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**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT**

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSCAR AMOS STILLEY, Defendant-Appellant.	No. 22-5113 (D.C. No. 4:09-CR- 00043-SPF-2) (N.D. Okla.) (Filed Oct. 16, 2023)
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**ORDER AND JUDGMENT\***

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Before **TYMKOVICH, EID, and CARSON**, Circuit Judges.

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Oscar Amos Stilley appeals pro se the district court's judgment revoking his supervised release.<sup>1</sup>

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\* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. *See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G)*. The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with *Fed. R. App. P. 32.1* and *10th Cir. R. 32.1*.

<sup>1</sup> We ordinarily construe pro se parties' filings liberally, *see Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer*, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), unless the party is a licensed attorney, *see Mann v. Boatright*, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007). Mr. Stilley is no longer a licensed attorney because he was disbarred. *See*

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Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

### **I. Background**

In 2010, Mr. Stilley was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of tax evasion and aiding and abetting, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The judgment included special conditions of supervised release, to which Mr. Stilley did not object at sentencing. We affirmed his convictions and sentence, and his convictions became final on December 11, 2011. In 2021, Mr. Stilley filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court dismissed the motion as untimely, rejecting his arguments based on equitable tolling, actual innocence, and the inapplicability of § 2255's one-year limitations period. We denied a certificate of appealability.

Mr. Stilley began his period of supervised release on August 10, 2022. His probation officer filed a petition on August 24, 2022, and an amended petition on September 7, 2022, alleging that Mr. Stilley had violated certain special conditions of his supervision, including that he refused to allow the installation of remote monitoring software on his computer and

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*United States v. Springer*, 444 F. App'x 256, 259 (10th Cir. 2011). Although we afford him a liberal construction, he must nonetheless comply with all procedural rules. *See Garrett*, 425 F.3d at 840.

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cellphone, and he failed to provide password and login information for online accounts.

The day before his revocation hearing scheduled for Monday, November 22, 2022, Mr. Stilley filed a flurry of motions. Among other relief, he sought appointment of standby counsel and modification of the special conditions of supervised release.

Before taking evidence regarding the alleged violations, the district court offered Mr. Stilley the opportunity to avoid revocation if he would commit to comply with all the existing conditions of supervised release going forward. After the parties conferred, the government represented that it had agreed on one modification to the special conditions and that Mr. Stilley had agreed to comply subject to the district court ruling on his pending motions. Because Mr. Stilley did not unqualifiedly agree to comply, the court proceeded with the revocation hearing.

After evidence and argument, the district court found that two violations had been established. It did not rule on two other alleged violations. Finding that a sentence of up to two years' custody was possible and that the advisory guidelines imprisonment range was three to nine months, the court sentenced Mr. Stilley to three months' imprisonment followed by thirty-three months of supervised release. The court declined to rule during the hearing on Mr. Stilley's motions for standby counsel and modification of the conditions of supervised release, instead giving him additional time

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to supplement those motions. It denied his other pending motions.

The court entered judgment finding Mr. Stilley guilty of violating two conditions of supervised release, sentencing him to three months' imprisonment followed by thirty-three months of supervised release, remanding him immediately to the custody of the United States Marshal, and reimposing restitution in the amount of \$815,874.93. *See R.*, Vol. 1 at 738-45. Mr. Stilley completed his three-month incarceration and is serving his new term of supervised release.

## **II. Appellate Jurisdiction**

Mr. Stilley moves to remand to the district court, arguing the judgment entered after his revocation hearing is not a final order subject to appeal. He bases this contention on the two alleged violations of supervised release that the district court did not rule on and his motions for standby counsel and modification of the conditions of supervised release that it left pending. Mr. Stilley cites no authority for the proposition that any of these issues prevented entry of a final judgment on the adjudicated violations.

We have jurisdiction over "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined." *Berman v. United States*, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1937)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” *Id.* at 212.

We are aware of no authority requiring a district court to make a finding on every alleged violation of supervised release before it can enter a final appealable judgment. *See, e.g., United States v. Daniel*, 209 F.3d 1091, 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.) (affirming revocation of supervised release based on district court finding that one of three charged violations occurred), *amended by* 216 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). A judgment revoking a defendant’s supervised release is a final appealable order. *See United States v. Lonjose*, 663 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011). Moreover, “a ‘judgment of conviction’ that ‘includes’ a ‘sentence to imprisonment’ is a ‘final judgment.’” *Dolan v. United States*, 560 U.S. 605, 617 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)). “So is a judgment that imposes supervised release (which can be imposed only in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment).” *Id.* at 617-18.

The district court could revoke Mr. Stilley’s supervised release upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he “violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added); *see also* *United States v. Miller*, 557 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A district court need only find a single violation to revoke a defendant’s supervised release.”). The district court found Mr. Stilley guilty of two of the four violations alleged, revoked his supervised release, pronounced his new sentence including imprisonment and supervised release, and entered judgment. Federal

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Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(k)(1) requires a criminal judgment to set forth the plea, in this case the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence. The judgment did so here. Furthermore, execution of the judgment began with Mr. Stilley's incarceration. The district court's judgment in this case "is clearly not lacking in sufficient 'finality' to support an immediate appeal." *Corey v. United States*, 375 U.S. 169, 173 (1963).<sup>2</sup>

As to the pending motions, the district court made clear at the revocation hearing that it was denying Mr. Stilley's motion for standby counsel *at that time*, while allowing him to supplement his motion for the purpose of representation at any future proceedings. *See R.*, Vol. 6 at 54 (noting that Mr. Stilley's filing of the motion the day before the hearing "causes me to observe that the motion in terms of any impact on today's hearing comes too late"). And Mr. Stilley does not show that the district court improperly treated his motion to modify the special conditions of supervised release as

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<sup>2</sup> Mr. Stilley also cites no authority for his assertion that the judgment is not final because, "[o]n the basis of the current record, the District Court could impose an additional sentence of incarceration on the day before [his three-month sentence] concludes, on the basis of [the additional allegations in] the petition to revoke." Am. Mot. to Remand at 8. If Mr. Stilley were correct, he could not appeal the revocation of his supervised release and resulting new sentence unless or until the district court ruled on the additional alleged violations. We are aware of no precedent for such a proposition. Rather, "[a]n appeal . . . must be taken promptly after sentence is imposed," *Corey*, 375 U.S. at 172, and "certainly when discipline has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to review," *id.* at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).

collateral to the revocation proceedings. *Compare* § 3583(e)(3) (revocation of supervised release), *with* § 3583(e)(2) (modification of conditions of supervised release).

We conclude we have appellate jurisdiction and deny Mr. Stilley's motion to remand to the district court.

### **III. Discussion**

Mr. Stilley devotes the majority of his opening brief to arguments of error in his original convictions and sentence for fraud and tax evasion. He also contends that the district court judge lacked authority to preside in his revocation proceedings and erred in reimposing special conditions of supervised release.<sup>3</sup>

#### **A. Collateral Attack on Original Convictions and Sentence**

Mr. Stilley attempts to challenge in this appeal of the revocation of his supervised release his original convictions and sentence on fraud and tax-evasion

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<sup>3</sup> To the extent Mr. Stilley mentions other issues in his opening brief, we decline to consider them because they are inadequately presented and insufficiently developed. *See Bronson v. Swensen*, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring an opening brief to contain “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”); *Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth*, 439 F.3d 1184, 1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (“An issue mentioned in a brief on appeal, but not addressed, is waived.”).

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charges. At least one of the motions he filed before the revocation proceedings sought the same or similar relief. The district court denied that motion, stating, “It amounts to an attempt to relitigate matters that are merged in the judgment of conviction entered 12 years ago for your fraud and that was affirmed on appeal.” R., Vol. 6 at 65.

On appeal, Mr. Stilley does not develop an argument explaining why, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the validity of his long-final convictions and sentence were before that court in his revocation proceedings or are before this court on appeal from those proceedings. He notes only his intent to raise such claims of error on appeal “to the extent that such is not inconsistent with law or rule.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 1; *see also id.* at 2 (purporting to challenge the original judgment “if appropriate”); *id.* at 30 (same “to the extent that he is not legally barred from it”). This is not sufficient appellate argument to invoke our review. Mr. Stilley cites no authority for and fails to frame and develop the proposition. *See United States v. Banks*, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (arguments must be supported by legal authority); *Kelley v. City of Albuquerque*, 542 F.3d 802, 819-20 (10th Cir. 2008) (perfunctory allegations of error are insufficient to invoke appellate review). And we will not craft an argument for him. *See Perry v. Woodward*, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Mr. Stilley’s opening brief includes a section alleging “fraud on the court” in his criminal prosecution. Aplt. Opening Br. at

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Consequently, we decline to address Mr. Stilley's undeveloped contention that he could collaterally attack his fraud and tax-evasion convictions and sentence in proceedings to revoke his supervised release, *see Dodds v. Richardson*, 614 F.3d 1185, 1208 (10th Cir. 2010) (declining to consider a point appellant failed to support with argument), as well as the several arguments of error related to the convictions and sentence that he purports to raise on appeal.

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56-58. But he does not affirmatively assert or develop a legal argument that he can collaterally attack his fraud and tax-evasion convictions in proceedings to revoke his supervised release by alleging fraud on the court. At the very least, he would need to address our holding that a defendant cannot circumvent the § 2255(h) certification requirements for second or successive motions to vacate by filing a differently styled pleading asserting fraud on the court. *See United States v. Baker*, 718 F.3d 1204, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2013).

In his reply brief, Mr. Stilley cites *United States v. Thomas*, 135 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1998). *Thomas* was an appeal of a sentence imposed on a probation violation, in which the court found the defendant's sentence on her original conviction was illegal, vacated it, and remanded for resentencing on that conviction. *See id.* at 874, 876. There are at least three problems with Mr. Stilley's reliance on *Thomas*. First, his citation comes too late. *See Stump v. Gates*, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to address issue first raised in a reply brief). Second, *Thomas* is not controlling precedent in this circuit. And third, the court's explanation for its authority to review and vacate the sentence on the original conviction in a probation-violation appeal is not persuasive. *See Thomas*, 135 F.3d at 876 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which presupposes a "judgment . . . lawfully brought before [an appellate court] for review").

## **B. Error in Revocation Proceedings**

Mr. Stilley argues (1) the district court judge was not authorized to preside over his revocation proceedings, and (2) the court erred in re-imposing certain special conditions of supervised release.

### **1. District Court Judge's Authority to Preside**

Mr. Stilley moved to disqualify the district court judge for lack of statutory authorization. Noting that Judge Stephen P. Friot is a district court judge appointed to preside in the Western District of Oklahoma, he argued Judge Friot could not preside over revocation proceedings pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The district court denied the motion based on a cross-designation order entered by the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), which assigned Judge Friot to hold court in the Northern District of Oklahoma during the time period that Mr. Stilley's revocation proceedings were pending. *See R., Vol. 1 at 681-82; see also 28 U.S.C. § 296* (giving assigned district court judge the powers of a judge of the court to which he is assigned). Mr. Stilley contends that successive, annual cross-designation orders authorizing judges of the various districts in Oklahoma to hold court in other districts in that state do not constitute temporary assignments, as required by § 292(b). He concedes there is no authority for this proposition. We reject Mr. Stilley's contention

because the relevant cross-designation order was, by its plain terms, temporary.

## **2. Special Conditions of Supervised Release**

Mr. Stilley challenges the findings the district court made in re-imposing special conditions of supervised release related to occupational restrictions under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 5F1.5 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n). Our local rules require him to identify where this precise issue was raised and ruled on in the district court. *See* 10th Cir. R. 28.1. He maintains the district court acknowledged that he objected to these special conditions. *See* Aplt. Opening Br. at 32 (citing R., Vol. 6 at 139-40). But after the court made detailed findings at the revocation hearing, Mr. Stilley raised no objection regarding their adequacy.<sup>5</sup> He therefore failed to preserve this issue for appeal. *See United States v. Pacheco-Donelson*, 893 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding substantive objection to special condition of supervised release did not preserve procedural objection on adequacy of findings). And because he does not argue for plain error on appeal, the issue is waived. *See United States v. Oldman*, 979 F.3d 1234, 1255 (10th Cir. 2020).

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<sup>5</sup> Before the district court made its findings, Mr. Stilley stated, “So, there’s a lot of other issues. The 5.1 findings. I’m not sure we actually need to go there. But here’s what I’m saying on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 5F1.5 if the court actually makes those findings. There’s a problem with the whole thing.” R., Vol. 6 at 137.

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Mr. Stilley also argues the § 5F1.5 special conditions of supervised release do not apply to his offenses of conviction. He notes that section provides:

- (a) The court may impose a condition of probation or supervised release prohibiting the defendant from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession, or limiting the terms on which the defendant may do so, only if it determines that:
  - (1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and
  - (2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.

USSG § 5F1.5(a). Mr. Stilley was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and tax evasion. He does not argue that § 5F1.5 special conditions do not apply to these particular offenses of conviction. Rather, he contends that because the government advanced conflicting theories of criminal liability he is innocent of the crimes charged in the indictment and therefore cannot be subject to § 5F1.5 special conditions. As this argument attempts to challenge the validity of his original convictions and sentence, we do not reach it for the reasons previously explained.

**IV. Conclusion**

We affirm the district court's judgment. Mr. Stilley's second motion for release pending appeal is denied as moot.

Entered for the Court  
Timothy M. Tymkovich  
Circuit Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO.  
09-CR-43-CVE

OSCAR AMOS STILLEY,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS  
NOVEMBER 21, 2022  
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN P. FRIOT,  
JUDGE PRESIDING

**REVOCATION AND SENTENCING HEARING  
APPEARANCES**

MR. JEFFREY A. GALLANT and MS. VANI SINGHAL, Assistant United States Attorneys, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, appeared on behalf of the plaintiff.

MR. OSCAR AMOS STILLEY, pro se.

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[117] THE COURT: Thank you.

In determining the disposition in this case, of course I take into account all of the Section 3553 factors as well as the chapter 7 policy statements. And I respectfully disagree with both the government and the defendant with respect to what the appropriate disposition is.

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It is my conclusion that the appropriate disposition is a sentence of incarceration of three months to be followed by 33 months of supervised release.

I will acknowledge to Mr. Gallant that it is tempting to impose the maximum term of two years and then do away with supervised release, but regardless of how well Mr. Stilley may or may not do on that remaining 33 months of supervision, I want Mr. Stilley to remain within, if you will, the short reach of the law for as long as possible.

Mr. Stilley is a fraudster, he is a predator. Mr. Stilley, you've done nothing since last August to suggest otherwise. I [118] hate to rely just reflexively, and as a matter of fact I don't rely reflexively on the findings that I made more than a decade ago, but you have given me no reason to think you have changed your ways. You were a merciless predator on vulnerable people. You fleeced them of their money. So you were not just a tax cheat; as you well know, you mercilessly preyed on vulnerable people who had their own tax problems. I want you to be within the short reach of the law.

You enriched yourself at the expense of others without any regard for their well-being. I certainly do want you to be within short reach of the law. It's going to be for another 33 months after you serve three months.

These factors that bear most heavily in my conclusion that that is the appropriate sentence and a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary

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to achieve the statutory objectives of sentencing are, first, your history and characteristics which I've already covered in some detail, the need to deter you from further misconduct, and the protection of the public from further criminal, fraudulent, and predatory activity on your part. And for that reason, as I say, I conclude that it is appropriate that you remain under supervision and that's the reason that I decline to sentence you to two years to be followed by zero supervised release. Your term of incarceration will be three months followed by 33 months of supervised release.

[119] Does either side require any additional or more detailed statement of reasons for this sentence to be imposed? What says the government?

MR. GALLANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What says the defendant?

MR. STILLEY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I do find that the defendant, Oscar Amos Stilley, has violated the conditions of supervised release as asserted in violations 1 and 3. Violations 2 and 4 remain unadjudicated. And as I have said, I will revisit those conditions with the benefit of submissions from Mr. Stilley and the government in response to Mr. Stilley's motion to modify his conditions of release, because that implicates the reporting requirements as opposed to the requirements about computer searches and disclosing screen names and passwords and so forth. Those are two distinct

categories of issues and I do intend to revisit the conditions that are implicated with respect to violations 2 and 4.

So, Mr. Stilley, bear in mind, you've got two opportunities for further filings: number one is a further filing in support of your motion for appointment of counsel, if you care to do so, as I mentioned this morning; and number two is your supplement to your motion to modify your conditions of supervision –

Let's see, Camie, did I say 21 days?

[120] THE DEPUTY COURT CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: – in 21 days with your exact proposed modified conditions so that I can have something to look at and consider when I determine, with the benefit of the government's response, whether the conditions with respect to reporting should be modified.

So, to return to where I started that digression, I do quite readily find that the defendant has violated his conditions of supervised release as set forth in violations 1 and 3. Those two violations themselves compel revocation. And so the fact that I'm leaving violations 2 and 4 unadjudicated for the time being really has no impact on my conclusion that revocation is compelled by the evidence before me.

The defendant has a criminal history category of I, his most serious violation is a grade C, resulting in an advisory guideline imprisonment range of three to nine months. The PROTECT Act does apply. I have

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certainly considered the section 3553 factors as well as the chapter 7 policy statements.

The sentence of three months is at the bottom of the guideline range. Mr. Stilley, it is my hope that by imposing a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range, a guideline range of three to nine months, that you do have some time to reach your own conclusion that there is no option that would be livable, workable, and acceptable for your family, for your [121] employer, for those who depend on you, other than to comply with your conditions of supervised release. If you reach no other conclusions during your three months in jail, I hope you reach that conclusion.

Upon release, you shall be on supervised release for a term of 33 months, and all mandatory and standard conditions of supervision approved as of November 1st of 2016 will be imposed in addition to the special conditions set forth in the original judgment from April of 2010.

You are further advised that from this order you do have the right of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and that if you cannot pay the costs of an appeal you may apply for leave to appeal without payment of costs for the transcript of the record and an attorney at government expense. Notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk within 14 calendar days or you may request the clerk now to spread the same of record.

I hope you've gathered, Mr. Stilley, that it's not with a wave of the hand that I make my decision with

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respect to immediate remand, but you have shown no intent from day one of your supervision to comply with your conditions of supervision. I conclude, however regretfully, that I cannot rely on your professed intent to comply or on your professed intent to report at required. You are remanded to the custody of the marshal immediately to begin serving your three-month term.

[122] Court will be in recess.

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**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT**

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSCAR AMOS STILLEY, Defendant-Appellant.	No. 22-5113 (D.C. No. 4:09-CR- 00043-SPF-2) (N.D. Okla.) (Filed Dec. 4, 2023)
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**ORDER**

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Before **TYMKOVICH, EID, and CARSON**, Circuit Judges.

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Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

The petition for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service. As no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court requested that the court be polled, that petition is also denied.

Entered for the Court

/s/ Christopher M. Wolpert  
CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

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