovery, opportunity to prepare and present my case, opportunity to call and cross examine witnesses in the sham proceeding brought to cover up state Court misconduct and to punish me for the exercise of my First Amendment rights.

47. The State Court also criticized me for noting outside circumstances as evidence of disability in its August 10, 2022 Order, while finding those circumstances, including, but not limited to vulture attacks against me and my property, to be legitimate reasons for granting an extension of time. (DI 77 Internal-Exhibit D incorporated herein by reference)

48. Despite having good cause to contest this reciprocal proceeding. I lack time and resources to appeal the original DE disciplinary proceeding, and the civil rights case. I am unemployed, unable to seek to return to my former law firm. I am left impoverished. My parents indicated they are not able to help me as much as they would like, during this economic down turn. My parents indicated they are actually disappointed with me. They would like me to contribute more. They have indicated they intend to cut off my inheritance. I love my parents more than money, but I love God more and have to stand up for my faith in Jesus without government persecution. Then others even future generations may no longer be free from government compelled belief should I not have courage now.

49. In the interest of justice, this court must not sacrifice my meaningful opportunity to be heard in all cases, by denying a stay. This court must preserve the right for my meaningful opportunity to be heard, without waste of judicial resources or prejudice towards me, by granting a stay.

50. I plead with this court to grant a stay to grant me time to argue legal justification to overturn the original Delaware Order on appeal, albeit the procedural defects still permit me to argue the order is voidable before the District Court.

V. Factor 5, Prejudice against me is Great

51. The prejudice against me should a stay be denied is great in the form of substantial burden upon my access to the courts, additional loss of my fundamental rights and licenses. I also face the risk of other hardships, related to the loss of the opportunity to work at my former law firm, or any law firm to earn a living in my profession.

52. I have good cause to contest the decision the Delaware Supreme Court made in placing me on disabled inactive. but for the exercise of my First Amendment right to religious-political speech, religious-political belief, religious-political-exercise, and to make religious-political petitions. Yet I am impoverished. I lack time and resources to fight both the appeal and the civil

rights case and other potential reciprocal cases simultaneously. I will face irreparable injury if a stay is not granted. *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770 (1987).

53. The balance of the equities require a stay be granted.

VI. A stay is required because I asked for money damages, equitable relief and nominal damages like voiding Kelly v Trump not available in the state Forum

54. Additionally, a stay is required since I requested relief not afforded in the state forum, including but not limited to monetary relief and relief under 42 USC § 1985 for the Defendants' interference in Kelly v Trump, not merely relief relating to In the Matter of Meghan Kelly Case No 22-58. DI 2-4, 20-21,34-43, 50-58, I incorporate herein by reference in its entirety.

55. I sought claims for emotional distress, First Amendment violations, loss of employment opportunities, or other economic harm, and harm to my reputation. (DI 2-4).

56. I also sought claims for Defendants' selective prosecution in bringing a disciplinary action against me to demean my reputation by placing me on inactive disabled to conceal Defendants misconduct in collusion with the Delaware Supreme Court, and to punish me for exercising the right to access the courts and

First Amendment rights, based on Defendants disdain for my religious-political beliefs contained in the speech in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act petitions and other petitions. Id.

57. I later amended the Complaint to include additional facts showing the Delaware Supreme Court instigated the disciplinary proceeding against me, colluded with Defendants to prejudice my case, concealed evidence and witnesses, while denying by ignoring my motions to perform discovery. I also included additional claims procedural due process violations, denial to access to the law library and other disparate treatment by the Delaware Courts made in bad faith, which occurred during the Delaware Disciplinary proceeding as distinguished from Kelly v Trump. I sought nominal damages, damages and additional equitable relief, including but not limited to voiding the Delaware Disciplinary proceeding and Kelly v Trump due to procedural due process violations which shock the conscience. I moved to add the Delaware Supreme Court as a party. (DI 43, 58-60, 69-75, 77, 80-82, 85)

58. I later amended the Complaint to include additional facts showing the Delaware Supreme Court instigated the disciplinary proceeding against me, colluded with Defendants to prejudice my case, concealed evidence and witnesses, while denying by ignoring my motions to perform discovery. I also included additional claims procedural due process violations, denial to access to the law

library and other disparate treatment by the Delaware Courts made in bad faith, which occurred during the Delaware Disciplinary proceeding as distinguished from *Kelly v Trump*. I sought nominal damages, damages and additional equitable relief, including but not limited to voiding the Delaware Disciplinary proceeding and *Kelly v Trump* due to procedural due process violations which shock the conscience. I moved to add the Delaware Supreme Court as a party. (DI 43, 58-60, 69-75, 77, 80-82, 85).

59. In *Deakins v. Monaghan*, the Supreme Court held only that “the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding.”¹ “Federal district court must stay rather

¹ Citing, *Deakins v. Monaghan*, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S. Ct. 523, 98 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1988) “In reversing the District Court’s dismissal of the claims for damages and attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals applied the Third Circuit rule that requires a District Court to stay rather than dismiss claims that are not cognizable in the parallel state proceeding.”); *See also, Brindley v. McCullen*, 61 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1995); *See also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706, 719 (1996) (“we have applied abstention principles to actions ‘at law’ only to permit a federal court to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether.”); *Lewis v. Beddingfield*, 20 F.3d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1994). (It was proper to stay rather than dismiss the federal suit because the damages could not be claimed in the criminal prosecution.); *Jones v. Prescott*, 702 Fed. Appx. 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2017) (Younger abstention does not apply to federal suits seeking only money damages) (citing *Alexander v. Ieyoub*, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1993)); *See also, Boyd v. Farrin*, 575 Fed. Appx. 517 (5th Cir. 2014); **Third Circuit:** *Abbott v. Mette*, No. 20-CV-131-RGA, 2021 WL 1168958, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2021), *aff’d*, No. 21-1804, 2021 WL 5906146 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (A court “has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding.”); *Abbott v. Mette*, No. CV 20-131-RGA, 2021 WL 327375, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-131-RGA, 2021 WL 1168958 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2021), *aff’d*, No. 21-1804, 2021 WL 5906146 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (“As a general matter, assuming that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, the federal court’s “obligation to hear and decide [the] case is virtually unflagging.” *Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *Crane v. Fauver*, 762 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1985) (“District court should have retained jurisdiction over correctional

than dismiss claims that are not cognizable in parallel state proceeding.” *Deakins v. Monaghan*, 484 U.S. 193, 202, 108 S. Ct. 523, 529–30, 98 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1988)

60. I made it clear to the District Court, I pled defamation, Constitutional injury and emotional distress, by pleading damages, albeit unartfully in my original

officers' civil rights action arising out of their discharge, even if it properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims, and stayed action pending outcome of related state proceeding where officers were relegated for prudential reasons to state proceeding which could only afford them dismissal of charges and back pay, with attorney fees only to extent that back pay award was reduced by interim earnings, but officers sought constitutional damages and attorney fees, and new complaint upon termination of state proceedings may have been time-barred.”); *Williams v. Hepting*, 844 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1988) (The Third Circuit held, “Accordingly, we hold that the district court should have stayed instead of dismissed without prejudice Williams' failure-to-investigate and suggestive pretrial identification claims. Because these particular federal court claims for damages seek relief that is unavailable in Williams' ongoing state proceedings, the allegations should be stayed pending the outcome of his state court appeal on the underlying conviction.”); *Nimer v. Lichfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees*, 707 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2013) (*Younger* abstention applies to § 1983 damages claims, but district court must stay rather than dismiss federal suit; in other words district court has no discretion to dismiss federal suit); *Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens*, 139 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 1998) (when federal suit seeks damages and *Younger* is invoked, federal suit should be stayed, not dismissed; this likely will be a formality, given probable preclusive effect of state court decision); *Watkins v. Ohio Dep't of Educ.*, No. 2:21-CV-04482, 2022 WL 672565, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022) (“Further, when a plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief, many courts in the Sixth Circuit stay the entire case rather than treat each form of requested relief differently.”); *Maraan v. Off. of Ohio Disciplinary Couns. for Supreme Ct. of Ohio*, No. 1:18CV645, 2021 WL 3173311, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2021) (Court “stayed until the conclusion of the state disciplinary proceedings, rather than be dismissed.”), citing *Kalniz*, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 975 (explaining that where a plaintiff is bringing constitutional civil rights claims in a federal court case in which *Younger* abstention was proper, the stay protects against the possibility that the statute of limitations could deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to present the merits of her damages claims); see also *Meyers v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas*, 23 F. App'x 201, 206 (6th Cir. 2001) (and cases cited therein); *Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud*, 179 F.3d 598 (8th Cir. 1999) (when damages are sought in § 1983 action subject to *Younger* abstention, and damages are not available in pending state proceeding, federal action should be stayed, not dismissed); *Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith*, 163 F.3d 475 (8th Cir. 1998) (when § 1983 complaint seeking damages is subject to *Younger* abstention, federal action should be stayed rather than dismissed).

Complaint. (DI 2, 34-35). In addition, I showed my intent to seek nominal damages, damages, and equitable relief too. (D.I. 43, 58, 69-75, 77-79).

61. My claims for damages and other equitable relief were unavailable in state court.

62. A court must stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceeding, and may not dismiss the case. *Citing, Abbott v. Mette*, No. 20-CV-131-RGA, 2021 WL 1168958, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2021), *aff'd*, No. 21-1804, 2021 WL 5906146 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021); *See, Watkins v. Ohio Dep't of Educ.*, No. 2:21-CV-04482, 2022 WL 672565, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022).

63. Staying this action is required. *See, Meyers v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas*, 23 F. App'x 201, 206 (6th Cir. 2001); *Maraan v. Off. of Ohio Disciplinary Couns. for Supreme Ct. of Ohio*, No. 1:18CV645, 2021 WL 3173311, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2021); *Watkins v. Ohio Dep't of Educ.*, No. 2:21-CV-04482, 2022 WL 672565, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022); (“Further, when a plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief, many courts in the Sixth Circuit stay the entire case rather than treat each form of requested relief differently.”).

64. Additionally, to avoid the appearance of partiality, I must be afforded to appeal the Third Circuit’s disciplinary order where Justice Alito indicated the Third Circuit is a Defendant.

65. I am tired please safeguard my opportunity to petition the courts in defense of my life, liberty, license, and eternal life. It is the opportunity to be heard pursuant to the Fifth Amendment applicable to the Federal Courts I seek to protect, not the guarantee of justice.

66. Human judges are special in that they are more powerful than Congress or the President in that they may lay down selfish desires and the desires of men or the masses to do what is right, by love. They are special in that they may reflect the image of God by love unconditionally, even for those they disagree with or whose ideas they may think are bad or repugnant like mine.

67. Are human judges perfect? No. It is the mere opportunity to petition them without foreclosure based on religious-political beliefs or poverty which must be protected in order not to violate the 5th Amendment Equal Protections component as applied to me as a party of one. I am impoverished, with unique religious-political beliefs. If I am not free to petition, than others may no longer be free in future generations.

68. Opposing Counsel did not state her position on this motion I alerted her and this Court on. 3DI 103.

Wherefore, I pray this court grants this motion.

January 4, 2023,

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Meghan Kelly _____

Meghan Kelly, Esquire

34012 Shawnee Drive

Dagsboro, DE 19939

meghankellyesq@yahoo.com

(302) 493-6693

Retired Bar No. 202268, INACTIVE, not
practicing law Pro se party

(Word Count, less than 5,080 when
subtracting signature and caption)

Under Religious objection I declare, affirm that the foregoing statement is true and correct under the penalty of perjury.

Dated: 1/4/23

Meghan Kelly (printed)


 (signed)

Exhibit A

21-3198 Meg's Aunt's health has deteriorated. Meg would be grateful if you filed a letter not contesting extension/time to pray and hydrate are needed/Aunt's eternal life is more important than this life

From: Meg Kelly (meghankellyesq@yahoo.com)
To: zi-xiang.shen@delaware.gov; caneel.radinson-blasucci@delaware.gov
Cc: meghankellyesq@yahoo.com; david.weiss@usdoj.gov
Date: Wednesday, January 4, 2023 at 08:51 AM EST

Good morning Zi-Xiang,

If you could write a note you do not contest an extension, I would be grateful.

I am still dehydrated and not feeling too well. I had a family member related by affinity pass away over the weekend, now my Aunt Jackie's health has declined.

It is too late to show love when people are dead. She has been mad at God since the priest at her son's funeral callously said "hurry it up" as people spoke at her son's funeral. I do not want her to go to hell. She remembers I scolded the Priest as I left by stating, "What would Jesus say."


I am not sure if my mom will come up from Florida on such short notice. I require time to pray too, before it is too late and she is dead and her fate is sealed until the resurrection the last day for life or death.

Thank you for your kind consideration. I do not want anyone to lose eternal life in hell. Guiding the misguided blinded by business greed can save them. As lawyers you can save lives and eternal lives. You are special.

Love,
Meg

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: "3025423088@mms.att.net" <3025423088@mms.att.net>
To: "8586105266@mms.att.net" <8586105266@mms.att.net>; "8086358652@mms.att.net" <8086358652@mms.att.net>; "meghankellyesq@yahoo.com" <meghankellyesq@yahoo.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 4, 2023 at 07:11:53 AM EST
Subject:

 text_0.txt
562B

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT

Meghan Kelly)	
Plaintiff,)	Appellate Court
v.)	No.: 21-3198
Disciplinary Counsel Patricia B. Swartz, et al.)	No. 22-2079
)	District Court
Defendants.)	No.: 1:21-cv-01490-CFC

Certificate of Service Appellant Plaintiff Meghan Kelly’s Second Motion to Stay the Proceeding pending a determination on appeal of the disciplinary matter before the US Supreme Court or until the time for appeal has lapsed

I, Appellant Plaintiff Meghan M. Kelly, Esquire, hereby certify that on January 4, 2023, I had a true and correct copy of the above referenced document sent to all Defendants through their attorneys, served via E-filing, and to

Zi-Xiang Shen and Caneel Radinson-Blasucci
Delaware Department of Justice
Carvel State Building 820 N. French St. 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801,

Dated January 4, 2023

Respectfully submitted,
/s/Meghan Kelly
Meghan Kelly, Esquire
DE Bar Number 4968
34012 Shawnee Drive
Dagsboro, DE 19939
(302) 493-6693
meghankellyesq@yahoo.com
US Supreme Court Bar No. 283696
Not acting as an attorney on behalf of
another

Under Religious objection I declare, affirm that the foregoing statement is true and correct under the penalty of perjury.

Dated: January 4, 2023

Meghan Kelly
(printed)

Megh. Kelly
(signed)