

APPENDIX-A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

APR 22 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FIDEL ALCANTAR SOTO,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

M. E. SPEARMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 23-15258

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC
Eastern District of California,
Sacramento

ORDER

Before: MILLER and LEE, Circuit Judges.

The request for a certificate of appealability (Docket Entry No. 5) is denied because appellant has not made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); *see also Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

Any pending motions are denied as moot.

DENIED.

APPENDIX-B

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 FIDEL ALCANTAR SOTO.

12 Petitioner,

13 v.

14 M.E. SPEARMAN,

15 Respondent.
16

No. 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC

ORDER

17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this application for a writ of habeas
18 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate
19 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

20 On September 8, 2022, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein
21 which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to
22 the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty-one days. (ECF No. 18.)
23 Petitioner was granted two extensions of time to file objections (ECF Nos. 21, 24) and has now
24 filed timely objections to the findings and recommendations (ECF No. 25).

25 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this
26 Court has conducted a *de novo* review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the
27 Court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper
28 analysis.

1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:


2 1. The Findings and Recommendations filed September 8, 2022 (ECF No. 18), are
3 adopted in full;

4 2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is DENIED:

5 3. The Court declines to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C.
6 § 2253; and

7 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

8 **DATED: February 7, 2023**

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11 Troy L. Nunley
12 United States District Judge
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U.S. District Court

Eastern District of California – Live System

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Case Name: (HC)Soto v. Spearman

Case Number: 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC

Filer:

WARNING: CASE CLOSED on 02/08/2023

Document Number: 26

Docket Text:

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 02/07/2023 ADOPTING the [18] Findings and Recommendations in full and DENYING the [1] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court declines to issue the certificate of appealability. CASE CLOSED. (Spichka, K.)

2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ian Patrick Whitney ian.whitney@doj.ca.gov, debra.pereirayoung@doj.ca.gov,
diane.boggess@doj.ca.gov, DocketingSACAWT@doj.ca.gov, ECFCoordinator@doj.ca.gov

2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC Electronically filed documents must be served conventionally by the filer to:

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APPENDIX-C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

FIDEL ALCANTAR SOTO,

CASE NO: 2:17-CV-01002-TLN-AC

v.

M. E. SPEARMAN,

/

Decision by the Court. This action came before the Court. The issues have been tried, heard or decided by the judge as follows:

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

THAT JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
COURT'S ORDER FILED ON 02/08/2023

Keith Holland
Clerk of Court

ENTERED: February 8, 2023

by: /s/ K. Spichka
Deputy Clerk

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--Case Participants: Ian Patrick Whitney (debra.pereirayoung@doj.ca.gov, diane.bogges@doj.ca.gov, docketingsacawt@doj.ca.gov, ecfcordinator@doj.ca.gov, ian.whitney@doj.ca.gov), Magistrate Judge Allison Claire (caed_cmecf_ac@caed.uscourts.gov), District Judge Troy L. Nunley (caed_cmecf_tln@caed.uscourts.gov)

--Non Case Participants:

--No Notice Sent:

Message-Id: Subject:Activity in Case 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC (HC)Soto v. Spearman Judgment.
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U.S. District Court

Eastern District of California – Live System

Notice of Electronic Filing

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Case Name: (HC)Soto v. Spearman
Case Number: 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC
Filer:

WARNING: CASE CLOSED on 02/08/2023

Document Number: 27

Docket Text:

JUDGMENT dated "02/08/2023" pursuant to order signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 02/07/2023. (Spichka, K.)

2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ian Patrick Whitney debra.pereirayoung@doj.ca.gov, ecfcordinator@doj.ca.gov, ian.whitney@doj.ca.gov, docketingsacawt@doj.ca.gov, diane.bogges@doj.ca.gov

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APPENDIX-D

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 FIDEL ALCANTAR SOTO,

12 Petitioner,

13 v.

14 M.E. SPEARMAN, Warden,

15 Respondent.
16

No. 2:17-cv-1002 TLN AC P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17 Petitioner is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of
18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The action proceeds on a petition which challenges
19 petitioner's 2015 conviction for multiple sex offenses against minor victims. ECF No. 1.
20 Respondent has answered. ECF No. 14. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

21 BACKGROUND

22 I. Proceedings In the Trial Court

23 Petitioner was charged in Yolo County Superior Court with oral copulation of a child, two
24 counts of lewd acts on a child, and child endangerment. CT 72-76 (amended information).¹

25 The case proceeded to trial. Because the only claim presented in federal habeas addresses
26 jury selection, the evidence presented to the jury need not be summarized here. On April 3, 2015,
27

28 ¹ "CT" refers to the Clerk's Transcript on Appeal, Lodged Doc. No. 1 (ECF No. 15-1).

1 petitioner was found guilty on all counts and the jury found a multiple victim allegation to be
2 true. CT 133, 137-144. Petitioner's post-trial motion to dismiss one count as time-barred was
3 granted by the superior court on June 26, 2015, and petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to
4 life imprisonment. CT 204-207.

5 II. Post-Conviction Proceedings

6 Petitioner timely appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of
7 conviction on November 2, 2016. Lodged Doc. 10 (ECF No. 15-10). The California Supreme
8 Court denied review on January 11, 2017. Lodged Doc. 12 (ECF No. 15-12).

9 Petitioner filed no petitions for state habeas relief.

10 STANDARDS GOVERNING HABEAS RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA

11 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
12 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides in relevant part as follows:

13 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
14 in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be
15 granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

16 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
17 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

18 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
19 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

20 The statute applies whenever the state court has denied a federal claim on its merits,
21 whether or not the state court explained its reasons. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99
22 (2011). State court rejection of a federal claim will be presumed to have been on the merits
23 absent any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Id. (citing Harris v. Reed,
24 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear whether a
25 decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis)). "The presumption
26 may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's
27 decision is more likely." Id. at 99-100.

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1 The phrase “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the “governing legal
2 principle or principles” previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Lockyer v. Andrade,
3 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Only Supreme Court precedent may constitute “clearly established
4 Federal law,” but courts may look to circuit law “to ascertain whether...the particular point in
5 issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64
6 (2013).

7 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the decision
8 “contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Williams v. Taylor,
9 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision “unreasonably applies” federal law “if the state
10 court identifies the correct rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to
11 the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-08. It is not enough that the state court
12 was incorrect in the view of the federal habeas court; the state court decision must be objectively
13 unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003).

14 Review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen v.
15 Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-181 (2011). The question at this stage is whether the state court
16 reasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts before it. Id. at 181-182. In other
17 words, the focus of the § 2254(d) inquiry is “on what a state court knew and did.” Id. at 182.
18 Where the state court’s adjudication is set forth in a reasoned opinion, §2254(d)(1) review is
19 confined to “the state court’s actual reasoning” and “actual analysis.” Frantz v. Haze, 533 F.3d
20 724, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). A different rule applies where the state court rejects claims
21 summarily, without a reasoned opinion. In Richter, supra, the Supreme Court held that when a
22 state court denies a claim on the merits but without a reasoned opinion, the federal habeas court
23 must determine what arguments or theories may have supported the state court’s decision, and
24 subject those arguments or theories to § 2254(d) scrutiny. Richter, 563 U.S. at 102.

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1 there something else you wanted to say?' And she said something like,
2 'Well, no. I thought I was waiting for you to get done with your
questions.'" [...]

3 The prosecutor also specifically denied exercising his challenge
4 because N.G. was African American.

5 Defense counsel began his rebuttal by "concede[ing]" that N.G. is
6 obese and pivoting to his assertion that "[t]here's at least three or four
7 different jurors who are younger than [N.G.]" Defense counsel also
8 argued the prosecutor's claim that N.G. lacked life experience was
9 "not supported by the record, at least compared to other jurors who
10 [defense counsel] has not challenged." Defense counsel did not
11 address the prosecution's characterization of N.G.'s responsiveness or
12 their exchange. Defense counsel did add, "[I]f [the prosecutor] struck
her because she's obese, the Court's going to have to make a decision
whether that's a sufficient race-neutral reason. I confess, I do not know
the case law on striking obese people, whether they're a protected
class or whether there's a sufficient race-neutral reason to overcome a
Batson/Wheeler challenge. But she's not the only overweight person
on the panel. It's—it seems like a suspicious reason and I ask the
Court to sustain the challenge." [...]

13 The trial court denied the motion: "I do not find that the evidence and
14 arguments supports a conclusion that there has to be [sic] purposeful
discrimination in exercising the challenge against [N.G.]"

15 Lodged Doc. No. 10 at 2-4 (footnotes omitted).

16 II. The Clearly Established Federal Law

17 Purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges
18 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Batson, 476 U.S. 79;
19 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005). Batson claims are evaluated under a three-step test:

20 First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case "by showing
21 that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
22 discriminatory purpose." [Citations]. Second, once the defendant
23 has made out a prima facie case, the "burden shifts to the State to
24 explain adequately the racial exclusion" by offering permissible
race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, "[i]f a
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide
... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination." [Citation.]

25 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (footnote omitted); see also Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 987-88
26 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

27 ///

1 At the third step of Batson, “the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike
2 has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 765,
3 768 (1995). Although the burden remains with the defendant to show purposeful discrimination,
4 the third step of Batson primarily involves the trier of fact. After the prosecution puts forward a
5 race-neutral reason, the court is required to evaluate “the persuasiveness of the justification.” Id.
6 To accept a prosecutor’s stated nonracial reasons, the court need not agree with them. The
7 question is not whether the stated reason represents a sound strategic judgment, but “whether
8 counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez v.
9 New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion). This credibility determination must be
10 made in light of the totality of the relevant facts about a prosecutor’s conduct. Batson, 476 U.S.
11 at 94; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363.

12 In considering whether a state court’s decision is “contrary to” or “an unreasonable
13 application of’ Batson under § 2254(d)(1), the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that Batson
14 clearly establishes the requirement that courts perform a “sensitive inquiry into such
15 circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d
16 984, 1004 (2014) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93). State courts disobey this clearly established
17 requirement if they “‘rubberstamp’ a prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanation for
18 exercising a disputed peremptory strike,” or “misstate[] the test,” or “impermissibly rel[y] on an
19 erroneous factor.” Id. at 1005.

20 III. The State Court’s Ruling

21 This claim was raised on direct appeal. Because the California Supreme Court denied
22 discretionary review, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal constitutes the last reasoned
23 decision on the merits and is the subject of habeas review in this court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,
24 501 U.S. 797 (1991); Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012).

25 The Court of Appeal ruled in relevant part as follows:

26 Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling violated his right to
27 equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
28 States Constitution (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89) and his right
to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution

1 ([People v.] Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d [258] at pp. 276–277
2 [1978]). “The exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror
3 on the basis of race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional
4 magnitude requiring reversal.” (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th
5 345, 386 (Silva).)

6 The law applicable to Batson/Wheeler claims is well-established:
7 “First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has
8 made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a
9 peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is
10 made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
11 challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court
12 determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful
13 discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial
14 motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the
15 strike.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612–613; accord
16 People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 173.)

17 In this case, only the third step is at issue. “At the third stage of the
18 Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial
19 court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.
20 Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the
21 prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the
22 explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some
23 basis in accepted trial strategy.’ [Citation.] In assessing credibility,
24 the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir
25 dire. It may also rely on the court’s own experiences as a lawyer
26 and bench officer in the community, and even the common
27 practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her.”
28 (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.)

We review the trial court’s determinations for substantial evidence.
(People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613; see also Foster v.
Chatman (2016) — U.S. — [136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747, 195 L.Ed.2d
1, 13] (Foster) [explaining the third step “turns on factual
determinations, and, ‘in the absence of exceptional circumstances,’
we defer to state court factual findings unless we conclude that they
are clearly erroneous”].) “We presume that a prosecutor uses
peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great
deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons
from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a
sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory
justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on
appeal.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864.) The trial
court here did not make explicit findings regarding the prosecutor’s
stated reasons for striking N.G. However, “[w]hen the trial court
has inquired into the basis for an excusal, and a nondiscriminatory
explanation has been provided, we ... assume the court understands,
and carries out, its duty to subject the proffered reasons to sincere
and reasoned analysis, taking into account all the factors that bear
on their credibility.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1049,
fn. 26.) Likewise, “[w]hen the prosecutor’s stated reasons are both
inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial court
need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings. But
when the prosecutor’s stated reasons are either unsupported by the

1 record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial
2 court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient.”
(Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 386.)

3 Defendant’s assertion of error rests on his invocation of this latter
4 principle from Silva, but he has not demonstrated that the
5 prosecutor’s explanation was implausible or unsupported by the
6 record such that more detailed findings by the trial court were
7 required. Here, the prosecutor based his decision on a totality of
8 factors. “Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors
rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a
peremptory challenge.” (People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194,
1220.) Defendant attacks each of the prosecution’s stated factors
individually, and we conclude his arguments neither separately nor
collectively persuade.

9 Defendant does not dispute that N.G. was in fact young and
10 appeared to lack life experience. Instead, he contends this was a
11 pretextual explanation because other jurors were also young and
lacked life experience. Defendant relies primarily on Foster, supra,
12 195 L.Ed.2d 1 and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472
(Snyder) to support this claim. With respect to Foster, defendant
13 quotes from a passage in which the United States Supreme Court,
after holding that several of the prosecution’s stated reasons for
14 striking a particular potential juror were contradicted by the record,
observed that other explanations for striking the juror—including
15 the juror’s age—“while not explicitly contradicted by the record,
are difficult to credit because the State willingly accepted white
16 jurors with the same traits that supposedly rendered [the excused
panelist] an unattractive juror.” (Foster, supra, at p. 15.) In
particular, this excused African-American juror “was 34, and the
17 State declined to strike eight white prospective jurors under the age
of 36.” (Id. at p. 16.) In Snyder, the United States Supreme Court
18 found one of the prosecutor’s stated explanations for why he
excused a particular African-American juror, J. Brooks, pretextual
19 for similar reasons. (Snyder, supra, at pp. 479–485.) The prosecutor
used five of his 12 peremptory challenges to eliminate all of the
20 African-American prospective jurors from the panel. (Id. at pp.
475–476.) The prosecutor said he dismissed Brooks in particular
21 because: (1) Brooks looked nervous during questioning and (2) he
had expressed concern about jury service because he was a student-
22 teacher and was missing classroom time. (Id. at pp. 478, 480.) The
Supreme Court decided it could not presume the trial court credited
23 the prosecutor’s assertion regarding Brooks’ nervousness instead of
basing its ruling on the second justification. (Id. at p. 479.) As to
24 the second justification, the court stated, “[t]he implausibility of this
explanation is reinforced by the prosecutor’s acceptance of white
25 jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have
been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks’.” (Id. at p. 483.) In our case,
26 the prosecutor’s explanation for why he excused N.G. is neither
implausible nor difficult to credit. The prosecutor admitted he had
27 concerns about other jurors based on their youth as well. And N.G.
was in one of the final groups of prospective jurors: “[T]he
28 particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may,
and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in

1 the jury box. It may be acceptable, for example, to have one juror
2 with a particular point of view but unacceptable to have more than
3 one with that view.” (People v. Johnson, *supra*, 47 Cal.3d at p.
4 1220.) And critically, unlike in Foster and Snyder, the prosecutor
5 here relied equally on other factors that were supported by the
6 record.

7 In particular, the prosecutor made the observation, which he
8 characterized as unseemly, that N.G. was “morbidly obese.” He
9 explained he has “concern about people who are morbidly obese,
10 how they might interact with other jurors, what motivates them. It’s
11 my own—it’s my own thing.” Defendant asserts this is a suspicious
12 justification. We disagree. It is supported by the record and not
13 inherently implausible. (See People v. Johnson, *supra*, 47 Cal.3d at
14 p. 1218 [prosecutor explained in part that one excused juror “was
15 overweight and poorly groomed, indicating that she might not have
16 been in the mainstream of people’s thinking”]; see also People v.
17 Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1208 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard,
18 J.) [prosecutor’s statement that juror was “grossly overweight,
19 appeared unclean and wore an excess of cheap jewelry” were
20 “factors he believed might prevent effective interaction with other
21 jurors” was “plausible, and there is no apparent reason why we
22 should reject [it]”].) And while defense counsel also argued other
23 jurors were “overweight,” there is no suggestion that the fact that
24 N.G. was “morbidly obese” coupled with her youth did not make
25 her unique among the jurors. (See People v. Mai, *supra*, 57 Cal.4th
26 at p. 1051 [“Nothing indicates the prosecutor was wrong in
27 suggesting that when [the excused panelist’s] age, familial status,
28 and death penalty views were considered together, she was unique
among the jurors who had been evaluated at the time the prosecutor
excused her”].) In short, the record adequately supports the
prosecutor’s explanation of the race-neutral reasons that collectively
led him to exercise a peremptory challenge against N.G.

Defendant also notes it appears from the record the prosecutor
misattributed some statements made by a different juror to N.G. But
a genuine mistake—even one that goes unnoticed in the trial
court—is a race-neutral reason. (People v. Williams (2013) 56
Cal.4th 630, 661.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court rejected a
similar challenge based largely on Silva in People v. Jones (2011)
51 Cal.4th 346, 361. In that case, defendant argued on appeal that
the prosecutor misstated one of the excused juror’s answers while
explaining the justification for a peremptory challenge. (*Id.* at p.
366.) At the trial court, defense counsel declined to comment on the
prosecutor’s explanations for exercising his peremptory challenges,
“thus suggesting he found the prosecutor credible.” (*Id.* at p. 361.)
Our Supreme Court held that “[u]nder the circumstances, the court
was not required to do more than what it did.” (*Ibid.*) It also found
no basis to overturn the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s
motion: “The purpose of a hearing on a Wheeler/Batson motion is
not to test the prosecutor’s memory but to determine whether the
reasons given are genuine and race neutral. ‘Faulty memory,
clerical errors, and similar conditions that might engender a
“mistake” of the type the prosecutor proffered to explain his
peremptory challenge are not necessarily associated with

1 impermissible reliance on presumed group bias.’ [Citation.] This
2 ‘isolated mistake or misstatement’ [citation] does not alone compel
3 the conclusion that this reason was not sincere.” (*Id.* at pp. 366,
4 368.) Likewise, here, the prosecutor accurately described an
5 exchange that occurred. No one questioned the sincerity of his
6 recollection on the record. Under these circumstances, the trial
7 court did not abuse its discretion in declining to make more detailed
8 findings or denying defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion.

9 Lodged Doc. No. 10 at 4-9 (footnotes omitted).

10 IV. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d)

11 No part of the state court’s adjudication of this issue is contrary to, or constitutes an
12 unreasonable application of, Batson and its progeny. The Batson test is correctly stated and the
13 court conducted the third step inquiry as required by clearly established federal law, evaluating
14 the credibility of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral justification in light of the totality of
15 relevant facts. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 365. The appellate court considered the defense
16 argument that reliance on N.G.’s youth was pretextual, and it found an inference of pretext to be
17 unsupported in light of (1) the point in jury selection at which N.G. was questioned and excused,
18 and (2) factors that distinguished N.G. from other jurors. These are not objectively unreasonable
19 bases on which to reject a pretext argument. The state court’s discussion of Foster v. Chatman,
20 578 U.S. 488 (2016) and Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), *supra*, accurately described
21 the facts and holdings of those cases and distinguished the facts of the present case in ways that
22 are supported by the record.

23 Furthermore, it was not objectively unreasonable for the appellate court to conclude that
24 the prosecutor’s mistaken attribution of certain statements to N.G.³ did not compel a finding of
25 pretext. There is no hint in the record of anything the prosecutor did or said, whether related to
26 N.G. or otherwise, that reflected concern about race—let alone racial animus. Accordingly, there
27 is no basis for an inference that the error was anything other than an honest mistake. Certainly

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³ As noted above, the prosecutor stated at the Batson hearing that N.G. had been reticent in
answering questions and that he had had to prompt her. This voir dire exchange had in fact
involved a different juror. See Aug. RT (Lodged Doc. 5) at 170.

1 there is no basis for a conclusion that the court of appeal's finding in this regard constituted an
2 objectively unreasonable determination of fact or law.

3 Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court that the totality of
4 circumstances did not support a finding of purposeful discrimination. There is no basis for this
5 court to disturb that ruling. As the Court of Appeal reasonably found, the record is sufficient to
6 uphold the prosecutor's claim that he was influenced by N.G.'s combination of youth and morbid
7 obesity, rather than by race. Whether or not rejection of a prospective juror on the basis of
8 obesity is appropriate, or fair, or strategically sound, it is not forbidden by Batson. The question
9 for the trial court, and for the Court of Appeal, was not whether this was a proper basis to excuse
10 N.G. but whether it was the real reason that the prosecutor excused her. See Hernandez, 500 U.S.
11 at 365. On the basis of the record that was before the Court of Appeal, it was not objectively
12 unreasonable to affirm the trial court's implicit credibility finding. Moreover, this court's
13 independent review of the jury selection transcript reveals no evidence of racial bias on the part of
14 the prosecutor, whether related to N.G. or otherwise, and no indications that anything about the
15 prosecutor's demeanor created a question about his credibility.

16 In sum, the state appellate court correctly stated the standard that applies under Batson,
17 evaluated the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation for striking N.G. in light of all
18 relevant circumstances, and relied on no impermissible factor. Accordingly, the opinion of the
19 state court cannot be found objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law. See
20 Murray, 745 F.3d at 1005. Federal habeas relief is therefore barred under § 2254(d).

21 CONCLUSION

22 For all the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition
23 for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days
26 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
27 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
28 "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." If petitioner files objections,

1 impermissible reliance on presumed group bias.’ [Citation.] This
2 ‘isolated mistake or misstatement’ [citation] does not alone compel
3 the conclusion that this reason was not sincere.” (Id. at pp. 366,
4 368.) Likewise, here, the prosecutor accurately described an
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answering questions and that he had had to prompt her. This voir dire exchange had in fact
involved a different juror. See Aug. RT (Lodged Doc. 5) at 170.

1 he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to
2 which issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed
3 within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
4 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.
5 Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

6 DATED: September 7, 2022.

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9 ALLISON CLAIRE
10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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MIME-Version:1.0 From:caed_cmeef_helpdesk@caed.uscourts.gov To:CourtMail@localhost.localdomain
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Eastern District of California – Live System

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Case Name: (HC)Soto v. Spearman
Case Number: 2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC
Filer:
Document Number: 18

Docket Text:

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 9/7/2022
RECOMMENDING that [1] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. Referred to District
Judge Troy L. Nunley. Objections due within 21 days after being served with these findings
and recommendations. (Huang, H)

2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ian Patrick Whitney ian.whitney@doj.ca.gov, debra.pereirayoung@doj.ca.gov,
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2:17-cv-01002-TLN-AC Electronically filed documents must be served conventionally by the filer to:

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